You won’t be put on a TSA “List” if you forget Your ID

“Lack of ID put fliers on TSA list.”

This USA Today story perpetuates exactly the type of misperceptions that damage the credibility of a system designed to protect the traveling public in a post 9/11 world. The paper was careful not to be inaccurate but omitted information we provided that would have given a more balanced perspective.

An August 13 USA Today article overstated the Transportation Security Administration’s interest in passengers who come to airport checkpoints without identification but cooperate in establishing their identity. The story gives the public the impression they might be put on a “list” if they forget their ID. That is false.

Passengers whose identity is confirmed will not be added to any watch list or face additional scrutiny during future checkpoint visits.

When it comes to security, identity matters. Positively identifying passengers is a critical tool in TSA’s multi-layered approach to security and one that has been bolstered significantly during the past 18 months. On June 21 enhanced identification requirements went into effect and passengers now have to be positively identified before proceeding past the checkpoint. This makes sense because our law enforcement and intelligence partners go to great lengths to identify people planning attacks on aircraft. It is our obligation to stop them once they have been identified.

Since the new requirements went into effect, 16,434 people nationwide have come to the checkpoint without identification for a variety of reasons. The identity of these individuals was successfully resolved in all but 558 instances. This was during a period of time that 92 million people flew in the United States.

TSA collects real-time information from airports across the country so that our operation center can look for patterns and data points of significant security value. The information is only shared with other law enforcement partners on a need-to-know basis. The ability to "connect the dots" on emerging situations can not be underestimated. In the post 9/11 world, such analysis is so fundamental to protecting the American public that it was a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

Because our mission requires this capability, we do collect information about individuals who present false identification or misrepresent themselves to get in an airplane.

Christopher
TSA EoS Blog Team

Pay For Performance; Good For Security

The next time you’re in the security line at your local airport, contemplating the 3-1-1 liquids rule or the possibility of making it home in time to tuck your kids into bed, take a quick look at the officers at the checkpoint.

Right there in front of you are some of the most tested professionals inside or outside of government. At any time, 24/7/365 TSA, DHS or GAO testers can and do test our officers’ ability to detect items that could be used in an attack. Our belief is that rewarding excellent performers is one way to motivate a workforce with a deadly serious job to do. Conversely, not rewarding mediocre performance based solely on seniority is a way to motivate people to step up or consider other career options.

Yesterday, our Deputy Administrator, Gale Rossides testified before members of Congress on TSA’s pay-for-performance compensation system. Along side colleagues from the intelligence and law enforcement communities, she clearly explained that our system provides incentives to the best performing officers. Nowhere is this more important than on the frontlines of our nation’s efforts to keep its citizens safe. We thought you might find her opening statement interesting and thought provoking. For her more comprehensive, written testimony, click here.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Oral Statement
of
GALE ROSSIDES
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, TSA
Before the
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JULY 22, 2008

Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss TSA's progress on our pay-for-performance system, known as PASS [Performance Accountability and Standards System].

I am honored to appear and represent the thousands of TSA employees, our Transportation Security Officers [TSOs], who serve to ensure the safety and security of 2 million passengers a day. These women and men are dedicated security professionals with one of the most difficult jobs in government. These Officers are the most tested in the Federal workforce. Contrary to what so often is the headline grabber about attrition, 22,000 of our Officers have been with TSA from the beginning. They have participated in the largest stand-up of a Federal agency in fifty years. They have stayed with us as we responded to the evolving threat by continuously enhancing the security process, while also building the infrastructure and the human capital system to properly pay, train, reward, and recognize their performance. They stayed for the mission.

There are two reasons TSA relies on pay for performance. Security is the first and foremost. Second, it is to instill a culture of high performance and accountability in our workforce.

Performance on the job has a special meaning for us. Let me be very direct. Our job is to stop a terrorist attack. Our Officers work in an environment in which 99.9 percent of the people they see every day are not a threat, but the threats against our aviation system remain. TSOs want to get passengers through the security checkpoint with a high degree of confidence that they have stopped anyone seeking to do harm—your safety is their priority.

How does PASS improve security? When you get paid more to do a better job, you do a better job. PASS is targeted to reward excellent performance. That is an incentive to perform at the highest level to which you are capable. PASS rewards the individual performance necessary to achieve TSA's organizational goals and that increases security.

TSA's pay-for-performance system is driven by validated data. Its performance metrics are standardized, measurable, observable and almost completely objective. PASS has been adjusted based on feedback from our Officers about what the real job is.

Our Officers have told us they want a pay-for-performance system because they know what is at stake: they want to know that their fellow officers are equally competent. But building a pay-for-performance system takes time. It takes employee engagement. It takes leadership. It takes flexibilities in the human capital system. It takes continuous improvement and it takes constant communication. But for us, it is essential. In my thirty years of Federal service, twenty-three of them with the General Schedule, I have never been more sure of anything: The pay-for-performance system is the best way in this post 9/11 environment, for TSA to manage and ensure the quality of persons on the front line.

The effectiveness of PASS is proven by the statistics. More than half of our TSO workforce has been on the job for four years or more. The 2007 DHS Annual Employee Survey validates that 94 percent of TSOs said the work they do is important. Eighty-three percent said they know how their work relates to the agency's goals and priorities.

TSA supervisors have a significant stake in the PASS program as well, and they are evaluated on how effectively and fairly they administer it. Successful implementation of the program is a component of their own PASS ratings.

At TSA, pay for performance ensures the technical proficiency of the people on the front line. Our goal is for our Officers to be switched on and always at the ready. Pay for performance drives their higher level of performance because their earning power is directly tied to their learning power.
The Senior Leadership Team of TSA is passionately dedicated to our people and the principles of pay-for-performance. We are committed to using the flexible human capital system provided under ATSA to make TSA a model performance-based organization. We are building a culture in which our workforce is actively engaged. It is through listening and working collaboratively with all of our Officers to find solutions that we will continue to meet our challenges.

While significant advances are being made in our technology and security processes, each day's success begins and ends with our Officers. They are TSA's greatest investment. They are everyday heroes. In this war on terror, the individual motivation of our Officers to excel is critical to our success. We rely on the best to do the best at this security job. Pay-for-performance is vital to sustaining this top performing workforce.

Christopher
TSA Blog Team

Myth Buster: TSA's Watch List is More Than One Million People Strong

MYTH: TSA's watch list has more than 1 million names on it.

BUSTER: First, TSA doesn't have a watch list. TSA is a customer of the Terrorist Screening Center, a component of the FBI that is responsible for maintaining the consolidated terrorist watch list. The center has said publicly that there are less than 400,000 individuals on the overall consolidated watch list, 95 percent of whom are not U.S. persons and the vast majority of whom are not even in the U.S.

TSA uses two subsets of this list, the no-fly and selectee lists. These small subsets of the overall list are reserved for known or suspected terrorists that reach a threshold where they should not be allowed to fly, or should get additional scrutiny.

MYTH: There are 1 million names on U.S. Government terror watch lists.

BUSTER: There are less than 400,000 individuals on the consolidated terrorist watch list and less than 50,000 individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists. Individuals on the no-fly and selectee lists are identified by law enforcement and intelligence partners as legitimate threats to transportation requiring either additional screening or prohibition from boarding an aircraft.

MYTH: The ACLU's math estimates that there will be 1 million people on government watch lists this July.

BUSTER: Assumptions about the list are just plain wrong. While a September 2007 report may have said that there are 700,000 records on the terrorist watch list and it was growing by an average of 20,000 per month, that is not the same as the number of individuals on the watch lists. A new "record" is created for every alias, date-of-birth, passport and other identifying information for watch listed suspects. The ACLU does not account for the name-by-name scrub that took place in the Fall of 2007 by all government agencies involved with the lists through the Terrorist Screening Center. This review reduced the no-fly and selectee lists by almost 50 percent and eliminated records of individuals that no longer pose a threat.

MYTH: Ted Kennedy, Catherine Stevens, and "Robert Johnson" are all on the no-fly or selectee watch lists.

