



*U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of Inspector General*



*2010 Census:
Quarterly Report
to Congress,
January 2011*

Final Report No. OIG-11-017-I

For Public Release





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Inspector General
Washington, D.C. 20230

January 18, 2011

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member:

This report responds to the explanatory statement accompanying the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 requiring the Office of Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis the status of Census's 2010 operations. This report covers two quarterly periods from April-September 2010. For these periods we report on the impact of Census's Paper-Based Operations Control System on many enumeration operations, including the largest, Nonresponse Follow-up; the status of the 2010 Census budget and spending of funds provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; and an update on program-level risks to the census, including the growing concerns about the safety of census employees. In addition, we summarize several other OIG census reviews, including whistleblower allegations concerning operations in Brooklyn, New York.

We have sent identical letters to the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies.

If you have any questions, or if we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 482-4661.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Todd J. Zinser".

Todd J. Zinser

Enclosure

cc: Members of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Inspector General
Washington, D.C. 20230

January 18, 2011

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Madam Chairwoman and Senator Shelby:

This report responds to the explanatory statement accompanying the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 requiring the Office of Inspector General to report on a quarterly basis the status of Census's 2010 operations. This report covers two quarterly periods from April-September 2010. For these periods we report on the impact of Census's Paper based Operations Control System on many enumeration operations, including the largest, Non-response Follow-up; the status of the 2010 Census budget and spending of funds provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; and an update on program-level risks to the census, including the growing concerns about the safety of census employees. In addition, we summarize several other OIG census reviews, including whistleblower allegations concerning operations in Brooklyn, New York.

We have sent identical letters to the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies.

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Sincerely,

Todd J. Zinser

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Report In Brief

U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General



Why We Did This Review

The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 gave the Census Bureau an additional \$210 million to help cover spiraling 2010 decennial costs stemming from the bureau's problematic efforts to automate major field operations, major flaws in its cost-estimating methods, and other issues. The Act's explanatory statement required the bureau to submit to Congress a detailed plan and timeline of decennial milestones and expenditures, as well as a quantitative assessment of associated program risks, within 30 days.

OIG must provide quarterly reports on the bureau's progress against this plan. This report's objective was to provide an update of activities and operations, identify budget and spending issues, and examine risks to the 2010 Census program.

Background

First conducted in 1790, decennial censuses have fulfilled a vital constitutional mandate. The 2010 Census enumerated more than 300 million people. The results provide important data that will guide Congressional apportionment and redistricting, as well as the distribution of more than \$400 billion of government funding annually.

The 2010 Census represents the largest peacetime mobilization in American history. For this massive undertaking, Census integrated 44 separate operations (with a total of some 9,400 program- and project-level activities). Temporary bureau management staff ran 494 local offices and managed over 600,000 temporary workers, all in order to contact 134 million U.S. households. Census completed the count on time and matched the 2000 decennial's final mail participation rate of 74 percent.

2010 Census: Quarterly Report to Congress

January 2011 (OIG-11-017-I)

What We Found

This report covers 2010 Census activities for two quarterly periods, from April through September 2010, and includes more current information where available. We address the status of the Census budget and spending of Recovery Act funds; the status of OIG field observations, especially for Nonresponse Follow-up (NRFU) and Vacant Delete Check (VDC) operations, and how paper-based operations control system (PBOCS) problems affected them; and risk management activities, including enumerator safety and an allegation of improprieties at one local Census office. In addition, we report the findings of other OIG reviews during this period. More specifically, we focused on:

- **2010 Census Costs.** Although spending remained under budget (\$7.4 billion projected; about \$5.5 billion spent), Census did not adequately implement our recommendation to control wage, travel, and training costs. Our two previous quarterly reports highlighted lower cost estimates offset by higher spending, which were obscured by financial management reporting that lacked transparency. Here we report that the trend continued, due to inadequate planning and insufficient tracking. Additionally, our analysis of travel and training costs reveals inefficiencies.
- **OIG Field Observations.** IT systems instability caused higher costs and may have negatively affected data quality. Our February and May quarterly reports raised questions about the viability of PBOCS, Census's primary tool for field workload planning and reporting. Our field observations confirmed the expected: increased cost and potential data errors because of PBOCS' inadequacies. We describe how the system adversely affected NRFU and its quality control component, the Field Verification operation that followed NRFU, and the completion of the Update/Enumerate operation.

Previous OIG reports tracked early field operations (before April 1, 2010) and NRFU. OIG oversight of the 2010 Census continued with NRFU and VDC. We observed some enumerators not following important procedures, such as leaving notice of visits and following questionnaire scripts. During VDC, we also observed respondents' unwillingness to answer interview questions, which affected production. Finally, we explain how Census map quality needs improvement.

- **Census Employee Safety.** Our review of the Census field notes and incident reports indicated that not all threats and other criminal conduct directed at enumerators generated either a formal review or an enforcement action. NRFU highlighted many instances of Census employee risk at the hands of respondents; reports detailed hundreds of instances of threats as well as physical, verbal, or sexual attacks. We suggest that the Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, law enforcement agencies, and Congress collaborate to develop an appropriate solution that explicitly addresses enumerator safety.
- **Risk Management Activities.** Census's Risk Review Board (RRB) continued to oversee risk management activities and modify its risk register. However, the RRB made little progress in finalizing outstanding contingency plans. The board's inability to prioritize the completion of remaining contingency plans—especially with one of the risks rated "high" throughout the major decennial operations—was of serious concern.
- **Other OIG Census Reviews.** During this period, we examined contract labor costs; investigated important whistleblower accusations at a Brooklyn, New York, local Census office; and looked at the bureau's process for handling fingerprint checks of potential hires.

This report does not provide recommendations. We will publish a synopsis and final report of all OIG field operations and evaluations of the 2010 Census in the spring of 2011.

OIG Quarterly Report to Congress, January 2011

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Introduction and Summary

The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, enacted June 30, 2008, gave the U.S. Census Bureau an additional \$210 million to help cover spiraling 2010 Census costs. The Act's explanatory statement required Census to formulate a detailed plan encompassing a timeline of decennial activities, cost estimates, and risk management activities. This information and subsequent updates of Census's progress are the measures that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews in these quarterly reports.

Our previous quarterly report, issued in May 2010,¹ covered 2010 Census activities from January through March 2010. It discussed the status of Census's Paper-Based Operations Control System (PBOCS) and its relationship to the success of several Census operations, especially Nonresponse Follow-up (NRFU); the status of the 2010 Census budget and spending of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds; and an update on program-level risks to the census, including the development of contingency plans and tests of physical security at key Census facilities. In addition, we reported the findings of field visits by OIG personnel.

