To borrow from Elizabeth Barrett Browning… let me count the ways.
First and foremost, we don’t have enough troops. (Yes, yes, I know I’m a broken record to regular Antiwar.com readers.) The accepted standard for successful counterinsurgency operations is 20 soldiers per 1,000 civilians (recognized in the COIN – counterinsurgency – manual written in large part by Gen. David Petraeus, now head of U.S. Central Command). The population of Afghanistan is 32 million, which translates to a force requirement of 640,000 troops – more than the total number of U.S. Army active-duty soldiers. The current combined NATO and U.S. force size is about 140,000 troops – only enough to occupy Kabul and perhaps two or three provinces (leaving 30 provinces unoccupied).
Second, we do not have the political will (nor should we unless the very survival of our nation is at stake, which it isn’t in Afghanistan) to engage in the harsh – and often indiscriminate – tactics necessary to put down an insurgency. The inconvenient truth about counterinsurgency is it usually means having to kill a lot of people, with inevitable collateral civilian casualties. The British, often thought of as the best in conducting counterinsurgency, had to use such methods to crush the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s. Such tactics in Afghanistan would only increase resistance and fuel the insurgency – not to mention increasing anti-American sentiment throughout the Muslim world.
Third, we don’t have the patience. Successful counterinsurgency is a long and painful road to travel. The British spent seven years in Kenya fighting the Mau Mau insurgents and more than 20 years in Malaysia battling the Malayan National Liberation Army. The United States has been in Afghanistan eight years now. Particularly with the continued uncertainty about economic recovery, it’s unlikely that the American people will be willing to stay the course forever – more so if U.S. casualties climb (the number of U.S. dead hit the 1,000 mark when seven U.S. troops were killed – five in a massive Taliban suicide bombing in Kabul – earlier this week). And then there is the reality that the occupier must always leave, and there is no guarantee that whatever success may have been achieved during occupation will hold afterward.
Fourth, we are conducting military operations in the name of a notoriously corrupt government that does not have widespread support among the people of Afghanistan. According to a Pentagon report released in April, “the population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan government in 24 percent (29 of 121) of all Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts.” That doesn’t necessarily mean the population supports the insurgents, but it does mean we are backing an unpopular horse. We tried that in Vietnam with the Diem regime, and it didn’t work out so well. It also means that the population is more susceptible to being won over by the insurgents since they have no natural affinity for the standing government.
Fifth – in another case of déjà vu all over again vis-à-vis Vietnam – the insurgents have sanctuary in Pakistan. We weren’t able to deny the NVA sanctuary in Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War, and our options to do the same to al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan are less than attractive. Probably the only way to have high confidence of denying sanctuary in Pakistan is to invade and end up owning yet another Muslim country. Needless to say, we don’t have the military forces necessary for such an invasion. More importantly, occupying another Muslim country would be confirmation that we are engaged in a war against Islam – not likely to help win the hearts and minds of the nearly 1 billion Muslims in the world, including American Muslims. We could carpet-bomb western Pakistan in an effort to destroy sanctuary areas and break the will of the people providing sanctuary – but that probably would not be viewed kindly by the Pakistani government and would ultimately result in killing innocent Muslims. The least bad of the not very good options is to let the Pakistani government deal with the situation, which means not deal with it very well if at all. However, as long as the al-Qaeda and Taliban threat emanating from Pakistan is local and not global, i.e., a direct threat to America, a less than satisfactory situation is what we may have to learn to live with.
Finally, there is this:
This is an actual PowerPoint slide shown by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, last summer to portray the complexity of U.S. strategy. What it really demonstrates – beyond “PowerPoint makes us stupid,” according to Gen. James N. Mattis of the Marine Corps – is the impossibility of U.S. strategy. There are too many moving pieces with multiple inter-relationships to be able to control them all. And – like a kaleidoscope – a small change to one thing changes everything else unpredictably and a completely new pattern emerges.
Read more by Charles V. Peña
- Cyberwar for Me but Not for Thee – June 14th, 2012
- You Cannot Be Serious, Redux – June 7th, 2012
- Stick a Fork in al-Qaeda – May 6th, 2012
- Coming to a Neighborhood Near You – March 30th, 2012
- WMDs Redux – February 26th, 2012
M Shannon
May 24th, 2010 at 4:30 am
The 20 troops per 1,000 population per current Cointra doctrine would include Afghan, PSC and NATO forces and would only be needed in large numbers in areas where the insurgency is on…so 640,000 is more than is needed and is doable but this number is only a theory and doesn't speak to the quality of the troops, what exactly they will be doing (infantrymen or IT specialists?) or how long they will stay in theater. It also assumes a reliable host government which the US does not have and which it's own doctrine manual (3-24) says is indispensable.