BUSTER: These individuals are NOT on the no-fly or selectee lists. They, and other Americans, are being misidentified as individuals on the selectee list. Today watch list matching is carried out by the airlines for every passenger manifest. In cases when individuals with similar names are misidentified, folks experience inconvenience like no remote check-in but they are allowed to fly. Once TSA's Secure Flight initiative is in place the number of misidentifications will be GREATLY reduced. Under Secure Flight, TSA assumes watch list matching from dozens of airlines and implements a uniform, efficient matching process. Today the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs--like airports and train stations--or crossing U.S. borders.

FACTS ABOUT TERROR WATCH LISTS:

• Terror watch lists keep legitimate terror threats off of airplanes every day, all over the world.

• According to the Congress' investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office, terror watch lists have, "helped combat terrorism" and "enhanced U.S. counterterrorism effort."

• Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a terror threat. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

Christopher
EoS Blog Team

The evolution of the Bag: Going "Checkpoint Friendly"

We’ve spent a lot of time talking about the evolution of the security checkpoint here during the past seven months. Some ideas like the Diamond Lanes and our screening of the MacBook Air have been tremendously well received while other topics like the science behind 3-1-1 and our recent ID requirement have generated lots of, let’s just call them spirited debates… In all cases, we’re working to create a system that is not only better for security but easier for passengers to navigate. We do this not because of a need to be loved, but because we increase security through a calmer checkpoint (think bad guys sticking out of the crowd more in a relaxed environment).

One project we’re currently working on that has been widely discussed on the Internet and several blogs is a “checkpoint friendly” laptop bag. This bag would allow our officers a clear, unobstructed view of the laptop and allow passengers to keep the laptop in the bag during screening.

Why do we keep calling it a “checkpoint friendly” bag you may ask? Because the simple truth is that if we were to “certify” bags or “TSA approve” bags, we’d be here for months and maybe years and not weeks developing an approved government standard for laptop bags. By not certifying or approving, we leave it to industry to develop bags that work and get out of their way. We expect these bags to hit the market in the Fall, in plenty of time for holiday shopping this year.

To support private industry’s foray into this new and exciting field, we have opened up our operations to bag manufacturers for a look see. The TSA screening operations at Ontario, California, Austin, Texas and Washington-Dulles have invited manufacturers in to see how their prototypes appear on our x-ray machines, both AT and standard. Officers working these checkpoints are providing valuable feedback on which bags work and which ones need more work. After all, the ultimate authority on whether a laptop will have to be removed from a bag will rest with the officer working the x-ray machine.

Once manufacturers think that their bags are indeed “checkpoint friendly,” then we expect them to produce bags for the market. Some things to look for in your “checkpoint friendly” bag, once they’re on the market, include:

o No metal snaps or zippers underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Plastic works much better than anything metal
o No pockets either underneath or on-top of where the laptop would be X-rayed
o Bags with thick dividers may cause officers to pull the bags for secondary screening and do not provide clear images
o No emblems or seals that are thick and placed on top of or underneath where the laptop would be
o Bags greater than 30 inches in length when unfolded often do not fit on a single image, requiring the TSA officer to view the contents of the bag as multiple images, which takes longer. It is faster to keep the fully opened bag to an opened length of 30 inches or less (although not critical for image clarity).
o If the bag does not present a clear image to the officer, he or she should be able to have easy access to the laptop computer for secondary screening to speed the process.



The key is a clear image of the laptop inside the bag. If wires, batteries or cords are on top of or under the laptop, it’s going to have to come out; which will slow security and anger a passenger that just bought this new “checkpoint friendly” bag.

So, all this talk about laptops may leave you asking, “Why do laptops have to come out of the bag today?” The reason is so we can get a good, clear look at them. It’s easy to hide items inside of or underneath laptops. By removing the laptop from the bag and placing it in a bin, the officer can quickly make the determination that the laptop hasn’t been altered or is hiding anything.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

ID Q&A

Okay, we continue to receive questions on the ID requirement. I will attempt to answer as many as possible below. It’s kind of a virtual chat. We’d love to be able to do a live chat and we’re exploring that technological possibility.

There is also the very real possibility that civil people can agree to disagree…which is the direction I believe we’re heading.

Here goes:

Anonymous said... Could you please elaborate on those approximately 20 persons that weren´t allowed to fly? June 23, 2008 4:51 PM

Sure. The 20 people of the 10 million plus that did fly were turned away from the checkpoint. Some went and got their IDs, some tried to fly from other airports (and were stopped) and the rest just didn’t come back.

Phil said... TSA: If the people on your blacklist are so dangerous that we must restrict their movement, why don't you send the police to arrest them and put them in front of a judge? June 23, 2008 4:52 PM

Couple things here Phil. First off, TSA doesn’t have a “blacklist.” We use two of the Terrorist Screening Center’s watch lists, no-fly and selectee. The no-fly is reserved for known threats to aviation, most of which are not in this country and are not exactly sitting around, waiting for a visit from any government official, U.S. or otherwise. While the exact number of “no-flys” is secret, there are many, many less than 500,000. No Ted Kennedy and other are NOT on the no-fly list. If a person truly is, they “NO FLY” get it?

The other list is the selectee list. This list is for people that require additional screening before they fly. They fly after undergoing additional screening..

Anonymous said... So you're saying that you've been letting 10 people too dangerous to fly on planes each and every day since your misbegotten agency started? June 23, 2008 5:03 PM

Huh??? What we’re saying is that identity matters and we’re strengthening the system by verifying ID.

Chris Boyce said... 1. Where is the privacy impact assessment for the new form and the obviously commercial datamining check? I don't recall seeing it on line, nor do I remember a public comment period. We wouldn't be breaking the law, would we???

No Chris, we wouldn’t be breaking the law. A privacy impact assessment has been conducted and is pending review at DHS prior to being posted. There is no public comment period for Privacy Impact Assessments. Also, commercial “datamining” is not an accurate description of what is happening. We are simply using commercial data as a way to assist individuals in verifying their identity when they otherwise are unable to establish it through an acceptable identity document. Commercial data is not being used to predict criminal or terrorist activity.

2. Why would Hawley state on CNN that he was confident that his new policy would withstand a legal challenge if it weren't retaliatory in nature? Surely even he would know that it's unlikely that lawsuits are a known Al Qaeda tactic. June 23, 2008 5:13 PM

Huh? The question from the reporter was, “Would this new procedure withstand a lawsuit?” The answer was yes. Had the question been, “Will Al Qaeda sue you over this new procedure,” the answer would have been different.

Marshall's SO said... OK, so now we know what kinds of questions travelers, even those who are lying, are asked when they say they "forgot" their ID, i.e., birthdate, previous address, political party affiliation, where are you getting the data from to ask such questions? Can you verify that whatever data service you are using has "good" information? June 23, 2008 5:24 PM

Thanks Marshall. Just for the record, we’re not asking “political party affiliation” as you suggest nor are we asking other sensitive question like religion, charitable donations or things like that (see Kip’s comment on the ID post from the other day). Based on the publicly available data we’re using, we have a range of questions and it’s not a one strike and you’re out procedure. There are a number of questions we ask simply to determine if you are who you say you are. That’s it.

Because of the number of questions that could be asked, we’re also preventing someone from memorizing a simple set of facts to game the system.

Anonymous said... The average length of time for these ridiculous checks tells us nothing. What was the longest length of time you detained a citizen seeking to travel by air who did not have an ID? What was the shortest? June 23, 2008 5:40 PM

I feel like the average length of time is an important data point on how this is going. That said, the longest length of time we took to make an identity verification decision was 47 minutes. Yes that’s a long time and may have caused that one individual to miss his or her flight. The quickest is in the seconds.

Don’t know if the person waiting 47 minutes was a citizen or not but detained is not an accurate term either.