This report examines 2010 Census activities for two quarterly periods, from April through September 2010, in order to report comprehensively on the nationwide NRFU field operations occurring during this time. More current information is included where available. The report addresses the status of the Census budget and spending of Recovery Act funds; the status of OIG field observations, especially for NRFU and Vacant Delete Check (VDC) operations, and how they were affected by PBOCS problems; and risk management activities, including enumerator safety and an allegation of improprieties at one local Census office. In addition, we report the findings of field visits by OIG personnel during this period. A synopsis and final report of all OIG field operations and evaluations of the 2010 Census will be published in the spring of 2011.

2010 Census Costs: Although Spending Remained Under Budget, Census Did Not Adequately Implement our Recommendation to Control Wage, Travel, and Training Costs

Both of our last two quarterly reports pointed out that overall Census spending has remained within budget, but warned of expected increases in the upcoming NRFU and VDC operations.² The February report highlighted spending disparities among local Census offices on the Address Canvassing operation, discussed overpayments of mileage reimbursements due to incorrect use of a higher per-mile rate than warranted, and described how a lowered cost estimate for NRFU would likely be offset by increases for VDC. In May, we reported that spending was under

¹ 2010 Census: *Quarterly Report to Congress, May 2010* (OIG-19791-4, May 2010).

² 2010 Census: *Quarterly Report to Congress, May 2010* (OIG-19791-4, May 2010) and *2010 Census: Quarterly Report to Congress, February 2010* (OIG-19791-3, February 2010).

budget but again warned of impending cost increases associated with NRFU. Further, we discussed the lack of transparency in some of Census's financial management reports.

This report illustrates that the same trend has continued: overall spending was under budget, although unnecessary costs were incurred and planning was inadequate. Along with insufficient tracking, this resulted in management's lack of knowledge regarding operational expenses.

IT Systems Instability Caused Higher Costs and May Have Negatively Affected Data Quality

Our February and May quarterly reports raised questions about the viability of Census's primary tool for handling the results of its enumeration: the paper-based operations control system (PBOCS). Development and testing of this system consistently indicated that reduced functionality would be a problem and would require various workarounds to complete NRFU—the largest operation of the decennial. Indeed, PBOCS' instability and frequent outages, especially when combined with the sheer volume of NRFU-generated data, foretold substantial reliability problems. OIG field observations confirmed the expected: increased cost and potential data errors because of PBOCS' inadequacies.

Concerns over Census Worker Safety Have Grown; Clarification of Data Confidentiality Restrictions Needed for Adequate Employee Protection

NRFU highlighted many instances of Census employee risk at the hands of respondents; reports detailed hundreds of instances of threats and physical or verbal or sexual attacks. Although the Census Bureau seeks to ensure enumerator safety, the strong confidentiality clauses in Title 13, which restrict disclosure of respondent information, complicate the prosecution of such assaults. While Title 18 makes it a crime to harm federal employees, Title 13 does not expressly facilitate using Title 18 to address threats directed toward Census staff. Since the use of information about respondents, obtained by Census workers who have been the victims of these attacks, may be necessary to prosecute their attackers, it is important that the Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, law enforcement agencies, and the Congress develop an appropriate solution. A complete solution should—while continuing to strongly protect the confidentiality of respondent information—clearly authorize the use of Census information in the limited situations where it is needed to protect Census employees and for the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed directly in connection with the Census.

Contract Labor Costs, Whistleblower Issues, and Fingerprinting Adjudication

During this period we examined contract labor costs, investigated important whistleblower accusations at one local Census office, and looked at the bureau's process for handling fingerprint checks of potential employees before hiring.

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Labor costs associated with the Decennial Response Integration System appeared to be handled in accordance with contract stipulations, but not enough analysis was performed by Census to determine whether the price for a \$264-million contract modification was fair and reasonable and whether, therefore, the bureau received the best value for its expenditure. The whistleblower case was confirmed, appropriate personnel actions were taken, suspect enumeration results were redone, and procedures were studied to tighten the system to lessen the opportunities for such issues in the future. Finally, while fingerprinting adjudication prior to hiring appeared adequate, we did discover instances in which terminated employees were not removed as quickly as they should have been, due to procedural problems that need to be addressed.

Appendix A contains a complete discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Appendix B contains a list of sites visited by OIG staff during NRFU and VDC operations.

Chapter 1: 2010 Census Costs

The 2010 Census was estimated to cost approximately \$14.7 billion, reflecting an increase of \$3.2 billion over the last 2 years. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, spending on the 2010 Census was projected to total \$7.4 billion. As of September 30, however, the bureau had spent approximately \$5.5 billion for the fiscal year, including \$903 million that remained in available Recovery Act funds. Census recently announced its plans to return \$1.6 billion to the Treasury. Census's financial management reports show a surplus of nearly \$1.9 billion. Approximately one-half (about \$800 million according to Census) was related to unused contingency funds, while the remaining amount points to problems discussed in previous OIG reports—the bureau's inability to adequately estimate costs that, in conjunction with the lack of integrated systems, limits effective program management.

Difficulties in estimating costs have hampered the bureau's ability to measure cost, schedule, and performance in an integrated way to support the entire decennial in relation to its plans for all individual operational life-cycle components. As we previously reported, the Address Canvassing operation overspent its \$356-million budget by \$88 million (25 percent). NRFU, the largest and most expensive field operation of the 2010 Census, was initially estimated to cost \$2.7 billion. Following Address Canvassing, the budget was reevaluated and projected to cost \$2.3 billion (estimates ranged from \$1.9 and \$2.8 billion). The actual cost fell outside the lowest parameter of the range at \$1.7 billion.

Similarly, Census underspent its FY 2009 and overspent its FY 2010 Recovery Act funding. The Recovery Act provided the Census Bureau with \$1 billion—\$250 million to improve communications and outreach and \$750 million to fund early operations—for the 2010 Census. Over \$3 million in unused FY 2009 funds were spent in FY 2010.

Although Census's Overall Spending Is Under Budget, it Lacks Transparency

According to the Census Bureau, it spent approximately 25 percent less than planned for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010 (see table 1). Table 1 further shows a monthly variance ranging from 48 percent *under* budget to 51 percent *over* budget when comparing actual vs. budgeted monthly spending. Census stated that its financial management reports do not reflect true surpluses and deficits. Only the month in which the financial management report is issued shows the month's performance. Surplus funds from previous months are often re-planned for another purpose in the latter month and are no longer visible in subsequent reports. The fact that Census changes its plans retroactively makes it difficult to plan and manage project funds as well as from an oversight perspective, to monitor budget overruns and underruns across several months. This spending includes funds for nearly 300 individual projects, each with its own project manager and numerous cost categories. The monthly status reports for September show that cumulative expenditures were lower because of salaries, mileage, and training costs not incurred and obligations that were delayed. As of September 30, 2010, then, the bureau had spent nearly \$5.5 billion of the budgeted \$7.4 billion.

