

agree to only a ten-hour session, insisting that he had to get back to the Soviet Embassy in Washington to attend to “other business.” It was not clear what “other business” was more important than meeting with Bush. It may have been that Gorbachev was at that time having difficulty with the politburo and army officials. But for whatever reason, Gorbachev was now playing hard to get when it came to one-on-one informal sessions.

Retirement

Q: Didn't you decide to retire in June 1990 after the Washington summit?

A: Yes. After the Washington summit, I felt that my usefulness to the President as an arms control advisor was coming to an end. There had been no clear-cut differences between the President and myself on major issues, yet the general trend of events was not to my liking. The way in which I was required to give my advice was tolerable, but only barely so. I felt that I was no longer a major player on the President's team and that my views were not being taken sufficiently into account. I went to see John Sununu, the President's chief of staff, and asked his advice. He told me he was not surprised at how I felt, adding that he marvelled I had continued to function under such difficult conditions for so long. He said that Secretary Baker was Bush's principal, and at times only, advisor on arms control and that Baker overshadowed the other three principal advisors: National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Colin Powell. When I asked Sununu if there was some way I could improve my situation, he said he thought not.

I said that under the circumstances I would submit my resignation, effective June 30, 1990. I told Sununu that I would not make a big issue of my resignation, or take it to the press. He said he thought this was best; if I were to indicate that I was resigning in protest over the way I was being treated, the administration would simply paper things over. But in the long-run, he said, nothing would change. On my last day in office, Marlin Fitzwater made a simple announcement that I had resigned. The reporters asked him several questions, but he referred them to me. I was asked if I was resigning in protest or because of major policy differences with the Bush administration. Since I agreed with Sununu that airing my unhappiness about how I was being used would serve no useful purpose, I said only that I thought it was time for me to leave. President Bush's action was predictable. He sent me a nice letter, thanking me for "the contribution I had made to U.S. arms control policies."

Q: What happened to START after you resigned?

A: In the fall of 1990 and early months of 1991, Bush was preoccupied with Operation Desert Storm, resulting in the remaining START issues taking a back seat. Shevardnadze had resigned abruptly on December 15, 1990, and was replaced as foreign minister by Alexander Bessmertnykh, the able Soviet ambassador to the United States. All of Baker's careful nurturing of his relationship with Shevardnadze went to naught. Baker should have known better; our relationship with the Soviet Union does not depend on the personal rapport between high-level officials. Still, it continues to be a misperception on the part of Americans that Soviets will repay our acts of kindness by changing their positions on policy issues.

President Bush had scheduled a meeting with Gorbachev for early January 1991. Although I was no longer a part of the administration, I let several of my friends close to the President know that I thought a meeting at this time was not a good idea. The reasoning behind my advice was that the Soviet Union had used force to crush the independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia, and that Bush should show his displeasure by not meeting with Gorbachev. The President did, in fact, cancel the meeting. However, the reason he gave for doing so was that he was too involved with the Gulf war. While I was pleased that Bush did not meet with Gorbachev, I would have preferred his using my reason for not doing so.

Several days later, the Soviet Union tried to get into the act during the Gulf war. Although the Soviets had committed no forces, they tried to convene a meeting between Iraq and the coalition in which the Soviets would play a major role. President Bush, having read their intentions correctly, politely and firmly outmaneuvered them. What is more, the Soviet Union had backed the U.S. in its proposal that the UN apply sanctions against Iraq. It was a rare display of how to deal with the Soviet Union and a pair of diplomatic triumphs for President Bush.

Q: After Iraq was defeated, didn't President Bush call for a summit meeting?

A: Yes. Following the cessation of hostilities, the administration floated a trial balloon. It said that Bush would be willing to meet with Gorbachev at a summit, whether or not a START treaty would be ready for signature. This idea of attending summits as a routine event, separate from progress on arms control, was a policy I had been recommending ever since Bush became President. Summit meetings, in my opinion, should be held on a routine basis and not tied to the successful outcome of negotiations on a treaty. Predicting progress always works against us; the Soviets invariably use rising expectations that there will be an agreement as a way of extracting concessions from us.

However, there was an immediate outcry from the leaders of the inside-the-beltway arms control community. They said that Bush should make the completion of START a precondition for the summit meeting. That same day, within hours after his original statement, Fitzwater said that the President preferred to go to a summit when START was ready for signature. The next morning, reporters asked Bush which of his spokesman's statements they should believe. "Both of Fitzwater's statements are correct." Bush said. It was a typical Bush fence-straddling response.