Boy, this anonymous character sure asks a lot of questions. :)

Travel_Medic said... how is checking IDs add anything to security when they are not compared to any list. June 23, 2008 7:31 PM

Hello Doc. You are compared to no-fly and selectee lists by the airlines. Verifying identity is an additional layer of security because it is added to the other layers…namely travel document checkers and the airlines checks against the above mentioned two watch lists. By doing all three, we’re verifying people are who they say they are, they are not on the no-fly list and their documents are legit.

Just yesterday (July 1), we identified a passenger with a fake social security card. Last week, we found a fraudulent passport. Altered documents are a staple of criminal and terrorist activity. We’re playing offense here and not giving free shots to a patient enemy.

Bob Eucher said... What became of the 20 people that were considered "too dangerous to fly"? Arrested? Let go? June 23, 2008 8:09 PM

Bob, I loved you in Major League (yes the last name is spelled differently but it was too close to resist). We’re not saying these people are “too dangerous to fly.” We’re saying we can’t verify they are who they say they are.

You and others might not care who sits next to you on that plane but we do.

Trollkiller said... ONCE AGAIN, I CHALLENGE THE TSA TO PROVE THE TWO SECTIONS OF 1540 THAT THEY CITE (§ 1540.107 & § 1540.105 (a)(2) ) GIVE THEM ANY AUTHORITY OR RIGHT TO DEMAND AN ID AS A CONDITION OF ACCESS TO A STERILE AREA June 23, 2008 10:06 PM

TROLLKILLER…MY VOICE IS GETTING TIRED FROM SCREAMING. Our attorneys interpret ATSA as saying we can do this, we think it’s important so we’re doing this. I’m not an Internet-based attorney but I probably could play one on TV.

Anonymous said... Again, if the airlines need to verify whether the person boarding the plane is the correct person, they could ask for ID at the gate. But why get the government involved in this? June 23, 2008 10:30 PM

The government is involved in this because we’re charged with aviation security. The airlines were charged with aviation security until TSA was formed in late 2001. We partner with said airlines to ensure no-flys aren’t getting on planes and that we do know who is. We supplement that with trained document checkers, identity verification, behavior detection officers and more than 15 other layers of security.

Anonymous said... So it only took 48 hours before the first reported instance of a question about political affiliation being required. I'll make two predictions: 1) The TSA employees who did this will never be reprimanded in any serious manner; the worst thing they will face will be some additional "training". June 23, 2008 10:35 PM

Nostranonymous, I think Kip was pretty clear when he wrote, “"It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."

The person that did this made a mistake and has been corrected. Hope you never make a mistake at your job.

Anonymous said... Just out of curiosity, do you guys run my credit report if I show up with no ID? That's the only way I can think of you'd be able to validate I am who I say I am. June 23, 2008 10:46 PM

No. We’re not concerned about that Columbia House bill you never paid in college. We use publicly available info to verify you are who you say you are. It’s taking about 6 minutes for the .00005 percent of people that show up without ID every day.

Andy said... TSA, Question 1: You repeatedly claim this helps improve no-fly list enforcement. As we have told you over and over again, the ID checkers aren't checking names against a list. They're just comparing the name against the boarding pass, and the face to the ID. So, how exactly does this new policy enhance the NFL enforcement?

Andy, you can tell me “over and over again” that document checkers don’t check against the no-fly list and it’s still not the point. Airlines check against the no-fly, trained document checkers check validity of IDs, we verify identity of those without ID. The three work in combination.

You can say 1 plus 1 equals 7 a thousand times and it still doesn’t make it so.

Also, at the risk of hijacking this thread, we are also working on assuming responsibility for watch list matching from the airlines through our Secure Flight program. We believe this will also strengthen the watch list matching and greatly reduce the misidentifications that occur today.

Question 2: What exactly was wrong with the old policy (claim you have no ID, you get a SSSS and you're on your way)? We technically can still do that, and remember when there's a will, there's a way. There's no such thing as perfect security.

You’re 100 percent right on this on point Andy. There is no such thing as perfect security. The combo of the three layers above is better that the old system when anyone shows up, says “no ID” they get screened and go on their merry way. Keeping no-flys off planes is good security and simply patting down someone does not verify identity.

Question 3: Why are you targeting those who simply refuse to show ID? Some people refuse to show ID because of: identify theft concerns; religious reasons; self-privacy reasons; and/or their own principle. We are free people here in the USA, and we have a right not to show ID. People can lie and say they lost their ID, and get by, but those truly wanting to stand up for their rights will be punished. Is there a political connection to this? I think it's blatantly obvious what your purpose is here, TSA. June 24, 2008 5:08 PM

No political connection Andy, none at all. It’s all about strengthening security. There’s no “targeting.” People are showing up without ID and we’re verifying identity, simple as that. We believe we have the legal authority and we believe this increases security.

Anonymous said... Seriously, what happens if you are a physically disabled person and you've never had an official, government-issued photo ID made because you don't drive or use other services that require such ID? I know of several people with seizure disorders and severe dyslexia who have never gotten a state ID because they simply didn't need one. Their sole photo IDs were their college IDs - nothing official or certified. June 25, 2008 7:41 PM

No problem anon, we work with these individuals to establish their identity just like we would anyone else.

yangj08 said... How are you going to deal with foreign passports? I've already heard of someone having to go through a secondary because the TSO at an airport didn't recognize his Dutch passport. He had to go through a secondary (even though he had valid ID). So what happens to those people (especially if it's someone that doesn't speak English very well)? June 26, 2008 2:14 PM

Apples and oranges Yang. If a passenger has legit ID, including a Dutch passport, off they go. Being subjected to additional screening is not the same as verifying ID.

Anonymous said... Can you please elaborate on how the false positive problem will be addressed? I am currently on the Selectee list (and fed up with it) and want to know how soon this madness will end. June 27, 2008 9:04 AM

Well, anonymous does appear to be a very common name so it might just be a misidentification…Honestly, false positives on the selectee list is a different matter. One we’re planning on addressing on the blog in the next few weeks.

I do encourage you to apply for redress at: http://www.dhs.gov.trip/. You’ll also be glad to know (hopefully) that we’re in the process of taking over watch list matching and that will greatly (like 99 percent or greater) reduce misidentifications, which you are much more likely to be rather than a real-deal selectee.

Anonymous said... If they have no weapons, why does it matter WHO they are?
June 27, 2008 2:42 PM

Ah, this is the key argument. We honestly believe that identity is as important as going through the metal detector. Our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly and in some cases under great physical danger to identify individuals that pose a threat to aviation. The simple truth is that it would be negligent to not use this information to our advantage.

*** Anonymous said... How can requiring ID fit within our constitutional rights?

We’ve answered this repeatedly. Our position is that Gilmore v. Gonzalez affirmed our ability to require ID for transportation via air and the law that formed TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) empowers the TSA to make these decisions.

How are the watch lists being improved? How did they come together in the first place? June 27, 2008 6:17 PM

While the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the lists and TSA is a customer of the no-fly and selectee lists we have worked closely with them to make the lists we use as useful as possible.

As was widely reported several months ago, TSC with TSA’s assistance completed a name by name scrub of the lists (no fly and selectee) and reduced them significantly. This reduces the number of misidentifications, making the list more effective.

As I have also said earlier, we’re also working to assume watch list matching from the airlines and this will have a great impact on the effectiveness of the watch lists.

means to authenticate the passenger's boarding pass.) June 27, 2008 6:50 PM

Abelard said...

1. If requiring ID is truly instrumental in keeping the flying public safe, why did it take the TSA until June of 2008 to institute that policy?

Good question Abelard. We’ve been increasing layers of security for years and now that TSA officers check documents at every airport in the country, we’ve effectively moved the issue and are trying to address this threat.

2. What will the TSA due if a majority of the states refuse to issue READ ID cards to their respective citizens?

What’s READ ID? :) We’re already reading IDs…

We will be prepared to address that issue if it happens. Thusfar, every state in the union is working with DHS on REAL ID.

3. In general, what disciplinary action will be taken against a TSO who asks someone questions regarding their religion or political beliefs in order to verify their identity?