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Table 1.
Comparison of 2010 Annual and Cumulative Budget to Actual Costs, FY 2010
(\$ in millions)

Month	Monthly Budget ^a	Monthly Actual Spending	Monthly Variance	Monthly Variance: % Under (Over) Budget	Cumulative Budgeted Spending ^b	Cumulative Actual Spending	Cumulative Variance	% Under Budget
October	\$ 465	\$ 460	\$ 5	1	\$ 465	\$ 460	\$ 5	1
November	534	366	168	31	924	825	99	11
December	315	164	151	48	1,164	989	175	15
January	358	293	65	18	1,469	1,282	187	13
February	322	258	64	20	1,681	1,540	141	8
March	540	579	(39)	(7)	2,285	2,119	166	7
April	1,017	816	281	8.1	3,002	2,824	178	6
May	2,037	1,137	900	44	4,213	3,961	252	6
June	739	548	191	26	5,301	4,509	792	15
July	664	460	204	31	5,285	4,969	316	6
August	354	221	133	38	5,434	5,190	244	4
September	176	267	(91)	(51)	7,308	5,457	1,850	25

^a Annual operating budget as presented in the October 2009 Financial Management Report

^b As revised between November 2009 and September 2010 and reported in the monthly status reports.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Analysis of Travel and Training Costs Reveals Some Inefficiencies

Various Census operations took place from January through August 2010. During this period, more than 700,000 temporary Census employees traveled 568 million miles in private vehicles, for which they were reimbursed \$284 million. In addition, employees were given one week of paid training prior to performing fieldwork. However, in some cases they completed little or no fieldwork. The issues regarding travel and training were discussed and recommendations made in a previous OIG report but were not sufficiently addressed.

Specifically, we warned of the multiplied effect from NRFU if Census did not act:

*While the number of employees with questionable reimbursements is very small compared with the overall universe of 140,000 employees involved in this operation, the potential exists for this problem to be compounded because upcoming field work operations will involve significantly more temporary employees than did Address Canvassing. Census Bureau managers should monitor mileage reimbursements carefully during upcoming enumeration operations, and verify the validity of those reimbursement claims that appear excessive before they are paid.*³

³ 2010 Census: Quarterly Report to Congress, February 2010 (OIG-19791-3, February 2010).

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Census’s decennial personnel and payroll system did provide management reports to assist managers in monitoring mileage and other reimbursable expenses. However, given the problems we uncovered, we believe that, for the 2020 decennial, Census should strengthen its internal controls over wage and travel costs; further, it should take steps to ensure that an appropriate number of temporary employees are hired and trained.

Ratio of miles driven per hour to hours worked. Using bureau data, an analysis of payroll records for more than 700,000 temporary employees from January 3 to August 7, 2010, indicated that less than 1 percent (some 20,300 employee pay periods) had spent an estimated 75 percent or more of reported work hours driving (at 50 mph). Yet the total mileage cost of these suspicious claims was over \$5 million (2 percent of the total mileage reimbursement). Although it is possible that a few workers at each local Census office acted as couriers, thus accruing higher than normal mileage expenses, we find it unlikely that they accounted for the entire \$5 million in excessive mileage costs (see table 2).⁴

	Employee Pay Periods ^b	Mileage Cost
More than 100%	3,155	\$ 640,400
90%-100%	3,915	1,168,640
75%-89%	13,242	3,552,208
Subtotal	20,312	\$5,361,249
0-74%	3,887,048	\$278,395,156
Total	4,907,360	\$283,756,405

^a Not all totals add due to rounding.
^b Number of employees times number of pay periods worked; for example, 20 employees working 25 pay periods each would equal 500 employee pay periods.
Source: OIG analysis of Census data

Training costs. Census trained several thousand employees who either did no work or worked fewer than 3 days (we considered employees trained if they received at least 24 hours of training). Census deliberately hires and trains more temporary employees than necessary to offset turnover; the bureau calls this practice “frontloading.” The problem with this, however, is that it frequently resulted in many more enumerators than needed.

Between January 3 and August 7, we estimate that Census trained 74,000 employees (see table 3) who worked fewer than 3 days or not at all. While this constituted less than 2 percent of the total number of employees hired, these employees were nonetheless reimbursed nearly \$5 million for mileage, above and beyond the more than \$32 million worth of training received.

⁴ Training hours were excluded from this calculation because Census workers are sometimes required to travel long distances to training sites.

Table 3.
Analysis of Costs Related to Training of Temporary Census Employees,
January 3–August 7, 2010
(Working 3 Days or Fewer)

Employees who received training but	Number of Employees	Training Earnings	Training-related Mileage Reimbursement	Other Reimbursement ^a	Total Cost
Did not work	10,858	\$ 4,883,655	\$ 384,474	\$ 34,456	\$ 5,302,584
Worked, but less than 1 day	27,504	11,813,006	1,420,202	51,546	13,284,754
Worked between 1 and 3 days	35,440	15,488,490	2,893,123	78,635	18,460,248
Total	73,802	\$32,185,151	\$4,697,799	\$164,637	\$37,047,586

^a Such as telephone calls and per diem.
 Source: OIG analysis of Census data

If the Census Bureau had acted on previous OIG recommendations, it might have been able to save some of the \$42 million (\$5.3 million in mileage from table 2 and \$37 million from table 3) it spent on training costs and mileage reimbursement, from which it received little benefit.

**Chapter 2:
Office of Inspector General Field Observations**

PBOCS’ Instability During Census Field Operations Increased Cost and May Have Negatively Affected Data Quality

PBOCS was integral to managing data collection and quality control for 10 discrete enumeration operations, including the largest, NRFU. But PBOCS’ instability and unreliability necessitated a series of replacement applications for key functions, some at the last minute. Because of the problems with PBOCS—during NRFU and other field operations—Census was forced to work in what can best be described as crisis management mode, repairing technical problems and developing clerical workarounds and automated contingencies in real time to compensate for the loss of PBOCS’ functionality. As a result of this substantial effort, Census was able to complete NRFU on time, but not without increased costs and potential data quality issues. Excess costs due to PBOCS amounted to a total of \$11.6 million for all field operations (see table 4).

