February 2009 Electrical Safety Occurrences

There were 4 electrical safety occurrences for February 2009:

- 1 resulted in electrical shock (welding shock)
- 3 involved lockout/tagout
- 1 involved cutting energized conductors
- 2 involved electrical workers and 2 involved non-electrical workers
- 2 occurrences involved subcontractors

February reports continue to follow the trend for the past three years by dropping significantly from the spike experienced in the previous months. In February 2008 there were 8 events, 9 fewer than January 2008. The positive momentum carried forward through March 2008, but began an adverse trend in April that carried through the spring. The 4 events in February 2009 represent a reduction of 7 from the 11 in January 2009. A seasonal review of electrical safety events has shown a favorable (decreasing) trend from the winter of 2004/2005 through the fall of 2008. A look at the distribution of events by season (2005 through 2007) shows that 17 percent of the events occurred in the fall, while 26 percent occurred in winter, 28 percent occurred in spring, and 29 percent occurred in summer. An electrical safety awareness campaign in March could pay dividends by heading off the predicted upward trend until Electrical Safety Month in May.

In compiling the monthly totals, the search initially looked for occurrence discovery dates in this month (excluding Significance Category R reports), and for the following ORPS "HQ keywords": 01K – Lockout/Tagout Electrical, 01M - Inadequate Job Planning (Electrical), 08A – Electrical Shock, 08J – Near Miss (Electrical), 12C – Electrical Safety

Three of the four occurrences involved a hazardous energy control discrepancy. Only one report (NA--LASO-LANL-BOP-2009-0001) provided an Electrical Severity (ES) score. Although the use of the Electrical Severity Measurement Tool in the evaluation of electrical energy events is not required, it's use is strongly encouraged in order to provide a more consistent approach to tracking and trending electrical energy events. This month's report includes an additional column in the table that provides an estimated ES score for each of the events.

Period	Electrical Safety Occurrences	Shocks	Burns	Fatalities
Feb-09	4	1	0	0
2009 total	15 (avg. 7.5/month)	3	0	0
2008 total	113 (avg. 9.4/month)	26	1	0
2007 total	140 (avg. 11.7/month)	25	2	0
2006 total	166 (avg. 13.8/month)	26	3	0
2005 total	165 (avg. 13.8/month)	39	5	0
2004 total	149 (avg. 12.4/month)	25	3	1

Below is the current summary of 2009 electrical safety occurrences:

The average rate of electrical safety occurrences in 2009 is 7.5 per month, which is less than the average rate of 9.4 per month experienced in 2008. The 2009 average rate, of course, is based on a very small set of data and is below the 2004 - 2007 average rates.



EE - Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, EM - Environmental Management, FE - Fossil Energy, LM - Legacy Management, NA - National Nuclear Security Administration, NE - Nuclear Energy, RW - Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, SC - Science

Electrical Safety Occurrences – February 2009

No	Report Number	Event Summary	DIV (1)	N. 5111(2)	GT ID (3)	GTT 0 GTT		4 D C D (4)	TOTO (5)	EXCAX(6)	GUT (7)	x (8)	E C ⁽⁸⁾
			EW	N-EW ⁽²⁾	SUB ⁽³⁾	SHOCK	BURN	ARCF	LOTO	EXCAV ⁽⁶⁾	CUT/D ^(*)	VEH ⁽⁰⁾	ES
1	EM-IDCWI-IWTU-	A Carpenter/Welder reported a											
	2009-0002	tingling in his hand while		Х	Х	Х							110
		performing a weld.											
2	NALASO-LANL-	While pulling a sealed flexible											
	BOP-2009-0001	conduit, the conduit made contact	v						V				110
		with an energized computer rack	Х						Х				110
		and a grounded floor stringer.											
3	NALSO-LLNL-	During concrete-cutting											
	LLNL-2009-0013	operation, a 110-Volt power line		V	v				v		v		1.00
		enclosed in PVC conduit was		Λ	Λ				Л		Л		100
		severed.											
4	SCPNSO-PNNL-	Electricians did not apply a											
	PNNLBOPER-2009-	personal Lock Out Tag Out											
	0003	(LOTO) as required by the PNNL	Х						Х				0
		Hazardous Energy Control											
		Process.											
	TOTAL		2	2	2	1			3		1		
	TOTAL		2	2	2	1			5		1		

<u>Key</u>

(1)EW = electrical worker, (2)N-EW = non-electrical worker, (3)SUB = subcontractor, (4)ARCF = significant arc flash, (5)LOTO = lockout/tagout, (6)EXCAV = excavation, (7)CUT/D = cutting or drilling, (8)VEH = vehicle event, (9)ES = Electrical Severity