The officer is not coming up with the questions, our 24/7 security operations center is using publicly available databases to determine the most appropriate questions. We’ve already said we don’t see the types of questions you bring up as appropriate.

1) Since anyone can photoshop a boarding pass to match their ID, couldn't someone just buy a ticket under any old name, change their boarding pass, and then proceed through security, with their own, legit ID, since none of your employees are checking the boarding passes to see if a) they're legit, or b) if the person whose name is on it is on your "no fly" list?

Why do that when someone could just print a fake boarding pass at home? That’s why we have these layers I keep talking about. No-fly passenger forges boarding pass at home, shows up and has to beat document checkers, behavior detection officers, and the other layers. No self respecting terrorist is going to say “no ID” when he/she knows they’ll get the extra attention this process now entails.

See, we’re doing is forcing people with bad intentions into additional layers of security here.

2)What happens when someone truly forgets their ID, and the company you contract out with to verify has the wrong information?

We don’t contract out with anybody. TSA employees at our ops center verify the identity with publicly available databases.

3) How does this stop someone who is not a known terrorist?

Totally clean skins are still subjected to the other layers of security, particularly behavior detection officers.

4) Why, in their right mind, would a known terrorist use a legitimate ID to buy their ticket? Wouldn't they just get a good fake?

My sentiments exactly. See above.

5) What if someone is a forgetful person...how many times can they have forgotten their ID?? June 27, 2008 10:09 PM

As many as they want….

Hope these answers helped clear up our position and why we think this is so important. As I wrote in the beginning, it’s perfectly acceptable for rational, intelligent people to disagree on important issues.

Christopher

EoS Blog Team

ID Update and Word on the Blog

June 27th Update to ID Requirements:

Now that the new ID requirement is almost one week old, we wanted to provide additional stats. Below are the latest numbers:

Saturday, June 21-Wednesday, June 25:

Total flyers: Approximately 10 million
Flyers without ID: 1705 (.000017 of total flyers)
Flyers denied access: 59 (.000005 of total passengers)
Average wait time for identity verification or decision: 6.9 minutes

And an editorial comment:

A few bloggers have asked us where we are and why we have not responded to questions. Questions like:

“Do these questions being to make you realize why TSA is a joke?”

“Of what are you so afraid that you refuse to address this issue?”

“Unless you are just going to turn the blog iinto (sic) a carnival or circus?”

That last one brings us to an interesting point. As Kip wrote in the opening post of this blog on January 30th, “Our ambition is to provide here a forum for a lively, open discussion of TSA issues… Our hosts…job is to engage with you straight-up and take it from there.”

I think we can all agree that comments like:

“I am just waiting for Kip to mutter "I would have gotten away with it if it wasn't for those meddling kids."

“My tinfoil hat theory is that the TSA knows it doesn't and have given up any pretense of spin control.”

“I agree -- more TSA crap. The sooner y'all are simply arrested for violating our rights, the happier I'll be.”

don’t really bring anything to the larger debate and really don’t beg for nor want a response.

The simple truth is that we’re just about the only government agency engaging in this type of dialogue on security issues and policies and we’re sincerely interested in rational debate and conversation...but we have neither the time nor the desire to respond to random, vitriol filled diatribes that don’t serve passengers or other bloggers in any way.

We’ve used this blog as a method of change and hope we have proven its merit on several occasions (ending the electronics problem in Hooray Bloggers, Diamond Lanes, etc.). These posts and the bloggers' comments have had a positive impact on your experience and mine at the checkpoint. We’re more than willing to engage in a vigorous debate on controversial issues and look forward to many more spirited debates without the poison for poison’s sake.

We’ve certainly proven over the past seven months that we can take a punch but the constant barrage of body (and low) blows without substance would tire even Mike Tyson in his heyday.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

New ID Requirements: The First 48

UPDATE: We're aware of reports that someone was asked their political affiliation to verify their identity and it is being looked into. Here's a response given to us by Kip Hawley: "It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated."



We're 48 hours into the new procedure and things have been smooth so far. Approximately 650 people have shown up to security checkpoints without ID and a total of 20 people have not been allowed to fly. That is .0005 percent of the approximately four million people that flew this weekend.

Of the 650 people that showed up without ID, it's taking us an average of 10 minutes to verify their identity and get them on their way. We're able to do this so quickly because of the close coordination of our officers at airports and our 24/7 ops center.

Our critics say this has nothing to do with security and it only affects people that want to exercise their rights to anonymous air travel (which Gilmore v Gonzalez ruled on) and terrorists that aren't good liars.

What these folks aren't getting is that by requiring ID, you're closing that old loophole that allowed (up until Saturday) anyone, good or bad, to show up with any boarding pass (theirs or someone else's), say they lost their ID, get a pat-down and bag check and be on their way. Now, no self respecting terrorist is going to subject him or herself to all the additional attention the new procedures brings. This includes: the possibility of interviews with behavior detection officers, calls about them to our national counter-terrorism ops center, unpredictable physical and bag screening and the real possibility of a chat with a local or federal law enforcement officer. No, now we're funneling people with bad intentions towards our expert-trained document checkers and behavior experts. Could a bad person produce an excellent fake ID and get past document checkers... sure. We know that no single layer is invulnerable, but forcing terrorists into what we want as opposed to what they prefer is just good security.

We'll continue to update the stats here and continue to thank the 99.9995 percent of air travelers that work with us to quickly and easily establish their identity.

Sterling
EoS Blog Team

Why is ID Important for Security?

Last week we announced on our Web site a plan to begin REQUIRING ID from travelers on June 21st. This plan includes enabling our officers to refuse entry into the area beyond the security checkpoint to anyone who does not cooperate with us to establish his or her identity. The exclusive reason to do this is to ensure people are who they say they are and are not gaming the system by using a boarding pass with a fake name; a well-known endeavor of professionals and college kids alike that could potentially circumvent the no-fly list.

Does that mean that if you lose your wallet in the cab on the way to the airport you’re going to have to walk home?

Absolutely not…this rule is solely focused on the passenger who simply will not provide ID or help us establish their identity.

So for the security experts in the crowd (and you know you’re out there) you might be asking yourself a few questions, like:

So if a terrorist shows up and says his dog ate his ID, you’ll just let him go?

The answer is a simple and clear NO. Under today’s rules, you show up, say you lost your ID, get a quick pat down, have your bag searched and you’re on your way. One enterprising fellow has even advocated it as a quicker way through security in the past.

Starting June 21, that person could be subjected to a range of options, including interviews with behavior detection officers and local and/or federal law enforcement, enhanced pat-downs or other options. By increasing our options, people with bad intentions don’t know what exactly to plan against, have to beat multiple layers at the checkpoint and need to be ready to face any number of obstacles to their plans.

Why would a terrorist show up and say he has no ID when he can just show a fake and breeze right through?

Ah hah, that’s where layers of security really come into play. TSA has deployed thousands of highly-trained document checkers to identify fake IDs. We’ve caught everything from Spring Breakers with terrible IDs to fraudulent passports. Our officers are very adept at finding fake documents and work closely with behavior detection officers on a daily basis. The old story of the airline contractor not even looking up at a person while checking IDs is long in the rear view mirror.

This is just an assault on my personal freedoms and security theater.

The only reason we’re doing this is to make sure people are who they say they are and not someone who is a known threat to aviation.

Also, our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly to identify potential threats to aircraft. Enhancing our ID requirements further enables TSA security officers to ensure that individuals are who they say they are when they enter the security checkpoint and not individuals who may pose a threat.

And for all the legal eagles out there, it is my constitutional right to fly without ID.

Under the law that created TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA administrator is responsible for overseeing aviation security (P.L. 107-71) and has the authority to establish security procedures at airports (49 C.F.R. § 1540.107). Passengers who fail to comply with security procedures may be prohibited from entering the secure area of airports to catch their flight (49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2). Additionally, in Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to a passenger identification policy.