Table 4. Costs Directly Attributable to Activities Necessary to Compensate for PBOCS Failures	
Activities Compensating for PBOCS Failures	Cost (in millions)
Addition of computer equipment to improve system performance	\$ 4.9
Consultation with vendors of PBOCS technology	1.1
Development and maintenance of replacement shipping application	0.1
100% re-interview of Field Verification cases	2.5
Overtime pay (clerks)	3.0
Total	\$11.6

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Census also decided to deploy an independent replacement application for the last operation, Field Verification, freeing PBOCS developers to provide technical support for NRFU and the succeeding operation, Vacant Delete Check. The risk of this late change in the decennial schedule was somewhat mitigated because the replacement application was built using components of existing, proven Census systems. Functionality was also added to PBOCS for a new operation, NRFU Residual, which required visits to over 729,000 respondents whose questionnaires were either sent in late but lacked a count of residents or the enumerator did not enter such a count.


PBOCS development started late in the decennial cycle, partially due to a late change in plans from using handheld computers to using paper for collecting NRFU respondent data. With population counts for apportionment due to the President by December 31, 2010, the schedule for decennial operations was fixed, forcing Census to develop, test, and deploy individual increments of PBOCS functionality just before they were needed in each field operation. The

inevitable result of this just-in-time approach was that PBOCS functionality was incomplete, and a series of errors was encountered as the system was deployed in actual operations.

PBOCS’ technical problems continued during NRFU. PBOCS continued to be the most unreliable decennial system during NRFU. At peak usage, local offices reported five times the number of complaints about PBOCS as for any other decennial system (see figure 1). The most frequent complaint concerned checking in questionnaires that enumerators had returned to the local offices. Questionnaires are checked in to ensure that all questionnaires sent out into the field are returned, and that the appropriate data had been entered on each questionnaire before shipping them to the data-capture centers. Office clerks had difficulty checking in questionnaires primarily because PBOCS’ availability was limited due to unacceptably slow performance or complete outages.

Total PBOCS outages during NRFU amounted to nearly 80 hours, mostly in May, the first month of the operation. Outages and slow performance caused a large backlog of over 10 million questionnaires awaiting check-in, which delayed the NRFU-Re-interview operation.

Figure 1.
Count of IT Help Desk Requests (Per Week)




Source: U.S. Census Bureau

The Census technical staff, with assistance from industry consultants, determined that PBOCS’ performance could not be improved without disrupting operations because of fundamental database problems. Only three clerks per local Census office could use PBOCS simultaneously without bringing it to a standstill, which was not enough to both check in completed questionnaires and then check out questionnaires for shipping to Census’s data collection centers. The bureau’s replacement application for shipping was deployed on May 22; PBOCS performance eventually stabilized, outages decreased significantly, and the backlog was reduced and finally eliminated.

PBOCS instability led to increased cost. Overall cost due to PBOCS problems amounted to \$11.6 million, with \$8.6 million attributed to troubleshooting and implementing solutions, and at least another \$3 million in overtime pay (see table 4). Our analysis showed that overtime pay correlated closely with operational outage hours⁵ (see figure 2). PBOCS outages totaled 290 hours—more than 7 weeks of 8-hour shifts since the beginning of operations in January through the first week of August.

The costs resulting from PBOCS problems continued to mount. In Field Verification, to minimize the risk of using a replacement system, local offices were required to re-canvass 100 percent of cases (rather than the original 80 percent) to achieve the desired level of data quality. According to a bureau official, re-canvassing an additional 61,000 addresses increased the cost by an estimated \$2.5 million. The cost of Census employees devoted to contingencies and other support work, such as additional checks of data accuracy due to PBOCS issues, are not included in this \$11.6-million total.



Source: U.S. Census Bureau

^aThis figure shows that PBOCS outages in one week affected the amount of overtime billed in the following week. The data in the chart correspond to the dates of outages as shown by the red line. The increase in overtime billing as shown by the blue line does not correspond to the dates in the chart, but occurred the week following the corresponding outages.

In addition to Field Verification, PBOCS caused delays that adversely affected the NRFU quality control operation. The NRFU quality control operation entailed reinterviewing 5.5 percent (1.9 million questionnaires) of the eligible NRFU workload.⁶ Reinterview cases were selected by PBOCS as NRFU questionnaires were checked in. A second interviewer was

⁵ Using regression analysis, we found the results to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level ($p < .01$). The model controlled for autocorrelation and total workload.

⁶ Eligible NRFU cases excluded mainly vacant and delete cases, which were followed up in the Vacant Delete Check operation.

dispatched to the same address to replicate the enumeration and the results of the re-interview were compared against the original responses to validate the information and assess the quality of an enumerator's work. The process was designed so that enumerators found to have completed questionable work could have received additional training or been terminated for poor performance (including questionnaire falsification).

As the backlog of questionnaires grew, cases could not be selected for reinterview, increasing the time lag between the original and follow-up interviews. This time lag can adversely affect the quality of the data collected in the follow-up interviews because the more time that elapses, the less reliable the respondent's memory of what was initially reported. And the slow pace of identifying addresses to re-interview delayed the bureau from retraining or removing enumerators performing questionable work.

During the NRFU operation, PBOCS was also designed to support two ongoing decennial operations: Group Quarters Enumeration and Update/Enumerate. Because of PBOCS' instability and unavailability, Census decided to postpone using it for these operations and limit use of the system to NRFU. As a result, the U/E quality control operation was delayed; originally scheduled to end June 9, it was not completed until July 1. Similar to the NRFU reinterview process, the delay adversely affected the quality control operation.

OIG Oversight of the 2010 Census Continued with NRFU and VDC Operations

NRFU, the largest and most expensive field operation of the 2010 Census, officially ran from May 1 through July 30.⁷ This operation consisted of two components—the production process and a quality control (QC) procedure known as the reinterview (NRFU-RI)—and was carried out by 475,000 temporary workers nationwide. Vacant Delete Check (VDC), the next major operation following NRFU, sought to verify the status of housing units listed as vacant or nonexistent during NRFU. This operation was carried out between July 1 and August 25 by nearly 130,000 temporary staff. Table 5 (page 12) shows the costs involved with both operations, including enumerator training, production work, and mileage reimbursement.

To oversee these two operations, OIG staff visited 39 local Census offices in 30 states during NRFU and 17 offices in 16 states during VDC from mid-April through late July (see Appendix B). We visited offices in all 12 Census regions to interview office managers and observe enumerators carrying out door-to-door interviews. For NRFU, OIG staff conducted 227 observations, visiting 2,751 housing units. We observed enumerators successfully completing 799 questionnaires through interviews with household members or proxies. The remaining visits included 136 respondent refusals and 1,816 housing units where no one answered the door. For VDC, we conducted 64 observations, visiting 460 housing units. We observed the verification of

⁷ NRFU began in April in some areas to enumerate university students at off-campus housing units before they left for summer break. According to Census, 493 of 494 offices completed NRFU prior to the scheduled completion date of July 10, 2010. The remaining office located in the New York City area did not finish until July 30 because staff had to re-enumerate several thousand questionnaires because of an allegation of questionnaire falsification as discussed on page 23 of this report.

