

(9)23 Binder #3

**SCREENED**  
By *lap* Date *9/21/2011*

6/23/72

10:04-11:39 a.m.

JUNE 23, 1972 FROM 10:04 TO 11:39 AM

HALDEMAN: I think--that's fine. Now, on the investigation, you know, the Democratic break-in thing, we're back to the--in the, the problem area because the FBI is not under control, because Gray doesn't exactly know how to control them, and they have, their investigation is now leading into some productive areas, because they've been able to trace the money, not through the money itself, but through the bank, you know, sources - the banker himself. And, and it goes in some directions we don't want it to go. Ah, also there have been some things, like an informant came in off the street to the FBI in Miami, who was a photographer or has a friend who is a photographer who developed some films through this guy, Barker, and the films had pictures of Democratic National Committee letter head documents and things. So I guess, so it's things like that that are gonna, that are filtering in. Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell's recommendation that the only way to solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that...the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC...they did a massive story on the Cuban...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: thing.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "Stay the hell out of this...this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development,...

PRESIDENT: Um huh.

JUNE 23, 1972 FROM 10:04 TO 11:39 AM

HALDEMAN: ...and, uh, that would take care of it.

PRESIDENT: What about Pat Gray, ah, you mean he doesn't want to?

HALDEMAN: Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them ...and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: he's ambitious...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Ah, he'll call him in and say, "We've got the signal from across the river to, to put the hold on this." And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is. This is CIA.

PRESIDENT: But they've traced the money to 'em.

HALDEMAN: Well they have, they've traced to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.

PRESIDENT: Would it be somebody here?

HALDEMAN: Ken Dahlberg.

PRESIDENT: Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?

HALDEMAN: He's ah, he gave \$25,000 in Minnesota and ah, the check went directly in to this, to this guy Barker.

PRESIDENT: Maybe he's a...bum.

JUNE 23, 1972 FROM 10:04 TO 11:39 AM

PRESIDENT: All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson.

HALDEMAN: The FBI interviewed Colson yesterday. They determined that would be a good thing to do.

PRESIDENT: Um hum.

HALDEMAN: Ah, to have him take a...

PRESIDENT: Um hum.

HALDEMAN: An interrogation, which he did, and that, the FBI guys working the case had concluded that there were one or two possibilities, one, that this was a White House, they don't think that there is anything at the Election Committee, they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it, non political,...

PRESIDENT: Uh huh.

HALDEMAN: or it was a...

PRESIDENT: Cuban thing--

HALDEMAN: Cubans and the CIA. And after their interrogation of, of...

PRESIDENT: Colson.

HALDEMAN: Colson, yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it is a CIA thing, so the CIA turnoff would...

PRESIDENT: Well, not sure of their analysis, I'm not going to get that involved. I'm (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: No, sir. We don't want you to.

JUNE 23, 1972 FROM 10:04 TO 11:39 AM

PRESIDENT: and it may be too, that we misjudged the dates. You read it through and particularly read the newspaper analysis and see what I mean. I mean, it's, it's ...even realizing '68 was much better organized.

HALDEMAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: It may be we did a better job in '60. It just may be. It may tell us something. Anyway, would you check it over?

HALDEMAN: Yep.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) check another thing. (unintelligible) Moscow worked out the book and Chuck Lichtenstein (unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: He was, I'm not sure if he still is.

PRESIDENT: Could you find out from him what chapters of the book he worked on. Ah, I didn't I don't, Moscow worked on the heart attack thing. I did most of the dictating on the last two, but I've been curious. I know, I know Lichtenstein worked on the one thing, but could you find out which chapters he worked on. Also find out where Moscow is... what's become of him...what's he's doing in ten years. (unintelligible) we really ought to say hello to him (unintelligible) and we might find it useful for our purposes, future, despite the agony and all that. You'll find this extremely interesting, read (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I've read, read that a number of times (unintelligible) different context (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Ah, I would say another ting...Bud Brown (unintelligible) on my (unintelligible) did you read it? (Unintelligible) candidates.

6/23/72

2:20-2:45 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING  
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND H. R. HALDEMAN  
ON JUNE 23, 1972 FROM 2:20 TO 2:45 P.M.

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(Background noise)

HALDEMAN: Well, it's no problem. Uh two of them in, uh, state of health (unintelligible) but it's kind of interesting. Walters said that, uh, make a point. I didn't mention Hunt at the opening. I just said that, that, uh, this thing which we give direction to we're gonna create some very major potential problems because they were exploring leads that led back into to, uh, I'm afraid it will be harmful to the CIA, harmful to the government. (telephone rings) But, didn't have anything to with, with, with (unintelligible) kind of thing.

PRESIDENT: (Answers telephone) Hello? Chuck, I wondered if you would, ah, give John Connally a call. He's on his trip. I don't want him to read it in the papers before Monday about this quota thing and say, "Look, uh, he met, uh, we're gonna do this, but, but, I checked, uh, I asked you about the situation, and you personally checked your calendar and made, have an understanding. It's only temporary (unintelligible). It won't affect (unintelligible) people (unintelligible)." Okay. I didn't want him to read it in the papers. Good. Bye.

(Hangs up telephone)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). He said

HALDEMAN: I think Helms did, too. Helms said what, uh, I've had no, uh (unintelligible) and uh, Gray called and said, uh, yesterday, and said uh, that he thought --

PRESIDENT: Who had, Gray?



HALDEMAN: Gray had called a counselor for him and said, uh, uh, I think we went right into the middle of a CIA covert operation.

PRESIDENT: Gray said that?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and Helms said "nothing, nothing we've got at this point" and uh, uh, this involved, "sure looks to me like that's what we did." Some damn thing where he had -- (unintelligible).

We can do about it -- this would require at all and, uh, that was the end of that conversation. I fixed it so (unintelligible) we don't, so (unintelligible) we don't think (unintelligible). He said, well, the problem is that it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs. It tracks back to some other -- if their leads run out to people who had no involvement in this except by the contacts or connections, but you get the areas that are at the (unintelligible) to be raised. The whole problem of this, this fellow Hunt, uh . . .

So at that point Hunt's, Helm's kind of got the picture, kind of like the picture. (unintelligible)

. . . he, he said, he said, "We'll be very happy to be helpful to, ah, you know, get everything you want. I would like to know the reason for being helpful." And it may have appeared he wasn't gonna get it explicitly (unintelligible) in or out (unintelligible). So he said fine, and uh, Walters. I don't know whether we can do it. Walters (unintelligible). (Laughs) (Unintelligible) Walters is gonna make a call to Gray.

(Unintelligible) that's the way we put it, that's the way we left it, and, uh, (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: How would that work though? How would -- for example, if they've got one guy from (unintelligible) got somebody from Miami bank to be here to count the inventory.

2/13/73

9:48-10:52 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING  
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CHARLES W.  
COLSON ON FEBRUARY 13, 1973 AT 9:48  
TO 10:52 AM

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PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) that's come from the other-  
you can't get Webster there ah, well you  
need a man. Would you keep Gray?

COLSON: Yes, sir I would now.

PRESIDENT: Now you could send him to the Senate for  
confirmation.

COLSON: Ah, yep. I would.

PRESIDENT: Why?

COLSON: Well, because first of all, I-I could back  
him up with a very strong Deputy. Ah,  
because I think if you took Gray out now,  
with all of the turmoil in the Bureau and  
every ah-, the- the everything that's goin'  
on in that Bureau is being leaked out.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Well, how could we stop it?  
(Unintelligible)

COLSON: Ah, by creating certainty. You see, I'm  
afraid one of the problems of it is that  
there isn't anybody who knows they're  
insured. Ah, now. . .

PRESIDENT: Who's the Deputy you have in mind?

COLSON: Well, I'd suggest that Bill Sullivan is ah-  
he's ah

PRESIDENT: They say he's (unintelligible). . .

COLSON: Oh, he is.

PRESIDENT: He was (unintelligible) again.

COLSON: Well, he was our man, that's. . .

PRESIDENT: I know

FEBRUARY 13, 1973, AT 9:48 TO 10:52 AM

COLSON: Ah, Al Haig has called me yesterday and said, Jesus, ya know, get Sullivan back in there. Ah, Haig is very high on Sullivan. I don't know Sullivan- but I know of so many people who do think highly of him, and that those are all the people I. . .

PRESIDENT: In what way (unintelligible)

COLSON: No, sir. I don't think so.

PRESIDENT: Did they also make your reflection on Gray --Vesco--(unintelligible) investigation of Watergate appearance?

COLSON: Yeah. I think in a way it is. And ah, you might want to move Gray at the end of the year, but ah, I'd get through this year without, without rockin' that boat and I would try to get in ah, confirm Gray he's after all-, Gray's loyalty to, to you. . .

PRESIDENT: Totally

COLSON: Totally. So, give him the strength and back him up with som- couple people and ah, make sure he- make sure he understands what he has to do. I mean there- ah, the most important thing over there is to be God damn sure th-that the Department and that Bureau understand that ah, we've got enough troubles with the Hill without creating any more for ourselves.

PRESIDENT: Right

COLSON: And this is a partisan game. This is no longer Law Enforcement or Investigation. This is part of. . .

PRESIDENT: Sure. What'd you mean, Watergate?

COLSON: Watergate.

PRESIDENT: Oh, hell, yes.

COLSON: And ah, I-I read this. . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) partisan press news never heard of (unintelligible) Ehrlichman. God damn racist. (Unintelligible) everything. (Laughs)

FEBRUARY 13, 1973, AT 9:48 TO 10:52 AM

COLSON: Hysterical. But they're gonna make a, they'll have a political circus. Ah, but it is. . .

PRESIDENT: Remember how they built up that poor jackass Ralph Landers?

COLSON: Yeah

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) When he--McCarthy built him up as a great saint, poor bastard. Well, he's an idiot.

COLSON: Well. . .

PRESIDENT: He's a sweet guy, Ralph Landers. (Unintelligible)

COLSON: Well, no, he was nothin'.

PRESIDENT: But he took McCarthy out.

COLSON: McCarthy's great comment about bring the butterfly net (unintelligible) (Laughs)

PRESIDENT: Oh, God, I wish we had, I wish we had more of Pat Gray's. Well any way, that's that. Oh, so long- I got (unintelligible). I feel that there's a couple of good guys who work around here, everyone around here forgets the God damn thing in the White House. (unintelligible) (noise). (cough) You just figure you're gonna have s-, leaks, television, press- and just say that's underneath us. (cough) Ah, ah, how do you feel? Is there anything else you could do?

COLSON: Well, the only thing you can do Mr. President. . .

PRESIDENT: I mean if you can't, you've got to get for example Magruder's operation, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman and the rest, Dean,

COLSON: Yes

PRESIDENT: if they all get into this, they're gonna go through the ITT thing (unintelligible)

2/14/73

10:13-10:49 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING BETWEEN  
THE PRESIDENT AND CHARLES COLSON,  
IN THE OVAL OFFICE ON FEBRUARY 14,  
1973, FROM 10:13 TO 10:49 P.M.

PRESIDENT: (Noise) Going on your way? (Noise)

COLSON: Yes, sir. I think I've just been--  
packing and, uh, getting briefed...

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah.

COLSON: ...by the State Department.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: I've finished up my office work.

