

VI.B Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.)
Negotiations, 1965-67: Announce Position Statements

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE



UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967



VIETNAM TASK FORCE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Part VI.B.

NEGOTIATIONS 1965 - 1967:

ANNOUNCED POSITION STATEMENTS

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VI. B.

NEGOTIATIONS 1965 - 1967:

ANNOUNCED POSITION STATEMENTS

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1. US POSITION STATEMENTS

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE: Statement by Mc-George Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, September 30, 1963 (Excerpts)¹

* * * * *

The difficult situation in the troubled country of South Viet-Nam is one which I have even less desire to discuss, in substantive terms, than the other questions I have taken as examples. The important mission of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment on the course of action which may be chosen in the light of this mission and of the continuing consideration which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington.

Yet it is not wrong, I think, to suggest that in this case again there are two propositions, both of them true, and two kinds of error which can result from an unwillingness to accept them both. And again both propositions have been stated clearly by the President. The first is that the object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subversion—military, paramilitary, and political. The commitment of the United States to the independence of South Viet-Nam goes back many years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2 years ago, and since then a major cooperative effort has been carried forward with increasing energy—and at least until recently with increasing success—by Americans working closely with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain that effort.

Yet it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise questions about the ability of the Government and people of South Viet-Nam to support each other effectively in their contest with communism. The President has made it clear that the United States is not indifferent to these events and regards them with great concern. It is and must be the policy of the United States Government to make clear its interest in whatever improvements it judges to be necessary, always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest in the first instance upon the people of South Viet-Nam.

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Viet-Nam have often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these differences there have come divergent recommendations for policy. There is nothing discreditable in the existence of such differences. In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which commitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisubversive effort is going well, the man who is working on that effort is bound to see that part of reality as very large. If in the cities there is repression and alienation of public support, men living in those cities, with responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 21, 1963, pp. 623-629.

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963¹

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 623.

SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of February 25, 1965²

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to take a few moments of your time to try to draw together in the simplest and most fundamental way our attitude toward the situation in Southeast Asia.

Some of the things which I shall say will repeat what has been said before, but memories here and abroad seem to be sometimes short. And it is important to repeat and draw together those matters which are at the center of the problem, because there is a great deal else which is peripheral and transitory.

1. The nations of Southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against them from outside their borders. Now, this is not an empty theory; it is a point of vital importance to the safety and, indeed, the very existence of more than a hundred smaller nations all over the world.

2. North Viet-Nam, in callous disregard of the agreements of 1954 and 1962, and of international law, has directed and supplied the essential military personnel and arms for a systematic campaign of terror and guerrilla action aimed at the overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam and at the imposition by force of a Communist regime. The evidence of North Viet-Nam's direct responsibility for this aggression has been repeatedly presented by the Government of Viet-Nam, the United States Government, and the International Control Commission. A full and up-to-date summary of the evidence establishing this responsibility will be available to you within a very few days. It is now being processed for publication.

3. The attitude of the United States toward threats to the peace in Southeast Asia has been made clear many times and in the most serious and formal ways:

(a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact in February 1955, which includes South Viet-Nam as a protocol state; (This treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.)

(b) by a decision of President Eisenhower in 1954 to extend aid to South Vietnam, who said in a letter to the President of South Viet-Nam:

The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

and he went on to say that

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

and then again (c) by the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States, passed in August 1964 by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated, among other things:

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

and that

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

and that

• • • the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom

(d) and then you should remind yourselves of the statement made by President Johnson on the occasion of signing that joint resolution:

To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

4. Now, it has been stated over and over again that the key to peace in Southeast Asia is the readiness of all those in that area to live at peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Now, there is no mystery about that formulation; those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means. It is an obligation under the 1954 agreements, under the 1962 accords on Laos, and under general international law. The illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot be described as "leaving your neighbor alone."

5. There have been negotiated settlements in Southeast Asia, the most recent one as late as 1962. Those several agreements were intended to establish peace in that area; compliance with them by all concerned can achieve that result.

6. Now, since the Geneva conference of 1962, the United States has been in active and continuous consultation with other governments about the danger created by aggression in Southeast Asia. It has been discussed in the United Nations, in the SEATO and NATO Councils, and on innumerable occasions directly with other governments through diplomatic channels. We have had direct discussions with almost every signatory of the agreements of 1954 and 1962. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing and what it knows it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of this crucial element affects the current discussion of "negotiation." Political channels have been and are open, and a considerable number of governments are actively interested in keeping them open to explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution. But a negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible. And a negotiation which simply ends in bitterness and hostility merely adds to the danger.

7. Let me remind you that on February 17 the President said, and I am quoting:

As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

These actions [he added] will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task.

Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once more, that the central object of American policy and action in peace in Southeast Asia and the safety of the independent states in that region. Many of the peoples of that area have been subjected to 25 years of turmoil and violence; they are entitled to peace. We ourselves much prefer to use our resources as a part of an international effort to assist the economic and social development of the peoples of that area than to have them diverted into the harsh necessities of resisting aggression.

I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the association of the United States Government with the activities of these nations you referred to which are trying to keep open the channels of diplomacy?

A. Well, we are ourselves in regular contact with many governments in all parts of the world, through diplomatic means. We have not seen any basis on which we can ask anyone else to speak for us, and we do not know of anyone else who is purporting to speak for us.

But let me come back again with great emphasis—because I do think that it is central to this question of negotiation. And that is that the missing piece—the missing piece is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, in many of these postwar negotiations in the last 20 years, as you know, the negotiations have been frequently and most often preceded by some indication that those negotiations might have some chance of success. Now, that is the missing piece here—that is the missing piece.

The object is the safety and security of these smaller countries of Southeast Asia. In that issue all of the smaller countries of the world have a vital stake. It is at the heart of the very structure of international life, of the international state system. And it is the missing element, the unreadiness of Hanoi to stop doing what it is doing—that is the problem in this thing called negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you give that message to Hanoi by way of the Chinese Communists in the Warsaw meeting the other day?

A. We had a talk—I think it was yesterday. That talk revealed nothing new in the known positions of the two sides. That talk did not supply the missing piece that I am talking about. There was no indication in that talk that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what they are doing.

Q. Well, did you use that channel to get this word directly to them?

A. Our policy, along the lines that I have summarized here, was made clear there; it is made clear repetitively with governments all over the world, time and time again, and this was done yesterday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is speculation here that the United States is now in the process of expanding its military role in Viet-Nam in hopes that this might convince the Hanoi government to provide this missing link.

A. I wouldn't speculate on that from that point of view. I would urge you to look at what I have said in my opening statement. Look at all of it—look at all of it taken together. That is the policy—that is the policy. How you feel you must act at a particular time and under particular circumstances under that policy and within that policy—for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress—depends upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to act to support the independence and safety of these countries of Southeast Asia. That is the policy.

And I would urge you to give serious consideration to all of the elements that I have indicated in my opening statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant, in New York yesterday, in urging the beginning of some kind of informal discussions to restore peace in Viet-Nam, said, "I am sure that the great American people, if they only know the true facts and the background to the developments in South Viet-Nam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary." Now, are you hiding any true facts from the American people?

A. Well, I don't want to comment on that particular statement in any personal sense. I believe that there has been some clarification of that statement since then. But, as I have said to you gentlemen before, I don't know of any situation anywhere in the world on which the American people have been better informed, in more detail, on a current basis, both by officials and by the intensive effort of a vigorous and free press, that is the case with respect to South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps, sir, then you could clarify this point. There has been a noticeable, considerable difference of emphasis in the statements of the general objectives of United States policy in these terms. There have been times when the United States policy has been said to be to defend the freedom of the people of Viet-Nam. There have been other times when the policy of the United States has been said to be to resist the expansion of Chinese Communist aggression. Could you clarify that?

A. I think those two mean exactly the same thing. The expansion of Communist aggression involves the attempt to take over South Viet-Nam. I think that is looking at the same coin from both its sides.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General said he had made a proposal to the United States. The White House said no such proposal has been presented to the President. Do you know of any such proposal?

A. Well, we have talked over the past 2 years informally and on a number of occasions with the Secretary-General, who carries a very heavy responsibility in his role at the United Nations, as well as with many governments in various parts of the world. Now, during that 2-year period, various suggestions have been discussed—sometimes by us, sometimes by others. But the proposals that I know about thus far have been procedural in nature. The missing piece continues to be the absence of any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, these suggestions and procedural questions have been discussed, many of them publicly. This question of calling a conference, under what circumstances—these are procedural matters. What we are interested in, what is needed to restore peace to Southeast Asia, is substance, content, an indication that peace is possible in terms of the appetites and the attitudes of the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you evaluate the situation, the political situation in South Viet-Nam, in the light of the recent changes of government and whether or not you feel that an effective government is now possible there, and is that one of the missing pieces?

A. Well, we have been very deeply concerned, as you know, for some time about the question of the essential unity and solidarity of the Government in Saigon. Confusion on that matter—or the absence of unity—ramifies in a variety of directions and, of course, makes it that much more difficult for them and for us to act effectively to insure the independence and the safety of South Viet-Nam. And undoubtedly disunity and confusion in Saigon increases the expecta-

tion of the other side that, if they persist, they have a chance of success.

So we attach the highest possible priority to unity and solidarity among the South Vietnamese leaders and its Government.

I can express my belief, as well as my hope, that at least some of these problems of disunity have been resolved.

The recent so-called coup that involved—what—something like three battalions again, similar to the one of last September, did not interfere with the operation of the civilian government, or did not create a situation of bloodshed within the country.

But we are moving with hope and expectation and in the closest working relationship with the present Government in that country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement seems to suggest that only Hanoi's aggression gives any body and major danger to what some have also described as the coincident civil war in South Viet-Nam. Did you mean to suggest, sir, that if you obtain evidence that Hanoi stops doing what it is doing, the United States aid and assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would no longer be necessary to handle the local problem?

A. Well, let's be a little careful about this word "indigenous element." There are those who use that term, particularly in the Communist world, because the North Vietnamese are Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese are Vietnamese and they would like to have everyone believe that that is what is meant by letting the Vietnamese settle their own problems. But an attack by North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam by military personnel and arms is aggression contrary to established agreements. Without the control of these operations from the North, without the manpower, the trained manpower sent from the North into the South, without the supply of arms and other key items of equipment from North to South, the indigenous aspect of this problem, the genuinely indigenous aspect of this problem, would be quite a different matter. It was this external aspect of the matter which explains the presence of the American military personnel in that area, the rapid increase in American personnel since 1961. It was the escalation of that infiltration. So I think we need to separate very carefully that part which is local, that part which is external; and the external part of it is the crucial aspect in terms of the pacification of the country and in terms of the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia.

Q. You mean then, also, sir, the withdrawal of such manpower as may have infiltrated as being part of stopping, doing—

A. Well, that is what they are doing; that is what they must stop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect more active and perhaps collective support from other parties than Asians to the American effort in South Viet-Nam, and could you describe whether they have given any formal pledges?

A. Well, we have been discussing with other governments, as you know, for some time now, increased assistance to South Viet-Nam, political, through personnel, economic, in other ways. We have been encouraged in some cases to see that that increased assistance is forthcoming. We know that there are other governments that are considering now whether they might not be able to do more than they have been doing, not just those in Asia. We would welcome additional

support, and we think it is very important, both as an encouragement and practical support for South Viet-Nam and also as an indication to the other side of the international objection as to what the other side is trying to do here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to interpret your statement correctly, could you tell us whether or not you mean to suggest that it would be a precondition of any negotiation or conference that there must be an actual cessation of this penetration, or merely an indication of that?

A. No. I think that it is well for us and for everyone to concentrate on the meat of the matter. The meat of the matter is that Hanoi is sending these people and these arms into South Viet-Nam contrary to every agreement and contrary to international law. Now, if that problem is grappled with, then we can get into details. We can consider whether the meat involves a little salt and pepper and a dash of garlic, but here is the meat of the matter, and I think we ought to keep our eyes on that. That is the central, all-important element in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of legal basis did the United States have to bomb the targets of North Viet-Nam?

A. Self-defense of South Viet-Nam and the commitments of the United States with respect to the security and the self-defense of South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we could turn from Viet-Nam briefly, I wonder if we could go to the Middle East. I wonder, sir, what was the reason for our approval of the shipments of tanks to Israel? And, secondly, now that the German shipments have ceased, what plans does the United States have to see that Israel gets the remaining part of the arms shipment?

A. On the first part of your question, we have been interested in some sort of reasonable balance in the armed forces in that area. As you know, Western Europe has been the primary supplier of arms to Israel. We ourselves have tried not to be active in the Near East in the arms field, although we have taken some steps in that regard because for some years we have been trying to find some way in which to put some ceilings on this neighborhood arms race in the Near East.

We have been working with the governments concerned to find out whether it is possible that this arms race might somehow be turned downward.

The second part of your question I am not able to get into—about the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to an earlier question you equated Chinese Communist expansionism with the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam, but I don't believe you mentioned Peiping or Communist China in your opening statement. I wonder whether you could tell us what you believe the role of Red China and its guilt in this particular operation is?

A. Well, I think in my earlier statement I intended to comment on—

Q. You emphasized Hanoi.

A. I intended to comment in answer to an earlier question on Communist aggression and not specifically, necessarily Peiping or the Chinese Communist aggression at the same time. However, I think the role of Peiping here is pretty clear. They have gone to considerable lengths to make it public themselves. They have announced the doctrine of a militant world revolution, which they not only have adhered to in theory but have backed up in practice on more than one occasion. They have supported that doctrine with a harshness which has created very serious problems even within the Communist world, quite apart from problems with the free world.

Now we know that they have been giving encouragement, that they have been sending arms to North Viet-Nam, that many of these arms that we capture in South Viet-Nam are of Chinese origin, Chinese manufacture, and they have thrown their military and undoubtedly their economic weight behind what Hanoi is doing, and I would suspect that they have a very strong influence indeed in Hanoi's attitude in this present situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Hanoi and Peiping—what about the shipment of Russian supplies to North Viet-Nam?

A. We haven't precise information on that, but I think in the case of the Soviet Union, judging from their public as well as private statements over the last 2 years or so, I think they have all along taken about the same view of South Viet-Nam as have other members of the Communist world. They have had a somewhat different view on Laos where they had a very specific and clear commitment on Laos, but I think they have been less active in this present situation than these other two capitals by a very considerable—

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we return, sir, to what you restated several times as a critical point? Could you clarify for us in a diplomatic sense what it is that the United States would regard as evidence that Hanoi is stopping doing what it is doing? How could this be converted into a diplomatic, negotiable situation?

A. I don't think that it requires me at this time to try to spell that out in detail. We would find out very shortly on the ground, as well as through any diplomatic channel, whether there has been any change in the position in that respect. But I don't think it is appropriate for me to talk about complex sets of preconditions on their side or on our side or problems of that sort, because we still have this missing piece, which is the dominant element in the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were we satisfied that all supplies and infiltration from the North had been stopped, would the United States be content to solve the indigenous aspects, the civil war aspects, by free elections under international supervision in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, let's get to the first step first, and then if we get to that step, then we will have the luxury of indulging in the consideration of the second step.

Q. What are our policies with regard to the indigenous aspects of a civil war? Could you enlighten us on this?

A. Well, I think that the indigenous aspects of it could be brought to a conclusion very quickly and that the South Vietnamese people could turn back to the problem of building their country and improving their constitutional system, elevating the economic standards of the country and get on with the modernization of the country which has been their purpose from the beginning.

Q. But only by military force, Mr. Secretary?

A. I am not commenting on that. I think the pacification of the country would be easy if the external aggression were stopped.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for years now we have been talking about the war in South Viet-Nam as a guerrilla war. And yet today twice you spoke about the armed attack and aggression from one nation upon another. I wonder, sir, if this is, in substance, changing the context of our understanding of the war in Viet-Nam?

A. No. I think all along we have put the finger on this question of the infiltration of the personnel and of the arms from outside as the key to the problem, and if those are aggressive acts, that is aggression from the North, and that is the thing which is at the heart of the problem, I wouldn't characterize it as a different thing.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Sure.

Q. I did want to clear up two things here. You said you had looked into this matter, and I wondered, did you know there were unauthorized wiretaps and did you know there was untruthful testimony under oath? Those seem to be the pertinent points.

A. Well, I am aware of the circumstances involving both those points, but I won't make a characterization of either one of them at this point.

Q. Do you think it's all right? Did you approve it?

A. No, I am not making any comment about what I did or did not approve of about either one of those points.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in past press conferences I believe you have reiterated the theme that the war—and so has Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara—that the war has to be won in the South. Why now is all this talk about Hanoi and infiltration from the North? This is a relatively new theme, at least as far as the emphasis is concerned. Are you still of the mind that the war has to be won on the ground in the South?

A. Well, that part of it, of course, is extremely important and is crucial to the entire effort. But again let me go back to my opening statement, taken altogether. Because the aggression, these aggressive acts from the North have been—as we have made clear recently—have been increased both with respect to manpower and with respect to arms. The problem has increased in size and scale. And the necessary steps, therefore, change.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. When we were involved in the Korean war, Chiang Kai-shek's offer of troops to participate was rejected. Now, as I understand it, South Koreans are being introduced into Viet-Nam. Can you tell us wherein the situations differ?

A. Well, the South Korean personnel that are going into South Viet-Nam are not going there for combat purposes. They will be primarily engaged, I understand, on engineering tasks here and there. They will have with them certain local guards in connection with those particular tasks. They were requested by the South Vietnamese Government. They have a limited mission. I think that explains that particular point.

The other question 15 years ago had many more complications in it.

Q. Are the South Koreans able to defend themselves if attacked?

A. The South Koreans and the United States are able to defend South Korea if attacked, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, without commenting on specific future operations, you did imply in one of your earlier answers that the concept of self-defense and United States security commitments would, in your view, give us the right to continue attacks.

A. I think the question was the legal basis for the action that had been taken in that regard.

Q. Well, that implied the broad concept of self-defense would permit—

A. That's correct.

Q. —would permit further attacks without necessarily—

A. I was commenting on the legal basis, yes.

Q. Under that concept, Mr. Secretary, has the United States, by allowing American combat flights in South Viet-Nam, modified its previous position on the role of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, again, the policy remains the same. Look at the congressional resolution passed by a margin of 502 to 2. Now, the use of a particular weapon may change from time to time, or a type of aircraft, but the policy is the same. When the circumstances or changed circumstances require changed actions, those actions will be taken. But that does not mean an underlying change of policy. I have tried to put together in my opening statement the elementary and basic policy within which we are operating.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the negotiations, is it a fair summary of what you have been saying today that the United States is not prepared for any kind of negotiation on the war in South Viet-Nam with the governments of Hanoi and Peiping unless and until what you call this missing piece is provided?

A. Well, I would think that that would be the essential point in discovering whether what is broadly called the political process—whether it's diplomatic contacts or whatever—can help bring this question to a peaceful solution. I think that is crucial to it. There is no political gimmick by which you can bar the other side from

continuing aggression if they are determined to do so. That has to be met on the ground, factually, directly. There is no political wizardry which will change that until that will is changed, until the decision is changed on the other side.

Q. A related question, Mr. Secretary—

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your thinking on the present reception being accorded to Mr. Ulbricht of East Germany by Egypt?

A. Well, we consider the Federal Republic of Germany the spokesman for the German people on international affairs. We have not looked with favor upon any treatment of East Germany or its officials that would seem to undergird or underpin the division of the German people or enhance the position of the regime in East Germany.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Laos is also a part of this aggression from North Viet-Nam. The policy statements that you have been making today apply equally to Laos, do they, or just for Viet-Nam?

A. Yes. For brevity's sake I did not include Laos in detail, but the same situation obtains there. In the case of Laos, we have an agreement as recent as 1962. I don't know of any single day since the signing of those agreements in which North Viet-Nam has been in compliance with them. Now, compliance with those agreements would make a big contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia. That is what they were for. Their entire purpose was to decide that everyone would leave the Laotians alone and let them run their own affairs. That is what it was all about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems that the congressional opinion that has been expressed over the last couple of weeks has not focused so much on goals of policy, which you have outlined, but the ability of the United States to realize them in Southeast Asia. Can you say why you think the new level of action which the U.S. has moved up to in Southeast Asia will realize these goals any more than the policy of simply fighting the war out in the South that we were following before?

A. Well, I think I would go back to the President's statement on February 17th and to the underlying policy of the congressional resolution itself. What is required is required. The commitment there is very clear with respect to this aggression and our commitment to the security of these countries of Southeast Asia.

No, I don't think one could look into the future and get a specific answer to your question as to how they will eventually develop. The other side is very much involved in writing that scenario. I think the policy and the determination and the attitude are clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the British and the Russian Governments, as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, decided to convene it, in the absence of the missing piece, would the United States be prepared to attend this conference?

A. Well, I think they would be in consultation with the members of the conference before they convened it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is implied on the subject of negotiations that what you're saying is that the minimum on our side would be a status quo ante. That is, at the beginning of the guerrilla war, that South Viet-Nam would remain with its territorial integrity and independence.

A. Well, the heart of the problem is an assault upon the safety and the territorial integrity and independence of South Viet-Nam. If that is relieved and removed, then things can begin to move. That is the heart of the problem. That is why we have forces out there. They could come home tomorrow if that problem had not been created by aggression. They never would have been there in the first place. That is the central heart, the essence of the situation, and that is the problem that has to be dealt with.

Q. Thank you, sir.

PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Address
by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 17,
1965¹

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle:

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back in 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will joint in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN
MINISTER TRAN VAN DO ON THE OCCASION OF THE
"DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID," June 22, 1965.

For many years, South Vietnam has been plunged into a war imposed on it by the Communists. It has been able to preserve the integrity of its territory and freedom only because of the courage of its sons and the friendly countries of the free world, which have not spared either their friendship or their generous assistance.

To the representatives of those countries present at this ceremony, I express, in the name of the Republic and people of South Vietnam, our profound gratitude, which I ask them to convey to their Government.

It is also my duty to tell them what we are doing with their assistance. Some is used to relieve the misery and suffering of our people as a result of the war, to rebuild on our ruins, and to reconstruct our nation; some to help us defend ourselves against the Communist aggression. I say "defend ourselves" advisedly, for our primary objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or prolongation of the war. We do, certainly, want peace, but not peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the following conditions must be met:

1. Since the war now in progress in Vietnam was provoked by Communist aggression and subversion, it is essential, first of all, that these subversive and military activities undertaken, directed, and supported from abroad against the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam cease, and that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two zones, a principle that was laid down in the 1954 Geneva agreement and in international law, be respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must dissolve all these front organizations and agencies it has created in South Vietnam under the title the "Front for the Liberation of the South," "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary Party," and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and the political and military leaders it has sent there illegally.

2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be left to the discretion of those people in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever source. That will be feasible, obviously, only when the aggression by the Communist regime of Hanoi and its campaign of intimidation to which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been terminated.

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and beyond its boundaries that are now necessary to defend that territory against Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their military forces from South Vietnam. It reserves the right, however, to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right to appeal again for foreign assistance in the case of further aggression or threat or aggression.

4. Lastly, the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam must be effectively guaranteed.

If the Communist regime in Hanoi sincerely wants peace, if it puts the interests of the nation above those of an ideology or a party, if it wants the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of southeast Asia to live in peace instead of war, prosperity instead of poverty, freedom instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression.

This is the only path that we believe can lead to peace if the South Vietnamese people are to be able to enjoy the full benefits of the aid that the friendly nations have so generously lavished upon it.

77-78. TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON VIETNAM BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF JULY 23, 1965¹

WE WILL STAND IN VIETNAM

My fellow Americans, not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote,

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every State in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the east room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

THE LESSON OF HISTORY

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam, and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

There are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.

In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.

¹ Department of State Publication 7937, Released August 1965.

INCREASE IN U.S. FORCES

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General [William C.] Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country due and adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that we will take to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with these committees, the appropriate congressional committees, what we plan to do in these areas. I have asked them to be able to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready, and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present defense appropriations bill under consideration, to transfer funds in addition to the additional money that we will ask.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American Nation.

U.S. WELCOMES UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposals. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam.

PURPOSE OF U.S. ACTION

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory, but we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase crops, and the worker to find a job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction—not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

A PERSONAL NOTE

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO U THANT,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
JULY 28, 1965¹

His Excellency U THANT,
*Secretary General of the United Nations,
United Nations, N.Y.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I want you to know from me directly of the very great personal confidence which I place in Ambassador Goldberg. His appointment as permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations—and his acceptance of this responsibility in the circumstances—is, I hope, strong evidence that this Government places the very highest importance on the work of the United Nations and will continue to give it our utmost support.

I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close contact with you on the situation in Vietnam. Your efforts in the past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table are much appreciated and highly valued by my Government. I trust they will be continued.

Meanwhile, as I stated publicly last April, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions. That remains our policy.

And as I stated in San Francisco last month, we hope that the members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, will use their influence to bring to the negotiating table all governments involved in an attempt to halt all aggression and evolve a peaceful solution. I continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be effective in this regard.

I hope that you will communicate to us, through Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can strengthen our common search for the road to peace in southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY
30, 1965¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The President of the United States announced on July 28, 1965, certain steps being taken by my Government to lend further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in resisting armed aggression.

At the same time the President reaffirmed to the Secretary General of the United Nations the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about discussions in a negotiating forum. On July 29 the Secretary General immediately sent a most welcome and appreciated reply, stating his determination to pursue his efforts to remove the dispute over Vietnam from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace of southeast Asia, has been kept informed of the policy of my Government with respect to the dangerous course of events in that part of the world. For example, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, told the Council more than a year ago on May 21 1964:

* * * the United States has no, repeat no, national military objective anywhere in southeast Asia. U.S. policy for southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.

Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the U.S. Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes of southeast Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva Accords of 1954. . These efforts have included—

Various approaches to Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow.

Support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Favorable reactions to proposals made by 17 nonaligned nations, and later by the Government of India.

Approval of efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations to initiate peace talks.

Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in southeast Asia, including a U.N. mission of observers along the frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia, a U.N. mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam, and a U.N. invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and social development projects in southeast Asia.

A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.

Repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least 15 occasions in the past four and a half years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in southeast Asia by peaceful negotiations.

I am sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my Government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the regime in Hanoi, which, along with the Republic of Vietnam, is most directly involved in the conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council.

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations require us to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam. This responsibility—to persist in the search for peace—weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and security affairs.

The purpose of this communication therefore is to reemphasize to the members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in southeast Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.

It is the hope of my Government that the members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in southeast Asia.

I respectfully request that this communication be circulated to the members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

¹ U.S. mission to the United Nations press release 4510, dated July 30, 1965.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI
OF ITALY, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1965¹

FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
NOVEMBER 20, 1965

Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

MR. PRESIDENT: In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.

In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your attention the following:

On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated—according to what they wrote me—that—

in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (a) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the cessation—that is, of all belligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of debarkation of further American troops); (b) a declaration according to which the Geneva agreements of 1954 will be taken as the basis for the negotiations—a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application, in other words, of the Geneva accord.

The text of the communication which I have received adds that “the government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the American troops.”

To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: “I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone.”

These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine—confided to Mr. A. Goldberg, the U.S. representative to the U.N., so, that he can deliver it promptly and confidentially—I bring word for word to your attention.

You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter.

With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings.

Yours,

AMINTORE FANFANI.

SECRETARY RUSK'S REPLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI,
DECEMBER 4, 1965

His Excellency AMINTORE FANFANI,
Foreign Minister of Italy.

DEAR MR. FANFANI: My Government is most grateful to you for your help and cooperation in transmitting views attributed to the North Vietnamese Government on negotiations to deal with the problem of Vietnam. We have carefully examined the suggestions you have conveyed, and I wish to make the following comments:

1. As it has repeatedly stated, the United States is prepared to enter into discussions or negotiations with any government at any time without any preconditions whatsoever. We reaffirm this willingness.

2. Although there is some ambiguity in the statement of Hanoi's position, your source seems to indicate that Hanoi would agree that negotiations might be undertaken on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954 without any qualifications or conditions. We for our part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this basis without any qualifications or conditions.

3. The United States does not, however, agree with the contention that the four points advanced by Hanoi constitute an authentic interpretation of the Geneva agreements of 1954. Elements in the four points, notably the political program of the so-called National Liberation Front, have no basis in the Geneva agreements, and Hanoi's apparent insistence on a prior declaration accepting the four points thus appears both to be inconsistent with the agreements and to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to include these four points for consideration in any peace talks along with any proposals which the United States, South Vietnam, and other governments may wish to advance.

4. Your sources also mention another apparent Hanoi condition calling for a cease-fire and other measures prior to negotiations. The United States would be prepared for negotiations without the imposition of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction or cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and reciprocal basis. If there were a cessation of certain military activities on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cessation of military activities on the other. The formulation proposed by Hanoi's leaders does not appear to meet this test, for example, in that it imposes no restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and equipment from North to South Vietnam.

5. The U.S. Government notes the message conveyed that North Vietnam would not insist on the actual withdrawal of American forces prior to the initiation of negotiations. However, the clarification of this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions discussed in 2 and 3 above.

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real willingness for unconditional negotiations. We would be pleased, for our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above and perhaps in light of any further soundings your sources may make with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available to you at any time for this purpose.

Further, if it develops following such discussions, or further contact by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States would be authorized to meet with them privately.

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on the contents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with your sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this important matter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,
Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK.

FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI'S REPLY TO SECRETARY RUSK,
DECEMBER 13, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received on December 6 your letter which Ambassador Goldberg had previously announced to me on November 29.

The same day I summarized in a document of mine essential observations made by you on various points and I have just received word that on Wednesday last, December 8, said document has been confidentially delivered into the hands of a qualified representative in order to be forwarded to Hanoi. I think, as of today, said document has already reached its final destination.

I would like to add I desire, Mr. Secretary, to thank you very much for the confidence and trust in my person you and the American Government have confirmed in your letter. I can assure you that, as soon as I receive any reaction on the points contained in the letter, I will inform you immediately.

Anticipating the pleasure of meeting you next week in Washington, I remain, Mr. Secretary,

AMINTORE FANFANI.

STATEMENT CONCERNING 1964 PEACE OVERTURES

The North Vietnamese regime has made it clear again and again that it will not enter into any discussions unless the conditions it has set down for settlement are accepted as the basis of negotiation. These conditions, amounting to a surrender of South Viet-Nam to Communist domination, and formulated most forcefully on April 8, 1965 by Premier Pham Van Dong in his "four points," include the withdrawal of United States Military Forces and acceptance of the program of the Viet Cong. Not only have the North Vietnamese reiterated these conditions on numerous occasions, but they have peremptorily rejected the repeated attempts of the United States to find an avenue to peaceful settlement, including notably the President's declaration of April 7, 1965, that we stand ready to engage in unconditional discussions.

In this regard, the Secretary made the following statement in his press conference of November 26, 1965:

"...It is true that last autumn Ambassador Stevenson was informed by the Secretary General that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi would be willing to have a contact with the United States and that the Secretary General had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site.

"When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world. I am not at liberty to cite all of these contacts, which were numerous, but you will recall that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the eight months prior to the end of May. There were other public indications such as the failure of the Polish proposals on Laos and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the UN Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussions with the representatives of other governments, including Communist governments. It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of aggression against South Viet-Nam. Indeed, in the latter part of 1964 Hanoi increased its infiltration, including units of its regular army. They undoubtedly felt they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations.

"Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist world was that they might consider some device to save the face of the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon South Viet-Nam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested in saving face but in saving South Viet-Nam.

"It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in Southeast Asia early in 1961, and determined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller nations of Southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks with Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led to agreement in principle on Laos but not on Viet-Nam. The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an agreement which failed because Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape or form. Nevertheless, during and after that conference the United States has had repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in Southeast Asia.

"Hanoi, in their well known four points, has indicated its basic position on Viet-Nam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that their points can be discussed along with all other points presented by other Governments. They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they know the United States will take, namely, that North Viet-Nam must stop its aggression against South Viet-Nam and discontinue its effort to impose the program of the National Liberation Front on South Viet-Nam by force.

"There have been many efforts by the United States and by other governments throughout the past five years to achieve peace for the nations of Southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic procedure there has not been and there is not now any indication from Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rather than what the communist countries have come to call their wars of national liberation.

"You are familiar with many initiatives which have been taken during the past year to bring this matter from the battlefield to the conference table but you are also familiar with the increased infiltration by North Viet-Nam to impose their will by force.

"Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often stated, namely, to assist our friends in South Viet-Nam to repel the aggression against them and, at the same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned, or, as the 17 non-aligned nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions."

4/17d - 1266BT

Office of Public Services
Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 26,
1965 (Excerpts) ¹

Since my return from the Inter-American Conference I have read what has been said during my absence about the so-called peace feelers of last autumn. I have also seen the fragment on this subject which appeared recently in a national magazine. It is true that last autumn Ambassador Stevenson was informed by Secretary General U Thant that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi would be willing to have a contact with the United States and that the Secretary General had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site.

When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world. I am not at liberty to cite all of these contacts, which were numerous, but you will recall that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the 8 months prior to the end of May. There were other public indications such as the failure of the Polish proposals on Laos and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the U.N. Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussions with the representatives of other governments, including Communist governments. It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of aggression against South Vietnam. Indeed, in the latter part of 1964 Hanoi increased its infiltration, including units of its regular army. They undoubtedly felt that they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations.

Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist world was that they might consider some device to save the face of the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon South Vietnam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested in saving face but in saving South Vietnam.

It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in southeast Asia early in 1961, and determined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller nations of southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks with Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led to agreement in principle on Laos but not on Vietnam. The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an agreement which failed because Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape, or form. Nevertheless, during and after that conference the United States has had repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in southeast Asia.

Hanoi, in their well-known four points, has indicated its basic position on Vietnam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that their points can be discussed along with all other points presented by other governments. They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they know the United States and others will take; namely, that North Vietnam must stop its aggression against South Vietnam and discontinue its effort to impose the program of the National Liberation Front on South Vietnam by force.

There have been many efforts by the United States and by other governments throughout the past 5 years to achieve peace for the nations of southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic procedure, there has not been and there is not now any indication from Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and the independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rather than what the Communist countries have come to call their wars of national liberation.

You are familiar with many initiatives which have been taken during the past year to bring this matter from the battlefield to the con-

ference table and you are also familiar with the increased infiltration by North Vietnam to impose their will by force.

Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often stated; namely, to assist our friends in South Vietnam to repel the aggression against them and, at the same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned, or, as the 17 nonaligned nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in the light of your statement about the Vietnamese situation, if today we had such an indication through Mr. Thant or any other channel that they were prepared to contact, apparently without specific conditions, would we accept?

Answer. Well, the President has said, on more than one occasion, and so have I, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions or, as the 17 nations put it, negotiations without precondition.

In view of the statement made by Hanoi in the last 24 hours, I would not predict that this is likely to occur in the next week or so.

Question. Well, would you say, then, that we have somewhat softened our position; that is whereas last year we sensed—we attached some conditions to our position, that this time—

Answer. No, I think this is a problem of nuance here.

President Johnson said in April of this year, publicly and clearly, without any doubt whatever, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions.

Prior to that time the discussions had been private; that is, our attitude on this had been private.

I have myself spent hours and hours and hours since 1961 with representatives of the other side talking about peace in southeast Asia. There was never any period when we were unwilling to talk about peace in southeast Asia.

Now, at the time last autumn, I want to comment, and I cannot pursue it, that this was not the only contact by any means. There were many contacts with the other side, including Hanoi. This was not the only contact.

This particular incident had to be looked at in—against the background of a very considerable activity that was going on among the foreign offices of the world, to determine whether or not this particular thing made a significant difference.

Question. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that there was no change in American policy in so far as negotiations are concerned dating from last April 7?

Answer. Well, in April the President said at Baltimore that we are prepared for unconditional discussions. I think that perhaps that was the first time that it had been said in just those words publicly. But this was not a major change in the sense that for the past 5 years we have been in continuous contact with representatives of the Communist world about peace in southeast Asia. There has never been any cessation of discussion on this subject. There has never been any lack of opportunity to bring this matter of peace to the conference table, if the other side is prepared to stop trying to impose their will by force on South Vietnam.

So that if there was a difference in the public way in which this matter was stated, there was no difference in the basic objective of

the United States, and no difference on the point that we were in regular contact with the Communist world.

Question. When you say without preconditions, however, you are talking only about without preconditions of getting in the same room to open discussions, are you not, because you listed a number of conditions which the United States would have in terms of the settlement to be reached at any such discussions.

Answer. Well, I do not suppose that anyone would expect the United States, in agreeing to discussions without preconditions, to imply thereby that we are going to accept the program of the other side in such discussions.

Question. Therefore you concede that the other side will also come with its preconditions.

Answer. Well, we have already said to the other side—we have already said publicly to the other side that we are prepared to talk about their proposals along with the proposals of all the other governments concerned, and they have turned that down.

Question. Your point is that as of today, aside from the technical problem which you call getting a meeting started, the situation is that we are willing to listen to their preconditions for settlement as well as our own, that they are not willing to listen to our preconditions as well as theirs.

Answer. Well, the question of whether, for example, their four points, Mr. Roberts, are preconditioned to any discussion, or any conference, has varied a little over time.

There have been moments, quite frankly, when it has appeared that they were rigid preconditions, that these four points would have to be accepted before there can be any serious discussions.

There have been other times when we had the impression that there were not necessarily preconditions to discussions, but that they would be the points on which the other side would insist as necessary for peace.

I would—one has the impression that in recent weeks their attitude has been moving toward these four points as preconditions somewhat more than might have been our impression for a time. We don't know. We don't know.

But what we are saying is that if they want to come to the conference table, if they want to have discussions, we will discuss, and in those discussions they can say anything that they want to. But we must be free to say anything that we want to. And then we will try to find out whether there is a basis for peace.

But we are not going to limit discussions to their four points.

Now, these have got to be discussions in which governments can talk like governments, discuss their problems, their interests, their demands, to see whether in that kind of mutual discussion there is any basis for peace.

Now, we did that in 1961, on Laos, and it seemed, in the Vienna conversations between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, that there was a basis for a settlement of the Laotian question.

No such basis appeared in discussing Vietnam.

We got the conference and the agreement on Laos.

And as I pointed out in my statement, the problem with that is that Hanoi never complied with it.

But I don't want to leave the impression that we are—I think it is important to be clear on two things; that we are prepared for discussions, without conditions, without preconditions. But we are not going to promise in advance or at any time that we are going to give away the basic interests of the South Vietnamese people and South Vietnam, and the interests of the United States when we go into such discussions. The other side is not going to do that.

So the problem is to find out whether, given the attitudes, the interests, the commitments of the two sides, if peace is possible.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO
SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT, JANUARY 5, 1966¹

His Excellency U THANT,
Secretary General, United Nations.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all States members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of governments are the following: That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussion or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

I should urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of July 31, 1965 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, *inter alia*, that the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

¹ U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 4731, dated Jan. 5, 1966.

U.S. OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM: State Department
Press Release, January 7, 1966¹

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least \$1 billion;
13. The President has said:

The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem.

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

¹ Department of State press release No. 4 dated Jan. 7, 1966.

EXTRACT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE
UNION MESSAGE, JANUARY 12, 1966¹

* * * * *
Not too many years ago Vietnam was a peaceful, if troubled, land. In the north was an independent Communist government. In the south a people struggled to build a nation, with the friendly help of the United States.

There were some in South Vietnam who wished to force Communist rule on their own people. But their progress was slight. Their hope of success was dim. Then, little more than 6 years ago, North Vietnam decided on conquest. From that day to this, soldiers and supplies have moved from north to south in a swelling stream—swallowing the remnants of revolution in aggression.

As the assault mounted, our choice gradually became clear. We could leave, abandoning South Vietnam to its attackers and to certain conquest, or we could stay and fight beside the people of South Vietnam.

We stayed.

And we will stay until aggression has stopped.

We will stay because a just nation cannot leave to the cruelties of its enemies a people who have staked their lives and independence on America's solemn pledge—a pledge which has grown through the commitments of three American Presidents.

We will stay because in Asia—and around the world—are countries whose independence rests, in large measure, on confidence in America's word and in America's protection. To yield to force in Vietnam would weaken that confidence, would undermine the independence of many lands, and would whet the appetite of the aggressor. We would have to fight in one land, and we would have to fight in another—or abandon much of Asia to the domination of Communists.

And we do not intend to abandon Asia to conquest.

Last year the nature of the war in Vietnam changed again. Swiftly increasing numbers of armed men from the north crossed the border to join forces that were already in the south. Attack and terror increased, spurred and encouraged by the belief that the United States lacked the will to continue and that their victory was near.

Despite our desire to limit conflict, it was necessary to act: to hold back the mounting aggression, to give courage to the people of the south, and to make our firmness clear to the north. Thus we began limited air action against military targets in North Vietnam. We increased our fighting force to its present strength tonight of 190,000 men.

These moves have not ended the aggression but they have prevented its success. The aims of the enemy have been put out of reach by the skill and the bravery of Americans and their allies—and by the enduring courage of the South Vietnamese who, I can tell you, have lost eight men last year for every one of ours.

The enemy is no longer close to victory. Time is no longer on his side. There is no cause to doubt the American commitment.

Our decision to stand firm has been matched by our desire for peace.

In 1965 alone we had 300 private talks for peace in Vietnam with friends and adversaries, throughout the world.

Since Christmas your Government has labored again—with imagination and endurance—to remove any barrier to peaceful settlement.

For 20 days now we and our Vietnamese allies have dropped no bombs in North Vietnam.

Able and experienced spokesmen have visited, in behalf of America, more than 40 countries. We have talked to more than a hundred governments—all 113 that we have relations with, and some that we don't. We talked to the United Nations and we have called upon all of its members to make any contribution that they can toward helping obtain peace.

In public statements and in private communications—to adversaries and to friends, in Rome and Warsaw, in Paris and Tokyo, in Africa and throughout this hemisphere—America has made her position abundantly clear.

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self-determination—that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it in free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.

This is all we want for South Vietnam. It is all the people of South Vietnam want. And if there is a single nation on this earth that desires less than this for its own people, then let its voice be heard.

We have also made it clear—from Hanoi to New York—that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

We have said all this, and we have asked—and hoped—and we have waited for a response.

So far we have received no response to prove either success or failure.

We have carried our quest for peace to many nations and peoples because we share this planet with others whose future, in large measure, is tied to our own action, and whose counsel is necessary to our own hopes.

We have found understanding and support. And we know they wait with us tonight for some response that could lead to peace.

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming months, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference, or even both at once.

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear. We will act as we must to help protect the independence of the valiant people of South Vietnam. We will strive to limit the conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor do we want to invite increased danger.

But we will give our fighting men what they must have: every gun, every dollar, and every decision—whatever the cost or whatever the challenge.

And we will continue to help the people of South Vietnam care for those that are ravaged by battle, create progress in the villages, and carry forward the healing hopes of peace as best they can amidst the uncertain terrors of war.

And let me be absolutely clear: the days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle.

There may be some who do not want peace—whose ambitions stretch so far that war in Vietnam is but a welcome and convenient episode in an immense design to subdue history to their will. But for others it must now be clear the choice is not between peace and victory. It lies between peace and the ravages of a conflict from which they can only lose.

The people of Vietnam, North and South, seek the same things: the shared needs of man, the needs for food and shelter and education—the chance to build and work and till the soil, free from the arbitrary horrors of battle—the desire to walk in the dignity of those who master their own destiny. For many painful years, in war and revolution and infrequent peace, they have struggled to fulfill those needs.

It is a crime against mankind that so much courage, and so much will, and so many dreams, must be flung on the fires of war and death.

To all of those caught up in this conflict, we therefore say again tonight: Let us choose peace, and with it the wondrous works of peace, and beyond that, the time when hope reaches toward consummation, and life is the servant of life.

In this work, we plan to discharge our duty to the people whom we serve.

This is the state of the Union.

But over it all—wealth, promise, and expectation—lies our troubling awareness of American men at war tonight.

How many men who listen to me tonight have served their Nation in other wars? How very many are not here to listen?

The war in Vietnam is not like these other wars. Yet, finally, war is always the same. It is young men dying in the fullness of their promise. It is trying to kill a man that you do not even know well enough to hate.

Therefore, to know war is to know that there is still madness in this world.

Many of you share the burden of this knowledge tonight with me. But there is a difference. For finally I must be the one to order our guns to fire, against all the most inward pulls of my desire. For we have children to teach, and we have sick to be cured, and we have men to be freed. There are poor to be lifted up, and there are cities to be built, and there is a world to be helped.

Yet we do what we must.

I am hopeful, and I will try as best I can, with everything I have got, to end this battle and to return our sons to their desires.

Yet as long as others will challenge America's security and test the dearness of our beliefs with fire and steel, then we must stand or see the promise of two centuries tremble. I believe tonight that you do not want me to try that risk. And from that belief your President summons his strength for the trials that lay ahead in the days to come.

The work must be our work now. Scarred by the weaknesses of man, with whatever guidance God may offer us, we must nevertheless and alone with our mortality, strive to ennoble the life of man on earth.

¹ House Document No. 321, 89th Cong., 2d sess.

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 10, 1967

I appreciate very deeply the honor which Howard University has paid me today. The ideals Howard has stood for, and the pioneering things it has achieved, in its first century are not merely of local but of national and indeed international significance. For the future of our democracy depends on the opportunity—such as Howard has always sought to provide—for every American to develop to the fullest his inborn potential of character and intellect. In pursuit of this ideal I feel certain that Howard will provide in its second century a leadership no less important than in the century you have just completed.

You may be sure that when I use the word "leadership" in connection with Howard University I am not thinking in the abstract; I am thinking with great admiration and gratitude of one particular leader, your eminent President and my dear friend and colleague, Dr. James M. Nabrit, Jr.

As you know, when the President asked me to assume the post of United States Representative to the United Nations and I had to find a Deputy Representative who could share the immense difficulties of that vital work for peace, I sought out Jim Nabrit; and by dint of hard negotiating I managed to get him for one year. During that year I had countless occasions to be grateful for his clear and vigorous mind, his ability to see to the heart of a complex problem, his force of character, his charm and persuasiveness—all of which made him a most effective and memorable advocate of the United States in the councils of the world.

I know you are as proud as I am of the services Dr. Nabrit has rendered his country. And much though we at the UN miss him, we must acknowledge that here at Howard University he is still rendering an outstanding service to his country.

It seems to me fitting that, in the presence of Dr. Nabrit who shared with me for more than a year in the search for peace, I should report from my

United Nations vantage point on where we now stand in the unceasing effort to achieve a just and honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. It is equally fitting that this report should be made on a university campus, for no issue of our day has brought forth a greater involvement on the part of our universities than this one question.

Our effort to open the door to peace in Vietnam has been continuous. In recent weeks public attention has been focussed on this effort by an unusual number of statements, reports and events: pronouncements by the governments involved, appeals by world leaders including Pope Paul and Secretary General U Thant, news stories and interviews with various personalities—and the perplexing events in Mainland China. Right now we are in the midst of another pause in the fighting, the Lunar New Year truce. Thus this may be a good moment to assess the present status of our efforts for peace.

In such an assessment, a responsible official must, in all that he says in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private diplomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable responsibility to keep the public adequately informed. It is difficult to deal on both levels at once but it is essential to do so as well as we can.

Let me begin, then, by recalling the basic American peace aims in Vietnam. These aims have been stated many times by President Johnson and other responsible spokesmen of the United States. They have been stated over a span of two years, but the ebb and flow of the military situation during that time has not made them any less valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability of seeking peace through negotiations. Today, therefore, I wish to review the essence of these American aims.

The United States seeks a political solution in Vietnam. We do not seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries. We seek a settlement whose terms will result not from dictation, but from genuine negotiations—a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice the vital interest of any party. In the words of the Manila Communique: "The settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution." As President Johnson said a week ago here in Washington: Such a solution "will involve . . . concessions on both parts".

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism. We do not seek an American sphere of influence in Asia; nor a permanent American "presence" of any kind—military or otherwise—in Vietnam; nor the imposition of a military alliance on South Vietnam.

We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We seek to assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative exercise of the right of self-determination—the right to decide their own political destiny free of external interference and force and through democratic processes. In keeping with the announced South Vietnamese Government's policy of national reconciliation, we do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future. We are prepared to accept the results of that decision whatever it may be. We support the early consummation of a democratic constitutional system in South Vietnam, and welcome the progress being made to this end.

As regards North Vietnam, we have no designs on its territory, and we do not seek to overthrow its government whatever its ideology. We are prepared fully to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end.

We believe the reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without any outside interference; and the results of that choice also will have our full support.

Finally, when peace is restored we are willing to make a major commitment of money, talent and resources to a multilateral cooperative effort to bring to all of Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam, the benefits of economic and social reconstruction and development which that area so sorely needs.

These, then, are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel the objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely believe they contain nothing inconsistent with the interests of any party. Our public pronouncements of them—both in Washington and at the United Nations—are solemn commitments by the United States.

Our adversaries have also placed their aims and objectives on the public record over the past two years. The major statement of these aims is the well-known "Four Points" of Hanoi, which I will summarize without departing too much from their own terminology.

The first point calls for recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. It also calls for the cessation of all acts of war against the North; the ending of United States intervention in the South; the withdrawal of all United States troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, the dismantling of American bases and the cancellation of what they term the United States "military alliance" with South Vietnam.

The United States would not find any essential difficulty with a reasonable interpretation of any of the terms included in this point. Our chief concern is what it does not include: namely, that North Vietnam also cease its inter-

vention in the South, end all of its acts of war against the South, and withdraw its forces from the South. Such a requirement is obviously essential to the "peace" to which this first point refers.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements. It provides that, pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, both the North and the South must refrain from joining any military alliance; and that there should be no foreign bases, troops or military personnel in their respective territories.

Here again, the only real difficulty is the omission of any obligation on the North to withdraw its military forces from the South—although the Geneva Accords which established the demarcation line in Vietnam forbid military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other, and even go so far as to forbid civilians to cross the demilitarized zone.

The third point calls for the settlement of the South's internal affairs "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam". This point, of course, was not a part of the Geneva Accords at all. It introduces a new element which I shall discuss later in this analysis.

The fourth point calls for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, to be settled by the people of both zones without any foreign interference. We have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech to the General Assembly on September 22.

There has apparently been added a fifth point—put forward and repeatedly endorsed by both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front since the enunciation of the four points in April, 1965. This fifth point was stated by Ho Chi Minh in January, 1966, when he said that if the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of the people of South Vietnam, and engage in negotiation with it. This, like the third of the "Four Points", introduces a new element which was not part of the Geneva Accords.

Now, from this brief summation of our aims and those declared by Hanoi, it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been helpful in certain aspects, but how great the disagreements are is still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some of these ambiguities because they relate to very consequential matters.

There is ambiguity, for example, on the role of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations. I have already noted the statement of Ho Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and negotiate with it". If this means that we are asked to cease our recognition of the Government in Saigon and deal only with the Front, insistence on this point would imperil the search for peace. For the

Front has not been chosen by any democratic process to represent the people of South Vietnam. Nor has the Front been recognized by the world community. It is pertinent to recall that more than 60 nations recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whereas none recognizes the National Liberation Front as a government.

On the other hand, some public statements seem to call for the National Liberation Front to be given a place or voice at the negotiating table. If this were the position of our adversaries, the prospects would be brighter; for President Johnson, as long ago as July, 1965, said that "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in being represented and in having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides that it wants to cease aggression". He added that this did not seem to him to be "an insurmountable problem," and that "I think that could be worked out".

A further ambiguity relates to the role of the National Liberation Front in the future political life of South Vietnam. Hanoi asks that the affairs of South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front". Our adversaries, in their various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally recognized Government of South Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders have taken, and have currently under way, and the institutions they are now creating, for the purpose of providing their country with a constitutional and representative government.

Nor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South Vietnamese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpretation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.

However, some claim that what the National Liberation Front really seeks is no more than the opportunity to advance its program peacefully along with other elements and groupings in the South in a free political environment.

We have already made it clear that we do not wish to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future, and that we support a policy of national reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the Manila Communique. Indeed, as Secretary Rusk said in an interview last week, if the Viet Cong were to lay down their arms, ways could be found to permit them to take part in the normal political processes in South Vietnam.

Further ambiguities arise concerning the question of foreign troops in South Vietnam. What does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops"? They clearly include in this term the forces of the United States and other countries aiding the South, but they have never admitted the presence of their own forces in the South. Of course, a one-sided withdrawal by our side

would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as well as ours, if peace is to be achieved.

There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position on the timing of the withdrawal of external forces. Do our adversaries consider withdrawal of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements imply? If so, this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But if they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated in a settlement, this clearly could be worked out. The United States and its allies are already on record in the Manila Communique that their forces "will be withdrawn . . . as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled". Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased and supervised withdrawal of forces by both sides.

Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's position on the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. At times their public statements have demanded that the bombing be ended unconditionally, without any reference to a possible response from their side. On the other hand, quite recently a spokesman of Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the bombardments, the American Government proposes to enter into contact with the [North Vietnamese] Government, . . . this proposal will be examined and studied". And just this week we have seen a further statement, in an interview by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, that cessation of the bombings "could lead to talks between North Vietnam and the U.S.". Many of their statements insisting that the bombing cease have also contained other expressions, such as that the American military presence in South Vietnam be completely withdrawn, and that the "Four Points" of Hanoi must be recognized and accepted as "the" basis—or possibly as "a" basis—for settlement of the conflict. This creates an additional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi means to add still other prenegotiating conditions.

The position of the United States on this bombing question has been stated by a number of Administration spokesmen, including me at the United Nations. The United States remains prepared to take the first step and order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a tangible response toward peace from North Vietnam. In his letter of February 8 to His Holiness, Pope Paul, President Johnson said: ". . . I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is willing to do likewise. We are prepared to discuss the balanced reduction in military activity, the cessation of hostilities or any practical arrangements

which could lead to these results. We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they are crowned with success."

Some analysts contend that our terms of settlement should be more precisely defined. But it is very difficult to be more precise in advance of negotiation and particularly in light of the substantive ambiguities on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised, they should and can best be resolved in discussions between the parties who have the power to resolve them. For our part, we stand ready to negotiate in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questions.

The United States approach to negotiations is flexible. We and our allies do not ask our adversaries to accept, as a pre-condition to discussions or negotiations, any point of ours to which they may have objections. Nor do we rule out the discussion of any points of theirs, however difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate not only our own points but Hanoi's "Four Points" and points emanating from any other source, including the Secretary General of the United Nations.

It remains to be seen whether our adversaries share this concept of negotiations. As I have already pointed out, their various public declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statements that the goals they put forward must, for example, be "accepted" or "recognized" as the "sole basis" or "the most correct basis" or "the only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solution".

Such statements contain still further ambiguity—in one sense the most fundamental of all, since it relates to the concept of negotiation itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations only if there is an assurance in advance that the outcome will be on their terms and will, in effect, simply ratify the goals they have already stated? Such an attitude would not be conducive to peace and would make the outlook for a settlement bleak indeed.

If, on the other hand, North Vietnam were to say that their points are not pre-conditions to discussions or negotiations, then the prospects should be more promising.

Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarification of the other side's position. It does not require the acceptance in advance of any points, least of all those whose meaning may be in need of clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi—and progress toward a settlement will be facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us.

In this situation, how can we best move toward a settlement?

One essential early step is to analyze the positions of all parties in order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel common to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact which may prove to be such a kernel—namely, the fact that both sides have pointed to the

Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 as an acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement.

But I must add quickly that this does not necessarily indicate a real meeting of the minds, because of doubts that all sides interpret the Geneva Agreements in the same light. Hanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained in its "Four Points". But the four points would not put Hanoi under any restraint or obligations in its hostile activities against the South, which the Geneva Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides, as I already pointed out, these points insist that the South's future be regulated in accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva Accords and did not even exist when they were written. And in any case, if the Geneva Accords were to serve as a basis for settlement, it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international machinery which they provided for supervision—which is presently operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective international guarantees; and to update other provisions of the Accords which on their face are clearly out of date.

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can be said that if the meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for genuine negotiation, then the constant reference to these agreements by both sides would be more than a verbal similarity; it would be a significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement.

From all this analysis, there emerges one basic and practical question, and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a settlement to be overcome?

The first and essential pre-requisite is the will to resolve them—not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but through a process of mutual accommodation whereby nobody's vital interests are injured, which would be a political solution. Speaking for the United States Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution.