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93 vacant and 74 deleted housing units and the enumeration of 61 households, with the remaining 242 housing units not enumerated because no one was home.

Table 5. NRFU and VDC Costs and Workload, Estimated and Actual (\$ in millions)^a				
Operation	Budget ^b	Actual Cost	Estimated Workload ^{c,d}	Actual Workload ^c
NRFU Production	\$2,248	\$1,589	48.6	47.2
NRFU Reinterview	94	95	2.7	1.9
NRFU Total	\$2,342	\$1,684		
VDC	\$244	\$281	8.5	8.7

^a Figures have been rounded.
^b The original FY 2010 budget request for NRFU was \$2.7 billion; for VDC, \$341 million.
^c Housing units
^d Workload figures derived from Census weekly status report issued May 7, 2010.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Some enumerators did not follow important procedures. In both NRFU and VDC, we observed procedural deviations from the enumerator training in three areas: notices of visits, questionnaire scripts, and contacting proxy⁸ respondents. It is impossible to tell exactly what the effects of such noncompliance were, but our objective was to report problems to Census officials in real-time to enable corrective actions to be taken. For both operations, enumerators were required to fill out and leave *Notice of Visit* forms, to inform a respondent that an enumerator had visited the household while no one was home. These notices provided an enumerator's contact information and requested a call back from the respondent to schedule a time to complete the questionnaire. During NRFU and VDC, we observed enumerators not properly completing these forms. Enumerators left out information identifying a household or wrote down the wrong information, making it difficult for an enumerator to find the correct questionnaire if a respondent called back. During VDC, we also observed enumerators leaving notices in places such as car windshields and in mail boxes, both of which were against Census procedures. In other cases, enumerators failed to leave notices at all.

During NRFU, enumerators did not read their interview scripts verbatim, despite being required and trained to do so. Some enumerators did not fully read several questions from the questionnaires during interviews, in particular those asking about Hispanic origin and race. In some cases, enumerators made assumptions about household members regarding race and Hispanic origin rather than asking respondents directly. Further, enumerators searched Internet sources to find respondent and proxy information. Among the sources used were online

⁸ A proxy interview is one in which the respondent is not a member of the household being enumerated. The respondent might be a neighbor or some other knowledgeable person.

directories, government Web sites, and online real estate sites. Census procedures did not include guidance on the use of online resources to search for respondent or proxy information.

During VDC, enumerators used proxies to complete questionnaires prior to making the required three personal attempts to visit a housing unit. The household resident is always the best source of information; however, Census procedures allow enumerators to obtain limited information from persons such as neighbors. By using proxies before the three personal attempts were made, enumerators could have received incorrect or incomplete information about a household when the actual resident could have provided more accurate information had the enumerator made a second or third attempt to interview him or her.

Respondent reluctance affected VDC production. Census employees encountered respondent reluctance during VDC. VDC enumerators often encountered households that were uninhabited, those in which residents were unwilling to participate, or rural households that were miles away from each other. They therefore had a difficult time locating not only willing respondents but also viable proxies who were knowledgeable about the household in question when a household member could not be reached. During VDC, “fatigue” from being questioned repeatedly during multiple Census operations hindered participation. In large apartment complexes with high turnover, site managers (for example, superintendents) were typically the only knowledgeable proxies for multiple vacant addresses. Often these complexes were split into several blocks and, in turn, several assignment areas, which were not always assigned to the same enumerator. Because of this split, apartment managers were repeatedly contacted by multiple enumerators throughout NRFU and VDC to determine the status of vacant housing units. Often the managers refused to provide information to enumerators who were not the first to make contact.

The quality of Census’s maps could be improved. Census maps are critical to locating housing units during enumeration; they are essential for confirming the specific block and geographical units. Without them, enumerators cannot reliably ensure that the unit in question is indeed the one they want and is in the expected location. The quality of these maps, then, must be a primary focus. Many local Census office managers identified the following problems with the maps and address lists used during the NRFU and VDC operations:

- missing neighborhoods or apartment buildings,
- incorrect housing unit numbers and street names,
- duplicate addresses,
- inaccurate or missing map spots, and
- housing units located in the wrong collection blocks.⁹

Office managers attributed these issues to problems identified during Address Canvassing, such as listers failing to follow procedures or not having an accurate global positioning system (GPS) signal. Enumerators in both operations concurred with their managers’ assessment about the quality of maps, reiterating the same issues. As a result of poor map quality, some enumerators

⁹ According to the Census Bureau, a collection block is the smallest geographic area within which Census enumeration operations are conducted and is usually bounded by visible features, such as streets or rivers.

in both operations did not use the Census maps and instead used alternate maps, a GPS device, the Internet, or their personal knowledge of an area to find the housing units.

PBOCS Delayed Completion of the Update/Enumerate Operation and Forced Changes to the Quality Control Operation

Since Update/Enumerate (U/E), a doorstep interview, was the main method by which residents of American Indian reservations could participate in the census, we reviewed both its production and quality control components. Every local Census office we visited that handled U/E spoke of delays due to PBOCS problems; “U/E is on the back burner” was a common refrain. Because of PBOCS issues, the quality control segment of this operation did not progress as planned. Without PBOCS, Census could not monitor the workload, allocate staff, or complete assignments in a timely manner.

PBOCS was intended to assist U/E in ways similar to other operations: printing assignment materials, checking materials out to the field and back into the office, managing individual cases, making quality control assignments, shipping materials to data-capture centers, and providing reports for managing the operation. But PBOCS’ downtime, slowness, and limited usage, especially when gearing up for NRFU, caused a backlog of questionnaires waiting to be checked-in.

According to bureau officials, management was concerned about PBOCS’ ability to handle the much larger NRFU operation, and therefore decided to limit the use of PBOCS for U/E. Since the U/E quality control field assignment workflow depended on the timeliness of questionnaire check-in from production, some of these

Contingency instructions to the field:
 “The biggest change for the [canvassing] component of UE QC is that the number of units that are checked ... will no longer be variable based on the total number of addresses in an AA [assignment area].... Each AA will have a maximum of three (3) HUs [housing units] checked.”