Later in the spring of 1991 the President made several statements assuring the public that the unresolved START issues were "merely technical." These statements raised questions as to whether or not the President was being adequately briefed on the critical differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the very least, it betrayed a significant contradiction. If the remaining problems were strictly "technical" in nature, why didn't Bush accept the Soviet positions and sign the agreement? The obvious answer was that the remaining issues were actually of critical importance and not as easily resolvable as the President would have us believe.

By mid-June of 1991, Washington was rife with rumors of an impending U.S.-Soviet summit. Nevertheless, acting chief START negotiator, Lynton Brooks, reported that there were approximately 100 issues still awaiting resolution. Of these, four were major obstacles that struck at the very heart of the treaty.

Perhaps the most important was the long-standing dispute over the Soviets' heavy missiles. The original intent of the START negotiations was to cut in half the number of highly destabilizing, heavy land-based Soviet ICBMs. It would be accompanied by a prohibition on the testing and modernization of the remaining force. This would pave the way for the eventual technological obsolescence-and hence retirement-of all heavy missiles. The Soviets have, however, continued to improve the accuracy of their heavy missiles. Even a 50 percent reduction in their current force of SS-18 Mod-5s would provide them with the same destructive capability as their entire original heavy missile force.

A second major stumbling block concerned the "downloading* of missile warheads. In an effort to appear less threatening, the Soviets offered to place only three warheads on their SS-N-18, submarine-launched ballistic missiles which were capable of carrying seven warheads. Although this was an encouraging sign and in keeping with the U.S. desire to reduce the number of MIRVed missiles, it soon became evident that the Soviets did not intend to destroy the extra four warheads per missile. The Soviets wanted to have the SS-N-18 counted as a three-warhead missile. But they also wanted to maintain their ability to more than double that force in a crisis by holding on to their excess warheads. Since there is no sure-fire

method of verifying the number of MIRV [multiple independent reentry vehicle] warheads a missile can carry, the Soviets were asking us to trust them. To make matters worse, the Soviets tried the same ploy with their SS-24 rail-mobile ICBMs, "downloading" them from 10 to 5 warheads, while holding on to the extra weapons.

The third major issue concerned the Soviets' refusal to exchange missile telemetry data that the U.S. consider critical for monitoring compliance with the treaty.

Finally, there was a dispute over-how to define a "new type" missile. The Soviets refused to agree that throw-weight, the best measure of a weapon's potential capability, be taken into account. All of these problems were complex and difficult to resolve. For President Bush to refer to them as merely technical was misleading.

Q: Didn't the preparations for a summit begin in July 1991?

A: Yes. Several days prior to the opening of the opening of the G-7 economic summit in London in July, President Bush wrote Gorbachev, asking him to send a high-level representative to Washington who would be empowered to make decisions on the remaining issues of START. To the utter dismay of our negotiating team in Geneva, Bush provided Gorbachev with the U.S. "bottom line" on each of the major issues. He told Gorbachev that he wanted to wrap up START in a hurry. He also indicated the concessions he was ready to make to get an agreement. Gorbachev was, of course, delighted with Bush's moves. He sent Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh to meet with Secretary Baker. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that when Bush left for London all but one of the issues had been resolved.

The remaining issue concerned how to define a new type missile. The Soviets were obviously playing to the public galleries. They wanted to build suspense to highlight the upcoming summit meeting. At the last minute, during a luncheon following the G-7 meetings, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to a "new type" definition. The Soviets agreed to include throw-weight as a criterion, even though the throw-weight could be increased by 21 percent before it would make the missile a "new type." The two leaders declared that the last obstacle to START had been overcome and that the treaty would be initialed at a Moscow summit July 29-31, 1991.

Q: Was START signed in late July?

A: Yes. The START treaty was signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991. It received relatively little attention in the public media because most of the attention was paid to Gorbachev's attempts to build support for his economic goals. In their press conference following the signing of the START treaty, President Bush hailed it as the first agreement to call for the actual reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev also praised the treaty but predicted-accurately I believe-that the treaty would encounter difficulties in the ratification process.