The next question, then, is by what procedure such a political settlement can be reached. One well-tested and time-proven way is the conference table. President Johnson has repeatedly stated our readiness to join in a conference in Geneva, in Asia, or in any other suitable place. We remain prepared today to go to the conference table as soon as, and wherever, our adversaries are prepared to join us.

There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: namely, private negotiations—either by direct contact or through an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private method, for in a situation as grave as this, with its complex historical background and its present political cross currents, it would be exceedingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.

I therefore affirm that the United States Government stands ready to take this route also toward a political settlement. And we give our assurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safeguarded on our side. Of course we do not and should not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree. Nevertheless—as that conspicuous champion of free expression, Dr. Erwin D. Canham, recently reminded us—no one's credibility ought to suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circumstances.

Let me quickly add that at this juncture I do not want to raise any false hopes by this remark. I am simply stating a principle which is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and security of private explorations.

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods to be employed in seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnamese conflict. Nor should we overlook the possibility that negotiations, private or public, might be preceded or facilitated by the process of mutual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a formally negotiated ceasefire. This, of course, would be welcome on our part.

It is altogether possible, too, that there will be no negotiations culminating in a formal agreement; that our adversaries will sooner or later find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gradually come to an end.

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome. But our most respected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that this will happen quickly, and that we must face the possibility of a long struggle. Surely, if there is any contribution that diplomacy can make to hastening a just and honorable end of this struggle, we cannot in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make that contribution—no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort may be, or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it may entail.

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side.

Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to be confused and distressed by what seems like an inconsistency in their leaders' policies. Some complain that the talk of peace suggests a weakening of our resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously others complain that the continued military effort suggests an attempt to bring the adversary to his knees, to break his will—and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will to peace.

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us that there are substantial conflicting interests at stake which stubbornly resist

solution; that peace cannot be bought at any price, nor can real conflicts of purpose be waved away with a magic wand. By the same token, the ferocity of war should not be an incitement to hatred but rather a stern discipline—a reminder of the imperative duty to define responsibly the limited interests for which our soldiers fight and which a peace settlement must protect.

The effort to make such a responsible definition, and to carry it through the process of peace negotiations, is "piled high with difficulty". A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict can be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in our highest national interest that an acceptable, livable solution should be found.

Let no one suppose that patriotism, which is so inspiringly displayed on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table. All our recent Presidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotiation as a means of peacefully bridging differences.

President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the eve of the first Summit Conference with the Soviet leadership: "We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the clash of the battlefield."

President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, said: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

And President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation as follows:

"To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show good sense. We believe that collective bargaining is working as long as parties stay in negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to the bargaining table are the hallmarks of success."

And to these words the President added specifically:

"This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. We shall count it a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are around a conference table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us."

I am sure all three of these Presidents would agree today that the effort to discover through negotiation, the common ground on which to build a just and honorable peace, is worthy of our most sincere and dedicated efforts.

His Excellency
Ho Chi Minh
President
Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll--in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the US Government, provided that we ceased "unconditionally" and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the

sent 3/8/67
received by Hanoi
3/21

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privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of US forces in South Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet-Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Viet-Nam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

To His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President,
United States of America,

Your Excellency:

On February 10, 1967, I received your message. This is my reply.

Vietnam is thousands of miles away from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva conference, the U.S. Government has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in South Vietnam with a view to prolonging the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neo-colony and a military base of the United States. For over two years now, the U.S. Government has, with its air and naval forces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country.

The U.S. Government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings and destruction in Vietnam. May I ask you: Who has perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It is the United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Government is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam.

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national independence movement, and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of the U. S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American people.

The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease this aggression. That is the only way to the restoration of peace. The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Such is the basis (sic) content of the five-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles and provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, it is the basic (sic) of a correct political solution to the Vietnam problem.

3/15/67 to Johnson
3/21 released in Hawaii

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In your message, you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. If the U. S. Government really wants these talks, it must first of all stop unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the U.S. Government will act in accordance with reason.

Sincerely,

Ho Chi Minh

MARCH 28, 1967

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 70

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 28, 1967

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

SECRETARY RUSK: Earlier today, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, made public some proposals which he had offered to a number of governments involved in the problem in Viet-Nam on March 14. The following day, we gave the Secretary General our interim reply, stating that we welcomed his initiative, and, after consultation with the Government of Viet-Nam and other allies, we would give him a more considered reply.

On March 18, we delivered that reply to the Secretary General, and you now have that in front of you.

In essence, the Secretary General proposed that there be a general standstill truce in Viet-Nam, that there then be preliminary talks leading to a

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reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

In our reply, we stated that we accepted the outline of his proposals, that we would be glad to negotiate the standstill truce, and take part in preliminary discussions leading to a reconvening of that conference.

We do not yet have in front of us the full text of whatever reply Hanoi may have delivered to the Secretary General. Whether Hanoi will make that public I do not now know. We do have a public statement from Hanoi which seems to indicate their attitude. That public statement of yesterday said that:

"To call on both sides to cease fire and hold unconditional negotiations, while the United States is committing aggression against Viet-Nam, and taking serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, to depart from reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the aggressors."

And then it adds:

"And, by the way, it is necessary to underline

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once again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations, and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the Viet-Nam question."

The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi has once again taken a negative view toward an initiative taken by someone else to move this matter toward peace.

I might say that the recent publication of the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh; and today's publication of the proposals of the Secretary General, and the responses to it, illustrate the problem that we have had from the beginning in bringing the Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclusion.

Many governments, many groups of governments, many world personalities, have tried to take an initiative to move this conflict toward a peaceful settlement. There has invariably been a positive and a constructive response from the United States; and there has invariably been a negative and hostile and, at times, vituperative

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response from the authorities in Hanoi. When one looks back over the long record of initiatives taken by many personalities and governments, and groups of governments, one sees the record of Hanoi's intransigence, with such phrases as "swindle," and "farce," and words of that sort.

Now, we do not ourselves believe that peace is not the business of the United Nations. We believe that no nation can say that a world organization representing 122 nations cannot properly take up the question of maintaining the peace. The

Charter provides for it; the obligations of the nations of the world are involved; and the issue of peace is at stake.

Nevertheless, we have never insisted that the United Nations is the sole mechanism for dealing with this question.

There is now pending before the Security Council a resolution offered by the United States calling for a peaceful settlement of this problem. That has been resisted in the United Nations because of the attitude of Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement

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of the United Nations. When the Soviet Ambassador said at the Security Council that "This is not the business of the U. N., it is a matter for the Geneva machinery," Ambassador Goldberg said, "All right. If that is your view, we will agree with that; then let us use the Geneva machinery."

But the Geneva machinery has been paralyzed by the attitude of Hanoi and Peking. For example, that machinery has not been available to respond favorably to Prince Sihanouk's request that the International Control Commission step up its activities to ensure the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Cambodia. That machinery was not available to ensure the demilitarization of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Viet-Nam.

So we would say to the authorities in Hanoi that, surely, there must be some machinery somewhere which can open the possibilities of peace. If not the United Nations, then the Geneva machinery; if not the Geneva machinery, then the resources of quiet diplomacy.

I can tell you, now that the exchange between

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President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh has been made public, and U Thant's proposals and our reply have been made public, that there is nothing in the private record which throws any different light on this situation than you now have in the public record. Despite all of the efforts made privately by many people in many places, the private record and the public record are now in agreement.

I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi would give serious thought to the present situation. If they have supposed that they would be able to obtain a military victory in the South, they must, surely, now put that hope aside. If they have had any hope that there would be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely, they must now know that all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who have some differences among themselves, are resolved to bring into being a Constitutional Government in which those various groups can work together on a basis of the free choice of the South Vietnamese people with respect to their future; and that one point, on which they are generally agreed in South Viet-Nam, is that they do not wish the program

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of Hanoi or the Liberation Front.

If Hanoi supposes that somehow international opinion will come to their rescue, surely they must know that when they rebuff the United Nations Organization, an organization of 122 members, that this will not bring them support in other parts of the world.

And, surely, they must understand that all small nations who are within the reach of some greater power have a

stake in the ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its own future for itself. And, surely, Hanoi must not be

under continuing misapprehension that, somehow, some

divisions within the United States might cause us to change our attitude toward our commitments to South

Viet-Nam. Because although there may be some differences among us, those differences are trivial compared to the differences between all of us, on the one side, and Hanoi on the other.

So we would hope that in some fashion, in some way, at some time, the authorities in Hanoi will make use of some machinery in which to be responsive to the many efforts which we and others have been making toward peace over the last several years.

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It is no good to brush aside the 17 nonaligned nations, and the British Commonwealth of Prime Ministers, and His Holiness the Pope, the Secretary General, and the President of India, and all the others who have been trying to find some basis on which this matter could be moved toward a peaceful conclusion, and suppose that, somehow, world opinion is supporting them in their efforts to seize South Viet-Nam by force,

So we would advise them to believe that, as far as we are concerned, we are not calling the search for a peaceful settlement to an end because of Ho Chi Minh's reply to President Johnson, or because of the attitude which they seem to be taking toward U Thant's most recent proposals. We shall continue that effort by private and public means, and we would hope that we would get some response through some channel that would begin to bring this thing within the range of discussion and make it possible to move toward a peaceful settlement.

Now, I am ready for your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of the reasons why they, surely, must not believe these various elements. What is it then you think that makes

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them keep on fighting and refusing to negotiate in the face of what must be a loss of international support, and these other adverse factors?

A Well, it is very hard to say. I can't enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi on a matter of that sort. I would suppose, really, that they are under some misapprehension. They are making some misjudgments and miscalculations on some point: either the state of international opinion, or the state of opinion within the United States. It's possible even that they still have some slender hopes of some military success in the South.

I just don't know what is in their minds. But what I am saying is that, so far as we understand their point of view, the principal pillars of their hopes are eroding from under them, and they should become interested in peace, and at an early date and not at some long delayed future date.

Q Mr. Secretary, your statement today in reply to U Thant has said that there would be "an appropriate involvement for the Government of South Viet-Nam throughout

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the entire process of arranging a peace."

Would you spell that out a little more, sir?

Premier Ky has been indicating that we haven't called him in.

A Well, obviously, any discussion with North Viet-Nam about peace in Viet-Nam must directly involve the Government of South Viet-Nam. Indeed, as you know, the Government of South Viet-Nam has on more than one occasion suggested direct talks between South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. They have proposed, for example, that the two governments there get together on the question of possibly extending the Tet standdown, the Tet Cease-Fire.

We would support that as a means for coming to grips with this problem. We would think that it would be a very good idea if Hanoi were to accept the proposals of South Viet-Nam for direct talks to move this toward a peaceful solution.

There are many opportunities available, you see.

There would be direct talks between Saigon and Hanoi. There would be talks between ourselves and

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Hanoi. There would be talks under the auspices of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, or under the auspices of the three members of the International Control Commission. Or there could be intermediaries, such as the Secretary General of the United Nations, or some other distinguished governmental or non-governmental leader. Any of these methods are appropriate and useful, as far as we are concerned.

The problem is that no one has been able to find a procedure or a method which, apparently, is agreeable to Hanoi.

Q Mr. Secretary?

A Yes,

Q If Hanoi persists for months and even years in its attitude, what will our response then be? What will our course be?

A We shall meet our commitments in South Viet-Nam. We shall do our duty there.

Q Mr. Secretary, at the end of the Korean War, as I recall, we entered into talks without a truce and the fighting continued for two years. Would you explain, would this formula to which you have responded today, could it be a lead to that same sort of thing, peace talks without any change in the fighting?

A Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch, of our most elementary position on this matter of talks. We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow morning without any conditions of any sort on either side. We are prepared to talk while the shooting is going on. If the other side wishes to raise major conditions, as they have with their demand that there be an unconditional permanent cessation of the bombing, we are prepared to talk about conditions. We will discuss the conditions which must precede the initiation of formal negotiations.

Or if they do not wish to start at that end-- that is, what do you do about the shooting--we are prepared to start at the other end -- what do you do about a final settlement of the problem? And work back from that to the practical means by which you reach the final settlement. So we are prepared to talk without any conditions of any sort, or about conditions.

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Now, let me say that we don't ourselves fully understand why there cannot be discreet talks even though the shooting is going on. Now, we are aware of the element of so-called face, but face is not a substitute for very serious practical problems that we face on the military side.

Now, I remind you that we discussed Berlin while the blockade was still in effect. We discussed Korea while the hostilities were still in effect. Indeed, we took more casualties in Korea after the negotiations started than had occurred before the negotiations started. We talked about the Cuban missiles while the Cuban missile sites were being built by the hour in Cuba. So we are prepared to talk without any change in the military situation whatever.

But we are also prepared to talk about changes in the military situation. What we cannot do is to commit ourselves to a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing without knowing what the practical results of that will be on the military side.

No one has been able to tell us, for example, just as one example, that if we stop the bombing those three divisions or more of North Vietnamese troops that

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are now in and on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone will not advance to attack our Marines who are six miles away.

Now, obviously, these are important practical questions. So we will talk at this moment, or we will talk about any other circumstances in which the other side might think that they might wish to talk. But what we cannot do is to stop half the war and let the other half of the war go on unimpeded.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when we referred in our reply to the Secretary General to a general stand-still truce, are we talking at that point of a cessation of the bombing, and cessation of infiltration from the North?

A I would suppose that a general stand-still truce would involve an elimination of all military action of all sorts on both sides. Now, one reason why there has to be some discussion of that is that it is necessary for both sides to understand what in fact will happen, particularly in a guerrilla situation where the situation on the ground is somewhat complicated. And so there needs to be some discussion of that point if it is to be a protracted stand-still.

But if that can be achieved, then we can move into the preliminary political discussions which might open the way for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference or some other appropriate forum. But a military standstill would involve the concept of stopping the military action on both sides, and that certainly would include stopping the bombing.

Q Mr. Secretary, just how does this formula today differ from Mr. Thant's previous formula?

A Well, I think that he would perhaps be the better one to comment on that. If there is a major difference, I think that this does place emphasis upon a mutual stop of the military action on both sides as an important first step.

As far as his earlier proposals were concerned, the three-point proposals, you recall that they envisage that we would stop the bombing as the first point. The second point, that there would be a mutual de-escalation of the military action; and, third, there would be discussions among all those involved in the conflict.

We said, "Your point one, stopping the bombing, gives us no particular problem, but what do you have from the other side about point two?" Well, what he had from

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the other side about point two was a complete rejection, that there will be no mutual de-escalation of military action.

And on point three, the question of discussions with all the parties involved in the fighting, the other side has consistently said in and out-from time to time, rather--that the Liberation Front must be accepted as the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.

We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi to engage in discussions with the Government in Saigon. We think that would be an appropriate way to begin such discussions, and the possibilities of peace might be opened up if that channel were to become active. But thus far Hanoi has refused to exercise it.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you distinguish between this proposal and the President's proposal to Ho Chi Minh?

A Well, I think that perhaps the Secretary General's proposal is somewhat broader, in that it would presumably apply to a cease-fire throughout all of Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam as well as the disengagement militarily between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. So to that extent, it is somewhat broader. But, nevertheless,

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that is something which we are perfectly prepared to discuss with representatives from the other side, or are perfectly prepared to have the Government of Saigon discuss with the representatives from Hanoi.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is your answer to those critics who say that the President's letter in effect raised the American price?

A Well, I don't understand what they are talking about.

Q Well, they say that in this letter the United States is demanding proof in advance that infiltration would have stopped.

A We didn't talk about proof in advance. The words used were "assurances that infiltration had stopped."

Q Well, it is your contention that the price was not raised, that you're on the status quo ante as far as that is concerned?

A The principal point here is that Hanoi has increasingly emphasized during this past year its inflexible demand that a stop in the bombing be permanent and unconditional, and that in exchange for

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that, there would be no indication from Hanoi as to what comparable or corresponding military action they would take on their side.

Now, just recall, for example, during the 37-day pause at the beginning of last year, Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to the Heads of Communist States, and in that letter he demanded that the United States must end unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other acts, war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Only in this way can a political solution of the Viet-Nam problem be envisaged.

Now, that insistence upon the stoppage of the bombing, which would be permanent and unconditional, has been a major increase in the public demands of Hanoi during this past year. And that makes it necessary for us to know what would happen if we committed ourselves to any such cessation.

The North Vietnamese representative in Paris on February 22nd said that we must state in advance at the time of any cessation of bombing that it would be permanent and unconditional. Well, that means that we must know what the effects would be. Will the infiltration continue? Will those three divisions move against

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our Marines? Are they going to continue their half of the war? No one has been able to whisper to us that that would not be the result. No one, private citizens, governments, Hanoi's own representatives, governments friendly to Hanoi. No one has been able to whisper to us that there would be any change in the present military tactics and strategy of Hanoi with respect to seizing South Viet-Nam by force.

If any of you gentlemen have any information to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it.

Q Mr. Secretary--

A Yes?

Q May I ask you if the channels directly to Hanoi remain open after this exchange of letters, and if so, are we putting these propositions that you have just stated directly to them?

A As far as we are concerned, the channels remain open. They have been open all along. I have referred to the fact that nothing we have had privately throws any different light on what you now know publicly about the attitude of the two sides. But I shouldn't exaggerate the point that channels remain open. When you

pick up the telephone and nobody answers on the other end, is that a channel or not? Or if you find yourself in a telephone conversation and the other end hangs up, I will leave it to you as to whether that is a channel. I can say at the moment that our channels are not very efficient, to say the least.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the amount of reciprocity that we would require for stopping the bombing a negotiable commodity, or is there a decisive--must there be a complete stoppage in infiltration, or is it negotiable?

A I don't want to give a categorical response to that because President Johnson in a recent press conference said that we would be glad to hear of almost anything from the other side. But that doesn't mean that we can live on just nothing from the other side, just nothing.

I point out to you that during the Tet pause, at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave his reply to the letter which President Johnson had sent to him at the beginning of the Tet pause, he had some other alternatives open to him. If there was a problem of time, he could have said, "Mr. President, time is rather short here. We

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need a little more time on this." He didn't say that. Or he could have said, "I don't particularly like your proposal, but here are my counterproposals." He didn't say that. In effect, he called for the capitulation of South Viet-Nam and capitulation of the American forces in South Viet-Nam, and a permanent and unconditional stoppage of the bombing. That we can't take.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the public and private record being the same, what exactly do you mean? Do you mean there is nothing outstanding now privately in the way of negotiation?

A No. What I'm saying is there is nothing in the private record that reflects any different view on the part of the authorities in Hanoi than you now have on the public record.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you explain why you haven't published the text of four other letters that you recently sent to Hanoi?

A Because we do not wish ourselves to establish the point that a private communication with us is impossible. If Hanoi wishes to make public a

communication from us, as they did in connection with the exchange between President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh, that is a choice which they can make. But I think it could be very important in the future that Hanoi at least know that it is possible for them to communicate privately with us without its becoming public, to the extent that you gentlemen would let us get away with that.

Q Mr. Secretary, Point (b) of the United States answer talks about preliminary talks. What's your understanding of who would take part in those talks--just Hanoi and Washington, or would it be Saigon or the NLF?

A Well, we haven't formulated that in great detail because we need to know what the attitude of Hanoi would be and what the general situation would be. In our reply we did say that of course the Government of South Viet-Nam will have to be appropriately involved throughout this entire process, and that the interests and views of our allies would also have to be taken fully into account. So we did not try to make that precise in detail because we would be interested in

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knowing what Hanoi's response to the Secretary General's initiative would be.

Q Mr. Secretary, you referred to the fact that there was no contradiction between the public and private record as far as peace talks are concerned. I wonder if you would be prepared to comment now on reports concerning the possibility of negotiations in Warsaw.

A If your question is would I be willing to, the answer is no. I think the attitude of Hanoi on these matters is fairly clear at the present time, but I do not want to point the finger to, or close the door on, any contacts that might occur anywhere in any capital as far as the future is concerned.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

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THE PATH TO VIET-NAM: A LESSON

IN INVOLVEMENT by William P.

Bundy, Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

August 15, 1967.

* * * *

Cornerstones of U.S. Policy

In essence:

(a) Our objective remained solely that of protecting the independence of South Viet-Nam from external interference and force. We declined, and still decline, to threaten the regime in North Viet-Nam itself or the territory and regime of Communist China.

(b) We indicated in April of 1965 that we were prepared for discussions or negotiations without condition, and we have relentlessly pursued our own efforts to enter into meaningful discussions as well as following up on a host of peace initiatives by others. Unfortunately, Hanoi has clung firmly to the objective of insuring a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam and has refused to enter into any fruitful discussions. Indeed, Hanoi has rejected any discussions whatever—initially unless its basic objective was accepted in advance through the so-called “third point,” more recently unless we agreed to a complete cessation of the bombing without any responsive action on their part. Hanoi’s philosophy toward negotiation has now become authoritatively available, particularly in the section on “fighting while negotiating” in the captured remarks of one of the North Vietnamese leaders, Comrade Vinh.

(c) We continued to place every possible emphasis on the crucial nonmilitary aspects of the conflict, greatly strengthening our own contribution to the essentially South Vietnamese task of restoring stability and control in the countryside and working for the welfare of the people.

(d) Militarily, our actions were directed to proving to North Viet-Nam that its effort to take over the South by military force must fail and to extending and enlarging the areas in which the vital business of bringing real se-

curity and peace to the countryside could go forward with all the strength we could hope to give it. The total effort in the South remained primary, even as the bombing of military targets in the North was carried on—initially to demonstrate resolve but always and basically to make Hanoi’s infiltration far more difficult and costly and to prevent levels of new men and equipment that could only, in the arithmetic of guerrilla warfare, multiply many times over, for each addition from North Viet-Nam, the requirement for forces in the South.

(e) We encouraged the South Vietnamese in their own resolve to move to a constitutional basis of government, a process set underway formally by Prime Minister Ky in January of 1966 and followed since that time in the face of all the difficulties and dangers of attempting to create such a basis in a country without political experience and ravaged by terrorism and by guerrilla and conventional military action.

(f) We encouraged the South Vietnamese at the same time to proceed on the track that has now become reconciliation, the holding out to members of the Viet Cong of the possibility of reentering the political life of their country under peaceful conditions. In essence, we seek and would accept a fair determination of the will of the people of South Viet-Nam along the lines well summarized by Ambassador Goldberg’s Chicago speech of May 12, 1967.¹⁴

These were the South Vietnamese aspects of our policy. But then, as previously, the policy was seen in the wider context of the future of Southeast Asia. So it was that President Johnson lent our strong support in April of 1965 to the development of regional cooperation and of economic projects created through Asian initiative. By this vital element in our policy, we made clear again that our underlying objective was to do what we could to assist in the constructive task of bringing about a Southeast Asia of cooperative and independent nations, whatever their international postures might be.

We had a security job to do in Viet-Nam and were joined over time by five other area nations in supplying military forces to do that job. And we are assisting Thailand against a concerted Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese effort at external subversion, an effort begun—to keep the record straight—as early as 1962 and clearly and definitively by December 1964, before our major decisions in Viet-Nam. Our SEATO and ANZUS undertakings remain firm.

But we looked beyond these, and we must still look beyond these, to the whole question of the future of Southeast Asia and to the role that we can play in assisting the nations of the area to consolidate their national independence and to improve the welfare of their people.

This, then, is a barebones account of "The Path to Viet-Nam." Even within its own terms, it may omit what others would include. And, long as it may seem, it is still incomplete in two respects that it would take far too much time to cover.

First, it is plainly inadequate to focus solely on our policies toward Viet-Nam or even toward Southeast Asia as a whole. Those policies are intimately related to the rest of Asia; to the implications of Asian developments for other areas and, in the last analysis, for our own national security; and to our central world purpose—the creation of an international order of independent states.

Secondly, I have tried to isolate what I consider to have been the major policy decisions. Obviously, policy is not just a matter of single decisions, however fully considered. A vast number of lesser policy decisions have accompanied these basic ones, and the way in which a basic policy is carried out in the end affects its substance. I have not tried to cover, for example, decisions on the balance of effort within South Viet-Nam, decisions on particular negotiating proposals, decisions on the pace and nature of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, or the subtle and difficult problem, over the years, of United States influence toward political progress in the South. I know full well that these are areas in which many of you undoubtedly hold strong views. I welcome discussion of them.

"The Lesson in Involvement"

What, then, is "the lesson in involvement"?

—Is it that we have been trapped into a difficult situation by a series of lesser decisions taken with no clear view of their implications?

—Is it that we should never have become engaged in Southeast Asia?

—Is it that we should never have attempted to support South Viet-Nam?

—Is it that, having supported South Viet-Nam in certain respects (including a treaty) and having become deeply engaged in Southeast Asia, we should nonetheless have decided—or should now decide—to limit the actions we take or even to withdraw entirely?

The first question seems to me both separate and difficult. At some point in the history I have recited we became committed, deliberately and by formal constitutional process, to the support of the freedom of South Viet-Nam from external interference. That commitment included a strong treaty obligation, and that is a clear part of the story. But what is perhaps more to the point is that great powers must face two central points:

(a) As Irving Kristol has pointed out in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, the very definition of a great power is that not only its actions but the cases in which it declines to act have major consequences. At every stage in the Viet-Nam story, it has seemed clear to the leaders of this country that not to act would have the gravest effects. This is the way that successive choices have appeared to four successive Presidents.

(b) The second point that a great power cannot escape is that its actions in themselves affect the stakes. When great powers commit themselves, by treaty and by a total course of conduct extending over many years, an element of reliance comes into being, both within the area and within other areas in which commitments have also been undertaken.

Yet, all this being said, I do not think one can conclude that because we said or did *a*, we must necessarily say or do *b*—in an old phrase of Bismarck's. So I, for one, do not believe that the "lesson in involvement" is that we are the prisoners of history.

Rather, I think we should be focusing on the second, third, and fourth questions I have listed above.

These are big questions, and if I have tried to do anything today it is to stress that the matter has really been looked at for at least the last 13 years in this kind of larger framework. The policies followed today are, as they must be, the policies of this administration. No one can say whether another administration would have done the same. What can be said is that the underlying viewpoint and analysis of factors have been largely similar throughout the last 13 years, if not longer.

This does not prove, of course, that this analysis has been correct. The United States has no divine dispensation from error, and the most that your leaders at any time can do is to exert the best human judgment and moral sense of which they are capable. I, for one, am convinced that this has been done at all stages.

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Sept. 21

—Following is the text of a speech to General Assembly delivered today Arthur J. Goldberg, United States chief representative:

Today, as every year at this time, we open a new chapter in the history of the United Nations. We open on a hopeful note with your [Corneliu Manescu of Rumania] election as President, for you are not only known and respected by your colleagues throughout the world as an able and distinguished diplomatist; you also have the distinction of being the first representative of a country of Eastern Europe to be elected to this high office. We of the United States welcome this development as one further sign of the evolution which has been taking place in the relations among the states of Eastern Europe and of other parts of the world. May all members take this new step as a reminder of the truth which a modern Danish sage has compressed into these words: "Coexistence — or no existence."

We congratulate you, Mr. President, and pledge to you our cooperation in the discharge of your difficult and important office.

I take this occasion also to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, the President of the Twenty-First Session, Ambassador Pazhwak of Afghanistan.

We share the admiration of all delegations for the resourcefulness and patience with which he guided us through more meetings of the General Assembly than have been presided over by any other man in the history of this organization.

This annual general debate serves the important purpose of allowing each member to lay before the entire Assembly, at the outset of our session, its major concerns in the international sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on all the issues on the agenda to which my country attaches importance. This statement will concentrate on certain issues which, in our view, are of transcendent significance to world peace.

The Conflict in Vietnam

First among these is the continued tragic conflict in Vietnam. For the entire community of nations, the search for peace in Vietnam remains a matter of the first priority, for peace in Vietnam must and should be our major concern. Indeed, pursuant to its Charter, the United Nations has the most explicit right and duty to concern itself with this question, as it does with any breach of or threat to the peace anywhere in the world.

Holding this conviction as we do, my Government continues to seek the active participation of the United Nations in the quest for peace in Vietnam. Every member and every organ of the United Nations, this Assembly included, shares the Charter obligation of lending its

weight and influence to help resolve disputes and conflicts between nations by peaceful means. Today, despite past disappointments, I reiterate our appeal to all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to accept that obligation — to use their influence to help bring the Vietnam conflict to an end by peaceful means.

The distinguished delegates who participate in this debate will undoubtedly make observations and offer suggestions as to how this can be brought about. My delegation will listen to them with close attention and respect.

As our contribution to the Assembly's discussion of this issue, let me state as precisely as possible the views and ideas of my Government.

Our basic view is one which, I am sure, is shared by the great majority of this Assembly: that this conflict can and should be ended by a political solution at the earliest possible time. A military solution is not the answer. For our part, we do not seek to impose a military solution on North Vietnam or on its adherents. By the same token, in fidelity to a political solution, we will not permit North Vietnam and its adherents to impose a military solution upon South Vietnam.

Procedures for a Solution

The question then naturally arises: By what procedure can a political solution be reached? One well-tested way is the conference table. We are prepared to follow this path at any time — to go to the conference table in Geneva or any other suitable place.

There is a second way to pursue a political settlement: through private negotiations or discussions. The United States stands ready to take this route also — and, in so doing, to give assurances that the confidence and privacy of such negotiations or discussions would be fully respected by our Government.

It may be that negotiations or discussions might be preceded or facilitated by mutual military restraint, by the scaling down of the conflict, by de-escalation either with or without a formal ceasefire. This route, too, we are prepared to follow.

There is, on the other hand, the danger that the conflict may continue until

one side finds the burden of war too exhausting or too costly, and that the fighting will only gradually end, without negotiations and without an agreed settlement. Certainly this is a grim prospect, for it would mean prolonged conflict and tragedy. It is in essence a military solution, and it is not one we seek. We earnestly hope that it is not the course in which our adversaries will persist. In any event, there will be no slackening in our resolve to help South Vietnam defend its right to determine its own future by peaceful means and free from external force.

Committed as we are to a political solution through discussions or negotiations, we regret that, despite many efforts, North Vietnam and its adherents have not yet agreed to this objective. But we shall continue in our efforts; and we hope that what we say today may help to bring nearer the time when the two sides will sit down together.

The Attitude of Hanoi

It is said by some that Hanoi will agree to begin negotiations if the United States ceases the bombing of North Vietnam—that this bombing is the sole obstacle to negotiations. I would note that in its public statements Hanoi has merely indicated that there "could" be negotiations if the bombing stopped. True, some governments—as well as our distinguished Secretary-General and other individuals — have expressed their belief or assumption that negotiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, if the bombings were stopped. We have given these expressions of belief our most careful attention. But no such third party — including those governments which are among Hanoi's closest friends — has conveyed to us any authoritative message from Hanoi that there would in fact be negotiations if the bombing were stopped. We have sought such a message directly from Hanoi without success.

On its part, the United States would be glad to consider and discuss any proposal that would lead promptly to productive discussions that might bring about peace to the area.

We do not, however, conceive it to be unreasonable for us to seek enlightenment on this important question:

Does North Vietnam conceive that the cessation of bombing would or should lead to any other results than meaningful negotiations or discussions under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side?

Moreover, we believe we also have a right to address ourselves to those governments which support Hanoi's cause and which have stated to us their beliefs about Hanoi's intentions and to put this question to them:

If the United States were to take the first step and order a prior cessation of the bombing, what would they then do or refrain from doing, and how would they then use their influence and power, in order to move the Vietnam conflict promptly toward a peaceful resolution?

Constructive answers to these questions would aid in the search for peace.

A Further Necessity

In the minds of some, there is a further necessity: namely, to articulate more precisely the principles of an honorable settlement. In the interest of meeting this viewpoint, let me set forth these principles envisaged by my Government in as precise a manner as is possible prior to negotiations — and without in any way pre-conditioning or prejudicing such negotiations.

It is widely accepted that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 should constitute the basis for settlement. We agree. In our view, this entails:

1. A complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel in both North and South Vietnam on a specified date. Such action was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
2. No military forces, armed personnel or bases to be maintained in North or South Vietnam except those under the control of the respective governments. This would mean withdrawing or demobilizing all other troops, withdrawing external military and related personnel introduced from outside South Vietnam, and the evacuation of military bases, as soon as possible under an agreed time schedule. This too was contemplated under the Geneva Agreements.
3. Full respect for the international frontiers of the states bordering on North and South Vietnam, as well as for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
4. Peaceful settlement by the people in both North and South Vietnam of the question of reunification, without foreign interference. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
5. Finally, supervision of all the foregoing by agreed upon international machinery. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

thus summarizing the central elements of the Geneva Agreements, I note that, as evidenced in the communiqué issued at Manila last October 25, the Government of South Vietnam holds similar views.

We make this authoritative statement, Mr. President, in the hope that a settlement can be reached by reaffirming the principals of the Geneva Agreement and by making use of the machinery created by those agreements — including in particular a reconvened Geneva Conference in which all concerned parties can appropriately participate.

An Additional Question

And we suggest that a further question is in order:

Does North Vietnam agree that the foregoing points are a correct interpretation of the Geneva Agreements to which it professedly subscribes?

To this question let me append this plain statement about the aims of the United States toward North Vietnam. The United States has no designs on the territory of North Vietnam: we do not seek to overthrow its government, whatever its ideology; and we are fully prepared to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end.

By the same token, it remains our view that the people of South Vietnam should have the right to work out their own political future by peaceful means, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, and without external interference; and that this right too should be respected by all.

And it is our further view that all South Vietnamese who are willing to participate peacefully in the political life of South Vietnam should have an equal chance as first-class citizens with full rights in every sense. We do not conceive that any segment of the South Vietnamese people should be excluded from such peaceful participation. We would consider it altogether wise and proper, if this would remove an obstacle to peace, that appropriate assurances on this matter be considered in connection with a political settlement.

It should be noted in this connection that the Government of South Vietnam has stated that it has "no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North," that it seeks only to resolve its political problems without external interference; and that it is prepared for "reconciliation of all elements in the society." It is also noteworthy that the people of South Vietnam have just concluded a peaceful election under a new constitution, and have made progress in the democratic process.

Let me add that my Government remains willing, and indeed has already begun, to make a major commitment of resources in a multilateral cooperative effort to accelerate in all of Southeast Asia the benefits of economic development so sorely needed there. When the conflict is ended and peace is restored, we would hope to see North Vietnam included in that effort.

Constructive Replies Urged

In the interest of progress along this road to peace, we earnestly hope that constructive answers to the questions we have raised will soon be forthcoming. We are all too conscious that the present reality is one of grim and harsh conflict — already tragically and unduly prolonged. Surely if there is any contribution that diplomacy, whether bilateral or multilateral, can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none in this Assembly can in good conscience spare any effort or any labor to make that contribution — no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required.

We of the United States, for our part, stand ready to make that effort and to persist in trying to overcome all obstacles to a settlement.

The President of the United States, speaking specifically of Vietnam, has said: "We Americans know the nature of

a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us." In the flexible spirit of that statement, and speaking for the United States Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution of the conflict in Vietnam.

I turn now to the Middle East, a second area of conflict which is both tragic in itself and dangerous to the peace of the world.

The views of the United States on the requirements of peace in the Middle East have been set forth by President Johnson, notably in his statement of June 19 which remains our policy. In that statement my Government appealed to all the parties to adopt no rigid view on the method of bringing peace to the area. Rather, we have emphasized throughout that there is something more basic than methods: the simple will to peace. There must be present on both sides an affirmative will to resolve the issues, not through the dictation of terms by either side, but through a process of mutual accommodation in which nobody's vital interests are injured: In short, both sides must have the will to work out a political solution; both must be committed to the peace; and no appropriate method, such as good offices or mediation, should be excluded.

Emergency Session's Work

In candor it must be said that such a will to peace was not manifest in the recent emergency session of the Assembly. It is greatly to be hoped that, after sober reflection by all concerned, a new and better mood will emerge — a mood of reconciliation and magnanimity.

Surely the purposes of peace cannot be served if the right of a member state to its national life is not accepted and respected by its neighbors; nor if military success blinds a member state to the fact that its neighbors have rights and interests of their own.

In realism, it is perhaps not to be expected that reconciliation and magnanimity will appear overnight; but surely enmity must at least give way to tolerance and to the will to live together in peace. Once that will is manifest, the terms of settlement can be evolved.

The principles which my Government believes can bring peace to the region are these:

¶ Each nation in the area must accept the right of others to live. The least that this requires is that all should renounce any state or claim of belligerency, which as long ago as 1951 was found by the Security Council to be inconsistent with peace.

¶ Troops must be withdrawn — and withdrawn in a context of peace. For some parties cannot be left free to assert the rights of war while others are called upon to abide by the rules of peace.

¶ There must be justice for the refugees. The nations of the area must address themselves at last, with new energy and new determination to succeed, to the plight of those who have been rendered homeless or displaced by wars and conflicts of the past, both distant and recent.

¶ Free and innocent passage through international waterways must be assured for all nations. One of the lessons of the recent conflict is that maritime rights must be respected.

¶ The wasteful and destructive arms race in the region must be curbed, thereby making more resources available for economic development.

The status of Jerusalem must not be decided unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned, and in recognition of the historic interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places.

The political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area must be respected.

Boundaries must be accepted and other arrangements made, superseding temporary and often violated armistice

lines, so as to afford security to all parties against terror, destruction and war.

These are important general principles on which, we believe, rests the peace of the area. While the main responsibility lies with the parties, the United Nations and every member state, including my own country, must help in the search for peace. For it is in the highest international interest, as well as in the national interests of the parties, that peace should be achieved as soon as possible.

As for my own country, our most cherished wish for the Middle East has long been an age of peace in which we could enjoy good relations with every nation of that region. In such a climate of peace there is much that we could do, and would be glad to do, in cooperation with other members and with the gifted people of the region itself. Regional economic development; the full rehabilitation of the refugees; the desalting of water and the restoration of the desert to human use — these, and not war or armaments, are the works to which my country, and I am sure many both in and outside the Middle East, would prefer to devote our energies.

I turn now to a third momentous problem: the search for reliable programs of international disarmament and arms control, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons.

Step-by-step progress in this field, which seemed out of reach for so many years, has more recently become a reality. Significant limitations regarding nuclear weapons have been accepted by the nuclear powers in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963; and only last year in the Outer Space Treaty.

These successive steps have encouraged us to continue to tackle one of the most basic aspects of the nuclear dilemma: the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more nations. This poses one of the gravest dangers to peace and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The longer this problem remains, the graver the danger becomes.

My Government has long been very much alive to this danger. In response it we have given the highest priority to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee to the objective of a non-proliferation treaty.

Last month this long effort culminated in the simultaneous tabling by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty

— complete in all except its safeguard provisions. The texts of these drafts will be available in document form to all members of the General Assembly.

Complex Problems Remain

Complex problems still remain. But we are hopeful that a complete treaty draft, including a generally acceptable safeguard provision, will be presented to this session in time to allow for consideration and action by the Assembly, under whose general direction and guidance this treaty is being negotiated.

The presentation of such a completed draft will, of course, not be the end of the process. There will remain the understandable desire of certain non-nuclear countries for assurances against nuclear blackmail. The Assembly, in addition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it will, can make a significant contribution to the treaty's objective of non-proliferation by helping to develop a solution to this related problem.

We fully understand that the drafts which have been tabled in Geneva are far too important to admit of hurried consideration by prospective signatories. But neither does this urgent matter admit of procrastination. All concerned powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, should press forward with all practical speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when it unanimously declared in Resolution 2149 (XXI):

First, that states take all necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty; and

Second, that all states refrain from any actions conducive to proliferation or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement.

Mr. President, our preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty has not diminished my Government's concern over other major problems in the arms control field. High on the list of these problems is the growing arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Some time ago we expressed to the Soviet Union our interest in an understanding which would limit the deployment of such missiles.

In the interim, we in the United States have been obliged to review carefully our strategic position. Our conclusion from this review was that our security, including particularly security against the threat of a missile attack by Mainland China, required us to embark upon the construction of a limited anti-ballistic missile system — and I emphasize the word "limited."

No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, should feel that its security is endan-

gered by this decision. On the contrary, to the extent that the United States will be better able to meet its international defensive responsibilities, and to respond to appeals from states threatened by nuclear blackmail, the present safety of many other countries may in fact be enhanced.

No Illusions on Missiles

However, we have no illusions that the construction and deployment of missiles of any kind is the preferred road to security. It is not. The events which led to our decision simply underscore the urgent importance of pursuing negotiations on a limitation of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Despite our lack of success thus far, the United States remains ready to open talks on this subject at any time.

Mr. President, these developments once again demonstrate the urgent need not only for a non-proliferation treaty, but for all the necessary steps toward general and complete disarmament. Let no one imagine that the building or acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap security. True security for all powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress on the entire range of arms control and disarmament measures — including control of the strategic arms race, a verifiable comprehensive test ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will help to build a more secure world for all.

Mr. President, the fourth great problem which I wish to discuss is that of assuring self-determination and full nationhood to all peoples who still live in colonial subjection.

Our Assembly agenda reminds us that the work of ending the colonial age is far from finished. In fact, the hardest problems have remained until the last. This is true above all in the southern portion of the African continent, where white minorities have become deeply entrenched in their dominion over black majorities. In much of this area we see not one evil but two evils which, under one guise or another, go hand in hand: colonialism and that particularly cruel offense against human rights, racial discrimination.

The opposition of the United States to these twin evils draws strength from two of the deepest elements in our own national life: our historic stand as an anticolonial power and our continuing struggle against racial injustice among our own people.

My country, founded on the proposition that all men are created equal and have equal rights before the law — and currently engaged in a vigorous nationwide program to make that equality real for all its citizens — cannot and will not adopt a double standard of what is happening in the southern part of Africa.

To those who are impatient for redress of grievances we shall show that we sympathize with them and support their objectives, even though we may not always agree on the specific steps to be taken by the international community.

To those who, on the other hand, resist all change, we shall continue to insist that the way to preserve peace is not the submergence of legitimate grievances, but their timely redress. And we shall unceasingly bring home to them America's profound conviction that apartheid—like every other form of white supremacy—is, as my predecessor Adlai Stevenson said, "racist in its origins, arrogant in its implementation, and, in its consequences, potentially dangerous for all."

Mr. President, during the coming three months the General Assembly will address itself not only to the questions we have discussed in this statement but to a vast range of matters affecting the peace and welfare of mankind, both now and in the long future. My delegation will seek to participate constructively in the Assembly's many concerns; and on a number of topics of particular interest we shall present proposals of our own.

The United States turns to these tasks in a mood of sober determination. Our distinguished Secretary General, in the introduction to his annual report, has made clear his view that this has not been a good year for the United Nations; and we agree with that assessment. The fault lies not in the organization itself but in ourselves, its members; and it is to our own policies that we must all look if we desire a better future.

In serving the cause of a just and peaceful world, we are not permitted the luxury of being easily discouraged. Indeed, the most forbidding obstacles are precisely those which should call forth our most persistent efforts. Nor should we look for any alternative to the United Nations, for there is none. Year in and year out, through all the difficulties that may arise, we must strive to be true, both in word and deed, to the permanent pledge of peace and justice which we, as members, have made to the United Nations and to one another.

As this Twenty-second General Assembly opens, the United States once again solemnly reaffirms its devotion to that pledge.

Weekly Compilation of
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

Week Ending Friday, October 6, 1967

VIETNAM

The President's Remarks in San Antonio Before the National Legislative Conference. September 29, 1967

Speaker Barnes, Governor Hughes, Governor Smith, Congressman Kazen, Representative Graham, most distinguished legislators, ladies and gentlemen:

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to appear before an organization whose members contribute every day such important work to the public affairs of our State and of our country.

This evening I came here to speak to you about Vietnam.

I do not have to tell you that our people are profoundly concerned about that struggle.

There are passionate convictions about the wisest course for our Nation to follow. There are many sincere and patriotic Americans who harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three Presidents and a half a million of our young men have made.

Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problems of Vietnam are quite complex. They are a mixture of political turmoil—of poverty—of religious and factional strife—of ancient servitude and modern longing for freedom. Vietnam is all of these things.

Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetite for conquest.

It is the arena where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today—where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is killing and kidnaping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America has entered—with its material power and with its moral commitment.

Why?

Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian nation more than 10,000 miles from American shores?

We cherish freedom—yes. We cherish self-determination for all people—yes. We abhor the political murder of any state by another, and the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for 27 years—since the days of lend-lease—we have sought to strengthen free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

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But the key to all we have done is really our own security. At times of crisis—before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land—every American President has finally had to answer this question:

Is the aggression a threat—not only to the immediate victim—but to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the entire world of which we in America are a very vital part?

That is the question which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to answer in facing the issue in Vietnam.

That is the question that the Senate of the United States answered by a vote of 82 to 1 when it ratified and approved the SEATO treaty in 1955, and to which the Members of the United States Congress responded in a resolution that it passed in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2, "the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment—that securing South Vietnam from armed domination is not worth the price we are paying—must also answer this question. And the test they must meet is this: What would be the consequence of letting armed aggression against South Vietnam succeed? What would follow in the time ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in 5 months or 5 years from tonight?

For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these past 10 years, the stakes to us have seemed clear—and have seemed high.

President Dwight Eisenhower said in 1959:

"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom. . . ."

And President John F. Kennedy said in 1962:

". . . Withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area."

A year later, he reaffirmed that:

"We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there," said President Kennedy.

This is not simply an American viewpoint, I would have you legislative leaders know. I am going to call the roll now of those who live in that part of the world—in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations—and who bear the responsibility for leading their people, and the responsibility for the fate of their people.

The President of the Philippines had this to say:

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now. . . . It may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance. . . . For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia."

The Foreign Minister of Thailand said:

"(The American) decision will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration."

The Prime Minister of Australia said:

"We are there because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened."

President Park of Korea said:

"For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat troops overseas . . . because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people."

The Prime Minister of Malaysia warned his people that if the United States pulled out of South Vietnam, it would go to the Communists, and after that, it would be only a matter of time until they moved against neighboring states.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand said:

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe—and is prepared to back up its concern with action."

The Prime Minister of Singapore said:

"I feel the fate of Asia—South and Southeast Asia—will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam."

I cannot tell you tonight as your President—with certainty—that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia. But I do know there are North Vietnamese troops in Laos. I do know that there are North Vietnamese trained guerrillas tonight in northeast Thailand. I do know that there are Communist-supported guerrilla forces operating in Burma. And a Communist coup was barely averted in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

So your American President cannot tell you—with certainty—that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a third world war much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that this would not be so.

But all that we have learned in this tragic century strongly suggests to me that it would be so. As President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble on the chance that it is not so. I am not prepared to risk the security—indeed, the survival—of this American Nation on mere hope and wishful thinking. I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, we are greatly reducing the chances of a much larger war—perhaps a nuclear war. I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and

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by meeting this danger now, and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children and for our grandchildren.

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam itself.

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every really thoughtful person. I am going to put some of these questions. And I am going to give you the very best answers that I can give you.

First, are the Vietnamese—with our help, and that of their other allies—really making any progress? Is there a forward movement? The reports I see make it clear that there is. Certainly there is a positive movement toward constitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have met the political schedule that they laid down in January 1966.

The people wanted an elected, responsive government. They wanted it strongly enough to brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror and assassination to vote for it. It has been said that they killed more civilians in 4 weeks trying to keep them from voting before the election than our American bombers have killed in the big cities of North Vietnam in bombing military targets.

On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of the Constituent Assembly, an elected government will be inaugurated and an elected Senate and Legislature will be installed. Their responsibility is clear: To answer the desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination and for peace, for an attack on corruption, for economic development, and for social justice.

There is progress in the war itself, steady progress considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Vietcong on the people is being broken.

Since our commitment of major forces in July 1965 the proportion of the population living under Communist control has been reduced to well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the population has grown from about 45 percent to 65 percent—and in the contested areas, the tide continues to run with us.

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered severely, as have we—particularly in the First Corps area in the north, where the enemy has mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines of communication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties in the war have reached about 13,500 killed in action, and about 85,000 wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 of the 85,000 have been returned, or will return to duty shortly. Thanks to our great American medical science and the helicopter.

I know there are other questions on your minds, and on the minds of many sincere, troubled Americans: "Why not negotiate now?" so many ask me. The answer is that we and our South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared to negotiate tonight.

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh, and other chiefs of state concerned, tomorrow.

I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their foreign minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative of America to any spot on this earth to talk in public or private with a spokesman of Hanoi.

We have twice sought to have the issue of Vietnam dealt with by the United Nations—and twice Hanoi has refused.

Our desire to negotiate peace—through the United Nations or out—has been made very, very clear to Hanoi—directly and many times through third parties.

As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

So it is by Hanoi's choice—and not ours, and not the rest of the world's—that the war continues.

Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with the war?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the very end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week—he had just been in Hanoi—"They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital had this to say: "They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive war. . . . Thus we are sure to win in the end."

Are the North Vietnamese right about us?

I think not. No. I think they are wrong. I think it is the common failing of totalitarian regimes, that they cannot really understand the nature of our democracy:

- They mistake dissent for disloyalty;
- They mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy;
- They mistake a few committees for a country;
- They misjudge individual speeches for public policy.

They are no better suited to judge the strength and perseverance of America than the Nazi and the Stalinist propagandists were able to judge it. It is a tragedy that they must discover these qualities in the American people, and discover them through a bloody war.

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And, soon or late, they will discover them.

In the meantime, it shall be our policy to continue to seek negotiations—confident that reason will some day prevail; that Hanoi will realize that it just can never win; that it will turn away from fighting and start building for its own people.

Since World War II, this Nation has met and has mastered many challenges—challenges in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, in Cuba.

We met them because brave men were willing to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who carry our colors in Vietnam at this very hour.

The price of these efforts, of course, has been heavy. But the price of not having made them at all, not having seen them through, in my judgment would have been vastly greater.

Our goal has been the same—in Europe, in Asia, in our own hemisphere. It has been—and it is now—peace.

And peace cannot be secured by wishes; peace cannot be preserved by noble words and pure intentions. "Enduring peace," Franklin D. Roosevelt said, "cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom."

The late President Kennedy put it precisely in November 1961, when he said: "We are neither warmongers nor appeasers, neither hard nor soft. We are Americans determined to defend the frontiers of freedom by an honorable peace if peace is possible but by arms if arms are used against us."

The true peace-keepers in the world tonight are not those who urge us to retire from the field in Vietnam—who tell us to try to find the quickest, cheapest exit from that tormented land, no matter what the consequences to us may be.

The true peace-keepers are those men who stand out there on the DMZ at this very hour, taking the worst that the enemy can give. The true peace-keepers are the soldiers who are breaking the terrorist's grip around the villages of Vietnam—the civilians who are bringing medical care and food and education to people who have already suffered a generation of war.

And so I report to you that we are going to continue to press forward. Two things we must do. Two things we shall do.

First, we must not mislead our enemy. Let him not think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assure you they won't. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender. Because they won't. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he won't.

Second, we will provide all that our brave men require to do the job that must be done. And that job is going to be done.

These gallant men have our prayers—have our thanks—have our heart-felt praise—and our deepest gratitude.

Let the world know that the keepers of peace will endure through every trial—and that with the full backing of their countrymen, they are going to prevail.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:34 p.m., c.d.t., at the Villita Assembly Hall in San Antonio, Texas. The speech was broadcast nationally.

The National Legislative Conference is an operation of the Council of State Governments with headquarters in Atlanta, Ga. The group included approximately 2,000 delegates to the Conference.

SUBMISSION OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1967

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and Aiken.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We meet this morning to continue a series of hearings on the role that the United Nations should play in settlement of the Vietnam conflict. The committee is considering two resolutions covering the question of submitting the Vietnam war to the United Nations Security Council. Both Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, Senator Morse, and Senate Resolution 180, introduced by the senior Senator from Montana, Mr. Mansfield, with 57 cosponsors, are being considered by the committee.

We are very happy indeed this morning to welcome the Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. Mr. Ambassador, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. I should like to say I am accompanied here today by Mr. Joseph Sisco, the able and dedicated Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate very much your invitation to appear before this committee and to give testimony in public session on the important subject of the responsibility of the United Nations in the search for peace in Vietnam. This is the gravamen of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 introduced by Senator Morse, and of Senate Resolution 180 introduced by Senator Mansfield and many other Senators.

I should like also, Mr. Chairman, to express my appreciation to the committee which had scheduled me to appear last week to defer my appearance which was impossible at that time because of a meeting

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of the Security Council and other consultations on the Middle Eastern crisis at the U.N. I should like also to thank Dr. Marcy who was so kind as to arrange for this day which was more convenient.

At the very outset let me say that I agree completely with the concept of the responsibility of the United Nations which underlies both resolutions.

In preparing my testimony I have taken note of Senator Morse's comment in the hearings before this committee on October 26, referring to Senator Mansfield's resolution and I quote Senator Morse, who said in part: "I think it probably would be the most appropriate type of resolution to send to the President, for, after all, this ought to be a teamwork play."

I need scarcely add at this time that the Senator made it very clear this was without prejudice to his own views in the matter.

It is my considered view as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations that the adoption of Senator Mansfield's resolution at this time will support the efforts I have been making at the United Nations at the direction of the President to enlist the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam.

U.N. RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CHARTER

Any analysis of the problem of U.N. involvement in Vietnam must start with the United Nations charter. Under the charter, the United Nations and its members have a specific obligation to cooperate in the maintenance of international peace and security. This obligation is clearly set forth in the provisions of the charter, including specifically the following:

Article 1, paragraph 1, which states the first purpose of the United Nations as:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Article 2, paragraph 3, which includes among the principles binding upon all members the following:

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered.

Article 24, paragraph 1:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Article 25:

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

And to these provisions should be added all of chapters VI and VII of the charter which confer broad powers on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Moreover, it is obvious that these powers and obligations of the United Nations apply to the situation in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular.

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In saying this I am mindful of the argument that is sometimes made, both in and out of the United Nations, that several of the principal parties—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China—are not in the United Nations and that it is, therefore, not a suitable place to deal with the Vietnam question. The premise is, of course, a fact, but the conclusion is incorrect. The charter explicitly provides for the responsibility and participation of nonmembers; for example:

Article 2, paragraph 6, provides—

The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

And article 32 provides in part, and I again quote, that—

Any state which is not a member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

—It is clear, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the United Nations has a duty to act for peace in Vietnam, and that the involvement of nonmembers is no obstacle to such action. The question therefore arises: Why has such action not taken place?

I believe it would be useful to the committee if I review briefly the record of our endeavors in the Security Council to obtain such action.

* * * *

ATTITUDE OF COUNCIL MEMBERS TOWARD DEBATE

Ambassador GOLDBERG. It is important to note also, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, that the Soviet Union and Bulgaria refused throughout to even join in the consultations which Ambassador Matsui held among the Council members. The Soviet representative, Ambassador Fedorenko, sent a letter to the President of the Council stating his "strong objections" to the procedure followed by Ambassador Matsui, and charging him with "steps that go beyond the limit of his confidence and violate the Security Council's rules of procedure and established practice." A similar letter was also sent by the Bulgarian representative. I need scarcely add, Mr. Chairman, that in our view and I think in the view of many members of the Council Ambassador Matsui acted quite properly in doing what he did and quite within his authority as President of the Council in reporting to the members of the Council the results of his consultations.

My own canvass taken independently of that of Ambassador Matsui confirmed his assessment that the members of the Council were generally unwilling to proceed with a substantive discussion despite the strong and express preference of the United States that we get on

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with the debate. I should also like to add we did have somewhat of a substantive debate as happens in the U.N. even in the process of inscribing an item. I made a statement of a substantive character in support of inscription because I could hardly avoid it, and other members spoke to the substance in dealing with the inscription matter as is apparent from the record you have kindly allowed me to file with the committee.

Indeed my canvass showed that this unwillingness to get on with the debate was found even among those members who had voted affirmatively on inscription in the hope that such a vote might sway the negative attitude of the Soviet Union and France in particular.

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EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Now, Mr. Chairman, this is the record of my efforts on behalf of the Administration and the President to enlist the United Nations and specifically the Security Council in the search for peace in Vietnam.

I must confess that the failure of these efforts has been my keenest disappointment and my greatest frustration during my service for our Government at the United Nations. I frankly had hoped for a much more constructive and positive role of the United Nations when I took on this assignment for our country. But, Mr. Chairman, in spite of these rebuffs, I do not intend, as long as I occupy my present post, to diminish my efforts in this cause.