ORPS Operating Experience Report 2 Production GUI - New ORPS

ORPS contains 54066 OR(s) with 57384 occurrences(s) as of 3/4/2009 10:14:38 AM Query selected 4 OR(s) with 4 occurrences(s) as of 3/4/2009 11:43:41 AM

	Download this report in Microsoft Word format. 🗐						
1)Report Number:	EM-IDCWI-IWTU-2009-(EM-IDCWI-IWTU-2009-0002 After 2003 Redesign					
Secretarial Office:	Environmental Management						
Lab/Site/Org:	Idaho National Laboratory						
Facility Name:	Integrated Waste Treatment	Unit					
Subject/Title:	IWTU - Welder Receives Sh	ock While Arc Welding	g				
Date/Time Discovered:	02/11/2009 16:35 (MTZ)						
Date/Time Categorized:	02/11/2009 17:25 (MTZ)						
Report Type:	Notification						
Report Dates:	Notification	02/12/2009	19:25 (ETZ)				
	Initial Update						
	Latest Update						
	Final						
Significance Category:	3						
Reporting Criteria:	10(2) - An event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the Facility Manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)						
Cause Codes:							
ISM:							
Subcontractor Involved:	Yes URS-Washington Division						
Occurrence Description:	On Wednesday, February 11, 2009 at approximately 1415 hours (MDT) a URS Carpenter/Welder reported he had felt a tingling and his hand had momentarily clenched onto the weld stinger while he was performing a weld at the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU). The carpenter/welder was on the East wall about 15 feet off of the first scaffold platform welding a small clamp onto a piece of tube steel that serves as extra bracing for the concrete forms associated with Wall #11. At approximately 1415 hours (MDT), the surrounding area had been wetted						

	down as required by the assigned Fire Watch in accordance with the Hot Work Permit. They had wetted the upper scaffold and lower scaffold.
	The carpenter/welder then climbed the side of the wall to perform the welding. The carpenter/welder noted that there were puddles of standing water on the scaffolding and the floor below, that there was water dripping onto his head from the scaffolding above him, and that the concrete forms were wet. The carpenter/welder stated that his leather welding gloves were damp after climbing to the weld location. Shortly after striking the arc, the carpenter/welder felt a tingling in the hand and arm and his hand clenched onto the stinger. The carpenter/welder immediately stopped welding, descended the wall and reported the event to line management.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	The area around for 35 feet around the welding location had been watered down as required by the hot work permit.
Activity Category:	Construction
Immediate Action(s):	 Immediate Actions taken: the carpenter/welder was sent to the Central Facilities Area (CFA) medical dispensary where he was evaluated and was released with no work restrictions. all welding at the IWTU was suspended pending review and determination of corrective actions. an electrical inspection of the welding unit, leads and surrounding area was performed.
	- the event was categorized as ORPS reportable.
FM Evaluation:	At 1736 hours (MDT) on February 11, 2009 the DOE Facility Representative was informed that the IWTU Operations Manager had categorized this event as a DOE M 231.1-2 Group 10 (Management Concerns/Issues), Sequence 2 (Any event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the facility manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken.), Significance Category 4. The DOE Facility Representative concurred with the contractor's event categorization.
	Following the Fact Finding meeting that was held on February 12, CWI re- categorized the event as Group 10, Sequence 2, Significance Category 3 at 0845 hours (MDT). The DOE Facility Representative concurs with the re- categorization.
	The CWI Lead Construction Engineer convened a fact finding on Thursday morning February 12, 2009. Highlights from the fact finding included: - The Hot Work Permit had been recently revised requiring wetting down of

Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? Yes By Whom: Scott Marhefka By When: 02/19/2009
Division or Project:	Integrated Waste Management Unit
Plant Area:	IWTU Enclosure
System/Building/Equipment:	Welding on the north east wall forms
Facility Function:	Nuclear Waste Operations/Disposal
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	01NInadequate Conduct of Operations - Inadequate Job Planning (Other) 08AOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Electrical Shock 08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Noncompliance 11GOther - Subcontractor 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management attention) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process Deficiency
HQ Summary:	On February 11, 2009, shortly after striking an arc, a URS Carpenter/Welder felt a tingling and his hand momentarily clenched onto the weld stinger while he was welding at the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU). The welder was standing on wet scaffolding and water dripped onto his head

from the scaffolding above. His leather welding gloves were damp. At the time of the event, the welding unit was set at 92 Amps. An electrical inspection of the welding unit, leads and surrounding area was performed. The welder was examined at medical and released with no restrictions.