PRESIDENT: Well, I think when you're there -- now,  
the thing to do is to try to put out  
of your mind all of the problems in which  
I--You got to fish these things out--We  
always do. We (unintelligible)--  
Watergate and all that sort of thing--is  
going to be, be there. It's gonna be  
(unintelligible) for what it is. And  
I think that you gotta take, take periods  
like this, (unintelligible)--three weeks...

COLSON: I--I'll be off and it'll be about three  
weeks.

PRESIDENT: Good. Just get out there and don't read  
any papers, and---

COLSON: Well, (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I think, (unintelligible)

COLSON: It's, uh--

PRESIDENT: The only paper I--left is basically the  
Washington Post, as far as I can see.  
Damn, it's worse than the Washington Post.  
I--characterize the Post, the Times--The  
New York Times.

FEBRUARY 14, 1973, FROM 10:13 TO 10:49 AM

PRESIDENT: The thing is th (unintelligible)

COLSON: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: They just--that's something we just can't get into.

COLSON: Well, you're--

PRESIDENT: Today as for example, too, like, like a story Colson this morning commented that Liddy had the--, the FBI Internal Security taps. But I can't believe that's true. I mean, I, uh, I don't know what they're talking about.

COLSON: I, uh, that could have been true. They, they had that security unit set up in the basement of the EOB which Bud Krogh ran.

PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, they were, at that time, in the country--

COLSON: Oh sure. And they were, that was perfectly legitimate. I mean that's, that's the kind of thing they were hired to do...

PRESIDENT: Mmm hmmm.

COLSON: Uh, investigating the authenticity of....

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

COLSON: ...of the Dita Beard letter was was a perfectly legitimate thing. And, uh, I told the FBI about that--there wasn't anything to hide. Uh, the thing you can't do is you can't get part way pregnant. You can't start talking about one aspect of a relationship...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.



FEBRUARY 14, 1973, FROM 10:13 TO 10:49 AM

PRESIDENT: Right.

COLSON: ...to talk about.

PRESIDENT: You know the thing about it of course is that you have this enormous differ-difficult double, double standard in the press, for instance. You can take this story about today about the--that they had access to the confidential memoranda. Now, who the hell is that coming from, I ask ya? See they got this and they're dripping it up little, by little. Who--where are they getting these stories, Chuck?

COLSON: Bureau.

PRESIDENT: The FBI?

COLSON: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Did they question the FBI (unintelligible) how did the FBI know?

COLSON: Well, the FBI would have been in a--would have been sending that information over to Liddy and Hunt.

PRESIDENT: Mmm hmm.

COLSON: And, uh, every leak we've had, Mr. President, has been out of the Bureau, uh, that's one of the reasons that when you asked me my opinion yesterday, I, I don't know whether--

PRESIDENT: About Gray.

COLSON: I don't know whether Gray's the best man or not, but I--

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

COLSON: Yes, certainly. Let him go in and fire some of the bastards that he thinks have, have uh, (unintelligible)--

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

FEBRUARY 14, 1973, FROM 10:13 TO 10:49 AM

COLSON: The whole damn--

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) on the other hand they go out (unintelligible). What then?

COLSON: Well, the hell, they're talking now. If-- there isn't anything that I ever told the Bureau that I haven't seen come out in print. And, uh, it does, it really does raise questions about the integrity of the Bureau's process. You have to be a little careful what you--

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). Well, when Hoover was there it didn't leak.

COLSON: It didn't happen?

PRESIDENT: Did not happen.

COLSON: Oh, hell no. They were scared stiff.

PRESIDENT: I, I could talk to Hoover about all sorts of things and I talked to him very freely over the years and there it never, never came out.

COLSON: Well, because they knew that if anybody talked--

PRESIDENT: To the press.

COLSON: to them. And, uh--

PRESIDENT: You take, you take the (unintelligible) make a smart thing, big thing out of some contribution we received that would sort of (unintelligible) more than a five thousand dollar contribution. You know that wasn't really a blunder. Was it? Good God! When our people spent thirty-four million dollars where the hell (unintelligible).

FEBRUARY 14, 1973, FROM 10:13 TO 10:49 AM

(PRIVILEGED MATERIAL DELETED)

PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. Don't read the papers. Forget the whole damn thing. Let her go.

COLSON: Well, we'll, we'll, uh, we'll tough it (unintelligible) through and, uh, come out on top as we always have.

PRESIDENT: I mean, this is a tough one, because there's so many players, and so God-damn sad I think of those seven guy...

COLSON: So do I.

PRESIDENT: ...who are involved, you know, Jesus Christ, they did it with good intentions (unintelligible). Of course, I guess they, they must have known that they had to take this kind of risk (unintelligible)

COLSON: I think that they've taken that all their lives. I don't think that's --

PRESIDENT: Yeah. They've been talking, they've been doing this sort of thing--

COLSON: Yeah, I think they got--well--

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

COLSON: 

Referred

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

COLSON: Mr. President I thank you for your (unintelligible)

2/27/73

3:55-4:20 P.M.

FINAL

TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING  
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN ON  
FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

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TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING  
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND JOHN DEAN ON  
FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, John, how are you?

DEAN: Pretty good.

PRESIDENT: I, uh, discarded some (unintelligible) won't interrupt us (unintelligible) uh, uh, did you get your talk with Kleindienst yet?

DEAN: I just had a good talk with him.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, fine. Have you got him, uh, positioned properly, the uh--

DEAN: I think, I think he is.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) properly--ah, has he talked yet to Baker?

DEAN: No, he hasn't, he, uh, he called Sam Ervin and offered to come visit with both he and Baker. And, uh, that was done last week.

PRESIDENT: Uh, huh.

DEAN: But he thought that timing would be bad to call Baker prior to the joint meeting. So he says after I have that joint meeting, I'll start working my relationship with Baker.

PRESIDENT: Well, Baker left with me that he was going to, going to set up a joint meeting well, anyway (unintelligible). I see. So Kleindienst has talked to, uh, uh, he has talked to Ervin and Ervin said-- (unintelligible).

DEAN: Ervin has left it dangling and said, "I'll be back in touch with you." Uh, I think what, what disturbs me a little bit about Baker was his move to put his own man in as minority counsel, so quickly, without any consultation as he had promised consultation. And I'm told this man may be a disaster himself, the minority counsel.

FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

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PRESIDENT: He is? What do you mean to, is he--?

DEAN: Well he's a, well I can't knock age, he's 30, he's 30 years of age, he doesn't know a thing about Washington.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: So we'll have to--

PRESIDENT: Baker, Baker says that he puts the blame on the White House. He says, whatchamacallits his name, Korologos called him and suggested somebody else, that was a great mistake. Course I didn't know anything about that, apparently.

DEAN: Well Baker apparently is quite open in his felicity I want to counsel with you all, and I don't want to move until I've told you what I'm going to do, and then he did just the reverse. So it was curious: one, that he wanted a meeting with you. Uh, secondly: that, uh, he suggested Kleindienst as a conduit...

PRESIDENT: That's correct.

DEAN: ...and there is hope, I think that, uh, he may try to keep an eye on this thing and not let it get into a total circus up there.

PRESIDENT: Who? Baker.

DEAN: Baker, Baker might.

PRESIDENT: Well that's what he indicated, he indicated but of course, of course with the regard to his, uh, situation, his position though, and with regard to Kleindienst's position, I, uh, I shook Kleindienst up a bit but (unintelligible) really is the, is the fellow who's going to get hurt most out of this (unintelligible) is Mitchell. Said others are gonna get hurt too, but Mitchell is, ah, the real problem is whether or not Mitchell will--uh, get him on perjury.

DEAN: Hum.

PRESIDENT: I said now look, ah, perjury's very damn hard thing to prove too, fortunately. But, uh, if you, uh (unintelligible) keep from poppin' off. I said, well, I, I, I talked (unintelligible) did ya ever talk to Mitchell about this. Never has.

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: He says he has never talked to him. Did you go into the Mexican part of it with Kleindienst or did you get...

DEAN: Well, I...

PRESIDENT: ...into any substance at all?

DEAN: I've always, I've always, braced Kleindienst in the past about, you know, the potential implications of what this whole investigation the Bureau conducted, what the U.S. Attorney's Office was doing...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: ...what the trial meant...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: ...I think this could come to haunt...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: If it gets out of hand, I don't want to get into a lot of specifics.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: I, at this last meeting, I just sat with him and said Dick, I said, "I don't think I ought to brief you on everything I know. I don't think..."

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: ...that's the way to proceed. But if I see you going down the wrong track, I'm going to have to tell you why."



FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

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PRESIDENT: Um hum. Good, good. What did he say?

DEAN: He said, "I agree, that's the way it should stand."

PRESIDENT: On the Executive Privilege one, I worked with, uh, talked to John Ehrlichman a little and decided that the last paragraph, which, uh, should be modified so that it covers what I might have to say if I were asked at a press conference, he'll indicate what it, but in, in a nut shell, uh, rather than simply, flatly say that I think that what we should say is uh, that uh, that uh, that the uh, that members of the President's staff I will not appear before a formal session of the Commission, committees. However, under proper, appropriate circumstances that uh, informal discussions, or so forth, can be conducted to obtain information and so forth and so on-- appropriate, I want, I tell you what you're, what we're up against, right here's, uh, Kleindienst, Kleindienst has indicated to me, I don't know whether he did to you, that uh, he felt that the back-up position here should be an executive session of the Committee. And I said, "Well, that's a hell of a difficult thing the, for the men." I said, "I think that the position should be one of a, that our position should be one of a, a, a solution. That you can't-written interrogatories (unintelligible) which is unlikely, of the two committee--I, uh, the, the ranking committee members and the counsel, questioning any member of the White House staff, you know, under proper, you know, restrictions...

DEAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: ...and so forth and so on. I put that to Baker as well and, uh, (unintelligible) said Baker, Baker probably, uh, probably wants to get, for the same reason that Ervin does, because of the publicity and so forth, wants to haul down the White House staff and...

DEAN: Um.

PRESIDENT: ...put them in the glare of those lights.

DEAN: True.

PRESIDENT: Uh, that we cannot have. That we cannot have. On the other hand, we cannot have a stonewall, uh, so that it appears that we're not letting them. And so I think we've got to be in a position to, did ya discuss this with Kleindienst, as to what the position would be on that point? That, I think, John, is the important thing that Kleindienst has gotta stand God damn firm on.

DEAN: I did, I talked to Dick about that. I said that, uh, "One, there's a statement forthcoming. I don't know the timing on it."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: The Department will issue. I said that, it's fortunate the context it's coming out in, because Clark Mollenhoff solicited the statement in a press inquiry that's coming out in unrelated context and not related to Watergate per se.

PRESIDENT: Right, right.

DEAN: And so that'll be out soon and that will define what the outer perimeters are. It also gives--

PRESIDENT: Have Kleindienst say that nobody from the White House staff will testify before a committee.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Of course, that doesn't help much at all.

DEAN: Well, under normal circumstances, if they're--

PRESIDENT: ...if they were normal.

DEAN: That's the, there's little, uh, slide in there. And then what, in a practical matter I told 'em would probably happen, would be much like the Flanigan situation where there's an exchange and the, the issues become very narrow as to the information that's sought.

FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

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PRESIDENT: Well, you worked with, uh, if you'd talked to John Ehrlichman, you worked at revising that last paragraph.

DEAN: We've done that.

PRESIDENT: Oh, you've already worked with him on that.

DEAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: And, uh, well, after I see his, uh, this Cardinal Midi (phonetic) take me about, I think five, we ought to get rid of him in about, ah, fifteen or twenty minutes. You might bring it down and, uh, you've got it written already?

DEAN: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: Then let me take a look at it again.

DEAN: Uh huh.

PRESIDENT: And we'll approve the statement, I don't want to put it out right now because I, I, just depends (unintelligible) I decide to do on the, do on the, the press thing.

DEAN: It'd probably be easier not to have those questions in your press conference per se.

PRESIDENT: I, I, would prefer, that's what I want to do, is to have this statement come after the press conference, to say, if they ask anything about it, that "I've covered that in a statement that will be issued tomorrow on Executive Privilege. It's very complicated (unintelligible) that's what I had in mind. I'd rather not be questioned on the statement.

DEAN: Mollenhoff himself will debate you right there on the subject.

PRESIDENT: Right. So I'll say I'm covering--

DEAN: And I did talk to Mollenhoff yesterday at, uh, Rogers' request.

FEBRUARY 27, 1973, FROM 3:55 TO 4:20 P.M.

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PRESIDENT: ...(unintelligible) want to look in the case.

DEAN: Tell him I want to look in the case and I had an extended discussion with him on the Executive Privilege question. Of course, he differs somewhat from where we're coming out, but he agrees that certainly the President has the legal authority to do that and he agrees also that it's, uh, it's--

PRESIDENT: Well, in his case, I mean what was he talking about?

DEAN: Well, he says, he thinks that all White House staff should be ready to run up to the Hill and testify and he asked...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

DEAN: ...as to what they're doing and it's a rare exception when the President invokes the privilege. I said, "Clark, that's got to be the other way around. The staff can't operate if they're going to be queried on every bit of communication they had with the President."

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: Mansfield, himself, Mr. President, has recognized that communications between you and your staff are protected. He said this in a policy statement before they issued this resolution up there on, uh, having confirmable individuals agree they'd testify before they are confirmed.

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Well...

DEAN: I'm--

PRESIDENT: ...as for confirmable individuals are concerned, they're all available for testimony though.

DEAN: That's right. It's no problem there.

PRESIDENT: It's no problem there.

DEAN: There's not a giveaway by any means on that.

PRESIDENT: They, of course, will, uh, they, they, they, I guess, we, we would not normally claim Executive Privilege for Cabinet officers would we?

DEAN: Uh, no sir. Only, only if in, say the rare instances where we have already, where they're going for information which should be protected. Investigative files, uh, classified material or say, aid programs or something, when we did it in the last--IRS files. Those are the instances in which we've done it.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: And they're quite, uh, traditional and, and should be expected by the Congress when they go after information like that.

PRESIDENT: I think, I think went over to Kleindienst, I said just to show you how the worm turns here, what we went through in the Hiss case. There, we were, investigating, not, uh, espionage by a political, what one political organization against another, but a charge of espionage against the United States of America, which was a hell of a lot more serious. And in that case, the Department of Justice, the White House, the FBI totally stonewalled the committee. The FBI would not furnish any information and here the FBI had a chance to furnish information to this committee.

DEAN: Yes.

PRESIDENT: That's according to Gray, right?

DEAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: All right. The Department of Justice refused to give us any information at all and of course the White House used Executive Privilege and the press was all on their side. You see that was...

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: ...that was a, that's, sure it's whose ox is being gored. Now here you got so-called espionage involving a political organization and, uh, so now (unintelligible).

DEAN: Well, you know I've been...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

DEAN: ...and in, in, uh, doing some checking.

PRESIDENT: I told Dick a (unintelligible). That's what our Democratic friends did when we were trying to get information.

DEAN: Lyndon Johnson, uh, was probably the, uh, greatest abuser of the FBI, I'm told by people, some of the old hands over there.

PRESIDENT: He used it for everything.

DEAN: He used it as his personal, uh--

PRESIDENT: But didn't he use it against the press?

DEAN: He...

PRESIDENT: That's ah--

DEAN: ...used it against the press, he used it against his own party, uh, back in '64 when the Walter Jenkins thing broke, uh, he had high officials of the FBI out trying to strong-arm a doctor to say that this man had a brain tumor, uh, Walter Jenkins, he also, then, turned his, the FBI loose on the Goldwater staff, uh, this sort of thing is starting to seep...

PRESIDENT: Uh, who knows?

DEAN: ...out now.

PRESIDENT: Is it getting out?

DEAN: Uh, I'm sorry. (Unintelligible).

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PRESIDENT: But you, of course, know the incident of his, uh, (unintelligible) the, the famous incident of the bugging of our plane...

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: which, uh, maybe--, they really know is true. And you know the instances that they talk about, about the, uh, about our bugging, the FBI stuff, believe me, I know exactly what those were.

(Sensitive Material Deleted)

DEAN: Um hum. Now they're so--

PRESIDENT: And then, of course, the other things involved leaks out of the NSC, where we, they bugged Haig, Lake, or Halperin, I mean. But that was all.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: We were as limited as hell, I mean Hoover, good God, we could have used him forever. He's, he's-- but Johnson had just apparently, just used them all the time for this sort of thing.

DEAN: That's what I'm learning. There's more and more of this--

PRESIDENT: Who's, who's, who from the FBI is trying to put out this stuff on us?

DEAN: God, I thought, I wish I knew, Mr. President, uh.

PRESIDENT: You don't believe it's a--

DEAN: I've heard there're, there're several names that are bantered around. I, I tried for example, to track the leak.

PRESIDENT: You don't think it's Sullivan?

DEAN: N, no, I, I confronted Sullivan, as a matter of fact, right after this, I said, "Bill," I said, uh, I called him into my office, I said, "I want to tell you what Time Magazine said they have." His reaction was not that of a man who has leaked something. Uh--

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PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: And then he helped.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

DEAN: He told me, he said, "If this ever comes down to the very short strokes," he said, "As far as I'm concerned this was Hoover and Sullivan. No one else. And I'm ready to stand forward and take it at that." I said, "Well, I don't think it's ever going to be that because, uh--

PRESIDENT: Well, what, why would it be Hoover and Sullivan, did Hoover order him to do it?

DEAN: Hoover ordered him to do it.

PRESIDENT: In order to ah--

DEAN: They did this--so he could say I could cite examples chapter and verse of Hoover telling me to do things like this.

PRESIDENT: Now Sullivan knows that their, it was terribly limited--it was limited.

DEAN: That's right.

(Sensitive Material Deleted)

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And that I must say, I think we did request though, did we say find out the leaks, and so Hoover goes and, uh, bugs people.

DEAN: Well, I, I think...

PRESIDENT: That's the way to do it.

DEAN: ...the way it's postured now, uh, we can stonewall it, ah, Gray can go up there in his confirmation hearings and he's not gonna have to bother with it, because they'd accused him in the article of being, sitting on top of the bugs...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.



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DEAN: ...it was there once he came in, which is not factual.

PRESIDENT: Well, there weren't any.

DEAN: There were none there when he came in.

PRESIDENT: Well, three years ago that this happened...

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: ...and there hasn't been a God damned thing since.

DEAN: That's correct.

PRESIDENT: Right.

DEAN: That's correct.

PRESIDENT: Another thing you can say, too, John, is the fact that all this had to do with the war...

DEAN: I know.

PRESIDENT: ...and now the war is over.

DEAN: Now--

PRESIDENT: Now Johnson, on the other hand, went bugging his political opponents, and every son-of-a, everything you can imagine. We've been, that's the problem, we're getting a real bum rap, aren't we?

DEAN: We cert--, we are getting a terrible rap, ah--

PRESIDENT: You stop to think of, we got rid, we got rid of the Army bugs, we got, you know that Army ah, espionage business, intelligence business, we got, you remember that?

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Uh, we've limited the FBI things to national security bugs, to very, very certain few, probably too few.

DEAN: We're, we're now (unintelligible).

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PRESIDENT: But somebody's gonna get a shock one day, and they'll wonder why we didn't bug 'em, huh?

DEAN: That's right. We are getting a bad rap.

PRESIDENT: Well, for example...

DEAN: The fact is--

PRESIDENT: ...as you know, as you know, Hoover did bug Martin, Martin Luther King.

DEAN: That's right, I was aware of that also.

PRESIDENT: Well, Christ yes, Hoover used to tell us about what his, what a, a morally depraved son-of-a-bitch he was--And Johnson probably ordered him to do it, now let's face it.

DEAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: So, ah, I don't, well you can't blame Hoover. I'm sure he didn't do it unless, ah, Johnson asked him to, but Johnson was that kind of a man, he used the FBI as his own private patrol, but God, we've been as careful, I've, I've talked to Hoover any number of times, but we've never ordered anything like that. But he'll come in with his little things.

(Sensitive Material Deleted)

DEAN: Johnson, ah...

PRESIDENT: Huh?

DEAN: ...Johnson, used the FBI to cover the, ah, New Jersey convention before he dropped out, officially, he had all the delegates--

PRESIDENT: He did?

DEAN: That's right, which is kind of fantastic.

PRESIDENT: Sullivan knows this?

DEAN: Um hum, Sullivan is a wealth-of-knowledge and the more I, you know, sort of generally chat with him about these problems, the more it comes out he's the man that can also document--

PRESIDENT: Why did Hoover have a fight with him? It's a hell of a mistake for Hoover to do that. Sullivan knows too much.

DEAN: That's right, ah.

PRESIDENT: Why didn't Sullivan squawk?

DEAN: I think Sullivan probably is loyal to the...

PRESIDENT: ...institution--

DEAN: ...the institution and doesn't want--

PRESIDENT: Somebody over there is not, can he help you find out who the hell is not? Isn't it a possibility...

DEAN: He advised--

PRESIDENT: ...the guy that--Time Magazine's lawyer, you don't think it's him?

DEAN: He speculates, and, the speculation is generally, is it's either Sullivan himself, Mark Felt, who is--

PRESIDENT: I know, the lawyer says that.

DEAN: That's right. Ah, and the other one is a fellow Tom Bishop who is now departed, who was in charge of their public information and where--

PRESIDENT: Does he know about these things, Hoover didn't tell people like that, about these things...

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: ...did he?

DEAN: For example, the '68 thing, I try-, was trying to determine who might know about that.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, ah...

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DEAN: Hoover, apparently...

PRESIDENT: Ah, I guess.

DEAN: ...Hoover apparently told Pat Coyne, Patrick Coyne, who used to be on the NSC staff.

PRESIDENT: I know, I know, I believe, is he still living?

DEAN: I don't, I don't know the man.

PRESIDENT: He told Pat Coyne?

DEAN: He told Pat Coyne; Coyne told Rockefeller; Rockefeller relayed this to Kissinger, this was one channel that might have it in a public domain. The other is when Sullivan took the records, or all the documents in connection with this, ah, out of his office, and out of the Bureau, he also instructed the Washington Field Office to destroy all their records, which they did. Ah, Hoover, incensed at this, that he couldn't reconstruct, that he didn't have the records and couldn't get them from Sullivan, tried to have the Washington Field Office reconstruct them, which they couldn't. As a result of that movement and flailing around by Hoover, a lot of people in the agency were aware of what had happened and it was on the grapevine.

PRESIDENT: Oh, that's when it happened then, the night Sullivan left, he took the records with him--

DEAN: He took the records with him...

PRESIDENT: And that's the only records there were?