I repeat my conviction that Senator Mansfield's resolution, if it is adopted by the Senate, as I hope and trust it will be, will support the efforts I am making at the United Nations at the President's direction. The resolution, as I understand it, is intended to express the sense of the Senate and appropriately leaves the timing and circumstances of action in the Security Council for Presidential determination.

For my part, I promise this committee and the American people, in keeping with the spirit of the resolutions that you are considering, to persevere with all the resources at my command to the end that the Security Council may carry out its clear responsibilities under the charter with respect to Vietnam. I shall do so in the conviction that if there is any contribution that diplomacy—in or out of the United Nations—can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none of us can in good conscience spare any effort or any labor to make that contribution—no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required. The admirable courage and perseverance of our men on the battlefield must be fully matched by our perseverance in seeking, through diplomacy, to find the common ground on which a fair and honorable political settlement can be built.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I think that is an extraordinarily clear and very fine statement, and I think it does great credit to your representation of this country in the United Nations.

There are a few questions I want to go into quickly, much quicker than I would like, in order that other members may have an opportunity to put questions.

INTENTION TO RECONVENE GENEVA CONFERENCE

May I ask regarding the current proposal that you have or expect to submit, which—

Calls for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace in Southeast Asia based upon the principles of the Geneva Agreements.

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Is it proper to interpret that as meaning the same as the reconvening of the Geneva conference under the cochairmanship of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., with the same membership participating?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

It is intended to reaffirm our willingness to have that done. It is also intended to add a little more flexibility because there have been some indications from the other side that perhaps some other conference might be desirable. But we would be entirely willing, and we would be interpreting this clause to mean that the Geneva conference, with the same membership should be reconvened.

The CHAIRMAN. On several occasions, the other side, the North Vietnamese and, I think, as one of your citations of the Chinese said, that that is the competent forum in which this matter should be settled; is that not correct?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. There have been some recent statements particularly from China further qualifying their former position, and our formulation was intended to be more encompassing so as not to exclude any type of international conference, but we believe the most appropriate would be the reconvening of the Geneva Conference as you have said.

The CHAIRMAN. And from time to time, the Soviet Union has also stated that the conference was a proper forum; is that not correct?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct, but the Soviet Union has not responded to our repeated invitation to them to join with the British in reconvening the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that.

RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

Let me say, I certainly am sympathetic with your view that Hanoi has been very unresponsive to these offers and it is quite beyond my comprehension as to why. I don't understand their reluctance or their refusal to do it except possibly they may interpret this move to mean the United Nations is going itself to undertake to deal with the substantive question. Now, this may be a point, I am not clear, I don't know, of course, whether or not that is their reason, but if that should be so that they interpreted this as a move on our part to use the U.N. to solve the problem then they, not being a member have some reason for it. Even so, I would not agree with their position at all. I think that it would be perfectly proper if they would agree to come and submit the matter to the United Nations.

But in any case, seeking to find some basis upon which we might get a reconvening of the Geneva conference, it has seemed to me that this point is very important. I confess that if this is the purpose, to reconvene the Geneva conference, I cannot possibly understand the attitude of the French Government or of the Soviet Government in refusing to take the position in the Security Council that this would be a proper mode of procedure because you do not deal with it substantively.

I think some of the statements of the Soviets and of the French that I have seen and some which you cite seem to indicate that they believe, too, that we are attempting to use the Security Council itself to deal with the substantive question; is that correct?

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Ambassador GOLDBERG. I shared your apprehensions about this, Mr. Chairman, and in the inscription debate in 1966 after listening to the comments made by the Soviet Union and by France and having read some of these editorials which appeared at the time, I specifically addressed myself to that problem in the same light as you have just done, trying to make clear that while we believe, and had to believe under the charter, that the Security Council had competence, nevertheless, in light of what they are saying about it, it was not our proposal that the U.N. itself settle the matter, but rather, we were trying to get the great influence and prestige of the Security Council behind the reconvening of the Geneva conference, and I think the statement you made today is a helpful statement. I endorse it completely, and I also am puzzled why, in light of their contention on the basis that the Geneva conference is the forum, why they can possibly object to a Security Council resolution which supports the reconvening of the forum which it is asserted by them is the appropriate forum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. This really raises a question of their good faith, in my mind. If they really are interested in being of assistance in stopping this serious conflict, I am at a loss to understand why they would refuse to reconvene the conference if the members of the Security Council so recommend. That would particularly apply to France and the Soviet Union who have both on numerous occasions stated publicly that this was the way to proceed.

ATTITUDE OF NONPERMANENT MEMBERS OF COUNCIL

Now, I am not aware of the previous statements of some of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council. You don't have time, of course, to outline them, but in your consultations, I can't understand why they would not, at least nine of them, agree to this. Do you think they understand this point?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I think they must understand it, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen. I have before me the statement I made, which is in your record, after the debate that we had in February of 1966, and I said this—I should like to read, if I may, just a paragraph or two.

Now I shall turn to some of the questions raised by members in the course of our discussion. I should like to deal with what was first pointed out by my friend, our former President, the Representative of France, whose wisdom I have learned to appreciate very much and whose friendship I deeply value. The question he raised is an important one and has been raised by others, the representative of Mali, the representative of Uganda, and it has been adverted to by the representative of Bulgaria and I think was mentioned also by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Fedorenko of the Soviet Union. Their point is this: It has been pointed out by them that the Geneva conference at which all parties to the conflict are represented, has been the international body which has in the past dealt with the problems of Vietnam, and it has been claimed that it still remains the appropriate body to do so. The United States has no quarrel with this contention. We have repeatedly stated that we would welcome the reconvening of the Geneva conference for this purpose. It has been correctly pointed out that the purpose of our draft resolution is to assist in what thus far it has not been possible to realize, the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. That has not been possible to realize not because of any opposition on the part of the United States. Quite the contrary. Under these circumstances, therefore, the choice before the members of the Security Council is not whether to deal with this problem in the Council or to deal with it in Geneva, but whether to deal with it at all. The door to Geneva is at least for the time being closed and the question we have to decide is a plain

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and simple one: Do we wish also to close the door to the United Nations? What will the people of the world say if we do?

The CHAIRMAN. You have made that very clear this morning, much clearer than it has ever been made before, although I think your speech in August went very far in this direction. I must say I thought it was an excellent speech and I am at a loss to understand why so many members of the Assembly have recently made speeches critical of our country, and of the bombing in view of your speech. I can't believe they understand what we really mean. So I am particularly pleased that you support this resolution of Senator Mansfield. I predict that if this is properly handled, and I have every confidence it will be by you, that this will make a great impression upon a number of those people who have been critical. I don't see how they could object to this procedure.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I certainly endorse everything the Chairman has said. I have been very much impressed with your statement, Ambassador Goldberg. It seems to me that you have gone into the matter most carefully and pointedly, and I don't see much left to question you about.

I am puzzled as is the Chairman, about the attitude of many of these countries, as to why they could not accept what seems to be the clear responsibility of the Security Council under the charter of the United Nations to take some kind of action. It seems to me that you have probed in just about every direction that you can to find some action that they could agree to take.

AGREEMENT ON RECONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE

Does the Geneva Conference have the power to reconvene itself?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Under the rules of the conference, the two cochairmen, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, may reconvene the conference.

Senator SPARKMAN. But it cannot be reconvened unless both chairmen agree to it?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. And so far the chairmen have not agreed to do so?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. The British have repeatedly indicated their willingness to do so by public statements and by private letters to the other cochairman as recently as in the Assembly of the United Nations last month.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does the Soviet representative give reasons for his unwillingness to reconvene the conference?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Basically, if I were to interpret his reasons, his reasons are that Hanoi does not want the conference reconvened. He always says that the Soviet Union does not want to, but he always reads the statements made either by Hanoi or the NLF, and my interpretation is that that is the basis for the decision taken by the Soviet Union. That is my interpretation, Mr. Chairman. He also asserts that they are unwilling, but that is my interpretation.

Senator SPARKMAN. How many countries constitute the Geneva Conference?

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Ambassador GOLDBERG. The Geneva Conference, there are quite a number.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you talking about the 1954 one or the 1962 one? There are nine in the first; 14 in the second.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. There are a larger number.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fourteen in the one that prevails at the present time. I believe you have put to them that we would be willing to proceed under either the 1954 or the 1962 arrangement; is that right?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct. Although we do feel that if a conference were to be held it would be highly desirable to deal with both issues because it would be necessary to deal with peace in that part of the world, and would be highly desirable to deal with the problems in Laos, Cambodia, because they are related problems, as well as Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. But the membership is powerless to act in the absence of the agreement of the two chairmen.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I want to commend you for what I consider the excellent job that you have been doing for us in the United Nations and for your presentation here today.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

MEMBERSHIP OF GENEVA CONFERENCES

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, Mr. Ambassador, unless it is already in would you insert the membership of both Geneva conferences and also the present membership of the Security Council?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes; I shall be very glad to do so.

(The material referred to follows:)

MEMBERSHIP OF GENEVA CONFERENCES

1954	I. PARTICIPANTS	1962
Cambodia	Burma	
China (Communist)	Cambodia	
France	Canada	
Laos	China (Communist)	
United Kingdom	France	
United States	India	
U.S.S.R.	Laos ²	
Vietnam, State of (South)	Poland	
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North) ¹	Thailand	
	United Kingdom	
	United States	
	U.S.S.R.	
	Vietnam, Republic of (South)	
	Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North)	

¹ Popularly known as Viet Minh.

² During the conference, there were three Laotian representatives invited to sit at the table with equal status: one representing the neutral faction, one representing the leftist faction, and one representing the rightist faction.

The U.S.S.R. looked upon the neutral faction as representing the Royal Lao Government; the United States looked upon the rightist faction as representing the Royal Lao Government. The conference adjourned for several months to permit the three factions to untangle their conflicting claims. They finally reached an agreement (in June of 1962) to establish a government of national union, and it was this government which accepted the agreements reached at the conference.

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PARTICIPATION IN FORMULATION OF U.S. VIETNAM WAR POLICY

I have another question. You may answer it or not, just as you like. Did you or Mr. Sisco participate in formulating our government's Vietnamese policy in carrying out of the war?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I would like to say this: I am often talked to about these matters, but I do operate under the restrictions that are imposed by the United Nations Participation Act by Congress, which I think are appropriate restrictions. At the U.N. I state the viewpoint of the U.S. Government as determined by the President, and I have participated in many meetings, however, on the subject of Vietnam.

Senator AIKEN. I notice in the last paragraph of your statement you say that you promise to persevere with all the resources at your command to the end that the the Security Council may carry out its clear responsibilities under the charter with respect to Vietnam.

Now, the resources at your command would be whatever the President decides you should have?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct, and I am confident that those resources will be available if the Senate sees fit to pass this resolution.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, I will say this. It is entirely possible that the President and the Secretary of State might not see eye to eye on the degree of resources which you should have.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, I know only one way to use my resources and that is to use them fully. I don't know any other way to use them.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, I am saying that. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Ambassador, I want to congratulate you on an excellent statement. I think you have put the question in proper perspective before this committee. I very much appreciate the colloquy between you and the Chairman of this committee relative to the limitations which apply to the U.N., and a recognition of the fact that it is not the U.N. which will make the final decision but, let us hope, something like a reconvened Geneva conference.

This resolution does not hand you any blank check, and I think that ought to be kept in mind. Nor does it allow, if it is passed, any authority to the U.N. to dictate a peace in Southeast Asia.

MANSFIELD RESOLUTION IS ADVISORY

The pending resolution is entirely advisory, at least the resolution cosponsored by 58 Senators. It places the President in no straitjacket. It leaves the conduct of foreign policy on Vietnam where, in the end, only it can be, in the hands of the President.

In my view the adoption of this resolution would say to the President most respectfully, that the Senate hopes that he would see the desirability of trying again to open the question of Vietnam to formal consideration by the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, we would say to him that we think it is desirable to take timely note of the deep concern over Vietnam which has been expressed by more than

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100 nations during the current session of the General Assembly and try to convert these words of concern into a U.N. action for peace.

We would say further by the passage of this resolution, in effect, that if a U.N. contribution to peace is not forthcoming it ought not to be because this Nation has been unwilling to act positively under the charter.

On the contrary, we would ask the President to consider making clear to the world that this Nation will submit the issues of Vietnam to the formal procedures of the Security Council in an effort to move the search for solutions from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

In sum, the Senate resolution would suggest to the President that he consider acting on the premise that the U.N. could be a point of entry to the road to peace even if it is not the place where peace is negotiated in the end.

The U.N. may not prove useful in this connection, but no one can blame the President or this Nation of not acting in good faith to try to find out by an initiative involving votes who is willing to try for a just peace by this route and who is not willing.

In my judgment, win, lose, or draw, this Nation has everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking that initiative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator MORSE.

COOPERATION IN SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAM ISSUE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, I think you have made a powerful statement this morning. My prediction is, in light of future developments in Asia, it is going to be a historic one. I have in mind your views in regard to United Nations participation and settlement of this war from the very beginning. I think I violate no confidence by saying, at your invitation, I went to your Supreme Court office three days after your nomination and prior to your confirmation and we talked about my views in regard to United Nations responsibilities. You will recall at the time of the steel case we were down at the White House together and the President asked us to talk about it further.

I mention that only because I think many people do not know what the President's position was from the very beginning. There is no doubt that he has always welcomed appropriate United Nations participation and intervention in trying to seek a peace in Southeast Asia. And, as you point out this morning, as his Ambassador you have sought to serve that purpose on the part of the President.

It is true, as you point out in your statement, that I quickly endorsed the Mansfield resolution. In that record which you accurately quoted from, I pointed out I thought it was important that we build a bridge between the Congress and this Administration in trying to resolve some of these foreign policy differences. I think it is a great mistake when people don't want to cross those bridges. You have crossed one this morning by appearing before this committee in a public hearing, as I think you should have done, as you were always willing to do, and which I think is in keeping with our whole system of representative government.

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ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH
VIETNAM

Now, as far as neutralization, we have said that we do not as a matter of principle, and I repeat here, do not, in any way oppose neutralization of South Vietnam if South Vietnam wants to be neutral. Why do I not extend it to North Vietnam? We would welcome the neutralization of North Vietnam, but I am being realistic. North Vietnam is a Communist regime, professedly so, and I don't want to put a barrier in the way of settlement by adding a new term since my idea is to have a settlement. If we, the United States, were to put forward a position today that the price of a settlement in Vietnam is "a neutralization of North Vietnam" we would be putting a barrier in the way of a settlement in light of the nature of their regime. So we have gone as far as we can reasonably go in saying that so far as U.S. policy is concerned, if the people of South Vietnam want to be neutral, nonaligned that is their decision, that is acceptable to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Gore has raised a very valid point that has bothered me, but it seems to me this is the kind of question that the conference at Geneva should decide. We don't have to decide that in advance. It is a problem that has always bothered me.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, I would agree that is a proper subject within the competence of the conference. I gave an interpretation.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, the contradiction has not been resolved at all. The resolution provides that the Geneva accord would be adequate basis for peaceful settlement. The Geneva accord does not make reference to two separate political entities; in fact, it definitely rules them out.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is correct, but there is a proposal for discussion before the Security Council to seek a reference. They don't have to accept this interpretation.

U.S. POSITION TOWARD NEUTRALITY AS BASIS FOR PEACE

Senator GORE. I know, but what is the position of the U.S. Government? This is the point at which I am aiming.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. May I answer it.

Senator GORE. Will we accept the neutrality of Indochina as a basis of peace? Will we, in fact, accept reunification, self-determination of one country? Will we, in fact, be satisfied with the Geneva accord as a basis for peace? It appears now that we will not.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure about that.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I want to make it explicitly clear and it does not appear to be now. With due respect, I want to make it explicitly clear we accept the Geneva accord as a basis for peace. I also want to make it explicitly clear when we offer a resolution that is the offer. We are ready to hear other views, including the views of this committee. When I put a piece of paper for informal discussion, it is quite agreeable to me to put a piece of paper before the Security Council without going into controversial detail, saying we accept the Geneva accord as a basis for peace. We ask for the reconvening of the conference and we recognize the competence of the conference to settle, adjudicate it or related problems. I am perfectly willing to put that in the resolution and I think that meets your point of view, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.

PRAISE FOR DOCUMENTATION OF U.S. EFFORTS IN U.N.

Senator LAUSCHE. Ambassador Goldberg, I am grateful to you for your very lucid presentation and documentation of the efforts of the United States to have the United Nations take jurisdiction of the Vietnam dispute.

Unfortunately through the propaganda of the Communists and in many instances through statements of uninformed individuals within our own country, the impression has been gained that we sought to escape the rights and the powers of the United Nations to intervene for the establishment of peace in areas of the world where violence existed.

Your presentation regrettably will not be heard fully by the people of the Nation. But the documentation which you have given refutes completely every argument that has been made that our Government has not extended its efforts to have the United Nations take jurisdiction.

I want to chronologically follow your presentation of what has been done. You cite the efforts of the Cambodian Government to have the United Nations check to ascertain whether or not there were unlawful transgressions on their border by the Communists. And the United Nations did take jurisdiction, but Cambodia finally dropped its petition. Is that correct?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct, Senator.

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IS CESSATION OF BOMBING PREREQUISITE TO SETTLEMENT?

I have been struck by the unanimous recommendation of all the witnesses who have come up on the Mansfield and Morse resolutions heretofore to the effect that we didn't have a chance of securing action in the Security Council unless there was a cessation of the bombing first. Each witness stated this in the record.

I was wondering what your own views were with regard to this point.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, my own view about that is that at the moment that is probably not the determining factor. It may affect, as I said, other countries, but the determining factor from the standpoint of countries that could obstruct Security Council action has been this concept of no competence, because Hanoi says no competence. But, as I have said, I don't think it serves their interest to pursue that, and I am going to make another effort.

Senator PELL. But would it not be correct, to put it in a more affirmative way, that the chances of success of some positive action involving either resolution would be better if there were a cessation of the bombing?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I don't, frankly, know the answer to that question because of the experience that we had during the bombing pause.

Senator PELL. Excuse me for interrupting, I do not mean a bombing pause. I am among those who are rather concerned at the idea of a pause because I can see the thing blowing up further at the end of it. I mean cessation.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Even with respect to that. You will remember I said that at that time when we were engaged in an indefinite pause, I consulted. Now, the viewpoint then on the part of many countries was that if this was the situation we ought to develop private diplomacy. If we brought it to the Security Council, there would be a public exposition, people would have to take a position, and it would be far better, therefore, to explore by private diplomacy the prospect of another forum, the Geneva conference, and so on.

So I really cannot honestly say.

I will say in candor, in answer to your remark, that I have no doubt that that would affect the judgment of some. But with respect to those countries that can obstruct the action, those with the veto power, at the moment I don't think it would affect their judgment.

Senator PELL. Right. I appreciate your position, and your official position, too. But I think the record should very clearly show that every witness who has come here on this resolution has specifically stated that the resolution did not have a chance unless there was a cessation of the bombing.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Senator, I might say this is a subject I am quite prepared to talk about; we talk about everything in negotiating a resolution, but I am quite clear in my own mind that on the basis of every talk I have had this is not the determining factor for the Soviet Union and perhaps France, but that does not mean that we ought not to try.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

VIETCONG MILITARY BASES AND FORCES

Finally, I have one specific question on your testimony in connection with the draft resolution, section (b), the same one that Senator Symington drew our attention to. It says—

That there should be no military forces or bases maintained or supported in North or South Vietnam other than those under the control of the respective governments, and all other troops and armed personnel should be withdrawn or demobilized * * *.

Does this apply to the Vietcong?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes.

By the way, this is not intended to be a formulation of ours. This is intended to be our interpretation of what the Geneva accords would require, and again this was put, and specifically put by me in the form of a question to the other side, is there disagreement that this is what the Geneva accords require?

Senator PELL. But would this not, in fact, be almost a preventive factor in anything coming out? In other words, would it be conceivable, in your view, that that portion of South Vietnam which is under Communist discipline or Vietcong discipline would willingly drop its weapons and demobilize while those portions which are under the Ky government's regime maintained their weapons?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Again, I would answer in terms that the Chairman put it. This is what the Geneva accords, in our view, provide; and there is a matter which ought to be discussed in the Geneva conference as it was discussed in 1954 and in 1962. There were decisions made in both 1954 and 1962 about the disarming of irregular forces, and this obviously would be a subject appropriate for discussion in the Geneva conferences. This is not put forward to be any barrier.

Senator PELL. I understand.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. As I said, the language of the resolution is subject to discussion. This is intended to be a statement in response to the statement very often made that we don't state what we think about the Geneva accords. This is what we think. We are ready to talk about what other people think about the Geneva accords.

Senator PELL. Right. I think we have made a great step forward here today in the assertion of our willingness, if necessary, to negotiate with the representatives of the NLF because that has been an inhibiting factor.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, I think the President has frequently said that is not an insurmountable problem, and I was repeating it in that context.

Senator PELL. I understand and I thank you very much and I think we are very lucky indeed to have you as our Ambassador to the United Nations, and I wish you the best in your efforts along this line.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN, Senator McCarthy?

SUBMIT VIETNAM CONFLICT TO UNITED NATIONS

U.S. WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM VIETNAM

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Ambassador, I have a few questions, one which moves on from the reference Senator Pell has made to your discussion of the Geneva accords. Do I understand that this is the Administration's position in the United Nations, should these other conditions prevail: that you would withdraw troops?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. This is what the Geneva accords provide and we said we would be willing to use them as a basis for settlement.

Senator McCARTHY. Is this limited to what happens in Vietnam?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I am sorry I am not following you.

Senator McCARTHY. The consideration of whether you would withdraw is limited to what might happen in Vietnam. Does this have reference to other parts of Southeast Asia or not?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. We are also very interested in observance of the 1962 accords in Laos, very much so. We would like the Laos accord to be complied with.

Senator McCARTHY. Where would this leave us in the light of what the Secretary of State said in his rather well publicized press conference of October 12 when he talked about the threat of a billion Chinese with nuclear weapons to all Southeast Asia and beyond that to the United States itself?

Are we going to leave this critical area open to a billion Chinese if the question of South Vietnam should be settled within the limits you have defined or not?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. I think that question ought to be addressed to the Secretary of State.

Senator McCARTHY. All right, I will ask the Secretary.

Senator PELL. When?

Senator MORSE. Where? [Laughter.]

IS PROCEEDING THROUGH THE U.N. AN EXERCISE OF FUTILITY?

Senator McCARTHY. One other question relating to that press conference. You seem to think that proceeding this way through the United Nations is worthwhile, at least the efforts you are talking about, even though it may not come to very much.

Now, the Secretary, when he held a press conference, said about what you have said in terms of process but then said, "On the other hand, there are some problems about going through an exercise of futility, if this is what it appears to be, to satisfy some critics among our own people."

This is not particular to the process he was thinking about. But, on the record, you don't think this is necessarily an exercise of futility?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. If I thought it was an exercise of futility, I would not engage in it.

Senator McCARTHY. Very good. Thank you very much.

2. NVN POSITION STATEMENTS

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON
THE FOUR POINTS

(Report of Pham Van Dong to National Assembly April 8, 1965 -
Tab H, pp. 1-2)

"...The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their basic provisions as embodied in the following points. . ."

"The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the aforementioned stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. . ."

(VNA statement rejecting 17 non-aligned nation appeal -
Tab J, pp. 1-2)

"To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965."

"The DRV Government is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

(Attack on President Johnson's May 13, 1965 speech - Tab M, p. 2)

"The DRV Government has shown them a most correct way out in the four-point stand presented by Premier Pham Van Dong at the second session of the DRV National Assembly -- that is, to withdraw from South Vietnam, stop its acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. . . ."

(DRV Foreign Ministry statement on suspension of U.S. Attacks, May 18, 1965 - Tab N, p. 2)

"The DRV Government affirms once again that the four-point stand made public on 8 April 1965 is the only sound basis for a political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(No DRV reaction to Canadian disclosure of mission to Hanoi - Tab O, p. 1)

"The Foreign Minister stated repeatedly that the four conditions which had previously been outlined by the Prime Minister of North Vietnam on April 8, taken as a whole, represented the Hanoi government's approach to a settlement."

(Nhan Dan protests U.K. Government's connivance with U.S.
7 June 1965 - Tab P, p. 4)

"Once again, we stress that the Vietnam problem can be solved only in accordance with the four points mentioned in the statement and resolution of the DRV Government and National Assembly and the five points of the 22 March 1965 statement of the NFLSV and on the condition that the U.S. imperialists stop their aggression, withdraw from South Vietnam, stop their attacks against the DRV, respect and implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people solve their own problems without any foreign intervention."

("White Paper" on "US aggression and intervention in Vietnam - Tab Q, p. 6)

"The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points."

"The DRV Government holds that the above-mentioned stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is accepted, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading to a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

(Thong Nat (Reunification) Article by Nguyen Van Vinh
July 1965 - Tab R, pp. 4-6)

"The DRV Government is of the opinion that the above-mentioned stand is the basis for a correct political solution to the Vietnamese problem. Only through recognizing this basis will the peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem be afforded the conditions in which it can be conducted favorably and will it be possible to think of convening an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam."

"The four-point program as set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong and the views as set forth by the NLFV in its 22 March statement are truly constructive and practical."

"If the U.S. imperialists agree to accept the above-mentioned conditions of the people in both North and South Vietnam, we will readily negotiate with them anywhere at any moment."

(DRV Report on Ghanaian mission to Hanoi - Tab S)

"Presented the four-point stand of the DRV Government, the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(DRV statement on President Johnson's July 28, 1965 press conference -
Tab T, p.2)

"For the U.S. Government there is only one way to an honorable peace;

that is, to correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and accept the four-point stand of the DRV Government."

"More recently, on 8 April 1965, it made clear its four-point stand as a basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(Le Monde interview with Ho Chi Minh - Tab U)

"The U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV which conforms to the essential political and military clauses of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam; it must immediately stop the air attacks against DRV territory, stop forthwith the aggressive war against the south of our country, and withdraw from there all U.S. troops and weapons. That is peace in honor; there is no other way out."

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial of August 20, 1965 - Tab V, p. 1)

"Only when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its recognition of the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the five-point stand of the NLFV can there be a basis for the peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam."

(DRV Embassy in Moscow issues "correction" of Press Interview - Tab W)

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government as expounded by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965 is the basis for all soundest political solutions to the Vietnam question. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam."

(Pham Van Dong's National Day report August 31, 1965 - Tab X, p. 6)

"This four-point stand fully conforms to the most important political and military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and the whole world is now of the view that these agreements must be correctly implemented. This four-point stand must be solemnly accepted by the U.S. Government before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be contemplated."

(DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum of September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, p. 4)

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government . . . is the sole correct basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solution at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any solutions which seek U. N. intervention in the Vietnam situation, because such solutions are fundamentally contrary to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

"The U.S. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this four-point stand before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be considered. . . ."

(Joint Asahi-Mainichi interview with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi in October 4, 1965 - Tab CC, pp. 1-2-4-9-10-11)

"Premier Pham Van Dong of the DRV stated in a very strong tone on 4 October that 'The present Vietnam war can never be settled unless the United States accepts the four conditions presented by our side. And without that, there also can be no discussion.'"

"We proposed four conditions for the settlement of the present war some time ago. They asked for respect of the Geneva agreement of 1954 concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct observance of the basic clauses of this agreement. We proposed at the time that if the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that it accepts the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time."

"If the United States wants negotiations, it must accept the four conditions and recognize the NFLSV."

"We have announced that if the United States issues a statement to the effect that it will recognize the four conditions, we will respond to talks. The United States, however, has no such intention."

"The only just way to settle the Vietnam issue is to accept, in line with the 1954 Geneva agreement, the four conditions proposed by the North Vietnamese Government and the stand explained in the NFLSV's March statement."

"North Vietnam's four conditions are in complete accord with every one of the essential, political, and military provisions in the Geneva accords of 1954. The four conditions alone can be the basis to bring a correct solution to the Vietnam issue. The U.S. Government must declare clearly that it accepts the four conditions. A political solution can be considered after that."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON THE FRONT'S POSITION

(Excerpts from Joint Statement of October 30, 1962 - Tab A, pp. 2, 4)

"...The Vietnam Fatherland Front holds that the NFLSV, which came into being owing to the growth of the South Vietnamese people's struggle and which rallies broadly the patriotic and anti-U.S.-Diem forces in South Vietnam, is the genuine representative of the people there, and is one of the decisive factors for their certain victory. The Vietnam Fatherland Front fully supports the program and the urgent steps advocated by the NFLSV to realize independence, democracy, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, in an advance toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The program and urgent steps of the NFLSV meet the interests and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the practical situation in South Vietnam at present...."

"...The 14 million South Vietnamese compatriots will develop more and more their valiant and indomitable tradition and unite more and more widely and closely within the NFLSV to directly oppose the U.S.-Diem clique.)

(Excerpts from National Assembly Statement Published July 5, 1964 - Tab B, pp. 1 and 2)

"...The U.S. Government must put an end to its aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all its troops and weapons from there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by themselves in accordance with the program of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam..."

"...The National Assembly of the DRV wholeheartedly supports the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and firmly believes that the South Vietnamese people, who are closely united under the front's banner and are heightening their determination to fight and to win..."

(Excerpt from Text of DRV-USSR Delegations' Joint Statement, February 10, 1962 - Tab F, p. 2)

"...The Soviet Union fully supports the just and heroic struggle for independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality which the South Vietnamese people are waging under the leadership of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam..."

(Report by Pham Van Dong to the National Assembly April 8, 1965 -
Tab H, p. 5)

"...In response to the appeal of the NFLSV, the South Vietnamese cadres, army men, and ordinary citizens regrouped to the north have enthusiastically voiced their readiness to return to their native land and to fight, arms in hand, or to do any work to contribute to the annihilation of the enemy and to national salvation..."

(DRV-SOVIET Communiqué issued April 17, 1965 - Tab I, p. 1)

"...the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of the will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, its only legitimate representative. The program of the front enjoys (the broad?) support of the mass of the people because it proclaims independence, democracy, peace, an end to (imperialist?) intervention and the formation in South Vietnam of a national, democratic coalition government carrying through a policy of independence and neutrality in full conformity with the Geneva agreements of 1954..."

(VNA on 17-Non-aligned Nation Appeal, April 19, 1965 - Tab J, p. 1)

"...The NFLSV is now controlling three-fourths of South Vietnam's territory and two-thirds of its population. It is clear that at the present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the decisive voice of the NFLSV is impractical..."

("Nhan Dan" Editorial April 21, 1965 on the NFLSV - Tab K, pp. 1,2)

"...In the world, the voice of the NFLSV is the decisive one in the settlement of the South Vietnam question..."

"... A. N. Kosygin declared: Today everybody must see that the NFLSV, which is leading the South Vietnamese people's struggle, is a real force which decides the present as well as the future of South Vietnam. Premier Chou En-lai has on many occasions asserted that the NFLSV is the only legal representative of the South Vietnam population..."

"...Just as the NFLSV Central Committee declared in its communique of 15 April, any settlement of the South Vietnam question will lose its practical and positive meaning if it is undertaken without the participation of the NFLSV in a decisive role..."

"...and all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and all kinds of war materiel and means--and those of the satellites--if they still do not dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the traitors still surrender the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence and democracy to the U.S. imperialists, and if the NFLSV--the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people--does not have its decisive voice."

(DRV White Paper on "United States Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam"
Tab Q, pp. 1, 2, 4 and 6)

"...The NFLSV, founded on 20 December 1960, more and more clearly proves to be the sole genuine representative of the people, the mobilizer and organizer of all patriotic forces in South Vietnam..."

"...It unites all social strata, classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious groups, and patriotic personalities, irrespective of political tendency, to fight and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents, achieve independence, democracy, better living conditions, peace, and neutrality for South Vietnam and eventual peaceful national reunification..."

"...To date, the NFLSV has gained control of four-fifths of the territory and 10 million people; that is, two-thirds of the population in South Vietnam. It has become a powerful force which has a decisive voice in the South Vietnam problem..."

"...The United States talks about its desire to hold discussion with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the South Vietnam question, but it refuses to recognize the NFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnam people. It is obvious that the United States wants neither peace nor negotiation..."

"...All negotiations at this moment are entirely useless if the U.S. imperialists still persist in refusing to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and war materials of all kinds and those of their satellites, and to dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the Vietnamese traitors continue to surrender to the U.S. imperialists the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence,

and if the NFLSV--the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people--is not asked to say its decisive say..."

(Excerpts from Nguyen Van Vinh's 4-part article issued in "Reunification", a Vietnamese language newspaper on July 2, 6, 9 and 13 - Tab R, pp. 2,3)

"...The United States still carries on war in the south and still refuses to recognize the presence of the NFLSV--which controls most of the territory and population of the south and which leads the sacred resistance of 14 million people in South Vietnam. Therefore, the United States continues to be fought against by the South Vietnamese people, and there can be no peace..."

"...Moreover, they have brazenly stated that they are determined to eliminate the NFLSV from all international conferences, and, at worst, they can regard the NFLSV only as the tail of North Vietnam..."

"...In the past the Americans did not want to negotiate with the CPR or to recognize the Pathet Lao. The French did not want to recognize the Viet Minh and the Algerian FLN. But finally they were defeated and forced to negotiate with them. Concerning this point, in its famous 22 March statement the NFLSV declared: 'Any negotiation with the U.S. imperialists about the South Vietnamese problem will be useless if the U.S. imperialists refuse to respect and strictly implement the Geneva accords, abolish the U.S. military bases, and withdraw from South Vietnam all the soldiers, weapons, and other war materiel of the United States and its satellites, if the sacred rights of the Vietnamese people--independence and democracy--continue to be offered to the U.S. imperialists by the kneeling traitors, and if the NFLSV--the only legitimate representative of 14 million southern people--does not have a decisive voice..."

(DRV on President Johnson's July 28, 1965 Press Conference Statement
Tab T, p. 2)

"...The U.S. Government must stop at once its air war against the DRV and completely cease all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the DRV. It must put an immediate end to the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons therefrom, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs in accordance with the program of the NFLSV--the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people..."

(LE MONDE Interview with Ho Chi Minh--Hanoi Broadcast in English,
August 15, 1965 - Tab U, p. 1)

"...(Q)...the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their own affairs themselves without foreign interference and on democratic bases?

(A) "...on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnam people..."

(Pham Van Dong's National Day Report, August 31, 1965 - Tab X, p. 1)

"...In response to the pressing requirements of the patriotic struggle, in 1960 the NFLSV came into being, closely uniting all strata of the people holding high the banner of patriotism, and starting the resistance war against U.S. imperialist aggression..."

"...The NFLSV, now controlling more than four-fifths of South Vietnam's territory and over two-thirds of its population, is the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. The Front's international prestige and influence increase with every passing day. The Front is now the real master of the situation in South Vietnam. It must have a decisive say in the settlement of the South Vietnam question..."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum of September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, pp. 1,2,3)

"...U.S. troops will not withdraw, but will cling on to South Vietnam; the United States always regards South Vietnam as a separate nation, that is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to be prolonged indefinitely; it does not recognize the NFLSV, the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its scheme is to try to achieve at the conference table what it has been unable to gain on the battlefield..."

"...The NFLSV, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy, support, and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's peoples. Yet the U.S. Government refuses to recognize it as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declared that it does not regard the front as an independent party in negotiations. This

This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere swindle. There cannot be any negotiations on the South Vietnam problem without the NFLSV having its decisive say..."

"...This stand also proceeds from the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people in both zones, as embodied in the program of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the NFLSV; namely, peace, independence, unity, and democracy..."

(DRV Message to the Austrian Red Cross Society, September 25, 1965 - Tab AA)

"...The only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people is the NFLSV. The Red Cross organization set up by the front is the only organ serving the interests of the South Vietnamese people..."

(Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi, October 4, 1965 Tab CC, pp. 3, 4, 8 and 9)

"...It is very foolish of the United States not to recognize this Liberation Front which is the only force which has the ability to settle the Vietnam problem..."

"...The best way is for the United States to negotiate first with the Liberation Front. That is only natural, considering that the United States is actually fighting the Liberation Front.... The United States should negotiate with the Liberation Front of the South first of all. However, it will be out of the question if it were to take the attitude of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if it were conveying a favor. The primary and decisive party for the United States to deal with is the Liberation Front..."

"...as long as the United States does not recognize the People's Liberation Front of the south, there cannot be any negotiations..."

"...Who is fighting the United States in the south? It is the liberation army. And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the war against the north. Does it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and settle the problem?..."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON
THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

(Joint Statement October 30, 1962 - Tab A, pp. 1-2)

"...the Vietnamese people and the Government of the DRV constantly implemented correctly the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam..."

"...This is a just struggle, which conforms to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam..."

(DRV National Assembly Statement July 5, 1964 - Tab B, pp 1-2)

"...The U.S. Government as well as the governments of the countries which took part in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina must live up to their commitments: respect and sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs...."

"...we demand that the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina be strictly implemented...."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4, 1964 - Tab C, pp 1-2)

"...The DRV Government has more than once stated its eagerness for peace and its constant desire of respecting and correctly implementing the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-nam..."

"...The DRV Government...earnestly requests the cochairmen and the participants of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, in accordance with point 13 of the final declaration of the conference, jointly to study such measures as might prove to be necessary to secure from the U.S. Government an immediate end to all acts of provocation and sabotage against the DRV and to the aggressive war in South Vietnam, as well as the withdrawal of all U.S. troops, military personnel, and arms from South Vietnam, thereby insuring respect for and correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam with a view to maintaining and consolidating peace in Indochina and southeast Asia...."

(DRV Note of Protest Issued February 9, 1965 - Tab E, pg 2)

"...The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government, who have always respected and correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, will certainly not be cowed by the U.S. attempts at intimidation...."

"...It resolutely demands that the U.S. Government correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and stop at once the aggressive war in South Vietnam and all acts of war against the DRV...."

"The

"The DRV Government earnestly requests the cochairman and the government of the participating countries of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and all peace-loving countries of the world to take timely and effective actions with a view to checking the hands of the warlike and aggressive U.S. imperialists, insuring a correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and defending peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

(Joint Statement February 10, 1965 - Tab F, pp. 2-3)

..."The two governments...regard these acts as completely inconsistent with international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements...."

..."The two sides unanimously note that for the past 10 years and more the U.S. Government has sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, sought to hinder the reunification of Vietnam, and turned South Vietnam into a new-type colony and a military base of the United States...."

..."The two governments firmly stand for the defense and implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, resolutely oppose the U.S. violations of the said agreements, and demand that all participants of the 1954 Geneva conference respect and correctly implement them. As a cochairman of the Geneva conference on Indochina, the Soviet Union will do its best to ensure international support for the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina...."

(Ho Chi Minh's Interview with Akahata April 5, 1965 - Tab G, pp. 2-3)

"...The U.S. imperialists' acts of aggression and war in Vietnam are of the utmost gravity; they grossly trample upon the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and constitute violations of international law and manifestations of disregard for world public opinion...."

"...To settle the South Vietnam question, first of all the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people themselves decide their own affairs, and stop its provocative attacks against the DRV. The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people...."

(Pham Van Dong's Report to DRV National Assembly April 8, 1965 - Tab H, pp 1,2,4)

"...If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam...."

"We

"...We believe the world's people were awakened on hearing President Johnson speak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. This was a laugh. Everyone knows the U.S. imperialists are the enemy of the Geneva agreements...."

"...By attacking the DRV they have completely scrapped the Geneva agreements and grossly violated international law and all human laws. They must pay for their crimes...."

(DRV Statement on 17 Nation Appeal - Tab J, pg. 1)

"...It is the unswerving policy of the DRV Government to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:..."

(DRV Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks May 18, 1965 - Tab N, pg. 2)

"...The peace-loving peoples and governments in the world are firmly demanding that the United States end its aggressive war in South Vietnam, stop for good the savage bombing and strafing raids against the DRV, and scrupulously observe and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam..."

(DRV "White Paper - Tab Q, pp. 1, 6)

"...But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against the aggressors for national salvation and self-liberation. Theirs is a thoroughly just struggle which fully conforms to the 1954 Geneva agreements and to international law...."

"The DRV Government has always held that the correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settling the South Vietnam problem...."

(Thong Nat Article July 1965 - Tab R, pg. 2)

"...If the U.S. imperialists really respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, they must first of all recognize the fundamental provisions of the Geneva agreements on the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the subsequent provisions insuring the implementation of the Geneva agreements; also, the United States must immediately abolish all U.S. military bases, withdraw all troops, weapons, and war equipment of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, and stop all forms of aggression in South Vietnam and all war activities against the DRV...."

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial August 20, 1965 - Tab V, pg. 1)

"...Now the Vietnamese people only demand that the U.S. imperialists return to the 1954 Geneva agreements: they must stop their aggression, withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, stop air raids on North Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves..."

(Joint communique September 16, 1965 - Tab Y, pg 1)

"...The fundamental rights of the Vietnamese people to independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of their country were solemnly recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements and must be respected...."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, pp. 2-3)

"...The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that internationally speaking the consideration of the U.S. Government's war acts against the DRV and the U.S. war of aggression in South Vietnam falls within the competence of the participants in the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, and not of the United Nations. Any U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the United Nations...."

"This stand proceeds from the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Vietnamese people -- independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity -- and from the essential military clauses of the said agreements."

"The 1954 Geneva agreements are an international legal document which all participants must respect and correctly implement. At the 1954 Geneva conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, recognized and pledged respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 years it has systematically violated them and had thus brought about a serious situation in Vietnam...."

(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab BB, pp. 1-2)

"...The only way out for the U.S. imperialists is to put an end to their aggressive war, to withdraw all their troops and weapons as well as those of their satellites, to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of our country as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements...."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON
THE U. N.

(Pham Van Dong's Report to DRV National Assembly - Tab H, pg. 2)

"...any approach tending to secure U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam...."

(DRV Statement Rejecting 17 Nation Appeal - Tab J, pg. 2)

"...The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam...."

(DRV "White Paper" - Tab Q, Pg. 6)

"...The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading to a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam...."

(Statement on President Johnson's July 28, 1965 Press Conference Statement - Tab T - pg. 2)

"...There is no other way, not even the resorting to U.N. intervention in Vietnam...."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, pp. 2-4)

"...The U.S. authorities are also feverishly trying by every means to secure a U.N. intervention in Vietnam. They have 'requested help from the United Nations membership at large in getting peace talks started.' This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms...."

"...Any U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the United Nations...."

"The

"...The four-point stand of the DRV Government is enjoying an ever-warmer sympathy and support from the peace-loving governments and peoples all over the world. It is the sole correct basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solutions at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any solutions which seek U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation, because such solutions are fundamentally contrary to the 1954 Geneva agreements in Vietnam."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON
MEDIATION EFFORTS BY OTHER COUNTRIES

(DRV Rejection of Radhakrishnan Proposal - Tab L)

"...The Indian authorities have recently dealt with the establishment of an Asian-African force to (?supervise) the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam and (?considered) it a necessary measure for the (?restoration of) peace in this area...."

(Nhan Dan Protests U.K.'s Connivance with U.S. June 7, 1965 - Tab P, pg. 3)

"...To demand a cease-fire as mentioned in the British Government plan, or the Indian Government's proposal some time ago, is deliberately to ignore the nature and the origin of the war in Vietnam..."

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial August 20, 1965 - Tab V, pg. 3)

"...One cannot mediate between the U.S. imperialists' stand to carry out aggression to the end and the Vietnamese people's thorough stand to oppose aggression. If anybody wants to stand as mediator without condemning the aggressors and demanding that the latter stop their aggression and without approving and supporting the victims of aggression in their struggle against the aggressors, he can but encourage the aggressors to continue their aggression...."

(Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview with Phan Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab CC, pp. 2, 3, 9)

"...The United States is proposing peace talks, in which it does not believe, in order to escape criticism from these third parties of good intention and world public opinion which is steadily mounting against it. Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude..."

"...It is not possible to seize this opportunity and move forward toward peace because the US side has no sincerity at all. It is possible to seize this opportunity and expose the true nature of the United States. Of course, we welcome those people who are making various efforts, with good intentions of peace. We are planning to prove to these people by actual deeds how lacking in good intentions the United States is. The way to prove this lies solely in driving the American aggressors to the wall and by pressing them to the last point, or in other words, in continuing the war...."

"...We

"...We and the Liberation Front of the South will make the ultimate provisions for the settlement of the Vietnam question. Of course, third parties can fulfill certain roles, but the final deciders are ourselves and the people of the Liberation Front...."

"...It is possible for third parties to make contributions to a certain extent, but the final settlers, or deciders, are ourselves and the Liberation Front of the south...."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON THE BOMBING PAUSE

(DRV Foreign Ministry Statement, May 18, 1965 - Tab N, pp. 1-2)

"...According to various sources, the U.S. Government has informed a number of other governments that air raids against the DRV are to be suspended from noon (Washington time) 12 May 1965 till the following week, and that the United States is ready to resume the raids if U.S. and puppet troops are subjected to further attacks in South Vietnam. In making this perfidious allegation, the U.S. aggressors have no other aim than to cover up their extremely dangerous acts intensifying the war in Vietnam and Southeast Asia and at the same time to deceive world public opinion on the so-called U.S. peace will..."

"...This time, in the face of the mounting movement for an end to the aggressive war in South Vietnam and to the bombing and strafing of the DRV, the U.S. Government has put forward the so-called suspension of air raids against North Vietnam. It has gone so far as to state arrogantly that the suspension of U.S. air raids on the north must be responded to by a cessation of attacks against the U.S. aggressors and their agents by the people and liberation army in South Vietnam..."

"...The DRV Government resolutely exposes the U.S. Government's trick in the so-called suspension of air raids against North Vietnam as a deceitful maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of war. The peace-loving peoples and governments in the world are firmly demanding that the United States end its aggressive war in South Vietnam, stop for good the savage bombing and strafing raids against the DRV, and scrupulously observe and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. The DRV Government affirms once again that the four-point stand made public on 8 April 1965 is the only sound basis for a political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

(Nhan Dan Protests U.K. Government's Connivance with the United States, June 7, 1965 - Tab P, p. 3)

"...In mid-May, while the U.S. leading circles boasted about a pause in the airstrikes against North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists did not cease sending aircraft to reconnoiter and strike North Vietnam and rushing more U.S. troops and weapons into South Vietnam. These facts enable us to understand that intensification and expansion of the aggressive war in Vietnam is the basic policy of the U.S. imperialists. As for the arguments about negotiations and cease-fire, they are but tricks aimed at creating favorable conditions for the carrying out of their policy."

(Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview With Pham Van Dong in Hanoi October 4, 1965,
Tab CC, pp. 4, 7)

"...The United States temporarily suspended bombings against the north at one time but that was only a pretext for strengthening escalation..."

"...Earlier, the United States propagandized that it had suspended bombings against the north for some days. However, we were not able to respond, as the suspension of the bombings were aimed at eliciting our consent to demands which we cannot possibly accept. The temporary suspension was rather a pretext for further escalation. We cannot possibly accept such temporary suspension or such demands..."

EXTRACTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS ON
U.S. MOVES

(DRV Statement July 5, 1964 - Tab B, pp. 1-2)

"...With regard to North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have intensified their provocative and sabotage activities and threatened to extend their war to the north...."

"...the National Assembly of the DRV resolutely demands that the U.S. Government stop at once all its provocative and sabotage activities against the DRV."

"Should the U.S. imperialists and their stooges be rash enough to expand their war to North Vietnam, all people of North Vietnam, millions as one man, would stand up together with the people in the south to defeat them..."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Letter September 4, 1964 - Tab C, pg. 1)

"...Since its unwarranted attack against the DRV on 5 August 1964, the U.S. Government has increased its military build-up in South Vietnam and southeast Asia...."

"While carrying out this large-scale movement of troops, the U.S. authorities have openly announced the possibility that wider action against North Vietnam might become necessary...."

(Nhan Dan Editorial, December 19, 1964 - Tab D)

"...While being unable to win in South Vietnam, they even threaten to attack the North, thus opening a new war...."

(DRV Note of Protest February 9, 1965 - Tab E, pg. 1)

"...The 7 and 8 February 1965 air attack is a new, extremely serious act of war perpetrated by the United States against the DRV, a most brazen violation of international law and the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and an intolerable challenge to the world's peoples...."

(DRV-USSR Joint Statement February 10, 1965 - Tab F, pg. 2)

"The two governments energetically condemn the aggressive acts on 5 August 1964 of the United States, especially the barbarous attacks by the

U.S.

U.S. Air Force on the territory of the DRV on 7 and 8 February of this year in the areas of Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh. They regard these acts as completely inconsistent with international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements...."

(Ho Chi Minh's Interview with Akahata April 5, 1965 - Tab G, pp. 1-2)

"...For over 10 years now, the U.S. imperialists have waged an aggressive war in South Vietnam in an attempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type colony and military base and to prolong the partition of our country...."

"In an attempt to extricate themselves from their impasse, the U.S. imperialists are feverishly intensifying and stepping up the aggressive war in South Vietnam...the war is being carried to the north with repeated air and naval attacks being brazenly launched on many places of the territory of the DRV...."

"Of late, the U.S. imperialists have put forward misleading talk about peace and negotiation. The peoples of the world are fully aware of their aggressive and warlike nature. To step up aggression in South Vietnam and to bomb the north are part of their policy of special warfare. By such acts, they also aim at bringing about an advantageous position so as to be able, in case of necessity, to negotiate from a position of strength. This policy is wrong and cannot be carried out...."

(Pham Van Dong's Report to DRV National Assembly April 8, 1965 - Tab H, pp.2,3,5)

"...Today, the U.S. imperialists are obliged to refer to the Geneva agreements on Vietnam but with the aim of distorting the basic principles of the agreements in order to perpetuate our country's division and to consider the north and the south as two entirely different nations...."

"...In his speech, President Johnson spoke of peace, the end of the war, and unconditional negotiations, however, the U.S. government is now intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and extending the war to North Vietnam, and according to General Taylor's statement, there will be no limit to the aggression against North Vietnam...."

"...By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they stupidly hope to cow our people and also intimidate peace-loving governments and peoples in the world. They hope that our people and the peoples of the world will flinch out of fear, and thus they will be in a position to shift from a weak to a strong position!"

"...What causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, in the United States itself, a movement has been developing widely to oppose the U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of aggression in South Vietnam and increasing their acts of war against North Vietnam...."

(Joint communique April 17, 1965 - Tab I, pg. 1)

"...the United States is still keeping a course for the extension of the acts of aggression against the people of South Vietnam and does not seek to explore avenues leading to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem."

"It is significant that the statement by the U.S. President on a so-called peaceful settlement has been made at a time when further bombings of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are taking place, when there are further movements of American military units and weapons to South Vietnam to step up the bloody aggression against the people of South Vietnam -- and these aggressive actions continue...."

(DRV Statement Rejecting 17 Nation Appeal - Tab J, pg. 1)

"...To soothe and mislead public opinion, on 7 April 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson spoke of peace and independence in South Vietnam, of unconditional negotiations toward a political solution to the war in South Vietnam. He even promised to set aside 1 billion dollars to develop the economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian countries. But in this very speech, Johnson declared that the United States will not withdraw from South Vietnam and will intensify its air raids against North Vietnam.

(Nhan Dan Attack on President Johnson's May 13, 1965 Speech - Tab M, pp. 1-2)

"...Once again Johnson clamored that the United States is ready for unconditional discussions. But he could not hide his sinister design, which is disclosed in his own speech. Before speaking of unconditional discussions, Johnson declared that the United States will not abandon its commitment to its henchmen in Saigon, and right after speaking of unconditional discussions, he threatened that if North Vietnam refuses to negotiate on U.S. terms, this will only mean damage to North Vietnam...."

"...As regards North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have unceasingly intensified their war of destruction...."

"...The U.S. aggressors are escalating the war in a dangerous manner. This is an undeniable fact. The so-called unconditional discussions are obviously a big swindle...."

(DRV Statement on Suspension of U.S. Attacks May 18, 1965 - Tab N, pp. 1-2)

"...The U.S. trick is nothing new. It is to be recalled that on 7 April 1965 U.S. President Johnson had to speak of unconditional discussions and peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem....But within one month after these hypocritical words, another 16,000 U.S. troops have been sent to South Vietnam, thus bringing the strength of U.S. troops there to nearly 50,000. U.S. air raids against North Vietnam have increased fourfold as compared with the period from 5 August 1964 to 7 April 1965...."

"By making the cessation of the South Vietnamese people's just struggle a condition for the ending of the U.S. bombing and strafing of North Vietnam, the U.S. Government has clearly revealed its scheme to prepare for an intensification and expansion of the war against the DRV...."

"The DRV Government resolutely exposes the U.S. Government's trick in the so-called suspension of air raids against North Vietnam as a deceitful maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of war...."

(Nhan Dan Protests U.K.'s Connivance with the U.S. June 7, 1965 - Tab P, pg. 2)

"...Being bitterly defeated in South Vietnam and strongly protested and condemned by the world peoples, the U.S. imperialists are madly stepping up and expanding the war, hoping by so doing to get out of their impasse...."

(DRV "White Paper" - Tab Q, pp.2-5)

"...In an attempt to find a way out of this crumbling position, the United States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam's borders.

"Since early 1964 the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged carrying the war to North Vietnam...."

"...Noteworthy is plan No. 6 worked out by Walt W. Rostow, the policy planner of the U.S. State Department. This plan envisages three stages: first stage: naval blockage of Haiphong port; second stage: naval attacks on North Vietnam coastal installations; and third stage: air bombings of North Vietnam...."

"...The United States says that it wants a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, but at the same time it declares that it will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. A peaceful settlement which does not include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite troops from South Vietnam cannot be regarded as such by sound-minded people...."

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam because it wants peace to be quickly restored, but it deems it necessary to increase its response and make attacks by air...."

"...While talking about peace, the United States continue to intensify the war in South Vietnam and to extend the war with its air force and navy to North Vietnam. This may lead to unforeseeable consequences...."

"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Government are further laid bare by the following arrogant action: On 24 April 1965 President Johnson designated the whole of Vietnam and the waters adjacent thereto up to 100 miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the territorial waters of the Chinese Peoples Republic around the Paracels of Islands, as a combat zone of the U.S. armed forces. This is in essence a move toward a blockage of the DRV and, at the same time, a preparation for larger-scale military adventures...."

(Thong Nat Article July 1965 - Tab R, pg. 2)

"...Obviously, as long as the U.S. imperialists continue to spin such nonsensical stories and to explain the southern people's uprising as a reaction to North Vietnamese aggression so as to have a pretext for attacking the DRV, this will mean that the U.S. imperialists still want to continue war and that it will be impossible to achieve peace; in other words, the United States will continue to attack the North and the northern people will be obliged to return blows...."

(DRV Government Statement on President Johnson's July 28, 1965 Press Conference
Tab T, pg. 1)

"...This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the truth. In fact, the U.S. Government has sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, trampled upon international laws, continuously intervened in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U.S. troops against the South Vietnamese people, bombed and strafed the territory of the DRV, and has gone to the length of bluntly stating that it will not withdraw from South Vietnam...."

"...It is talking about peace discussions to conceal the plan for intensified war. Its design is to prolong indefinitely the partition of Vietnam and to stick to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a U.S. new type colony and military base for attack against the DRV, thus jeopardizing peace in Asia and the world...."

"The DRV Government once again exposes the U.S. authorities' deception of unconditional discussions, which is in essence a perfidious maneuver to impose by force on the Vietnamese people submission to the U.S. policy of aggression...."

(Quan Doi Nhan Dan Editorial August 20, 1965 - Tab V, pg. 2)

"...To beat a drum for this deceitful peace, Johnson has been bally-hooing that the United States has made considerable concessions, that Washington tried again and again to change its attitude, that the United States does not oppose free elections throughout all Vietnam and is ready to discuss Hanoi's proposals...."

"...the Vietnamese people have seen clearly the U.S. aggressive design through their peaceful negotiations smokescreen: the United States never speaks of withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolition of U.S. military bases in South Vietnam, and a definite end to their criminal bombing raids on North Vietnam. This means that the U.S. imperialists will continue to carry out their aggression in Vietnam and violate most seriously the basic provisions of the Geneva agreements while unleashing their peaceful negotiations swindle. Moreover, right at the moment when they were speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured tens of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased bombing raids on North Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent. By so doing, unquestionably the U.S. imperialists are deliberately throwing every possibility on the political settlement of the Vietnam issue into the greatest impasse...."