Similar (OR Report	Number:
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Facility Manager:	Name	Jam	es M White			
	Phone	e (208	3) 520-4443			
	Title	Ope	rations Manag	er		
Originator:	Name	BOS	SLEY, JAMES	В		
	Phone	e (208	3) 533-3552			
	Title	STA	FF ENGINEE	R - ISSUE MAN	AGEMENT C	0
HQ OC Notification:	Date	Time	Person Notifie	ed Organization		
	NA	NA	NA	NA		
Other Notifications:	D	ate	Time	Person Notified	Organization	
	02/11	/2009	17:36 (MTZ)	Brad Davis	DOE-ID	
	02/12	2/2009	08:45 (MTZ)	Brad Davis	DOE-ID	
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Gene	Newso	ome Date: 0	2/12/2009		

2)Report Number:	NALASO-LANL-BOP-2009-0001 After 2003 Redesign						
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security A	National Nuclear Security Administration					
Lab/Site/Org:	Los Alamos National Labora	itory					
Facility Name:	"at large" or Balance of Plan	t					
Subject/Title:	Unexpected Discovery of an Energized Source during Maintenance Activities						
Date/Time Discovered:	02/05/2009 11:00 (MTZ)						
Date/Time Categorized:	02/05/2009 11:25 (MTZ)						
Report Type:	Notification						
Report Dates:	Notification	02/09/2009	19:28 (ETZ)				
	Initial Update						
	Latest Update						
	Final						
Significance Category:	3						
Reporting Criteria:	2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include						

	discoveries made by zero-energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is authorized to begin.
	10(3) - A near miss, where no barrier or only one barrier prevented an event from having a reportable consequence. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the near miss, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)
Cause Codes:	
ISM:	
Subcontractor Involved:	No
Occurrence Description:	MANAGEMENT SYNOPSIS: On February 5, 2009, at Technical Area 3, Building 132, Room 270, at 1105, while an electrician (E1) was pulling a sealed flexible conduit, the conduit made contact with an energized computer rack and a grounded floor stringer resulting in an electrical arc. Using a voltage meter, E1 and another electrician (E2) identified the source as the computer rack. They unplugged the twist-lock cord cap from the receptacle. The electricians immediately barricaded the area and notified the Institutional Facilities and Central Services (IFCS) operations personnel. Subsequent inspection found the computer rack's cord cap, which was designed for 120 volts, had been plugged into a 208 volts receptacle thereby energizing the computer rack cabinet. No personnel injuries resulted. The Computing Operations and Support Group (HPC-2) management locked and tagged out the computer rack pending further evaluation. Because of the inappropriate power configuration of the computer rack and the potential impact it could have posed to the safety of personnel, operations, and the facility, the IFCS Facility Operations Director also categorized the event as a near miss.
	BACKGROUND: The HPC-2 had a project to remove circuits from power distribution units (PDUs) and install new circuits in Room 270 which is a computer room. The electricians had been tasked to remove unused circuits and the associated flexible conduits.
	Subsequent discussion with a Systems Integration Group (HPC-5) worker (W1) found he had been tasked by his line management to move the computer rack from one section of the computer room to another section where other HPC-5 computer racks were located. W1 indicated he had worked with the HPC-5 research and development (R&D) manager who normally moves computer racks in the room. On or around January 26, 2009, W1 and the R&D manager moved the computer rack. They initially moved the rack to one section of the room, but did not find the appropriate receptacle (110V). They moved the computer rack to another section where the R&D manager identified what he thought was the appropriate receptacle. The R&D manager ran the cord under the sub-flooring and told W1 to plug

	the 120V twist-lock cord cap into the 208V twist-lock floor receptacle. W1 stated the plug did not initially plug into the receptacle. W1 turned the plug a few degrees before it fit into the receptacle. W1 indicated he had not turned on the power to the computer rack because it still required a network connection. W1 and the R&D manager then left the computer room not knowing the incorrect configuration of the plug-in.
	According to HPC-2 management, any time the tenants need to have their computer racks moved, they are to complete and submit a request to HPC-2. Upon receipt, HPC-2 personnel review and approve the request. Following approval, a work ticket is generated for the electricians to move and install the computer racks. As part of the installation process, the computer rack is bonded and grounded before it is energized. In this instance, the movement of the computer rack did not follow this process; therefore, the computer rack had not been bonded or grounded.
	Following the event, a Division Electrical Safety Officer (DESO) evaluated the event using the electrical severity tool. The evaluation resulted in a score of 110 for an electrical severity significance of "Medium" because of the presence of a moderate electrical hazard factor of 120V and the shock proximity was within the prohibited approach boundary when the equipment inadvertently made contact with an uncontrolled, hazardous electrical energy source.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	Maintenance Activities
Activity Category:	Maintenance
Immediate Action(s):	1. The electricians unplugged the computer rack cord cap from the floor receptacle. They barricaded the area and notified their supervision and the IFCS operations personnel.
	2. The HPC-2 management locked and tagged out the computer rack pending further evaluation.
	3. The HPC-2 management will inspect and verify the plug-ins are in the correct configuration. In addition, they will also inspect and verify the computer racks are bonded.
	4. The HPC Division management will share the event lessons learned with personnel.
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is	Yes.