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

assignments were severely delayed. Weekly reports throughout May showed quality control running significantly

Table 6. Update/Enumerate Completion Data from May Weekly Report		
As of	Expected QC Completion	Actual QC Completion
May 3	40%	18%
May 10	47%	27%
May 13	62%	27%
May 23	76%	31%
<i>Source:</i> U.S. Census Bureau		

behind, completing only 31 percent as of May 23 (see table 6). Further, the bureau decided that it would

complete the remaining 69 percent of the quality control component without the operational products or progress data provided by PBOCS.

Without PBOCS to generate and monitor quality control assignments, by early June the bureau had limited the number of housing units to be checked for larger assignment areas (see box) and required manual tracking of the operation’s progress. In addition, the delays and workarounds increased opportunities for error. For example, our subsequent review of assignment area binders

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used by enumerators to manage their workflow reflected the enumerators' inability to check for housing units missing from the address list.

The June 11, 2010, Census status report stated that the operation missed its scheduled completion date of June 9. As of June 4 (the operation does not appear on subsequent weekly reports), quality control had cost only 37 percent of its \$35 million budget, and the overall operation had cost 45 percent (\$56 million) of U/E's total budget of \$124 million. U/E's 1.4 million cases included seasonal dwellings and Colonias (small, unincorporated communities along the Texas/Mexico border), in addition to reservation housing. Census had to check 32,600 assignment areas for missing and correctly deleted housing units, and a sample of housing units were reinterviewed to check individual enumerator performance. The culmination of these events raises concerns about this enumeration operation, in particular the thoroughness of the quality review.

**Chapter 3:
Growing Concerns About the Safety of Census Employees and
Update to Bureau Risk Management Activities**

***Substantial Number of Threats and Attacks Against Census Workers Calls for
Meaningful Strengthening of Protections***

The Census Bureau conducts numerous household surveys throughout the decade, not just the decennial census. As such, its various field representatives—not just enumerators—interact with the public on a continuing basis. At the same time, necessary confidentiality restrictions contained in Title 13, Section 9, of the U.S. Code are aimed at ensuring that Census employees do not (1) disclose information furnished by respondents or other data obtained during survey collection to non-sworn¹⁰ persons outside the bureau, or (2) use the Title 13 information for any purpose other than the statistical purpose for which it was supplied. Title 13 contains serious sanctions against those who violate these restrictions. It is clear through enumerator reports (incident reports and information communications [INFO-COMMs]), the number of documented situations in which Census Bureau representatives may be threatened or harmed is troubling.

Incident reports provide information related to employee safety. Census used incident

reports to officially document specific instances of injury, illness, accident, or fatality. Information from some of these is also discussed in this section. While infrequent, serious incidents including homicide, robbery/carjacking/kidnapping, and auto accidents (fatal and nonfatal) were reported. More frequently reported incidents are reflected in table 7, which lists the six most common incident types (totaling 693) caused by respondents against Census enumerators. But such reports cover activities broader than violence alone. These reports also documented 19 cases in which a non-Census employee impersonated a Census enumerator. The fraudulent impersonation of Census enumerators is a great concern, as it could prevent respondents from participating in the survey or result in fraud or identity theft.

Table 7. Threats Against Census Enumerators^a	
Category	Number
Assault (Physical, Verbal)	322
Weapon Threat (Gun, Other)	252
Animal Attack	43
Phone/Web Threat	41
Gun Shots	18
Sexual Assault	17
Total	693
^a As of August 17, 2010 Source: U.S. Census Bureau Incident Reports	


In some of these cases of suspected impersonation, respondents referenced a Census-identified employee with a laptop computer who conducted a more in-depth survey. This may have been an

¹⁰ Individuals who have not been sworn to uphold the confidentiality provisions of Title 13 and signed affidavits to that effect.

actual Census employee conducting a separate, non-decennial survey. However, due to lack of communication from Census or misunderstanding by respondents, those respondents who were selected to complete this more detailed survey often hesitated or refused to cooperate with the Census enumerator during NRFU. Census office managers raised similar concerns to us. For the future, Census should consider how it can improve its communication with respondents selected for a non-decennial survey while the decennial is operational, to avoid confusion and minimize refusals.

Other threats or attacks were documented in INFO-COMMs. Census employed a paper form called an INFO-COMM to document anomalous situations that census field workers encountered during the conduct of their duties. In our site visits to local Census offices during NRFU and VDC, we examined a nonrepresentative sample of INFO-COMMs that were available, collecting over 1,000 examples¹¹ completed by Census representatives in the field. These INFO-COMMs provided good snapshots of actual encounters with the public including a substantial number of threats. Figure 3 contains a breakdown of the “refusal” category—the 474 refusals out of the 1,034 INFO-COMMs reviewed—into six subcategories; these illustrate the challenges and difficulties enumerators face, including housing units considered unsafe to enumerate and threats or attacks. Combining the subcategories “Respondent Refusal,” “Refused but Provided Headcount,” and “Proxy Refusal” accounts for 57 percent of respondent refusals. While such refusals are usually nonphysical, they typically involved the respondent refusing in an aggressive manner and often included yelling at, cursing, or slamming the door on the enumerator.

The “Unsafe to Enumerate” designation was employed for housing units with dangers such as suspected drug house, unleashed dog in a yard, gun being pulled on enumerator, sexual advances from a respondent, or warnings from neighbors that residents may be too dangerous. The “Refused with Threat” subcategory defined cases of respondents not only refusing but also verbally threatening to either shoot, release their dog(s) to attack, or physically harm either the current or a follow-up enumerator. In such situations, INFO-COMMs served as a



¹¹ We examined INFO-COMMs relating to various areas of interest. Those pertaining to enumerator safety were specifically selected to support our interest and concern for the safety of enumerators, and should not be considered reflective or representative of all INFO-COMMs.

useful tool for offices to document these addresses and prevent follow-up or future attempts for enumeration during the decennial.

The subcategory “Refused and Attacked” includes cases in which enumerators were actually physically attacked by a respondent, gunshots were fired nearby, dogs were released onto an enumerator, respondents would not call their dogs off an enumerator, or an enumerator was chased by the respondent in his or her car. Enumerators experiencing such attacks sometimes incurred damage to their clothing or vehicles and in some cases required medical treatment.

Title 13 does not explicitly address field staff safety. Although other laws such as Title 18 make it a crime to harm federal employees, Title 13 does not more specifically address assaults, threats, and other criminal conduct directed towards Census staff. Further, Title 13 confidentiality provisions criminalize the disclosure of Census data in most instances. Our review of the Census INFO-COMMs and incident reports indicated that not all threats and other criminal conduct directed at enumerators generated either a formal review (incident report) or an enforcement action. There have been inconsistent interpretations as to whether Census confidentiality requirements limit the use of evidence in criminal prosecutions of individuals who harm enumerators or who commit other crimes, such as the falsification of Census data by enumerators (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of employee misconduct in Brooklyn).