(Pham Van Dong's National Day Report August 31, 1965 - Tab X, pp. 2-4, 6)

"...The extension of air attacks on North Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists is an extremely blatant war act against the DRV, an independent and sovereign country. This is a most serious violation of the 1964 Geneva agreements on Indochina, of the U.N. Charter, and of international law. In their escalation against North Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have committed inhumane crimes, bombing and strafing densely populated areas, many hospitals..."

"...The U.S. imperialists still continue the escalation in the north...." They may even start a new Korean war in this area...."

"...In his speech on 28 July President Johnson even began to talk about his readiness to discuss Hanoi's proposals, to mention the question of re-unifying Vietnam, and the NLSV. Why is there such a change? Is that an indication of Washington's willingness for peace?

"Replying to this question, we must consider not the statements by the U.S. ruling circles, but their deeds! What have they done? They have been intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and stepping up the escalation in the north...."

"...In a word, President Johnson talks about peace in an attempt to cover up his war schemes; the more he talks about peace the more he steps up the war...."

"...As

"...As for the U.S. escalation of the war to the north, it obviously constitutes an intolerable act of aggression....To bow down before the threats of the U.S. imperialists or to compromise with them would constitute an act of encouragement fraught with incalculably serious consequences...."

(DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum September 23, 1965 - Tab Z, pp. 1-2)

"...Since 7 April 1965 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occasions professed readiness to engage in 'unconditional discussions' and made proposals for a 'cease-fire,' a 'suspension of the bombing of the north.' But it is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has decided to send in 50,000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. strength in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch has also been announced...."

"The 'unconditional discussions' proposal of the U.S. authorities is but an attempt to compel the Vietnamese people to accept their own terms...."

"...The 'cease-fire' trick of the U.S. authorities is designed in fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their arms while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and commit aggression against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for time to consolidate the puppet administration and army, to increase forces for further expansion of the war in Vietnam...."

(Vietnam Courier Article - Tab BB, pg. 1)

"...Such allegations as peace, discussions -- put forth by the imperialists -- are but deceitful words. The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed war against the DRV...."

(Joint Asahi-Mainichi Interview with Pham Van Dong October 4, 1965 - Tab CC pp. 1-2, 7, 10)

"...No, the United States is definitely not desiring peace. They have no intention at all of ending the war....are they not expanding war in both the south and the north, while talking about peace? They still believe in power, and they think that if they further increase their forces and strengthen the bombings against the north, they will produce effects. That is very foolish, but it happens to be the truth. That is why we do not trust their peace proposal. In the choice between accepting the Johnson proposal and continuing the war, we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest hesitation...."

"...The

"...The United States' escalation against the north has failed so far. Its greatest failure lies in its having been unable to bring the north to the conference table by threatening its people...."

"...President Johnson began to talk about peace negotiations half a year ago. However, whenever he spoke about peace, he ordered reinforcement of the U.S. forces in South Vietnam and "escalated" the war against North Vietnam...."

EXCERPTS FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT -- NORTH VIETNAMESE FATHERLAND FRONT* JOINT
STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1962

(The Joint Statement was issued on the occasion of a visit to Hanoi from October 19 to 31, 1962 of a NFLSV delegation led by Secretary General Nguyen Van Hieu. The Statement, broadcast in English by Hanoi's VNA on October 30, 1962 accuses the U.S. and the Diem "clique" of violating the Geneva Agreements. It also states the Front, which came into being owing to the growth of the South Vietnamese, is the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. It calls for neutrality of South Vietnam, and for peaceful reunification.)

GENEVA

"...1. Both parties note that over the past eight years or so the Vietnamese people and the Government of the DRV constantly implemented correctly the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, but the U.S. imperialists have interfered more and more deeply in South Vietnam and directed the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities to seriously sabotage the implementation of these agreements. The U.S. imperialists are plotting to partition Vietnam permanently, turn South Vietnam into a new type U.S. colony and military base...Over 10,000 U.S. officers and men and hundreds of thousands of Ngo Dinh Diem troops armed with modern U.S. weapons and noxious chemical are repeatedly conducting terrorist raids and barbarously persecuting the South Vietnamese people, regardless of age, sex, religion, nationality, or political tendency. Millions of South Vietnamese peasants have been herded by the U.S.-Diem clique into concentration camps, so-called strategic hamlets....

"The U.S. imperialists are also plotting to use South Vietnam as a base to sabotage the peace and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, threaten peace in southeast Asia and the world, and, at the same time, to make South Vietnam a proving ground for the suppression of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

"Both parties denounce to world public opinion the criminal U.S.-Diem schemes and acts, severely condemn the aggressive and warlike policy of the U.S. imperialists and the antinational and antidemocratic policy of the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities, hangers-on of the United States.

GENEVA

"2. In the face of the U.S. imperialists' aggressive acts and Ngo Dinh Diem's traitorous acts, the South Vietnamese people have been compelled to rise up to struggle for their right to live and for independence, democracy, and peace. This is a just struggle, which conforms to the 1954 Geneva...

*The Fatherland Front of North Vietnam is the replacement for the Viet Minh group. The Front organizes and coordinates all the mass organizations, the trade unions and the three political parties. (All members of the National Assembly are elected as members of the Fatherland Front.) All these organizations operate under the aegis of the Fatherland Front as well as independently.

agreements on Vietnam, to the principles of the U.N. Charter and the spirit of the 1955 Bandung conference. This struggle is an integral part of the movements for national liberation and peace in the world. Yet, in their special report to the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference*, the Indian and Canadian delegates to the International Commission have deliberately tuned into the U.S.-Diem allegation, misrepresenting the South Vietnamese people's just struggle as infiltration and subversion by the North. This is an offense to the sacred patriotism of the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese people from North to South energetically object to it.

FRONT

"The Vietnam Fatherland Front holds that the NFLSV, which came into being owing to the growth of the South Vietnamese people's struggle and which rallies broadly the patriotic and anti-U.S.-Diem forces in South Vietnam, is the genuine representative of the people there, and is one of the decisive factors for their certain victory. The Vietnam Fatherland Front fully supports the program and the urgent steps advocated by the NFLSV to realize independence, democracy, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, in an advance toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The program and urgent steps of the NFLSV meet the interests and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and conform to the practical situation in South Vietnam at present...."

"3. ...The delegation of the NFLSV welcomes the policy of the Vietnam Fatherland Front for national reunification on the basis of independence, democracy, and by peaceful means, without coercion or annexation of one side by the other, and taking into due consideration the legitimate interests and aspirations of the people of all shades in the two zones. This policy matches the political program of the NFLSV, which provides for 'reunifying the country step by step by peaceful means on the basis of negotiations between the two zones and discussions in all forms and measures beneficial to the Vietnamese people and fatherland'.

DRV TERMS

"4. In the face of the present extremely serious situation in South Vietnam created by the U.S.-Diem (clique?) both parties hold that the urgent tasks of the people in both zones are to strengthen solidarity, resolutely struggle against the U.S.-Diem (clique?) urge an end to war and persecution, dissolve the "strategic hamlets" and other concentration camps in South Vietnam, demand the dissolution of the U.S. Military Command in Saigon and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, military personnel, arms, and war material from South Vietnam. The U.S. Government must respect the sovereignty and independence of the South Vietnamese people. The latter's internal affairs must be settled by themselves; no foreign country has the right to interfere in them.

* Special report to the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, issued in Saigon on June 2, 1962.

"Both sides hold that, at a time when the country is still temporarily divided it is a must to boost the struggle for normal relations between the people of the zones in the economic, cultural, and postal fields. The Vietnam Fatherland Front and the NLFV will strive to overcome difficulties, create favorable conditions for representatives of mass organizations of the two zones to contact each other, and at the same time, to exchange cultural articles of these mass organizations, such as films, books, and papers.

"5. Both sides are very happy to note that the just struggle of South Vietnamese compatriots for the emancipation of South Vietnam and that of all the Vietnamese people for peaceful national reunification have won the active and warm approval and support of the world's peoples, including the progressive people in the United States, and the governments of many countries. On behalf, of the people of both zones, the two sides express thanks for that valuable support.

"Both sides hold that the Vietnamese and the world's people have a common enemy, U.S. imperialism, the war-seeking diehard of the colonialists and imperialists. The anti-U.S. struggle of the Vietnamese people and the struggle of peoples for national independence and peace are closely connected with each other. That is why both sides warmly welcome the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question and the formation of the National Union Government in Laos. The peaceful settlement of the Laotian issue proves that international disputes can be settled satisfactorily by means of negotiations. Both sides demand the scrupulous respect for and strict implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, and the complete withdrawal from Laos of all military men of the United States and its satellites.

"The two sides protest against the infringement upon the sovereignty and territory of Cambodia by the South Vietnamese and Thai authorities on U.S. orders. They welcome the proposal of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk for convening an international conference to discuss a guarantee of Cambodia's independence and neutrality.

"The two sides demand a complete withdrawal of American troops from Thailand, and the dissolution of the aggressive SEATO military bloc headed by the United States.

"Both sides support the struggle of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan and oppose the scheme to create two Chinas, support the Chinese people in their defense of national sovereignty and territory, support the proposal of the CPR Government for the settlement of the Sino-Indian border question by peaceful negotiations, and demand restoration of the legitimate position of the CPR in the United Nations.

"6. The two sides unanimously hold that nowadays the world's people's forces of national independence and peace are stronger than the aggressive and bellicose forces of the imperialists headed by the United States. No matter how small they are, the peoples are able to win if they are united closely and struggle valiantly. Though the U.S.-Diem clique still has many evil designs and the South Vietnamese compatriots' struggle is still difficult, hard, and

long, no reactionary force can check the growth of the patriotic movement in South Vietnam.

FRONT

"The 14 million South Vietnamese compatriots will develop more and more their valiant and indomitable tradition and unite more and more widely and closely within the NFLSV to directly oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The 16 million North Vietnamese compatriots will support more actively the South Vietnamese compatriots' liberation struggle, and endeavor to emulate with each other to build North Vietnam into a strong and firm basis for the struggle to reunite the country. The socialist countries, the peaceful and neutral countries, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and peace-loving people throughout the world will obviously support more wholeheartedly and practically (word indistinct) South Vietnamese and all the Vietnamese people. The U.S.-Diem clique will certainly meet with failure. The Vietnamese people from north to south who are closely united and who struggle resolutely, will undoubtedly achieve success."

HO CHI MINH'S INTERVIEW WITH AKAHATA
APRIL 5, 1965

(Ho's interview with Yoshita Takano of Akahata, organ of the Japanese Communist Party, was broadcast by Hanoi VNA in English on April 9, 1965. Ho expressed the view that to settle the South Vietnamese question first of all the U.S. must withdraw from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people decide themselves their own affairs, and stop their provocative attacks against the DRV. "The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people.")

"Question: The U.S. imperialists have suffered repeated defeats in South Vietnam. However, they are still contemplating bringing in superweapons, up-to-date weapons in an attempt to subjugate the Vietnamese people. From the people's viewpoint what is the character of the war in Vietnam and what is its significance in contemporary history? The U.S. imperialists are said to have landed themselves in an embarrassing dilemma in South Vietnam. What is the relation between this position and their recent frenzied aggressive acts vis-a-vis North and South Vietnam? In such circumstances, what is the most important immediate task of the Vietnamese people?

OVES "Answer: For over 10 years now, the U.S. imperialists have waged an aggressive war in South Vietnam in an attempt to turn that zone into a U.S. new-type colony and military base and to prolong the partition of our country. They have brought in over 30,000 troops and military personnel, thousands of aircraft, hundreds of warships and hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, they have carried out a most ruthless policy of terror and repression against all patriotic people in South Vietnam.

"Confronted with such a situation, our compatriots in the south have had to rise up against the U.S. aggressors in defense of their life and their country. This struggle has recorded tremendous victories. Over three-quarters of the area with two-thirds of the population have been liberated. The United States and its agents have sustained heavy defeats. The U.S. special war in South Vietnam is going bankrupt.

FRONT

"If the South Vietnamese people are becoming ever stronger and winning ever greater victories, as the fight goes on, that (proves that?) their cause is just, because they are animated with an ardent patriotism and guided by the sound policy of the NLFV. The war being waged by our compatriots in the south is a peoples revolutionary war against foreign aggression, for national independence and peace. It is an active part of the world peoples movement against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, headed by U.S. imperialism, for national independence, democracy, peace, and social progress.

That is precisely the reason why the peoples of the whole world are extending us their sympathy and support. The increasing victories of the South Vietnamese people show that in our epoch, a nation closely united and waging a resolute struggle is fully capable of defeating the imperialist aggressors, however ferocious, cruel, and well armed they may be.

US MOVES

"In an attempt to extricate themselves from their impasse, the U.S. imperialists are feverishly intensifying and stepping up the aggressive war in South Vietnam. They have brought in U.S. marines and South Korean mercenaries, their planes are daily strafing and dumping napalm bombs and toxic gas on liberated areas, destroying hospitals, schools, and pagodas, and massacring the civilian population including old people, women, and children. On the other hand, the war is being carried to the north with repeated air and naval attacks being brazenly launched on many places of the territory of the DRV. Meanwhile the war is intensified in Laos and provocations are staged against Cambodia. The U.S. imperialists' acts of aggression and war in Vietnam are of the utmost gravity; they grossly trample upon the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and constitute violations of international law and manifestations of disregard for world public opinion.

GENEVA

"The U.S. rulers claim that the north is waging aggression on South Vietnam and that their attacks on the north aim at putting an end to the assistance extended by the north to the South Vietnamese people. These are deceitful contentions designed to fool the world's peoples and to cover up the U.S. aggressive acts. It must be pointed out that it is the legitimate right of the South Vietnamese people to drive out the U.S. aggressors, to defend their country and to decide themselves their own international affairs. It is the sacred right of the Vietnamese in the north as well as in the south to oppose and defeat the U.S. imperialists' aggressive acts to defend their national independence and their life. The U.S. imperialists' acts, however frenzied and reckless they may be, cannot prevent the Vietnamese people from carrying on their patriotic struggle until final victory.

"Question: There is now much talk about a peaceful settlement and negotiations.. to end the war in South Vietnam. What is in your view the minimum basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem?

US MOVES

"Answer: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have put forward misleading talk about peace and negotiation. The peoples of the world are fully aware of their aggressive and warlike nature. To step up aggression in South Vietnam and to bomb the north are part of their policy of special warfare. By such acts, they also aim at bringing about an advantageous position so as to be able, in case of necessity, to negotiate from a position of strength. This policy is wrong and cannot be carried out.

"The Vietnamese people cherish peace and have always respected and correctly implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements. However, they are determined to fight to the end against the aggressors. If the U.S. imperialists stubbornly persist in their policy of aggression and war, they will certainly suffer a humiliating defeat.

I TERMS

GENEVA

"To settle the South Vietnam question, first of all the United States must withdraw from South Vietnam, let the South Vietnamese people themselves decide their own affairs, and stop its provocative attacks against the DRV. The carrying out of these basic points will bring about favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference. Such is a reasonable and sensible approach which is beneficial to peace and to the U.S. people."

"Question: What is your appraisal of the Indochinese peoples' conference recently held in Phnom Penh?"

"Answer: The Indochinese peoples' conference convened at the initiative of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian head of state, has recorded good successes. This is a big victory for the peoples of Vietna, Cambodia, and Laos in their united struggle against their common enemy, the U.S. imperialists. While the United States is stepping up and expanding the aggressive war in South Vietnam, attacking the DRV, intensifying the war in Laos, and repeatedly encroaching on the territory and national sovereignty of Cambodia, the success of the conference shows the determination of the three Indochinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists in defense of national independence and peace in Indochina and southeast Asia.

"Question: Of late, the U.S. imperialists have schemed to direct the reactionary and militarist Japanese administration to rapidly conclude the Japan-ROK talks. They also plan to set up the SEATO aggressive military bloc. This is directly related to their aggressive acts in South Vietnam. What are your assessments of the dangerous designs and activities of the U.S. and Japanese reactionary forces on Japanese soil and of the Japanese peoples struggle against these dangerous schemes and acts?"

"Answer: The Japan-ROK talks are a maneuver of the U.S. imperialists aimed at establishing the SEATO aggressive military bloc and intensifying war preparations. This maneuver is in complete contradiction with the interests of the Japanese and Korean peoples and poses a threat to peace in the Far East and the world. The U.S. imperialists who are the aggressors in South Vietnam are also occupying the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Ogasawara and occupying South Korea. The Japanese militarists who have colluded with the United States and repressed the Japanese people have also sent sailors and technicians to help the United States in South Vietnam and allowed Japanese territory to be used as a base for aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists are the common enemy of the peoples of Vietnam, Japan, and Korea. The same may be said of the Japanese militarists and the South Korean puppets. The Vietnamese people fully support the struggle of the Japanese people against the Japan-ROK talks and the reactionary policy of the U.S. imperialists and Japanese militarists. They sincerely thank the Japanese people for warmly supporting their struggle against the U.S. aggressors.

"I take this opportunity to convey my cordial greetings to the editorial board of AKAHATA and request your paper to convey to the fraternal Japanese people the greetings of militant solidarity of the Vietnamese people."

REPORT OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT SUBMITTED BY
PHAM VAN DONG TO THE DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ON APRIL 8, 1965

(The first section of this report was broadcast by Hanoi VNA in English on April 12, 1965. The concluding section containing Pham Van Dong's four points was translated by FBIS from a Hanoi domestic broadcast on April 13. The four points and other pertinent excerpts from the report are included below. The report contains a lengthy indictment against U.S. activities in South Vietnam as well as a report on conditions in North Vietnam.)

"...The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

4 POINTS

"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people -- peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory.

"3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference.

"4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"This stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

GENEVA

"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the aforementioned

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stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate. Such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam....

GENEVA
US MOVES

"We believe the world's people were awakened on hearing President Johnson speak of a return to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. This was a laugh. Everyone knows the U.S. imperialists are the enemy of the Geneva agreements. Never have they and their Saigon henchmen officially recognized these agreements. Worse still, they have never officially recognized the ICC's execution of the Geneva agreements. At this very moment they are down-trodding the Geneva agreements more brazenly than ever. The U.S. imperialists have never respected the 1954 Geneva agreements on Cambodia and the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. At present, they persistently refuse to reconvene the international conference on Cambodia and Laos. Today, the U.S. imperialists are obliged to refer to the Geneva agreements on Vietnam but with the aim of distorting the basic principles of the agreements in order to perpetuate our country's division and to consider the north and the south as two entirely different nations.

"As for our government and people, they have continuously struggled to maintain the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and considered these agreements as a legal basis for the sacred and inviolable national interests of the people of the three friendly countries.

"President Johnson's 7 April speech is full of irreconcilable contradictions between the deceitful words and the criminal acts of the U.S. Government in Vietnam.

US MOVES

"1. In his speech, President Johnson spoke of peace, the end of the war, and unconditional negotiations, however, the U.S. government is now intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam and extending the war to North Vietnam, and according to General Taylor's statement, there will be no limit to the aggression against North Vietnam.

"2. President Johnson spoke a lot about South Vietnam's independence: South Vietnam will not be bound to any foreign intervention or bound to any alliance and will not allow any country to set up its military base there. However, it is the U.S. imperialists who are seeking at all risks to cling to South Vietnam and have increased the number of U.S. combat units in South Vietnam and the number of aggressive acts against North Vietnam in an attempt to cling to South Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the U.S. Government is waging this aggressive war against South Vietnam, but it has brazenly accused North Vietnam of being the aggressor. President Johnson stated in his speech that "we will not withdraw publicly or under any (word indistinct) agreement." This brazen statement has completely laid bare the U.S. policy on Vietnam. It is a threat to world public opinion.

"3. President Johnson also pretended to be humane when speaking of economic development and the improvement of other people's livelihood with the aid of

1 billion dollars, but his purpose was to woo the southeast Asian peoples. The U.S. imperialists are really the creators of all danger of war in Vietnam, Laos, and other places. They have committed considerable criminal acts and have even used toxic gas not only in the war, but in the repression of anti-U.S. people in the urban centers.

"4. President Johnson threatened to continue the use of force. This threat cannot frighten us. The Vietnamese people are determined to fight and win. They are not afraid of any difficulty or enemy. As they are suffering defeats, the U.S. imperialists will certainly be defeated completely. As the U.S. Government has been urged by public opinion the world over and in the United States to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and put an end to the war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, President Johnson was obliged to utter demagogic words, and these were only maneuvers or tricks aimed at deceiving public opinion and appeasing the increasingly widespread and vigorous opposition in the United States and the world over to the war of aggression in Vietnam.

"So, our Vietnamese people and the world's people must heighten their vigilance against the U.S. imperialists' new acts of war and, at the same time, against their deceitful move to intensify the war under the label of peace and negotiations and to slander other people as warmongers....

US MOVES

"The NPLSV, the mobilizer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South Vietnam, the leader which has taken the people to ever greater victories, is now controlling three-fourths of the territory and two-thirds of the population of South Vietnam. It has ever higher international prestige and position, and is being more and more recognized by foreign countries and world public opinion as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people.

"Its sound program constitutes the banner of unity and struggle for national salvation...with a view to achieving independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and eventual peaceful reunification of the country. The statement of 22 March 1965 of the front is resounding in the world as the strong voice of a people determined to fight and to win, the voice of justice, the voice of the just cause of the Vietnamese people and of the present epoch....

"The Government of the DRV sternly exposes and denounces to compatriots in the whole country and to the peoples of the world the new, extremely serious war acts of the U.S. imperialists: on the one hand the latter are intensifying the aggressive war in the South, and on the other they are launching air and naval attacks on the north.

US MOVES

"By engaging in this highly dangerous military adventure, they stupidly hope to cow our people and also intimidate peace-loving governments and peoples in the world. They hope that our people and the peoples of the world will flinch out of fear, and thus they will be in a position to shift from a weak to a strong position!

"But in the face of their new aggressive acts, the Vietnamese people from the south to the north are waging an all the more resolute struggle, and the world's peoples are extending us an all the more vigorous support. It is clear that still heavier defeats are in store for the U.S. imperialists....

"Ten years ago the French Expeditionary Corps, in spite of its 200,000 crack troops, ended in defeat at Dien Bien Phu. A U.S. expeditionary corps will inevitably meet with the same ignominious fate in South Vietnam. For their part, our southern compatriots are prepared to fight with determination, to fight to the end, and to fight until not a single U.S. soldier is any longer to be seen in our country, even if they will have to fight for 10 or 20 years or more, and however great their difficulties and hardships may be (22 March 1965 statement of the NFLSV).

"While intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists are expanding it to the North with their air force on the grounds that the DRV is at the origin of the patriotic struggle in South Vietnam. These are obviously impudent acts and perfidious tricks of corsairs....

GENEVA

"By attacking the DRV they have completely scrapped the Geneva agreements and grossly violated international law and all human laws. They must pay for their crimes...."

"The entire people of the north, united as one, are determined to struggle in a self-sacrificing spirit to defeat all enemy aggressive schemes, to defend the north, and, more closely than ever, to stand side by side with our southern compatriots and wholeheartedly support their liberation struggle till final victory.

"In laying hands on the north, the U.S. warmongers expose themselves not only to well-deserved counterblows in the north, but also to still more telling blows in the south, as was pointed out in the 22 March 1965 statement of the liberation front:

"To defend the beloved north, the army and people of the south have vented their flames of anger at the U.S. aggressors and their agents. If the U.S. imperialists lay hands on the north of our fatherland once, the army and people of the south are resolved to strike twice or three times as hard at them...

"In these circumstances, the more frenzied the United States attempts to extend the war to North Vietnam, the more disastrous will be their defeat! An anti-U.S. wave of indignation is now surging up in the world. The governments and people of the socialist countries, nationalist countries, international organizations, peoples the world over, and progressive circles and various social strata in the United States itself are extending an ever more resolute and vigorous support and assistance to our just struggle...

"Today we are much stronger than before, strong in the north, strong in the south, and strong in worldwide support. For their part the U.S. imperialists are

being bogged down in South Vietnam and encountering great difficulties in various fields in many places. That is why our people are all the more heightening their will and determination, are animated with even greater enthusiasm and confidence in their just and certainly victorious struggle, and are resolved to devote all their forces to drive the U.S. aggressors out of our country, to defend the north, to liberate the south, to eventually build a peaceful, reunified, independent, democratic, and prosperous Vietnam, and to contribute to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and the world....

FRONT

"The whole people of the north are warmly responding to the statement of the NFLSV and the statement of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, they are simultaneously carrying out production, fighting, and combat preparations, determined as they are to do their best to build and defend the north and to extend wholehearted support to the cause of the liberation of the south. In the present juncture, all social strata and all citizens must work more with a higher sense of urgency and higher productivity. Everybody must, according to his capacity and strength, make his most effective contribution to the common cause of the country.

"In response to the appeal of the NFLSV, the South Vietnamese cadres, army men, and ordinary citizens regrouped to the north have enthusiastically voiced their readiness to return to their native land and to fight, arms in hand, or to do any work to contribute to the annihilation of the enemy and to national salvation. Pending orders to this effect, all of them are striving with one mind to boost up production and actively work to contribute to the defense and the building of the north. We warmly hail their patriotism and combat-readiness!...

"In the process of production and fighting, the administration in the north will be ever more consolidated and ever stronger. The northern part of our country, the DRV, will bring into play its great impact as the base for the liberation of South Vietnam and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland....

US MOVES

"What causes us to be moved and enthusiastic is that in recent months, in the United States itself, a movement has been developing widely to oppose the U.S. imperialists who are stepping up the war of aggression in South Vietnam and increasing their acts of war against North Vietnam. This movement includes a great numbers of American people from all walks of life -- workers, youth, women, students, intellectuals, religious people, congressmen, and journalists. The struggle forms have gradually become stronger and more abundant....

"Dear comrade deputies of the National Assembly, the anti-U.S. struggle of our people has received never-before-seen sympathy and wide support from the people in the world, from fraternal socialist countries to people from all walks of life of various Western countries, including the United States. This is an event having an international meaning of great importance....

"We must carry out this task properly because the U.S. imperialists continuously seek all means to deceive world opinion and to sow confusion concerning problems (several words indistinct). Worse still, they are so

crafty as to try to (wipe out?) and to change black into white. For example, they say they have to expand the war to the north because the DRV has caused the liberation war in the south.

"We must unmask the U.S. aggressors in time and vigorously and sharply because they are used to stealing while crying for help. We must awaken the world's people to these dishonest tricks of the U.S. bandits. Care must be taken when they speak of love and justice because they surely want to get in a house without having to break down the door."...

VNA "AUTHORIZED" STATEMENT REJECTING THE
17 NON-ALIGNED NATION APPEAL

(VNA broadcast a statement April 19, 1965 in English which it had been "authorized" to issue rejecting the 17 Non-Aligned Nation appeal passed at the Belgrade meeting of non-aligned countries on March 15, 1965. The "authorization" presumably was by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

FRONT

"...The NLSV is now controlling three-fourths of South Vietnam's territory and two-thirds of its population. It is clear that at the present time any solution to the South Vietnam issue without the decisive voice of the NLSV is impractical..."

US MOVES

"To soothe and mislead public opinion, on 7 April 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson spoke of peace and independence in South Vietnam, of unconditional negotiations toward a political solution to the war in South Vietnam. He even promised to set aside 1 billion dollars to develop the economy and raise the living standard of the peoples in southeast Asian countries. But in this very speech, Johnson declared that the United States will not withdraw from South Vietnam and will intensify its air raids against North Vietnam."

"In point of fact, since 7 April 1965, the U.S. imperialists have introduced into South Vietnam two more battalions of U.S. Marines totaling 3,000 men and a large quantity of modern weapons. American aircraft have continually bombed many towns and villages, sowing so much mourning and devastation in both South and North Vietnam. It is clear that Johnson's speech is but a smokescreen to cover up the U.S. imperialists' new military adventures in Vietnam, directly jeopardizing peace and security of the peoples in this area.

4 POINTS

"To settle the Vietnam problem at present, the only correct way is to carry out the points laid down by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965."

"It is the unswerving policy of the DRV Government to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected (while?) the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.

"3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the NFLSV program, without any foreign interference.

"4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

4 POINTS "The DRV Government is of the view that the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem, if this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

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"The DRV Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

"Among the 17 countries which sent representatives to the meeting held in Belgrade on 15 March 1965, some did not sign the appeal issued by this meeting. Others, who signed it because they were not accurately informed about the bloody war provoked in South Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists and the latters' piratical attacks against the DRV, have now shown unwillingness to support that appeal...."

NHAN DAN EDITORIAL, APRIL 21, 1965 ON THE NFLSV
AS THE ONLY GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

(The Nhan Dan editorial marks a strengthening of the DRV characterization of the NFLSV role in South Vietnam, marking it out as the "only genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people which must have "its decisive voice." The following extracts from the editorial were broadcast in English by Hanoi Radio April 21, 1965.)

FRONT

"From a place in the liberated area in South Vietnam, on 22 March 1965 the epic statement of the NFLSV Central Committee was broadcast all over the world. Within only a month, this appeal for national salvation has rapidly won a broad and powerful response throughout Vietnam. In the world, the voice of the NFLSV is the decisive one in the settlement of the South Vietnam question, one of the most important questions at present on which all of mankind is focusing its attention.

"With its just cause of national liberation and its correct line of resistance for national salvation, the NFLSV has continually led the South Vietnamese people from one victory to another. At present, over three-fourths of the territory and two-thirds of the South Vietnamese populations have been liberated. The front has actually become the organizer and guide of all facets of the life of the 9 million people in the liberated areas, while the people in areas under the temporary control of the enemy are constantly turning their thoughts to the front and responding to and carrying out all its policies. The front's prestige in the world is growing daily. The front and the mass organizations affiliated with it have established relations with hundreds of international and national organizations in the world. It has set up representative organs in many countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The front's Central Committee has regularly exchanged letters and messages with the governments and state leaders of many countries.

"The foundation day of the front, 20 December, has become one of the anniversaries to which progressive people and political circles in many countries are paying great importance. On the rostrums of various international conferences of mass organizations, the voice of the front's delegates is regarded by all as that of a valiant fighter on the front line against U.S. imperialism. The NFLSV representative attended the Indochinese people's conference last February and the recent 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference as the only genuine representative of the heroic South Vietnamese people.

"Faced with the great prestige of the NFLSV, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are extremely frightened. In an attempt to overshadow the front's role, the U.S. aggressors have endeavored to doll up the Saigon puppet administration. But they will never be able to achieve their goal. Chairman A. N. Kosygin declared: Today everybody must see that the NFLSV, which is leading the South Vietnamese people's struggle, is a real force which decides the present as well as the future of South Vietnam. Premier Chou En-lai has on many occasions asserted that the NFLSV is the only legal representative

of the South Vietnam population, and the Chinese people firmly respond to the 22 March statement of the NFLSV and will send to the South Vietnamese people all material aid to defeat U.S. imperialism. President Sukarno has very correctly remarked that nobody regards the Saigon regime as a government. It is the United States which is occupying Saigon.

"The role and mission of the NFLSV have been entrusted by history and recognized by all the Vietnamese people and people all over the world. Just as the NFLSV Central Committee declared in its communique of 15 April, any settlement of the South Vietnam question will lose its practical and positive meaning if it is undertaken without the participation of the NFLSV in a decisive role.

"The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are stubbornly intensifying and expanding their war of aggression in South Vietnam. They will certainly receive more telling blows from the NFLSV and the 14 million South Vietnamese people. The front has clearly defined its stand:

"The South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are resolved never to relax their grip on their arms so long as they have not reached their goals: independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality..., and all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and all kinds of war materiel and means -- and those of the satellites -- if they still do not dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the traitors still surrender the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence and democracy to the U.S. imperialists, and if the NFLSV -- the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people--does not have its decisive voice."

FRONT

DRV "WHITE PAPER" ON "US AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM"

(On July 10, 1965 North Vietnam released a "White Paper" on "US Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam" which had been prepared by the DRV Foreign Ministry. The timing of release of the white paper was related to the 11th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam on July 20, 1954, but the paper itself was prepared in May, 1965. The full text of the paper was released by Hanoi VNA in English July 16. The white paper is divided into six chapters.

- 1 -- First US intervention in Vietnam.
- 2 -- Second US intervention in Vietnam, systematic sabotage of the 1954 Geneva agreements.
- 3 -- US armed aggression against South Vietnam.
- 4 -- The United States launched air and naval attacks on the DRV.
- 5 -- The so-called will for peace of the aggressors.
- 6 -- The sound basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem.

Excerpts from chapters two, three, four and five and the full text of chapter six are given below.)

Chapter 2

"...The U.S. policy of intervention has trampled upon the deep aspirations of the people of South Vietnam and of all Vietnam for peace, unity, independence, and democracy. Even the rights to life and peaceful labor have not been respected by the ruthless fascist dictatorial policies of the Ngo Dinh Diem administration. Therefore, exercising their rights of self-defense and self-determination -- which are the inalienable rights of all peoples -- the undaunted South Vietnam people have resolutely risen up against the U.S. imperialists and their agents.

"The patriotic movement in South Vietnam has rapidly developed into a mighty tidal wave which threatens to sweep away the positions of the United States and its agents. Once again the U.S. policy of intervention in South Vietnam has sustained disastrous failure..."

Chapter 3

GENEVA

"But the heroic South Vietnam people have risen up in arms against the aggressors for national salvation and self-liberation. Theirs is a thorough just struggle which fully conforms to the 1954 Geneva agreements and to international law.

FRONT

"The NFLSV, founded on 20 December 1960, more and more clearly proves to be the sole genuine representative of the people, the mobilizer and organizer of all patriotic forces in South Vietnam. Born in the midst of the anti-U.S.-Diem upsurge, the NFLSV, with Lawyer Nguen Huu Tho as its

president, unites all social strata, classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious groups, and patriotic personalities, irrespective of political tendency, to fight and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents, achieve independence, democracy, better living conditions, peace, and neutrality for South Vietnam and eventual peaceful national reunification.

"The front has succeeded in rallying even broader patriotic forces to the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their South Vietnam agents. Our southern compatriots, who enjoy the broad sympathy and vigorous support of the peoples of the socialist countries and peace-loving people throughout the world, have scored increasing victories. To date, the NFLSV has gained control of four-fifths of the territory and 10 million people; that is, two-thirds of the population in South Vietnam. It has become a powerful force which has a decisive voice in the South Vietnam problem.

"The front is enjoying growing prestige in the world. It has successively established official representations in Cuba, Algeria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, China, and the Soviet Union. It has also established a permanent representation to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council in Cairo and a permanent observer near the executive committee of the International Union of Students in Budapest.

"Its delegation have been warmly welcomed to various international conferences, where they were regarded as the genuine representatives of the South Vietnam people. In particular, three major international conferences were recently held to express the world people's full support for the patriotic movement in South Vietnam. They are: the meeting of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity With the Workers and People of South Vietnam, held in Hanoi at the end of October 1963; the International Conference for Solidarity With the People of Vietnam Against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the defense of peace, held in Hanoi in November 1964; and the Indochinese People's Conference held early in March 1965 in Phnom Penh. Committees for solidarity with the South Vietnam people are being set up in an increasing number of countries..."

Chapter 4

"The question no longer is whether war is being lost, but how fast the United States and South Vietnam are losing it and whether there still is any flimsy hope of saving the situation.

US MOVES

"In an attempt to find a way out of this crumbling position, the United States plots to extend the war beyond South Vietnam's borders.

"Since early 1964 the U.S. ruling circles in Washington have envisaged carrying the war to North Vietnam. Many plans have been mapped out by the U.S. strategists in the State Department and the Pentagon. Noteworthy

is plan No. 6 worked out by Walt W. Rostow, the policy planner of the U.S. State Department. This plan envisages three stages: first stage: naval blockage of Haiphong port; second stage: naval attacks on North Vietnam coastal installations; and third stage: air bombings of North Vietnam...

"These are cynical premeditated war activities, brazen violations of the sovereignty and territory of the DRV, undeniable violations of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and all norms of international law. They pose a heavy threat to peace in Indochina and southeast Asia. That is the reason why the U.S. air and naval attacks on the territory of the DRV have been sternly condemned by the peoples of the whole world and by many governments...

3 "The U.S. Government has put forward one argument after another, and published a blue book and a white paper in an attempt to cover up its aggression in South Vietnam.

"Since 7 April 1965 U.S. President Johnson has repeatedly stated that the United States has come to South Vietnam to defend freedom, to allow the people of South Vietnam to guide their own country in their own way. He also has accused North Vietnam of aggression against South Vietnam, and he has said that the United States is ready to engage in unconditional discussions to find a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam..."

"After the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva agreements, when Vietnam was temporarily partitioned into two zones, the South Vietnam people longed to see South Vietnam achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. But the United States had set up a fascist regime under the Ngo Dinh Diem brothers and, later on, under a succession of military dictators, it sabotaged the peaceful reunification of Vietnam as provided for in the Geneva agreements. It has brought into South Vietnam nearly 50,000 troops from the United States and thousands of mercenaries from a number of satellite countries to wage, together with the Saigon puppet army, an undeclared war, thus encroaching on the sovereignty and territory of Vietnam. It is crystal clear that the United States, instead of defending freedom, is carrying out an armed aggression in South Vietnam. It does not allow the people of South Vietnam to guide their own country in their own way, but is stifling their deepest and most sacred aspirations in an attempt to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. military base and new-type colony...

"The South Vietnamese people have every right to rise up in arms against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys to defend their country and their freedom, and they are fully entitled to use all necessary means in accordance with their right of self-defense and self-determination, including an appeal to peace- and justice-loving countries for moral support and material aid in the form of funds, weapons, and volunteers."

US MOVES

"Is it true that the United States is ready to engage in unconditional discussions with a view to finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam?"

"It will be recalled that not long ago President Johnson demanded, as a precondition to any negotiations for a settlement of the South Vietnam question, that North Vietnam should stop its aggression against South Vietnam. This time he proposes unconditional discussions presumably because he wants to give better proof of his will for peace, and even of his desire to raise the living standards of southeast Asian peoples. The U.S. ruling circles probably hope that Johnson's 7 April speech might mislead the world's peoples into taking this as the sign of a change in U.S. policy.

"Unfortunately, the 7 April speech is full of contradictions:

FRONT

"It is a fact that U.S. puppet troops are fighting against the South Vietnam Liberation Army and people which are led by the NFLSV. The United States talks about its desire to hold discussion with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the South Vietnam question, but it refuses to recognize the NFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnam people. It is obvious that the United States wants neither peace nor negotiation.

MOVES

"The United States says that it wants a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, but at the same time it declares that it will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. A peaceful settlement which does not include the withdrawal of U.S. satellite troops from South Vietnam cannot be regarded as such by sound-minded people. It only means that the United States, which has launched an armed aggression against South Vietnam, is insolently asking the heroic South Vietnam people to lay down their arms and surrender to those on whom they have inflicted defeat after defeat. This is the kind of negotiations from a position of strength repeatedly mentioned by the U.S. ruling circles, from Johnson to Deak Rusk and McNamara. But they should not have any illusions about it. The indomitable South Vietnam people deeply love peace, but they are determined to struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors; never will they lay down their arms until they win final victory.

"The United States says that it wants to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam because it wants peace to be quickly restored, but it deems it necessary to increase its response and make attacks by air. While President Johnson says that the United States will strive not to extend the hostilities, Maxwell Taylor, the initiator of the theory of special war, who is now the plenipotentiary representative of the U.S. Government in South Vietnam for carrying out this kind of war, bluntly states that no limit exists to the potential escalation of the war, and that America may directly enter the ground fighting if necessary.

US MOVES "While talking about peace, the United States continue to intensify the war in South Vietnam and to extend the war with its air force and navy to North Vietnam. This may lead to unforeseeable consequences. It is clear that the U.S. aggressors and warmongers are using double talk to cover up their new dangerous military adventures in this area..."

"The aggressive and bellicose features of the U.S. Government are further laid bare by the following arrogant action: On 24 April 1965 President Johnson designated the whole of Vietnam and the waters adjacent thereto up to 100 miles from the Vietnamese coasts, and part of the territorial waters of the Chinese Peoples Republic around the Paracels Islands, as a combat zone of the U.S. armed forces. This is in essence a move toward a blockage of the DRV and, at the same time, a preparation for larger-scale military adventures."

"In fact, the United States is frenziedly intensifying the aggressive war in South Vietnam, stepping up the war of destruction with its air force against North Vietnam, and menacing the territorial waters of the DRV with its naval forces, in an attempt to turn defeat and weakness into victory and strength, get out of its present impass in South Vietnam, and obtain at the conference table what it cannot win on the battlefield."

"The so-called will for peace and economic aid recently mentioned by Johnson are but familiar tricks of psychological warfare of the U.S. imperialists designed to soothe and deceive public opinion and cover up their attempt to extend the war and enslave the Indochinese and southeast Asian peoples. But such tricks, however perfidious, can fool no one. The U.S. rulers know better than anyone else how many countries have courageously renounced the noose of U.S. aid and how many U.S. personnel carrying out the Food for Peace and Alliance for Progress programs have been expelled from Asian, African, and Latin American countries."

Chapter 6

"The South Vietnam Army and people, starting with almost bare hands, have scored great achievements, recorded glorious victories, and driven the U.S. imperialists and their agents into a corner. In an attempt to retrieve this critical position, the U.S. imperialists are embarking on new, extremely dangerous military adventures, thereby threatening peace in Indochina and southeast Asia more seriously than ever."

FRONT "In its 22 March 1965 statement, the NFLSV Central Committee exposed the U.S. imperialists' policy of aggression and war, demonstrated the inevitability of their defeat, and made clear its stand on the South Vietnam problem:"

"The South Vietnam people and their armed forces are resolved never to lose hold of their arms so long as they have not reached their basic goals, namely, independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. The South Vietnam people are determined to go on striking hard at the U.S. aggressors

and their lackeys, and they are sure to win final victory. All negotiations at this moment are entirely useless if the U.S. imperialists still persist in refusing to withdraw from South Vietnam all their troops and war materials of all kinds and those of their satellites, and to dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam, if the Vietnamese traitors continue to surrender to the U.S. imperialists the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence, and if the NFLSV -- the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese people -- is not asked to say its decisive say.

"All the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government warmly hail and support this correct stand of the NFLSV.

GENEVA "The DRV Government has always held that the correct implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam is the correct way of settling the South Vietnam problem.

"On 8 April at the second session of the third National Assembly of the DRV, Premier Pham Van Dong once again made clear the position of the DRV Government regarding the present situation in Vietnam.

4 POINTS "The unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points: [See Pham Van Dong's 4 points at Tab H.]

"This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and people in the world.

"The DRV Government holds that the above-mentioned stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is accepted, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

UN "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant, any approach leading to a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

Hanoi, May 1965.

DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
JULY 28, 1965 PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT

(Following President Johnson's press conference Statement on July 28, the DRV issued a Government statement (on August 2) condemning the Statement but omitting any reference to the President's references to the DRV's "four points" or the NFL. The Statement focused on criticism of the build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and the continued U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Following are excerpts from the English-language broadcast of the Statement by Hanoi Radio.)

"...In an attempt to deceive the American people and world public opinion and to justify the massive dispatch of U.S. troops for intensified aggression in Vietnam, U.S. President Johnson has resorted to such nice words as defending peace, freedom, justice. He has reiterated his contention about unconditional discussion and claimed himself to be ready to move from the battlefield to the conference table.

US MOVES "This hypocritical talk cannot possibly cover up and distort the truth. In fact, the U.S. Government has sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, trampled upon international laws, continuously intervened in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people, sent U.S. troops against the South Vietnamese people, bombed and strafed the territory of the DRV, and has gone to the length of bluntly stating that it will not withdraw from South Vietnam.

"It is also a fact that the U.S. Government is waging a war of aggression in Vietnam. It is talking about peace discussions to conceal the plan for intensified war. Its design is to prolong indefinitely the partition of Vietnam and to stick to South Vietnam in a bid to turn that zone into a U.S. new type colony and military base for attack against the DRV, thus jeopardizing peace in Asia and the world....

"The DRV Government once again exposes the U.S. authorities' deception of unconditional discussions, which is in essence a perfidious maneuver to impose by force on the Vietnamese people submission to the U.S. policy of aggression.

"The DRV Government solemnly declares that Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. The U.S. imperialists having encroached on Vietnamese territory, every Vietnamese is duty-bound to fight against the U.S. aggressors for national salvation. This is an imprescriptible sacred right of the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese people, millions as one, are determined to stand firm on the frontline of the world people's struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress."

"Even if the U.S. imperialists send in 100,000 or 200,000 or more American troops, even if the struggle is to last 10, 20 years, or more, The Vietnamese people are determined to fight until complete victory.

"This stand as well as the 22 March 1965 statement by the NFLSV have elicited warm approval and support from many governments and from the world's people.

4 POINTS "For the U.S. Government there is only one way to an honorable peace; that is, to correctly implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and accept the four-point stand of the DRV Government.

FRONT "The U.S. Government must stop at once its air war against the DRV and completely cease all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the DRV. It must put an immediate end to the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons therefrom, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs in accordance with the program of the NFLSV-- the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people.

UN "There is no other way, not even the resorting to U.N. intervention in Vietnam....

"U.S. President Johnson has spoken about an honorable peace. It will be recalled that all along for the past 11 years the Government of the DRV has repeatedly put forward reasonable and sensible proposals with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the 1954 Geneva agreements.

4 POINTS "More recently, on 8 April 1965, it made clear its four-point stand as a basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem."

LE MONDE INTERVIEW WITH HO CHI MINH

(On August 15, 1965 Hanoi broadcast in English the text of Ho Chi Minh's responses to four questions submitted in writing by French correspondent for Le Monde, Philippe Devillers. Ho insisted that the US must give "tangible proofs" that it accepted the DRV's "four points" and appeared to completely rule out any role for the GVN in any negotiations.)

"Question: Does the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam remain that which was defined by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April, namely the South Vietnamese people must be left to solve their own affairs themselves without foreign interference and on democratic bases?

FRONT "Answer: That's right, and this on the basis of the program of the NFLSV, the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnam people.

"Question: Is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ready to accept, so long as the South Vietnamese people will so desire, the existence of an autonomous South Vietnam, neutral of course, but disposed to establish with the north the relations implied by fraternity and a common nationality?

"Answer: Of course, Along with preparations for the national reunification of Vietnam which will be carried out through peaceful means, on the basis of the free consent of the north and the south, according to the program of the NFLSV and the program of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, our entire people are now struggling with their main and might against the U.S. aggression in our country to defend the DRV, liberate South Vietnam, and achieve peaceful reunification, highest goal of all the Vietnamese.

"Question: In case the U.S. Government would solemnly reaffirm its will to respect the basic principles of the Geneva agreements -- namely, unity and independence of Vietnam and prohibition of any base and any presence of foreign troops on its soil -- would the Government of the DRV agree to discuss with it the conditions and guarantees for disengagement which this U.S. declaration would imply? Also, in your opinion, is an end to the U.S. air attacks against the DRV territory a sine qua non condition leading to a settlement of the Vietnam problem?

4 POINTS "Answer: To this end, the U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV which conforms to the essential political and military clauses of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam; it must immediately stop the air attacks against DRV territory, stop forthwith the aggressive war against the south of our country, and withdraw from there all U.S. troops and weapons. That is peace in honor; there is no other way out.

"Question: Do you think, Mr. President, that the solution to the Vietnam problem depends directly on the Hanoi and Washington governments -- without the holding of an international conference -- or do you think that it rests essentially with the NFLSV and the Vietnamese authorities in Saigon to find a settlement?

"Answer: The four-point stand of the Government of the DRV gives a clear answer to this question, and there is no question of Saigon authorities, a creation of the Americans which is cursed by our people, and which nobody in the world takes seriously.

"Friendly greetings."

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN EDITORIAL OF AUGUST 20, 1965
CRITICIZING ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION IN VIETNAM

(A commentary signed "Observer" in the PAVN daily newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, makes the first open criticism of attempts at outside mediation of the Vietnam conflict and also expresses DRV sensitivity to U.S. bombing raids. The following excerpts were taken from the text of the commentary as broadcast August 20, 1965 over Hanoi VNA in English.)

"...Can there be any conciliation between these two diametrically incompatible stands? Conditional or unconditional?

4 POINTS

"The Vietnamese people have always been stressing that only when the U.S. Government shows concrete manifestations of its recognition of the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the five-point stand of the NFLSV can there be a basis for the peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam.

"The U.S. imperialists have talked so much of their stand of peaceful negotiations, unconditional discussions....At first hearing, people may think that the U.S. imperialists put forward no conditions whereas the Vietnamese people raise certain conditions.

"The truth is that the Vietnamese people do not put any conditions to the U.S. imperialists. They only demand that the latter strictly implement the provisions of the Geneva agreements which were signed 11 years ago and which the U.S. imperialists undertook to respect. The content of the four point stand of our government conforms to the main political and military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

GENEVA

"Now the Vietnamese people only demand that the U.S. imperialists return to the 1954 Geneva agreements: they must stop their aggression, withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, stop air raids on North Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves.

"By so doing, how can it be said that the Vietnamese people put forward new conditions to the U.S. imperialists?

"What is the stand of the U.S. imperialists? Since 1954 the U.S. imperialists have sabotaged all political and military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Whereas these agreements recognize the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of

Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists have turned South Vietnam into a colony, set up in South Vietnam a separate state, plotting to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam, and are now brazenly carrying out bombing raids against the DRV, thus violating her sovereignty....

"By raising the stand of peaceful negotiations and unconditional discussions, the U.S. imperialists pursue a dark scheme of legalizing their acts of serious violations of the 1954 Geneva agreements over the past 11 years, compelling the Vietnamese people to recognize the presence of U.S. troops and the existence of U.S. military bases in South Vietnam, and imposing on the South Vietnamese people their lackey governments.

"Therefore, the so-called unconditional discussions proposal of the U.S. imperialists actually asks for one basic condition: recognition of the sabotage of the 1954 Geneva agreements by the U.S. imperialists and recognition of their aggression in Vietnam in the past as well as at present.

US MOVES

"To beat a drum for this deceitful peace, Johnson has been ballyhooing that the United States has made considerable concessions, that Washington tried again and again to change its attitude, that the United States does not oppose free elections throughout all Vietnam and is ready to discuss Hanoi's proposals....

"This psychological war trick of the United States was exposed by the U.S. press itself. AP commented that what seems to be concessions was considered by Washington as a tactical measure, and that negotiations might be prolonged so as to give the South Vietnam puppet administration a breathing spell.

"Indeed, without waiting for the disclosure by U.S. papers of this U.S. trick, the Vietnamese people have seen clearly the U.S. aggressive design through their peaceful negotiations smokescreen: the United States never speaks of withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from South Vietnam, abolition of U.S. military bases in South Vietnam, and a definite end to their criminal bombing raids on North Vietnam. This means that the U.S. imperialists will continue to carry out their aggression in Vietnam and violate most seriously the basic provisions of the Geneva agreements while unleashing their peaceful negotiations swindle. Moreover, right at the moment when they were speaking of peaceful negotiations, they have brazenly poured tens of thousands of aggressive troops into South Vietnam and increased bombing raids on North Vietnam to an ever fiercer extent. By so doing, unquestionably the U.S. imperialists are deliberately throwing every possibility on the political settlement of the Vietnam issue into the greatest impasse.

"The policy of using violence to force the Vietnamese people to recognize the U.S. conditions and to submit themselves to the aggressors has been openly stated by Johnson. He said that to continue bombing North Vietnam along with intensifying terrorist raids in South Vietnam remains a key to victory and only this double blow can persuade North Vietnam. The United States still holds that it is necessary to continue raiding and killing until the Vietnamese people lose all hopes in victory. That means the United States must fight until their aggressive goal is achieved.

"Obviously, while talking of peaceful negotiations the United States has not in the least given up its aggressive stand.

"So long as the U.S. aggression continues, the Vietnamese people are resolved to resist aggression until complete victory.

"The aggressors cannot be put on a par with the victims of aggression.

"The U.S. imperialists are the aggressors, the Vietnamese people are victims of aggression. In order to solve the war issue in Vietnam, the U.S. aggressors must stop their aggression. That is the only correct measure to restore peace in Vietnam....

MEDIATION

"Our people, who have suffered over 20 years of war, profoundly cherish peace, but peace must always link with national independence. One cannot mediate between the U.S. imperialists' stand to carry out aggression to the end and the Vietnamese people's thorough stand to oppose aggression. If anybody wants to stand as mediator without condemning the aggressors and demanding that the latter stop their aggression and without approving and supporting the victims of aggression in their struggle against the aggressors, he can but encourage the aggressors to continue their aggression. The situation in Vietnam at present is very tense. The only cause of this tension is the war acts committed by the U.S. aggressors. To relax the tension, the question now is not to recommend that both sides show less intransigence, but to compel the United States to give up its aggressive scheme. As for them, the Vietnamese people hold that only by determinedly struggling against the U.S. aggressors can the situation be relaxed."

DRV EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ISSUES "CORRECTION" OF LORD
BROCKWAY PRESS INTERVIEW.

(On August 24, 1965 a DRV spokesman in Moscow issued a statement stressing the DRV's 4 points were the basis for the soundest political solution to the Vietnamese question. This statement was issued after western press agencies including (AP, AFP and UP) had quoted Lord Brockway as saying that the North Vietnamese ambassador in Moscow told him that "Hanoi has never said that all U.S. forces must be withdrawn before negotiations for a cease-fire or peace begin. They did not insist on this." Lord Brockway also said the DRV ambassador told him Hanoi was prepared to make one concession beyond the Geneva Agreements ie South Vietnam should have temporarily a separate government, a democratic, national coalition, both politically and militarily neutral.)

"...According to a VNA correspondent in Moscow, the spokesman of the DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union has issued the following statement:

"On 19 August 1965 Nguyen Van Kinh, DRV ambassador to the Soviet Union, received Brockway, chairman of the British Committee for Peace in Vietnam, at the latter's own request.

4 POINTS "The spokesman of the DRV Embassy in the Soviet Union recalls that at this meeting Ambassador Nguyen Van Kinh explained to Brockway that the four-point stand of the DRV Government as expounded by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April 1965 is the basis for all soundest political solutions to the Vietnam question. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

"All the reports released by a number of Western agencies which do not conform to these explanations are without foundation and intended to distort the truth."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY MEMORANDUM OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1965

(The DRV Foreign Ministry Memorandum broadcast in English by Hanoi VNA September 23, 1965 states that the DRV's four points are the "sole correct basis" for a settlement. Following are excerpts from the Memorandum.)

US MOVES "...Since 7 April 1965 the U.S. authorities have on repeated occasions professed readiness to engage in 'unconditional discussions' and made proposals for a 'cease-fire,' a 'suspension of the bombing of the north.' But it is in this very period that U.S. President Johnson has decided to send in 50,000 more U.S. combat troops, raising the U.S. strength in South Vietnam to nearly 130,000; and a further dispatch has also been announced."

"Along with the introduction of various types of modern weapons' into the South Vietnam battlefield, the U.S. authorities have used B-52 strategic bombers and toxic gas to massacre the people and raze villages in South Vietnam. They have unceasingly 'escalated' the air war of destruction against the DRV. U.S. aircraft have bombed even schools, hospitals, dams, and densely populated areas, massacring civilians and disrupting the peaceful labor of the people in North Vietnam."

"The above facts show that the U.S. Government talks peace to cover up its war designs, and each time it speaks of 'peace negotiation' it takes a further step in intensifying the war of aggression in South Vietnam and in 'escalating' the war in North Vietnam. Faced with ever stronger protests from the peoples of the world, including the American people, it has been compelled to resort to hypocritical talks about 'peace negotiations' with a view to deceiving and appeasing peace-and justice-loving public opinion."

"The 'unconditional discussions' proposal of the U.S. authorities is but an attempt to compel the Vietnamese people to accept their own terms."

FRONT "These are: U.S. troops will not withdraw, but will cling on to South Vietnam; the United States always regards South Vietnam as a separate nation, that is to say, it wants the partition of Vietnam to be prolonged indefinitely; it does not recognize the NFLSV, the sole,

genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its scheme is to try to achieve at the conference table what it has been unable to gain on the battlefield. The Vietnamese people will never accept such insolent conditions."