Required:	Before Further Operation? No By Whom: HPC-DO, IFCS-DO & ESH-IO By When: 03/20/2009						
Division or Project:	High Perfor	mance Comput	ing Division				
Plant Area:	TA3-132-27	70					
System/Building/Equipment:	Dell Compu	ter Rack					
Facility Function:	Laboratory -	- Analytical					
Corrective Action:							
Lessons(s) Learned:							
HQ Keywords: HQ Summary:	 01AInadequate Conduct of Operations - Inadequate Conduct of Operations (miscellaneous) 01EInadequate Conduct of Operations - Operations Procedure Noncompliance 01MInadequate Conduct of Operations - Inadequate Job Planning (Electrical) 01RInadequate Conduct of Operations - Management issues 08JOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Near Miss (Electrical) 12KEH Categories - Near Miss (Could have been a serious injury or fatality) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process Deficiency On February 5, 2009, while an electrician was pulling a sealed flexible conduit in Building 132, Room 270, the conduit touched an energized computer rack and a grounded floor stringer resulting in an electricial area 						
	Subsequent inspection found that the computer rack's cord cap (designed for 120 volts) had been plugged into a 208-volt receptacle, which energized the computer rack cabinet. No personnel injuries resulted. The Computing Operations and Support Group management locked and tagged out the computer rack pending further evaluation						
Similar OR Report Number:							
Facility Manager:	NameJudiPhone(505)TitleIFC	th Huchton 5) 665-2272 S Facility Oper	ations Director				
Originator:	Name YAZ	ZZIE, ALVA M	1				
	Phone (505) 664-0666 Title OCCUBRENCE INVESTIGATOR						
HO OC Notification:							
ng oc nouncation.	DateTimeNANA	NA	d Organization NA				
Other Notifications:	Date	Time	Person Notified	Organization			
	02/05/2009	11:57 (MTZ)	Ed Christie	NNSA			

	02/06/2000 12:20	(MTZ) Notification Line	NING A	1
			ININGA	
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Antonia Tallarico	Date: 02/09/2009		
3)Report Number:	NALSO-LLNL-L	LNL-2009-0013 After 200	3 Redesign	
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Administration			
Lab/Site/Org:	Lawrence Livermore National Lab.			
Facility Name:	Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab. (BOP)			
Subject/Title:	110-Volt Power Line Severed During Concrete Cutting Activity in Building481			
Date/Time Discovered:	02/26/2009 14:00 (PTZ)			
Date/Time Categorized:	02/26/2009 14:30 ()	PTZ)		
Report Type:	Notification			
Report Dates:	Notification	02/27/2009	1	7:20 (ETZ)
	Initial Update			
	Latest Update		<u>`</u>	
	Final		J	
Significance Category:	3	1		
Reporting Criteria:	(e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made by zero-energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is authorized to begin.			
Cause Codes:				
ISM:				
Subcontractor Involved:	Yes Gowan Constructio	n		
Occurrence Description:	On February 25, 20 received by Security operation of the pay operation was stopp February 26, 2009 i Volt power line enc booth was severed. initiating the cutting ongoing.	09, a power outage to the E y Alarms Group. At the sam yer inside the building was bed to determine the cause of it was determined that durin closed in PVC conduit supp The area was surveyed and g activity. Work remains sto	Building 481 ne time, a sa occurring. The of the power ag the cutting lying power plans review opped and ar	CAIN booth was w cutting he saw cutting outage. On g operation a 110- to the CAIN wed prior to a investigation is
Cause Description:				
Operating Conditions:	Does not apply			
Activity Category:	Construction			

