

soldiers were glad to have the war over with and stayed in place, sentries or no sentries.

From Genoa, we continued along the coast until we got to the town of Savona on the Italian-French border. The French moved their troops south of the town behind us. They were trying to establish a new border several kilometers to the south of the original border. Our maps indicated that Savona was in Italy; the French claimed it belonged to France. Rather than fight our allies, we took the matter up in diplomatic channels. President Truman responded immediately. He cut off the petroleum supply for the entire French armed forces. Within 48 hours, the French got the message and moved their troops back. It was my first experience at international negotiations. I learned that there was no substitute for a bold, decisive leader in charge at the top.

Q: How long after the war was over did you stay before coming back to the States?

A: Less than 24 hours. On the afternoon of VE Day, General Almond, my division commander, called me into his van, opened the safe, and took out a message. He said: "For some months I have had these orders. You are to return to Washington to take part in planning the final invasion of Japan. I told them I wouldn't let you go until VE Day. Well, it's VE Day, and you're now released. Good luck." The next **day** I caught a plane and returned to Washington. Two days later I reported for duty in the Pentagon.

### **Staff Officer, War Department General Staff**

Q: Where were you assigned in the Pentagon?

A: I was assigned to the Strategic Plans Section of the Operations Division: OPD. You will recall that OPD was a "kitchen cabinet" that General Marshall had assembled to run the war, allowing the rest of the War Department to stay intact. However, the Operations Division made the operational plans and the top-level policy recommendations to the chief of staff. The remainder of the War Department implemented the instructions and provided the logistical support.

The Strategic Plans Section, a stable of highly qualified officers, only had 12 officers in it. Half a dozen of them were Rhodes scholars: men like Tick Bonesteel, Abe Lincoln, Larry Lincoln, Hank Byroade, John McCormick, and Dean Rusk. Bonesteel rose to become the commander of the Eighth **Army**. Abe Lincoln became the Army planner. Hank Byroade went with General Marshall to the State Department and later became ambassador to India. McCormick went on

to head MIT, Dean Rusk became Secretary of State. The Strategic Plans Section contained other fine officers who were not Rhodes scholars. Among them were Andy Goodpaster, Ted Conway, and Bob Porter, all of whom became four-star generals.

About a week after joining the section, I was given the job of developing a portion of the plan for the final invasion of Japan, the landing at Tokyo Bay. In about ten days I was ready to submit my plan for approval. It had not gone unnoticed that my seat in the section had been occupied by four officers in the previous 12 months, whereas the other seats were occupied by officers on a more permanent basis. Obviously, my predecessors hadn't done very well. I wanted the seat permanently and was quite nervous about my plan.

I took my plan to Andy Goodpaster, whom I had known since cadet days. In fact, he was the first cadet I met on entering the academy. A tall, good-looking man with a stentorian voice, he was a natural leader. He rose to become Regimental Adjutant of the Corps of Cadets, the number two spot under the First Captain of the Corps. Although Goodpaster had struck terror in my breast when I was a plebe, we had become friends later on.

I asked Goodpaster to read over my plan. He did so quickly and said, "Ed, you've got all the right ideas. But you haven't presented them in a way that will appeal to General Marshall." He then took my plan into his office, called in his secretary, and dictated my plan to her in a different format. It was then typed twice. We didn't have Xerox machines in those days and plans had to be submitted in 10 copies.

Goodpaster looked over the final product quickly, brought it to my office and said, "Just sign it and submit it to General Marshall." I looked it over. It retained all of my ideas but was presented in a way with which I was unfamiliar. I signed it and sent it to General Marshall.

About 9 o'clock the next morning General Marshall sent for me. "Colonel Rowny," he said, "we've been trying to find someone to fill the 12th seat in the Strategic Plans Section and haven't had much success. Now we have someone who can do the job. I don't think your seat will rotate any longer. Congratulations."

I was elated, yet felt guilty. "General Marshall," I said, "I must confess to you that the plan I submitted is not my plan. The ideas are mine, but they were rewritten by Colonel Goodpaster."

General Marshall peered out over his spectacles and said, "Young man, I wasn't born yesterday. It's obvious that the plan was written by Colonel Goodpaster. But anyone who can get Goodpaster to do his work for him is good enough to occupy that seat. It's yours?"