Given the importance of the safety and well-being of Census employees, we suggest that the Census Bureau, the Secretary, law enforcement agencies, and the Congress explicitly address enumerator safety. A review of Title 13 and other laws associated with data collection and federal employee safety is necessary to determine the legislative and/or agency action that will best protect Census employees collecting information at the doorstep. A complete solution must—while continuing to strongly protect the confidentiality of respondent information—clearly authorize the use of such Title 13 information in the limited situations where it is needed to protect Census employees and for the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed directly in connection with the Census.

Census’s Risk Management Activities

Census’s Risk Review Board (RRB)—a subgroup of the Census Integration Group—continued to oversee risk management activities and modify its risk register. As of September 29, 2010, the register contained 18 program-level risks, with each rated high (likely), medium (somewhat likely), or low (unlikely)—colored red, yellow, or green, respectively. To comply with the requirements of its risk management plan, the RRB continued to hold monthly meetings to review the status of each risk rating on its register. The RRB also completed mitigation plans for the risks opened in April 2010. However, importantly, the board made little progress in finalizing outstanding contingency plans. While such plans at this time are less relevant with enumeration operations completed, the fact remains that the board’s inability to prioritize the completion of two remaining contingency plans—especially with one of the risks rated high throughout the major decennial operations—was of serious concern.

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Weekly Risk Review Board meetings steadily decreased. The RRB’s weekly meetings steadily decreased throughout the calendar year, as displayed in figure 4, with only 12 out of 38 possible weekly meetings being held from January through September of this year (no meetings were held during June, July, or August).¹² Although there may have been more work during the planning phase when most mitigation and contingency plans were developed and finalized than the monitoring phase of the risk review process, two contingency plans were not finalized. These two plans were “Within Household Person Over-Coverage and Under-Coverage,” a medium risk, and “Falling Behind Schedule on Key Milestones,” until July 2010 a high-level risk. However, the RRB continued to hold monthly meetings to review and update the status of each



program-level risk. Table 8 reflects the changes made at the monthly and weekly meetings since the quarter ended March 31, 2010. The monthly meetings have been useful for the board, as most risk status changes have been made at those times. Overall, the risk register—with the recent closed and opened risks—appears to reflect Census’s current risk environment with enumeration operations completed.

¹² February only included three possible weekly meetings due to inclement weather that caused federal government closures.

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Table 8. Program-level Risk Ratings, as of September 29, 2010, Indicating Changes from the Previous Quarter

Risk Grouping	Risk Name	March 2010	September 2010
Operations and Systems Risks	Contract management issues	High	Low
	Late design changes	High	Medium
	2010 operational and systems failures	High	Medium
	FDCA decentralization/reintegration	High	Low
Quality Risks	Housing unit duplicates and misses	High	Medium
	Exception enumeration quality	Low	Closed
	Inaccurate Puerto Rico address list	Medium	Closed
	Data quality	Medium	Medium
	Within-household person over-coverage and under-coverage	Medium	Medium
Public Cooperation Risks	IT security breach	Medium	Low
	Loss of confidential data affecting response	Medium	Closed
	Respondent cooperation	Medium	Closed
	Stakeholder support	Medium	Closed
	Immigration policy backlash	Medium	Closed
Major Disasters Affecting Population	Major disaster's effect on population	High	Closed
	Continued operations of critical infrastructure during disasters	Medium	Medium
Staffing Risks	Permanent staff retention	Low	Low
	Inability to recruit sufficient temporary workforce	Low	Closed
Budget Risks	Uncertainty of assumptions in cost model	Medium	Low
	Insufficient funding	Medium	Closed
	Insufficient funding FY 2011 ^a		High
	Insufficient funding FY 2012 ^a		High
	Insufficient funding FY 2013 ^a		Low
Schedule	Falling behind schedule on key milestones	High	Medium
Not Yet Categorized	H1N1 influenza affecting regional census centers and local census offices activities	Medium	Closed
	H1N1 influenza and similar contagious illnesses affecting non-regional census centers and non-local census offices activities	Medium	Low
	Litigation that threatens the delivery of apportionment and redistricting data	High	Medium
	Litigation that forces reprocessing and/or retabulation of apportionment and/or redistricting data ^a		Medium


^a Risk was opened after March 31, 2010.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

**Chapter 4:
Summary of Other OIG Census Reviews**

Review of DRIS-Incurred Labor Costs


The primary purposes of the Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS) contract were to (1) process Census forms through three Paper Data Capture Centers (PDCCs), and (2) provide inbound and outbound telephone service. To accomplish this, the Census Bureau awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin and six main subcontractors in October 2005 for \$485 million. Census organized the contract into three phases that roughly corresponded to the design, operation, and archiving of information. Census modified the contract prior to starting each phase to identify and task the scope of work to be accomplished. As of June 30, 2010, the contractor had nearly completed phase II of the contract requirements and reported \$343 million in incurred direct labor costs.

We conducted a limited review of the incurred labor costs from October 2005 through June 2010 and determined that the costs incurred were consistent with the parameters in the contract. While reviewing the contract files we found that Census accepted and awarded a modification for phase II, costing \$264 million, and the contracting officer did not retain essential documentation as part of the contract file to support the contracting officer’s price reasonableness decision. As a result, we cannot say whether Census received best value for its expenditure.



Our review took place, however, when contractor staff had begun to be reassigned. The contracting officer had stated that as part of surveillance, periodic audits on the contractor would be performed. However, we saw no evidence that the contracting officer's representatives performed and documented any checks on the staff during execution of the contract. The only documentation we identified was related to integrated process team meetings. Audits on a contract of this size should have included periodic on-site inspections earlier in the process.

We did not identify any significant issues with the PDCCs' handling of the unexpected volumes and erratic delivery of forms to be scanned during NRFU. The local Census offices had significant difficulties shipping questionnaires in a timely manner to the PDCCs during NRFU due to breakdowns in PBOCS; this resulted in days of unexpected downtime at the PDCC from mid-April onward (see figures 5 and 6). On May 22, the shipping functionality was moved from PBOCs to another management system because of the negative impact on shipping. Under



Source: DRIS Contractor Data

Census direction, DRIS contractors revised the overall staffing plans to compensate for some unproductive hours. Even with these adjustments, the contract stayed within budget during this period and continued to meet key performance indicators. Had PBOCS problems not slowed down the delivery of questionnaires to the PDCC, it is conceivable that labor costs may have been lower during these months.