DEAN: ...and that's the only records there are.

PRESIDENT: He did it out of, uh, I mean, pissed off at Hoover.

DEAN: No, ah, he was doing it to...

PRESIDENT: Protect...

DEAN: ...protect, ah--

PRESIDENT: ...the Bureau.

DEAN: No, he was doing it to protect the White House and the people over here.

PRESIDENT: Oh, oh, but for Christ sakes, Hoover, I mean, (unintelligible).

DEAN: Hoover never got his hands on the records is what happened. Sullivan has them, Sullivan had his, ah, his pissing match with Hoover and then took them with him at that time.

PRESIDENT: I see.

DEAN: And then he turned them over to Mardian ultimately.

PRESIDENT: I see.

DEAN: And--

PRESIDENT: That's how we got them.

DEAN: And then--

PRESIDENT: Where's Sullivan now?

DEAN: Sullivan is back at Justice in the Drug Intelligence (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: We owe him something.

DEAN: We do. He wants to go back to the Bureau and work on, ah, domestic, ah--

PRESIDENT: Why is it that Gray doesn't want him?

DEAN: I think Mark Felt has poisoned Gray on this issue and I think once Gray--

PRESIDENT: Well, who in the hell, somebody is doing Mark Felt in. You know what, do you, do you believe the Time Magazine lawyer? Is Felt (unintelligible), is he capable of this sort of thing?

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DEAN: Well, let me tell you where I, where else I heard that from, ah, was Sandy Smith, ah, I had told, not, not the lawyer but somebody else told Felt was his source...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...and this came to Henry Petersen, ah, Henry Petersen's an old hand over there, as you know, and, ah, bless his soul, he's a valuable man to us. Ah--

PRESIDENT: Yeah. What did he say?

DEAN: Ah, he said that he wouldn't put it past Felt but, ah, the other thing I was talking to Kleindienst about this when I was over there, he said if Felt is the source...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...and if we gets Felt way out of joint we are in serious trouble.

PRESIDENT: 'Cause he knows so much?

DEAN: He knows so much.

PRESIDENT: What's he know?

DEAN: I don't know, I didn't ask for specifics with, ah, he said, one thing, he said he could knock.

PRESIDENT: Does he know about Sullivan stuff?

DEAN: Yes, he knows about that. I called Felt, asked him what he knew about it and he was, for example, very cool when I, I said, "There's a Time Magazine story running, Mark, ah, that in '68..."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: or, or in '69 and '70...

PRESIDENT: Yes.

DEAN: and so on and so forth. He said, uh, I said "True or false?" and he said, "True." I said, "How do you know that?" and I said, "I've never heard of that before." He said, "Well, if you talk to Bill Sullivan, he'll tell you all about it." When he did he, sort of a general, he painted a general picture about it. Ah, but just cool as a cucumber about it. Ah--

PRESIDENT: And what does he say about Time, again, how does he, is he gonna stand up for the denial?

DEAN: He says, "John, " he said, ah, I said "First of all, I don't, I don't believe this could happen," I was protecting us, as far as...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...doubting what he had said. He said, "Well, John, as far as I'm concerned, our, our phone call is totally off the record, we never had it," so that's a good one to watch, just right there.

PRESIDENT: In other words, you can't blow the whistle on Felt, just like you can't blow the whistle on the son-of-a-bitch out there, the yeoman, in the Jack Anderson case, right?

DEAN: That's right, but there will become, ah, there will come a day when Gray's comfortably in there, when other things come past, that ah--

PRESIDENT: Like what?

DEAN: I think that Gray can, at some point when, if this sort of thing continues, once he gets through his confirmation, I don't know why he couldn't himself say "I'm gonna take a lie detector test and I'm gonna ask everybody in my immediate shop to take one and then we're gonna go out and ask some of the other agents to take them..."

PRESIDENT: Just for leakage.

DEAN: "...as for leakage, because this, this only hurts, ah, this whole institution."

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Where do you, ah, where do you stand on the, how will we leave it on Kleindienst hears, with regard to the, that's what there, ah, let me put it this way. You take the responsibility for Kleindienst, I'm gonna keep Ehrlichman and Haldeman out of it--out of their--any relationship with Kleindienst. You should have it only, but you've got to watch him and brace him--, on the Executive Privilege thing, that you, that you tell him what the line is...

DEAN: I have, I have...

PRESIDENT: ...and where he's to stand.

DEAN: I have told him and I've s-, I said "It's gonna be important."

PRESIDENT: Didn't he raise the idea of their hurrying the Executive Session refusal?

DEAN: No, he did not.

PRESIDENT: All right. Be sure he knows what the back up position is, which is (unintelligible), as I understand it, if we went in there under proper ah, ah, restrictions, allow, uh, two committee members to come down. Is that what you would do?

DEAN: I think we wo-, ought, if I think we ought to draw the line at written interrogatories. I think the position should be that you were holding nothing back, information wise.

PRESIDENT: That would be sworn.

DEAN: That's right, that would be sworn, uh, you can't be in a position of protecting any, anybody around here.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: The information has to be available. But to go up there and make a circus out of the appearance of, of people--

PRESIDENT: Right.



DEAN: Ah--

PRESIDENT: Good, well let me say about ah, about Felt, it sounds as if he knows, it sounds as if maybe he's--

DEAN: Kind of watch it like a hawk, Mr. President...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...and I just got to watch him, ah, he's too close to Pat Gray right now...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...for our interests.

PRESIDENT: Pat Gray is a little naive. (Sensitive Material Deleted)

DEAN: Yeah. Well I think it's--

PRESIDENT: And he never ever has anything wrong, find out some interesting facts, but, ah, nothing we ever used. I mean we just were awful careful. Joe Kraft, of course, should have been bugged. I would think the son-of-a-bitch is, ah, practically an agent to the communists.

DEAN: Well, what you said about Bob and John, too, I think, as before the election, I tried to only bother them or consume any of their time when it was just absolutely essential.

PRESIDENT: Right.

DEAN: And I think that's the way it's been.

PRESIDENT: That's right, that's right.

DEAN: He, ah...

Unidentified: (Unintelligible) is here.

PRESIDENT: Fine, fine.

HALDEMAN: Did he buzz?

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PRESIDENT: I buzzed twice, that means they, for 'em to come in. (Unintelligible) buzz (unintelligible) that means.

HALDEMAN: Apparently the phones aren't working properly.

PRESIDENT: Oh fine, sure, sure, sure, have 'em come right in. Right there

(Unintelligible with noise)

DEAN: Well, sir, I'll get that statement on executive privilege.

PRESIDENT: If you could, uh, if you could, uh, do your best to, uh, if you could keep me posted on (unintelligible) everything that way you need to but particularly with relation to Kleindienst. Okay?

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PRESIDENT: Well, let's just let Timmons tell Baker that if he wants to talk to, if he wants to get anybody at the White House, that I don't want him to talk to Timmons. Of course Timmons is a party in interest here, too. I don't want him to...

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: ...talk to Haldeman; I don't want him to talk to Ehrlichman, that you're the man--and that you're available. But leave it that way: that you're available to talk to him but not for everything. But, nobody else. How does that sound to you?

DEAN: I think that sounds good.

PRESIDENT: You tell Timmons that he sees him privately and says that's it. We are not pressing him. We don't care, we're not--because Baker-- (sighs). The woods are full of weak men.

DEAN: I would suspect if we're going to get any insight into what that--that Special Committee is going to do, it's going to be through the Gurneys--I don't know about Weicker, uh, where he's...

PRESIDENT: Weicker's a...

DEAN: ...going to fall out on this thing.

PRESIDENT: ...well, he'll, he'll he'll be--

DEAN: . Whatever's up--

PRESIDENT: I think Weicker, the line to Weicker is Gray. Now, Gray has got to shape up here and, and, uh, handle himself well, top. Do you think he will?

DEAN: I do. I think Pat is, uh, think Pat is tough. He goes up this morning, as you know. Uh, he is, uh, he's ready. He's very comfortable in all of the decisions he has made, and, uh, I think he'll be good.

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PRESIDENT: But he's close to Weicker--that's what I meant.

DEAN: Yeah, he is.

PRESIDENT: And, uh, so, uh, Gray, Gray--

DEAN: As a vehicle--yes.

PRESIDENT: One rather amusing thing about the Gray thing is that I, I, I, and I knew this would come--they constantly say that Gray is a political crony of, and a personal crony of the President's. Did you know that I have never seen him socially?

DEAN: Is that correct? No, I didn't.

PRESIDENT: He's--I think he's been to a couple of White House--but I have never seen Pat Gray separately.

DEAN: Oh, the press has got him meeting you at a social function. And, and, uh, going on from there.

PRESIDENT: When?

DEAN: Back in (sighs) '47, I think, is something I have read.

PRESIDENT: Maybe Radford had a party or something.

DEAN: Something like that.

PRESIDENT: Something like that. But that's all. Uh, well that's--I don't know. Gray is, uh, is somebody that I, that I know only as a-- He was a, he was Radford's Assistant, used to attend NSC meetings.

DEAN: Uh huh.

PRESIDENT: So I've met him. He's never been social. Edgar Hoover, on the other hand, I have seen socially at least a hundred times. He and I were very close friends.

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DEAN: That's curious, the way the press just--

PRESIDENT: But John--and that's the point: Hoover was my crony and friend. He was as close or closer to me than Johnson, actually, although Johnson used him more. But as for Pat Gray, Christ, I never saw him.

DEAN: While it might have been, uh, a lot of blue chips to the late Director, I think we would have been a lot better off during this whole Watergate thing if he'd been alive, 'cause he knew how to handle that Bureau...

PRESIDENT: Oh.

DEAN: ...knew how to keep them in bounds, uh-- was a tough cookie.

PRESIDENT: Well, if, if Hoover ever fought--He would have fought, that's the point. He'd have fired a few people, or he'd have scared them to death. He's got files on everybody, God damn it.

DEAN: (Laughs) That's right.

PRESIDENT: But now, at the present time, the Bureau is leaking like a sieve, and, uh, Baker, and, and--Gray denies it. Just says it's not coming from the Bureau. Just who in the hell is it coming from? How in the hell could it be coming from anybody else? It isn't coming from Henry Petersen, is it?

DEAN: No. I just would not--

PRESIDENT: It isn't coming from the depositions, is it?

DEAN: No. It's that, well, they're getting, they're getting raw data. They're getting the raw, what they call, 302 forms.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: Those are the summaries of the interviews.

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DEAN: That wouldn't surprise me, uh--

PRESIDENT: Bobby was a ruthless little bastard. But the FBI does--they, they tell you that, uh, Sullivan told you that, the New Jersey thing? We did use a bug up there--just for intelligence work.

DEAN: Intelligence work--just had agents all over (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Frankly, the doctors say that the poor old gent had a tumor.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: The FBI (unintelligible)

DEAN: Well, uh, he used Abe Fortas and Deke DeLoach backed up by, uh, some other people in the Bureau that were standing ready to go out and try to talk this doctor into examining Walter Jenkins to say the man had a brain tumor. He was very ill, that's why the erratic behavior. And this doctor, uh, wouldn't buy it.

PRESIDENT: The doctor had never examined him before or anything.

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: They were trying to set that up though, huh.

DEAN: Oh, yeah, that would've--

PRESIDENT: What other kind of activities?

DEAN: Well, I, you know, as I say, I haven't probed uh, uh...

