

National Transportation Safety Board

Board Meeting

Air Midwest Flight 5481 Charlotte, NC January 8, 2003

NTSB Boardroom, Washington, DC

Air Midwest Flight 5481, Charlotte, NC Board Meeting

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Factors Affecting Maintenance at the Huntington Facility

- Training
- Procedural guidance
- On-site supervision
- Continuing analysis and surveillance



Training

- Heavy use of on-the-job training (OJT)
- Vague procedures for OJT
- Noncompliance with company training policy
- Inadequate record keeping



Procedural Guidance

Detail 6 Inspection Work Card Aircraft Maintenance Manual

- → Nonspecific references
- → Inadequate instructions

- Inapplicable steps
- → Inadequate instructions



On-Site Supervision

- Air Midwest personnel were not usually present when maintenance was performed
- Raytheon Aerospace did not provide enough foremen and inspectors
- Inspectors performed some of the foreman's duties in addition to their own

Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Systems (CASS)

- Air Midwest's program had a history of deficiencies
- Program did not identify deficiencies in training and procedural guidance
- Program identified a staffing deficiency, but did not correct it



Federal Aviation Administration Oversight

- FAA was aware of deficiencies in training and CASS program before the accident
- FAA staff proposed delay of new routes to encourage change, but reconsidered
- Deficiencies still existed at the time of the accident



Programs to Reduce Human Error in Aviation Maintenance and Inspection

- 15-year FAA-sponsored research program
- Emphasis on development of written guidance and voluntary programs
- Maintenance-related accidents continue