This initiative is simply a way for us to better enforce the no-fly list and ensure the safety of the traveling public. No secret motives, no hidden agendas, just a security enhancement aimed at people trying to game the system.

For more information, go here.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

Update: 6/14/08

Just a quick note… Our ticket checkers found a fraudulent ID at JFK. Just thought some of you might be interested.

At New York Kennedy Airport (JFK) on Thursday, June 12, a passenger was interviewed by police after attempting to enter into a security checkpoint with a fraudulent ID.

A TSA Travel Document Checker noticed a passenger trying to use a fraudulent New York driver’s license and notified the Port Authority Police Department who came and interviewed her. The Port Authority Police Department released the passenger after issuing a Summons to Appear.

Travel Document Checkers are TSA officers that are specially trained to detect fraudulent IDs and boarding passes to help keep our airports safe and secure.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Friday Afternoon Cartoons

It’s funny, I’ve been with TSA for three years now and each and every previous major travel season, whether it’s Summer, Thanksgiving or whatever, the news media has forecasted a pending meltdown of the security system. As Mark Twain said, “Reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated.”

This is the first year since we started in 2002 that the major focus of a holiday travel season isn’t on the good old T-S-A. Maybe that’s a sign of a maturing organization that has gotten it right for the past several years, maybe is a sign of higher gas prices and a pending presidential election, who knows.

Today, just like each of the past six Memorial Day weekends, we’re staffed up, ready to roll and screen anyone and everyone that arrives at a security checkpoint. Wait times so far are short, maybe because the Air Transport Association forecasts a 1 percent reduction in passengers from last year, but in large part because of the dedicated service of a great majority of our 46,000 officers--- most of which will be on the line (40,000 plus), screening passengers and baggage this holiday weekend.

So instead of some thought-provoking, controversial subject this weekend, we thought we’d try to entertain you with a couple of cartoons that caught our eye. And while our Sensitive Security Information (SSI) office is concerned that the New Yorker may have unveiled standard operating procedures (just kidding), and this guy certainly isn’t Simpliflying, we’ll take the risk to share their most recent cover with you.

Our compliments to the New Yorker and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution respectively.

Have a safe and enjoyable Memorial Day weekend.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

UK Liquid Explosives Trial

While American Idol fans debate the merits of the two Davids, across the pond, a terror trial has captured the attention of most of England and in fact the continent.

Eight alleged terrorists are on trial for planning to blow up seven airliners, five of which were destined for the U.S. While this trial is barely registering in the American press, had the plot succeeded, it would have been catastrophic, killing thousands of innocent passengers and rivaling 9/11 in its ferocity. It’s also the basis for one of our most controversial policies, 3-1-1.

Since 2006, U.S. and global explosives experts have been following this plot with great interest, because of its alleged use of novel explosives and methods. Until information became public during the trial, we have been extremely limited in what we could say about this plot. As the trial progresses, we are finally able to share information - things like the fact that the bottles of liquid explosives were pre-mixed, non-binary and would have almost certainly brought down those airliners;
things like showing the hollowed out batteries that would have hidden detonators; things like despite doing everything “right” this crew of alleged would-be killers would have walked right through airport security anywhere in the world under the rules at the time… Had it not been for intelligence leads, police intervention and eventual arrests there’s just no telling the eventual outcome of this diabolical plot.

Just this week, jurors were shown a video of the liquid explosive the suspected terrorists allegedly planned to use on airplanes. The liquid explosive mix was created in a government laboratory and placed in an Oasis soft drink bottle, just as the terrorists planned to do.

We will post more specific information on the plot as it is available and plan to post a Q&A with the chief of our explosives division on the plot and its ramifications here in the U.S. in the next few days. In the mean time, the Daily Telegraph of London has posted notes from the trial and the video shown to jurors here. We have also posted regular updates to the trial on our Web site, here.

Below is the liquid explosive video we prepared and released last year.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

You asked for it...You got it, Millimeter Wave images.

Here are the much requested, much anticipated, full body images of millimeter wave - both front and back, male and female just like so many of you asked for.

These were provided to TSA by the manufacturer of the technology, L-3. We asked L-3 to blur the facial features just like they are blurred when our officers see the images in Phoenix, Baltimore, LAX and JFK. These are exactly what officers see at airports today and will see in future deployments.

While we have said this many times, it bears repeating, TSA will not keep, store or transmit images. Once deleted, they are gone forever. For additional privacy, the officer viewing the image is in a separate room and will never see the passenger and the officer attending to the passenger will never see the image. The officers have 2-way radios to communicate with other in case a threat object is identified.I venture to say, Mikhail Baryshnikov may have exposed more in his ballet costume than these robotic images portray.

Why did we decide to put them up now? Because you've asked for it... Hopefully the editors of Reader's Digest will consider these for their next cover.

What do you think?

- Bob

05/10/08 6:10 p.m. Christopher said:

There have been a couple of incorrect assumptions made regarding the actual screening that I feel are important to clear up.

The actual scan itself takes about 2.5 seconds. That is the length of time a passenger should stand still in the machine (which is clear Plexiglas, allowing passengers to view their items as they come out of the x-ray used to inspect carry-on bags). The remaining time, between 15-45 seconds, is used by the officer at the remote viewing location to evaluate the image. During that time, the passenger can move around at will next to the machine while the officer attending the machine waits to hear via wireless comms that the image is free of any potential threats. This is an important point as ALL items must be removed from passenger's pockets prior to entering the millimeter wave machine because they will show up and must be removed to ensure they are not threat items.

A couple of bloggers have advocated for the officer viewing the image to be out in the public area. We specifically require the remote location to protect the privacy of passengers using the machine. We just don’t think it’s appropriate for other passengers, airport, airline employees or just anybody walking by to see the images, much less snap a photo with a camera phone or anything else and post that image to TMZ.com or who knows where. That’s also why officers are not allowed to bring anything, including phones, bags or other items into the remote viewing location.

While we’re still collecting acceptance stats, the early word is that a great majority (more than 85 percent) of passengers prefer using this machine in lieu of a pat-down, which contrary to one poster takes much longer than 5 seconds and requires physical contact.

Hope this information helps.

Christopher
EoS Blog Team

TSO Gun Incident

Several bloggers have commented on our blog over the past few days on an incident that involved an officer showing up for work with an unloaded gun. We’ve read these comments and worked hard to get as much information as possible. After turning every stone and working with privacy experts and anyone else that would listen about our need to tell the whole story, the bottom line is that we simply cannot.

The federal Privacy Act prohibits us from providing any details about what happened, how it happened or any disciplinary action we took. It’s unfortunate because there are always two sides to every story.

What we can say is that anyone that shows up with a gun is held accountable, officer or passenger.

Christopher

TSA EoS Blog Team

Passengers Asked For It, Passengers Got It: Passenger Feedback Used in Checkpoint Evolution

While screening 2 million people every day, you learn a thing or two. In addition to this on-the-job learning, we specifically sought out passenger feedback on how a checkpoint could be designed to make their lives a little easier. Easier processes equal more relaxed, patient people. More relaxed, patient people equal better security for everybody.

What we leaned and incorporated is: People want someplace to get ready for screening, people want to move at their own pace and people want somewhere to sit down and put themselves back together after screening.

That’s why we have introduced the prep stop and re-composure benches to the Checkpoint Evolution.

The prep stop allows passengers that need to prepare for screening an unhurried, plastic-bag, trash can and recycle bin-filled environment in which they can make those last minute preparations. This part of the Checkpoint Evolution also helps these travelers better prepare for screening without the cold shoulder from the pinstripe-suited business traveler tapping his wing-tips on the tile floor.


The re-composure benches are specifically designed to accommodate two people and are even split-level to foster sharing and tying those wing-tips when you're done with screening. It's a place to put yourself back together before heading off to your gate.


A lot of thought and feedback has gone into these and the other elements of Checkpoint Evolution and we welcome any suggestions you might have to make this concept even better.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

Rumor Alert- Shortage Of Federal Air Marshals?