Meanwhile the plan to invade Kyushu fell by the wayside. More and more Japanese units showed up on Kyushu as we got closer to the final invasion date. General MacArthur recommended that the War Department scrap the plan to invade Kyushu and that our troops strike directly at Tokyo. It was in keeping with his island-hopping strategy. He believed in going right to the heart of the objective and simply bypassing other islands. The Japanese had figured out that we would attack Kyushu and had moved a large number of troops to the island. By bypassing Kyushu and going directly into Tokyo, we could hit the Japanese where they were weaker. But as MacArthur wanted, we would go directly to the capitol of the nation. The timetable to attack Tokyo Bay was moved up.

My part of the plan for the final invasion of Japan was to develop an artificial harbor nicknamed "Mulberry." For the invasion of Normandy we had sunk a number of ships around the harbor to make a breakwater, turning it into a protected harbor. Our plans for the final invasion of Japan, having been moved up, placed the invasion right in the middle of the typhoon season. As a safeguard against the typhoon we needed a sheltered harbor.

One day, while developing my plan for the Mulberry, I received a message which read: "The steel for your artificial harbor at Sagami-Wan [Tokyo Bay] is disapproved. Signed Manhattan District Engineer." I became quite upset and took the message to the office of my boss, Abe Lincoln, the Army planner. Lincoln wasn't in and I took the plan to his deputy, Bob Porter. "This is terrible," I said. "We can't let some engineer in New York interfere with our fighting a war."

Porter said, "You're right. Take this right up to the front office." I went to General Marshall's office with the telegram, feeling indignant and self-righteous. General Marshall was not in, but General Thomas Handy, the vice chief of staff, received me.

Handy took a look at the message and said, "Sit down, young man." He then pushed down all the buttons on his intercom and said: "Attention all officers. Anyone having a message from the Manhattan District Engineer will bring it directly to me. Furthermore," he added, "If anyone gets any requests from the Manhattan District Engineer, be advised that he enjoys a higher priority than you and his request is automatically approved? I asked General Handy if he could give me any further explanation. "No," he said, "just carry out my orders."

I went home pretty upset. I complained to my wife that, for the first time in my career, I was disappointed. The military was letting commercial and parochial interests interfere with the conduct of the war. About six weeks later the atom bomb was dropped. I heard for the first time that the Manhattan District Engineer was the code word for the head of the atom bomb project. Just to show you how well that secret was kept, not even the deputy Army planner knew about it. The war came to a close soon after the two bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Immediately after VJ Day, we shifted into a postwar mode. We began planning for the future of the Army. General Norstad took over from General Hull as head of OPD. This was a brilliant stratagem thought up by General Hap Arnold who was chief of the Army Air Corps. The Air Corps wanted to be a separate service. The Army, and especially the Navy, were opposed. By placing a bright Air Corps officer at the head of one of the most important staff sections in the Army, it immediately solidified the Army and the Army Air Corps, banding them together against the Navy.

Q: Was this General John Hull?

A: Yes. General John Hull was in charge of OPD toward the end of the war. I think Norstad was Hull's deputy for a while.

The interesting thing to me was the elaborate plans OPD made for the postwar Army. It made an even more ambitious plan for the new air force. Even before there was a separate air force, the Air Corps made strong arguments for a 50-wing air force. The Army and Navy could see a large segment of their budget being diverted to accommodate this new air force. The Army believed a separate air force was a good move, but had no idea that the air force was planning to be so large. Having spawned the idea of a separate air force, the Army then ganged up with the Navy to keep the air force from becoming too large.

Studies made by the proponents of a separate air force believed that future wars would not need a large Navy or Army. The Douhet theory of winning wars by air power was popularized. The theory held that we could bomb an enemy into submission and needed only a few Army units to guard the airfields and occupy the enemy after it had succumbed. While these studies helped create a new separate air force, they alarmed the Army and Navy so much that they kept the size of the new air force in check.