PRESIDENT: Sullivan.

DEAN: ...Sullivan to the depths on this because I-- he's, he's one I want to treat at arm's length, till we make sure...

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PRESIDENT: Right.

DEAN: ...he is safe.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

DEAN: But he has a world of information that, uh, may be available.

PRESIDENT: But he says that what happened on the, on the, uh, bugging thing is--who told what to whom again? The bugging thing?

DEAN: Oh. On the '68 thing--I was trying to track down the, the leaks.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: He said that the only place he could figure it coming from would be one of a couple of sources he was aware of, uh, that had been somewhat discussed publicly. He said that Hoover had told Patrick Coyne about the fact that this was being done. Coyne had told Rockefeller.

PRESIDENT: Yeah (unintelligible)

DEAN: Now Rockefeller had told Kissinger. Now, I have never run it any step beyond what Mr. Sullivan said there. Now the other thing is that when the records were unavailable for Hoover--all this and the logs...

PRESIDENT: Yeah. (Clears throat)

DEAN: ...Hoover tried to re--, reconstruct them by going to the Washington Field Office and he made a pretty good stir about what he was doing when he was trying to get the record and reconstruct it. And, he said that at that time we probably hit the grapevine in the Bureau that this had occurred. But there is no evidence of it. Uh, the records show at the Department of Justice and, and the FBI that there's no such, uh, surveillance was ever conducted. Uh--



PRESIDENT: Shocking (unintelligible)

DEAN: Now, about White House staff and reporters and the like, and, now, the only, the other person that knows--is aware of it--is Mark Felt, and we've talked about Mark Felt, and, uh--I guess, uh--

PRESIDENT: What does it do to him, though? Let's face it. You know, suppose that Felt come out and unwraps the whole thing. What does it do to him?

DEAN: He can't do it. It just--

PRESIDENT: But my point is: Who's going to hire him?

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Let's face it.

DEAN: He can't. He's--

PRESIDENT: If he--the guy that does that can go out and, uh, you mean he's a--of course, he couldn't do it unless he had a guarantee from somebody like Time magazine saying "Look we'll give you a job for life." Then what do they do? They put him in a job for life, and everybody would treat him like a pariah. He's in a very dangerous situation. These guys you know--the informers, look what it did to Chambers. Chambers informed because he didn't give a God damn.

DEAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: But then, one of the most brilliant writers according to Jim (unintelligible) we've ever seen in this country--and I am not referring to the Communist issue--this, this greatest single guy in the time of twenty-five or, thirty years ago, probably, probably the best writer in, in this century. They finished him.

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DEAN: Uh huh. Well, I think, I, there's no--

PRESIDENT: Either way, either way, the, the, the informer is not wanted in our society. Either way, that's the one thing people do sort of line up against. They...

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: ...they say, well that son-of-a-bitch informed. I don't want him around. We wouldn't want him around, would we?

DEAN: I don't, uh--

PRESIDENT: Hoover to Coyne to N.R. to K. Right?

DEAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: Good God. Why would Coyne tell Nelson Rockefeller? He was--I've known Coyne for years. I've--not well, but I--he was a great friend of, oh, uh, one of my Administrative--Bob, uh, King, who was a Bureau man.

DEAN: Now this is Sullivan's story. I have no--

PRESIDENT: Fine. That's all right.

DEAN: I don't know if it's true, but I don't have any reason to doubt that--

PRESIDENT: Most of this is Gospel. Hoover told me, so, uh--and he also told Mitchell, personally, that this had happened. (Unintelligible)

DEAN: Are you talking--I was talking about the '68 uh, incident that just occurred. Not the--

PRESIDENT: I'm talking about the '68 bugging of the plane.

DEAN: Yeah. Oh, I wasn't referring to that now. When this, when this Coyne, uh--

PRESIDENT: Oh, oh, that's--

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DEAN: This, this was the, this was the fact that newsmen had been, uh, I, I--excuse me, I thought he meant the reference to the fact that, uh...

PRESIDENT: Oh.

DEAN: ...three years ago the White House had allegedly--the Time story.

PRESIDENT: Oh, this is a--That's, that's not the, uh--

DEAN: No, on the, on the '68 incident, uh, all I've been able to find out is what you told me that Hoover had told you, what he'd...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...told Mitchell.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: He, uh--

PRESIDENT: Mitchell corroborates that, doesn't he?

DEAN: That's right. Uh, then--

PRESIDENT: Sullivan doesn't remember that?

DEAN: Kevin Phillips called Pat Buchanan the other day with, with a, with a tidbit that, uh, Dick Whelan on...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...the NSC staff had seen memorandum between the NSC and the FBI that the FBI had been instructed to put surveillance on Anna Chennault, the South Vietnamese Embassy and...

PRESIDENT: That is a--

DEAN: ...the Agnew plane.

PRESIDENT: Agnew?

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DEAN: Agnew plane.

PRESIDENT: They put it on our--well, this isn't mine-- maybe I'm wrong.

DEAN: Now, and it said al--, and this note also said that, uh, Deke DeLoach was the operative FBI officer on this.

PRESIDENT: I think DeLoach's memory now is very, very hazy in that connection. He doesn't remember anything.

DEAN: Well, I talked to Mitchell about this and Mitchell says that he's talked to DeLoach. DeLoach has in his possession, and he has let Mitchell review them, some of the files on this. Uh--

PRESIDENT: But not, but not--

DEAN: But they don't go very far; they don't go very far--This, this is DeLoach, uh, protecting his own hide. The, uh--

PRESIDENT: They are never going to--It's just as well, to be candid with you. Just as well. But, uh-- so Hoover told Coyne, and, uh, and--who told Rockefeller...

DEAN: --that this--

PRESIDENT: ...who told Kissinger that newsmen were being bugged...

DEAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: ...by us.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Now why would Hoover do that?

DEAN: I don't have the foggiest. This was Sullivan's story as to where, uh, the leak might have come from about this current Time Magazine story, which we are stone-walling totally, uh--

PRESIDENT: Oh, absolutely.

(Note: At this point, a discussion of one minute and twelve seconds which is not pertinent is not transcribed)

PRESIDENT: Sure. And the, and the, and the, and Henry's staff--He insisted on Lake, you see after working with McGov--, uh, uh, for Muskie.

DEAN: Um huh.

PRESIDENT: Incidentally, didn't Muskie do anything bad on there? (Unintelligible) Henry (unintelligible). At least I know not because I know that, I know that he asked that it be done, and I assumed that it was. Lake and Halperin. They're both bad. But the taps were, too. (Unintelligible) They never caught us. Just gobs and gobs of material: gossip and bull-shitting (unintelligible).

DEAN: Um uh.

PRESIDENT: The tapping was a very, very unproductive thing. I've always known that. At least, I've never, it's never been useful in any operation I've ever conducted. (Pause) Well, it is your view that we should try to get out that '68 story then?

DEAN: Well, I think the threat...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: ...the threat of the '68 story when, when Scott and the others were arguing that the Committee up on the Hill broadened its mandate...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...to include other elections...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...they were hinting around that something occurred in '68 and '64 that should be looked at.

PRESIDENT: Right. Goldwater claims he was bugged.

DEAN: That's right. Now I think that, I think that, that threats--

PRESIDENT: Did you think Gold--Oh, you, didn't you say that Johnson did bug Goldwater's--?

DEAN: He, he didn't--well, I, we don't know, I don't know if he bugged him, but...

PRESIDENT: He did intelligence work?

DEAN: ...he did intelligence work up one side and down the other...

PRESIDENT: From the FBI?

DEAN: ...from the FBI. Uh, just up one side and down the other on Goldwater.

PRESIDENT: Um hm.

DEAN: Now I have not had a chance to talk to the Senator, and I've known the Senator for twenty years. Uh, he is the first man in public life I ever met. Uh, Barry Jr. and I were roommates in school together, so I, and I can talk to the man.

PRESIDENT: Sure.

DEAN: I am really going to sit down with him one day and say...

PRESIDENT: I think you should.

DEAN: ...say, "what..."

PRESIDENT: Say, "What the hell do you..."

DEAN: "...what, what do you..."

PRESIDENT: ...Do you have any hard evidence?"

DEAN: That's right. Then we can go from there and...

PRESIDENT: Right.

DEAN: ...possibly reconstruct some things.

PRESIDENT: Get some stuff written, and so forth. I do think you've got to remember that, as you sure do, this is mainly a public relations thing, anyway. What is the situation, incidentally, with regard to the, the sentencing of our, of the people, the seven? When the hell is that going to occur?

DEAN: That's likely to occur, I would say, (sighs) could occur as early as late this week, more likely some time next week.

PRESIDENT: Why has it been delayed so long?

DEAN: Well, they, they've been in, in process of preparing the pre-sentence report. The Judge sends out probation officers to find out everybody who knew...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...these people, and then he'll--

PRESIDENT: He's trying to work on them to break them is he? (Unintelligible)

DEAN: Well, there's some of that. They are using the probation officer for more than a normal probation report. They are trying to, uh...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...do a mini-investigation by the Judge himself, which is his only investigative tool here, so they, that, they are virtually completed now. They--the U.S. Attorney who handles, the, the Assistant U.S. Attorney.

PRESIDENT: You know when they talk, though, about a thirty-five year sentence, now here's, here's something that does not involve--There were no weapons, right? There were no injuries, right? There was no succe--well, success maybe--I don't know. The point is--the, uh--that, that sort of thing is just ridiculous. One of these, one of these blacks, you know, goes in here and holds up a, a store with a God damned gun, and, uh, they give him two years and then probation after...

DEAN: And they...

PRESIDENT: ...six months.

DEAN: ... and they let him out on, on bond during the time that he is considering his case. These fellows cannot get out--

PRESIDENT: Are they out? Have they been in jail?

DEAN: They're in--well, all but one. Hunt made the, the bond. Everybody else is in jail. They've got a hundred thousand dollar surety bond which means they have to put up actual collateral, but uh, and none of these people have a hundred thousand dollars. The Court of Appeals has been sitting for two weeks or better now on a review of the bond issue. They're not even letting these people out to prepare their case for appeal.

.(Note: At this point, a discussion of about fifteen minutes which is not pertinent is not transcribed)

(Reel One Ends)

(Reel Two Begins)

PRESIDENT: You still think Sullivan is basically reliable?

DEAN: I, I have nothing to judge...

PRESIDENT: No.

DEAN: ...that on other--I watched him for a number of years. I watched him when he was working



DEAN:  
(CONTINUED) with Tom Huston on domestic intelligence, and his, in his desire to do the right thing. Uh, I tried to, you know, stay in touch with Bill, and find out what his moods are. Bill was forced on the outside for a long time. He didn't become, he didn't become bitter. He sat back and waited until he could come back in. Uh, he didn't try to force or blackmail his way around, uh, with knowledge he had. So, I, I have no, I have no signs of anything but a reliable man who thinks a great deal of this Administration and of, and of you.

PRESIDENT: You understand the problem we have here is that Gray is going to insist, I am sure, come down hard for Felt as the second man. And that would worry the hell out of me if Felt--I think at the present time it doesn't.

DEAN: It, it worries me, frankly.

PRESIDENT: But for the future, isn't it a problem?

DEAN: I think it is for the future, 'cause onl-- things can only get more complex over there as we move along. There is no (laughs) doubt about it.

