



Army Doctrine Publication 3-0

An Opportunity to Meet the Challenges of the Future

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While we cannot predict the future in today's uncertain and complex strategic environment, we can be certain that our Nation will continue to call on America's Army. As we apply the lessons of our recent combat experiences and adapt to a constantly changing strategic environment, I am committed to ensuring that we remain the best manned, best equipped, best trained, and best led Army in the world.

— 38th Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) *Marching Orders*

IN 2001, THE U.S. Army entered a period of sustained conflict that continues to this day. Through successes and hardships, in multiple theaters, the Army has conducted and continues to conduct operations in defense of the Nation. The past 11 years have been intense in terms of demands placed on soldiers and leaders as well as in efforts to capture key changes to doctrine resulting from changes in operational environments.¹ In fact, since 2001, the Army has published four versions of its capstone doctrine on operations.² In a sense, this is a statement of recognition that change is constant, and Army doctrine needs to keep pace with change. In dynamic operational environments, what may be true today may not be true tomorrow.³

Thus, the Army has an opportunity to develop doctrine that fulfills the 38th CSA *Marching Orders* by defining what Army forces do and how they should best be organized.⁴ Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, and its associated Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) provide direction for how the Army will operate in the future. This article discusses the development process of ADP 3-0 to inform the Army and responds to questions and concerns about the rationale for the various conventions used in the publication.

The Purpose of Doctrine

Doctrine provides the Army with a common philosophy, language, purpose, and unity of effort for the employment of forces. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as right. It provides a common perspective from which to train and fight. To meet the challenges of the future, Army

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IMAGE: ADP 3-0 Cover

leaders must understand the fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures articulated in doctrine publications. As changes occur in an operational environment, the doctrine development process provides Army forces the ability to make rapid doctrinal changes to techniques through active participation by soldiers and leaders in the force.⁵

Army leaders must reflect on the past but also look to an uncertain future. The concept of unified land operations provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort.⁶ Unified land operations is a natural extension of doctrine that has advised the Army for many years. Lessons learned over 11 years of combat have honed the Army's views of what the Army is, how the Army operates, and how the Army contributes to unified action.⁷ ADP 3-0 was

developed in the context of a new way of presenting doctrine, one that would provide ease of access and review to the reader.

The Beginning of Doctrine 2015

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 is the Army's first manual published under a concept known as Doctrine 2015. This concept, once completed, will provide soldiers with doctrine that is more collaborative and accessible.⁸ In 2009, senior leaders in the Army expressed a concern that soldiers were not reading doctrine due to the length of the manuals. Additionally, main ideas were often buried within the text. Finally, there was a sense that there were simply too many field manuals in the Army inventory. As a result, in 2009 the Combined Arms Center began an effort known as Doctrine Reengineering. Doctrine Reengineering was intended to reduce the number of field manuals, as well as review the size of the manuals.



(U.S. Army)

U.S. Army PhotoWarriors with 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade of 2nd Infantry Division alongside their Republic of Korea Army counterparts with 27th Armor Battalion and 125th Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the 75th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 26th Mechanized Infantry Division engage in a 2010 combined arms live fire exercise in Suwon, Republic of Korea.

In 2010, based on an inquiry from the CSA concerning the size of existing doctrine manuals, work began on developing a 10-page doctrine manual. This manual, called an Army Doctrine Publication, and a hierarchy of associated publications were the first manuals under what is now known as Doctrine 2015. Approved by the CSA in 2011, the intent of Doctrine 2015 is to provide a more logical flow of doctrine to the force, to categorize content by fundamental principles, tactics, procedures, and techniques. Each category corresponds to a specific type of publication. Material is available to soldiers through a variety of digital platforms, and soldiers will have the opportunity to shape the development of techniques publications through providing input via a Mil-Wiki site.

The intent is to develop concise, relevant, and accessible doctrine that will guide Army forces in the conduct of operations through the near future. Individual study, education, training, and professional dialogue are means to develop a common understanding. Professional discussion is also a means to improve doctrine. Through verbal and written discussion, soldiers and leaders achieve the benefit of multiple perspectives formed through experience and education. These perspectives often form the basis for further development of fledgling concepts that may become doctrine of the future.⁹

An example can be found in an article written by Major J.P. Clark, published in the July-August 2012 *Military Review* titled “The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.” The article provides perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of ADP 3-0 and the doctrine of unified land operations. Clark highlights what he deems are missed opportunities to provide doctrine that emphasizes key characteristics of today’s operational environment while clarifying what Army forces are expected to do in support of the joint force and offers suggestions on how the Army could improve its capstone doctrine. The points Clark makes in his article are certainly worthy of discussion.