One of the things I remember about this time in the Pentagon was General Norstad's so-called "dream sessions." Norstad was a broad-gauge thinker,

interested in global strategy. Even though he was an Air Force officer, he didn't share many of the Air Force officers' ideas of an air force-dominant strategy. He had a moderating effect on the new Air Force. Norstad saw a need for a sizeable Navy to maintain control of the seas, and also saw a large role for the Army in physically taking and holding land objectives. While he saw in this scheme a role for the Air Force, it was not nearly as large as his brother officers in the Air Force wanted.

During our dream sessions, General Norstad would have us speculate about the future. We talked about international issues we expected to emerge and how the military fit into them. Several of us were quite critical, even though we were otherwise great admirers of General Marshall, as to how he had handled events toward the end of the war. We felt he had put an overriding requirement on getting the troops out of Europe and rapidly drawing down the Army. We thought he had overlooked the real objective of the military in peacetime, that is, complementing and implementing our political objectives. For example, some of us were critical that U.S. officials had stopped our Army from advancing, thus allowing the Soviets to move into Berlin. We also felt the U.S. should have moved its forces into what Churchill called the "soft underbelly of Europe. "

Norstad had us analyze and discuss the telegrams George Kennan was sending in from Helsinki about Stalin's expansionist goals. We critiqued the famous telegram which later became the "Mr. X" article in *Foreign Affairs* recommending that the U.S. contain the Soviet Union.

Norstad believed that science would play a large role in the future of the military. One of our officers dreamed up the idea of ablative nose cones for nuclear weapons. If this could be developed, we could envision an intercontinental ballistic missile force. In other words, the warheads could fly long distances and in space not bum up when they reentered the atmosphere. If this could be done, we could foresee the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Even more revolutionary, if the weapon's nose cone could survive, then so could a man inside a capsule. Norstad's officers dreamed up the idea of putting a man on the moon within 25 years.

These were mind-boggling and mind-stretching ideas. We worked hard at preparing for these dream sessions, reading history, being briefed by scientists, and talking to global strategists and heads of think tanks.

About the time that our tours of duty in the Pentagon were coming to an end, General Norstad came up with the idea that several of us should go to graduate school to study international relations. Colonels Goodpaster, Dziuban and I were

all engineers scheduled to go to graduate schools to pursue engineering studies. It was General Norstad's idea that we should keep in touch with him and with one another. In this way, we could continue to participate in his dream sessions. However, the Army was opposed to sending us to school to pursue international relations, saying it was not part of the Army's mission. They didn't have the money and couldn't see how it could be done.

## Yale University

Nevertheless, we all managed to go to graduate school on the Engineer Corps' program. The plan was to pursue studies in engineering and piggyback additional studies in international relations. In Andy Goodpaster's case, he finished his studies in engineering and then pursued international relations under a Princeton University grant. Colonel Stanley Dziuban was able to work out a similar scheme with Columbia. Like Goodpaster, he stayed on for three years instead of two. In my case, I could not get a separate grant from Yale, but I had to pursue both courses of studies simultaneously. At the end of two years, I earned both a master's degree in engineering and a master's degree in international relations.

In retrospect, I believe I was the most fortunate of those of us officer students at that time. Yale had the country's largest collection of strategic thinkers. They tried to design ways in which atomic weapons could advance our national objectives. Our professors included Bernard Brodie, Klaus Knorr, William Kaufman, Arnold Wolfers, and W. T. R. Fox. During the time I was there Brodie was writing *The Absolute Weapon*. Among my classmates were Ray Garthoff, Dixie Walker, Lucian Pye, and Roger Hilsman. Our class was a small one, only about 15 in size. We critiqued the draft of Brodie's seminal book in our graduate seminars. I like to think some of my ideas are contained in the book.

**Q:** Let me return to General Marshall. Why do you suppose he was interested in moving U.S. troops out of Europe so fast? Would you say that he was opposed to it himself and was ordered to do so by Roosevelt, or was this his own view?

**A:** I don't know what happened at the higher levels. But in our internal discussions and in talking to people who were closely associated with General Marshall, I came to the conclusion that this was his personal philosophy. I believe he considered that military forces were to be used only for fighting wars and had limited value in peacetime. I think he felt that a war should be terminated at the earliest possible date and the troops immediately demobilized. I don't know how President Roosevelt felt about it, but from Roosevelt's broader perspective and experience, I would guess that he would have gone about demobilizing the Army more slowly.