Update:

3/26/08, 5:35 p.m.
Christopher Said:

Yesterday I mistakenly wrote and subsequently reiterated last night in a comment that the percent of flights covered by air marshals is in the “double digits.” Frankly, this was a result of my haste to provide information and to get the truth out quickly about our federal air marshal program. It is simply not appropriate to discuss percentage of flights covered.

In no way was I trying to provide information that is inappropriate for release or to mislead the public in any way. The definitive numbers that we can provide about the program are; the number of marshals we currently have is in the thousands, our true attrition rate (that is any air marshal leaving the agency for any reason) is approximately 6.5 percent since the expansion of the program in the Fall of 2001 and that we deploy air marshals based on intelligence and risk.

Since launching this blog 60 days ago, our only goal has been direct, honest, personal communications with the traveling public. I sincerely apologize for this error and hope that it has not degraded or devalued the important dialogue that has been started on this forum.

I have edited the post below to reflect the facts of the matter. Again, I apologize for any confusion this may have caused.

Christopher
EOS Blog Team

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CNN aired a story on Anderson Cooper 360 from investigative reporter Drew Griffin on the federal air marshal service. In the piece, anonymous air marshals, pilots and other "experts" discuss "staggering" attrition rates and make assertions that less than 1 percent of flights are actually covered by air marshals. Below are the facts on how we deploy air marshals, air marshal attrition rates, and the reality behind this highly successful program.


Myths:

"Of the 28,000 commercial airline flights per day in the U.S., less than 1 percent are protected by federal air marshals."

"I would have to guess it's fewer than 1 percent of all my flights," the pilot said. "I'm guessing by coverage of when I go to those cities, fewer than 1 percent."

"That means that a terrorist or other criminal bent on taking over an aircraft would be confronted by a trained air marshal on as few as 280 daily flights."

"One pilot who crisscrosses the country and flies internationally told CNN he hasn't seen an air marshal on board one of his flights in six months. A federal law enforcement officer with is not affiliated with the air marshal service...has gone months without seeing a marshal on board."


Buster:

While the exact number of flights that air marshals protect is classified because we don't want terrorists to play a mathematical guessing game based on percentages, the actual number of air marshals employed by the agency is in the thousands.


Beyond the number of flights that air marshals physically cover, the more important question to ask is which flights are air marshals flying on. Using our intelligence-driven, risk-based approach, we deploy marshals on the highest risk flights. That means a team of air marshals might be on one flight based on intel and none may be on the next.


Simply parroting a sound bite from an anonymous expert or a pilot that flies to New York once a day with no knowledge of scheduling or intel isn't accurately portraying the situation. Random "experts" hardly encompass a qualified opinion on air marshal deployments. The bottom line is that there are thousands of hard-working, dedicated marshals flying day in and day out to protect the traveling public both domestically and abroad. We clearly told CNN their numbers were inaccurate and they chose to report these numbers anyway.


Myth:

"Air marshals who spoke with CNN anonymously...are especially troubled by the lack of coverage on flight in and out of Washington and New York."


Buster:

Flying air marshals speaking on condition of anonymity simply do not have access to global scheduling information. Every single day of the year, air marshal schedules are altered to cover specific, high-threat flights. That means on one day, many flights into and out of New York and D.C. may be covered and on other days, less flights may be covered.


The role of not releasing specific numbers of marshals or flights carrying marshals is an important one. We should not tip our hand to terrorists and let them know the mathematical probability of air marshals being on flights they may be interested in taking over or otherwise disrupting.

We fully desire terrorists to not know for sure if marshals will be on board their flight so that they will have to factor them into any plots involving aircraft.


Myth:

"Air marshals told CNN that while the TSA tells the public it cannot divulge numbers...the agency tells its own agents that at least 5 percent of all flights are covered."

"One marshal said that while security is certainly one reason the numbers are kept secret, he believes the agency simply doesn't want taxpayers to know the truth."

"...the average taxpayer understands there's no physical way to protect every single flight everywhere," the air marshal said. "But it's such a small percentage. It's just very aggravating for us"


Buster:

Today, the number of air marshals TSA employs is in the thousands. We know this because we build the schedule and we assign these air marshals to flights all over the world each and every day.


Myth:

"Sources inside the air marshal field offices told CNN that the program has been unable to stem the losses of trained air marshals since the program's numbers peaked in 2003."


Buster:

Federal air marshal service attrition rates have been approximately 6.5 percent since the program expanded after 9/11. This isn't an exodus by any means and is comparable to other federal law enforcement agencies. The job does require extensive travel, a high level of alertness for hours on end and one of the highest firearms qualifications standards in government.

Being an air marshal isn't for everyone but that should not detract from the thousands of dedicated public servants out flying today and every day to protect the traveling public.


Myth:

"They are whistling past the graveyard, hoping against hope that this house of cards that they call airline security doesn't come crashing down around them," said David Mackett, president of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance.


Buster:

This insulting little sound bite discounts the dedicated service thousands of air marshals provide every day. While air marshals are an important layer of security, they are hardly the only thing stopping a terrorist from taking over an airplane. There are a full 20 layers of security, each vulnerable by itself but combined providing the highest level of security in the history of this nation.


Myth:

"CNN was told staffing in Dallas, Texas for instance is down 44 percent from its high, while Seattle, Washington, has 40 percent fewer agents. Las Vegas, Nevada, which had as many as 245 air marshals, this past February had only 47."


Buster:

Staffing in specific offices like Dallas, Seattle and Las Vegas has changed over the six years of the program BUT these air marshals have been shifted to other offices, not eliminated and not replaced.


Christopher

Rumor Alert: Conflict of Interest at TSA?

Blogger and pundit Annie Jacobsen published a piece titled, "Top TSA Officials in Cheating Scandal Also Ran Private Consulting Firm" on Saturday, March 15. This piece has been linked to from several blogs and other sites in the past day.

Below is a topic by topic comparison of suppositions and the truth. At the end of this post is an e-mail I personally sent to Jacobsen on Thursday, March 13th, three full days before the piece appeared, clearly answering her questions and explaining the rules concerning outside employment. Full e-mail addresses have been omitted.

Myth:
"...the TSA was caught encouraging colleagues to cheat on covert bomb detection tests being performed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)."

Fact:
Anyone remotely familiar with post 9/11 security knows that the FAA does not conduct covert security tests anymore and hasn't for several years. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, Government Accountability Office and TSA Office of Inspection do. The message in question was an attempt to notify federal security directors of the possibility of someone masquerading as a Department of Transportation official and was recalled 13 minutes after being sent. The individual that sent the e-mail was not familiar with covert testing at all.


Myth:
"Consulting in the private sector simultaneously is in direct conflict with federal policy and specifically prohibited by two statutes of Department of Homeland Security employment contracts..."

Fact:
As was written (see e-mail below) to Jacobsen three days before the article appeared, government ethics rules do not prohibit Federal employees from owning or operating a private business as long as it does not create any conflicts of interest for them. In other words, employees cannot participate in any government matter that could affect the financial interests of their own business. The law that restricts this type of conflict of interest is 18 USC § 208. TSA is not aware of any government matter that would affect the financial interests of the consulting company McGowan and Restovich operated.

Jacobsen also referenced a regulation titled, ADM 3700. After checking with our attorneys, that regulation pertains only to federal air marshal personnel, not regular TSA employees. This was also clearly communicated to Jacobsen in the e-mail below.

Additionally, looking at the very document she references in the piece, it clearly states, "TSA employees may not engage in outside employment or an outside activity that conflicts with their official duties..." TSA has looked into this activity and is not aware of any government matter that would affect the financial interests of Group 2M. (as is written in the e-mail below).

Myth:
"Morris "Mo" McGowan took Restovich's place as security operations chief after the cheating scandal broke."

Fact:
While chronologically correct, these events are completely unrelated. Mr. Restovich left the top post in security operations to become a senior field executive.

Myth:
"Restovich did not show up and was instead dispatched overseas. TSA would neither confirm nor deny if in his new role as DHS attaché, Mike Restovich is a government employee receiving a salary and benefits, or if he is a paid consultant."

