Mark N. Katz's Blog
The Russia and China Factors in Sanctions
For Russian strategists, the West’s obsession with sanctioning Iran over the nuclear issue appears to be counter-productive. They also view Western insistence on imposing further sanctions as either naïve or sinister—or both. In the past, Moscow occasionally found it useful to go along with the West, although often after long delays. The Russian calculation was that imposing sanctions against Tehran might elicit concessions for Russia from the West or Iran--or both. But Moscow is unlikely to support more serious sanctions that it views as unlikely to change Iranian nuclear policies but which will generate more problems for Russia and potentially benefit China at the expense of everyone else.
Russia’s New Diplomatic Idea for Iran
- During a visit to the United States in mid-July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov presented the Obama administration with a plan for "step by step" nuclear talks with Iran. What is new about the Russian initiative?
- How does the new “step by step” plan differ from previous diplomatic offers?
- Why is Russia pushing for renewed negotiations now?
- What is Russia doing to encourage Iran to cooperate?
- What are the prospects that Russian efforts will make headway with Iran when past diplomatic efforts have failed?
Read Mark Katz's chapter on Iran and Russia in “The Iran Primer”
Russia Balks at New Pressure on Iran
Mark N. Katz
After a year of cooperation on Iran, Russia now opposes new sanctions or other tough measures to pressure Tehran on its controversial nuclear program. The failure of recent diplomacy to get Iran to comply with U.N. resolutions, and reassure the world that it is not secretly trying to build a bomb, has triggered growing questions about what the international community should do next. Moscow now appears to be a major obstacle in forging a united position.
The Obama administration “reset” Russian-American relations shortly after taking office in 2009, in part to win Moscow’s support on Iran. The diplomatic initiative appeared to be working well in 2010. Russia was one of six major powers--along with Britain, China, France, Germany and the United States--that collaborated on both diplomacy and a new U.N. sanctions resolution. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also announced that Russia would not ship S-300 air defense missile systems to Tehran--even after Iran paid for them.
But in 2011, Russia is now urging restraint on new punitive measures against Tehran. Moscow’s unwillingness to pressure Iran any further is taking Kremlin policy back to the pre-reset days. Medvedev has also questioned Western intelligence assessments about Iran’s nuclear program. Reverting to Russia’s earlier position, he said there is no proof that Tehran seeks to acquire the world’s deadliest weapons. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has even suggested that the time has come to ease sanctions.
Two developments may have contributed to Russia’s policy shift. The first was the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as “New START.” For Moscow, the New START treaty was a high priority. With Russia not modernizing its nuclear weapons arsenal as fast as the United States, Moscow was desperate to get Washington to agree to the limits imposed by New START. Moscow would have been unable to match the American strategic nuclear arsenal without a pact. Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the treaty in April 2010, but Senate ratification was in doubt over Republican concerns about Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, support for Iran, and other issues. After Senate ratification in December 2010, Moscow’s incentive to appease the Republican minority decreased--at least for now.
The second factor is related to the democratic uprisings across the Middle East in 2011. Moscow did not seem concerned by Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution in January. Nor was it unduly upset by the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February. But when serious opposition to the regime of Moammar Qaddafi erupted in Libya, Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin began opposing the Middle East upheavals. Medvedev even suggested that the uprisings were instigated to trigger similar upheavals in Russia and even to break up the Russian federation.
Moscow has also publicly backed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite the Green Movement protests launched after the disputed presidential election in 2009. Indeed, Russia was the first major power to publicly congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his reelection. Moscow had no interest in backing a democratic movement in Iran then or now.
Moscow’s inconsistent positions--tolerance of democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt but opposition to uprisings in Libya and Iran--is due to their differing geopolitical impacts on Russia. The autocratic regimes ousted in Tunisia and Egypt had been closely allied to the United States. New governments may maintain those ties, but opening up political and economic systems could also provide new diplomatic and business opportunities for Russia. Libya, however, is a different story. Qaddafi’s relations with the United States have improved since 2003, but Russia’s relations have long been much stronger. A democratic revolution in Libya could decrease Russian influence in Tripoli--and further improve America’s position in this large oil-rich country.
Russia is particularly concerned about an uprising in Tehran that could lead to rapprochement between the United States and Iran. Russian analysts have long been concerned that a geopolitical shift in Iran could crowd out Russian businesses and lead the United States to work with Iran on provide an alternative to Russia as an export route for Caspian Basin oil and gas.
In this context, Moscow’s support for the autocratic regime in Tehran--and its opposition to new sanctions--are not surprising. And neither position appears likely to change in the near future.
Read Mark Katz's chapter on Iran and Russia in “The Iran Primer”
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University
Why Ahmadinejad Lashed out at Russia
Mark N. Katz
- Why is Ahmadinejad so publicly critical of Russia?
Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized for Moscow for cancelling its previously agreed-upon sale of S-300 air defense missile systems to Iran. Tehran expected these weapons to be delivered in mid-2009, but Moscow first cited delays for "technical reasons." Russia even claimed that the most recent set of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran did not cover the S-300s. Although Tehran was annoyed at Moscow, the Iranians still hoped that the Russians would eventually deliver the S-300s. But Moscow's recent announcement has dashed even this hope.
- What does this development mean?
Tehran had been especially eager to receive the S-300s because these may have been able to degrade (and hence, deter) an attack by Israel or even the United States aimed at destroying Iran's nuclear program. By canceling the sale, Moscow is denying Tehran one way to do this--and thus could make such an attack more likely, or at least more credible.
- How does it change things?
Moscow's cancellation of the S-300 sale to Tehran has to be seen as a success for the Obama Administration's campaign to get Russia to help the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue. Moscow had previously been content to pursue a more ambiguous policy of promising the defense system to Tehran but then not delivering the S-300s. The ambiguity created an incentive for Tehran as well as Western capitals to continue to court Moscow.
Moscow’s stance also helped the Kremlin project an image of Russia as a great power for its domestic audience. Moscow could claim that Russia pursued an independent foreign policy and did not just go along with the United States. These advantages may have diminished by Moscow's cancellation of the sale. Of course, Moscow--or more precisely, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin--could also decide to reinstate the sale in the future.
- Are the missiles that critical to Iran's military?
It will still be difficult for the United States or Israel to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities since these are reportedly dispersed in several locations and are well-protected or deep underground. Others are reportedly in major population centers. Tehran would still have liked to acquire the S-300s since they could help limit the damage that the Iranian nuclear program might suffer from an attack.
- What does it mean for Iran-Russian relations longer term?
The Russian cancellation of the sale of S-300s to Iran is just one more chapter in the tortured Russian-Iranian relationship going back at least two centuries. It would not be surprising if Tehran responded by denying or cancelling Russian participation in one of Iran's petroleum extraction projects or re-directing Iranian business opportunities from Russia to China. Still, as the Russians themselves may well calculate, Iranian retaliation may be limited since Tehran does not want Russia to vote for even harsher U.N. sanctions in the future.
Read Mark Katz's chapter on Iran and Russia in “The Iran Primer”
Mark N. Katz, professor of government and politics at George Mason University, is a visiting scholar at the Middle East Policy Council in Washington, DC in 2010.
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