Whistleblower Allegations Concerning Operations in Brooklyn, New York

On July 19, 2010, the Inspector General testified before a congressional hearing in Brooklyn on allegations concerning improprieties surrounding officials at the Brooklyn Northeast Local Census Office, specifically the office manager and the assistant manager for field operations.¹³

The charges, received through two e-mailed hotline complaints, alleged that these officials had directed employees to falsify enumeration questionnaires using information from an Internet database rather than attempting to conduct in-person interviews, as required by Census procedures.¹⁴ Within hours of receiving these complaints, we reviewed and forwarded the information to senior management at Census headquarters, requesting that Census initiate an immediate investigation. The Census Bureau's investigation—which included a personal visit to Brooklyn by the Census Director along with a Census investigative team—confirmed the allegations. As a result, we initiated our own investigation of both the allegations and the actions taken by Census in its response.

Within 8 days of our receiving the first complaint, Census notified us that it had terminated both the office manager and the assistant manager for field operations and had ordered the re-enumeration of all questionnaires completed on or after June 12 (2 days before the complaint was received), bringing in staff from nearby offices to carry this out. The number of housing units requiring re-enumeration was 4,221.

As a result of the Brooklyn incident, Census developed a process for identifying cases in which data were used improperly; it also began applying a methodology nationwide to detect anomalies indicative of similar abuses.

Irregularities continued. Less than a month later, we received two subsequent complaints that during the re-enumeration, some employees assigned from the other Brooklyn offices were inferring the number of household residents through improper means. Both we and Census independently verified this allegation as well, concluding that one of the causes may have been the interpretation of Census directives made by field staff enumerating “last resort” cases (addresses that could not be enumerated directly or by proxy interview after numerous attempts). As a result of this ambiguity, some enumerators resorted to counting the names on mailboxes, while others based their assumptions on other visible evidence. Census reviewed the matter and decided on corrective action, which included further re-enumeration. Clearly, for subsequent censuses, the bureau must ensure that its written guidance clearly prescribes both acceptable and unacceptable last-resort enumeration actions for determining the occupancy status of a housing unit and the number of its residents.

¹³ *Whistleblower Allegations Concerning Census Operations in Brooklyn, New York*, statement of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Commerce, before a field hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Brooklyn, N.Y., July 19, 2010.

¹⁴ Our hotline received a third e-mail 2 days after the first two, repeating the allegations and also indicating that an office operations supervisor had resigned, rather than complying with the managers' orders.

Finally, we reported the allegations concerning the Brooklyn Northeast office to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York. This office has declined to prosecute the allegation.

2010 Fingerprinting Adjudication Process

Census attempted to assess the suitability of its employees (1.4 million for Census 2010) for temporary decennial work through its Census Hiring and Employment Check (CHEC) Division. It worked with the FBI to check applicants' information against the FBI's criminal database. While initially sending only applicant names, dates of birth, and social security numbers, in October 2008 Census began submitting applicant fingerprints as well. In reviewing the CHEC adjudication process from April through July 2010, we determined that the adjudication process basically worked as intended.

However, we did find that Census's Field Division needed to strengthen its policy and enforce procedures for removing individuals that should have been suspended or terminated based on the CHEC adjudication. After asking the Field Division for its policy and procedures for removing enumerators from the field, we received eight documents, including two from a Census regional office. While Field Division managers stated that they told local Census office personnel to remove enumerators on these lists from the field, none of the documents outlined specific responsibilities and actions to be taken by office personnel. One office failed to quickly remove an individual from field work who had a record of a serious offense, thus increasing the risk that this individual could have harmed members of the public. In future censuses these procedures need to be tightened.

In its planning for 2020, the bureau should begin its fingerprinting process sufficiently early for each operation so that new hires can complete fingerprint screening before they receive assignments and conduct fieldwork.

**Appendix A:
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology**

This quarterly report on the 2010 Census provides an update on the status of 2010 Census with respect to schedule, cost, and risk management activities. This information mostly covers activities that occurred from April through September 2010.

To accomplish our objectives, we conducted a review of documentation, including monthly status reports, field operations logs, computer help desk logs, activity schedules, program management reviews for 2010 Census contracts, and updates to plans for Census-managed activities such as paper-based operations, financial management and status of funds reports, internal budget variance reports, risk registers, and mitigation and contingency plans for program-level risks. We attended weekly schedule and risk management meetings during this reporting period; we also met with systems managers, spoke with subject-matter experts, and observed daily meetings of technical oversight groups.

After intensive planning, we prioritized our review of 2010 Census operations based on their highest perceived risk. We deployed 15 staff members across the country to perform NRFU and VDC field observations from May through July 2010. We prioritized our selection of local Census offices based on the bureau's demographic measures of enumeration difficulty. We balanced the sample by including several areas that were not considered hard to count. Finally, we reviewed areas where reported or perceived problems were occurring. Our field operations reviews included observation of operation-specific 2010 Census enumerator training classes, field operations, and office procedures, practices, and conditions.

We conducted this review from April through September 2010, under the authorities of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; Departmental Organization Order 10-13, dated August 31, 2006, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspections* (revised January 2005) issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.

**Appendix B:
Local Census Offices Visited by OIG Staff**

During Nonresponse Follow-up, April through June 2010

Phoenix, Ariz.	Louisville, Ky.	Beaverton, Ore.
Little Rock, Ark.	New Orleans, La.	Folcroft, Pa.
Fresno, Calif. (2)	Catonsville, Md.	Providence, R.I.
Los Angeles, Calif.	Rockville, Md.	Beaufort, S.C.
Salinas, Calif.	Medford, Mass.	Nashville, Tenn.
Stockton, Calif.	Dearborn, Mich.	Houston, Texas
Denver, Colo.	St. Louis, Mo.	Laredo, Texas
New Haven, Conn.	Concord, N.H.	Burlington, Vt.
Hialeah, Fla.	New Brunswick, N.J.	Richmond, Va.
Atlanta, Ga.	Long Island City, N.Y.	Olympia, Wash.
Idaho Falls, Idaho	New York, N.Y. (2)	Beckley, W.Va.
Chicago, Ill.	Watertown, N.Y.	
Fort Wayne, Ind.	Oklahoma City, Okla.	

During Vacant Delete Check, July 2010

Mobile, Ala.	Sioux City, Iowa	Brooklyn, N.Y.
Tucson, Ariz.	Kansas City, Kan.	Rochester, N.Y.
Vista, Calif.	Houma, La.	Wilmington, N.C.
Newark, Del.	Detroit, Mich.	Fairfax, Va.
Savannah, Ga.	Duluth, Minn.	Everett, Wash.
Urbana, Ill.	Omaha, Neb.	