The important thing to note about Petreaus and 3-24 is that WRT foreign occupation it is a guess. It's a mainly French theory on how victory might have been achieved in Algeria, French Indo-China and Viet Nam…and is not based on a successful experiment.
bogi666
May 24th, 2010 at 10:24 am
The Afghans are the descendents of Ghenghis Khan and Tamarind which were warrior cultures. Using the French playbook which hs never been credited with success, how stupid is Patreaus and the Pentagon which obivious thinks, as stupid as it is, they are smarter than the American people which is a shame because the Pentagon is right. Let's simplify things. Just where is it that the Afghans can go en masse, they can't and won't all end up is Pakistan, only the Pushtuns could do so. They have to stay in Afghanistan but this doesn't come into the French equations apparently. Where did the Pentagon think the Vietnamese were going to go. They had no place else to go to, they had to stay and fight the U.S. until the U.S. had to leave because and had someplace to go. Perhaps the USG should consider what an Afghani would do rather than what the failed French strategy for Afghanistan would do. What do we expect for $3,000,000,000,000 trillion of Pentagon work, success and competence.NOT!
E. A. Costa
May 24th, 2010 at 2:30 pm
Excellent succinct summary.
The Afghans are a mixture of peoples and tribes, most of them ranging back to the pre-history of the Indo-European invasions.
Among the later tribes there are direct descendants of Alexander's army, that was wise enough to pass through the rough areas quickly, leaving a few selected cities, like Kandahar, as focal points.
There were Greeks and Macedonians among these troops but realize too that Alexander favored marrying his Macedonians to Persians and other locals, and also absorbed Persian troops and others into his army and elite.
For long centuries afterwards Afghanistan, like parts of India, was a semi-Hellenistic kingdom.
Leondeinos
May 24th, 2010 at 3:06 pm
Our fearless leaders, now and in the past 30 years or more, have had no policy for Afghanistan. (Just tell me, what do they really want there? What can they really get there?) Hence, they have no strategy. And therefore, they can have no tactics. Thus, the soldiers on the ground are dying for nothing.
Obama is very well represented by Petraeus, who, in turn, is well represented by his man McChrystal as he puts on goofy slide shows. The power point slide tells us all we need to know about US policy, strategy, and tactics for Afghanistan.
Eddie Mad
May 24th, 2010 at 3:27 pm
Hey Charles Pena….. your really do talk through your arse….
1) When in history did the Taliban threaten America……??
2) …. "but that probably would not be viewed kindly by the Pakistani government and would ultimately result in killing innocent Muslims."
…. just who do you think is getting killed at the moment…???…….. guilty Muslims..???
skulz fontaine
May 24th, 2010 at 5:02 pm
According to the McChrystal 'power-point', tactical line A crosses in intersection with counter tac line B subsec/3 to then intersect with overlay C minor point b and tangles up feed crossover 2.1a and then backtracks to subverse in parallel subsec z.q and that screws up the supply line for the ANSF theoreticians. I don't know, just seems obvious that Gen. Stan is barking mad.
DonT
May 24th, 2010 at 5:38 pm
Isn't it ironic that Zbig engineered The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in 1979 as their Vietnam, and we are now pursuing a strategy that leads us into Vietnam redux?
The grand strategy has always been to pre-empt China in Central Asia. We used the Soviets as our surrogates back in 1979…and very effectively…but then lost sight of the board.
With recent events in Korea, it appears that China has made a move that puts us in check.
TonyJoseph
May 24th, 2010 at 9:32 pm
The 'insurgents"? – were the 'American Colonists' merely "insurgents"? – or – were they the 'local population' fighting to rid themselves of the British invaders / occupiers?
NO one has ever 'won' in Afghanistan – that is why it has earned the reputation of being "the graveyard of soldiers and of empires".
We could send one million men to Afghanistan and we would still 'LOSE' – as with the Vietnamese, they will fight the invaders / occupiers to their last man.
We are too darn stupid and arrogant to NOT see that we need to get out of Afghanistan asap! And besides – has anyone ever defined what 'winning' would be in Afghanistan? – would be a stable government so that Big oOil can build its proposed gas line through that country?
E. A. Costa
May 24th, 2010 at 11:30 pm
Not a bad little precis of the history of Afghanistan here:
http://www.hinduwebsite.com/history/afghan.asp
Score Board
June 11th, 2010 at 5:20 pm
A-Rod out of lineup with groin tightness (AP)…
I found your entry interesting to I’ve added a Trackback to it on my weblog :)…
War, Will and Warlords: An Interview, Part II « Government Book Talk
July 23rd, 2012 at 12:02 pm
[...] forces in Afghanistan in the summer of 2009 to portray the complexity of U.S. strategy. Source: Charles V. Peña. Click on image above to [...]