US MOVES

"The 'cease-fire' trick of the U.S. authorities is designed in fact to compel the Vietnamese people in both zones to lay down their arms while U.S. troops continue to be reinforced, to occupy and commit aggression against Vietnam. This is also an attempt to play for time to consolidate the puppet administration and army, to increase forces for further expansion of the war in Vietnam. But the Vietnamese people will never slacken their fight so long as U.S. troops still occupy Vietnamese territory and so long as their sacred national rights--independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity--are not achieved and guaranteed. Let the United States stop its aggressive war against Vietnam and withdraw from South Vietnam and peace will be immediately restored...."

"What is more, they brazenly arrogate to themselves the right of bombing the DRV, an independent and sovereign country. They have seriously violated the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, grossly trampled underfoot international law, and committed monstrous crimes against the Vietnamese people. Now they are saying that they 'will cease bombing the north' if there is some 'response' from Hanoi."

"The DRV Government solemnly declares that the U.S. authorities must stop their criminal war acts against the DRV. They have no right to impose any condition on the DRV Government. Besides, they must end the war of aggression in South Vietnam...."

FRONT

"The NFLSV, the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, has gained sympathy, support, and recognition from ever broader sections of the world's peoples. Yet the U.S. Government refuses to recognize it as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. It has declared that it does not regard the front as an independent party in negotiations. This further exposes its talks about negotiations as a mere swindle. There cannot be any negotiations on the South Vietnam problem without the NFLSV having its decisive say."

UN

"The U.S. authorities are also feverishly trying by every means to secure a U.N. intervention in Vietnam. They have 'requested help from the United Nations membership at large in getting peace talks started.' This is a maneuver to use the United Nations to impose on the Vietnamese people negotiations under U.S. terms."

GENEVA

"The DRV Government has on repeated occasions declared that internationally speaking the consideration of the U.S. Government's war acts against the DRV and the U.S. war of aggression in South Vietnam falls within the competence of the participants in the 1954

UN Geneva conference on Indochina, and not of the United Nations. Any U.N. resolution in furtherance of the above U.S. scheme will be null and void and will completely discredit the United Nations...."

"They have striven to entice political circles in a number of countries to respond to their proposals and to come out with demands for 'negotiations,' for 'a cessation of all hostile activities,' and for 'concessions' from both sides, but to equate the victim with the aggressor is to fall into the U.S. imperialists' trap and to negate all elementary principles of freedom and justice. Therefore the U.S. scheme can by no means deceive peace- and freedom-loving people in the world."

FOUR
POINTS

"The lofty aims of the Vietnamese people's just struggle have been fully embodied in the four-point stand of the DRV Government."

GENEVA

"This stand proceeds from the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements, which recognize the national rights of the Vietnamese people--independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity--and from the essential military clauses of the said agreements."

"The 1954 Geneva agreements are an international legal document which all participants must respect and correctly implement. At the 1954 Geneva conference the U.S. Government, through its delegate, recognized and pledged respect for them. Yet throughout the past 11 years it has systematically violated them and has thus brought about a serious situation in Vietnam."

"The four-point stand of the DRV Government also conforms to the actual situation prevailing in South Vietnam and throughout Vietnam for more than 11 years now--the United States has engaged in aggression against Vietnam and sabotaged peace in Indochina and southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese people have been fighting against the aggressors in defense of their sacred national rights."

"To settle the Vietnam problem it is essential to remove the roots of the serious situation in Vietnam--U.S. aggression. Any approach which puts the aggressor and the victim on the same footing or which does not proceed from the real situation in Vietnam will fail to bring about a settlement of the Vietnam problem."

FRONT

"This stand also proceeds from the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people in both zones, as embodied in the program of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and that of the NFLSV; namely, peace, independence, unity, and democracy."

"The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government earnestly call on the governments and peoples of the world to resolutely struggle and demand that the U.S. Government accept the four-point stand of the DRV Government. The U.S. Government must put an immediate end to the air war against the DRV and completely stop encroaching on the latter's sovereignty and security. It must immediately end the war of aggression in South Vietnam and withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons from there...."

FOUR
POINTS

UN "The four-point stand of the DRV Government is enjoying an ever-warmer sympathy and support from the peace-loving governments and peoples all over the world. It is the sole correct basis for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. Any solutions at variance with it are inappropriate and so are any solutions which seek U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation, because such solutions are fundamentally contrary to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam."

"The U.S. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this four-point stand before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be considered...."

VIETNAM COURIER ARTICLE ON "HOW SHOULD THE MOST CORRECT
SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM BE UNDERSTOOD"

(On September 27 Hanoi's VNA in English, broadcast a "Vietnam Courier" article entitled "How Should the Most Correct Solution to the Vietnam Problem be Understood?" This article was originally published on July 9 in the Vietnamese-language newspaper, Thong Mat (Reunification) as Part III of a four part series called "With any type of war the U.S. imperialists will surely fail and we will surely win." The July 9 edition states that "the DRV Government is of the opinion that the above-mentioned stand (four points) is the basis for a correct political solution. The September 27 article states "the DRV Government is of the view that the stand expounded above (four points) is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. The article has some additions, which are given below, which do not appear in the original July 9 article.)

"...These dictators succeed one another at the beck and call of the State Department and the CIA.

"According to many American congressmen and newspapers, the Saigon Government, which is something completely alien to the South Vietnam people, cannot exist even for a week without American dollars and troops, even in 1958 and 1959 when it was said to enjoy a certain stability. Whom does it claim to represent, especially in such a deteriorating situation as today?...

"If the defense of the North is the bounden duty of our southern compatriots, in return the support given to the South is the sacred duty of our northern people. Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. U.S. imperialism is invading our fatherland. Each Vietnamese is dutybound to fight it and save the country. This is a matter of course and an inviolable right of all people suffering from imperialist aggression..."

"Following the 22 March 1965 NFLSV statement, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front issued a declaration on 27 March and an appeal on 6 April 1965, excerpts of which are as follows: if the U.S. Government is adamant not to implement the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and does not respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and is rash enough to step up its aggressive war in North Vietnam, it will certainly suffer a bitter failure at the hands of over 30 million Vietnamese people.

US MOVES "Such allegations as peace, discussions -- put forth by the imperialists --
 are but deceitful words. The U.S. imperialists have openly unleashed war
 against the DRV. They have torn away the 1954 Geneva Agreements, outrightly
GENEVA violated the independence and sovereignty of our people, seriously threatened
 the peace of Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. The only way out for
 the U.S. imperialists is to put an end to their aggressive war, to withdraw
 all their troops and weapons as well as those of their satellites, to respect

the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of our country as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements...

"If we do not solve the South Vietnam problem on the basis of these fundamental conditions put forth by the people of the two zones of Vietnam and if we accept the U.S. imperialists' unconditional discussions offer, this would be tantamount to coming to the conference table to recognize their aggression and their permanent presence in South Vietnam and negotiate under the pressure of their bombs. If a country faces imperialist aggression and is compelled to sit at the conference table while its enemy persists in his aggression until it accepts his terms, can that country yield to its enemy? Certainly not."

JOINT ASAHI-MAINICHI INTERVIEW WITH
PHAM VAN DONG IN HANOI IN OCTOBER 4, 1965

(The Asahi interview published in Japanese in Tokyo on October 5 and The Mainichi interview published in Japanese on October 5, plus written questions answered by Pham Van Dong for Mainichi published in Tokyo on October 9 are included below. Both articles and the written questions spell out the DRV's position that if the US wants negotiations it must declare clearly that it accepts the four points.)

Asahi Foreign News Editor Weiryu Hata on Interview With Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong:

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POINTS

"Premier Pham Van Dong of the DRV stated in a very strong tone on 4 October that 'The present Vietnam war can never be settled unless the United States accepts the four conditions presented by our side. And without that, there also can be no discussions.'

"During the interview, we asked considerably frank questions, but on each occasion, the Premier smiled calmly, and as if to say that he had been waiting for that question. He explained carefully why North Vietnam is taking the position that it is now taking. He also repeatedly asked us "to understand this point fully and make it known not only to Japanese people but also to American people." The Premier is a quiet gentleman with a reddish face, aged 57. The gist of the questions and answers exchanged between us was as follows:

"Question: The peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war is the most pressing question today. We have come to your country, seeking an opening to settlement. What are your views toward negotiations?

"Answer: Your question touches upon the most important and basic question of the present time. However, as a friend, there is one thing which I wish to ask you first. Do you think that United States is really seeking an armistice and peace?

US
MOVES

(We replied that the United States can probably end the war itself if it tried, but that we think that since the United States has committed itself in various places, it find it difficult to end the war unless it can save face, and in response to this, he replied): No, the United States is definitely not desiring peace. They have no intention at all of ending the war. As a

/matter

matter of fact, are they not expanding war in both the south and the north, while talking about peace? They still believe in power, and they think that if they further increase their forces and strengthen the bombings against the north, they will produce effects. That is very foolish, but it happens to be the truth. That is why we do not trust their peace proposal. In the choice between accepting the Johnson proposal and continuing the war, we chose the course of continuing war without the slightest hesitation.

"Question: The U.S. authorities concerned say, however: 'We wish to settle the problem in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva Agreement. The United States does not have any territorial ambitions toward Vietnam. It does not even wish to set up military bases there. Vietnam should settle its own internal problems without receiving interference from outside.'" If your contention is that their words contain no sincerity, why do you not respond to such discussions, or advocate negotiations from your side? Frankly speaking, why can you not take the initiative in order to eliminate the possibility of the misunderstanding that it is the United States which is proposing unconditional discussions and it is the North Vietnamese side which is insisting on continuing the war?'

4
POINTS

"Answer: We proposed four conditions for the settlement of the present war some time ago. They asked for respect of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 concerning the Vietnam question and sought the correct observance of the basic clauses of this agreement. We proposed at the time that if the United States were to issue a statement to the effect that it accepts the four conditions, we will agree to negotiate at any time. However, the United States refuses to accept these conditions. They have no intention of ending the war. We must expose this fact thoroughly. There is no other way for us to expose this fact to the whole world and shame them except by firmly fighting against their aggression and defeating them completely. We are determined to do so.

"Question: What is your evaluation of the activities of third parties, such as the call for the suspension of the bombings against the north and peace negotiations, advocated by Ghana and other nonaligned nations?

MED-
IATION

"Answer: The United States is proposing peace talks, in which it does not believe, in order to escape criticism from these third parties of good intention and world public opinion which is steadily mounting against it. Through these various methods the United States is trying to test our attitude. Their peace calls are a threat to us, similarly as their war expansion policy.

Question:

"Question: If that is so, there is the method of using the same means against them, seizing this opportunity when the United States is talking about peace.

"Answer: It is not possible to seize this opportunity and move forward toward peace because the US side has no sincerity at all. It is possible to seize this opportunity and expose the true nature of the United States. Of course, we welcome those people who are making various efforts, with good intentions of peace. We are planning to prove to these people by actual deeds how lacking in good intentions the United States is. The way to prove this lies solely in driving the American aggressors to the wall and by pressing them to the last point, or in other words, in continuing the war.

"The Liberation Front in the South and we in the North must fight and win. Until then, the United States will not wake up. The leaders of the United States are fools. Therefore, we must fight more fiercely and win greater victory. Of course, we will have to be prepared to sustain still greater hardships and sacrifices in the future, but we will never give up.

"Question: We understand fully your side's determination. However, we wish to ask you once again whether there is room for third-party nations of Asia to act within this difficult situation. At the same time, in the sense of moving forward even by one step, what will you do if the United States were to agree to suspend bombings against the North?

"Answer: (With a big smile) We and the Liberation Front of the South will make the ultimate provisions for the settlement of the Vietnam question. Of course, third parties can fulfill certain roles, but the final deciders are ourselves and the people of the Liberation Front.

"The most important thing is for the United States to recognize the strength of the Liberation Front. We highly evaluate the Liberation Front's military and political power. It is a very great force, and it is the only force which truly represents the people of South Vietnam. I ask you to study their policy platform very carefully. Their policies are very correct and are exactly suited to the actual situation in the South. It is very foolish of the United States not to recognize this Liberation Front which is the only force which has the ability to settle the Vietnam problem. It must be said that that is why the United States is repeating failures.

Question:

"Question: Can negotiations be realized if the United States recognizes The People's Liberation Front of the South? The United States is saying that it may recognize it as a party to negotiations.

FRONT

"Answer: The best way is for the United States to negotiate first with the Liberation Front. That is only natural, considering that the United States is actually fighting the Liberation Front. The United States is spreading the argument that we of the North are the enemy, but that is only an excuse for expanding the war to the North. It has already been made clear that the question of the South cannot be settled through bombings against the North. The United States should negotiate with the Liberation Front of the South first of all. However, it will be out of the question if it were to take the attitude of negotiating with the Liberation Front as if it were conveying a favor. The primary and decisive party for the United States to deal with is the Liberation Front."

Full Japanese Version of MAINICHI Correspondent Minoru Omori's Report From Hanoi on Interview With DRV Premier Pham Van Dong:

"MAINICHI head office foreign news department editor Omori--This reporter had an interview with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong for one hour and fifteen minutes from 3:00 p.m. on 4 October. The premier, at this interview, clarified a very firm determination of resistance against the United States and made the following points, saying that there is no room for negotiations: To uphold four conditions to the last, no intention of negotiating with the United States under the present situation.

4
POINTS

PAUSE

"The premier made clear the following points: 1) He has no intention at all of negotiating with the United States under the present situation; 2) If the United States wants negotiations, it must accept the four conditions and recognize the NFLSV; 3) The United States temporarily suspended bombings against the north at one time but that was only a pretext for strengthening escalation; 4) His side is using missiles, and in the future, anti-air firepower, from missiles to rifles will be strengthened; 5) He relies on aid from brother socialist countries; 6) The Liberation Army side did not lose in the fighting in Chu Lai; 7) Mediation by third powers will have some effects but final settlement must be made by the parties directly involved in the war; and 8) His side is strengthening close contacts with the South Vietnamese People's Liberation Front.

The interview

"The interview with the premier took place in the reception room of the president's office; it was a joint interview by this reporter and the ASAHI's foreign news department editor Hata. The premier was wearing an old but clean white shirt and well-creased yellow trousers. He has a broad forehead, and his eyes are mild. However, when he talks about the United States, his eyes gleam with the fierce flame of fighting spirit. He was deeply impressive, voicing throughout the interview his fierce determination that the present situation leaves no room for negotiations. The contents of the interview with Premier Pham Van Dong were as follows:

"Omori: Today, in 1965, when the 20th century is nearing its end, it is not reasonable that war is still going on. We can well understand North Vietnam's position, but is there no room for negotiations between the north and the south?

"Premier Pham Van Dong: Your question is a basic question, and I think it also has news value. I will tell you about the possibility of stopping the war. Mr. Omori says that he understands our position, but the most important thing is whether the politicians of the United States have any intention of stopping the war. The United States reinforced its military strength in the south by 100,000 men in a very short period of time. Why did it do so? That is because the United States has been repeating mistakes and failures in the south to date, and has fallen into a bog. The United States will be crushed in the south if it does not send in huge reinforcements. That is why it has brought in a large number of troops.

"However, a very important point is that even if it brings in huge military strength, the situation in the south will not change. The United States and allied satellite forces number 150,000 men, and the puppet troops number 600,000 men. They certainly have great firepower, but it will not change the victory in the liberation army side. The United States is providing a very good target for the people of the south. You know from your own experience of fighting the Americans that they have no spiritual power. Furthermore, the United States is waging a war which is against justice. It is the U.S. soldiers who are at a loss in a battlefield where the topography and climate are unsuited to them. Therefore, the Liberation Army will win without fail. The Liberation Army will secure greater victory than that in the battle of Ban Tsuon (meaning the fighting in Chu Lai--MAINICHI) in the future.

/"Omori:

"Omori: The U.S. side says that it won in Chu Lai, but what is the true situation?

"Premier: The United States claimed a false victory for propaganda purposes. It brought in huge forces, and it has to make propaganda to encourage them and also public opinion within the United States. In fact, the United States suffered a big failure in Chu Lai. The Liberation Army completely destroyed four battalions consisting of 1,000 men. You will find out about this if you go to Saigon and ask American soldiers who actually took part in the battle of Chu Lai. Next, I wish to touch upon questions of politics. The United States sent its expeditionary forces into South Vietnam, and has decided to carry out direct aggression by itself. This proved to the South Vietnamese people that the United States is a robber. All strata of the people, even the puppet military forces, will come to stand up and fight against the U.S. forces. The United States has already lost face. This, too, has brought good results for the Liberation Army side. The people do not yet know the huge size of the military forces the United States has brought into South Vietnam, and in South Vietnam, a sacred war of resistance against the U.S. forces is continuing.

"Meanwhile, the United States is even resorting to atrocious methods. The people's sense of resistance is being fanned by these atrocious methods. The U.S. forces are like an island isolated in a sea of people's hatred, and if they were to take even one step out of the island, they will be destroyed. What can the U.S. forces, isolated on an island, do? This is proved by the history of the war of resistance against France.

"Omori: What the United States really wants is to stop the war. The problem lies in the fact that the United States has made a promise to the South Vietnamese Government and the world, and I think the key to settlement lies in how the United States can save face.

"Premier: All questions focus on that point. The United States has no intention of stopping the war; it is rather strengthening the war. It has sent huge forces into the south and is also preparing escalation toward the north.

"Omori: What do you think of the mediation efforts of the special envoy of Ghanaian President Nkrumah and the 17 neutral nations?

/"Premier:

US
MOVES

"Premier: Unless we see the United States' real sincerity and efforts for settlement, we cannot feel like trusting the United States at the moment, the United States is testing us. While talking about peace, it is threatening us. At the same time, it is laying plots against world public opinion, too. World opinion is fiercely against the United States.

"(In reply to Hata's question asking, "The United States must talk about peace to the world; is it not possible to grasp and utilize this point?) Premier: It is not yet possible to grasp that chance and move forward to peace. We will prove justice to the world with actual deeds and drive the United States to the wall. We intend to fight through fiercely, in both North and South Vietnam, prepared for still greater difficulties and further sacrifices. Therefore, we want you to understand our position. For that purpose, I will explain briefly the important points of the present war situation in the north and the south. The U.S. forces carried out operations to build foothold bases, just as in the case of French General (Tussini--phonetic), but failed. Neither U.S. Ambassador Lodge nor General Lansdale has been able to bring about big political results. Their way is no different from that of Ngo Dinh Diem. The United States definitely cannot win even if it increases its forces in the south.

"Omori: However, there is order in matters, and as it is not possible to settle everything at once at one stroke, what will you do if the United States were to suspend bombing against the north for a long period of time.

US
MOVES

PAUSE

"Premier: The United States' escalation against the north has failed so far. Its greatest failure lies in its having been unable to bring the north to the conference table by threatening its people. World opinion, on the contrary, is starting to demand the suspension of U.S. bombings against the north. Earlier, the United States propagandized that it had suspended bombings against the north for some days. However, we were not able to respond, as the suspension of the bombings were aimed at eliciting our consent to demands which we cannot possibly accept. The temporary suspension was rather a pretext for further escalation. We cannot possibly accept such temporary suspension or such demands. Rather, we are pushing forward preparations to expose

/further

further the United States' plots. We will further strengthen our anti-air power without fail. And, we will prove the unprofitableness of the United States' escalation.

"Omori: Is North Vietnam using missiles for the defense of Hanoi?
Premier: Yes, we used them, exactly as you say. Omori: How many times have you used them? Premier: I do not remember exactly how many times we used them, but our air defense weapons, from missiles to rifles, are effective, and we will strengthen all of them in the future. And, we will effectively increase damage to U.S. planes and pilots. The pilots are all excellent American fliers, but if escalation is further pushed forward, the casualties among them will rise to several thousand.

"Toward Hata's three questions, that is, 1) the people of the north all have rifles today, so does the strengthening of anti-air firepower mentioned by the government mean the increasing of missiles?; 2) Do you intend to attack the other side's take-off (hasshin-kichi) bases for planes, from the North?; and 3) Are you using planes for defense battles? The premier said that he could not reply to question 2, but said as follows in answer to questions 1 and 3: Premier: We will strengthen all kinds of weapons, and in the future, we shall rely on brother socialist nations. We are also using planes.

"Omori: Is the north in contact with the People's Liberation Front in the south? Premier: We are in full contact. Omori: In what way are you maintaining contact? Premier: That, I cannot say. However, what I wish to say is that the Liberation Front has great authority and prestige in the south.

"I hope you will tell the United States this fact. The people now holding political power in the United States are fools. They cannot see this fact. We have been saying that the sole representative government in the south is the Liberation Front side. The United States should know that. Mr. Omori urges negotiations, but as long as the United States does not recognize the People's Liberation Front of the south, there cannot be any negotiations. The Liberation Front side holds the key, both politically and militarily. We highly esteem and respect the People's Liberation Front.

FRONT

"Omori: If the United States were to recognize the People's Liberation Front as a party to negotiations, will it be possible to discuss the problems of the south?

/"Premier:

FRONT

"Premier: That would be most desirable, but that is the problem. Who is fighting the United States in the south? It is the liberation army. And yet, the U.S. side is escalating the war against the north. Does it think that it can negotiate with the north alone and settle the problem? A third party's contribution to settlement is limited.

"Omori: Before coming here, I stopped in Djakarta and discussed with Indonesian President Sukarno about the possibility of seeking a way to settlement by holding a summit conference of the leaders of Asian nations near Vietnam and about the possibility of adopting a declaration for settlement of the issue at an Afro-Asian conference. What do you think of these ideas?

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"Premier: The most important point in regard to the Vietnam question is that all matters must be pushed forward in close liaison with our side and with the People's Liberation Front in the south. It is possible for third parties to make contributions to a certain extent, but the final settlers, or deciders, are ourselves and the Liberation Front of the south.

4
POINTS

"Hata then asked: "The United States says that it respects the Geneva agreement and that it does not have territorial ambitions. It also says that the Vietnam question should be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves. Is it not possible for you to take hold of these statements and propose negotiations on the basis of your four conditions from your side? There are some people even in Japan who think that it is the North Vietnamese side which is rejecting negotiations." To this, the premier replied as follows: Premier: In that regard, we have announced that if the United States issues a statement to the effect that it will recognize the four conditions, we will respond to talks. The United States, however, has no such intention. We are ready to fight as long as necessary. We have faith in the Japanese people's friendship. The United States is attacking Vietnam from bases in Japan; we hope that the good sense of Japan will stand up and see to it that the ground is laid for the maintenance of truly friendly relations in the future when our country becomes united.

Mainichi Questionnaire to Pham Van Dong:

"Minoru Omori, chief foreign news editor of Mainichi, submitted a questionnaire regarding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam dispute to

/North

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, irrespective of the 4 October interview with him. MAINICHI received a cable reply from Pham Van Dong on 8 October. Here follow excerpts from Pham Van Dong's important answers, omitting the same answers made by him in the above interview.

"Question: What do you think about President Johnson's proposals for "unconditional talks" and "peace talks?"

US
MOVES

"Answer: President Johnson began to talk about peace negotiations half a year ago. However, whenever he spoke about peace, he ordered reinforcement of the U.S. forces in South Vietnam and "escalated" the war against North Vietnam. Johnson has been speaking about peace while carrying out the war. His "unconditional talks" would be nothing but the Vietnamese people's acceptance of the U.S.-proposed conditions. In a word, President Johnson's hypocritical appeal for peace is designed to cover up war activities, to cheat the world, and to dodge the protest of the people of the world, including the United States.

"Question: What is your opinion of the neutral Afro-Asian nations' wish for a settlement of the Vietnam war?

4
POINTS

"Answer: The Vietnamese people and the DRV Government heartily appreciate the fact that many Afro-Asian peoples and governments are worried about the Vietnam issue, that they bitterly denounce the U.S. imperialist aggression in our country, and that they support our patriotic fighting from the bottom of their hearts. We believe that the socialist countries and the people of the world, including Asia and Africa, will strengthen their sympathy with us and their support for us to completely smash the U.S. imperialist aggression. The only just way to settle the Vietnam issue is to accept, in line with the 1954 Geneva agreement, the four conditions proposed by the North Vietnamese government and the stand explained in the NFLSV's March statement.

"Question: Concerning the so-called four conditions which you submitted to the DRV Parliament last April, should we understand them as your ultimate conditions? Can we not consider them preconditions for talks?

/Answer:

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POINTS

"Answer: North Vietnam's four conditions are in complete accord with every one of the essential, political, and military provisions in the Geneva accords of 1954. The four conditions alone can be the basis to bring a correct solution to the Vietnam issue. The U.S. Government must declare clearly that it accepts the four conditions. A political solution can be considered after that.

"Question: What will be your country's response if the United States suspends its northern bombing for a due period? Also, do you think the U.S. forces will bomb Hanoi in the near future?

"Answer: The U.S. imperialists are shamelessly 'escalating' the war and bombing North Vietnam. As the result, however, they are meeting an intensified offensive by the South Vietnamese people, as well as huge losses inflicted by the North Vietnamese people. Not being the least daunted, and intensifying their enmity against the U.S. aggressors, all the Vietnamese people are strengthening their determination to fight for national salvation. Availing myself of this occasion, I ask MAINICHI to convey to the Japanese people our deep gratitude for extending warm help to our patriotic anti-U.S. war."

MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 5 JANUARY 1967

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1967

NEW YORK TIMES
JANUARY 1967 P-1
HANOI ENVOY HINTS
END TO BOMBINGS
COULD SPUR TALKS

By RICHARD E. MOONEY
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 5—North Vietnam's chief diplomatic representative in Western Europe said today that if the United States stopped bombing his country, "definitively and unconditionally," the Hanoi Government would "examine and study" American proposals for negotiations to end the war.

He denounced several recent peace initiatives, including the efforts of the United Nations' Secretary General, U Thant, and pointed out that his Government would be more responsive if the bombing stopped. His remarks were interpreted here as possibly, but not certainly, a favorable signal to Washington.

However, he did not meet Washington's requirement that Hanoi give assurances of scaling down its own effort if the bombing stopped.

U. S. Aggression Charged

Rather, he said that the United States "could not hope for reciprocal action of any sort," noting that "the American aggression" was still undeclared war and that Hanoi had insisted on an unconditional cessation of the bombing from the very start.

The remarks came in a luncheon talk to French and foreign correspondents here by Mai Van Bo, who is, in a sense, Hanoi's ambassador here although officially he heads a diplomatic office that is called a "general delegation." Mr. Bo holds the personal rank of minister plenipotentiary.

Communist Support

Everything he said was in response to questions—eight of them. Much of what he said was insistent repetition of his country's charges against Washington and of his countrymen's determination and ability to win the war. His hint of flexibility on peace talks, if it was that, was well padded with combative remarks to the contrary.

French Reds Hear Talks

By coincidence or design there were also speeches here today by a North Vietnamese Communist leader and a leader of the National Liberation front, the political arm of the Vietcong. Both were made at the

French Communist Party congress in suburban Levallois. Neither hinted at flexibility.

Nguyen Van Tran, secretary of the North Vietnamese Workers party and Minister for Heavy Industry in the Hanoi Government, said that United States peace initiatives were a farce.

Dang Quang Minh, representing the National Liberation Front, said that "the possibility of winning militarily has become a living reality for us."

At the press luncheon, Mr. Bo maintained a sober and unemotional expression throughout. He was derisive toward recent peace appeals of Washington's United States delegate, Arthur J. Goldberg, and the British Foreign Secretary, George Brown.

He called Mr. Goldberg's effort "the same old song." Mr. Brown's proposal for immediate talks, he said, "is the English version of the American proposal of unconditional negotiation, designed to placate British public opinion, which demands that its Government break away from the American policy."

In the same response he said of Mr. Thant's efforts that "the Government of the Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam rejects all intervention by the United Nations in the Vietnam affair for the good reason that this intervention would be contrary to the Geneva agreements" of 1954, which ended the French Indochina war. He made no distinction between the United Nations and Mr. Thant.

"Every proposal aimed at promoting a settlement of the Vietnamese problem must conform to the reality of the war," he said. "In other words, the distinction must be made between the American aggressor and the Vietnamese victim, and the responsibility of the American aggressor must be well defined."

On a question about Premier Pham Van Dong's interview in Hanoi yesterday with Harrison E. Salisbury, an assistant managing editor of The New York Times, and particularly on the status of Hanoi's four-point peace program, Mr. Bo refused to comment on the published article, but said the following:

"The United States must first recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,

which is the only authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people, to negotiate with them and settle all the questions of South Vietnam. [Hanoi], for its part, insists that the United States recognize the four-point program as a basis for a settlement of the Vietnamese problem, and to demonstrate its goodwill by stopping the bombing of North Vietnam definitively and without conditions."

In this, Mr. Bo seemed to repeat the Premier's declaration that the four points are a basis for settlement rather than a condition for talks.

Hanoi's four points are: Recognition of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the withdrawal of United States forces from the area pending reunification of Vietnam; respect for the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreement barring foreign forces; settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs by the South Vietnamese in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front and peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the peoples of North and South without foreign interference.

Questioned about the possibility of allowing other Western journalists to visit North Vietnam now, Mr. Bo said that he could not understand their enthusiasm for such a risky assignment, and expressed regret that considerations of safety would not permit his Government to admit as many as it would like to.

Asked whether there were North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, Mr. Bo did not respond directly. He said that "the armed forces of the National Liberation Front [the Vietcong] and the people of South Vietnam are sufficient to hold in check the American expeditionary force," and that the rebels could also "recall to South Vietnam the men who have been regrouped in the north."

In a preface to his answer to one question, Mr. Bo said, "For thousands of years the Vietnamese people have been one nation, one people, speaking the same language."

"While it has sometimes been divided, it has been able to re-establish its national unity each time it has recovered its independence."

Of the bombings, Mr. Bo said that they had failed to undermine morale, disorganize the economy or shake the Government.

"In the light of their ineffectiveness, and the unanimous condemnation of which they are the object," he said, "if the United States comes to halting the bombardment definitively and without conditions, this fact will be examined and studied by the [Hanoi] Government."

"If, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the bombardments, the American Government proposes to enter into contact with the [Hanoi] Government, I believe that this proposal will be examined and studied, too."

Mr. Bo was not asked about and did not volunteer to comment on the Chinese Soviet split as it relates to the war—a favorite theme at the French party's current congress.

Arvid Y. Pelshe, a member of the Politburo of the Soviet party, told the congress today that China's refusal to act jointly with other Communist countries in supporting Vietnam "carries water to the mill of the American imperialists and encourages them to enlarge their aggression."

Mr. Pelshe reported that more than 60 Communist parties had declared that they favor a world Communist conference. But Luigi Longo, the Italian party chief, and the most important foreign Communist at the Congress, said that he preferred "exchanges of opinion" and "multilateral meetings" rather than a world assembly.

JJJ 1

NORTH VIETNAM

30 January 1967

Trinh
FOREIGN MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH BURCHETT

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0150 GMT 28 January 1967--B

(Text) Hanoi, 28 January--Nguyen Day Trinh, DRV foreign minister, has granted an interview to Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett. Questions and answers follow:

Question: Mr. Minister, what in your view are the most significant recent developments in the Vietnam war, and what are the prospects for the immediate future?

Answer: The U.S. imperialists are waging the most barbarous war of aggression against our country, threatening more and more seriously peace in southeast Asia and the world. But they have sustained heavy defeats in South and in North Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam, fighting with great heroism, have foiled all their military plans in spite of the commitments of over 1 million U.S., puppet, and satellite troops. The people of North Vietnam have not been and will never be cowed by the barbarous bombing raids of the U.S. imperialists and have dealt them well-deserved counterblows.

All Vietnamese people are resolutely fighting against the U.S. aggressors to defend their sacred national rights and fulfill their duty to the peoples of the friendly countries now struggling for their independence and freedom. The four-point stand of the DRV Government is a stand of independence and peace, and it is the expression of the fundamental principles and the main provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam. It is the basis for the most correct political solution to the Vietnam problem, a basis which fully meets the deep aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and fully conforms to the spirit of the five-point statement of the NLSV, the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam.

The peoples of the world, including very large sections of the population of the United States itself, more and more strongly support our just stand and demand ever more firmly that the U.S. imperialists stop their war of aggression in Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs themselves.

The U.S. imperialists talk of peace negotiations, but they still show great obduracy. President Johnson recently stated with impudence that he will go on intensifying and expanding the war of aggression in an attempt to cling to the south and to prolong the partition of Vietnam. But however perfidious the maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists may be, the Vietnamese people, united as one man and fearing neither hardships nor sacrifices, are determined to carry on their resistance war to the end to safeguard the independence and freedom of the fatherland, and contribute to the maintenance of peace in southeast Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people will win. The U.S. imperialist aggressors will be defeated.

Question: In the face of documentary evidence and eyewitness reports from foreign witnesses, including American journalists, Washington continues to claim that U.S. aircraft have been striking only at military targets and not at civilian targets in North Vietnam. What are your views on this subject?

Answer: The DRV is an independent and sovereign country and the U.S. imperialists have absolutely no right to violate this independence and sovereignty.

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U.S. bombing of any point of its territory, whether a military or a civilian target, is a blatant act of aggression and an unpardonable crime. It is an undeniable fact that civilian targets in North Vietnam have been attacked. The peoples of the world, including large sections of the American people, are strongly protesting against the U.S. imperialists' savage acts of aggression.

The U.S. imperialists must stop definitively and unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV.

Question: The United States has spoken of the need for dialog or contact between itself and the DRV. Would you comment on this statement?

Answer: The United States has made such statements, but in its deeds it has shown the utmost obduracy and perfidy and continues the escalation, stepping up and expanding the aggressive war. If it really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the DRV. It is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV that there could be talks between the DRV and the United States.

The four-point stand and the correct attitude of the DRV Government enjoy, we are sure, ever stronger approval and support from all peace loving and justice-loving peoples and governments in the world. If the United States refuses to listen to reason, it will further unmask itself as an obdurate aggressor. The Vietnamese people are determined to fight until total victory to defend the north, liberate the south, achieve the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, and contribute to the maintenance of peace in this area and in the world.

MAI VAN BO STATEMENT, 22 FEBRUARY 1967

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1967

NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1967 P1
**Hanoi Offers Anew
To Join U.S. in Talks
If Bombing Is Ended**

By HENRY TANNER
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 22—A spokesman for Hanoi reaffirmed today its offer to enter into talks with the United States if American bombing attacks against North Vietnam were unconditionally and permanently halted.

Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, indicated that his Government's position on this point had not changed in spite of the resumption of American bombing Feb. 14 following a six-day suspension.

Mr. Bo made his statement in a conversation with reporters from The New York Times at the headquarters of the North Vietnamese mission near Montparnasse on the Left Bank of Paris.

Before his statement, there had been widespread speculation for several days that the North Vietnamese position had hardened after the resumption of the bombings

and the failure of the mediation attempted in London by Prime Minister Wilson and the Soviet Premier, Aleksei N. Kosygin.

The principal reason for this speculation was a message from President Ho Chi Minh to Pope Paul VI on Feb. 13 restating Hanoi's four-point demands, including withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

As originally put forward in April 1965 by North Vietnam's Premier, Pham Van Dong, these demands were described as the basis for a peaceful settlement. They called for United States withdrawal from South Vietnam, a prohibition against the stationing of any foreign troops in Vietnam, a settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs in accordance with the political program of the National Liberation Front, and a reunification of North and South Vietnam without foreign interference.

Ho Chi Minh Cites Bombing

President Ho Chi Minh, in his message to the Pope, phrased the demands as follows:

"The U.S. imperialists must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and let the Vietnamese people themselves settle their

own affairs."

Mr. Bo said today that the President's message had referred to the terms of a settlement and not to the process of getting peace talks started. Therefore, he added, it did not constitute a change in the Vietnamese position.

Mr. Bo repeated over and over that the halt of American bombing had to be "permanent and unconditional."

He said the North Vietnamese would not talk "under bombs" or "the threat of bombs." He said that any cessation of bombing that was not clearly labeled "permanent and unconditional" would leave the "threat of bombing" intact and thus would constitute an unacceptable interference with the negotiation.

Asked how a distinction could be made between a temporary and a permanent halt to bombing, he answered that the United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was "permanent and unconditional."

Trinh Interview Recalled

Mr. Bo said that Nguyen Duy Trinh, the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, made an important gesture of goodwill toward the United States in late January when he told Wilfred Burchett, an Australian correspondent, that talks between Washington and Hanoi would be possible if the bombing stopped.

The North Vietnamese representative said that that had constituted a basic change in Hanoi's position. Earlier, he said, his government's stand was that if the United States stopped bombing unconditionally, this new fact would be studied and that, if Washington then proposed to negotiate, this proposal also would be studied.

Mr. Bo charged that the United States Government had responded in "bad faith" to the North Vietnamese "gesture of goodwill."

He asserted that neither President Johnson nor Secretary of State Dean Rusk had ever quoted Mr. Trinh's statement fully or accurately.

This, he added, was proof of bad faith since Hanoi's real position was fully known and understood in Washington.

He repeated several times that the Hanoi Government had made its "gesture" and that it was up to the United States now to make the next move. He said a "concession" of the kind that was made by Mr. Trinh in the Burchett interview remained "valid" only if it was followed up by the other side.

Mr. Bo's remarks indicated that the North Vietnamese would not be moved by President Johnson's demand for a reciprocal move on their part to accompany any United States cessation of bombing.

Mr. Bo, a slightly built man in his late forties or early fifties, was wearing a business suit when he received his visitors in a sitting room that was simply but comfortably furnished.

Deep green upholstered chairs and a sofa were grouped around a low table. Deep-red azalea plants were standing on the table and on a high sideboard. The only decoration on the wall was a portrait of Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. Bo carries the rank of a minister plenipotentiary and is Hanoi's chief representative in Europe.

His mission occupies a modest three-story brick house at 2 Rue le Verrier. Over the entrance is the emblem of North Vietnam, a gold star and a gold cogwheel on a red background.

Mr. Bo, underlining his remarks in turn with easy smiles and emotion-choked scowls, answered questions freely and extemporaneously in perfect French.

He made it clear that this was a "conversation" and not an "interview." He said that for an interview he would have insisted on written questions and would have given written answers. He asked that his remarks be reported fairly and correctly.

Mr. Bo indicated, but did not specifically say, that the four point program of Hanoi was subject to negotiation once United States-North Vietnamese talks had started.

When asked whether the four points constituted absolute terms for a settlement or whether a compromise might be possible, he answered that he could not say what would happen in any talks since no talks were now taking place.

Mr. B. called the four points "the most correct" solution. Asked whether this could be translated into English as "the best" solution, he said "no."

It is "the most correct" solution, he declared, because it would assure the North Vietnamese people the full exercise of their national rights, real independence and lasting peace.

Strong Backing for Front

Mr. Bo was asked about the third of the four points, which calls for the settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam according to the program of the National Liberation Front.

He said that the North Vietnamese Government regarded the National Liberation Front as the only "authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people.

He said the program of the front was to give South Vietnam independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. He added that Hanoi supported this program and regarded all the problems of South Vietnam as the sole concern of the front.

Therefore, he stated, there could be peace only if the United States settled South Vietnamese problems with the front.

Mr. Bo denounced in strong emotional terms the continuation of United States bombing.

He charged that the United States government was committing "crimes" in Vietnam — "crimes which are worse than those of Hitler." He said "millions" of Vietnamese suffered

Mr. Bo asserted that the origin of the war lay in the American decision to support the "phantom government" of the late President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and to bring in an expeditionary force of more than 400,000 men to wage what he described as a colonial war.

He said the American people had to be told about the "war crimes" committed by their Government.

Mr. Bo's voice choked when he said:

"One must demand that the American Government stop the war against an entire people whose only crime is to refuse

to accept American law.

"That's what the war is about — Vietnamese independence. All the rest is propaganda, lies turned out by a propaganda machine."

Mr. Bo made a distinction between the American people and leaders of the American Government. He said the people "like all peoples," wanted peace and that the North Vietnamese knew this.

He said the spirit of American officials was illustrated recently by a statement by Gen. Curtis LeMay former Air Force chief of staff.

Mr. Bo charged that the general had advocated saturation bombing of the North and had declared that, even if two bricks remained untouched it was too much.

The North Vietnamese representative said this was the language of "the cannibals of the 20th century." He added that he could not believe that the general, though retired, did not reflect the state of mind of official Washington.

Criticism by LeMay Recalled

General LeMay has frequently called for stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam.

In an article for U.S. News and World Report last October, he denounced the United States strategy in Vietnam as the "ultimate in military blindness" and said:

"The only way to win a war is to escalate it one way or another above what the enemy can take."

Last month he said in an interview with The Associated Press:

"It is not our aim to invade North Vietnam or destroy North Vietnam. What we want to do is stop them from carrying out their aggression."

N O R T H V I E T N A M

1 September 1967

HANOI MEETINGS HELD TO MARK NATIONAL DAY

Pham Van Dong Speech

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1506 GMT 31 Aug 67 B

[Text] Hanoi--The 22d anniversary of the founding of the DRV has just been celebrated at a grand meeting in Hanoi.

President Ho Chi Minh was present on the Presidium.

Among those on the Presidium were Vice President Ton Duc Thang; Le Duan, first secretary of the VWP Central Committee; Truong Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the VWP Central Committee and chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee; Premier Pham Van Dong, member of the political bureau; and Vice Premier General Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Bureau and commander in chief of the Vietnam People's Army.

Nguyen Van Tien, head of the permanent NFLSV representation in the DRV was present. Members of the diplomatic corps in Hanoi and foreign guests now visiting Vietnam also attended the celebration.

After the opening speech by Chairman Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong delivered an important speech in which he reviewed the situation in Vietnam expounded the just stand of the Vietnamese people, and reiterated their determination to march forward still more vigorously in order to win final victory over the U.S. aggressors.

Premier Pham Van Dong recalled the brilliant victories won by the armed forces and people in both the north and the south in their fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, as well as in economy, culture, and other fields. He stressed that all this had driven the U.S. imperialist aggressors into a serious impasse and isolation in the United States and in the world. He particularly pointed to the growing indignation among the American people of all strata over the U.S. ruling circle's policy in Vietnam and expressed the Vietnamese people's firm support for the just struggle of black people in the United States for freedom and equality.

Premier Pham Van Dong vehemently denounced the U.S. imperialists, who, although suffering heavy defeats, are still obdurately intensifying their war of aggression in South Vietnam, escalating their war of destruction against North Vietnam, and, at the same time, staging an election farce in South Vietnam in the hope of dolling up their puppets and making fallacious allegations about peace negotiations in an attempt to mislead world public opinion.

Recalling the stand of the Vietnamese people regarding a political settlement of the Vietnam problem and the question of negotiations, Premier Pham Van Dong said:

On these questions, the stand, viewpoint and attitude of the Vietnamese people, the DRV government, and the NFLSV are very clear and correct. On our government's four-point stand: This stand is the basis for a correct political solution to the Vietnam people.

1 September 1967

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In the very days when the United States expanded the war from the south to the north, brazenly carrying out air attacks against the DRV, our government proclaimed its four-point stand and the NFLSV issued its five-point statement. That is the standpoint of our people's inalienable national rights, and an expression of the main military and political provisions of the Geneva agreements. That is our people's fighting stand against the U.S. war of aggression.

Along with our military and political victories and, at the same tempo, the strength and justness of this stand have become ever clearer, and have won ever more resolute and vigorous approval and support from the world's peoples, world opinion, and progressive American opinion.

On its side, the U.S. Government has so far completely failed to propose any solution to the Vietnam problem. All it has been doing is quibbling and resorting to hypocritical talk, putting forward now 14, now 7 points, with the sole purpose of camouflaging its aggressive design to cling to South Vietnam at all costs and to prolong the partition of our country.

On the 28 January 1967 statement of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs: We know quite well that the United States does not want to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam problem, because imperialism is aggressive and warlike by nature. All it wants is war and it is stepping up its aggressive war. To make it possible for everybody and for world opinion to see clearer through the U.S. peace negotiation hoax, and, at the same time, to show our good will, our foreign minister issued his statement of 8 January 1967.

The U.S. Government has brazenly unleashed a criminal war against the DRV, an independent and sovereign state, a socialist state. It must therefore definitively and unconditionally stop its bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, and respect its independence, sovereignty, and territory. That is a legitimate demand of the Vietnamese people, and also an elementary requirement of international law. If the American side really wants to talk it must first of all stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV.

The United States has no right to demand any reciprocity whatsoever. Yet it is asking for mutual deescalation, and to back this piratical claim, each time it clamors about peace negotiations, it steps up its aggressive war in the south and its escalation against the north. By so doing, the U.S. ruling circles hope, through bombing, and under their conditions, to force us to the conference table. With regard to the world's peoples, including the American people, they hope to confuse white and black, and blur the line between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

Our people deeply love peace, but this must be real peace closely linked to independence and freedom, not the kind of American peace under the iron heels of the aggressors. So long as the United States pursues its aggression, we will continue to fight. As the NFLSV has said in its statement, our southern compatriots will resolutely fight on until not a single American aggressor is left on their beloved soil. Our people will never submit to force and will never talk under the threat of bombs.

1 September 1967

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Our people are making every effort to step up the military and political fight on the battlefield, and, at the same time, the struggle on the international front. They have unceasingly developed their initiative and offensive position and exposed the true features of the perfidious U.S. aggressors.

The U.S. government has provoked the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease its aggression; that is the only way to peace in Vietnam. The U.S. Government must definitively and conditionally stop the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam, recognize the NFLSV, and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs. There is no other way!

Premier Pham Van Dong pointed out: Our people's great resistance war against the U.S. aggression and for national salvation is a concentrated expression standing on the frontline of the revolutionary struggle of the working people and the oppressed nations in the world against the U.S. imperialists and for peace, national independence democracy, and social progress. Our victories are also victories of the revolutionary forces in the world. Other peoples fully understand this fact, which is why the support movement for our people is gaining in strength, scope and depth. As a matter of fact, a world people's front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors has gradually taken shape. The more our patriotic war drives the United States into the impasse and records great victories, the mightier, the deeper, and the broader the world people's movement in support of us grows, taking on diverse forms.

On the 22d celebration of National day, our people extend cordial greetings and heartfelt thanks to the fraternal socialist countries which are granting to them wholehearted support and assistance in all fields--moral and material, political, military, and economic. We warmly hail the fraternal Soviet people who are recording great achievements in building the material and technical basis of communism. This year, we warmly celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution which ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, strongly inspired the working class and the oppressed nations, and showed them the way to make revolution, to wipe out, step by step, imperialism and the other reactionary forces, and to win victory for socialism on a world-wide scale. We are unswervingly following the path of the October Revolution, the path of the Great Lenin, as we have been doing since the founding of our party. We are doing our utmost to bring into play the revolutionary ardor of the masses and to overcome all difficulties, determined to win victories in our revolutionary cause and, in the immediate future, to win victory in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and, at the same time, make our worthy contribution to the revolutionary cause of the world's peoples.

We warmly hail the fraternal Chinese people who are successfully building socialism. In our present struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, the great Chinese People's Republic is our great rear and the Chinese people are brothers, as close to us as the lips and the teeth. The resist the United States and aid Vietnam movement of the several hundred million-strong Chinese people, a broad, deep, powerful and diversified movement, is a brilliant manifestation of the militant solidarity between the two peoples.

1 September 1967

NORTH VIETNAM

China's successful test of its hydrogen bomb and nuclear warhead missiles is a positive contribution to strengthening the socialist countries, vigorously stimulates the peoples who are struggling for national independence, and is a great encouragement to our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

True to Marxism-Leninism, our party and people have always been strengthening solidarity with the fraternal socialist countries and the international communist and workers movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

On the 22d celebration of National Day, our people extend cordial greetings and sincere thanks to the fraternal Khmer and Laotian peoples who have always been standing on our side in a spirit of mutual approval and support in the struggle against the common enemy, U.S. imperialism, to defend national rights. We deeply rejoice at the happy development of the militant solidarity between our people and the Khmer people as shown by the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between the two countries and by our country's statement to recognize and respect the present frontiers of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Our people resolutely and unreservedly support the people of Arab countries who continue to carry aloft the banner of struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Israeli reactionary forces, in defense of their national independence and territorial integrity.

On the 22d celebration of National Day, our people extend cordial greetings and sincere thanks to the international working class, the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, and the peace-loving peoples throughout the world, including the American people, who are actively supporting our resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

We are very glad to note that the movement of support for our people is being more and more closely combined with the struggle of the working people and oppressed nations in the world for independence, freedom and their vital interests and against the U.S. imperialists' policy of intervention and aggression in various countries. We highly appreciate the success of the first session of the Bertrand Russell International Tribunal to judge the U.S. imperialist aggressors and expose their odious crimes in the south and in the north of our country: crimes of aggression, crimes of war, and crimes against mankind. The Bertrand Russell International Tribunal clearly shows that the broad sections of world opinion and the conscience of progressive mankind are on our side.

Pham Van Dong said: More than ever our compatriots and fighters all over the country nurture deep hatred for the landgrabbers, resolutely turn their hatred into strength and determination to fight and to win, give play to their initiative and offensive position on all fronts--military, political, and international--and strike even harder and more accurately at the U.S. aggressors. On the occasion of the current National Day, all our people further arm themselves with the rock-like will of President Ho as expressed in his 17 July 1966 appeal: We are determined to fight until total victory, to perseveringly fight a protracted war, fearing no difficulties, hardships and sacrifices. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom! Once victory is won, our people will rebuild our country and provide it with bigger and more beautiful constructions!

1 September 1967

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This splendid victory day is awaiting us. Compatriots and fighters, march forward with the mettle of victors, with the determination to defend the north, liberate the south, proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland, build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and powerful Vietnam, thus contributing to the defense of peace in southeast Asia and in the world. The U.S. imperialist aggressors will surely be defeated! Our people will be victorious!

3. NFLSV POSITION STATEMENTS

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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NFLSV PROGRAM ENUNCIATING MAJOR AIMS,
MADE PUBLIC IN FEBRUARY, 1961

(The ten-point program of the NFLSV was radioteletyped by VNA in English to Europe and Asia on February 11, 1961. VNA stated that the program of the "newly founded" NFLSV had "recently" been released by LNA (Liberation News Agency), the official organ of the NFLSV. Listing of the ten points is prefaced by mention of the struggle of the South Vietnamese people against Japanese and French domination, and the crimes perpetrated by the cruel and dictatorial United States-Diem rule.)

"...The NFLSV undertakes to unite people of all walks of life, all social classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious communities, and patriotic personages in South Vietnam, without distinction of their political tendencies, in order to struggle and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, and realize independence, democracy, life improvement, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

FRONT

"The program of the NFLSV includes the following 10 points:

"1--To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic coalition administration.

"The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the U.S. imperialists political lines. This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad national democratic coalition administration formed to include representatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people's economic, political, social, and cultural interests; to realize independence and democracy; to improve the people's living conditions; and to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"2--To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy.

"To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and to elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage.

"To promulgate all democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association of movement...(ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to the patriotic political parties and mass organizations, irrespective of political tendencies.

"To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration camps under any form whatsoever, abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws; and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had to flee abroad due to the U.S.-Dien regime....

"To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the U.S. imperialists and the ruling clique, their stooges....

"To help northern compatriots who had been forced or enticed by the reactionaries to go south after the restoration of peace to return to their native places if they so desire...

"5--To build a national and democratic education and culture....

"6--To build an army to defend the motherland and the people.

"To build a national army defending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the system of U.S. military advisers...

"To abolish all the military bases of foreign countries in South Vietnam.

"7--To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities...; to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and overseas Vietnamese.

"To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; to set up, within the framework of the great family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous regions areas inhabited by minority peoples;...to abolish the U.S.-Dien clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities...

"To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals abroad.

"8--To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

"To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by the U.S. henchmen which violate national sovereignty.

"To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the Bandung conference.

"To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia and Laos.

"To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming a military alliance with any country.

"To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist Vietnam without conditions attached.

"9--To establish normal relations between North and South Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.

"The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country by peaceful means. The NFLSV undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; to carry out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones; and to insure for people of both zones freedom of movement, of livelihood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence.

"10--To oppose aggressive war and actively defend world peace.

"To oppose aggressive wars and all forms of enslavement by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation struggles of peoples in various countries.

"To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

"To support the movements for peace, democracy, and social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world...."

STATEMENT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF NFLSV, MARCH 22, 1965,
PROCLAIMING THE NFLSV'S FIVE POINTS CONCERNING THE WAR
IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS SETTLEMENT

(According to a Liberation Radio broadcast of March 23, 1965, in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, the NFLSV Central Committee held an important press conference to proclaim the NFLSV's five-point statement concerning the escalation of the war. The lengthy statement contains only a small paragraph on negotiations. It states "at present all negotiations are useless as long as:

- a. The U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons and means of war of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military bases in South Vietnam; 1/
- b. "As long as the sacred rights of the South Vietnamese people--rights to independence and democracy--are still sold by the Vietnamese traitors to the U.S. imperialists;
- c. "As long as the NFLSV--true and only representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people--does not have the decisive voice.")

FRONT

"...At the press conference, Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho proclaimed an important five-point statement condemning the systematic war-seeking and aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam and enunciating the heroic South Vietnamese people's unchanged standpoint which is resolutely to kick out the U.S. imperialists

/in order

1/ We understand that the correct Vietnamese translation of this point states that negotiations are useless as long as the U.S. imperialists have not yet withdrawn all the troops, etc.

in order to liberate the south, build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam, and achieve national unification. Here is the NFLSV statement about the intensification and enlargement by the U.S. imperialists of their aggressive war in South Vietnam:

GENEVA

"...Faced with the present and extremely grave situation, the NFLSV deems it necessary to solemnly proclaim once more its unchanged stand of struggling against the Americans to save the country. The U.S. imperialists are saboteurs of the Geneva Accords, extremely rude and cruel aggressors and warmongers, and deadly enemies of the Vietnamese people.

US MOVES

"...The Vietnamese people are well aware of the value of those accords. The Vietnamese people have always and correctly applied those accords and resolutely struggled so that those accords would be implemented in accordance with the spirit and letter of this international document which has all the characteristics of legality. On the other hand, U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in South Vietnam have gradually and in an increasingly brazen manner trampled on the Geneva Accords and (word indistinct) destroying those accords by openly waging an atrocious war in South Vietnam over the past 11 years with a view to enslaving and oppressing the South Vietnamese people, turning South Vietnam into one of their colonies and military bases, and partitioning Vietnamese territory forever.

"...Naturally the criminal actions of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys aroused hatred throughout Vietnam and gave rise to a wave of boiling anger throughout the world. Public opinion in Vietnam, public opinion in Asia, and the impartial public opinion the world over severely condemned and energetically protested against the cruel actions of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and loudly demanded that they put an end to their war-seeking and aggressive actions against the

/South

South Vietnamese people and that they correctly implement the 1954 Geneva Accords. But all this fell on deaf ears. The U.S. imperialists continued to trample on justice and to rush ahead with their piratical war in South Vietnam.

"^{2/} The heroic South Vietnamese people are determined to kick out the U.S. imperialists in order to liberate South Vietnam; build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam; and advance toward national unification.

" The South Vietnamese people are fond of peace, but the South Vietnamese people cannot stand idle and let the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys freely trample on the country and dominate the nation. They prefer death to bondage. The 14 million people have risen in one bloc and struggled gallantly to defeat the U.S. invaders and the country-sellers, liberate South Vietnam, achieve independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and contribute to maintaining (peace in Indochina?) and southeast Asia.

US MOVES

"...To escape this dangerous situation, the U.S. imperialists are engaging in extremely dangerous adventurous military actions. The fact that they introduced into South Vietnam combat units of their air, naval, and ground forces, additional U.S. weapons, and mercenaries from South Korea and other satellites and used planes to bomb the DRV and the Laotian Kingdom and so forth does not reflect their strength at all. On the contrary, these are the crazy actions of a (hooligan?) who, faced with deadlock, engages in adventurous actions. They cannot threaten anyone. By its nature, the U.S. imperialist scheme of intensifying and enlarging their present aggressive war reflects one of their humiliating defeats. It proves that their 11-year-old colonialist and aggressive policy in South Vietnam and their so-called special war have gone bankrupt.

/"...Since

^{2/} The preceding part was not numbered.

" Since the U.S. imperialists have bogged down and almost died during the special war, they will be completely wiped out in (the regional war?). If they dare to extend the war to North Vietnam, to all of Indochina, and further, they will face more humiliating defeats more quickly. Previously, with empty hands the southern people dealt heavy blows on the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and fulfilled a great and glorious revolutionary task. Now, with their own strength, with the wholehearted support of powerful North Vietnam and the rich and powerful socialist countries, and with the sympathy, support, and encouragement of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries and all peace- and justice-loving peoples the world over, the South Vietnamese people will surely and gloriously triumph over the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys in any regional or special war waged by the latter. Now more than ever before, the South Vietnamese people must firmly hold rifles in hand and struggle to achieve their fundamental goal, which is to kick out the U.S. imperialists and build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam.

