

of proposed rulemaking to which this appendix is attached. All submissions by parties to this proceeding or persons acting on behalf of such parties must be made in written comments, reply comments, or other appropriate pleadings. Comments shall be served on the petitioner by the person filing the comments. Reply comments shall be served on the person(s) who filed comments to which the reply is directed. Such comments and reply comments shall be accompanied by a certificate of service. (See § 1.40 (a), (b), and (c) of the Commission rules.

5. *Number of copies.* In accordance with the provisions of § 1.420 of the Commission's rules and regulations, and original and four copies of all comments, reply comments, pleadings, briefs, or other documents shall be furnished the Commission.

6. *Public inspection of filings.* All filings made in this proceeding will be available for examination by interested parties during regular business hours in the Commission's Public Reference Room at its headquarters, 1919 M Street NW., Washington, D.C.

IFR Doc. 78-24856 Filed 9-1-78; 8:45 am

[4910-60]

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Materials Transportation Bureau

[49 CFR Part 192]

[Docket No. PS-52; Notice 1]

### TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE

Cathodically Protected Transmission Lines

AGENCY: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document proposes to revise the testing requirements for determining the effectiveness of cathodic protection in controlling corrosion on transmission pipelines. This proposed rule would delete the requirement that cathodically protected transmission lines be monitored annually for corrosion and would include transmission lines within the same monitoring procedures that are provided for service lines and mains. This action is based on recommendations of the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee and upon petitions from various State public service commissions. The proposed change would simplify the monitoring requirements for short sections of protected transmission lines and reduce the economic burden of testing such sections.

DATE: Comments must be received on or before October 15, 1978.

ADDRESS: Send comments to the Docket Branch, Room 6500, Materials Transportation Bureau, Trans Point Building, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should identify the docket and notice numbers and be submitted in triplicate. They will be available to the public for review at the above location.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Hammond, 202-426-0135.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with article 11 of the Department of Transportation (DOT) policy of improving Government regulations issued March 1, 1978 (43 FR 9582), the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) had initiated a program for reviewing its existing regulations and revising or revoking those regulations which it determines are not achieving their intended purpose. MTB initiated a systematic review of the existing gas pipeline safety regulations in 1977, with the aid of the Department's Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (TPSSC). The first segment of the regulations chosen for review was subpart I, Requirements for Corrosion Control, since that segment had been the subject of more inquiries and interpretations than any other. On January 18, 1978, the TPSSC completed its review of subpart I and recommended a few changes. In consideration of those recommendations, MTB is proposing by this Notice to amend § 192.465(a) as discussed hereafter. Some of the TPSSC recommended changes are not being proposed for adoption while others are being adopted as final rules which will be published separately in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

By a unanimous affirmative vote, the TPSSC proposed a change to § 192.465(a) to include transmission lines within the sampling procedure now provided for monitoring service lines and mains. Cathodically protected transmission lines now must be monitored annually. The TPSSC pointed out that requirements for monitoring short sections of transmission lines should not be different from those for short sections of distribution lines since cathodic protection is equally effective on both transmission and distribution lines and hazards are not any greater. The TPSSC argues that the proposed change would simplify the monitoring of short sections of protected transmission lines and reduce the economic burden of testing all such sections. MTB also had received petitions from the Arkansas Public Service Commission (Docket No. 76-29), the Virginia State Corporation Commission (Docket No. 76-12), and the Cathodic Protection Service (Docket No. 76-30) to undertake rule-

making action to permit the monitoring of short sections of transmission lines on other than an annual basis.

The current § 192.465(a) requires that each pipeline that is under cathodic protection must be tested at least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months, to determine whether the cathodic protection meets the requirements of § 192.463. However, if tests at those intervals are impractical for separately protected service lines or short sections of protected mains, not in excess of 100 feet, these service lines and mains may be surveyed on a sampling basis. At least 10 percent of these protected structures, distributed over the entire system, must be surveyed each calendar year, with a different 10 percent checked each subsequent year, so that the entire system is tested in each 10-year period.

The rule specifically limits application of the sampling procedure to certain distribution lines. An MTB review of the gas pipeline accident data contained in its leak-reporting and information system shows that corrosion does not present any greater problem on transmission pipelines than on distribution pipelines. In consideration of this data and the technical fact that cathodic protection is an equally effective method for controlling corrosion on transmission pipelines, MTB believes that the extra precaution of the present regulation requiring that all short sections of transmission pipelines under cathodic protection be monitored annually is too stringent. Furthermore, because transmission lines are usually located away from populated areas whereas distribution mains and services are generally in populated areas, MTB believes the more stringent annual monitoring requirement for short sections of transmission lines is not warranted on a public safety basis.

In consideration of the foregoing, MTB proposes that part 192 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations be amended by revising paragraph (a) of § 192.465 to read as follows:

#### § 192.465 External corrosion control: monitoring.

(a) Each pipeline that is under cathodic protection must be tested at least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15 months, to determine whether the cathodic protection meets the requirements of § 192.463. However, if tests at those intervals are impractical for separately protected service lines or short sections of protected mains and transmission lines, not in excess of 100 feet, these pipelines may be surveyed on a sampling basis. At least 10 percent of these protected structures, distributed over the entire system, must be sur-

veyed each calendar year, with a different 10 percent checked each subsequent year, so that the entire system is tested in each 10-year period.

NOTE.—MTB has determined that this document does not contain a major proposal requiring preparation of a regulatory analysis under DOT procedures.

(49 U.S.C. 1872; 49 U.S.C. 1804; 49 CFR App. A of Part 1 and App. A of Part 102)

Issued in Washington, D.C., on August 28, 1978.