Naming of the Parts

One of the hallmarks of a profession is a common language among its members.¹⁰ Physicians, scientists, and engineers use terminologies founded within their respective professions. Ideally, the same should be

true for Army forces, and in many cases is. However, under legacy doctrine, capstone and keystone doctrinal manuals were often lengthy and separated principles that define what the Army is and what it does.

Clark claims that Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 “avoids nuanced discussion in favor of a numbing series of definitions, a taxonomy of operational functions and methods.”¹¹ However, Unlike legacy doctrine, ADP 3-0 highlights the key fundamentals and principles. It intentionally avoids detailed explanatory material, while providing the reader with a concise listing of ideas that all soldiers need to know and understand.

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Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 follows a logic map that links the broad concept of unified land operations to specific foundations and tenets intended to introduce what the Army does in a fashion that can be remembered by the broader audience.¹² For example, ADP 3-0 defines unified land operations, and provides the six tenets of unified land operations (flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, synchronization).¹³ By providing specific lists associated with the larger concept, soldiers can easily read and study the material and, over time, remember the content. Every soldier in the Army will be expected to read and have a working knowledge of the fundamentals and principles found in the ADPs.¹⁴

This common baseline of knowledge is the end state of Doctrine 2015: an Army that can professionally discuss the material in ADP 3-0 and the other 14 ADPs within Doctrine 2015.

It is important to step back and recognize the net effect of Doctrine 2015. The reader benefits from the conciseness and clarity of the presentation of main ideas in ADP 3-0. If that ignites a deeper inquiry into Army doctrine, it has served its first purpose. If it stimulates further research into successive layers of doctrine, it has advanced the profession.



U.S. soldiers with Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division inspect the M1 Abrams tank in Contingency Operating Base Basra, Iraq, 8 August 2010.

Conceptual Emptiness

One of the primary objectives of Doctrine 2015 is to provide Army doctrine that is more collaborative and accessible. However, simply creating 10-page ADPs does not in itself achieve this objective. There are several keys to meet the objective. First, develop the ADPs with the intent of avoiding redundancy with existing Army or joint doctrine. For example, ADP 3-0 recognizes the joint definition of an operational environment, while focusing the discussion of the operational environment as related to Army forces. In addition, ADP 3-0 discusses the operations process as part of the operations structure while avoiding redundancy with the larger discussion found in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*.

Another key to making doctrine more collaborative and accessible is ensuring that major topics and the associated detail appear in the proper doctrinal manual. Clark states that ADP 3-0 suffers from conceptual emptiness due to lack of a glossary and detailed discussion of the various fundamentals and principles.¹⁵ It is true that ADP 3-0 focuses on the fundamentals and principles of unified land operations. ADP 3-0 also contains a one-page doctrinal glossary that defines key terms and acronyms. However,

under Doctrine 2015, a reader would access ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, for a more detailed explanation of the fundamentals and principles.¹⁶ ADRP 3-0 provides the foundational understanding so everyone in the Army can interpret the fundamentals and principles the same way.¹⁷

Every ADP has an associated ADRP that expands on the ADP's major topics. For example, ADP 3-0 summarizes the Army's contribution to Unified Action, while ADRP 3-0 dedicates a chapter to a detailed discussion of the concept. ADP 3-0 introduces the concept of decisive action, but ADRP 3-0 goes into a more detailed discussion of how the tasks of decisive action (offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities) change with echelon, time, and location. For even greater detail, ADP/ADRP 3-90, *Tactics*, describes how the Army intends to fight by providing an in-depth discussion of offensive and defensive tasks and sub-tasks.¹⁸ ADPs and ADRPs complement each other. The ADRP provides the details that a 10-page ADP cannot fully explore.

Knowing Ourselves

Clark states, "In an ideal world of linear processes, capstone doctrine would be the basis for other doctrine, as well as policies for equipping, manning, and training."¹⁹ In fact, ADP 3-0 is the basis for doctrine found in all other ADPs. Because of the parallel development, Army leaders were able to ensure that all 15 ADPs nest with ADP 3-0. In other words, all ADPs recognize the fundamentals and principles of unified land operations, while the fundamentals and principles found in the associated ADPs both complement and reinforce ADP 3-0 doctrine. The process Army leaders use to accomplish this effort reflects their desire to directly influence emerging doctrine through collaboration and dialogue.

Multiple conferences hosted by the Combined Arms Center bring together ADP proponents as well as leaders from various FORSCOM units. These conferences are dynamic venues for attendees to discuss the draft doctrine and provide recommendations that ultimately shape the final versions of the manuals.²⁰ Where disagreements arise between Army leaders, all sides voice their concerns, with the TRADOC commander or, depending on the ADP, the CSA making the ultimate decisions. The doctrine found in the ADPs represents the consensus of Army leaders.