US MOVES

" The NFLSV asserts once more that the U.S. scheme of introducing U.S. and satellite air, naval, and ground force units into South Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam and Laos to reduce the combativity of the South Vietnamese people, to stop the aid of the North Vietnamese and world peoples to the just struggle of the South Vietnamese people, and to create a strong position from which they can force the NFLSV and the South Vietnamese people to sell their fatherland to them cheaply through certain negotiations is only an empty dream of men who are crazy politically and adventurous militarily.

" The South Vietnamese people inform the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys: 'You are hooligans. You are stupid. How can you hope to deceive people when each time after hitting the north without warning you repeat again and again that you do not intend to enlarge the war,

/that

that the attacks are retaliatory measures, that the attacks are aimed at bringing about negotiations, and so forth? You are more stupid when you say you want to negotiate from a position of strength. The South Vietnamese people point their fingers in the faces of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and tell them: 'Your only way out is to withdraw from South Vietnam. If you stubbornly pursue the war, you will suffer the greatest and most humiliating defeat you have ever suffered.'

FRONT

"...At present all negotiations are useless as long as the U.S. imperialists do not withdraw all the troops, weapons, and means of war of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy their military bases in South Vietnam; as long as the sacred rights of the South Vietnamese people--rights to independence and democracy--(are still sold?) by the Vietnamese traitors to the U.S. imperialists; and as long as the NFLSV--true and only representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people--does not have the decisive voice. With regard to the South Korean clique and other satellites of the Americans who are planning to introduce mercenaries into South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese people tell them the following: Although you are involved in waging the war, you will never be given your share. You are simply shameful scapegoats for U.S. imperialism. Since nearly 30,000 U.S. generals, field grade officers, and men with nearly half a million lackey troops are being heavily beaten by the army and people in South Vietnam, what can a handful of you do?

"...3. The heroic South Vietnamese people and liberation troops are determined to fulfill their sacred mission which is to chase away the U.S. imperialists to liberate South Vietnam and to defend North Vietnam. Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one, north and south are one. Their affection is as high as a mountain and as deep as the sea. This truth is as sure as the sun rises in the east. Nothing can change it. In their hot and

/deadly

deadly struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, the South Vietnamese people have always received the great and extremely precious assistance of 17 million northern brothers. The northern compatriots are enthusiastically working day and night for the southern part of the country.

" On behalf of the 14 million South Vietnamese people, the NFLSV wishes to extend its full confidence and unchangeable promise to the 17 million northern compatriots. The South Vietnamese people are determined to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists. The heroic South Vietnamese people and liberation troops are determined to fulfill their sacred mission: to chase away the U.S. imperialists, to liberate South Vietnam, to defend the north, and to advance toward the reunification of the country.

"...The NFLSV always relies primarily on its own force and ability, but is ready to continue to receive all assistance, moral and material, including assistance in weapons and war materiel from the socialist countries and nationalist countries, all world organizations and all peace-loving peoples throughout the world. Moreover, the front reserves for itself the right to buy weapons and war materiel from any country and organization ready to sell them to the South Vietnamese people to help them strengthen their defensive potential.

"...All people must be united. All people must be armed and must heroically continue to move forward with the determination to fight to win over the U.S. enemy and the Vietnamese traitors.

"...We are absolutely convinced that we will certainly be victorious. We also pledge to our beloved Vietnam that we are determined to strike strongly, truly strongly; to strike to the last man, to the last breath, to the last drop of blood; and to strike very accurately at the heads of the U.S. enemy and his lackeys. We are determined to liberate the south, protect the north, and reunify the fatherland.

STATEMENT OF NFLSV CENTRAL COMMITTEE SPOKESMAN

ON MAY 12, 1965, REITERATING THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 22, 1965

(Liberation Radio broadcast on May 14, 1965, in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, a May 12, 1965 statement of a NFLSV Central Committee spokesman. The broadcast reiterates the NFLSV's five points. It also comments on recent U.S. actions, including "the economic trick called cooperation for economic development" and the creation of "smokescreens of deceitful peaceful negotiations". The statement stresses the role of the NFLSV as the true master of South Vietnam.)

"The South Vietnamese people, as well as the Cambodian people and other fraternal peoples in southeast Asia and throughout the world, will never forget the past 11 years of misery, shame and suffering caused by the 4 billion dollars of U.S. aid. President Johnson made a great mistake. U.S. dollars cannot corrupt, seduce, or subject the Vietnamese and other Asian peoples. (?We say) to the U.S. imperialists' face that the Asian peoples, with their culture dating back thousands of years, with their traditional respect for justice and disdain for ill-gotten wealth, and with their respect for moral principles and virtues, can never be subjected by violence. Poverty cannot change their hearts and misery cannot soil their purity and honor. You U.S. imperialists are conceited and disdainful, because you are well-off, but you have gained and will gain only insults, shame, and bankruptcy. Your 4 billion dollars cannot purchase (few words indistinct) South Vietnam and cannot purchase peace for the pirates.

"At present, with even 40 billion dollars you can purchase only the souls of a few more scores of country-selling, traitorous Vietnamese such as Ngo Dinh Diem and Phan Huy Quat. Formerly, in order to deceive, the fascist Hitler had to invent something called spiritual values. Today U.S. President Johnson need only wear dollars and guns on his chest in place of a religious medal....

US "At present, it is obvious that because of their heavy military
M defeats and their considerable political isolation, the U.S. imperia-
O lists have resorted to the economic trick called cooperation for deve-
V lopment and the label of false peace while stubbornly intensifying and
E expanding the war of aggression against our country.
S

"What is noteworthy in this trick is the U.S. imperialists' evil effort to create a smokescreen to cover up their colonialist and bellicose nature and their new foolish military actions in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Of course, if the U.S. aggressors carry out aggression by resorting to military means, we the Vietnamese people, will fight; if they carry out aggression by resorting to the label of false peace, we will fight. We will fight until final victory, until not one U.S. aggressor remains on our Vietnamese territory. To carry out their colonialist, aggressive policy, the U.S. imperialists have resorted to numerous cunning stratagems and tricks and (word indistinct) the traditional wicked effort to sow disunion....

"Is the South Vietnamese people's resolute struggle against the aggressive U.S. imperialists to save the country and win back independence and freedom and unjust struggle? Is progressive mankind's spiritual and material assistance to our struggle for national liberation, including weapons and (few words indistinct), an illegal act? Is it incorrect to say that the foreign intervention in many forms that aggravates the Vietnamese situation is none other than the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists against our country? What is the significance of Johnson's unconditional negotiations? Do they mean that our people must lay down their weapons and receive the U.S. bandits in their homes as honored guests?

"At present, the nationalist countries in southeast Asia and Africa constitute a great force unanimously supporting the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle. Therefore, in their attempt to isolate us and reduce their shameful isolation, the U.S. imperialists have not concealed their evil and vile intention of sowing disunion among them and taking advantage of them. But in face of the correct attitude shown by these nationalist countries, Johnson has lost his enthusiasm. It is crystal clear that the U.S. imperialists are very cruel and cunning, especially when they have suffered heavy defeats and are on a desperate path. However, diamond cuts diamond....

CONFIDENTIAL
"As everyone knows, the British government is a cochairman of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam and is responsible (?for implementing) the accords signed at this conference. Yet at present, Prime Minister Wilson continues to assert that his policy is to agree and support the U.S. imperialists' aggressive policy and war in South Vietnam. At present, Prime Minister Wilson is carrying out the duty of a stooge for the U.S. expeditionary troops, while President Johnson is calling for peaceful negotiations.

"Now more than ever, all the U.S. imperialists' deceitful and psychological warfare measures are useless, no matter how cunning and brazen. It cannot be otherwise. Even their most recent measure (?has only aroused) the anger of progressive mankind and millions of honest American people.

CONFIDENTIAL
"For our part, our stand is extremely clear. The NFLSV 22 March statement has fully reflected the unchanged aspirations, stand, and determination of 14 million southern people. It is also the unswerving line of the NFLSV, the only legal and true representative of 14 million southern compatriots:

"1--The U.S. imperialists are the saboteurs of the Geneva accords, the extremely rude aggressors and warmongers, and the deadly enemy of the Vietnamese people.

"2--The people of heroic South Vietnam are resolved to kick the U.S. imperialists out, to liberate South Vietnam, build an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam, and advance toward national unification.

"3--The people and liberation troops of heroic South Vietnam are resolved to fulfill completely their sacred duty, which is to kick the U.S. imperialists out in order to liberate South Vietnam and protect North Vietnam.

"4--The South Vietnamese people are deeply grateful to all the peace-and-peace loving peoples throughout the world for their warm support and declare that they are ready to receive any aid from friends on the five continents, including weapons and other war materiel.

"5--All the united and armed people are rising up heroically in order resolutely to defeat the U.S. bandits and their lackeys. In the name of 14 million South Vietnamese people, the NFLSV solemnly declared in its five-point statement that "the South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are resolved not to abandon their weapons as long as their basic objectives--independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality---are not achieved."

"The South Vietnamese people are resolved to continue dealing heavy blows to the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in order to achieve final victory. All negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at the present time are entirely meaningless unless the U.S. imperialists withdraw all troops and war materiel and weapons of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and destroy all their military bases in South Vietnam, unless the Vietnamese traitors stop sacrificing the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence and democracy and unless the NFLSV--the only true representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people--has the right to express their decisive voice.

"Through the U.S. president's 7 April speech, and (several words, indistinct) one can see that the U.S. imperialists are extremely frightened by the brilliant image of the NFLSV, the single and genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people and the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's struggle for self-liberation, against the U.S. imperialists' warlike and aggressive policy and against the oppression of the lackeys and traitors to the fatherland. The NFLSV is the image of the solidarity and unity of all patriotic and democratic forces in South Vietnam. The NFLSV is now the true master of South Vietnam and controls four-fifths of the territory and 10 million people. With its liberated armed forces and paramilitary forces, the NFLSV is the victor which is smashing the strength of the U.S. imperialist and colonialist aggressors.

"Everyone knows that (few words indistinct) the USSR, China, and the socialist countries have been actively supporting the South Vietnamese people in their struggle for self-liberation. It is thus clear that the South Vietnam revolution has been organized and led by the NFLSV. This truth is as shining as the sun. The U.S. imperialists, the most stubborn people, can no longer deny that the South Vietnam problem cannot be solved without the NFLSV and without the NFLSV platform as a decisive element in view of the present balance of forces in South Vietnam.

"In Vietnam, in Asia and the world, where will the U.S. imperialists go if they stubbornly continue to intensify the war in South Vietnam and to strike North Vietnam? It is clear that in the present situation in our country, President Johnson can only choose and is obliged to choose one of these two decisions: either to prolong and expand the aggressive war in our country or to follow the way out reserved for the U.S. imperialists, that is, to quit South Vietnam as soon as possible.

"As for the South Vietnamese, and the rest of the Vietnamese people, they will continue the resistance for five or ten years more. In reality we will have to lose only (word indistinct) final victory will certainly be ours. The South Vietnamese and Vietnamese people have sworn that they prefer death to bondage, and they are determined to fight until final victory, and to exterminate the U.S. bandits to the last man in their country, no matter what sacrifice they have to endure....

"In the struggle against 14 million South Vietnamese people, you are unable to win and are, on the contrary, being bitterly defeated, and now you are planning to (?fight) all 31 million Vietnamese people. It is true that you want to rush to death, unless you are great impostors (few words indistinct) the people of North and South Vietnam have answered and are answering you (few words indistinct) all the people are prepared and (passage indistinct) 700 million peoples of the brotherly countries, with their fraternal close friendship are also ready to cooperate closely with the Vietnamese people in resolutely exterminating the U.S. aggressors to the last man if they venture to expand the war to North Vietnam and Indochina and encroach on China.

FRONT "At present, it is clear that it would be wise for U.S. officials to withdraw all troops of the United States and its satellites and weapons and war material from South Vietnam and let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs--in accordance with the NFLSV platform--and stop their aggression against North Vietnam. This is the only way out which (few words indistinct)."

NFLSV CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF JUNE 12, 1965
ASSAILING U.S. AGGRESSION

(Liberation Radio released on June 14, 1965, a NFLSV Central Committee statement of June 12, 1965 aimed at "the U.S. imperialists' new adventurous acts and deceitful tricks" of escalating the war in South Vietnam. It also reiterates the NFLSV's five points of March 22.)

US MOVES

"...During the past few months, faced with heavy defeats, the Johnson government has openly and directly carried on the plan to intensify and enlarge the U.S. aggressive war in our country. Its attitude and acts have been those of a group of 100 percent colonialists. Regardless of public opinion and international law, the U.S. administration has ordered units of U.S. combat expeditionary troops and troops from satellite countries sent to South Vietnam with an unprecedentedly great quantity of weapons and war material....

"Faced with these concrete actions, can one say anything except that the U.S. authorities are crazily enlarging their despicable aggressive war in Vietnam? Is it possible to believe that these actions are the manifestations of President Johnson's genuine desire for peace and of the U.S. authorities' determination to respect and protect the 1954 Geneva accords on Vietnam? A normal man -- one who is not crazy and who is not an accomplice of the U.S. bandits -- must conclude that the actions of the U.S. imperialists are the rudest possible aggressive and warlike actions....

"Thus, while intensifying and enlarging their aggressive war, they set forth deceitful peace proposals. Recently U.S. President Johnson, with one hand, raised high his command baton -- thus giving the signal for U.S. officers, soldiers, planes, and warships to come to South Vietnam in large numbers -- and with the other hand, held high the ragged faked peace banner. In a series of speeches aimed at explaining U.S. policy, Johnson concentrated the most deceitful arguments; especially in the speech delivered in Baltimore on 7 April.

"Concerning so-called unconditional discussions, Johnson contradicted himself in trying to explain the content of his policy: He said that the Americans would stay in South Vietnam at any cost and that the Americans are preparing for a long and continuous war. This is the same as if Johnson ordered the South Vietnamese people to lay down their weapons and surrender to the Americans in order to have the so-called peace that would be enjoyed in their lifetime only as slaves to the invaders and traitors. The result of the U.S. authorities' trick of unconditional discussions would be that the Americans would continue to occupy and rule South Vietnam and that Vietnam would be partitioned forever.

"Johnson set forth conditions not only for discussions, but also for arriving at discussions. The U.S. authorities continuously shouted that if the Vietnamese refused to hold discussions with them, they would destroy Vietnam on an unprecedented scale. This means that the U.S. administration

gives itself the right to wage aggressive wars and sow destruction at any moment and any place in accordance with its colonialist desires.

"In fact, Johnson's arguments about peace discussions constitute a policy of brazen banditry. That is why the South Vietnamese people are not alone in their hatred of the U.S. bandits and their determination, millions as one, to oblige the latter to pay for their crimes and why the world peoples, including the U.S. people, are also angry at them. (Several words indistinct) the Vietnamese people have estimated their strength and (?clearly realized) the extremely cruel nature of U.S. imperialism, the international gendarme. They are resolved to keep their word -- we prefer to die than to become slaves -- and to fight to vanquish the U.S. bandits.

"Johnson also, in explaining why the Americans are attacked, invented the legend that North Vietnam invades South Vietnam and that China forces the Vietnamese people to struggle against the Americans. Then he invented the tricks of escalation and discontinuation of bombings of North Vietnam, without taking pains to hide his sinister scheme of forcing our country and China to negotiate with the U.S. bandits. It is obvious that those arguments are both deceitful and contradictory -- that the Vietnamese aggress against the Vietnamese and that the Americans are under attack although their country, in which there is not one single liberation soldier, is separated from Vietnam by a whole ocean.

"It is necessary to remind the U.S. authorities that the Vietnamese nation not only has personal experiences in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, but also has survived and prospered by itself for thousands of years before the birth of U.S. capitalism. In fact, it is necessary to stress that the rudely aggressive and warlike policies and acts by the U.S. authorities in our country during the last 11 years, especially during the last few months, have erased for a long time theoretically as well as practically the temporary demarcation line at the 17th parallel which divides Vietnam into two zones -- north and south. Our compatriots in both North and South Vietnam (?deem it) necessary and consider it a sacred duty to pay attention to and settle definitely this problem. It is clear that the U.S. authorities have intentionally fired smoke flares with a view of escaping the court of world public opinion, including that of U.S. public opinion, which is severely denouncing the U.S. imperialists as colonialist aggressors and war criminals in Vietnam. They thought that in so doing they could sow disunity inside the steel solidarity bloc of the Afro-Asian peoples who are actively directing the spearheads of their attacks at the common enemy -- the U.S. imperialists. They were, however, greatly mistaken.

"It is clear that in inventing the legend of aggression against South Vietnam by North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities have intentionally concealed a real fact which has been considered as striking truth. It is the South Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle itself, which has been waged under the banner of the NLFSV the organization that represents them truly. Naturally, all deceitful and threatening actions of the U.S. imperialists are completely ineffective....

FRONT

"The NFLSV sternly warns the U.S. imperialists that if they stubbornly continue to step up and enlarge their aggressive war, 31 million Vietnamese people certainly will not tolerate their crimes; their blood debts should be paid for by blood; and that the U.S. imperialist failure will be extremely lamentable and will happen within a shorter period of time. At present, no cunning ruse of the U.S. imperialists and no reactionary power in the world can ameliorate their deteriorating deadlock situation in South Vietnam....

FRONT

"In view of the fact that the U.S. imperialists are recklessly (?embarking on a new military adventurous step, the NFLSV finds it necessary to assert once again the unchanged adamant stand and determination of 14 million South Vietnamese people, which was clearly stated in the front's five point statement of 22 March. The South Vietnamese people and their armed forces are determined never to lay down arms before achieving their basic goal of independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. The South Vietnamese people are determined to deal thundering blows onto the heads of the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen and will surely achieve final success. At present, all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists are useless if the U.S. imperialists have not yet withdrawn from South Vietnam all the troops and war equipment and means belonging to them and their satellites, if the Vietnamese traitors continue to kneel down and offer the U.S. imperialists the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights concerning independence and democracy, if the NFLSV -- the unique legitimate representative of 14 million South Vietnamese people -- is not allowed to raise its decisive voice, and if the U.S. imperialists still refuse to stop air strikes against the northern part of our country."...

NFLSV RESTATES PEACE CONDITIONS AGAINST MILITARY ESCALATION

(On September 29 Hanoi broadcast in English a statement released on September 25 by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the NFLSV condemning expanded U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations in Vietnam and reiterating the Front's conditions for a settlement of the conflict.)

"...Therefore, the presidium of the NFLSV Central Committee deems it necessary to declare solemnly once again that if the U.S. imperialists refuse to withdraw their troops and dismantle their military bases in South Vietnam but continue to send more troops and build new military bases, refuse to stop all war acts but continue to use B-52's and other aircraft and artillery to carry out wanton bombardments against the South Vietnamese people, if they refuse to stop using chemicals and other lethal gases, refuse to stop their bloody repression of unarmed people's demonstrations and definitively put an end to their public execution or other acts of murder of prisoners of war, political detainees as well as demonstrators, if they do not respect and implement the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam in the spirit of respecting the independence and sovereignty of the South Vietnamese people, and leaving the latter alone to settle their own affairs, if they persist in their stubbornness, there can be no contact nor political solution with them. It is impossible to have conditions leading to a real and guaranteed peace in South Vietnam as long as the South Vietnamese army and people have not yet completely defeated the U.S. aggressors and completely liberated their country...."

RETYPE

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NFLSV SPOKESMAN IN ALGIERS

PARIS AFP in English 1346Z 20 Dec 65 E

(Text) Algiers-A leading member of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, Huynh Van Tam, said here today there is no question of negotiating a peace settlement in South Vietnam as long as it is occupied by the Americans. Huynh Van Tam, who expressed his faith in final victory, said his National Liberation Front now occupies four-fifths of Vietnam, containing 11 million out of 14 million inhabitants.

He said: All negotiation with the Imperialists would be absolutely useless at this time as long as they have not withdrawn all their troops and all their war material and those of their satellites outside South Vietnam.

Referring to recent statements by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Huynh Van Tam warned against fallacious American declarations of peace. All such declarations always had been followed by a new U.S. war effort, he said, he added that Vietnam had known 31 days of peace in 25 years of struggle.

Huynh Van Tam claimed that in one month, between 15 October and 15 November, the National Liberation Front had destroyed more than half the number of planes and more than all the enemy tanks put out of action in the first nine months of the year. He was giving a press conference under the auspices of the Algerian National Liberation Front, during the Algerian-Vietnamese Solidarity Week.

Speaking of French President Charles De Gaulle, he said the NFLSV appreciated the realistic positions he adopted, he added: Our position vis-a-vis France is very clear: We consider President De Gaulle's position on the South Vietnamese problem to be realistic. Here, in Algiers, we have relations with the French Embassy. We do not consider France to be a satellite of the United States.

He said he had never had discussions or official or unofficial meetings with representatives of President Johnson or of U.S. satellite countries. He charged that Britain, though not the British people, (word indistinct) in the forefront of American satellites. It was followed by countries that sent mercenaries to Vietnam or helped the U.S. war effort: these were Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China, and so forth, he said.

20 Dec 1524Z RW/AC

FBIS 43

LIBERATION RADIO ON BOMBING SUSPENSION

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIETNAMESE TO SOUTH VIETNAM AT 2330 GMT ON 10 JANUARY 1966 CARRIES A SIX-MINUTE COMMENTARY ENTITLED "THE MONK'S CLOAK BEARING THE U.S. TRADEMARK CANNOT COVER UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A BRIGAND, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN REVEALED."

THE COMMENTARY SAYS: "THE U.S. AGGRESSIVE CHIEFTAINS HAVE RECENTLY INITIATED THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A SORT OF U.S.-LABELLED MONK'S CLOAK DONNED BY CHIEFTAIN JOHNSON IN AN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' NEW DARK PLOTS AND ACTIONS."

LIBERATION RADIO CONTINUES "AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO USE THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AS A CONDITION FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMPATRIOTS. THE CUNNING U.S. MANEUVER IS TO MAKE US TAKE THE AGGRESSORS FOR THOSE ATTACKED."

"IN INITIATING THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM," THE COMMENTARY CONTINUES, "THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS TO REAP WHAT IT HAS NOT OBTAINED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. FOR THIS REASON, WHILE SHOUTING THAT THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS STRIVEN TO DOUBLE ITS MILITARY EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AS EVERYONE KNOWS, WHILE CARRYING OUT THE SO-CALLED TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD ITS AIRCRAFT INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM."

LIBERATION RADIO CONCLUDES: "THESE FACTS ARE ENOUGH TO SHOW US THAT THE PEACE DOVE OF JOHNSON IS REALLY THE DECEITFUL MANEUVER OF A MEAT-EATING MONK. BECAUSE IT IMPLIES A NEW PLOT TO ESCALATE THE WAR OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS. THE MONK'S CLOAK OF SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT COVER UP THE TRUE NATURE OF A U.S. BRIGAND, WHICH HAS BEEN COMPLETELY EXPOSED."

11 JAN 0815Z AHD/GS

S O U T H V I E T N A M

3 February 1966

NFLSV WILL NOT RECOGNIZE U.N. DECISIONS

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1749 GMT 2 February 1966--B

(Text) Hanoi, 2 February--The NFLSV today declared that the United Nations has no right to decide on problems of the South Vietnamese people and that it will consider all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void. In a statement made by its Central Committee spokesman and released by South Vietnam LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, the NFLSV said:

According to Western reports, on 31 January, right after sending planes to resume the bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. authorities requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council so that they could present a complete report on Vietnam and a resolution which might open the door to negotiations.

This is an arrogant and perfidious move of the U.S. imperialists. By resuming its air raids against North Vietnam, after failing in their peace efforts farce, the U.S. imperialists once again crudely challenged the Vietnamese people and all of peace-loving and justice-loving mankind. Yet, they try to gloss over their unjust act by asking the convening of the U.N. Security Council, attempting to use this organization to spread their fallacious good will for peace, slander the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and distort the just struggle for national salvation of the South Vietnamese people in the service of their schemes and acts of increasing and widening the war.

During the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, to open the way for negotiation, the U.S. imperialists continued to send reconnaissance planes to make repeated encroachments upon the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, sent 13,000 additional U.S. troops to South Vietnam, increased raids and massacres, and committed many new crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

At the same time they used the U.S. Air Force for intensive bombings of the liberated areas of Laos, instigated the Thai and South Vietnamese puppet armies to launch repeated provocative attacks against the border areas of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and made active preparations to increase and expand the war in Indochina.

All the aforesaid acts of the U.S. imperialists have laid bare the essence of the so-called U.S. peace efforts and have been condemned by public opinion all over the world. Decidedly, the U.S. imperialists cannot use the U.N. Security Council to cover up the truth and justify their schemes and acts of aggression in South Vietnam, still less to negate the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and force them into submission.

The NFLSV energetically condemns the U.S. imperialists' bombing of North Vietnam, intensification of the aggressive war in South Vietnam and Laos, and their attacks of provocation and sabotage against Cambodia. The U.S. imperialists must bear full responsibility for all the extremely serious consequences arising from their acts.

The NFLSV resolutely exposes before public opinion the perfidious attempt of the U.S. imperialists to hide under the U.N. banner to intensify their war of aggression in South Vietnam and sabotage the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

3 February 1966

SOUTH VIETNAM

The NFLSV solemnly declares that the United Nations has no right at all to decide problems of the South Vietnamese people. The front will consider all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void and as an act of encroachment on the principles of independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam which were guaranteed by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. imperialists must withdraw all troops and weapons of the U.S. and its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle by themselves their own internal affairs.

Should the U.S. imperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no way be able to avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to.

S O U T H V I E T N A M

21 July 1966

NFLSV PRESIDUM HALLS PRESIDENT HO'S APPEAL

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0500 GMT 20 July 1966--S

(South Vietnam National Liberation Front /NFLSV/ Central Committee Presidium statement, 20 July)

(Text) On 17 July President Ho called on the compatriots and combatants throughout the country to step up resolutely the resistance war against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, to protect the north, to liberate the south, and to advance toward the reunification of the country. President Ho said: For the sake of the fatherland's independence and out of a sense of duty toward the peoples who are struggling against U.S. imperialism, all of our people and combatants are united and of one mind, are not afraid of sacrifices and hardships, and are determined to fight until complete victory.

Also on 17 July, President Ho ordered partial mobilization in the north in order to step up the resistance war. The NFLSV warmly responds to the appeal of President Ho, the leader of all the people, and regards this appeal as a reflection of our people's stand, will, and aspirations. The NFLSV warmly acclaims this new effort of the northern people, in contribution to the sacred anti-U.S. national salvation struggle of the entire people. This is a tremendous encouragement for the southern compatriots on the anti-U.S. frontline. The NFLSV is deeply grateful to our northern compatriots for the unreserved support of the beloved north for South Vietnam.

The entire people and Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam are resolved to devote all of their material and moral strength to fulfilling their duty to the fatherland: Defend the north, liberate the south, and reunify the country. This is a sacred duty and a high honor. The southern combatants and people, who do not spare their blood, are resolved to fulfill that duty at any cost.

The U.S. imperialists are plunging more deeply into the criminal war of aggression in Vietnam. After being defeated in their special war, they have sent U.S. and satellite troops to occupy South Vietnam brazenly and have intensified and escalated the war of destruction against North Vietnam. They have even attacked the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. In South Vietnam, they have occupied many cities and territories of our fatherland, used all kinds of weapons to kill our people, and applied the scorched-earth "burn all, kill all, destroy all" policy. They have killed old as well as young people and men as well as women in both the cities and rural areas. Worse still, they have killed innocent children.

In North Vietnam, they have indiscriminately bombed and strafed hospitals, schools, factories, dikes, and dams in order to sow mourning and destruction, and thereby force our people to submit. In the world, they have professed the will for peace negotiations to fool public opinion and conceal their extremely ruthless, brazen, warmongering, aggressive faces. But, our people are determined not to submit, nor are they letting themselves be fooled by the U.S. imperialists

21 July 1966

SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese people, who have long nurtured a deep hatred for the U.S. aggressors, are resolved not to tolerate them or live with them under the same sky. Rivers may run dry and mountains may wear away, but the oath of determination not to serve as slaves of the aggressors taken years ago still remains fresh in the minds of the South Vietnamese people. As months and years go by, it will become even more resounding.

The South Vietnamese people, together with the people throughout the country, are determined to fight the Americans until complete victory, even though they have to fight for 5, 10, or 20 years, or longer. Like the people throughout the country, the South Vietnamese people ardently cherish peace. To our people, peace means that not a single U.S. aggressor or mercenary remains on Vietnamese soil to provoke war against our people. This is the only way to restore peace. As long as the U.S. imperialists cling to our country, the South Vietnamese will continue to fight them until independence and democracy are achieved and peace is accordingly established.

Responding to President Ho's appeal, the people and the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam are determined to strive to learn from the northern people, to emulate one another in scoring achievements in all fields, and to step up the national salvation resistance war. The southern army and people are determined to march forward urgently to annihilate and whittle down many more forces of the U.S. and puppet army, and in the immediate future to score the greatest victories in all activities during the current rainy season.

The southern army and people are determined to overcome all difficulties and hardships to buildup their forces in all fields, enthusiastically step up the movement to join the liberation army, or offer free labor, or join shock youth teams in order to contribute to the victory. The southern army and people are determined to maintain and expand the liberated areas, to cling to their land and houses, to strive for an increase in production, and to foil the pacification plan of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

The southern urban people are determined to strengthen and broaden unity, build up a strong force, step up the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to achieve national and democratic rights and vital interests, obliterate the oppressive machinery right in the heart of the cities, and be ready to take advantage of opportunities to score great achievements.

Our army and people are victoriously fighting against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and will certainly win complete victory. The resistance war of our armies and people is making big leaps forward. The situation at home and abroad is very favorable for us. Our army and people will certainly defeat the U.S. imperialists, as they once defeated the Japanese fascists and the French colonialists.

Signed: The NFLSV Central Committee Presidium, South Vietnam, 20 July 1966.

SOUTH VIETNAM

22 August 1966

NFLSV ATTACKS PEACE 'FARCE' OF ASA COUNTRIES

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0552 GMT 22 August 1966--B

(Text) Hanoi, 22 August--The spokesman of the Commission for External Relations of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (NFLSV) issued a statement on 19 August strongly condemning the so-called peace initiative of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) countries regarding a solution to the Vietnam problem. The statement, released by the South Vietnam LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, said:

As is known to everybody, each time the U.S. imperialists take a new step in expanding their war of aggression in Indochina, particularly in South Vietnam, they stage a new peace farce in an attempt to mislead public opinion and mitigate the wrath of the Vietnamese people, the people in the United States, and other peace-loving people of the world.

In a few months, the statement went on, the chief war criminals, Johnson, McNamara, and their accomplices, have introduced into South Vietnam some 10,000 additional U.S. troops. They are preparing to increase the number of U.S. troops in this area to 400,000, 500,000, or even more by the end of this year. Besides, they have pushed their war escalation in North Vietnam to a very dangerous degree by bombing several areas in the periphery of Hanoi and Haiphong.

The statement strongly denounced the willful U.S. servants in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia for contributing to the U.S. aggressive war in Vietnam while brutally repressing the movements for genuine independence and peace at home. It pointed out that the Thai ruling circles, who are noisily campaigning for a peace conference of Asian countries, are actually those who have been most zealously serving the aggressive U.S. plans in southeast Asia. They have not only sent Thai navy and air force units to South Vietnam to take part in the U.S. war but also offered all of Thailand to the U.S. imperialists, turning their country into a huge U.S. base of aggression against Vietnam and other countries in Indochina and southeast Asia.

The statement continued: It is thus stark clear that the ASA peace initiative is but another peace farce of the type already staged by the Johnson-Dean Rusk clique aimed at serving the U.S. schemes of war expansion and intensification against the Vietnamese people and other peoples in Asia. The ASA peace proposal calls for settlement of Asian problems by Asians, but in fact it serves the classic U.S. policy of using Asians to fight Asians. That is why several Asian countries have sternly condemned and rejected the proposal.

The statement stressed: The NFLSV once again reaffirms its immovable stand that so long as the U.S. imperialists have not recognized the South Vietnamese people's legal right to independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and national reunification, so long as they have not evacuated all U.S. and satellite troops and weapons from South Vietnam and dismantled all their military bases in this area, so long as they have not recognized the NFLSV as the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and so long as they have not let the South Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves, there will be no genuine peace in South Vietnam and all conferences on the South Vietnam issue will be null and void.

22 August 1966

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After reiterating the South Vietnamese people's determination to carry through to the end their resistance against the U.S. aggression, for national salvation, the statement stressed: Any peace frauds of the U.S. aggressors and their satellites, including the so-called Asian peace conference proposed by Thailand at U.S. instigation, will end in ignominious failure..

'TRI-THIEN' PROVINCES URGED TO FIGHT HARDER

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0500 GMT
19 August 1966--S

(Commentary: "The troops and people of 'Tri-Thien' must strike more strongly, uninterruptedly, and spontaneously")

(Excerpts) Quang Tri and Thua Thien are the two northernmost provinces lying close to the southern side of the temporary border. The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have attempted all ruthless and insidious plots to transform the Tri-Thien provinces into an absolutely safe area for them. Aside from the police, civil guards, and Ranger forces, they have stationed the First Infantry Division of the puppet army in the Tri-Thien area in addition to one armored regiment, four U.S. Marine battalions, and recently, three to five airborne and marine battalions of the puppet army's general reserve which have been regularly deployed in the Tri-Thien theater of war. A network of posts dot the area from Route 1 and Route 9 to inter-provincial roads. Moreover, the U.S. aggressors have built special forces camps commanded directly by the Americans along the Vietnamese-Laotian border.

In conjunction with the military measures, the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys have resorted to bribery and flattery to buy off the people of Tri-Thien, particularly those who live close to the demarcation line. However, the indomitable people of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, bearing in mind the thought of attacking the enemy, have bravely moved ahead to wage political and armed struggles at the same time and are winning greater and greater successes. With ardent patriotism, the people and youth in Hue have risen to face the enemy with forms of struggle ranging from meetings and demonstrations to denounce the enemy's crimes to armed occupation of the Hue broadcasting station, the ransacking of the U.S. information office and the U.S. Consulate, and demonstrations to demand that the Americans go home and that the Thieu-Ky clique be overthrown. From towns and municipalities to rural areas, successive political struggles have erupted to check the bloody hands of the enemy.

The guerrilla warfare which has been vigorously developed in the mountainous areas as well as in the lowlands and coastal region has delivered stunning blows to the enemy's head, flank, and back. The guerrillas have not only surrounded, encroached on the enemy's territory and forced him to withdraw from some posts such as the A Luoi outpost in western Thua Thien, and sniped at and killed dozens of Americans at Phu Bai each month, but have also regularly attacked the wicked self-defense men in the support of our compatriots living in strategic hamlets. The guerrillas and regional troops have also launched successive attacks against Route 9 and against military convoys on the Da Nang-Hue Highway, have destroyed bridges and attacked reinforcements coming to repair the bridges or roads, and have regularly shelled the enemy's military sub-sector.

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FAR EAST

Interview with the VC on Huntley-Brinkley Show -- In a 10-minute film interview made August 27 with NBC's Sander Vanocur and Tran Hanoi Nam, NLF representative in Algiers, the following points were developed:

a. Peace -- According to Tran, real peace can only come to Viet-Nam when the U.S. and its allies withdraw all their troops and dismantle their bases. Until then the South Vietnamese people resolve never to give in.

b. A Ceasefire -- The U.S. talks of peace and negotiations but each time it is preparing to send more reinforcements to escalate the war. At the same time U.S. rulers try to fool world opinion by blaming the Vietnamese people for not negotiating. The U.S. is attempting to change its position of weakness on the battlefield to a position of strength at a conference table. This is a move to cover U.S. weaknesses and to hoodwink U.S. public opinion.

c. Political Aims of the NLF -- To overthrow the disguised colonial government; to form a coalition of all elements in South Vietnamese life and hold general elections; to set up a progressive democracy; this unaligned government would

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establish diplomatic relations with all governments in the spirit of the Bandung Conference, and would accept aid from all countries; it would desire to live in peace with its neighbors.

d. Unification of the two Viet-Nams - The Front stands for gradual unification by discussions and negotiations between the two zones. It would hold elections with this in mind, the same elections spoken of before. Organized general elections are not possible as long as the U.S. does not withdraw its presence. The present election plan is a political bluff and will not be recognized by the Liberation Front.

e. Prisoners - As long as the U.S. does not recognize the Liberation Front, it is not possible to discuss the exchange or release of prisoners.

f. Meetings with U.S. Officials - Leaders of the Front have never met with U.S. officials. We consider any U.S. proposal for meetings now as a cover up for the aggressive plans of President Johnson and his intentions to hoodwink U.S. and world opinion.

g. 1954 Geneva Accords - The essential spirit of the 1954 Geneva agreements recognizes the independence, sovereignty

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and territorial unity of Viet-Nam. While the NLF did not participate in the Accords and is not bound by them, nevertheless the NLF is in agreement with the basic principles of the Geneva Accords because they represent the just aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

h. Postscript - Tran Hanoi Nam added at this point in the interview his thanks to those members of the intelligentsia, workers, students, and religious groups in the U.S. who manifest and have manifested solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

(UNCLASSIFIED) NBC News Huntley-Brinkley Report, 8/31 1945

S O U T H V I E T N A M

14 September 1966

BURCHETT INTERVIEWS NFLSV PRESIDIU HEAD

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 GMT
13 September 1966--S

(Text) On 25 August, Australian journalist Burchett met with lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium, in a place in the liberated area of South Vietnam. During this meeting Australian journalist Burchett interviewed Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho about the development of the war in South Vietnam and about the policies and line of the NFLSV, the only true leader of 14 million South Vietnamese people in the struggle against U.S. aggression. Here are the questions and answers of this interview:

Question: Since the day the Americans started their military buildup in South Vietnam and escalated their air war of destruction to North Vietnam, have the basic combat objectives of the NFLSV been changed?

Answer: Our unchanged combat objectives are: to completely defeat the aggressive war of the U.S. imperialists; to overthrow the Saigon puppet authorities; to set up a wide and democratic national coalition government composed of representatives of the people from all strata, all nationalities, all religions, all political parties, and patriotic personalities; to restore the sacred national rights of the South Vietnamese people; to achieve independence and democracy; to improve the living conditions of the South Vietnamese people; and to achieve peace, neutrality, and national unification.

The intensification and widening of the aggressive war by the U.S. imperialists has demonstrated that our previous assessment of the U.S. imperialists' nature and plans is completely correct. Since nothing is more precious than independence and freedom, we feel it impossible to detach ourselves from these basic combat objectives, no matter how savage the U.S. imperialists' means of war are and no matter how cunning their political tricks are. All the people and armed forces in South Vietnam are determined to fight and fight strongly. Final victory will surely be ours.

Question: Is it true that the introduction of U.S. and satellite troops into South Vietnam has shrunk the liberated areas and reduced their population?

Answer: Nothing is farther from the truth. (?It is true that) in certain areas, at certain times, the U.S. imperialists have occupied a small portion of the liberated areas. But, generally speaking, we have enlarged our areas and liberated an additional million people (?in very) important areas. I must add that although at present almost 4 million of our compatriots still live in disputed areas and areas under temporary control of the enemy, the great majority of these people--including officials, soldiers, and officers of the Saigon puppet authorities--are fed up with the Americans and their lackeys and feel sympathy for and support the front.

Question: A number of people are of the opinion that neither the Americans nor the NFLSV will win militarily in South Vietnam. What do you, Chairman, think of this view?

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Answer: These distorted opinions have usually been set forth by the Washington ruling circles so that they could present themselves in a favorable light by restricting the importance of our victories and making everyone doubt our chances of achieving complete victory. In fact, we have achieved victory after victory in the struggle against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. We have defeated the "special war" strategy and overwhelmed the puppet troops who have been organized, equipped, trained, and commanded by the Americans.

Rushing in to participate directly in combat since mid-1965 by massively introducing their troops in South Vietnam--including the seasoned units of which McNamara has often boasted--the U.S. imperialists have been unable to change the situation. On the contrary, they have suffered ignominious defeats. The fact that the Pentagon is continuing to pour more troops into South Vietnam, raising the total strength to 300,000 men, and is making preparations to send more reinforcement troops is eloquent proof that the South Vietnamese troops and people are winning, have the initiative on the battlefield, and are attacking continuously.

It is necessary to recall that at one time McNamara promised to withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. The ignominious failure of the 1965-66 dry season counteroffensive of the Americans, although the latter had carefully worked out the plan and (several words indistinct) forces, proves that they have been powerless in carrying out their plot aimed at recapturing the initiative and changing the war situation.

Participating in glorious combat with their bare hands, our people have quickly built a firm, strong political and military force and are achieving increasingly important victories. The Americans have the most powerful military and economic potentials in the Western world, but we have the invincible power of the people's war and the creativeness which is being developed to a high degree.

We are of the opinion that in a war, military power is composed of many factors, the most decisive being the political and moral ones. Politically and morally we are absolutely stronger than the Americans. Our people across the country are carrying out the war without yielding before sacrifices and hardships, with the determination never to put down their weapons so long as our combat objectives have not been reached.

We are also stronger than the Americans in other basic factors, such as strategy, rear areas, war leadership, and ground forces; these are the factors that decide the final victory of a war. Although they are strong materially and technically, the U.S. bandits have basic weaknesses in the political, military, strategic, and tactical fields. The factors of U.S. power are not limitless, partly due to their policy of dominating the world, to the fact that they are undertaking an aggressive war in our territory (several words indistinct), and partly due to the fact that they are powerless in (several words indistinct) any portion of our territory (several words indistinct). On the contrary, their weaknesses are truly basic and unsurmountable.

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During the process of war development, these basic weaknesses have become increasingly obvious and prominent and will finally lead the Americans to an unavoidable defeat. The ever great victories which we have achieved since the U.S. military buildup, and especially during the 1965-66 dry season, prove that theoretically as well as practically we are fully able to exterminate not only the puppet troops, but also the most seasoned units of the U.S. expeditionary force; we are fully able to maintain the initiative on the battlefield and the tempo of our attacks and we are fully able to victoriously oppose the new U.S. reinforcements and militarily defeat the U.S. aggressors under any situation.

Question: In your opinion, chairman, is there now a possibility of cooperating with the other political organizations in South Vietnam?

Answer: Our unchanged policy has always been to achieve a large degree of national unity aimed at carrying out the resistance against the U.S. aggressors and for national salvation. Thanks to this correct policy, we have succeeded in building a national united front based on a sound foundation and having a large membership. Apart from patriotic political parties, religious and national groups, and individuals who have joined the front, we have succeeded in cooperating with other patriotic political and religious organizations and individuals. On this basis, we have scored great victories.

At present, the U.S. troops are directly participating on a large scale in the aggressive war in South Vietnam, trampling underfoot our country, using extremely cruel means of war to massacre our compatriots, and committing extremely barbarous crimes. The traitors Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky have fully obeyed American orders and have sold national sovereignty for U.S. dollars and weapons. Nevertheless, apart from a small group of reactionaries dependent on the Americans, all other Vietnamese are patriots who feel great indignation toward the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. Therefore, we can say that there is a possibility of enlarging our cooperation with other organizations, forces, and individuals in South Vietnam, regardless of their previous activities.

Question: By this, do you mean all the people who had participated in the Ngo Dinh Diem government and the governments that succeeded it?

Answer: Yes. Regardless of their past activities, political tendencies and views, or their nationality or religion, (few words indistinct) aimed at the following objectives: opposition to the war of the Americans and their henchmen, restoration of national sovereignty, achievement of democratic freedoms, cessation of the U.S. interventionist and aggressive policy, achievement of peace and neutrality in South Vietnam, and improvement of the living conditions of the people. But the strength of the NPLSV political and military forces will certainly be the decisive factor for victory.

Question: Chairman, can you let us know the conditions for a political solution to the South Vietnam problem?

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Answer: For many months the Johnson administration has never stopped trumpeting about the so-called "desire for peace" and the unconditional negotiation proposal. Those honey-like words, however, are in full contradiction to the U.S. Government's criminal acts. At the very time when the President of the United States and his Secretary of State utter fine words, the U.S. Government expands the aggressive war in South Vietnam and continues to escalate the bombings against North Vietnam. Washington wants the Vietnamese people to accept its conditions; this means that it wants us to surrender. But the determination of our people and the NLFV to restore the sacred national sovereignty and to liberate the country is unshakable. We are ready to fight to the end, although we will have to fight for 10 or 20 years or longer and will have to face innumerable challenges, and we will fight until the territories inherited from our ancestors are liberated from the U.S. aggressors' yoke.

After enduring a war situation for 20 years, the Vietnamese people are eager for peace so that they can reconstruct their country. But peace must be achieved on the basis of independence and democracy.

The U.S. imperialists are invaders in South Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists have trampled underfoot the basic national sovereignty of South Vietnam. Therefore the conditions for a genuine peace in South Vietnam and, at the same time, for a single and correct solution to the South Vietnam problem can only be:

1--The Americans must end the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw U.S. troops and weapons and those of their satellites from South Vietnam, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

2--The Americans must respect the (national) rights of the South Vietnamese people; that is, independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality. The internal problems of South Vietnam must be solved by the South Vietnamese people themselves and without foreign intervention. Reunification of Vietnam must be decided on by the people of both zones.

3--The NLFV, the only legal representative of South Vietnam, must be present at and have a decisive voice in any political solution in South Vietnam.

Question: Chairman, can you tell us the results of the fact that the Americans have used modern means of war such as B-52 bombers and (few words indistinct)?

Answer: Resorting to barbarous means of war such as B-52 bombers, toxic gas, and poisonous chemicals, and to a scorched-earth policy of kill all and destroy and burn everything, the U.S. imperialists want to oppress our people and force us to surrender. But those means of war can only enhance our compatriots' indignation at the aggressors and further strengthen their determination to fight bravely until final victory, in defiance of all difficulties. The use of a strategic air force (for tactical purposes) is a last resort in the war and proves the confusion of the aggressors; it will not bring them the expected results, as you can see.

5 September 1967

SOUTH VIETNAM

TEXT OF POLITICAL PROGRAM ADOPTED BY NFLSV

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1710 GMT 1 Sep 67 B

[Text] Hanoi--Following is the full text of the political program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation adopted by an extraordinary congress of the Front convened by its Central Committee in mid-August 1967. The program was distributed to Vietnamese and foreign pressmen at a news conference here today by Nguyen Van Tien, head of the NFLSV permanent representation in North Vietnam:

Political Program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation

In 1960, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation came into being with its 10-point program aimed at uniting the entire people against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. Since then, the Front has achieved a broad union of the various sections of the people, the political parties, organizations, nationalities, religious communities, and patriotic personalities with a view to jointly fighting against U.S. aggression, for national salvation. It has successfully consolidated its base among the broad masses of the people; at the same time, it has achieved joint action with many political and religious forces and won over many industrialists and traders, many officials and functionaries of the puppet administration, and many officers and men of the puppet army.

The Front has constantly enjoyed wholehearted encouragement and assistance from our compatriots in the north and abroad. It has also enjoyed ever stronger approval and support from the peoples of neighboring Cambodia and Laos, from the peoples of the socialist, nationalist, and other countries in the world, including progressive people in the United States.

Under the leadership of the NFLSV, our people in the south have gone from victory to victory. The prestige of the Front has been unceasingly enhanced at home and abroad. The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation has become the sole genuine representative of the heroic South Vietnamese people.

These great achievements have proved that the line and policy of the front are correct, and that the strength of our people's unity and struggle is invincible.

At present, despite heavy defeats, the U.S. imperialists are still unwilling to give up their aggressive designs against Vietnam. They are stepping up the war, trampling upon the south, and intensifying the bombing of the north of our country. The monstrous crimes of the U.S. imperialists, however, have only served to deepen our people's hatred and increase their indomitable will. The people of South Vietnam, regardless of social standing, and even a number of persons in the puppet army and administration, have seen through the true features of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, hate them, and want to contribute to the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

Never before in our nation's history has the mettle of our entire people united for the fight to wipe out the enemy and save the country been so strong as now. Our people are in a victorious, initiative, and offensive position. The U.S. imperialists and the lackeys have been increasingly driven into passivity and embarrassment; they are in an impasse and are sustaining defeats.

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At this juncture, in a spirit of developing the former program, the NPLSV has worked out this political program with a view to further broadening the bloc of great national union, encouraging and stimulating the entire people to rush forward, resolved to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors, and to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam.

I. Unite the Entire People, Fight the U.S. Aggressors, Save the Country.

1--During 4,000 years of their history, the Vietnamese people have united and fought against foreign invasion to preserve their independence and freedom. Ever since our country was conquered by the French colonialists, our people have fought unremittently for their liberation. In 1945, our people from north to south rose up, successfully carried out the August revolution, seized political power from the Japanese militarists and their lackeys, and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

When the French colonialists came back to invade our country once again, our entire people heroically fought for nearly nine years, brought our sacred resistance to the great victory of Dien Bien Phu, smashing the aggressive schemes of the French colonialists and the interventionist policy of the U.S. imperialists.

The independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam were formally recognized by the 1954 Geneva conference. Since then, our compatriots in South Vietnam together with the people all over the country, should have been living in peace and building a free and happy life. However, the U.S. imperialists have sabotaged the Geneva agreements, ousted the French colonialists, set up in South Vietnam an extremely cruel puppet regime, and tried to turn the southern part of Vietnam into a neocolony and a military base in an attempt to prolong the partition of our country, conquer the whole of Vietnam, and impose their domination throughout Indochina and Southeast Asia.

The U.S. imperialists have shrunk from no cruel method to carry out their dark design. Defeated in their special war, they have switched to a local war, using over half a million U.S. and satellite troops, along with more than half a million puppet soldiers, for aggression against South Vietnam. At the same time, they have undertaken a war of destruction against the northern part of our country. They have also stepped up their special war in Laos and carried out continual provocations aimed at wrecking the independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

The U.S. imperialists are daily causing untold sufferings and mourning to our compatriots throughout the country! They have resorted to all kinds of modern war means and weapons, including strategic aircraft, napalm bombs, toxic chemicals, and poison gas to massacre our fellow countrymen. They have launched repeated operations, again and again sweeping many areas, carrying out the kill all, burn all, destroy all policy to raze villages and hamlets to the ground. They have herded the population, grabbed land, and set up a noman's land and fascist-type concentration camps dubbed strategic hamlets, prosperity zones, resettlement areas, and so on. In the north, they have wantonly bombed and strafed streets, villages, industrial centers, and heavily populated areas. They have even struck at dikes, dams, schools, hospitals, churches, and pagodas.

Obviously the U.S. imperialists are the most ruthless aggressors in history, the saboteurs of the 1954 Geneva agreements, the saboteurs of the peace and security of the peoples in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world--the enemy number one of our people and of mankind.

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Over the past few years, the U.S. imperialists have continually escalated the war, yet they have unceasingly clamored about peace negotiations in an attempt to fool the American and world people.

The Saigon puppet administration has sold out South Vietnam to the U.S. imperialists. It has oppressed and exploited our southern compatriots in an extremely ruthless way. It has forced South Vietnam youth into the army to serve the United States in massacring our fellow countrymen. In a demagogic bid, it has also staged the farce of working out a constitution and holding elections. It is only a clique of traitors, an instrument for the U.S. imperialists to enslave the South Vietnamese people, prolong the partition of our country and further the U.S. war of aggression.

2--The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys think they can intimidate our people by the use of force and deceive them by means of tricks. But they are grossly mistaken. Our people definitely will never submit to force, never let themselves be deceived! Bringing into play our nation's tradition of undauntedness, our 31 million compatriots from the south to the north have resolutely stood up and united as one man to fight against the U.S. aggressors and save the country.

On the frontline of the fatherland, our southern fellow countrymen have over the past 13 years shown marvelous heroism. Irrespective of age, sex, political tendencies, religious beliefs, and no matter whether they live in the plains or in mountain areas, our people of all strata and all nationalities have resolutely fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the reunification of the fatherland.

Since 1959-1960, our compatriots in the South Vietnamese countryside have carried out successive, simultaneous uprisings, destroyed a series of concentration camps and prosperity zones of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration and liberated vast rural areas. Our armed forces and people then rushed forward, destroyed thousands of strategic hamlets, liberated millions of people, and defeated the U.S. special war.

Since 1965, although the U.S. aggressors have brought in hundreds of thousands of U.S. expeditionary troops for direct aggression against South Vietnam, our armed forces and people have repeatedly won big victories, smashed two successive U.S. dry-season strategic counteroffensives, defeated over 1 million enemy troops--U.S., puppet, and satellite.

The liberated areas have continuously expanded and now make up four-fifths of the South Vietnam territory with two-thirds of its population. In these liberated areas, a national and democratic power is taking shape and a new life is blossoming. In addition to big military victories, we have also recorded important successes in the political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic fields.

In the beloved northern part of the fatherland, our 17 million compatriots are heroically defeating the U.S. imperialist's war of destruction, maintaining and boosting production, and wholeheartedly encouraging and helping the cause of liberating the south, thus fulfilling the obligations of the great rear toward the great front.

In the world, the peoples of the socialist, nationalist, and other countries, including the progressive people in the United States, are sternly condemning the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, and are giving their approval, support, and assistance to our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

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Facts have clearly shown that the more the U.S. imperialists obdurately intensify and expand their war of aggression against our country, the more they sustain bitter defeats and are driven into isolation; on the other hand, our people win greater victories and get more friends.

3--The most dangerous enemies of our people at present are the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys--the traitorous puppet administration.

The tasks and objectives of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle for national salvation are now as follows: To unite the entire people, resolutely defeat the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, overthrow their lackey puppet administration, establish a broad national union and democratic administration and build an independent, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the above task of fighting against U.S. aggression and saving the country is our great national union. The NFLSV constantly stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religious communities, all patriotic personalities, all individuals, and all patriotic and progressive forces, irrespective of political tendencies, in order to struggle together against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, wrest back our sacred national rights, and build up the country.

The NFLSV is prepared to invite and welcome all patriotic forces and individuals who oppose the U.S. aggressors to join its ranks, and to shoulder together the common duties. It proposes that any force which, for one reason or another, does not adhere to its ranks, take joint action against the common enemy--the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

The NFLSV pledges itself to strive, shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnam fatherland front, to fulfill gloriously the common task of fighting against U.S. aggression to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

While fighting for their sacred national rights, the people of South Vietnam actively accomplish their internationalist duty. Their resistance war against U.S. aggression is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the people all over the world.

The NFLSV undertakes to stand within the united bloc of the Indochinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The NFLSV pledges to take an active part in the common struggle of the world's people against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress.

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4--The cruel U.S. aggressors are trampling upon our homeland. We, the people of South Vietnam, must stand up to make revolution and wage a people's war with a view to annihilating them, driving them out of our borders, and wresting back national independence and sovereignty.

Having experienced over 20 years of war, our southern compatriots eagerly want to live in peace and rebuild our war-devastated country. But the U.S. imperialists have trampled underfoot this legitimate aspiration. That is why our people have to fight against them to win peace in independence. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. Only when real independence is secured can we have genuine peace!

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The enemy of our nation is ruthless and obdurate. But our entire people are determined to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. So long as the U.S. imperialists do not end their war of aggression, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from our country, and let the South Vietnamese people settle themselves the internal affairs of South Vietnam without foreign intervention, our people will resolutely fight on until total victory. The South Vietnamese people's liberation war is a long and hard one, but it is sure to end in victory.

Our people rely mainly on their own forces; at the same time they strive to win the sympathy, support, and assistance of the world's peoples.

To defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, our people do not spare any sacrifice. They enthusiastically contribute manpower, material resources, and talent to the national liberation war in the spirit of doing everything for victory.

The NFLSV undertakes to develop the Liberation Armed Forces comprising the main force units, the regional troops, and the militia and guerrilla units, with the aim of promoting people's war, combining guerrilla with regular warfare, wiping out as many live enemy forces as possible, crushing the enemy's will for aggression, and winning the final victory.