Fact:
Mr. Restovich was never "dispatched" overseas. He was selected to fill the position of DHS attaché to the United Kingdom. This was in no way related to any scheduled hearing.

During conversations and e-mail correspondences with the reporter, the question, "is Mr. Restovich a government employee receiving salary and benefits?" was never asked. If it had been asked, we certainly would have provided this information. As the e-mail below shows, we did answer all questions pertaining to Mr. Restovich's assignment in England and his predecessor in the position.

Myth:
"TSA's Office of Public Affairs declined to provide further information on Mike Restovich, Morris "Mo" McGowan, or the security consulting company the two men formed while working as TSA officials."

Fact:
As the e-mail below clearly shows, all the questions asked were answered in a very clear, straight-forward manner.

----- Original Message -----
From: White, Christopher
To: 'annie jacobsen' anniejacobsen@.com
Sent: Thu Mar 13 17:39:56 2008Subject:

RE: Two Questions

Annie, Below are answers to your questions. Also, going forward, you will be given the same access to information as other private citizens via our Freedom of Information Act office. They may be contacted at: foia@dhs.gov.

1) Did anyone hold the position, "DHS Attaché to the United Kingdom" before Mike Restovich? And if so, who.

Yes, David Tiedge

2) Do you have any updates you would like to share with the public regarding the Congressional investigation into the matter involving Mike Restovich last fall?

Congress would be a more appropriate source for updates on a congressional investigation. Suggest you contact the relevant committee.

Group 2M:

Government ethics rules do not prohibit Federal employees from owning or operating a private business as long as it does not create any conflicts of interest for them. In other words, employees at the Transportation Senior Executive Service (TSES) level and below cannot participate in any government matter that could affect the financial interests of their own business. The law that restricts this type of conflict of interest is 18 USC § 208. TSA is not aware of any government matter that would affect the financial interests of Group 2M. In response to your question regarding ADM 3700, that policy refers to Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) personnel only and neither Mr. McGowan nor Mr. Restovich are FAMS personnel.

Christopher

Some of the Hardest Working Dogs in the Nation

So here we are in the year 2008, we have laptops as thin as a potato chip, cars that run on electricity or hydrogen and 400 channels of satellite TV beamed right to your living room…yet the best way we have to detect explosives in many environments is that 4-legged friend, the dog. That’s right, TSA uses all kinds of tools to ensure the safety of passengers; things like minivan-sized explosive detection systems How We Do What We Do: Baggage Screening, handheld liquid explosives scanners and many, many other devices but nothing out there today is as flexible or mobile as man’s best friend. None of these tools can search a plane in minutes or sniff a pallet of cargo without removing each individual box.

Today we announced that for the first time we will be training and deploying TSA employee-led canine teams to complement the 496 TSA trained and certified law enforcement teams stationed at 70 airports and 14 mass transit systems. These teams (one handler and one dog) go through the same exact training as our law enforcement teams but will focus on air cargo screening and be one part of our answer to screen all air cargo on passenger-carrying aircraft by August 2010. The handlers are all trained cargo security inspectors so they can cover both the explosive detection and screening side with their dog as well as making sure our partners are meeting their obligations from the regulatory side of the house.

Speaking of air cargo, some of you may not realize just how immense an operation it is to ship air cargo around the world. Commerce and customers have come to expect that millions of packages will fly around the world, arriving at their destination with amazing efficiency and accuracy. The volume is so large that, in addition to the cargo company’s trains, planes and automobiles, many packages often fly with your luggage in the belly of commercial passenger aircraft. Care packages sent to Billy in his dorm room or fruitcakes from your grandmother are sometimes stored below passenger’s feet, right next to suitcases. This is an important source of revenue for the airlines as well as a means for customers to get their packages on-time. Some less popular commercial flight routes survive solely as a result of the money brought in by transporting cargo.

Screening the large volume of cargo passing through the airports is a great challenge that TSA has been addressing since its inception. When the Baja Men so eloquently asked “Who Let the Dogs Out,” TSA answered the call by saying, “we did, we sir, let the dogs out.”

Since joining TSA in 2002 from the FAA, the expansion of the canine program has been huge but we are not stopping there. We plan to deploy 400 more specially trained bomb dogs in the next two years, 85 of which will be TSA teams (non-law enforcement teams) whose main duty will be to search cargo bound for passenger aircraft. The first 12 TSA teams graduated today and will be deployed in the coming months to Dulles International, John F. Kennedy International, Los Angeles International and Miami International Airports. So, by the end of 2009, we will have a force of about 800 bomb sniffing dogs from coast to coast.

While most of us are lucky if our family dog knows how to sit and stay, TSA’s specially trained dogs and handlers enhance the safety of the traveling public, one sniff at a time.

Make sure you read the canine article on the TSA web page.

Alien Flight School Program: "9/11 Redux?"

Some of you may have seen a piece on ABC's World News Tonight last night about foreign student pilots training in the U.S. and alleged holes in the system that allow these individuals to take flying lessons without being checked. The memory of 9/11 was evoked and the name Mohammed Atta even made it into the piece.

Words like "TSA's enforcement is basically nonexistent," "Flight schools want the money to teach ‘em…then they just slip through the cracks," and "What happened in 9/11 (sic) we don't want to happen again…so something has to be done." were all uttered by a former FAA inspector Bill McNease in the piece.

Well, something has been done, is being done and will continue to be done. Here are the real facts behind the headlines:

• Former safety expert McNease estimated that about 8,000 foreigners with FAA certificates were not initially checked under the Alien Flight School Program. After conducting an analysis the actual number is 857, not the estimated 8,000. These 857 individuals held certificates prior to 9/11. In 2006, all 857 were checked and not a single person posed a threat to national security.
  
• Today, TSA checks EVERY foreign national that applies for flight training in this country or at FAA-certified facilities anywhere in the world. Flight schools are required to submit this application to TSA before training begins and our sister agency, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement checks individuals in the U.S.to make sure these students are here legally and properly.
• In addition to ICE's enforcement of immigration law, TSA inspectors have conducted 8,000 regulatory compliance inspections since 2005 to make sure flight schools, aren't "...gonna teach them how to fly and get their ratings and then they slip through the cracks." as the former safety inspector said.

In addition to all this checking of student pilots, we also know of the threat of already certified individuals. To address that threat we:

• Check 800,000 people with active FAA pilot certificates against terror watch lists every single day of the year. That way if an individual is deemed to pose a threat to aviation by a law enforcement or intelligence organization, they will not be allowed to fly into, out of or over the U.S.
• Check all master crew lists (that's cockpit crew, pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer) against terror watch lists to make sure the people flying commercial airliners don't pose a threat.

So, while thoughts of Atta flying around Florida pre-9/11 and former experts saying it's still happening are great for ratings, the TSA and our DHS partners are actively working to make sure that foreign flight students are getting the attention they deserve from us.

The TSA, Our Officers, The Public and Theft

As we know and you have reported on this very blog, theft in our nations' airports is a big problem. It's an issue that has plagued the industry for decades, but now, as the relatively new kid on the block and the agency charged with opening more than 1 million checked bags every day, the finger has been pointed directly at our workforce.

And in some cases, rightfully so... Unfortunately, TSA has experienced its problems with theft. To date, we have terminated and sought prosecution for about 200 of our employees who have been accused of stealing, either from checked bags, passengers’ carry-ons or fellow employees. While 200 out of more than 110,000 employees is a minuscule percentage (less than one half of one percent) over the short life of the agency, one theft is too many when you are in the position of public trust as we are. We do not tolerate, condone, cover up or minimize theft by our officers by any stretch of the imagination and in most cases, it is fellow employees uncovering the theft and the organization pushing hard for prosecution of those that would abuse their authority.

From our perspective, we don't want thieves in our workforce and will do all we can to root them out. We rely on security cameras, two to three person integrity - with managers present, reports of theft by fellow employees and sting operations conducted unilaterally or with law enforcement partners at our nation's airports.