Immediate Action(s):	Construction work was stopped and an investigation initiated.
FM Evaluation:	The Final Report is due to the ORO by 4/9/2009.
	The Final Report is due for entry into ORPS by 4/12/2009.
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? Yes By Whom: Lee Kapit By When: 04/09/2009
Division or Project:	NIF
Plant Area:	Site 200
System/Building/Equipment:	Building 481
Facility Function:	Laboratory - Research & Development
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	07CElectrical Systems - Power Outage 07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring 08FOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Industrial Operations Issues 11GOther - Subcontractor 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process Deficiency
HQ Summary:	On February 25, 2009, while cutting concrete in Building 481, the cutting saw cut an energized 110-volt power line resulting in a power outage to the Building 481CAIN booth. The area had been surveyed and plans were reviewed before starting the cutting activity. Work remains stopped and an investigation is ongoing.
Similar OR Report Number:	
Facility Manager:	NameValerie RobertsPhone(925) 424-3662TitleNIF Asst. Principal Associate Director for Ops
Originator:	NameFREEMAN, JEFFREY WPhone(925) 424-6787TitleOCCURRENCE REPORTING
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organization

02/26/2	.009	15:00 (PTZ)	David Corporandy	NNSA/LSO
02/26/2	009	15:30 (PTZ)	Joel Bowers	LEDO
02/26/2	.009	16:30 (PTZ)	Steven Lee	ESH TL

Authorized Classifier(AC):

4)Report Number:	SCPNSO-PNNL-PNNLBC	<u>PER-2009-0003</u> After	2003 Redesign
Secretarial Office:	Science		
Lab/Site/Org:	Pacific Northwest National I	Laboratory	
Facility Name:	Energy Research Programs (PNNL)	
Subject/Title:	Noncompliance with Hazard	ous Energy Control Pro	ocess
Date/Time Discovered:	02/25/2009 12:30 (PTZ)		
Date/Time Categorized:	02/25/2009 13:44 (PTZ)		
Report Type:	Notification		
Report Dates:	Notification	02/27/2009	14:22 (ETZ)
	Initial Update		
	Latest Update		
	Final		
Significance Category:	3		
Reporting Criteria:	2C(2) - Failure to follow a pro- (e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site discovery of an uncontrolled power circuit, steam line, pre- discoveries made by zero-en- investigations made before w	e condition that results hazardous energy sour essurized gas). This crit ergy checks and other p york is authorized to be	rgy control process in the unexpected ce (e.g., live electrical erion does not include precautionary gin.
Cause Codes:			
ISM:	4) Perform Work Within Con	ntrols	
Subcontractor Involved:	No		
Occurrence Description:	On February 24, 2009, PNN Generating Device (RGD) in electrical power by disconne breaker (source 2). They did (LOTO) as required by the P Building management becan February 25, 2009. The elect hazardous energy and were r were de-energized.	L electricians performin 331 Building, Room 1 cting a power cord (sou not apply a personal Lo NNL Hazardous Energ ne aware of and reported ricians did not come in not injured as both source	ng work on a Radiation 48, de-energized urce 1) and opening a ock Out Tag Out y Control Process. d the non compliance on to contact with ces of power to the RGD
Cause Description:			
Operating Conditions:	Indoors - dry conditions		

Activity Category:	Maintenance
Immediate Action(s):	The electricians LOTO Authorized Worker Qualifications are suspended pending further review. No further work on the RGD is pending. A critique is being scheduled.
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: By When:
Division or Project:	Operational Systems / Facilities & Operations
Plant Area:	300 Area
System/Building/Equipment:	331 Bldg / Room 148
Facility Function:	Laboratory - Research & Development
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	01KInadequate Conduct of Operations - Lockout/Tagout Noncompliance (Electrical) 12IEH Categories - Lockout/Tagout (Electrical or Mechanical) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process Deficiency
HQ Summary:	On February 24, 2009, PNNL electricians performing work on a Radiation Generating Device (RGD) in 331 Building, Room 148, de-energized electrical power by disconnecting a power cord and opening a breaker; however, they did not apply a personal Lock Out Tag Out (LOTO) as required by the PNNL Hazardous Energy Control Process. The electricians did not come into contact with hazardous energy and were not injured as both sources of power to the RGD were de-energized. The electricians LOTO Authorized Worker Qualifications were suspended pending further review. A critique is being scheduled.
Similar OR Report Number:	
Facility Manager:	NameBerger, J. E.Phone(509) 371-7959TitleManager, Maintenance & Fabrication Services
Originator:	NamePOLLARI, ROGER APhone(509) 371-7700Title
HQ OC Notification:	Date Time Person Notified Organization

	NA NA	NA	NA	
Other Notifications:	Date	Time	Person Notified	Organizat
	02/25/2009	13:45 (PTZ)	Christ, J.	PNSO
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Pollari, R. A	. Date: 02/	/27/2009	

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at (800) 473-4375. Hours: 7:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., Mon - Fri (ETZ). Please include <u>detailed information</u> when reporting problems.