The front undertakes to build and develop the political forces of the masses, promote the movement of political struggle, and combine armed struggle with political struggle and agitation among enemy troops, thus forming three converging prongs to defeat the enemy.

The NFLSV undertakes to encourage all strata of the population in the towns and rural areas still under enemy control to unite and struggle in every possible form to break the grip of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, destroy the Phuong (corporations) and strategic hamlets, demand democratic freedoms, national sovereignty, and a better life, oppose the pressganging of troops and forcible labor draft, struggle against enslaving and depraved culture, and march forward, together with the entire people, to overthrow the enemy's rule and seize political power.

At the same time, the Front undertakes to encourage all strata of people in the liberated areas to unite closely, to build the people's self-management system, to achieve step by step a local national democratic administration, to build base areas, to strive to produce and fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to proceed with a good settlement of the agrarian question, to build the new economy and culture of the liberated areas, to foster the people's forces with a view to insuring supplies for the frontline and carrying the resistance war through to complete victory.

II. Build an Independent, Democratic, Peaceful, Neutral, and Prosperous South Vietnam

The people of South Vietnam are determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, and to devote their might and main to build a political system that guarantees the independence and sovereignty of the nation and the freedom and happiness of the people, to heal the wounds of war, to liquidate the social evils left over by the U.S. puppet regime, to restore moral life and build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam.

To achieve these objectives, the NFLSV lays down the following concrete policies:

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1--To achieve a broad and progressive democratic regime:

To abolish the disguised colonial regime established by the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam, to overthrow the puppet administration, hireling of the United States, not to recognize the puppet national assembly rigged up by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to abolish the constitution and all antinational and anti-democratic laws enacted by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration.

To hold free general elections, to elect the national assembly in a really democratic way in accordance with the principle of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot. This national assembly will be the state body with the highest authority in South Vietnam. It will work out a democratic constitution which fully embodies the most fundamental and most eager aspirations of all social strata in South Vietnam and guarantee the establishment of a broad, progressive, democratic state structure. To guarantee the immunity of the deputies to the national assembly.

To set up a national union democratic government including the most representative persons among the various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, patriotic and democratic parties, patriotic personalities, and forces which have contributed to the cause of national liberation.

To proclaim and enforce broad democratic freedoms--freedom of speech, freedom of the press and publication, freedom of assembly, trade union freedom, freedom of association, freedom to form political parties, freedom of creed, freedom to demonstrate.

To guarantee to all citizens inviolability of the human person, freedom of residence and lodging, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of movement, freedom to work and rest, and the right to study.

To enforce equality between man and woman and equality among the various nationalities.

To set free all persons detained by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration on account of their patriotic activities.

To dissolve the concentration camps set up in all forms by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

All those people who have had to seek asylum abroad because of the U.S. and puppet regime, have the right to return to the country to serve the fatherland.

To severely punish the diehard cruel agents of the U.S. imperialists.

2--To build an independent and self-supporting economy, to improve the people's living conditions. To abolish the policy of economic enslavement and monopoly of the U.S. imperialists. To confiscate the property of the U.S. imperialists and their diehard cruel agents and turn it into state property. To build an independent and self-supporting economy. To rapidly heal the wounds of war, to restore and develop the economy so as to make the people rich and the country powerful. To protect the right to ownership of the means of production and other property of the citizens under the laws of the state.

To restore and develop agricultural production. To improve farming, animal husbandry, fish rearing, and forestry.

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The state will encourage the peasants to unite and help one another in boosting production, grant them loans at low interest for the purchase of buffaloes, oxen, farming implements, agricultural machines, seeds, fertilizers, etc, help them develop irrigation works, and apply advanced techniques in agriculture. To guarantee outlets for agricultural products.

To restore and develop industry, small industries and handicrafts. To guarantee to the workers and employees the right to take part in the management of enterprises.

The state will encourage the capitalists in industry and trade to help develop industry, small industries and handicrafts. To enforce freedom of enterprise to the benefit of nation-building and the people's welfare; to apply a customs policy designed to encourage and protect home-production. To restore and develop communications and transport. To encourage and step up economic exchanges between towns and country, between the plains and the mountain areas. To give due consideration to the interests of the small traders and petty shopkeepers. To set up a state bank. To build an independent currency. To apply a fair and rational tax policy. The state will adopt a policy of granting loans at low interest to encourage production, and will prohibit usury. To develop economic relations with the north; the two zones will help each other so that Vietnam's economy may prosper rapidly.

In accordance with the front's policy of neutrality and on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese nation, trade with all countries will be expanded, and economic and technical assistance from foreign countries will be accepted, regardless of political and social systems.

3--To enact the land policy, to carry out the slogan "Land to the Tiller." To confiscate the lands of the U.S. imperialists and the dishonest cruel landlords--their lackeys. To allot those lands to landless or land-poor peasants. To confirm and protect the ownership of the lands allotted to peasants by the revolution.

The state will negotiate the purchase of land from landlords who possess land upward of a certain amount, varying with the situation in each locality. It will allot these lands to landless or land-poor peasants. The recipients will receive the lands free of charge and will not be bound by any condition whatsoever. In areas where the required conditions for land reform do not yet obtain, land-rent reduction will be carried out.

To entrust the lands belonging to absentee landlords to peasants for cultivation and enjoyment of the produce. Adequate steps will be taken on this subject at a later stage in consideration of the political attitude of each landlord. To allow landlords to offer land to the Liberation Peasants Association; the state will allot these lands to landless or land-poor peasants. To encourage the owners of industrial crops or fruit-tree plantations to keep their farms going. To respect the legitimate right to ownership of land by the churches, pagodas, and holy sees of religious sects. To carry out a fair and rational redistribution of communal lands. To guarantee the legitimate right to ownership of reclaimed lands to those who reclaim them.

Those compatriots who have been forced into strategic hamlets, or concentration camps in any other form, will be free to return to their former villages.

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Those who have been compelled to evacuate or to change abodes and who wish to go on living there, will enjoy recognition of their ownership of the lands and other property which have resulted from their labor, and will be helped to continue earning their living in the same place; those who wish to return to their native places will also receive help.

4--To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science and technology, to promote public health. To fight against the American-type enslaving and depraved culture and education now adversely affecting our people's fine, long-standing cultural traditions. To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science and technology in service of national construction and defense. To educate the people in the Vietnamese nation's tradition of struggle against foreign invasion and its heroic history. To preserve and develop the fine culture and good customs and habits of our nation.

To raise the people's cultural standards: to liquidate illiteracy, to promote complementary education, to open new general education schools, higher learning establishments, and vocational schools. To make an all-out effort to train and foster a contingent of scientific workers, technicians, and skilled workers. To use the Vietnamese language as the teaching medium in higher learning establishments. To reduce school fees for pupils and students. To exempt poor pupils and students from school fees, or grant them scholarships. To reform the system of examinations.

The state will give every possible help to those youth and children who have rendered services to the fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to the children born into the families who have rendered services to the revolution, and to other outstanding youths so as to enable them to study and develop their capabilities.

Every citizen is free to carry out scientific and technological research, to indulge in literary and artistic creation, and to participate in other cultural activities. To encourage the intellectuals writers, artists, and scientists and to afford them the required conditions for research work, creation, and invention in the service of the fatherland and the people. To afford opportunities to those cultural workers, writers and artists who have been persecuted by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys for their patriotic activities. To develop health service and the movement for hygiene and prophylaxis. To attend to the people's health. To control epidemics. To do away with dangerous diseases left over by the U.S. and puppet regime. To develop the movement for physical training and sports. To develop cultural relations with the north; the two zones will help each other to raise the people's educational level and the (development) of qualified people. To promote cultural relations with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

5--To guarantee the rights and cater to the livelihood of workers, laborers, and civil servants. To promulgate labor legislation. To put into practice the eight-hour working day. To provide for a regime of rest and recreation. To set up a rational system of wages and bonuses for increased productivity. To improve the living and working conditions of the workers, laborers, and civil servants. To apply a policy of adequate remuneration for apprentices. To provide jobs to the workers and the poor people in the towns. To make every effort to do away with unemployment. To put into practice a policy on social security to care for and assist workers, laborers, and civil servants in case of disease, incapacitation, old age, or retirement. To improve living conditions in working people's residential quarters.

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To settle disputes between employers and employees through negotiations between the two sides and mediation by the national democratic administration. To strictly prohibit the beating of workers and laborers, to strictly prohibit fines deducted from wages and unjustified sacking of workers.

6--To build up strong South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces with a view to liberating the people and defending the fatherland. The South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces-- comprising the main force units, the regional troops, and the militia and guerrillas-- are the children of the people, and are boundlessly loyal to the interests of the fatherland and the people, and are duty-bound to fight shoulder to shoulder with the entire people to liberate the south, defend the fatherland, and make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Asia and in the world. To pay due attention to the building of the Liberation Armed Forces. To strive to raise their quality and increase their fighting capacity with a view to stepping up peoples war, defeating the U.S. satellite, and puppet troops, and bringing the fight against U.S. aggression, for national salvation to total victory. To strengthen the political work with a view to enhancing the patriotism and determination to fight and to win of the Liberation Armed Forces, enhancing the sense of discipline, and continuously tightening the "fish and water" relations between the army and the population.

7--To show gratitude to the martyrs, to cater for disabled armymen, to reward the fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The entire people are grateful to, and constantly bear in mind the memory of the martyrs who belonged to the Liberation Armed Forces or to various services and revolutionary organizations, and those who laid down their lives in political struggles. Their families are catered for and assisted by the state and the people. Armymen and compatriots disabled in the course of the armed and political struggle are cared for and helped. To reward in a worthy manner all fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The entire people are grateful to and help the families who have rendered services to the revolution.

8--To organize social relief. To give relief to the compatriots--victims of the war of aggression unleashed by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet regime. To attend to orphans, old folks, and invalid people. To organize relief for the areas affected by natural calamities or bad crops. Consideration is also given to disabled puppet armymen and to the families of puppet armymen killed in action, who are poor and forlorn. To help those people driven to desperation by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to rebuild their lives and serve the fatherland and the people.

9--To put into practice equality between man and woman, to protect mothers and children. To pay utmost attention to raising the political, cultural, and vocational standards of women in a manner fitting with their merits in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. To develop the Vietnamese women's traditions of heroism, undauntedness, loyalty, and aptitude to shoulder every responsibility. Women are equal to men politically, economically, culturally, and socially. Women who do the same job receive the same salary and allowances, and enjoy all other rights as men. Women workers and civil servants enjoy two months maternity leave with full pay before and after childbirth.

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To put into practice a policy of actively helping perfecting and training women cadres. To promulgate progressive marriage and family regulations. To protect the rights of mothers and children. To develop a network of maternity homes, creches, and infant classes.

To do away with all social evils brought about by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, which are harmful to women's health and dignity.

10--To strengthen unity, to practice equality and mutual assistance among nationalities. To abolish all systems and policies applied by the imperialists and their lackeys with a view to dividing, oppressing, and exploiting the various nationalities. To oppose discrimination among and forcible assimilation of the nationalities. To develop the long-standing tradition of unity and mutual assistance among the various fraternal nationalities with a view to defending and building the country. All nationalities are equal in rights and obligations.

To implement the agrarian policy with regard to minority peasants. To encourage and help them settle down in fixed residences, to improve their lands, to develop economy and culture, to raise their living standards so as to keep abreast of the general level. The national minorities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages to develop their own culture and art and to maintain or to change their customs and habits.

To strive to train minority cadres so as to quickly bring about conditions for good management of the local affairs by the concerned minority itself. In the areas inhabited by big communities of a specific minority and where the required conditions exist, autonomous zones will be established within independent and free Vietnam.

11--To respect freedom of creed, to achieve unity and equality among the different religious communities. To fight against all maneuvers and tricks of the imperialists and their lackeys who use a number of persons under the cloak of religion to oppose our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to sow dissension between believers and nonbelievers and among different religious communities, and to harm the country, the people, and the religion. To respect freedom of creed and worship. To preserve pagodas, churches, holy sees, temples. All religions are equal and none is to be discriminated against. To achieve unity among believers of various religions and between believers and the entire nation for the sake of the struggle against U.S. aggression and their lackeys to defend and build the country.

12--Welcome puppet officers and men and puppet officials back to the just cause, show leniency, and give a humane treatment to rallied armymen and prisoners-of-war. To oppose the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration's attempts to pressgang mercenaries to serve the U.S. aggressors against the fatherland and massacre the people. To severely punish the diehard thugs acting as efficient agents of the U.S. imperialists. To afford conditions for puppet officers and puppet officials to come back to the just cause and join the people's fight against U.S. aggression to save and build the country.

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Those individuals, groups, or units of the puppet army and administration who render services to the cause of fighting against U.S. aggression for national salvation will be rewarded and entrusted with responsible jobs. Those who sympathize with and support the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation or those who refuse to carry out orders of the United States and puppets to harm the people will have their merits recorded.

Those individuals, groups, or units who have broken away from the puppet army and voluntarily apply to join the Liberation Armed Forces for fighting against the United States to save the country are welcomed and enjoy equal treatment. Regarding those individuals or units who have broken away from the puppet army and administration and risen against the U.S. aggressors to save the country, the front stands ready to join actions with them in the fight against the U.S. aggressors on a basis of equality, mutual respect, and assistance so as together to protect the people and liberate the fatherland.

Those functionaries of the puppet administration who volunteer to serve the country and the people in the state machine after the liberation of South Vietnam will enjoy equal treatment. Those in the puppet army and the puppet administration at any level who have committed crimes against the people but are now sincerely repentant will be pardoned. Those who redeem their crimes by meritorious deeds will be rewarded accordingly. Captured officers and men of the puppet army will enjoy humanitarian treatment and clemency.

Those in the U.S. Army and its satellite armies who cross over to the people's side will be given kind treatment and helped to return to their families when conditions permit. Captured U.S. and satellite troops will be treated as captured puppet troops.

13--To protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese.

To welcome the patriotism of overseas Vietnamese and highly value all their contributions to the resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation of the people. To protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese. To help those overseas Vietnamese who wish to return to take part in the building of the country.

14--To protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign residents in South Vietnam. To welcome those foreign residents who have contributed to the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation. All foreign residents living in South Vietnam must respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and obey the law of the national democratic administration. To protect the legitimate rights and interests of all foreign residents who do not cooperate with the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in opposing the Vietnamese people and who do not harm the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam. To give adequate consideration to the rights and interests of those foreign residents who have directly or indirectly supported the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation.

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To resolutely oppose and abolish all policies of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen aimed at sowing discord between the Vietnamese people and Chinese residents in South Vietnam and exploiting, repressing, and forcing Chinese residents to adopt Vietnamese citizenship. To punish the diehard agents and secret agents of the imperialists and the South Vietnam puppet administration.

III To Restore Normal Relations Between North and South Vietnam, Proceed Toward Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland

Vietnam is one. The Vietnamese people are one. No force can divide our fatherland. Reunification of the country is the sacred aspiration of our entire people. Vietnam must be reunified.

The policy of the NLSV consists of the following:

1--The reunification of Vietnam will be realized step by step and through peaceful means on the principle of negotiation between the two zones without either side using pressure against the other and without foreign interference.

2--Pending the reunification of the country, the people in both zones will make joint efforts to oppose foreign invasion and defend the fatherland and at the same time endeavor to expand economic and cultural exchanges. The people in both zones are free to exchange letters, to go from one zone to another, and to choose their place of residence.

IV To Apply a Foreign Policy of Peace and Neutrality

The NLSV applies a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, a foreign policy which guarantees the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the country and helps safeguard world peace. In more concrete terms this policy consists of the following points:

1--To establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their social and political system on the principle of mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, without infringement upon each other, without interference into each other's internal affairs, territory, equality, mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. To abolish all unequal treaties which the puppet administration has signed with the United States or any other country. To respect the economic and cultural interests of those countries which sympathize with, support, or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vietnamese people. To accept technical and economic assistance from any country without political conditions attached. To join no military alliance, to accept no military personnel or military bases of foreign countries on South Vietnam territory.

2--To strengthen friendly relations with all countries which sympathize with, support, or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vietnamese people. To strengthen relations of good neighborhood with Cambodia and Laos. To unceasingly consolidate solidarity and mutual assistance between the peoples of the Indochinese countries with a view to defending their respective independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against the aggressive and war-provocation policy of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.

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3--Actively support the national liberation movement of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and old and new colonialism. Actively support the struggle of the American people against the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression in Vietnam. Actively support the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress in all countries in the world.

4--Actively struggle to contribute to the safeguarding of world peace, oppose the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism. Demand the dissolution of the aggressive military blocs and foreign military bases of imperialism. Unceasingly consolidate and develop relations with international democratic organizations and the peoples of all countries including the American people. Actively contribute to the consolidation and development of the world people's front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, for national independence and peace.

The struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation of our people is an extremely hard but glorious cause. It concerns not only the destiny of our people at present and all our future generations but also the interests of the peoples in the world who are struggling for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress. In order to accomplish that glorious cause, our people, already united, must unite still more closely and broadly!

The NFLSV warmly welcomes all political parties, mass organizations, and patriotic and progressive personalities who broadly rally within and outside the front in order to defeat together the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen.

The struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation of our people is a just cause. Our people throughout the country are of one mind to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. The sympathy, support, and assistance of the people of the socialist countries, the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, and peace-loving, justice-loving people all over the world, including the progressive people in the United States, are becoming deeper and stronger day by day. We are willing and will surely win complete victory.

No matter how frenzied, brutal, obdurate, and perfidious the U.S. imperialists may be, they will inevitably meet with bitter failure in their criminal schemes.

In the supreme interests of the fatherland, let our entire people in South Vietnam strengthen their solidarity, millions as one, and rush forward shoulder to shoulder in the impetus of our victories to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and their stooge administration, and together with our northern compatriots to fulfill the great and glorious cause of liberating the south, defending the north, and proceeding toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The NFLSV pledges to be always worthy of the confidence of our compatriots and our friends on the five continents. The Vietnamese people will surely be victorious! The U.S. aggressors and their henchmen will certainly be defeated! The NFLSV program for liberation is sure to materialize! Fighters and compatriots throughout South Vietnam, under the glorious banner of the NFLSV, march forward heroically!

4. ADDENDA

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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Sunday, Sept. 10, 1967 THE WASHINGTON POST
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Hanoi Stiffens Its Attitude in Bomb Step-up

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

North Vietnam is growing more unyielding about peace talks, rather than more flexible, as American bombings intensify, according to diplomatic reports reaching Washington.

This rising mood of militancy in Hanoi was one reason why Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Friday deliberately downgraded prospects for negotiations.

All accounts coming out of Hanoi, through public and private channels, show that the officially disseminated view of the war from there is precisely the reverse of the official version in Washington.

North Vietnam contends, and what is more, perhaps believes, that time and strategy are on its side for outlasting the United States.

Premier Is Quoted

In an interview in Hanoi last week with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong by American newsmen David Schoenbrun, the Premier was quoted as saying:

"As for peace talks . . . the initiative is up to the United States. You have to stop bombing us unconditionally. If you want peace talks, they can follow but . . . there will be no reciprocity. There will be no bargaining. There will be no blackmail, and we will not pay ransom to pirates."

As for the subject of talks, according to other reports relayed to Washington, Hanoi maintains there is essentially only one real topic: Withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam.

Schoenbrun, who was in North Vietnam for nine days, related his experiences in Bangkok on Thursday. They were broadcast last night (ABC Television's "Scope," to be rebroadcast here at 1 p.m. today on Channel 7).

Pham Van Dong was described as "planning for an American invasion" and expecting the aerial devastation of Hanoi.

Prepared to Fight On

"He believes," said Schoenbrun, "that in a last act of desperation we are going to wipe out Hanoi. . . . He is prepared to fight on in the mountains for as long as it can possibly take."

The Premier was reported reluctant even to talk about the possibility of peace discussions. "He is, I think," said Schoenbrun, "totally a hawk."

Despite the heavy American bombing of North Vietnam Schoenbrun, like other visitors, said he could detect "no evidence of fatigue" among the people but only resiliency—strengthened, not weakened, by the escalating air war.

Pham Van Dong was quoted as saying:

"We have one overriding problem only, and that is how to exist and how to survive, and our whole country is geared to this."

"You Americans have other problems. You have racial problems. You have world commitments. Vietnam is only one of your problems. Maybe you have got a million—maybe you have got 2 million—Americans who are devoting themselves seriously, full time to the Vietnamese war. We have 16 million. So we outnumber you 8 to 1."

'Like a Time Bomb'

In focusing on the racial rioting in American cities as a major plus in North Vietnam's favor, Dong in an Aug. 31 speech said: "This struggle is like a time bomb at the heart of the U.S. capitalist society."

Dong was reported by Schoenbrun to have scoffed at the Sept. 3 presidential election in South Vietnam in the same vein as have North Vietnam's public statements scorning it as "low comedy." But American analysts believe the election seriously discomfited Hanoi. They note that the program of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, has been revised to pledge a "really democratic" election.

At the Texas White House yesterday, press secretary George Christian said the President "is aware" of reports that South Vietnam has advised Great Britain that it means to approach North Vietnam soon with an offer of direct peace talks that would include the NLF-Vietcong.

Secretary Rusk on Friday said the United States "would welcome some basis on which there could be a general reconciliation among the people on a basis." But he said "that doesn't mean that the NLF has a status as a government . . . or that it should be given a veto on the possibility of pulling North Vietnam and South Vietnam apart militarily."

A leading House Republican, Melvin R. Laird (R-Wis.), said in Chicago on Thursday night that: "It's increasingly evident that the Administration is pressing Saigon to negotiate directly with the Vietcong." Laird said "they (the NLF) have the power in South Vietnam at the present time and must take part in negotiations."

Chronology of Viet Peace Efforts

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The record indicates that the Ashmore-Baggs peace effort ran afoul of a change in American policy which occurred at the moment they were involved in Vietnam diplomacy.

This is the record, as far as it is now known, of the pertinent events:

DEC. 4, 1966—Poland reported to the United States that North Vietnam was prepared to send a man to Warsaw to meet an American representative and to do so without demanding as a precondition an end to the American bombing of the North.

American officials subsequently contended that independent checks showed this to be a Polish view, not that of North Vietnam.

Dec. 13-14—American planes raid near Hanoi. Poland later privately blamed the raids for ending chances for a meeting. After the raids Hanoi began to stress the demand that bombing must cease unconditionally before there could be talks.

Dec. 26-Jan. 6, 1967—Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times created a furor with dispatches from Hanoi picturing civilian destruction from the American raids. Officials here said Hanoi had let Salisbury in as part of a campaign to force an end to the bombing. Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi the day Salisbury left.

Jan. 12—Ashmore and Baggs met Ho Chi Minh who stressed an end to the bombing. Ashmore now writes that "we had not brought back" from this interview "any hard proposal" from Ho "beyond the reiteration of his unqualified commit-

ment to enter into negotiations" if the U.S. halted the bombing.

Ashmore reported to State Department officials that he and Baggs felt that "Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation" of the fighting.

Early January to early February — The United States secretly sent four memoranda to Hanoi describing, officials say, possible methods of deescalation. These messages, yet to be made public, were handed by an American embassy official in Moscow to a North Vietnamese representative.

Jan. 27—Hanoi's man in Moscow gave a reply to the American official. Later the State Department described the reply as "a diatribe against the United States."

Jan. 28—North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in an interview with Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett said that "it is only after the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV (North Vietnam) that there could be talks between the DRV and the U.S."

Feb. 2—President Johnson prepared a letter to Ho in which he took up the Burchett interview points. Mr. Johnson said he would "order a cessation of bombing" and also halt "further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped." These "acts of restraint," he said, "would make possible serious private discussions." This letter, however, was not turned over to Hanoi's man in Moscow until Feb. 8 and the delay has never been explained.

Feb. 4—Ashmore and Baggs met at the State Department with Undersecretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and other top officials but not including Secretary Dean Rusk.

A letter from Ashmore to Ho was drafted with Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, whose area includes Vietnam, as the chief departmental draftsman.

The key sentence in the letter stated that "senior officials" at State "expressed opinion that some reciprocal restraint" was necessary along with a halt to the bombing and an end to the influx of American troops if talks were to take place.

Feb. 5—The draft letter was delivered to Ashmore at Fulbright's house. Ashmore mailed it that afternoon. The letter did not specify the "reciprocal restraint" although the President's letter of three days earlier had specified an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into the South.

In addition, on the day (Feb. 2) the Administration said the Presidential letter was drafted, Mr. Johnson told a press conference that "just almost any step" would be a suitable response from Hanoi. He also had said that "we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action." Sometime between Feb. 2 and 9 the official American terms were hardened.

Feb. 8 — Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, who was in London Feb. 6-13, said at a press conference that the Trinh interview with Burchett "boils down" to saying that if the U.S. unconditionally stopped the bombing, "then it would be possible" to open talks. Kosygin thus publicly changed Trinh's crucial word "could" into "would." He was never contradicted by Hanoi on this. Furthermore, Kosygin passed the word to Washington, which had inquired as to when talks would begin, that they could start in three or four weeks.

Feb. 9 — Secretary Rusk, at a press conference which had been announced by the White House, said that "for some time now there has been evident a systematic campaign by the Commu-

nist side to bring about an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam without any corresponding military action on their side, in exchange for the possibility of talks — talks which are thus far formless and without content."

Rusk also distinguished between a "pause in the bombing (here he seemed to indicate he would agree to a pause in exchange for talks) and a "permanent cessation." For the latter to take place, he said, "we must know the military consequences." The U.S., he said, cannot stop the bombing without reciprocity for that would be "closing off one-half of the war while the rest of it goes on full force."

In short, Rusk was surfacing the central point of the President's letter to Ho, the contents of which were not made public until Hanoi broadcast it March 21.

Feb. 10—Ho said he received the Johnson letter on this day. Ashmore assumes it arrived before his own letter with the less specific request on the point of reciprocity.

During this period, Feb. 8-14, there was a pause in the bombing over the Tet holiday in Vietnam, including a Presidentialy ordered short extension.

Feb. 13—Ho in a letter to Pope Paul VI assailed the U.S. He coupled an unconditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong. In Washington this was taken as a reply to the President. Resumption of the bombing was ordered.

Feb. 15—Ho replied to the President in words similar to the Pope. "A little later," writes Ashmore, he and Baggs received a reply to the Ashmore letter saying there did not seem to be any point to their making a second visit to Hanoi.

WASHINGTON POST, 18 SEPT. 1967

from THE WASHINGTON POST, 18 Sept. 1967

Ashmore's Letter to Hanoi Chief

Following is the text of the letter by Harry S. Ashmore to President Ho Chi Minh:

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. William Baggs and I have made a full report to appropriate officials of the United States Government on our recent conversation with you in Hanoi. Ambassador Luis Quintanilla has communicated his views to the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The State Department has expressed itself as most grateful for your thoughtful approach to the possibility of an ultimate settlement of the hostilities between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In our several discussions with senior officials of the State Department they took occasion to reiterate points we believe are already known to you. They emphasized that the U.S. remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relevant to a peaceful settlement. They reiterated that the Geneva Accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution.

They expressed particular interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the U.S. stopped bombing your country, and ceased introducing additional U.S. troops into Vietnam. They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

In the light of these concerns, they expressed great interest in any clarification of this point that you might wish to provide through a communication to us.

Speaking now wholly for ourselves, we believe the essential condition for productive talks is an arrangement under which neither side stands to gain military advantage during the period of negotiation. To achieve this end it may be that preliminary secret discussions would be helpful to determine the outline of a possible peaceful settlement.

As we see it, these are practical considerations that have nothing to do with questions of "face." There is no doubt in our minds that the American Government genuinely seeks peace. As private citizens, our sole concern is in facilitating a discussion that will bring all matters at issue to official consideration. It is in this sense that we convey these comments, and invite any reply you may wish to make, which of course we would report to our Government in complete discretion.

May I take this occasion to renew our thanks for the courteous and considerate treatment we received in Hanoi throughout our visit and for the honor of our most useful conversation with you.

If you feel that further personal conversation with Mr. Baggs and me is in order we would, of course, return to Hanoi at your convenience.

HARRY S. ASHMORE

JOHNSON ACCUSED OF MOVE NEGATING A PEACE FEELER

Ashmore, Editor Who Met
With Ho Chi Minh, Says
Efforts Were Undercut

TWO LETTERS AT ISSUE

One From the White House
Said to Have Conflicted
With Intermediary's

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—The editor and writer, Harry S. Ashmore, reported today that he relayed a peace bid to Ho Chi Minh on behalf of the State Department last February. But Mr. Ashmore charged that President Johnson then "effectively and totally canceled" the secret initiative by sending an uncompromising letter to the North Vietnamese President.

Mr. Ashmore said his letter had been written in response to a "conciliatory" conversation he had had with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi last January. He added that Mr. Johnson's letter, setting forth "most stringent" American terms for peace, reached Hanoi before the message that Mr. Ashmore had been authorized to send.

'Duplicity' Charged

Ho Chi Minh, in a letter to Mr. Johnson dated Feb. 15—which became public last March 21—rejected Mr. Johnson's demands. As a consequence, Mr. Ashmore has indicated, the secret State Department message routinely received a negative response from Hanoi.

Mr. Ashmore, former executive editor of The Arkansas Gazette, is now executive vice president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, Calif. He said President Johnson's letter had contradicted the terms of the message approved by

the State Department. Mr. Ashmore also accused the President of "crude duplicity" and the Administration of "double dealing."

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, said the State Department "had discussions with Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs, as we would with any American who has talked with leaders in Hanoi."

But he refused to comment on Mr. Ashmore's reported peace approach or his charge that the President's intervention had upset the effort.

Intensive Efforts Recalled

"Any comment must await a careful study of Mr. Ashmore's story," Mr. Bundy said. "I cannot comment on something like this over the phone."

Other officials, without confirming the report, recalled that last winter was a time of complicated contacts with Hanoi. The State Department has previously disclosed that the United States Embassy in Moscow made five contacts with North Vietnamese diplomats in January, culminating with the delivery of President Johnson's letter.

Early in February, the United States was also communicating with Hanoi through Prime Minister Wilson of Britain and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union, who were meeting in London.

Mr. Ashmore told of the peace approach in a 15,000-word article, "The Public Relations of Peace," printed in Center Magazine, a new bimonthly publication of his organization.

The peace approach, he reported, was an outgrowth of a trip he took to Hanoi last January with William O. Baggs, editor of The Miami News. They arrived in Hanoi Jan. 6, had a private two-hour conversation with Ho Chi Minh Jan. 12, left Hanoi on Jan. 14 and reported to the State Department on Jan. 18.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Ashmore said he had refrained from disclosing the episode until now because "we thought that as long as we

might be a useful channel we didn't want to jeopardize it."

But he said the latest expansion of the war indicated that "whatever kind of channel we had is no use now" and that there was no longer any point in keeping secret the unsuccessful maneuvering of last winter.

Mr. Ashmore said that during the contacts with North Vietnamese leaders he and Mr. Baggs found Ho Chi Minh and other senior officers "deliberately conciliatory."

Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation," Mr. Ashmore added. "Ho had understood that we would report our conversation to the State Department and expected some response, since he had made arrangements to have any further message sent directly to him."

In the telephone interview, Mr. Ashmore recalled that Ho Chi Minh had insisted on a halt in American bombing of North Vietnam as a requisite for peace talks. Ho Chi Minh also indicated that Hanoi would like to see a halt in the steady build-up of American forces in South Vietnam before talks began, Mr. Ashmore went on.

In his article, Mr. Ashmore says he then drafted, in collaboration with Mr. Bundy, a carefully worded letter of a page and a half. It was sent to Hanoi Feb. 5 through a previously established channel in Cambodia.

Mr. Ashmore says the letter appeared to reduce American conditions for a halt in bombing, asking for some move of "reciprocal restraint" by Hanoi.

In public statements, administration officials were demanding a "reciprocal reduction" of the fighting by Hanoi.

Key passages of the Ashmore letter, as reported in the article, were as follows:

Key sections of the letter, as reported in the article, referred to the efforts of Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs as follows:

"In our several discussions with senior officials of the State Department, they emphasized that the U.S. remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relevant to a peaceful settlement. They reiterated that the Geneva accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution.

"They expressed particular interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided that U.S. stopped bombing your country, and ceased introducing additional U.S. troops into Vietnam. They

expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement."

President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh, dated Feb. 2, was relayed through the United States Embassy in Moscow to North Vietnamese diplomats. President Chi Minh said he received President Johnson's letter on Feb. 10.

Mr. Ashmore charged that the Presidential message contradicted the Ashmore-Baggs message in several important respects and thus nullified it. He noted that the Presidential letter did not mention the Geneva accords as a basis for negotiation, as the other message had.

He also noted that the President had offered to stop the bombing and the American troop build-up in South Vietnam, but to do so only after receiving assurances that North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam had ceased.

Mr. Ashmore referred to this passage from the Johnson letter:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

Mr. Ashmore maintained that the Presidential letter was timed to put a "time squeeze" on Hanoi, an aspect that had carefully been avoided in the drafting of the Ashmore-Baggs message. He referred to this excerpt:

"I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent new year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the new year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those

of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce."

Mr. Ashmore's article comments: "William Bundy and the others who labored over our draft letter had insisted that it would be a mistake to tie any proposal to the Tet bombing pause, since this would be interpreted by Ho as an effort to

force his hand without adequate opportunity to consult with his own people and the National Liberation Front," or Vietcong.

The bombing pause, part of Tet, began 7 A.M. Feb. 8. It Feb. 12, but President Johnson extended it about 40 hours to avoid embarrassing Premier Kosygin, who had been in London over the Tet period trying to arrange peace talks.

Ashmore Says Feeler to Hanoi Was Nullified

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

A prominent former newspaper editor charged yesterday that the Johnson Administration joined in and then "effectively and brutally cancelled" a previously undisclosed peace overture to Hanoi last February.

The disclosure plus accusations of "double-dealing" and an "almost total absence of candor" on the part of President Johnson and the State Department were made by Harry S. Ashmore, executive vice president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, Calif.

Ashmore visited Hanoi in January. He portrayed the President, and by implication, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as nullifying a secret "conciliatory" letter to Hanoi that other State Department officials joined Ashmore in drafting, by sending a presidential letter setting tougher terms for peace talks.

The conditions for halting the American bombing of North Vietnam to produce negotiations are still at the center of current national and international debate.

White House Press Secretary George Christian said last night that he was unfamiliar with Ashmore's account or the letter he cited. Secretary Rusk said he had not talked with Ashmore or his associates and thus felt it inappropriate to get into the matter now, a spokesman said. Other officials had no immediate comment.

Ashmore, formerly the Pulitzer Prize-winning editor of the Arkansas Gazette of Little Rock, Ark., met with North

Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi last Jan. 12. With Ashmore were William C. Baggs, editor of the Miami (Fla.) News and also a director of the Santa Barbara Center, and Luis Quintanilla, former Mexican Ambassador to the United States.

Their meetings with North Vietnamese leaders were described at the time only as an effort to solicit North Vietnam's attendance at an unofficial peace convocation sponsored by the California-based Center at Geneva, last May.

Ashmore, in a lengthy article written for his organization's Center Magazine, said the trip was undertaken with secret recognition by the Administration that it also might "open up a useful channel of communication with the North Vietnamese."

Newsman Departs

At the State Department, he said, "we were asked to keep the trip secret as long as possible . . ." They entered Hanoi on Jan. 6, the day that Harrison Salisbury of The New York Times was departing on the International Control Commission plane that carried them to North Vietnam from Cambodia, and the news of the Ashmore - Baggs - Quinanilla visit became known.

They saw President Ho for about two hours on Jan. 12.

By the time Ashmore and Baggs returned to Los Angeles on Jan. 15, Ashmore wrote, the Salisbury articles about civilian casualties caused by bombing North Vietnam had "created a national furore," with a "concerted effort" in Washington "to discredit Mr. Salisbury . . ." Ashmore said "our reports were a complete vindication of Mr. Salisbury," but he and Baggs avoided any comment about their attempts to open private communications with Hanoi.

"At the State Department's request," said Ashmore, he and Baggs "managed to hide out for three days after our return, and to meet secretly in Washington with the Department's top echelon."

Departmental Briefings

"The briefings (at State) went on intermittently for a day and a half," said Ashmore, and covered the conversation with Ho in great detail.

"We had not brought back any hard proposal from Ho Chi Minh," Ashmore continued, "beyond the reiteration of his unqualified commitment to enter into negotiations if the United States halted the bombing of North Vietnam. This could not on its face be said to meet the stated American requirement of a recipro-

cal gesture of reduced military action by Hanoi.

"But Mr. Baggs and I," Ashmore said, "could offer our judgment that the tone of the conversation had been deliberately conciliatory and that Ho seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation.

"Moreover, no real risk was entailed in finding out whether this was so. Ho had understood that we would report our conversation to the State Department and had made arrangements to have any response sent directly to him."

'Schizoid Quality'

Ashmore and Baggs then left Washington. Ashmore said "our dealings with the Department had begun to take on a pronounced schizoid quality."

Baggs, he said, had done some confidential diplomatic errands for the late President Kennedy in the Caribbean, and "was on fairly intimate terms with a good many" top State Department officials.

Ashmore described himself as "encumbered by identification with the eclipsed Adlai Stevenson wing of the Democratic Party and by a long personal association with the Johnson Administration's leading bete noire, (Sen.) J. William Fulbright." Added Ashmore, "Finally, we represented the Center, an unconventional, and therefore automatically suspect, institution."

Ashmore wrote that "we soon began to feel that we were confronted by two distinct State Departments."

"One, which obviously regarded us with profound distrust, apparently was headed by Secretary Rusk," said Ashmore, "who never saw us or otherwise acknowledged our presence.

"The other (State) Department," said Ashmore, "which appeared to be seriously interested in negotiations with Hanoi, included Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Averell Harriman, the elder statesman who speaks with the authority of a personal representative of the President, and Assistant Secretary William Bundy, who is immediately in charge of Southeast Asian Affairs."

Invitations Rejected

At the State Department's request, said Ashmore, he and Baggs rejected invitations to testify before either Senate or House committees, and to stay out of the news as much as possible during "the next few weeks, while our report presumably bounced back and forth between the two (State) Departments."

Finally, he said, Sen. Fulbright expressed surprise when he asked Baggs if they had reported their conversation with Ho to President Johnson personally, and was told no. Fulbright raised that with the President at a White House function, said Ashmore, "and thereby pinked the nerve

that activates the President's consensus reflex."

Ashmore related that the President said he thought it unwise to see Ashmore and Baggs personally and start speculation, but wanted Fulbright "to be absolutely satisfied that we were being taken seriously and treated properly." The President, Ashmore said, suggested that the Senator sit in at the next session at the State Department.

"The President's intervention," Ashmore continued, produced a meeting with the "Department's upper hierarchy (minus Secretary Rusk)," and Fulbright, "plus a silent White House observer as witness."

Ashmore said last night that they met in Under Secretary Katzenbach's office on the morning and afternoon of Feb. 4. The principals there, he said, also included William Bundy and Harriman.

"When Sen. Fulbright had finished" outlining his views, Ashmore wrote, "and the air-conditioning had whisked away the last traces of brimstone, the decision was taken

to dispatch a reply to Ho Chi Minh..."

In it, Ashmore, it was agreed that Baggs and he "would express the Department's view that it might be possible to suspend the bombing and initiate negotiations, without specific concessions beyond an agreement that neither side would use the occasion to improve its military position."

"The letter also was to suggest that Mr. Baggs and I return to Hanoi for further informal discussions, or that arrangements could be made to phase us out if it were desired that the matter proceed directly to the official level."

The composition of a page-and-a-half letter, to be sent over Ashmore's signature, "consumed most of a Saturday afternoon," he said. "It was allowed to simmer overnight, was reconsidered without our presence at an upper-echelon meeting on Sunday afternoon," said Ashmore, and "the final version was delivered in a plain manila envelope to the residence of Sen. Fulbright,

where Mr. Baggs and I had gone for luncheon."

"I mailed it myself that afternoon, Feb. 5," said Ashmore, "under the perhaps prophetic postmark of the John Foster Dulles International Airport. By prior arrangement, the letter was to be mailed to Cambodia by regular mail and forwarded from there to Hanoi."

Ashmore said:

"The key passages in our letter (to Ho) read:

"In our several discussions with senior officials of the State Department . . . they emphasized that the U.S. remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relevant to a peaceful settlement. They reiterated that the Geneva Accords (of 1954 and 1962 on Southeast Asia) might be the framework for a peaceful solution.

"They expressed particular interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the U.S. stopped bombing your country, and ceased introducing additional U.S. troops into Vietnam. They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangible evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement . . ."

The key phrase here was the call for "reciprocal restraint," sources on the Ashmore-Baggs side of the issue stressed last night. These sources said it was emphasized in the discussions in the State Department that this terminology would leave open many

options, without setting out any specific demand for what would be termed adequate "reciprocal restraint" on either side's military actions.

Said Ashmore:

"This conciliatory feeler was effectively and brutally cancelled before there was any chance to determine what response Hanoi might have made.

Cessation for Holiday

"On Feb. 14, after a temporary cessation of the bombing for the Tet holiday (in Vietnam) and an ostentatious two-day extension beyond the originally announced termination, the aerial attack on North Vietnam was resumed and escalated."

But it was not until afterward that Ashmore and Baggs learned, apparently when the rest of the world did, that a presidential letter considerably different than the one they collaborated on, was written even before theirs was, on Feb. 2.

"Later (on March 21, 1967) it was revealed in Hanoi, and confirmed in Washington, that the President, under date of Feb. 2, had already dispatched an offsetting message," said Ashmore, "to Ho Chi Minh over his own signature.

"This was transmitted from Moscow on Feb. 8, the day the bombing was suspended and received in Hanoi on Feb. 10. It was certainly in Ho's hands when ours arrived."

That letter from the President, Ashmore contended, "set forth . . . the most stringent demands yet made for advance assurance that Hanoi would halt infiltration of troops to the South. The uncompromising tone of the presidential message thoroughly disposed of the careful tempering we

had undertaken in those long fly-specking sessions" in the State Department.

The key language in the President's message was:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of United States forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and sea has stopped."

Extending Truce

President Johnson also told Ho that the proposal "would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet (lunar New Year holiday) truce," then under way.

Hanoi, however, always had adamantly refused any negotiations with the regime in Saigon.

Ashmore said that "William Bundy and the others who labored over our draft letter had insisted that it would be a mistake to tie any proposal to the Tet bombing pause, since this would be interpreted by Ho as an effort to force his hand without adequate opportunity to consult with his own people and the NLF" (National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam.)

"Under date of Feb. 14," Ashmore charged, "Mr. Johnson got from Ho Chi Minh the sharp, negative reply he must have expected."

"Ours came a little later," said Ashmore, "the simple, unexceptionable statement that there did not seem to be any point in Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs coming back to Hanoi at that time."

'Necessarily Subjective'

Ashmore said he could only offer a "necessarily subjective" account of "what actually went on in the upper reaches of the Administration" to account for the diverse letters.

"From beginning to end of our dealings with the Department," he charged, "there was an almost total absence of candor on the official side."

"... We never got a satisfactory answer," he said, "whether the Administration was really willing to negotiate a compromise settlement in Vietnam or was committed to a military victory."

When Fulbright, at one of the State Department meetings, "bluntly stated his view that the latter was the case,"

said Ashmore, "... the disclaimers consisted of no more than assurance that those he was addressing, at least, were sincerely seeking a settlement."

Ashmore said "the credibility gap ... may be less a case of deliberate dissembling than of pervasive ignorance of ultimate policy that goes right to the top of the Cabinet." He said:

"A President who insists on keeping his options open as long as possible, and personally revealing his choices, leaves even his own most exalted associates embarrassingly mute in regard to large affairs for which they are nominally responsible."

Charges 'Double-Dealing'

Ashmore said that the President "has taken a ping-pong approach" to Vietnam to try to get out of Southeast Asia without appearing to have suffered a major military and political defeat." He said "the double-dealing to which William Baggs and I were subjected" reflects alternate presidential responses to military pressure and the unpopularity of the war.

The Administration, Ashmore charged, set out "to discredit" the unofficial conference on peace held in Geneva in May entitled "Pacem in Terris II."

The intensified American bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area in April, he said, led to North Vietnam's refusal to attend the conference, undermining the concept of the original conference objective.

Ashmore said the State Department sent a young diplomat, Frank Sieverts, to Geneva in line with its "successful effort to implant in the American media the notion that the Convocation was deliberately and suspiciously loaded against the United States."

President Johnson, in his dealings with "the American intellectual community," Ashmore charged, "made the tactical error of confusing his critics with his enemies." Ashmore said that "preaching consensus," the President "had made it impossible of attainment by constant resort to the kind of crude duplicity that buys time but destroys confidence."

"What the Administration desperately needs," said Ashmore, "is the support of men of intellectual capacity and moral passion, but these are qualities primarily associated with those Lyndon Johnson no longer tolerates."

THE NEW YORK TIMES 19 SEPTEMBER 1967

Johnson and Ashmore Letters to Hanoi Compared

Following is a comparison of highlights of a letter by President Johnson to President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam sent Feb. 8, and a letter by Harry S. Ashmore, the editor, sent Feb. 5.

President Johnson wrote:

"I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of United States forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration in South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped.

"These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

MR. ASHMORE wrote: "They [high officials of the State Department] expressed particular interest in your suggestion to us that private talks could begin provided the United States stopped bombing your country and ceased introducing additional United States troops into Vietnam. They expressed the opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage would provide tangi-

ble evidence of the good faith of all parties in the prospects for a negotiated settlement."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "There is one good way to overcome this problem [of communication] and to move forward in search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise, but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution."

MR. ASHMORE: "They [State Department officials] emphasized that the United States remains prepared for secret discussions at any time, without conditions, and that such discussions might cover the whole range of topics relative to a peaceful settlement."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent new year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the new year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be

greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce."

MR. ASHMORE relate a possible agreement to the new year's truce in Vietnam.

MR. ASHMORE: "They [the State Department officials] reiterated that the Geneva accords might be the framework for a peaceful solution."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON did not mention the Geneva agreements of 1954 as a possible framework.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow

where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions."

MR. ASHMORE's letter proposed no specific meeting place.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON: "If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible."

MR. ASHMORE: "In the light of these concerns, they [the State Department officials] expressed great interest in any clarification of this point [about mutual restraints] that you might wish to provide through a communication to us."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 SEPTEMBER 1967

U.S. DENIES CHARGE JOHNSON NEGATED PEACE INITIATIVE

Rejects Ashmore Contention That White House Letter to Hanoi Stiffened Terms

Text of the State Department
statement is on Page 24.

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18—The Administration today denied charges that President Johnson had "effectively and brutally" sabotaged a peace approach to Hanoi through private channels.

The State Department went to elaborate lengths to reply to the charge by the editor and writer Harry S. Ashmore. Mr. Ashmore wrote yesterday that he acted as a Government-approved intermediary last February only to be undercut by the President, who hardened American terms.

The controversy has arisen out of a trip to Hanoi last Jan. 6 to 14 by Mr. Ashmore and William C. Baggs, editor of The Miami News. They brought back reports of a "conciliatory" conversation with President Ho Chi Minh and were later given a State Department message to send to Hanoi.

Bundy Gives Account

William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, confirmed today that the Ashmore peace effort had taken place, but he said at a crowded news conference that Mr. Ashmore's version of the events was "misleading."

The burden of his argument was that the Ashmore efforts had been "subsidiary" to a far more active, important and direct official contact with North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow in January and early February.

In addition, taking direct issue with Mr. Ashmore, Mr. Bundy said there was "no inconsistency" between the Government-drafted message sent to Hanoi on Feb. 5 through Mr. Ashmore and a letter that President Johnson sent to Ho Chi Minh through the Moscow channel on Feb. 8. Mr. Ashmore had contended that the President's letter contradicted the one given him and thus "effectively and brutally canceled" his efforts.

Mr. Ashmore, reached by telephone late today, said the Government's argument "doesn't add up very well."

"My view is that the two letters are inconsistent in tone and content," he added. "Anyone can figure it out: they're both available now. The tone of ours is quite conciliatory. The tone of the President's is quite harsh."

The President's letter to Hanoi was published in The New York Times last March 22 and Mr. Ashmore's today.

If the Moscow contacts were so vital, Mr. Ashmore asked, "why did they send our letter?"

"They were under no compulsion," he added. "They could have said to us: 'Thank you very much, gentlemen. If you're ever back in Hanoi, send us a postcard.' That would have closed the matter."

Mr. Bundy, who was one of Mr. Ashmore's principal Government contacts last winter, dismissed as nonsense Mr. Ashmore's assertion that his role had been undermined by conflicts between "two State Departments"—one sympathetic to conciliatory efforts and the other taking a hard line toward Hanoi.

"Ashmore understandably felt his own channel was at the center of the stage," Mr. Bundy said. "It was not."

Mr. Bundy said the Administration had been concentrating on its exchanges in Moscow, which North Vietnam disclosed last March 21. He said he was "simply astounded" that Mr. Ashmore, in his published account of last winter's maneuvering, had failed to "consider" the impact of the Moscow contacts.

Not 'Stringing Along'

In an hour-long news briefing, unusually detailed for a subject so delicate as peace approaches, Mr. Bundy said Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs had not at the time been told of the Moscow efforts. It would have been "very unwise" to disclose them to private citizens, Mr. Bundy added.

But when a reporter asked if the Administration had been "stringing along" the two men, Mr. Bundy replied, "Absolutely not."

The Government's chagrin over the disclosure of the Ashmore-Baggs peace effort was evident both in Mr. Bundy's comments and in a statement issued by the State Department. The statement ended with the observation that the disclosure "will not reassure Hanoi" that future private peace contacts would remain secret.

Mr. Bundy also spoke of "undertakings" from Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs that they "would

not publish" details of their effort.

Mr. Ashmore disclosed the peace approach in a 15,000-word article in Center Magazine, a new bimonthly publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, Calif. Mr. Ashmore is executive vice president of the center and Mr. Baggs one of its directors.

In his article, Mr. Ashmore said they went to Hanoi to arrange for North Vietnamese participation in the convocation Pacem in Terris II, a world forum on peace. It was being arranged by the center to open in May in Geneva.

Mr. Ashmore wrote that on Jan. 12, he and Mr. Baggs met President Ho Chi Minh and that, in a two-hour conversa-

tion, the North Vietnamese leader was "deliberately conciliatory" and "seemed prepared to consider a specific proposal based on a formula of mutual de-escalation" of the fighting.

The State Department, while conceding that the two men had reported a "conciliatory tone" in their Hanoi conversations, asserted that their reports, dictated to the Government on Jan. 18, "did not indicate any give" in Hanoi's terms.

"In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the U.S. and Hanoi unless the bombing were stopped, and also unless the U. S. stopped all reinforcements during the period of the talks," the State Department said.

Contradicting the Ashmore

version of the episode, the Government statement went on to say, "Ho was reported to be adamant against any reciprocal military restraint by North Vietnam."

Mr. Bundy reported that at the time, Government officials saw "nothing hopeful" in the Ashmore-Haggs efforts but felt that it should not be neglected.

"You have to go on probing," he explained.

On Feb. 4, Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs were called to the State Department to meet with top officials including Mr. Bundy and Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was also present.

Text of State Department Comment on Peace Feeler

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18—Following is the text of a statement issued by the State Department today regarding a report that President Johnson had undermined a peace approach to North Vietnam:

We have had a number of inquiries concerning news stories published today, based on an article by Mr. Harry Ashmore in a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (C.S.D.I.).

The facts concerning the department's contacts with Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs [William C. Baggs, editor of The Miami News] are as follows:

[1]

During the summer of 1966, Mr. William Baggs told the department that C.S.D.I. was planning a major conference in May of 1967 in Geneva, to follow up on the first Pacem in Terris meeting held in New York in February of 1965. Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the center was making to invite North Vietnam to attend, and the department responded sympathetically to the idea of the conference and to these efforts. These initial contacts were with Mr. George Ball and Mr. William Bundy. The President and Secretary Rusk were informed, and Mr. Ball was directed to handle contacts with Mr. Baggs on behalf of the United States Government.

[2]

In mid-November and again in early December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ashmore in calls at the department. In these calls, the progress of the conference plans was reviewed, and the two visitors indicated that they had a tentative invitation to go to Hanoi, with Mr. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to conduct useful explorations of North Vietnamese views towards peace. Mr. George Ball having then left the department, the primary responsibility for these conversations passed to his successor, Mr. Katzenbach, who kept the President and the Secretary of State informed as a matter of course.

In these conversations, department representatives accepted the Baggs-Ashmore suggestions and undertook to cooperate fully. Accord-

ingly, the position of the United States Government on key issues relating to peace was discussed at some length, so that Baggs and Ashmore could represent it accurately in Hanoi.

[3]

On Dec. 23, Baggs visited the department just prior to the departure of the three-man group on Dec. 28. At that meeting, the basic understanding of the United States Government position was reaffirmed, and it was further agreed that Baggs and Ashmore would report confidentially what they were able to pick up in Hanoi.

[4]

Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore visited Hanoi from Jan. 6 to Jan. 14. They then returned to the U.S. and on Jan. 18 dictated for the department a full and confidential conversation with President Ho on Jan. 12. In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the U.S. and Hanoi unless the bombing were stopped, and unless also the U.S. stopped all reinforcements during the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be adamant against any reciprocal military restraint by North Vietnam. The record does not show that he solicited any U.S. Government response to these remarks.

[5]

Concurrently, prior to Jan. 18, on U.S. initiative and without any connection to the Baggs-Ashmore actions, U.S. Government representatives had established a direct channel for communication with North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow. With the apparent agreement of both sides, this channel was being kept wholly confidential, and was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in their discussions at the department.

It is, of course, fundamental to the U.S. Government dealings with Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that there existed at the time this direct and secret channel. Exchanges through this direct channel continued through January and early February and culminated in President Johnson's letter to President Ho of Feb. 8 (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as Feb. 2). As has been stated by representatives of the department, a wide variety of proposals was put be-

fore Hanoi in these Moscow contacts, without at any time producing any useful response.

[6]

Toward the end of January, Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore returned to Washington and expressed to the department the strong hope that they could be given a message for transmission to Hanoi. The department decided that, while the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and must at all costs be preserved, it would be useful to send a more general message through Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be consistent with the important messages being exchanged in Moscow. In view of this channel (of which Baggs-Ashmore were unaware) there was some question as to the further utility of detailed informal communications.

It seemed clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that their channel of communication had been established with the primary purpose of exchanges concerning North Vietnamese attendance at the May conference. Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they could send any messages for Hanoi through the regular mail to a North Vietnamese representative in Phnompenh, who in turn would relay it to a North Vietnamese official who had been the principal contact of Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in Hanoi. Accordingly, the letter now published by Mr. Ashmore worked out with the representatives of the department, and authorized to be sent on Feb. 5. We were subsequently informed by Mr. Ashmore that this letter reached Phnompenh on Feb. 15.

[7]

No useful purpose could be served by giving further details on what took place in the Moscow channel. We can say, however, that on Feb. 7, while that channel was still open and in operation, separate discussions were initiated in London between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R.

The combined reading of the Moscow channel and of these discussions led to the dispatch on Feb. 8 of President Johnson's letter to President Ho. This letter was of course published unilaterally by Hanoi on March 21, and

is a matter of public record. It rested on, and was of course read by Hanoi in relation to, the various proposals that had been conveyed in the Moscow channel. There was no change of basic position whatever between Feb. 5 and Feb. 8, but President Johnson's letter did include a specific action proposal that speaks for itself, as does the tone of his communication.

[8]

As already noted, Hanoi had not responded in any useful way to the variety of suggestions conveyed in the Moscow channel. Its sole and apparently final response was reflected on Feb. 13, in a letter by President Ho to Pope Paul VI. This letter, in the words of one press account today, "coupled an unconditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front." On Feb. 15, President Ho replied formally to the President in similar terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the Moscow channel.

[9]

Hanoi's attitude remained negative throughout. The Baggs-Ashmore efforts were necessarily handled by the department with an eye to the direct and then-confidential channel that existed concurrently to Hanoi. The latter appeared to be by far the more reliable and secure method of ascertaining Hanoi's views.

[10]

Finally, we note with regret that Mr. Ashmore is apparently ignorant of the subsequently published reports of the Moscow contacts, and of their confirmation by department representatives. We noted with still greater regret that at no time since has he consulted with the department in order to attempt to understand the interrelationship that necessarily obtained between the Moscow channel and his own efforts. As this case shows, the Administration has been prepared at all times to cooperate with private individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi in any way, and who are prepared to act responsibly and discreetly. This policy continues, although it seems clear that the present disclosure will not reassure Hanoi that such private contacts will be kept secret.