By developing the ADPs in tandem, leaders could resolve conflicting ideas and keep redundancy to a minimum.

Major Clark recognizes that doctrine should not be overly prescriptive.²¹ As stated earlier in this article, doctrine is by its very nature dynamic, impacted directly by events within an operational environment. Although it is not possible to determine future doctrinal needs with absolute certainty, the Army is able to consider possible changes to doctrine as new ideas and enduring trends emerge from multiple sources. Concept developers, lessons learned from training centers and theaters of operation, and academic institutions all contribute to what may be doctrine of the future.²²

What current doctrine should not do is stymie these processes. Doctrine should provide the force the latitude to adjust as necessary based on specific missions. Over time, changes in doctrine will certainly occur. Unanticipated events within an operational environment often determine how dramatic

the change is, but change is inevitable.²³ Change in operational environments drive Army forces to modify mission command systems to assist commanders on the battlefield.

Looking to the Future

ADP 3-0 and the associated Doctrine 2015 manuals were developed by Army professionals who shared ideas born out of experiences in combat over the past 11 years. It is a product of collaboration and dialogue among individuals who care deeply about their profession and desire a common language for the profession. The Army must encourage such collaboration and dialogue and welcome professional critiques to grow and mature as a force. Leaders should embrace the opportunity to engage in the development of doctrine through discussion forums as well as Mil-Wiki and encourage subordinates to do likewise. Only through this exchange of ideas can the Army prepare itself to meet the challenges it will face in future conflicts. **MR**

NOTES

1. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02).

2. The 2003 and 2008 field manuals were titled *Operations*. In 2010, TRADOC published Change 1, FM 3-0, *Operations*. Following publication of change 1, FM 3-0, extensive work was conducted in the development of what would have been known as Revised FM 3-0. However, as the Army approved Doctrine 2015, this version of the operations manual became the basis for Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0.

3. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2011). Paragraphs 7-10 discuss operational environments, and the fact that operational environments are not static. Change is constant, and commanders adapt to change within their operational environments.

4. Published in January 2012, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) *Marching Orders* represents GEN Odierno's initial guidance to the Army. This quotation is an excerpt from his concluding thoughts.

5. Although not formally defining the term, the Army's operations doctrine has traditionally viewed doctrine as a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Doctrine focuses on how to think—not what to think.

6. ADP 3-0, Foreword from CSA.

7. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).

8. Doctrine 2015 Information Brief 2 May 2012 <<https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/orgs/mccoe/cadd/Doctrine%202015%20Library/Forms/Document%20Management%20View.aspx>>. It is important to note that as the Army's Chief of Staff, GEN Martin Dempsey was actively involved in the development of ADP 3-0. ADP 3-0 then became a template for the development of all other ADPs under Doctrine 2015.

9. As an example, current Army doctrine concerning mission command and wide area security was first introduced in "The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016, 2028," 21 December 2009. In 2011, change 1, FM 3-0, *Operations*, introduced mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function. Then, in 2012, ADP 3-0 introduced wide area security as one of the Army's core competencies.

10. FM 1, *The Army*, June 2005, 1-11, discussion of professions: "To that end, they develop particular vocabularies, establish journals, and sometimes adopt distinct forms of dress."

11. Major J.P. Clark, "The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*," *Military Review* (July-August 2012): 48.

12. ADP 3-0, iii.

13. *Ibid.*, 1, 7-8.

14. The current Doctrine 2015 distribution plan is to ensure that every commander above company level receives copies of all ADPs and ADRPs in hard copy and/or electronic form via disk. Copies will also be available on the Reimer Library Web Site.

15. "The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*," 49.

16. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 2012).

17. Doctrine 2015 brief developed 7 July 2011 in preparation for the August 2011 Doctrine Conference conducted at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

18. ADP/ADRP 3-07 discusses the decisive action task of stability, while ADP/ADRP 3-28 discusses the decisive action task of defense support of civil authorities.

19. "The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*," 51.

20. The Combined Arms Center utilizes two formal conferences to resolve doctrine. Councils of Colonels bring together individuals directly involved with the development of respective doctrinal manuals. These individuals have decision making authority where decisions must be made on aspects of doctrine. General Officer Review Boards convene when issues arising in the Council of Colonels cannot be resolved. Attendees are usually general officers, with one senior officer heading the Board.

21. "The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*," 51-52.

22. The Capability Development Integration Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence has a major role in examining emerging concepts that may become doctrine of the future. Center for Army Lessons Learned and Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate actively participate in this process.

23. As an example, leaders from within and outside TRADOC are already examining the utility of the Army's core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security to determine if these competencies will continue to effectively serve the Army in the years ahead.