

CHAPTER 9

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ASSISTANCE UNDER AR 500-60

9-1. Policy. In implementation of and compliance with AR 500-60, USACE will support the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the CINC, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and the CINC, Pacific Command (PACOM) for disaster relief efforts of DOD. USACE will also provide support during other disasters and emergencies when directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, or the Directorate of Military Support.

a. Provision of Assistance. MSC and district commanders may assist civil authorities, recognized relief agencies, and Federal agencies charged with disaster relief. Assistance will be provided as needed (at the discretion of the commander of the activity providing the assistance) or as directed by higher authority. Assistance may be provided:

(1) When the situation is so severe and so widespread that effective response is beyond the capacity of the tribal, State and local governments (including the National Guard).

(2) When support is not immediately available from commercial sources. Support will normally not be furnished if it competes with private enterprise or the civilian labor force, unless so directed by FEMA or HQUSACE.

(3) When direct action is needed immediately to save human life.

(4) By the Commander, Pacific Ocean Division, to PACOM and the U.S. Army, Pacific, to address unique situations present in the PACOM Area of Responsibility.

b. Limitation of USACE Resources. Use of USACE resources in civil emergency relief operations will be limited to those resources that are not immediately required for the execution of the primary USACE mission.

c. Inadequate Communications Ability. When a serious emergency or disaster occurs (e.g., a massive earthquake) that requires immediate response, and waiting for instructions from higher authority would preclude or hamper effective response, and communications with higher authority is difficult or impossible, MSC or district commanders may act to do what is required and justified. This action includes anything necessary to save human life, prevent immediate human suffering, or lessen major property damage or destruction. The commander will report the action taken to HQUSACE as soon as possible. Guidance will be requested from HQUSACE if continued support is necessary or beyond the commander's ability to sustain.

d. Assistance Not to Be Delayed. In situations described in c. above, support will not be delayed or denied pending a commitment of reimbursement from the requestor.

(1) In addition, if needed, the MSC or district may request support from other DOD activities and units. An example of this type of support would be obtaining a helicopter from a nearby Army installation or Navy base.

(2) No emergency contracting is permitted under AR 500-60 unless funds are provided by the requesting (non-USACE) activity.

9-2. DOD Delegation of Authority and Areas of Responsibility.

a. DOD Executive Agent. The Secretary of the Army is designated as the DOD Executive Agent for military support in disasters and emergencies. Responsibilities include the effective use, coordination, and control of military resources employed by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other DOD components, to include all USACE activities.

b. Director of Military Support. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) acts for the DOD Executive Agent for military support in civil disaster situations. DOMS develops procedures and monitors the employment of DOD resources used in disaster relief. DOMS is also the DOD point of contact with FEMA and other Federal or Departments in all matters related to military assistance, excluding ESF #3 activities, during major disasters or emergencies.

c. Tasking Authority. DOMS principally tasks four commands for executing FRP missions. These four commands are:

(1) USJFCOM. The USJFCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the Continental US (CONUS). The US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is USJFCOM's lead operational authority (LOA) for the FRP.

(2) SOUTHCOM. The SOUTHCOM AOR is Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

(3) PACOM. The PACOM AOR is Alaska, Hawaii, US possessions in the Pacific, and the former trust territories in the Pacific.

(4) USACE. USACE is authorized to deal directly with FEMA as the lead DOD agency for ESF 3 planning and execution. For purposes of support to the FRP and execution under PL 84-99, USACE is not a subordinate of a CINC. However, USACE may provide support to ongoing CINC operations upon request or as directed by DOMS.

9-3. Funding. MSC and district use of USACE personnel, equipment and supplies for assistance rendered under authority of AR 500-60 and this chapter is on a non-reimbursable

basis for USACE funds. Costs will be charged to the MSC or district overhead accounts, or other accounts as may be appropriate. However, all appropriate costs and charges will be accounted for, in the event that reimbursement procedures and funding are made available by DOD.

9-4. Army Doctrine - Domestic Support Operations. Field Manual (FM) 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, and FM 100-23-1, Multiservice Procedures For Humanitarian Assistance Operations, should be referenced for Army doctrine on domestic operations as needed. FM 100-19 describes the six principles for the conduct of domestic operations as follows:

a. *Objective* - *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.* All commanders and soldiers must understand the objective and integrate their efforts with those of the supported civil authorities to achieve it. The concepts of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T) determine intermediate or subordinate objectives that must be accomplished to achieve the primary objective.

b. *Unity of effort* - *Seek unity of effort toward every objective.* Commanders must seek, establish, and maintain unity of effort. In most crisis situations, they will be in support and under the general direction of civil authorities. They must coordinate closely with these authorities and clearly understand the lines of authority and control. Unity of effort also requires coordination and cooperation among the other federal agencies involved. Almost all domestic support operations will be conducted in a joint and interagency environment. Although unity of *command* may not be possible since command structures vary, the requirement for unity of *effort* remains.

c. *Legitimacy* - *Sustain the people's willing acceptance of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.* Legitimacy derives from the perception that using military force is a legal, effective, and appropriate means of exercising authority for reasonable purposes. However, the issue of legitimacy demands caution and critical judgment. The Army must be aware of the legitimate interests, prerogatives, and authority of the various levels of civil government involved and act accordingly. If the Army aids in the solution of a domestic problem but detracts from the legitimacy of the national or state governments by so doing, its actions will be detrimental to the federal government's long-term strategic objectives.

d. *Perseverance* - *Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities in support of strategic aims.* Domestic support operations may require years to achieve desired effects. They may not have a clear beginning or end decisively. For example, the Army's involvement in counterdrug operations, which began in 1981, remains Active.

e. *Restraint* - *Apply appropriate military capability prudently.* Specific rules of engagement govern the disciplined application of force. In operations other than war, these rules will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns and may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of force characterize domestic support operations.

d. *Security* - *Never permit hostile forces to acquire an unexpected advantage.* The Army must never be lulled into believing that the nonhostile intent of a mission involves little or no risk. Individuals or groups may wish to take advantage of a crisis situation for personal gain or to make a political statement. Commanders must be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to their units or jeopardize their mission. Disaster assistance operations focus on alleviating human suffering, but as Army forces involved in 1992 Hurricane Andrew relief discovered, prevention of looting and protection of supplies are also necessary.