CESAR DE LEON,  
Acting Director,  
Office of Pipeline Safety Operations.  
[FR Doc. 78-24935 Filed 9-1-78; 8:45 am]

[4910-60]

Materials Transportation Bureau

[49 CFR Part 195]

[Docket No: PS-53; Notice 11]

**TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUIDS BY PIPELINE**

**Valve Spacing on Pipelines Carrying Highly Volatile Liquids**

AGENCY: Materials Transportation Bureau.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This notice proposes new regulations to reduce the amount of liquid spilled in accidents involving pipelines carrying highly volatile liquids (HVL) in inhabited areas. Remotely controlled or automatic valves would be required on new pipelines and on certain existing pipelines at points more than 6.0 km (3.7 mi) from another valve. Also, most existing valves would be required to be equipped for remote control unless they are designed for automatic control. This action is taken because MTB accident reports show that HVL pipelines have caused a substantially higher percentage of deaths, injuries, and property damage than liquid pipelines carrying less volatile commodities.

DATE: Comments must be received by October 31, 1978. Late filed comments will be considered so far as practicable.

ADDRESS: Comments should identify the docket and notice numbers and be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Branch, Materials Transportation Bureau, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments are available at Docket Room 6500.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Hammond, 202-426-0135.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: *Need for this proposal.* This rulemaking proceeding concerns the safety problem of limiting the amount of highly volatile liquid spilled from a pipeline in areas inhabited by people. The need to reduce the amount of highly volatile liquid spilled in a pipeline accident is demonstrated by the Materials Transportation Bureau's (MTB) pipeline accident reports filed by carriers under part 195, by the National Transportation Safety Board's "Special Study of Effects of Delay in Shutting Down Failed Pipeline Systems and Methods of Providing Rapid Shutdown" (Report No. NTSB-PSS-71-1), by the Mechanics Research, Inc. report, "Rapid Shutdown of Failed Pipeline Systems and Limiting of Pressure to Prevent Pipeline Failure Due to Overpressure" (DOT-OS-30008), and by the Battelle Laboratories' report, "Transportation of Highly Volatile, Toxic, or Corrosive Liquids by Pipeline" (DOT/OPSO-75/06). Copies of these published reports are available for inspection in the docket for this proceeding at MTB's Docket Room 6500.

A definition of a "highly volatile liquid" has been proposed for adoption under part 195 in notice 1 of docket PS-51 (43 FR 35513, August 10, 1978), but is repeated here for clarity: "A highly volatile liquid (HVL) means a liquid which has an absolute vapor pressure of 10 kPa (14.5 psia) or more at 37.8° C (100° F)."

The MTB accident reports show that over the past 9 years, HVL pipelines have caused a substantially higher percentage of deaths, injuries, and property damage than liquid pipelines carrying less volatile commodities. The record of liquid pipeline accidents reported on form DOT-7000-1 from 1968 through 1977 shows that although HVL pipeline accidents comprise only 10 percent of the total number of accidents involving liquid pipelines, the HVL pipeline accidents caused 66 percent of the deaths, 50 percent of the injuries, and 30 percent of the property damage. Thus, a reduction in either the number of accidents or severity of accidents involving HVL would result in significant reductions in deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by liquid pipelines overall.

Also, these statistics clearly illustrate the higher risk posed by an HVL spill than by spills of other liquids. The higher potential for damage is due to the fact that when HVL is released into the atmosphere, it forms a gas cloud, which is a markedly different and more insidious hazard than that presented by spills of less volatile liquids. Inside a pipeline, HVL will remain a liquid as long as the pressure is higher than the vapor pressure of

the liquid. If a pipeline rupture occurs, and the pressure is reduced to atmospheric, some of the escaping liquid will immediately flash to gas. The remainder will turn to gas as it picks up heat from its surroundings. The gas forms a cloud that will move downhill or downwind depending on the terrain, type of liquid involved, and atmospheric conditions. Because it is generally heavier than air, the rapidly expanding gas cloud will tend to hug the ground as it continues to move. If a source of ignition is encountered, a petroleum gas cloud will burn or explode. In the case of anhydrous ammonia, the greatest danger is that of toxicity or asphyxiation. For either commodity, the hazards are severe.

The amount of HVL spilled in a pipeline accident is affected by a number of factors including the size of the pipeline and rupture, liquid flow rate and flow characteristics, the natural boiling point of the liquid, the time to detect a failure, time to isolate and shut down a failed section, topography of the area, and spacing of valves or other means of isolating a line section. Of these factors, only the time to detect a failure, time to isolate and shut down a failed section and spacing of valves or other means to isolate a line section can be readily affected by regulation.

*Objectives.* To reduce the amount of HVL spilled in pipeline accidents in inhabited areas, MTB proposes to establish two new regulations on the spacing and operation of valves. The present regulation on installation of valves, § 195.260, does not require uniform or close valve spacing, and currently part 195 does not contain a specific regulation on valve operation.

Under the proposed §§ 195.260(g) and 195.407, automatic or remote control valves would have to be installed in inhabited areas on newly constructed HVL pipelines, and on existing HVL pipelines that are replaced, relocated, or otherwise changed (see § 195.200), at points on the pipeline which are more than 6.0 km (3.7 mi) from a sectionalizing valve. In addition, the proposed § 195.407 would require that each newly installed or existing block valve on an HVL pipeline in an inhabited area be equipped for remote operation from an attended location unless the valve operates automatically or lies 6.0 km (3.7 mi) or less from a sectionalizing valve that operates remotely or automatically.

On new HVL pipelines this proposal would result in line sections 12 km (7.5 mi) or less in length that can be isolated rapidly with remote control or automatic valves. Thus, the amount of spill after a rupture is detected could be limited to that contained in a 12 km (7.5 mi) line section plus the volume