For instance, you may have read a news article from the Chicago Tribune about an officer stealing gift cards from baggage at O’Hare. What you didn’t read in that article is that TSA’s Office of Inspection (our version of internal affairs) actually ran down the stolen gift cards at Target and Best Buy, obtained surveillance video of the thieves redeeming the gift cards and worked with the Chicago PD to make sure they did not get away with this.

A few other examples include: TSA working with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department during a sting operation last summer which netted two airline contractors who stole the weapons of two service members on their way to the Middle East; a TSA-led investigation conducted in New Orleans about three years ago had similar success in netting a small group of thieves working for us; and two years ago, a TSA baggage screener at LAX attempted to steal a high-priced watch from Paris Hilton, then had second thoughts and put it back. In that case, a fellow employee reported the incident and the TSA convinced the city attorney of Los Angeles to prosecute. All of these TSA employees were terminated immediately.

Additionally, to prevent theft, our employees are prohibited from taking backpacks, lunchboxes or any other personal carrying item into baggage screening operation areas. Some airports time and date stamp bag screening cards and today more than half of all travelers use airports that have “in-line” baggage systems. These systems greatly limit the personal handling of bags by our officers and enable them to screen these bags remotely. In short, we have implemented many tools to protect your belongings and ensure your safety.

The question will certainly arise... don't you do background checks on your employees? The answer: YES! The problem with background checks is they check the background, they don't predict the future.

Now many of you have referenced television reports that talk about claims and claim data that seem to implicate our workforce in wide-spread thievery. A Seattle television station aired the original story that was based on data they had requested through the Freedom of Information Act. The data, several hundred pages, listed claims that had been submitted by passengers from airports around the country. In the data, there were no categories for theft or disposition because that information was not requested. The facts, that went unreported and un-requested, were that the majority of those claims were denied or canceled because they lacked sufficient grounds for us to use your tax payer dollars to reimburse passengers.

Now, after the five or ten minutes of time that we have your bag...what happens to it? Well, we estimate that between five and eight airline employees touch that same bag, many times outside of the view of passengers, sometimes in the cargo hold of aircraft.

So what can you do if you feel you have been ripped off? First and foremost, file a police report. Most airports have law enforcement in the terminals, many airports could have a police officers respond in minutes. Second, file a claim with both TSA and the airline. We analyze this data and if we see a trend at a particular airport, we are in a better position to investigate further. Third, check to make sure you have all of your belongings prior to departing the checkpoint area. Fourth, check with lost and found. Everyday we itemize, catalog and store thousands of items that passengers may think were stolen, but in fact are waiting to be claimed. Our lost and found link on our web site can be found by clicking here, Fifth, when traveling through the security checkpoint, to prevent another passenger stealing from you, put your phone or watch or wallet in your briefcase, purse or carry-on bag. That way it all stays together and won't fall out of one of those bowls we have for screening or make for easy pickings from a thief.

Also, I can't tell you how many times I have heard of passengers putting expensive jewelry or even wads of cash in their checked bags! Keep it with you.

Christopher
TSA Evolution Blog Team

02.15.08, 2:10p.m.
Christopher said:

Couldn't agree more with anonymous at 12:31, "the screeners violated the public trust. That is completely unacceptable for a government employee at any level." That's what the post is all about. One case of officer theft is one too many and we're doing our level best to find, fire and aid in the prosectution of any officer that is stealing. Beyond the obvious lack of honesty and abuse of the public trust that has been mentioned, officers stealing sully the reputation of the great majority of the workforce and make their jobs much more difficult.

I'm not familiar with what a public affairs "gonk" is but I'm sure it's not a term of endearment. I was not trying to be intentionally vague when I wrote about 200. Let's agree to about 271, okay?

If you reply with a link to the Austin article, I'll track it down and get some facts and update this post later today. I've been with TSA three years and have never heard us characterize any theft as "minor" and am interested in this.

02.15.08, 3:10p.m.
Christopher said:

Great comments and questions about the locks. Hopefully this will clear up a couple issues. First, TSA is not cutting TSA recognized locks off your baggage. We have the keys and have no need to do this. In fact, it would take longer to grab bolt cutters (which we do keep for non-TSA recognized locks) and cut the lock off, pick up the pieces and replace the bolt cutters than it does to use the master keys we have.

The reality of the airport is that there are literally miles of belts with twists and turns everywhere. Belts the airlines use to get your luggage from the ticket counter to us, belts we use to move the bags through the mini-van sized explosive detection machines, belts to get the bags back to the airlines and to the areas where bags are collected for specific flights and of course belts to move the bags into the underside of the aircraft. This doesn't even include the belts at the destination airport that get bags from the plane to the carousel. The point about all these belts is that twists and turns in the belt system are notorious pinch points for bags and particularly locks. Go to any airport in America and the floor of these areas will have broken locks on them. Yes it's a design issue and it is being addressed in some of our more modern airports and systems but the plain truth about these locks is that more often than not, it's a belt that broke your lock, not a person.

As some have mentioned, these locks aren't built to withstand a serious pounding and can be broken, pulled apart, picked or otherwise disabled. These locks provide a modest amount of protection from opportunistic thieves, they will not stop someone bent on getting into a bag just like a lock on your front door would not prevent a burglar from breaking your window.

Christopher
TSA Evolution Blog Team

RUMOR ALERT! LAPTOPS

We have received several questions, comments and links to other blogs about a Washington Post article on confiscating laptops and other electronic devices at airports.

» Click Here to read the Washington Post Article.

As the article correctly states, this is a customs issue and not one TSA is involved in.

TSA does not and will not confiscate laptops or other electronic devices at our checkpoints. Our officers’ are solely focused on the safety of the traveling public and are looking for explosives and other prohibited items. Should one of our officers find something suspicious, we will immediately contact local law enforcement and potentially the local bomb squad. We will not ask for any password, access to any files or take the laptop from you for longer than it takes to determine if it contains a threat.

Should anyone at a TSA checkpoint attempt to confiscate your laptop or gain your passwords or other information, please ask to see a supervisor or screening manager immediately.


Christopher
TSA Evolution Blog Team

2/14/08 8:41 a.m.

Nico Said:

The post referencing LAX Terminal 6 requiring all passengers remove all electronic items piqued our interest, so we have done some digging. First thing this morning we checked with our Lead TSO at Terminal 6 and we spoke with our Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening, who both refuted the posting and stated, "passengers are not required to remove all electronics, in fact, we are requesting they put all small electronic items in their carry-on bags to help keep them together." Additionally, the Screening Manager at LAX who is responsible for the operations in both Terminals 5 and 6, is in the process of conducting an employee by employee inquiry to determine if anyone has required this of passengers in the last couple of days. So far, there have been negative findings. Is it possible that one passenger had to remove all electronics after an initial pass through the X-ray because we had trouble identifying possible threat items? Yes. But again, all passengers are not required to remove all electronics.

Blog Team Member

HOORAY BLOGGERS! (Commenting Disabled)

A Win for the Blogosphere

Posters on this blog have had their first official impact on our operations. That’s right, less than one week since we began the blog and already you’re affecting security in a very positive way.

On Monday afternoon we began receiving questions about airports that were requiring ALL electronics to be removed from carry-on bags (everything, including blackberrys, iPods and even cords). This practice was also mentioned on several other blogs and left us scratching our heads.

So…we checked with our security operations team to figure out what was going on. After some calls to our airports, we learned that this exercise was set up by local TSA offices and was not part of any grand plan across the country. These practices were stopped on Monday afternoon and blackberrys, cords and iPods began to flow through checkpoints like the booze was flowing on Bourbon Street Tuesday night. (Fat Tuesday of course).

So thanks to everyone for asking about this and for giving us a chance to make it right. Our hope is that examples like this validate our forum and show the solid partnerships we can form with our customers - the traveling public - in not only increasing security but in making all of our lives just a little easier.

Thanks again and keep those comments and questions coming.