PRESIDENT: Well, as he gets closer to the next election--Oh, uh, (unintelligible). I don't know Felt, never met him. What's he look like?

(Note: At this point, there was a discussion of one minute and sixteen seconds deleted which is not pertinent)

DEAN: Well, I've got to say one thing. There has never been a leak out of my (laughs) office. There never will...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: ...be a leak out of my office.

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DEAN: Oh, it is.

PRESIDENT: For Christ sake.

DEAN: It is.

PRESIDENT: I mean, uh, what, what happened to the kid? Did he just, uh, decide to be a hero?

DEAN: That's right. He apparently chatted about it around school, and the word got out, and he got confronted with it and he knew he'd chatted about it, and so there he was. It's, uh, absurd; it really is. He didn't do anything illegal. Uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, of course not. Apparently you haven't been able to do anything on my . . .

DEAN: But I have, sir . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . project of take the offensive. . .

DEAN: No, to the contrary.

PRESIDENT: . . . based on Sullivan.

DEAN: No, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Have you kicked a few butts around?

DEAN: Uh, I have all of the information that we have finished-- that we've collected. There is some there, and, uh, I've turned it over to Baroody. Baroody is having a speech drafted for Barry Goldwater. And there's enough material there to make a rather sensational speech just by: "Why in the hell isn't somebody looking into what happened to President Nixon when, during his campaign - look at these events. How do you explain these? Where are the answers to these questions?" Uh, there's enough of a thread, I've . . .

PRESIDENT: Double standard.

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DEAN: . . . Yeah, and I've, I've pulled all the information . . .

PRESIDENT: Also, the Senator then should also present it to the, uh, to the Ervin Committee and demand that that be included.

DEAN: . . . A letter . . .

PRESIDENT: He is a Senator, . . .

DEAN: What I'm working on now . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . a Senator -

DEAN: . . . is a letter to Senator Ervin saying, "This has come to my attention, and why shouldn't, uh, why shouldn't this be a part of the inquiry?" And he can spring out of '64 and then quickly to '72. And, and we've got a pretty good speech, uh, Baroody tells me, if we can get out our material.

PRESIDENT: Good.

DEAN: So it's in the mill.

HALDEMAN: Good. (Unintelligible) friends have you got (unintelligible)

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Thank God.

HALDEMAN: Why has there never been (unintelligible) come up and did it before?

PRESIDENT: Just wasn't enough stuff. They couldn't get anybody to pay attention. For example, the investigations were supposed to have been taken for the thirty-four million-odd contributed to McGovern in small-- Oh Christ, there's a lot of hanky-panky in there, and the records used on it are just too bad to find out anything.

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DEAN: That's one of the problems that he has . . .

PRESIDENT: That's the problem, and can that be an issue?

DEAN: That will be an issue. That we have -- there is a crew working that, also.

PRESIDENT: Do you need any IRS (unintelligible) stuff?

DEAN: Uh, not at this . . .

WAITER: Would you care for some coffee?

DEAN: No, thank you, I'm fine.

WAITER: Okay.

DEAN: Uh, there is no need at this hour for anything from IRS, and we have a couple of sources over there that I can go to. I don't have to fool around with Johnnie Walters or anybody, we can get right in and get what we need.

PRESIDENT: Talk to Elliot Gompers.

DEAN: I've, I've been preparing the, uh, the answers for the briefing book and I just raised this with Ron, uh. It's my estimation, for what it's worth, that probably this week will draw more Watergate questions than any other week you're likely to see, uh, given the Gray hearings, the new revelations about -- they're not new, but they're now substantiated -- about Kalmbach and Chapin that have been in the press.

PRESIDENT: To the effect of what? They . . .

DEAN: That Chapin directed Kalmbach to pay Segretti, the alleged saboteur, somewhere between thirty-five and forty thousand dollars. Uh, there is an awful lot of that out in the press now.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: There is also the question of Dean appearing, not appearing -- Dean's role. There was more

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stories in the Post this morning that are absolutely inaccurate, uh, about my turning information over to the Re-election Committee for uh, uh -- some woman over there, Mrs. Hoback, signed an affidavit, gave it to Birch Bayh, said that I was, uh, brought into Mardian's, Bob Mardian's office within forty-eight hours after a private interview I had with the jury confronted with it. How did they know that? Well, it came from internal sources over there, is how they knew it.

PRESIDENT: From what?

DEAN: Internal sources. This girl had told others that she was doing this, and they just told, uh, just quickly filled her to the top that she was out on her own.

PRESIDENT: She did?

DEAN: She did. Then we had two or three of those.

PRESIDENT: Why did she do that? Was she mad?

DEAN: She's a registered Democrat.

PREISIDENT: Why did we take her in?

DEAN: I'll-- To this day, I do not understand what she was doing. And she was . . .

PRESIDENT: Who was she working for?

DEAN: She worked in Stans' operation.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) that was a bright move.

DEAN: It wasn't a good move. He had -- in fact, that was one of our problems, was the, uh, the little pocket of women that worked for Maury Stans. No doubt about it, that was -- things would have sailed a lot smoother without that pack. Not that they had anything that was devastating.

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PRESIDENT: They won't believe the truth, they don't know what to believe when they convicted seven people.

DEAN: That's right. They will continually try to say that there's something (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: They'll say, "Haldeman did it." And then they'll say I did it.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: I don't think they'll get to that point. They might question his political savvy, but not mine. Not on a matter like that.

DEAN: (Laughs.) No. (Pause) Well, the thing on Sullivan which I have. (Noise) Sullivan, uh, who as I told you, and, have been prompting him and I said, "Bill, I would like, for my own use, to have a list of some of the horrors that you're aware of." Well, he hasn't responded back to me, but he sent me a note yesterday saying that, "John, I am willing at any time to testify to what I know if you want me to." What he has, as we already know, has got a certain degree of, uh-- it's a, it's a dynamite situation what he's got already-- the '68 bugging, the surveillance that Goldwater people . . .

PRESIDENT: It's not -- we (unintelligible) on the '68 bugging, that it was ordered, but he doesn't know whether it was carried out.

DEAN: That's right. Uh . . .

PRESIDENT: But at least he will say that . . .

DEAN: Yes.

PRESIDENT: Tell them, for example, I mean I . . .

DEAN: I would think . . .

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PRESIDENT: That kind of thing. (Noise)

DEAN: Well, I've never talked to Bill about this so it must be-- I've never really gone into detail, because he's always been very up close about it, but he is now getting to the point if, if we wanted him to do this, someone, and I don't think the White House should do it, should sit down with him and really take him over cross-examination of what he does know and, and how strong it is, what he can, can substantiate.

PRESIDENT: John, who the hell could do it if you don't?

DEAN: Well, that's, that's probably-- there's no one. That's the, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: That's the problem.

DEAN: . . . That's the problem. Now, the other thing is, if we were going to use a tactic like this: Let's say in the Gray hearings, . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: . . . where everything is cast that, that we're, we're, that we're the political people and they're not-- that Hoover was above reproach, which is just not accurate.

PRESIDENT: Bull shit. Bull shit.

DEAN: Total bull shit. The, uh, the person who could, would destroy Hoover's image is going to be this man, Bill Sullivan. Uh, that's what's at stake there. Also, it's going to tarnish quite severely, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Some of the FBI.

DEAN: . . . Some of the FBI. And a former President.

PRESIDENT: Fine.



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DEAN: Uh, he's going to lay it out, and he, it's just all hell is going to break loose once he does it. It's going to change the atmosphere of the Gray hearings. It's going to change the whole atmosphere of the Water-gate hearings.

PRESIDENT: Not much.

DEAN: Now the risk . . . .

PRESIDENT: How will it change, John?

DEAN: How will it change? Because it'll put them in context that, that, uh, uh, a government institute was used in the past for the most flagrant political purposes.

PRESIDENT: How does that help us?

DEAN: How does it help us?

PRESIDENT: I'm being, I'm just being . . . .

DEAN: Yeah, I, I appreciate what you are doing.

PRESIDENT: Red herring. Is that what you mean?

DEAN: Yes. It's a, it's a red herring. It's what the public already believes. It's just that -- people would just -- I would say, react, that, oh Christ, more of that stuff. Uh, they're all, you know, they're all bad down there. Because it's a one way street right now . . . .

PRESIDENT: The press may not use it?

DEAN: Pardon?

PRESIDENT: The press may use it? They may not play it.

DEAN: It'd be difficult not to. Uh, it'd be difficult not to.

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PRESIDENT: Why is it that Sullivan'd be willing to do this?

DEAN: I think the, the quid pro quo with Sullivan is that he wants someday back in the Bureau very badly.

PRESIDENT: That's easy.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Do you think after he did this to the Bureau that they'd want him back? "They." If there is a "they."

DEAN: Uh, probably not. But I think that, uh, he could also possibly do -- what, what Bill Sullivan's desire in life is, is to set up a national, or domestic national security intelligence system, a plan, a program. He says we're deficient. Uh, we've never been efficient, since Hoover lost his guts several years ago. If you recall, he and Tom Huston worked on it. Uh, Tom Huston had your instruction to go out and do it. Then the whole thing just crumbled.

PRESIDENT: Do you think Hoover would have cooperated?

DEAN: That's all Sullivan really wants. Even if we just put him off studying it for a couple of years, we could put him out in the CIA or some place else where he felt . . .

PRESIDENT: Put him there; we'll do it.

DEAN: I think that's what the answer is. I've never really . . .

PRESIDENT: No problem with Sullivan. We'll put him -- I mean, he's a valuable man. (Phone rings) Uh, now, would the FBI then turn on him, piss on him?

DEAN: There would be some effort at that. That's right, they would say he's disgruntled.

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He was canned by Hoover. He is angry, he's coming back. But that would kind of, I would think a lot of that would be lost in the, uh, in the shuffle of what he is laying out. I don't know if he's given me his best yet. I don't know if he's got more ammunition than the way he has already told me. Those were just a couple off-the-cuff remarks.

PRESIDENT: And that's why you said that-- Why do you think he is now telling you this? Why is he doing this now?

DEAN: Well, the way it came out is, when I, when the Time Magazine article broke on the fact that it charged that the White House had directed that newsmen and White House staff people be, uh, subject to some sort of surveillance for national security reasons, I called, in tracking down what had happened. I called Sullivan and I said, "Bill, you'd better come over and talk to me about that and tell me what you know." I was calling him to really determine if he was a leak. That's one of the reasons. I was curious to know where this might have come from because he was the operative man at the Bureau at the time. He's the one who did it. Uh, he would not, you know, he came over and he was shocked and, uh, distraught, and the like about going (unintelligible) (laughs) frankly, uh, and then, and after going through his explanation of all what had happened, he started volunteering this other thing. He said, "John, what, this is the only thing I can think of during this administration that has any taint of political use but it doesn't really bother me 'cause it was a national security purpose. These people worked-- there was sensitive material that was getting out, was getting out to reporters."

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) what we ordered?

DEAN: That's right.

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PRESIDENT: Of course, it had to be true after he (unintelligible) involved in the God damned Vietnam War.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's what it was.

DEAN: Then he told me about going to Paris and working with the Paris Police on Schraft and all that and I, I, he said that doesn't bother me, but he said, "John, what does bother me is that you all have been portrayed as politically using -"

PRESIDENT: And we never did.

DEAN: And we never have. He said the Eisenhower Administration didn't either. The only . . .

PRESIDENT: Never.