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FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSCRIPT DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 18:

(DISTRIBUTION OF "STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE" DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1967:

1:06 P.M.

QUOTE MR. MCCLOSKEY: IT APPEARS THAT MOST OF YOU NOW HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THROUGH THE STATEMENT, WHICH IS A DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT.

AS ONE OF THE GENTLEMEN CONCERNED IN THE CONVERSATION WITH MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE, WILLIAM BUNDY IS HERE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT YOU MAY HAVE, AFTER HAVING READ THE STATEMENT.



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Q. IS HE ON THE RECORD?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: ON THE RECORD.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM BUNDY: I WILL BE ON THE RECORD IN RESPONDING TO YOUR QUESTIONS, IN THE SCOPE OF THIS DISCUSSION, AND ALL OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT MR. ASHMORE'S AND MR. BAGGS' CONTACTS WITH US, AND SO ON.

I DO WANT TO SAY ONE THING, IF I MAY, ON BACKGROUND, HAVING READ THE WHOLE OF THE ARTICLES THROUGH THE GENEROSITY OF ONE OF THE LOCAL NEWSPAPERS, AND, THAT IS, WITH RESPECT TO ALL THE WHOLE SHEEP OF HIS ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE MEETING IN GENEVA, IN MAY, I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT ON THOSE IN DETAIL. A GREAT DEAL COULD BE SAID, AND WE ARE DOING SOME WORK THAT MAY RESULT IN SOMETHING LATER, BUT LET ME JUST SAY, ON BACKGROUND, THAT ALL OF YOU ARE WELL AWARE, I AM SURE, WITH RESPECT TO ONE POINT IN THAT -- AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WAS, IN FACT, SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN GENEVA AT THAT MEETING, AS A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMAN. THE FACT THAT HE COULDN'T GET THERE, AND THAT NO SENIOR MAN WAS AVAILABLE TO TAKE HIS PLACE, WAS DUE ENTIRELY TO THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS CAME IN THAT WEEK, AND I MERELY STATE THAT TO REMIND YOU OF WHAT TOOK PLACE, ON ONE PARTICULAR POINT ON WHICH HE IS CRITICAL OF US.

WITH THAT BACKGROUND COMMENT, I AM OPEN FOR ON THE RECORD QUESTIONS.

QUESTIONS, AND ANSWERS BY MR. BUNDY:

Q WILL YOU RESPOND DIRECTLY TO WHAT SEEM TO BE THE NEWS POINT OF THE ASHMORE MAGAZINE ARTICLE: THAT, THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, IN FEBRUARY, I THINK THE QUOTE WAS "EFFECTIVELY AND BRUTALLY CANCELED THIS WHOLE EFFORT TO DRAW HO INTO A PEACE ARRANGEMENT."

A WELL, LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET, AS IS OBVIOUS FROM THE ACCOUNT BEFORE YOU, THAT THE PRINCIPAL, RELIABLE -- AND, AT THE TIME, SECURE -- CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO HANOI LAY IN MOSCOW. THIS WAS THE ONE TO WHICH WE WERE DEVOTING ALL OUR ATTENTION,



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AND IT WAS VITAL THAT OUR HANDLING OF THE BAGGS/ASHMORE MATTER NOT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICED THE SECRECY OF THAT CHANNEL.

I HAVE DESCRIBED SUFFICIENTLY, AND AS MUCH AS THE NATIONAL INTERESTS WOULD PERMIT, WHAT TOOK PLACE ON THAT CHANNEL. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD, AND IT WAS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THOSE PROPOSALS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WITH A SPECIFIC ACTION PROPOSAL, SHOULD BE READ AND WAS READ IN HANOI.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANNEL DEVELOPING THROUGH BAGGS AND ASHMORE WAS, OF COURSE, THERE. BUT WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WHAT HANOI WAS REALLY LISTENING TO WAS WHAT WAS SAID IN MOSCOW, AND THIS WAS CULMINATED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.

IN EFFECT, WHAT WAS SAID THROUGH BAGGS AND ASHMORE WAS A GENERAL INSISTENCE ON RESTRAINT. WHAT WAS SAID IN THE PUBLISHED PARTS OF THE OTHER EXCHANGES AND MORE GENERAL SUGGESTIONS WERE MADE AT OTHER PARTS IN THE EXCHANGES WAS THIS SPECIFIC ACTION PROPOSAL THAT MOVED THE QUESTION OF OUR STOPPING REINFORCEMENTS TO AN IMMEDIATE STATUS, AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, SUGGESTED A VERY CLEAR AND SPECIFIC FORM OF ACTION BY HANOI.

I SEE NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE TWO.

ONE IS THE KIND OF MESSAGE YOU WOULD USE ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS IN A NEW AND AN UNTRIED CHANNEL. THE OTHER WAS A VERY SPECIFIC SUGGESTION FOLLOWING MORE GENERAL SUGGESTIONS IN AN ESTABLISHED CHANNEL. THE ESTABLISHED CHANNEL WAS THE MAIN THING.

IN A NUTSHELL, WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE -- WHILE WE TREATED IT SERIOUSLY, AND IT MIGHT HAVE LED TO A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION -- WAS DEFINITELY SUBSIDIARY.

Q IN OTHER WORDS, YOU DON'T REGARD THE PHRASE "RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT," WHICH WAS USED IN THE BAGGS/ASHMORE LETTER, AS GREATLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WHICH CALLED FOR A MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION, IN SPECIFIC TERMS?

A THAT'S CORRECT. WHAT WAS PROPOSED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER



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-- IN A CONTEXT THAT CALLED FOR VERY SPECIFIC AND IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ON OUR PART, BOTH STOPPING THE BOMBING AND CEASING REINFORCEMENT -- WAS A VERY SPECIFIC FORM OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF HANOI.

Q COULD WE CLARIFY THIS QUESTION OF THE DATES OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTERS? THIS IS NOW SEPTEMBER. ON MARCH 21ST, WHEN THESE LETTERS WERE MADE PUBLIC BY HANOI, THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS DATED FEBRUARY 2ND. NOW, SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, WHEN THE DATE MAY HAVE SOME SIGNIFICANCE, YOU SUDDENLY SAY "MR. ASHMORE HAS MISTAKENLY STATED THIS DATE."

AT THE TIME YOU TOLD US -- THE DEPARTMENT TOLD US -- IT WAS HANDED OVER IN MOSCOW ON THE 8TH. WE NEVER GOT AN EXPLANATION OF THE DELAY.

WHY IS IT THAT SUDDENLY THE DATE IS BEING CHANGED?

A TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, IT ISN'T BEING CHANGED.

I HAVE BEFORE ME THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SERIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNDATED, WHICH WAS THE COMPENDIUM OF A NUMBER OF THINGS. THIS WAS LATE MARCH. BUT I AM SURE IT FITS WITH WHAT WAS SAID BEFORE -- WHICH DATES THE LETTER AS THE 8TH IN ALL RESPECTS. I WILL SAY, FOR THE RECORD, THE LETTER IS -- WAS TRANSMITTED ON THE EARLY MORNING OF THE 8TH IN MOSCOW, AND IT IS DATED THE SAME DAY.

Q WHEN WAS IT WRITTEN?

A IT IS THE EFFECTIVE DATE. I WILL NOT GO INTO THE EXACT DATE ON WHICH IT WAS WRITTEN. THAT SEEMS TO ME A MATTER OF INTERNAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS. BUT THAT'S THE DATE ON WHICH IT WAS WRITTEN, AND DELIVERED.

Q YOU ARE CONTRADICTING THE STATEMENT THE DEPARTMENT GAVE AT THE TIME IT WAS WRITTEN, ON THE 2ND.

A IF I AM, IT IS BECAUSE WE MADE A MISTAKE, CHAL, ON IT. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT IN OUR MINDS ON THE DATE THAT WAS INVOLVED.



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Q YOU ARE SAYING IT WAS WRITTEN AND DIVIVERED BOTH ON THE 8TH.

A THAT IS THE OFFICIAL VERSION, AND IT IS DATED THE 8TH.

Q WITHOUT ASKING FOR A SPECIFIC DATE OF DRAFTING HERE IN WASHINGTON, LET ME ASK WHAT MIGHT BE A RELATED QUESTION: WHEN YOU WORKED WITH ASHMORE AND BAGGS ON THE DRAFT OF THAT LETTER, WERE YOU AWARE OF A FIRM TEXTUAL VERSION OF THE LETTER WHICH WAS DELIVERED THERE TO MOSCOW ON THE 8TH?

A I WON'T RESPOND TO THAT BECAUSE IT INVOLVES A DISCUSSION OF THE EXACT OPERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT. I WILL SAY THAT THE LETTER THAT WAS WORKED OUT WITH MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF EVERYTHING THAT WAS TAKING PLACE, AND CONTEMPLATED IN THE MOSCOW CHANNEL.

Q BUT THE 8TH -- THE LETTER OF THE 8TH WAS "SPURRED ON" -- I THINK IT SAYS HERE, BY DEVELOPMENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN LONDON ON THE 7TH. WAS THIS A REACTION?

A THEY MADE CONTRIBUTION TO IT. I WILL LEAVE IT AT THAT.

Q LET ME GET A CLARIFICATION IF I MAY HERE. YOU SAID TOOK ACCOUNT OF EVERYTHING THAT WAS TAKING PLACE AND WAS CONTEMPLATED WAS THROUGH THE MOSCOW CHANNEL. IS THAT CORRECT?

A THAT'S CORRECT.

Q WOULD YOU COUNT THE LONDIN KOSYGIN/WILSON OPERATION AS PART OF THE MOSCOW CHANNEL?

A NO, ESSENTIALLY NOT. THESE WERE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PREMIER KOSYGIN, WHO WAS CONDUCTING A LONG SCHEDULED VISIT IN LONDON, AND PRIME MINISTER WILSON. AND THOSE ARE DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH THE TWO MEN WERE DISCUSSING RELATED TOPICS, AND IN WHICH WE GOT WORD OF WHAT WAS BEING SAID.

Q WAS THE VERSION OF THE LETTER THAT WAS DELIVERED IN MOSCOW ON THE 8TH OF FEBRUARY -- WAS THE TEXT OF THAT VERSION BASED, IN PART, ON REPORTS FROM LONDON OF A CONVERSATION THERE ON

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THE 7TH?

A I WON'T GO INTO THAT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT WHAT WAS SAID IN THE LETTER TOOK ACCOUNT OF ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ON ALL CHANNELS.

Q THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF THESE PEACE PROPOSALS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER, AND, IN MY MEMORY, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NEVER RESPONDED TO IT IN SUCH DETAIL AND WITH SUCH GREAT ELABORATE CARE. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU ARE DOING IT IN THIS CASE, AND DID NOT IN THESE PREVIOUS CASES?

A WELL, IT DEPENDS ON THE CASE. IN THIS CASE, WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH A VERY DETAILED SET OF ALLEGATIONS, ALMOST EVERY SENTENCE IN THIS RESPONDS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO THE ACCOUNT THAT MR. ASHMORE HAS GIVEN. I THINK WE OWE IT TO EVERYBODY TO GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT. AND SINCE WE ARE DEALING WITH A FULL, AND I AM AFRAID MISLEADING ACCOUNT, WE THOUGHT WE HAD TO DEAL WITH THIS ONE IN THE MANNER THAT WE HAVE DESCRIBED.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: EXCUSE ME. YOU MIGHT ALSO RECALL THAT IN THE EXCHANGE IN THE ITALIAN CHANNEL THERE WAS A VERY COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF THAT PROVIDED HERE.

Q THE FANFANI?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: FANFANI.

A (MR. BUNDY CONTINUED ANSWERING QUESTION)

WE HAVE HAD TO DO THIS WHERE THE MISLEADING ACCOUNTS OF WHAT TOOK PLACE ARE PUT OUT IN DETAIL. THERE IS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE.

Q FROM HINDSIGHT, IT IS ALWAYS EASIER TO FIGURE THESE THINGS OUT, BUT FROM WHAT YOU HAVE SAID YOU THOUGHT THAT THE ASHMORE/BAGGS CHANNEL MIGHT OFFER SOME SUBSIDIARY ASSISTANCE IN THIS THING. IN RETROSPECT, WAS THERE ANY CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO JUST POSTPONING ACTION THROUGH THEIR CHANNEL UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAD GOTTEN HIS LETTER OFF -- WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONTENDS WAS ALL IN THE WORKS ANYWAY?



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A WELL, I HAVE COMMENTED -- I WON'T TAKE YOUR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LAST. I MERELY STAND ON THE STATEMENT I MADE BEFORE.

LET ME SAY WHAT THE PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN, QUITE CLEARLY: THAT, MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE WERE URGING VERY STRONGLY THAT A RESPONSE BE MADE, AND MADE QUICKLY, BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEY HAD SOME INDICATIONS. I HAVE DESCRIBED, FROM THEIR OWN RECORDED ACCOUNT, WHAT DID TAKE PLACE IN THEIR CONVERSATION WITH HO. I HAVE CHECKED IT AGAINST THE RECORD THEY DICTATED. THEY WERE URGING US VERY STRONGLY TO GO AHEAD AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE.

I THINK, FRANKLY, THAT HAD WE SAID, "OH, NOW IS NOT THE TIME," OR SOMETHING OF THAT SORT, THEIR SUSPICIONS THAT SOMETHING ELSE WAS GOING ON, OR THAT WE WERE BEING NEGATIVE -- NEITHER OF WHICH, THE LATTER OF WHICH WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE -- WOULD HAVE BEEN AROUSED, AND THE RESULTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREJUDICIAL TO THE VERY IMPORTANT AND SECRET CONTACTS WE WERE HAVING.

Q WELL, WHY EHN THEY ASKED --

Q YOU USED THEM AS FALL GUYS.

A WELL, THAT'S A CYNICAL PHRASE. WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TREAT IT THE WAY WE DID, IN TERMS OF WHAT WAS SAID. WE WOULD HAVE BEEN GLAD TO SEE IF HANOI HAD ANY DIFFERENT CHANNEL IN WHICH IT WISHED TO SAY ANYTHING DIFFERENT. WE WERE SERIOUS IN THAT RESPECT. WE NEVER KNOW THROUGH WHOM THE LEADERS IN HANOI MAY WISH TO COMMUNICATE. BUT WE HAD TO CONDUCT WHAT WAS SAID IN THE BAGGS/ASHMORE CHANNEL WITH AN EYE TO WHAT SEEMED TO ONLY REALISTIC JUDGMENT -- THAT, WITH A DIRECT CHANNEL OPEN IN MOSCOW, THAT WAS THE MAIN ONE TO CONCENTRATE ON.

Q WHY WAS SENATOR FULBRIGHT INCLUDED IN AT LEAST ONE OF THESE SESSIONS?

A WELL, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE FACT THAT THEY HAD MADE THIS TRIP, AND THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN ALLOWED -- NOT "ALLOWED",



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THEY HAD BEEN INVITED BY PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS TO GIVE US A FULL AND CONFIDENTIAL ACCOUNT, THEY FELT THAT IT MIGHT NOT HAVE GOT TO HIGH QUARTERS. IN FACT, OF COURSE, IT HAD AND, IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS CRYSTAL CLEAR, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT SENATOR FULBRIGHT MIGHT ATTEND A GENERAL DISCUSSION IN THE DEPARTMENT WITH MR. KATZENBACK AND OTHERS; AND THIS WAS DONE.

Q THERE IS SOMETHING VERY CONFUSING HERE. YOU REPORT THAT ON JANUARY 12TH BAGGS AND ASHMORE TOLD OF WHAT HO HAD INSISTED UPON, WHICH WAS BEING ADAMANT AGAINST ANY RECIPROCAL MILITARY RESTRAINT BY NORTH VIET-NAM. IN VIEW OF THAT, WHY WERE YOU, OR ANYBODY IN THE DEPARTMENT, AT ALL HOPEFUL THAT THIS MIGHT BE A PROMISING CHANNEL?

A FRANKLY, ON THE FACE OF THE RESPONSE THERE WAS NOTHING HOPEFUL. NONTHELESS, WE FELT THAT A REPLY THROUGH THIS BAGGS/ASHMORE CHANNEL -- THAT, IN ITS TERMS, RELATED TO, AS YOU CAN SEE, THE SEQUENCE OF REMARKS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THIS CONVERATION WITH HO -- MIGHT PROBE IN A MORE GENERAL FASHION ON WHETHER HANOI WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT. AND IT HAS ALWAYS THE SUBSIDIARY PURPOSE OF SEEING WHETHER, IN FACT, THIS IS A CHANNEL THAT HANOI WANTS TO USE, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE SPECIFICS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT MAY BE NEGATIVE.

Q IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REPLY TO HO, THERE IS A REFERENCE IN THERE TO HAVING BEEN ASSURED -- WITHIN THE PAST TWO WEEKS OF THE TIME HE WROTE THE LETTER -- THAT HANOI'S POSITION REMAINED THE SAME AS IT HAD BEEN. IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THERE MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND HALT AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES.

IS THIS THE BAGGS/ASHMORE CONTACT THAT HE IS REFFERING TO THERE? IS THIS MOSCOW?

A NO. THE STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WHICH I HAVE BEFORE ME, REFERS TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, AND THAT, IN TURN, REFERS TO THE WELL-KNOWN MINH-WILFRED BURCHETTE INTERVIEW, WHICH WAS PUBLISHED BY HANOI, ON JANUARY 28, AND THERE IS A STATEMENT IN IT THAT SAYS, "SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES HAVE ASSURED US INDIRECTLY THAT THAT



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IS, IN FACT, YOUR PROPOSAL." AND I WILL LET THAT STATEMENT STAND ON ITS OWN BOTTOM.

Q AS A SENIOR OFFICER IN THE DEPARTMENT, WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON HIS STATEMENT THERE ARE "TWO" STATE DEPARTMENTS, AND THAT ONE WAS OBVIOUSLY MORE CONCILIATORY THAN THE OTHER?

A IT'S NONSENSE. NO. THE PUBLISHED -- THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT I HAVE GIVEN YOU COVERS THAT, I THINK, QUITE CLEARLY. EARLY IN THE GAME, THE CONTACTS WITH MR. BAGGS, AND LATER WHEN MR. ASHMORE JOINED HIM, WERE BOTH -- WAS DELEGATED, FIRST, TO MR. BALL, AND THEN TO MR. KATZENBACH, AND, AS THE STATEMENT SAYS, AT ALL TIMES THEY KEPT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE INFORMED. THAT IS ENTIRELY A NORMAL PRACTICE.

TO THE BEST OF OUR RECOLLECTION, NEITHER MAN EVER SUGGESTED THAT THEY SEE THE SECRETARY. THEY WERE SEEING THE UNDER SECRETARY. IN SOME PERIODS OF TIME, THE ACTING SECRETARY. THEY WERE GETTING -- AND I AM SURE THEY CAN HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT IT -- A FULL AND AUTHORITATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

I MIGHT ADD, ON THE QUESTION WHICH IS CONTAINED IN THE ARTICLE OF CANDOR, THAT WE WENT VERY FULLY INTO OUR POSITION ON ALL KEY ISSUES. WE ARE ACCUSED OF LACK OF CANDOR BY MR. ASHMORE, IN ONE SPECIFIC RESPECT -- THAT, BEFORE THEY LEFT, WE DIDN'T TELL THEM THAT HARRISON SALISBURY WAS GOING TO BE IN HAND. AND, THEREFORE, THEY MIGHT FIND THAT THEIR TRIP WAS DETECTED SOONER THAN WE OR THEY HOPED.

THE FACT IS WE DIDN'T KNOW MR. SALISBURY WAS GOING TO HAND UNTIL WE GOT WORD THAT HE HAD TRANSITED ON THE 24TH, AND HIS FIRST STORIES APPEARED ON THE 26TH. SO LACK OF CANDOR CAN HARDLY BE CHARGED AGAINST US ON THAT POINT.

AND, AS FAR AS THE BORAD SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, I CAN ONLY SAY THAT THEY WERE EXTREMELY CANDID.

Q THERE IS A QUESTION I WOULD LIKE TO ASK. I THINK THE ANSWER IS PREDICTABLE, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT ON THE RECORD BECAUSE OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS THING. SENATOR



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FULBRIGHT WAS IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND, ALSO, I THINK THAT ASHMORE SAYS -- I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE, BUT THERE WAS SOMEONE THAT ASKED HIM NOT TO TESTIFY UP ON THE HILL, AND SO FORTH -- NOT TO APPEAR BEFORE ANY COMMITTEES. THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE, IN MINDS MORE CYNICAL THAN MY OWN, AS TO WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN STRINGING THESE FELLOWS ALONG IN ORDER TO KEEP THEM FROM GOING UP ON THE HILL, AND SUPPORTING SALISBURY'S REPORTS.

A ABSOLUTELY NOT.

AS FAR AS THEIR OBSERVATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM CONCERNING THE BOMBING WERE CONCERNED, THEY HAD, IN ANY EVENT, WRITTEN FULL NEWS ARTICLES. WE FELT, AND THEY AGREED, THAT, IF THEY WERE TO MAKE THIS KIND OF APPEARANCE, THE QUESTIONS MIGHT TURN TO THE CONFIDENTIAL ASPECTS WHICH THEY HAD NOT -- AND I THINK REASONABLY AND WISELY -- INCLUDED IN THEIR NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS. BUT THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO, IN ANY SENSE, CUT DOWN THEIR RIGHT OF EXPRESSION ON WHAT THEY HAD SEEN WITH RESPECT TO THE BOMBING, AND, INDEED, BAGGS DID IT IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES AS FULLY AS HE KNEW HOW. THIS WAS HIS RIGHT.

Q MAY I ASK A QUESTION HERE? A POINT THAT PUZZLES ME ON THIS IS WHY -- SINCE THESE TWO GENTLEMEN WERE INVOLVED IN A QUASI-DIPLOMATIC ROLE, WITH AT LEAST YOUR CO-OPERATION TO SOME EXTENT -- WHY THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO TELLING THEM ABOUT THE SECRET CHANNEL, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THEY THEY KEEP IT SECRET?

A LET ME -- I AM AFRAID, YOU INVITE ME TO GO INTO TWO QUESTIONS. ONE IS THE GENERAL QUESTION WHETHER PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH SECRETS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT WERE KNOWN ONLY TO A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION. AND, I REGRET TO SAY, I WILL ALSO CALL ATTENTION -- WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF IT -- TO MATTERS ON WHICH MR. DUDMAN IS BETTER INFORMED THAN I. THE EPISODE THAT LED UP TO THE UNFORTUNATE DISCLOSURE OF THE LA PIRA MESSAGE FROM HANOI INCLUDED MR. ASHMORE'S PART IN THAT, I REGRET TO SAY. AM I WRONG, MR. DUDMAN?

MR. DUDMAN: I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN ABOUT HIS PART IN



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IT".

A (MR. BUNDY STILL ANSWERING) HE WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN SETTING UP HIS OWN SEPARATE CHANNEL TO MR. LA PIRA AND IT WAS SOMEONE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CENTER, WHICH, I BELIEVE, GAVE YOU THE STORY. IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. DUDMAN THAT IS NOT CORRECT.

A WELL, WAS IT SOMEBODY WHO HAD HEARD IT FROM MR. ASHMORE?

MR. DUDMAN: THAT'S POSSIBLE.

A LET ME SAY THAT WE WERE DEALING WITH PRIVATE CITIZENS, AND WE WERE DELAING AGAINST A BACKGROUND THAT DID INCLUDE THIS MATTER.

Q GIVEN THE FACT THAT YOU DIDN'T WANT TO DISCLOSE THIS MOSCOW CHANNEL BY ANY MEANS, DID YOU CONSIDER THAT GIVING AN OFFICIAL T F SANCTION TO THEIR APPROACH TO HANOI, AT THE SAME TIME THAT YOU WERE GOING TO MAKE ANOTHER VERY OFFICIAL APPROACH THROUGH MOSCOW, MIGHT MAKE HANOI WONDER WHO WAS TALKING FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT?

A WE DIDN'T THINK THERE COULD HAVE BEEN ANY SERIOUS DOUBT. AND THE MESSAGE THAT WAS GIVEN WAS, AS I SAY, CONSISTENT WITH THE TOTALITY OF WHAT WAS BEING SAID. WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT HANOI WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE TRUE AND DIRECT CHANNEL WAS THE ONE THAT EXISTED, AND WE DIDN'T THINK THAT THERE COULD BE ANY SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD -- WE DIDN'T KNOW, OF COURSE, EVEN AT WHAT TIME THE LETTER TO PHNOM PENH WOULD REACH HANOI. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WE STILL DON'T KNOW THAT. WE WERE INFORMED BY ASHMORE IT REACHED PHNOM PENH THE 15TH. FRANKLY, WE WERE DEALING WITH A CHANNEL THAT AT THE VERY BEST WAS VERY LONG IN ITS TIMES OF TRANSMISSION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAD A VERY DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE CHANNEL. I DON'T THINK HANOI, IN A SOPHISTICATED WAY, COULD POSSIBLY HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD.

Q BOTH YOU AND MR. ASHMORE REFERRED TO THIS BUSINESS OF HO CHI MINH, AND HIS CONVERSATION WITH ASHMORE AND BAGGS, AS TO



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THE NEED FOR THE U.S. TO AGREE TO STOP REINFORCING ITS TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. NOW, AS FAR AS I KNOW, THIS DEMAND WAS NOT MADE ANYWHERE ELSE PUBLICLY. WAS IT MADE ANYWHERE ELSE PRIVATELY?

A OH, THAT'S NOT TRUE. THIS QUESTION OF CHARGING US WITH CONTINUING REINFORCEMENTS GOES BACK, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO THE 37-DAY PAUSE IN EARLY 1966.

Q BUT DIRECTLY CONNECTED AS A PRIOR CONDITION OF TALKS?

A I AM NOT SURE WHETHER WE HAD EVER HEARD IT BEFORE. BUT WE HAD CERTAINLY HEARD ENOUGH REMARKS IN THIS GENERAL AREA TO BE AWARE OVER A LONG, LONG PERIOD THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT, IF WE COULD WORK OUT A BALANCED PROGRAM OF MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.

Q WELL, ON PAGE THREE --

Q IN THE MOSCOW CHANNEL DID YOU EVER MENTION THE BAGGS/ASHMORE LETTER, OR WHAT WAS --

A I CAN'T COMMENT ON THAT. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION, WE DID NOT.

Q ON PAGE THREE -- GETTING BACK TO THE QUESTION RAISED -- IT IS WRITTEN HERE AS THOUGH HO IS INSISTING ON TWO THINGS BEFORE AGREEING TO TALKS. BOTH A STOP TO THE BOMBING, AND A STOP TO REINFORCEMENTS. NOW THAT --

A YES.

Q WELL, TWO QUESTIONS. WAS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF HO'S POSITION, BASED ON OTHER EVIDENCE? AND, SECONDLY, IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF HO'S POSITION TODAY?

A. WELL, THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH FOUR SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, AND ARE DIRECTLY FROM THE DICTATED ACCOUNT BY MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE.

Q RIGHT.

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A SO I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT, WITHOUT QUESTION, THAT THAT IS WHAT HO SAID ON THIS OCCASION.

IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO SEE IN THE TRINH BURCHETT INTERVIEW, IN HO'S REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, AND IN OTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS, AS ABSENCE OF MENTION OF THIS ISSUE.

NOW, I WILL LEAVE IT AT THAT. IN OTHER WORDS, SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HAVE NOT APPEARED TO TAKE THIS POSITION. NOW WHAT THEIR FINAL POSITION MAY BE, I REGRET TO SAY I CAN'T CLARIFY AT THIS MOMENT OF TIME, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE PUBLIC RECORD DOES NOT INCLUDE THIS COND

Q. WELL, DID YOU USE THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE TWO GENTLEMEN TO FASHION THE REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT?

A. IT WAS PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE WE HAD. BUT A VERY, VERY SMALL PART. IF, INDEED, IT PLAYED ANY PART AT ALL BUT IT WAS, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE TO ALL OF US WHO WERE WORKING ON THESE MATTERS.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU DID NOT REPLY SPECIFICALLY TO THIS POINT OF REINFORCEMENT BECAUSE YOU GOT IT THROUGH BAGGS AND ASHMORE?

A. NO. AS I HAVE SAID, THIS AS A POSSIBLE ELEMENT IN A TOTAL PICTURE OF MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION HAD LONG BEEN PRESENT IN OUR MINDS, AND HAD BEEN RAISED BY HANOI IN ITS POST-MORTEM, IF YOU WILL, ON THE JANUARY 1966 37-DAY PAUSE, AND SO ON. SO IT WAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD GIVEN A LOT OF THOUGHT TO OVER LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

Q. WHAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND IS WHY, CONSIDERING THAT BAGGS AND ASHMORE BROUGHT BACK THE WORD THAT HO WAS ADAMANT ABOUT ANY RECIPROCAL ACTION -- WHY, ON THE FACE OF IT, FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW, IT WAS AN ABSURD AND HOLLOW PEACE EFFORT, IT DIDN'T MEAN ANYTHING. HO WANTED US TO STOP BOMBING. SO WHY DIDN'T YOU JUST TELL THEM, "LOOK, HE'S NOT GOING TO DO ANYTHING. IT'S HOPELESS, FORGET IT."



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A. WELL, IF YOU ACCEPTED EVERY NEGATIVE STATEMENT BY HAND! AS CLOSING THE DOOR TO ANY POSSIBILITY OF EXPLORATION, WE WOULD PLAINLY GET NOWHERE. I THINK YOU HAVE TO GO ON PROBING, AND YOU HAVE TO RECKON --

Q. IT WON'T DO ANYTHING?

A. LET ME FINISH. YOU HAVE TO RECKON THAT THIS WAS AN ENCOUNTER WITH INDIVIDUALS, TO WHOM HE MIGHT TAKE A HARDER POSITION THAN HE WOULD TAKE IN SECRET, CONFRONTED WITH A CONCRETE PROPOSITION OR WITH GENERAL SUGGESTIONS; AND THIS IS WHAT WAS DONE IN FACT. BUT YOU CAN'T TAKE A NEGATIVE STATEMENT TO AN INDIVIDUAL AS FORECLOSING THE DESIRABILITY OF PROBING ON IT. IT IS JUST NOT THE WAY YOU NEGOTIATE IN ANY SITUATION; OR TRY TO GET TO A POINT OF NEGOTIATING I GUESS I HAD BETTER SAY.

Q. DO YOU PLAN TO HAVE SCHROENBRUN WRITE A LETTER WHEN HE GETS BACK?

A. WE HAVE HAD NO CONTACT FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Q. DID THEY EVER TELL YOU ANYTHING THAT HE SAID THAT MADE ANY OF YOU FEEL FOR A MINUTE THAT MAYBE HE WANTED TO MAKE PEACE?

A. THEY DID SAY THAT THE TONE OF THE CONVERSATION, AND THIS IS WHAT ASHMORE SAYS IN THE ARTICLE, WAS CONCILIATORY. ON THESE KEY POINTS, THEIR DICTATED ACCOUNT DID NOT APPEAR TO INDICATE ANY GIVE. NONETHELESS, THE FACT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE TYM, TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS--IT WAS CERTAIN OMISSIONS IN THE CONVERSATION. IT WAS THE KIND OF CONVERSATION WE HAVE HAD REPORTED TO US OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME FROM MANY SOURCES, AND IT IS VERY HARD EVER TO GIVE A CAPSULED SUMMARY THAT GETS THE FULL FLAVOR. THEY THOUGHT IT WAS CONCILIATORY -- MERELY THE FACT THAT THEY WERE RECEIVED AND TALKED TO IN THIS WAY, AND THAT THE TONE WAS CONCILIATORY; AND, OF COURSE, THEY WERE THERE.

Q. I BELIEVE THE ASHMORE ARTICLE SAYS THAT HE MADE A CATEGORICAL COMMITMENT, OR -- IT IS INCORRECT -- IT REFERS TO HIS CATEGORICAL COMMITMENT TO TALK IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED. DO YOU REMEMBER THIS -- SOME SUCH PHRASE AS THIS?

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A. I DON'T RECALL IT IN THE LETTER.

Q. IT WASN'T THAT, BUT VERY CLOSE.

Q. IT IS NOT IN THE LETTER; IT IS IN THE ARTICLE.

A. NOW, WAIT A SECOND. DO IT AGAIN. I'M SORRY.

Q. HAS HO CHI MINH EVER -- EITHER PUBLICLY OR IN SECRET EXCHANGES -- MADE A FIRM COMMITMENT, A FIRM STATEMENT THAT IF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM WAS STOPPED HE WOULD ENTER PEACE TALKS?

A. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS "NO." I KNOW OF NOTHING -- CERTAINLY, NOTHING THAT HAS BEEN CONVEYED AUTHORITATIVELY TO US THAT SAYS THAT FLATLY.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION --

Q. THROUGH THESE THIRD PARTIES, THEY ALWAYS USE THE CONDITIONAL COULD, OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

A. THAT HAS BEEN THE NORMAL FORMULATION. THERE HAVE BEEN THIRD COUNTRY REPORTS THAT INDICATE IT IS MORE POSITIVE, BUT NOTHING THAT HAS BEEN CONVEYED OR INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED TO US, THAT I AM AWARE OF.

Q. DO YOU GET -- IN WHAT IS CONVEYED TO YOU -- THE USE OF THE CONDITIONAL?

A. THAT'S THE NORMAL FORMULATION.

Q. DID THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT ANY TIME EVER FEEL THAT THESE TWO MEN WOULD HAVE ANY BENEFICIAL AFFECT ON TALKS, OR WERE THEY JUST BEING PAMPERED?

A. NO, AS I SAID BEFORE, THEY HAD ACTED REASONABLY AND RESPONSIBLY. THEY HAD CAREFULLY GONE OVER THE POSITION BEFORE THEY WENT. THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT IN SO FAR AS THEY PURPORTED TO DESCRIBE THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT THEY HAD DONE SO HONESTLY AND FAIRLY. THEY HAD AGREED TO REPORT



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CONFIDENTIALLY WHEN THEY GOT BACK? AND THEY HAD DONE SO.

THEY REPORTED THAT THEY HAD A WAY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HANOI. WE ARE PREPARED TO TRY ANY WAY OF COMMUNICATING WITH HANOI. IT DID NOT SEEM -- TO BE PERFECTLY HONEST -- LIKELY THAT YOU WOULD OPEN UP A NEW INDIRECT, AND VERY -- I WON'T SAY "TENUOUS" -- WELL, I WOULD SAY TENUOUS -- BUT, RUNNING THROUGH THE RAILS TO PHNOM PENH, AND SO ON, DIDN'T GIVE ONE THE VAST FEELING THAT THIS WAS GOING TO OPEN UP. BUT, NONETHELESS, WE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE IT A CHANCE. IF THEY HAD, IN SOME FASHION, STRUCK HO AS PARTICULARLY REASONABLE MEN THROUGH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO DEAL, THIS WAS CERTAINLY WORTH WHATEVER SMALL CHANCE THERE MIGHT BE THAT THIS WOULD COME OFF.

Q. A RELATED QUESTION, BILL. IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAY " ... THAT THE PRESENT DISCLOSURE WILL NOT REASSURE HANOI THAT SUCH PRIVATE CONTACTS WILL BE KEPT SECRET." ARE YOU SAYING THIS MIGHT HAVE A SERIOUS AFFECT ON ANY CONTACTS OR NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE UNDERWAY NOW?

A. I THINK I WILL LET THE STATEMENT SPEAK FOR ITSELF, SPENCER. I THINK IT IS A SELF-EVIDENT STATEMENT.

Q. RELATED TO THE LAST QUESTION OVER HERE, ON THE PAMPERING, DOES THE FACT THAT THIS HAD SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S IMPRIMATUR CAUSE YOU TO GIVE IT MORE CREDENCE?

A. WELL, IT WAS AN ELEMENT OF FACT, PHIL, BUT I WOULDN'T ATTEMPT TO GIVE ANY WEIGHT TO IT. THE REAL QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT WAS A CHANNEL WORTH SEEKING A PROBE TO SEE IF IT OPENED UP, AND TO SAY NOTHING IN IT INCONSISTENT. A GENERAL MESSAGE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE WERE SAYING IN THE DIRECT CHANNEL.

Q. WOULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEANT BY USING THE WORD "MISLEADING" EARLIER ABOUT THE ASHMORE ARTICLE -- IN WHAT SENSE?

A. MISLEADING IN THE VERY BASIC SENSE -- THAT IT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF MATTERS THAT ARE MATTERS OF PUBLIC RECORD. I AM SIMPLY ASTOUNDED, TO BE PERFECTLY BLUNT ABOUT IT, THAT MR. ASHMORE -- WHO SEEMS TO HAVE STUDIED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER -- DOESN'T TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER



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== PUBLISHED OF COURSE, UNILATERALLY BY HANOI == SPECIFICALLY REFERS TO CONTACTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN MOSCOW. AND, AS YOU GENTLEMEN AND LADIES KNOW, THIS QUESTION WAS RAISED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WHEN THE LETTER WAS MADE PUBLIC BY HANOI. AND THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONTACTS, AND THAT SEVERAL PROPOSALS HAD BEEN MADE ON OUR SIDE. THINGS REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED ONE OF ITS PERSONAL PROFILES OF THE GENTLEMEN IN MOSCOW WHO WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE CONDUCTED THE DISCUSSIONS.

THE FACT THAT MR. ASHMORE COULD ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE OUR CONTACTS WITH HIM, EXTENDING QUITE SELF-EVIDENTLY OVER THE SAME PERIOD, WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN OUR MINDS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO, SEEMS TO ME TO DESERVE THE WORD MISLEADING.

Q. WE ARE ALWAYS IN A POSITION OF DISCUSSING WITH YOU ISSUES LIKE THIS EIGHT OR NINE MONTHS AFTER THE FACT. AND, IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS EIGHT MONTHS FROM NOW, ARE YOU INVOLVED IN ANY GREAT EFFORT WITH HANOI AT THIS TIME?

A. I THINK YOU KNOW MY ANSWER TO THAT. IT IS THE STOCK ANSWER THAT WE ALWAYS GIVE TO QUESTIONS OF THIS SORT. IT IS NOT TO BE READ ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. AND THAT IS "NO COMMENT."

Q. IT WAS WORTH A TRY.

Q. IS THIS USING THE PRESS MEDIA TO CARRY ON SECRET NEGOTIATIONS?

A. USING WHAT?

Q. THE PRESS MEDIA.

. WELL, I WOULDN'T DESCRIBE IT IN THAT SENSE BECAUSE IN RESPECT TO THE VIEWS THAT THEY GOT FROM US, AND THEIR IMPARTING OF THOSE VIEWS; AND THEIR IMPARTING BACK TO US WHAT WAS SAID TO THEM, IT WAS QUITE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD WITH MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE THAT THY WERE ACTING AS AMERICAN CITIZENS AND NOT AS PRESS MEN. THE UNDERTAKINGS EXCHANGED BETWEEN US, IN EFFECT,



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WERE UNDERTAKINGS THAT THEY WOULD NOT PUBLISH THIS.

Q. DO YOU FEEL THEY HAVE BROKEN THAT UNDERTAKING BY PUBLISHING WHAT THEY HAVE PUBLISHED?

A. I WILL LEAVE THAT FOR YOU TO JUDGE, AND I WILL LEAVE IT WITH THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE RELEASE.

Q. JUST TO CLARIFY ONE POINT HERE, AND TO GET THE MAIN THRUST OF ONE OF THE POINTS THAT YOU ARE MAKING: IS IT ACCURATE TO SAY THE EXISTENCE OF THE SECRET MOSCOW CHANNEL WAS NOT DISCLOSED TO THESE TWO GENTLEMEN, BECAUSE IT WAS FEARED THAT DISCLOSING IT IN SECRET TO THEM MIGHT SOMEHOW IN SOME WAY DESPITE THEIR BEST EFFORTS LEAD TO EXPOSING WHAT YOU BELIEVED TO BE A PROMISING CHANNEL OF CONTINUING DIRECT NEGOTIATION?

A. THAT'S TRUE. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOSCOW CHANNEL WAS EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD. NOW, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, YOU CAN'T CONDUCT SECRET DIPLOMACY WITHOUT THAT. TO SUGGEST THAT TWO PRIVATE CITIZENS, HOWEVER WELL-MEANING, SHOULD BE INFORMED OF IT SEEMS TO ME, ON ITS FACE, AN UNWISE SUGGESTION.

Q. WAS THERE ANYTHING EXCHANGED IN THE MOSCOW CHANNEL PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO HO THAT GAVE YOU ANY ENCOURAGEMENT?

A. I HAVE SAID IN THE STATEMENT THE ONLY ANSWER I WILL GIVE TO THAT, WHICH IS THAT WE NEVER HAD ANY USEFUL RESPONSE TO ANY OF THE PROPOSALS. BUT, TO REPEAT, YOU KEEP TRYING.

Q. ON PAGE SEVEN OF YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAY THAT YOU " ... NOTE WITH REGRET THAT MR. ASHMORE IS APPARENTLY IGNORANT OF THE SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED REPORTS OF THE MOSCOW CONTACTS, AND OF THEIR CONFIRMATION BY DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES. WE NOTE WITH STILL GREATER REGRET THAT AT NO TIME SINCE HAS HE CONSULTED WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND ... " AND SO ON, AND SO ON.

ARE YOU SAYING THERE THAT YOU HAD NO CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE HO PUBLISHED THE LETTERS? AND WOULDN'T IT HAVE BEEN, PERHAPS, WISE TO HAVE CALLED HIM AND SAID, "NOW YOU SEE WHY WE WERE SO CAREFUL" AND SO ON?



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A. I SAY THAT WE HAVE CERTAINLY HAD NO CONTACTS OF THE KIND THAT IS DESCRIBED IN THE SENTENCE. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY OF ANY SORT. WE HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CENTER, AND WE MAY HAVE TALKED TO MR. AXMRE ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, IN MAY. I SUPPOSE WE COULD HAVE TRIED TO CLARIFY IT, BUT WE COULDN'T HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN WHAT WOULD HAVE SEEMED TO MOST OF US A FAIRLY SELF-EVIDENT CONCLUSION FROM THE PUBLISHED REPORTS.

Q. DID THE DEPARTMENT LEARN IN ADVANCE THAT HE WAS GOING TO PUBLISH THIS PIECE?

A. NO, WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER.

Q. WHY DIDN'T YOU INCLUDE IN MR. ASHMORE'S LETTER A SPECIFIC CONDITION LIKE THE PRESIDENT MADE?

A. WELL, LET ME PUT YOURSELF IN OUR SHOES. WE HAD A VERY ONGOING DIRECT CHANNEL; WE HAD IN THE BAGGS/ASHMORE THING ONLY THE CONCEIVABLE MAKINGS OF A CHANNEL. TO START, ON THE FIRST COMMUNICATION, THROUGH A NEW AND UNTRIED CHANNEL WITH SOMETHING SPECIFIC IS NOT, PERHAPS, ALWAYS THE WISEST STRATEGY, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU HAVE GOT A DIRECT CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH YOU CAN SAY ANYTHING YOU WANT.

Q. MR. BUNDY, ARE THERE ANY MORE OF THESE FREE-LANCE EFFORTS GOING ON, SINCE THEN?

A. WELL, LET ME SAY THERE HAVE BEEN A GREAT MANY. AND I WON'T COMMENT ON WHETHER THERE ARE ANY UNDER WAY AT THE PRESENT TIME, FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT I GAVE THE RESPONSE I DID TO MR. KALB.

THIS HAS BEEN RECURRENT, AND, AS WE MAKE CLEAR IN THIS STATEMENT, REASONABLE AND DISCREET ACTION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IS SOMETHING WE ARE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE WITH. IT HAS TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE TOTAL PICTURE OF CONTACTS THAT EXIST AT ANY ONE TIME.

Q. SHALL WE MEET AGAIN IN EIGHT MONTHS?

(LAUGHTER)

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Q. MR. BUNDY, ACCORDING TO THE LETTER, THEY SAY -- IN REPORTING ON THE LETTER -- THAT THEY SENT TO HO CHI MINH (IT IS REFERRING TO THE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICIALS) -- THEY SAY, QUOTE, "THEY EXPRESS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN YOUR SUGGESTION TO US THAT PRIVATE TALKS COULD BEGIN, PROVIDING THE U. S. STOP BOMBING OUR COUNTRY AND CEASE INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL U. S. TROOPS INTO VIET-NAM. THEY EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT SOME RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS BE MADE TO INDICATE THAT NEITHER SIDE GETS THE ADVANTAGE, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH OF ALL PARTIES IN THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT."

I RETURN AGAIN TO MY QUESTION: WHAT MAKES YOU SO SURE THAT HANOI WASN'T READING THIS AS SOMETHING CONTRADICTORY TO WHAT THEY RECEIVED LATER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON?

A. WELL, BECAUSE I THINK HANOI IS SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO REALIZE THAT A DIRECT CHANNEL AND A DIRECT COMMUNICATION, SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IS THE AUTHORITATIVE VOICE; AND I THINK THEY WOULD HAVE SEEN CLEARLY WHAT WE WERE DOING. THEY KNEW MESSRS. BAGGS AND ASHMORE, AND THEY MUST HAVE SEEN CLEARLY, I THINK, WHAT THE DISTINCTION WAS. THAT DIDN'T EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME KIND OF A RESPONSE, HAD THEY BEEN LESS NEGATIVE ON THE BAGGS/ASHMORE CHANNEL, IF THEY WISHED TO DEVELOP IT.

I REALLY DON'T THINK SOPHISTICATED RECIPIENTS WOULD HAVE HAD ANY TROUBLE SORTING THAT ONE OUT.

Q. DID YOU -- IN SPEAKING WITH BAGGS AND ASHMORE -- EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT WE SHOULDN'T SEEK TO TIE ANY SUSPENSION OF THE BOMBING TO THE TRUCE; IN OTHER WORDS, TAKE A POSITION WHICH APPARENTLY WAS CONTRADICTED BY THE OFFICIAL PROPOSAL THAT THE PRESIDENT MADE ONLY A FEW DAYS LATER?

A. LET ME SAY WHAT WE WERE DEALING WITH THERE -- WE WERE DEALING WITH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TIMING FACTORS. THE PERIOD OF THE TET TRUCE, THE AGREED PERIOD, RAN FROM THE 8TH TO THE 12TH. WE WERE DEALING WITH A LETTER THAT WAS GOING TO BE AIR MAILED ON THE 5TH TO PHNOM PENH. TO SUPPOSE THAT IT COULD REACH HANOI IN TIME TO REFLECT IN ANY WAY, BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE TRUCE

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PERIOD, RAN AGAINST ANY REASONABLE CALCULATION OF TIME. AND, ALSO, THIS HAPPENS TO FIT WITH THE SUBSEQUENTLY REVEALED BY US -- TO MR. AXMRE -- DELIVERY DATE, WHICH WAS THE 15TH, IN PMOM PENH. THERE WAS NO POINT IN IT. WE WANTED TO GET AWAY FROM THAT. AND, INCIDENTALLY, THE REFERENCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF ON THAT SUBJECT, AND I WILL LET IT SPEAK FOR ITSELF. BUT I THINK, IF YOU REREAD IT, YOU WILL SEE THAT IT DOESN'T HAVE THE IMPLICATION THAT SOME OF MR. ASHMORE'S WORDS APPLY TO IT.

Q. WAS THE SPECIFIC DEMAND FOR ADVANCE ASSURANCE OF THE HALT IN NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH FORMULATED BEFORE, OR AFTER, THE ASHMORE LETTER WAS DRAFTED?

A. THAT'S NOT A QUESTION I CAN REASONABLY OR PROFITABLY DISCUSS. THIS IS A LINE OF THOUGHT THAT HAD GONE ON FOR A LONG, LONG WHILE.

Q. CAN YOU SAY WHAT IT IS -- NOT FOR MR. SCALI'S BENEFIT BUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF MR. SCALI'S HEARERS -- WHAT IMPLICATION YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN YOU REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND MR. ASHMORE'S STATEMENTS?

A. WELL, THE TREATMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF ANY EXTENSION OF THE TET TRUCE, I THINK, IS NOT REALLY OPEN TO THE KINDS OF FEARS THAT ARE ASCRIBED BY MR. ASHMORE TO US IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE SAME TOPIC IN RELATION TO THEIR CONVERSATION. IS THAT CLEAR?

Q. NO. TRY AGAIN.

A. ALL RIGHT. IF YOU GET OUT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, YOU WILL SEE THAT ITS TREATMENT OF THIS IS NOT MADE A CONDITION OR ANYTHING OF THIS SORT. IT MERELY SAID IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF YOU LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM, WHICH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF STATEMENTS FROM SAIGON, BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, OF OURSELVES. IF YOU COULD LOOK TO SEE IF WE COULD EXTEND THIS, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL; BUT IT'S IN NO SENSE TIME-LIMITED OR CONDITIONED BY THAT.

Q. DO YOU AGREE, BILL, WITH THE WIDELY STATED VIEW THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONSTITUTED A HARDENING OF THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS?

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A. NO, I DO NOT. IT ADDED A VERY MAJOR ACTION ON OUR SIDE, THE CESSATION OF REINFORCEMENTS IMMEDIATELY. IT PROPOSED A VERY MAJOR ACTION ON THE OTHER SIDE IN RESPONSE. THERE IS A LONG SERIES OF PROPOSALS OF A GENERAL SORT IN THIS AREA THAT HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. I DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TO HAVE BEEN A HARDENING. ON THE CONTRARY, IT ADDED A VERY MAJOR NEW ACTION ON OUR PART.

Q. THAT'S THE SOFTENING.

A. I CONSIDER IT CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC WAY IN WHICH WE HAVE APPROACHED THIS WHOLE QUESTION OF CESSATION.

Q. THE IMPLICATION OF ASHMORE'S STATEMENT IN HIS ARTICLE, AND I THINK HE ALMOST SAYS IT IN SO MANY WORDS, IS THAT HE HAD A GOOD THING GOING WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY, VERY PROBABLY LEAD TO SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT TO STOP THE WAR, AND THE PRESIDENT SENT A VERY TOUGH LETTER TO HO WHICH KNOCKED IT ALL IN THE HEAD.

NOW, IN VERY SIMPLE PEASANT LANGUAGE, THIS IS WHAT A LOT OF THIS WHOLE CONTROVERSY IS ABOUT. WILL YOU COMMENT ON THIS POINT?

A. YES. I WILL COMMENT TO SAY THAT IT'S AGAIN OBVIOUS TO ANY STUDENT OF THE RELATIVE WEIGHT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CHANNELS AS OF THAT TIME THAT THE DIRECT CHANNEL IN MOSCOW WAS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT. I THINK MR. ASHMORE YIELDS TO AN UNDERSTANDABLE PERSONAL FEELING THAT HIS OWN WAS THE CENTER OF THE STAGE. I THINK THE ACCOUNT I HAVE GIVEN MAKES CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT, AND IN THE NATURE OF THINGS COULD NOT BE.

THE QUESTION IS WHAT THE SUM TOTAL OF THE EXCHANGE IS IN MOSCOW -- WHICH I HAVE CHARACTERIZED AS FAR AS IT'S IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO DO -- AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, AND WHAT HO'S REPLY IS. AND I THINK IT'S CLEAR, IF YOU TAKE THESE ALL TOGETHER, THAT THE READING WAS THAT HANOI HAD NO DESIRE TO MOVE AT THAT TIME.

Q. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE BAGGS-ASHMORE REPORT HAVE THE CONVERSATION WITH HO -- TO WHAT EXTENT DID THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE END PRODUCT, NAMELY THE LETTER OF FEBRUARY 8TH BY THE PRESIDENT?

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A. I THINK I HAVE ALREADY ANSWERED THAT QUESTION.

Q. I AM NOT CLEAR.

A. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY PART OF OUR TOTAL INFORMATION. I DON'T THINK IT PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT PART, BUT IT WAS A PART OF OUR TOTAL STOCK OF INFORMATION.

Q. COULD I ASK THE QUESTION ANOTHER WAY: ARE YOU PREPARED TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS IN NO WAY IMAGINABLE, CONCEIVABLE, RELATED TO THE BAGGS-ASHMORE --

A. NO, I DIDN'T SAY ANY SUCH THING. I SAID IT WAS BASED ON TOTAL ANALYSIS OF ALL INFORMATION OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND, IN PARTICULAR ON THE INFORMATION, NEGATIVE THOUGH IT WAS, OF RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS MADE IN MOSCOW TO OTHER INFORMATION THAT HAD REACHED US FROM OTHER QUARTERS VERY RECENTLY AND REFERRED TO IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND TO THE TOTALITY OF ALL WE HAD.

NOW, OF COURSE, IN THAT TOTAL SENSE, WHAT BAGGS AND ASHMORE HAD GIVEN US WAS A PART OF IT. SO TO SAY THAT IT HAD NO IMPACT WAS, I WOULD SAY, MY OWN SUMMATION -- NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT -- BUT IT WAS A PART OF THE TOTALITY.

Q. BUT YOU WILL NOT SAY THAT THE DAY THAT YOU DRAFTED THE LETTER WITH ASHMORE THAT YOU WERE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER?

A. NO, SIR. I WILL NOT COMMENT ON THE DRAFTING OF LETTERS WRITTEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Q. WELL, THIS IS THE CENTRAL POINT OF HIS ARGUMENT.

A. NOT AT ALL, IN THE ACCOUNT I HAVE GIVEN. THE EXACT DAY AT WHICH YOU COME TO A DECISION TO HANDLE A THING, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS A MATTER THAT A GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO LET STAND ON THE RECORD.

Q. BUT YOU ARE TRYING TO ANSWER HIS ACCUSATION, AND HIS

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ACCUSATION IS THAT ONE-HALF OF THE GOVERNMENT DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE OTHER HALF WAS DOING.

A. I HAVE ANSWERED THAT QUESTION TOO. I HAVE SAID THAT THOSE WHO FRAMED THE RESPONSE THAT WAS GIVEN TO MR. ASHMORE WERE FULLY AWARE OF ALL THAT WAS UNDER WAY AND CONTEMPLATED IN THE OTHER CHANNEL.

Q. WAS THE LETTER UNDER WAY AND CONTEMPLATED AT THAT TIME?

A. THAT'S A QUESTION THAT I REGARD AS A MATTER OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND NOT A MATTER IN WHICH ANY SPOKESMAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMMENT. THE LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

Q. BUT YOU STAND BY WHAT YOU SAID BEFORE, THAT THE LETTER WAS --

A. WE WILL NEVER COMMENT ON DATES LETTERS ARE WRITTEN.

Q. YOU DID SAY BEFORE --

A. YOU ORIGINALLY TOLD US IT WAS WRITTEN ON THE 2ND, YOU DID.

A. NO. I MERELY CORRECTED THE RECORD ON THAT, CHAL.

Q. AFTER IT BECOMES --

A. IF IT WAS SAID AT ANY TIME BY ANY ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN THAT IT WAS FEBRUARY 2ND -- AND THIS IS A MATTER THAT DOUBTLESS BOB MCCLOSKEY HAS GOT SOMEBODY LOOKING UP AT THIS MOMENT -- THAT WAS IN ERROR. THAT LETTER WAS IN ITS PUBLISHED FORM DATED FEBRUARY 8TH. I HAVE TOLD YOU THE FACTS.

Q. I THINK WHEN WE WERE GIVEN THE LETTER THERE WAS NO DATE ON IT.

A. THAT QUITE OFTEN HAPPENS WITH CORRESPONDENCE. IT'S NORMALLY GIVEN A DATE CORRESPONDING TO THE DATE OF TRANSMISSION, WHICH IN THIS CASE WAS VERY EARLY ON THE 8TH.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I HAVE THE RECORD OF THE TRANSCRIPT ON THAT DAY. THERE'S NO REFERENCE TO FEBRUARY 2 IN THE RECORD ON THAT.

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A. I REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW THE FEBRUARY 2 STORY GOT STARTED,
AND I WILL HAVE TO LEAVE IT TO ONE SIDE.

Q. HIGHER OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TOLD US THAT DATE.

A. WELL, IN THAT EVENT WE WERE WRONG. UNQUOTE.
RUSK

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