DEAN: . . . evidence that he can recall that there has been a real political use has been during Democratic tenure. I said, "For example, Bill, what are you talking about?" Then he told me this example of, of, uh, the Walter Jenkins affair, when DeLoach

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . and, and Fortas, and (unintelligible) something out of that.

PRESIDENT: Definitely. The Kennedys, the Kennedys used it, let me say, politically on that steel thing.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That was not, that was not a national security, was it?

DEAN: No. Now I asked, uh, I asked somebody about that and they told me that what happened

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there is that, uh-- they were being defensive of Kennedy, and so that the person who would defend Kennedy necessarily was saying that Kennedy had given Hoover orders and Hoover, being typical in his response, tried to get it yesterday as far as the answer for the President. And that's why he sent people out in the middle of the night and the blame really fell on Hoover. And, and this might be (unintelligible) over there though, who knows.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: Well, that's right.

PRESIDENT: It's still wrong.

DEAN: That's right. Sure.

PRESIDENT: Good God. Can you imagine if somebody -- steel company that had raised hell about, uh, or an automobile company, about something, silly thing, Ruckelshaus does, and we send FBI Agents out to arrest? Jesus Christ, now. Does he know about the bug-ging of Martin Luther King?

DEAN: Yep.

PRESIDENT: I wonder if he'd tell that, that would be good.

DEAN: I think he would tell everything he knows.

PRESIDENT: You do?

DEAN: Uh huh. That's why I'm saying he is, he is, he is a trem -- he's a bomb. Uh, now the fact is. . .

PRESIDENT: You really have to keep telling . . .

DEAN: What?

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

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DEAN: Well, if that's, that's the, the real problem is, how it's structured, how can it be done. Uh, he sent me this note and I called up and I said, "Bill, I appreciate getting that note very much." I said, "It takes a lot of guts to send a note like that to me." And he said - I said, "It's kind of a pleasure to see a man stand up, blowing a little smoke up him and the like." Uh, he said, "Well, John, I mean it. I am perfectly willing to do anything you want. If you want me to go up and testify, I will." I said, "Well, how much, you have just given me some tidbits that you, in our conversation and I would really like to again repeat: Can you put together what you do know; just for your own use right now, just put it together on a pad, go through all your recollections; and then also tell me how you can substantiate it, and, what kind of cross-examination you might be subject to on it if you did testify." So he is doing that. Now, the question I've, I've had is, how in the world can we program something like this? The wa-- I, I just have a feeling that it would be bad for one Bill Sullivan to quietly appear up on, uh, on some Senator's doorstep, and say, "I've got some information you ought to have." "Well, where did you get it? Where-- why are you up here?" "The White House sent me." That would be bad. The other thing is, maybe this information could be brought to the attention of the White House, and the White House could say, uh, to, uh, Eastland, "I think you ought to call an executive session and hear his testimony. This is quite troublesome, the information that has been presented to us. It's so troublesome, we can't hold it here and hope to, uh, and rest comfortable."

PRESIDENT: Why, why on the other hand doesn't he just present it to Eastland? I mean, uh -- Why executive session? That doesn't serve. . .

DEAN: Well, it would, one, because you're trying -- The first approach would be not to destroy

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the Bureau, not to tarnish the names. It's going to leak out of there, though, quite obviously. If it doesn't, we'd make sure it did. Uh - (coughs) (pause) If, if, uh, Sullivan went up to Eastland cold and just said, or Hruska. I would think they would say, "Go on back down to the Department of Justice where you work, and let's not start all this."

PRESIDENT: Suppose another thing, Patrick Gray says to either Eastland or to, or to Hruska or anybody on that Committee-- who is the tiger on the Committee on our side, on the Committee, the Judiciary Committee?

DEAN: Cook's . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: Gurney, Gurney has been good. Gurney was good during the ITT hearings, and he, he'll study, he'll get prepared. Uh, . . .

PRESIDENT: But, would he go after the Bureau? (Unintelligible)

DEAN: They're not going after the Bureau. What they are doing is, they're taking the testimony of somebody who is going after the Bureau.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I know that. I'm just thinking of the . . .

DEAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: They all look down the road and see what would be the result of what they are doing is, won't they? I would think so. I mean, I'm just trying, how -- would they go after Johnson? (Pause) Let's look at the distant future. Uh, look at the -- how bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly discredited? (Unintelligible)

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DEAN: (Unintelligible) I've, I've, kicked this around with Dick Moore, these, these broader questions, and, I think it would be damaging to the FBI, uh, but maybe it's time to shake the FBI and rebuild it.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: I'm not so sure the FBI is everything it's cracked up to be. I, I'm convinced the FBI isn't everything the public thinks it is.

PRESIDENT: No.

DEAN: I know quite well it isn't.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) if you could get, uh, Jerry Wilson in there rather than a political appointee. What is your feeling at the moment about Gray? Can he hang in? Should he? I don't know.

DEAN: Uh. . .

PRESIDENT: Awfully close.

DEAN: . . . I -- they're going to vote this -- they have an executive session this afternoon to invite me to testify.

PRESIDENT: Sure.

DEAN: Uh, there's no question, they're going to invite me. Uh, I would say, based on how I handle the: (1) the formal letter that comes out of the Committee asking for information, and I programmed that they do get specific, just what in the hell do they want to know that I've got, and lay it out in the letter that's sent down here asking me to appear so I can be responsive, fully. . .

PRESIDENT: Respond to the letter.

DEAN: . . . Respond to the letter in full. I think I have, I feel I have nothing to hide, as far as, uh, the issue they've raised.

PRESIDENT: Would you respond under oath?



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DEAN: I think I would be willing to, yes.

PRESIDENT: That's what I'd say because that's what I am preparing in the press thing. I'll say you'll respond under oath in a letter. You will not appear in a formal session.

DEAN: That's, that's our present position.

PRESIDENT: What if they say, what if they say, "Would he be willing to be questioned under oath?"

DEAN: That's not what the question is. Yes, I'd be willing to be questioned under oath, but we're not going up.

PRESIDENT: No, no. But here?

DEAN: Oh, I think that would be a hell of a bad precedent.

PRESIDENT: Okay. I just wanted to be sure we don't cross that bridge. I agree. You--but you would respond to written interrogatories.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's it. Okay.

DEAN: Now, uh, after, after that, if we've been responsive, their argument for holding up Gray's confirmation based on me is, should be gone. Sure, they're going to say it raises more questions than it answers, but if we're-- but that can go on forever. We've taken the central points they want answers to, given them the responses, that puts something in Eastland's hand that can say, "All right, it's time, it's time to vote." And Eastland says he's got the votes to get Gray through. Now, but what happens on the Senate Floor is something else, 'cause Byrd is opposing Gray. Byrd's got good control of that Southern bloc.

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PRESIDENT: Not totally.

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Byrd is running for leader of the whole Senate. A lot of them may desert him on this.

DEAN: But Mansfield, on the other hand, of course, has come out and said that he favors, initially he supported Gray's, uh, confirmation.

PRESIDENT: My feeling is that they would like (unintelligible). I think that they'd like to have, a, an excuse not to do it. Maybe they'll use, not you, but all this crap about hearings (unintelligible)

DEAN: Well, if they say, if they say they have to hold up Gray's confirmation until the Watergate hearings are completed. . . .

PRESIDENT: Oh, that's great.

DEAN: . . . that's the vehicle . . . .

PRESIDENT: The best of both worlds for us, John.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Because Gray, in my opinion, should not be the head of the FBI. Not because of any character or other flaws or thoughtless flaws, but because he is going to be too much like Kleindienst. After going through the hell of the hearing, he will not be a good Director, as far as we're concerned.

DEAN: I think that's probably true. He'll be a, he'll be a very suspect Director. Not that I don't think Pat won't do what we want. I, I read him a little differently than Dick in that regard. Like he's still keeping close touch with me. He's calling me. He's given

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me his private line. We talk at night, just how do you want me to handle this, so and so forth. So he still plays, playing in tight and still being involved. But I think he. . .

PRESIDENT: But he couldn't do it.

DEAN: But he can't do it. He's under, he's going to be under such surveillance by his own people-- watch every move he's making--uh, that'll be the difficult thing for Pat. Not that Pat wouldn't want to still play ball, but he may not be able to.

PRESIDENT: I agree. That's what I meant.

DEAN: Pat has already gotten himself, himself, in a situation where he's got this Mark Felt as his number two man. These other people are surrounding him. If you put a guy like Jerry Wilson in there he could just, you know, wipe this, and say, "Gentlemen, I'm putting my own team in, and I'm going to bring people in I've met around the country who are good office directors; Sacks out of Chicago," wherever, and just put his own team together for the, for the Headquarter's Office.

PRESIDENT: So where do you come out?

DEAN: Gray's already been locked into, to major personnel decisions. (Pause) I wouldn't be surprised to see that occur if they say that they cannot go forward with Gray's hearings because of the Watergate.

PRESIDENT: Where would that be done, John, at what point in the Committee or on the Floor or both?

DEAN: It could happen. It would certainly be voted on first in the, uh, uh, in the Committee, in the Judiciary Committee.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

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DEAN: The question is, then, whether, uh, it'll be put on the calendar by the leadership. I assume that that's . . .

PRESIDENT: The leadership might determine that we will not put it on the calendar until after the Watergate hearings.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Then we could then. Gray could then come in and say I will not wait that long.

DEAN: And they'll -- when they -- you're -- "This, you're, this is damaging to the leadership of the FBI, and I will have to withdraw based on this." What would be nice for all would be to get Gray voted out of the Committee . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . with a, with a positive vote, uh, enough to get him out of the Committee, and then lock him at limbo there.

PRESIDENT: What is Moore's judgement about Sullivan? Does he know?

DEAN: Yeah, he's uh, uh, he says it's a piece of dynamite. He says it depends and we both agree, that it, it -- the way it would be done would be a secret, whether it was done. Whether -- this isn't the sort of thing we could just leap out and do. Have to be very carefully thought through. Have to be, have to decide in advance should the White House not be involved or should we be involved? If we're going to play with it, we are going to probably have to say that we were involved and structure it in a way that there is nothing improper with our involvement.

PRESIDENT: The difficulty with the White House being involved is that if we are involved in pissing on Johnson -- that's only thing that concerns me.

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DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's why it really ought to be, I mean, if he could just . . .

DEAN: I suppose the answer is saying, to, to have him -- to say to him . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

DEAN: . . . You've got, you know, this is something -- "What you've, you've intimated a few things to me, uh, the proper place to take that information is to the Senate Judiciary Committee or to the Attorney General, possibly." (Pause) And then have Dick take it to the Committee. Or is that too close to the President, still?

PRESIDENT: First hand, if he takes it to the Committee, it's better if the Committee's conducting a hearing. (Unintelligible). Wait a minute, he works for the Attorney General, doesn't he.

DEAN: That's right. If he takes it to Kleindienst, Kleindienst is going to say, "Bill, just don't do it because you are going to take DeLoach's name down with it, and DeLoach is a friend of ours."

PRESIDENT: Bull shit.

DEAN: Something I have always questioned.

PRESIDENT: Nobody is a friend of ours. Let's face it. Let's don't worry about that sort of thing.

(Pause)

DEAN: Well, it's something I will, uh, I think I ought to (unintelligible) kick around with Dick Moore, 'cause . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

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DEAN: But first of all, I've got to, uh, just have to be thought through every inch of the way. It came here . . .

PRESIDENT: Sure.

DEAN: . . . late yesterday afternoon.

PRESIDENT: Sure.

DEAN: It was not -- Bob said, uh, when I talked to him, he said he was quite excited about it, as Ehrlichman said, gave a very favorable "Uh huh." Uh, and I said, "Well, I'm not going to rush anything on this. It's -- We've a little bomb here that we might want to drop at one. . . ."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . point down the road."

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah.

DEAN: Maybe, maybe the forum to do it is something totally out of the Committee context between the Gray confirmation hearings and the Water-gate hearings. Maybe let him go over to U.S. News, or who knows what it would be, but we ought to consider every option, now that we've got it, and see if. . . .

PRESIDENT: Rather than doing it in a hearing, (pause) doing it in the press. Then that will force the hearing to call him. That's another way you can do on this. Have him be selected to, . . .

DEAN: Give an interview.

PRESIDENT: . . . to give an interview. I would do it in U.S. News. Do it in (unintelligible) wire service guy or something. A respected damn reporter. Why not go to a jackass like Mollenhoff? No, he's too close to use.

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DEAN: Well, that's interesting. Now, Mollenhoff is, is close but, by God, you can't program Mollenhoff to do anything.

PRESIDENT: No.

DEAN: And if, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: No. And also, we are in a position on Mollenhoff, who's been fighting us some, that maybe, maybe Mollenhoff would be a pretty good prospect for this thing because it's the kind of a story he loves, he digs on some. You couldn't tell him, however, uh, you couldn't let him know (unintelligible) story part. Or Sullivan just goes to talk to him, says, "Well, now, hell, you're a hell of a, hell of a guy, and, uh, I just want to tell you a few things."

DEAN: Or, can you call Clark and say -- can I call Clark and say, "Listen, Clark, a guy has brought me a piece of dynamite I don't even want in the White House?"

PRESIDENT: He will write that, though, won't he?

DEAN: No. Because that'd look like that's a set-up deal. Well, Clark Mollenhoff is the first guy to (unintelligible) uncover . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . a piece of anything; he'll say no way.

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: But he's willing to do it.

DEAN: Uh huh.

PRESIDENT: That's very important, at least.

DEAN: Uh huh.

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PRESIDENT: Are they going to go back as far as Chappaquiddick?

DEAN: Well, yeah, but this, this fellow worked into '71 on this. He was up there. He talked to everybody in that town. He, you know, he, he's the one who caused a lot of embarrassment for Kennedy already by saying -- he went up there as a newspaperman. "So why aren't you checking this? Why aren't you looking there?" And pointing the press' attention to things. Gosh, the guy did a masterful job. I have never been, had the full report.

PRESIDENT: Well, coming back to the Sullivan thing, you'd better now go ahead and talk to him. You will now talk to Moore, again to Moore, and, uh, then what?

DEAN: Uh, I'll see if we have something that's viable. And if it's . . .

PRESIDENT: In other words -- have you talked to Sullivan again?

DEAN: Oh, yes. Yes I plan on it.

PRESIDENT: Why the hell don't you get him in and talk to him? (Unintelligible)

DEAN: Well, he's -- I asked him last night and he said, "John give me a day or so to get my, all my recollections together," .

PRESIDENT: Right.



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DEAN: . . . and that was yesterday. So I thought I would call him this evening and say, uh "Bill, I'd just like to know . . ."

PRESIDENT: You see, the fact that you've talked to him will become known. So maybe, maybe the best thing is to say "I am not concerned here," and you say that he, he's to turn this over, and you say we will not handle it. Then make, then anyway, it gets to the Committee, aren't they going to say, "The White House turns over information on the FBI?" That's the -- I don't know how the Christ to get it down there.

DEAN: Well, that's what I think I can kick around with Dick Moore. He and I do very well just bouncing these things. . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . back and forth and coming up with something that . . .

PRESIDENT: I think a newsman . . .

DEAN: . . . we don't have to be embarrassed about it.

PRESIDENT: . . . a newsman, a hell of a break for a newspaper. . .

DEAN: Oh yeah.

PRESIDENT: . . . A hell of a story. Uh, maybe the Star would just run a hell of a story. I mean a real bust on the FBI. Then, and then, and then the Committee member, the man, you, you, for example, on this basis could call Gurney, and say, "Now look. We're on to something very hot here. I can just tell you. I'm not going to tell you anything more. Go after it, forget you ever had this call." And then he goes.

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DEAN: Uh, huh.

PRESIDENT: It seems to me that that's a very effective way to get it out.

DEAN: Uh huh. Another thing is, I don't think Sullivan would give up the White House. Sullivan -- as I said could, there's one liability in Sullivan here, is that's his knowledge of the earlier things that occurred. Uh . . .

PRESIDENT: That we did?

DEAN: That we did.

PRESIDENT: Well, now you should tell them. Oh, you mean he wouldn't, he'd say, he'd say, I did no political work at all. My, my work where they're concerned in Nixon Administration was, was solely in the national security."

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And that is totally true.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Okay. Well, good luck.

DEAN: All right sir.

PRESIDENT: It's never dull, is it?

DEAN: Never.

(end)

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1:25-2:10 p.m.

DEAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: Well, well, "suppose I want to come down with my counsel and question them?" No.

DEAN: No. Written interrogatories, we've said every-- these, these are honest, humble men who are going under oath, they're swearing to me this is the extent of their knowledge, ah . . .

PRESIDENT: And they will, what, what, but on the other hand, we're not saying that they have additional knowledge (phone rings) not as a result of this, that we won't answer written interrogatories.

(Non-pertinent telephone conversation.)

(Loud noises.)

PRESIDENT: Ah, Bob . . . go on, uh.

DEAN: Well I think that, ah . . .

PRESIDENT: Yes.

DEAN: . . . this would be very disarming also for Ervin to, you know, if he came down here and had a little -- with you . . .

PRESIDENT: I think when you see him alone, it's better than having-- Baker's a little whipper-snapper, he'll try to make his point. I've seen Baker.

DEAN: I tell you, for example, something that came back on, fed back through the Attorney General and the Attorney General wanted to talk to you about, but I don't know if it's necessary or not. Ah, Baker said that, raised with Kleindienst, in their private meeting, after he met with both Ervin and Baker-- He said, uh, I want to talk to you, ah, about this '68 bugging incident, which the, ah, the President mentioned to me, when I met with him. This is Baker speaking to Kleindienst, and Kleindienst said well ah, I said I wanted to talk to you about that also because (clears throat) Kleindienst obviously knows that DeLoach is involved. Kleindienst and DeLoach are good friends.

DEAN: The long and short of what I simply say that I think that, ah, Kleindienst, would like to turn Baker off a little bit on looking into the '68 thing and Baker wants to get some more facts on it. So (sighs) it's kind of a hiatus right there, and I don't know as, uh, Baker will go aboard unless Kleindienst assures him they have something to produce and I don't know if Kleindienst has anything to produce.

PRESIDENT: He won't produce if he has it. The question is now what about Sullivan? Are you gonna convert him?

DEAN: No, Sullivan, ah, is, ah, committed to have me or have prepared for me in his own type-written, ah, product, his list of all the horrors that he is, ah . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . been able to recollect.

PRESIDENT: I want that, I want that for starter, of course, nothing more.

DEAN: I think so.

PRESIDENT: You need it very much. I want it. Now, you were saying too, ah, what really, ah, where the, this thing leads, I mean in terms of the vulnerabilities and so forth. It's your view the vulnerables are basically Mitchell, Colson, Haldeman, indirectly, possibly directly, and of course, the second level is, as far as the White House is concerned, Chapin.

DEAN: And I'd say Dean, to a degree.

PRESIDENT: You? Why?

DEAN: Well, because I've been all over this thing like a blanket.

PRESIDENT: I know, I know, but you know all about it, but you didn't, you were in it after the deed was done.

DEAN: ... if, if somebody out of here were to start saying, or say, all right, Jeb, you're gonna, you're, you're gonna take the heat on this one, ah . . .

PRESIDENT: Somebody down here's gonna say that?

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Can't do that.

DEAN: No.

PRESIDENT: I think what you've got to do, to the extent that you can, John, is cut her off at the pass. And you cut off at the pass. Liddy and his bunch just did this as part of their job.

DEAN: They were out on a lark. They went beyond any assignment they ever had.

PRESIDENT: Now on the Segretti thing, I think you've just got to -- Chapin and all of them have just got to take the heat. Look, you've got to admit the facts, John, and . . .

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And that's our -- and that's that. And Kalmbach paid him. And paid a lot of people. I, I just think on Segretti, no matter how bad it is-- It isn't nearly as bad as people think it was. Espionage, sabotage, shit.

DEAN: The intent, when Segretti was hired, was nothing evil, nothing vicious, nothing bad, nothing. Not espionage, not sabotage. It was pranksterism that got out of hand, it-- and we don't know that. And I think we can lay our story out there. Ah, I have no problem with the Segretti thing. It's just not that serious. The, ah, ah, the other potential problem, ah, is Ehrlichman's and that is . . .

PRESIDENT: In connection with Hunt?

DEAN: In connection with Hunt and Liddy both.

PRESIDENT: They worked for him?

DEAN: They -- these fellows had to be some idiots, as we've learned after the fact. They went out and went into Dr. Ellsberg's doctor's office and they had, they were geared up with all this CIA equipment, cameras and the like. Well, they turned the stuff back in to the CIA some point in time and left film in the camera. Ah, CIA has not put this together, and they don't know what it all means right now. But it wouldn't take a very sharp investigator very long because you've got pictures in the CIA files that they had to turn over to Justice.

PRESIDENT: What in the world, what in the name of God was Ehrlichman having something (unintelligible) in the Ellsberg?

DEAN: They were trying to -- this was a part of ah, an operation that, ah -- in connection with the Pentagon papers. They were -- the whole thing -- and they wanted to get Ellsberg's psychiatric records for some reason.

PRESIDENT: Why?

DEAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: This is the first I ever heard of this. I, I (unintelligible)

DEAN: Ah . . .

PRESIDENT: ... care about Ellsberg was not our problem.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Jesus Christ.

DEAN: Well, anyway, it, it, you know, it was under an Ehrlichman structure, maybe John didn't ever know. I've never asked him if he knew. I didn't want to know.

PRESIDENT: I can't see that getting into, into this hearing.

DEAN: Well, look. Here's-- no, here's the way it can come up.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: In the CIA's files which they -- which the Committee is asking for -- in the material they turned over the Department of Justice . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

DEAN: . . . there are all the materials relating to Hunt. In there are these pictures which the CIA developed and they've got Gordon Liddy standing proud as punch outside this doctor's office with his name on it. And it's this material, it's not going to take very long for an investigator to go back and say, why would this somebody be at the doctor's office, and they'd find out that there was a break-in at the doctor's office, and then you'd find Liddy on the staff, and then you'd start working it back. I don't think they'll ever reach that point.

PRESIDENT: Campaign.

DEAN: This was way . . .

PRESIDENT: It's irrelevant.

DEAN: It's irrelevant. Right.

PRESIDENT: That's the point. That's where -- that's where -- where, ah, Ervin's rules of relevancy-- I'd like to know-- Now what the hell has this got to do with it?

DEAN: It has nothing as a lot of these things that they could stumble along into, ah, is irrelevant.