Public sentiment in the United States was mixed. In a McNeil-Lehrer broadcast on July 31, 1991, the commentators accurately expressed the views of three groups. The first group was represented by Paul Warnke, President Carter's chief negotiator of SALT II, who hailed START as a significant beginning to the reduction of additional weapons. Max Kampelman, who had taken over the START negotiations after Senator Tower's resignation, also praised the agreement. However, he saw its value in political rather than military terms. I represented a third and more skeptical group. I said that President Reagan had charged me with achieving a 50 percent reduction of weapons, and that while I welcomed any reduction of nuclear weapons, the treaty only accomplished half of Reagan's goals. It would reduce weapons by only 30 percent. Moreover, it was not verifiable in many of its most important aspects. I said that in view of the Soviets' having violated every agreement it entered into: the ABM treaty, the INF agreement, the CFE agreement, and the chemical/biological convention, the Senate had its work cut out for it and would have to make the treaty more watertight. I added that the Senate also had a great deal of work to do to assure that we had an insurance policy by developing our strategic defenses.

A week before the START treaty was signed, Senators Nunn and Warner reached an agreement which was approved by a vote of 14-4 in the Senate Armed Services Committee. They proposed that the administration deploy 100 ground-based defensive missiles, as permitted by the ABM treaty. They -also called upon the administration to attempt to renegotiate the ABM treaty, as called for in its provisions. Importantly, they proposed the continuation of research on space-based sensors. On the McNeil-Lehrer program I praised the Nunn-Warner proposal as a positive step in the right direction and was pleased that Max Kampelman agreed. Warnke was predictably against the Senate action; he called strategic defenses "pie in the sky."

Within 24 hours after its signing, the START story dropped off the front pages of the newspapers. Most editorial writers praised the agreement for reducing weapons, but several said that so many nuclear weapons would still remain in the arsenals of both sides that the treaty had little military significance. We shall have to wait and see how the Senate approaches the treaty during the ratification process.

Q: Let me go back to the time you resigned in late June 1990.

Didn't you then take a trip to Czechoslovakia and Poland?

A: Yes. I went to Czechoslovakia on June 30, 1990, shortly after I left the government, and then on July 1st on to Poland. My trip to Prague was at the invitation of the Czechoslovakian government to take part in a week-long symposium on how to bring democracy to Czechoslovakia and how to further its economic development. The interesting thing to me was that while I was no longer an official representative of the United States, I was treated very cordially, even royally. I had numerous meetings with high-level officials, for example: Mr. Diensbier, Father Maly, and Vaclav Havel.

You will recall that I had gone to Czechoslovakia in 1985 after the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit. I went again in 1986 at the invitation of the Czechoslovakian government.

Before my second trip I put down a proviso that I would go only if I were allowed to talk to the dissidents [the signers of Charter 77] if they wanted to talk to me. To my pleasant surprise, the Jakes government said I should come and that they would tender an invitation to the dissidents to meet with me. At that **1986** meeting I met with about 12 dissidents in a three-hour meeting. The group included Havel, Diensbier, Father Maly, Rita Klimova, and several others who have since come to power. It was very encouraging to me to see in 1990 that the people who had been imprisoned in the 1980s were now on top. As a matter of fact, I was there during the inauguration of Vaclav Ravel as the new president of Czechoslovakia. Rita Klimova, in the meantime, had been named to be the Czech ambassador to the United States.

Q: Was Rita Klimova one of the dissidents you met in 1986?

A: Yes, I met with her again in the spring of 1990 before going to Czechoslovakia and was distressed to learn that she had leukemia. In Czechoslovakia, I talked to Diensbier about her condition. He said that it was a serious illness and they felt that they had to consider replacing her. But Rita Klimova's illness went into a state of remission and she remained in Washington as the Czechoslovakian ambassador to the United States.

The 1986 trip to Czechoslovakia was a very satisfactory and satisfying one. I then went to Poland. As in Czechoslovakia, I was treated very well and invited to speak to Polish officials at several levels. I not only talked to the members of Parliament, but to Prime Minister Mazowiecki, President Jaruzelski, and Lech

Walesa.

Q: What did you talk about with these Polish officials?

A: In addition to talking- about their general political and economic situation, I talked to them about a pet project of mine, returning the remains of Paderewski to Poland. I left with Mazowiecki a draft letter which I said I hoped he would send to President Bush. It requested that Paderewski's body be returned to Poland. I specified in the draft that the body be returned on June 29, 1991, the 50th anniversary of the death of Paderewski. You will recall that Paderewski died on June 29, 1941, in New York. President Roosevelt ordered the War Department to bury Paderewski at Arlington National Cemetery. But the Secretary of War said this could not be done, since only U.S. nationals can be buried at Arlington. Roosevelt then ordered Paderewski's remains to stay in Arlington until the end of the war. In 1963, President Kennedy went to Arlington Cemetery and dedicated a brass plaque which said that Paderewski should continue to rest in Arlington Cemetery and be returned to his native country "when Poland is free." The letter that I left with Mazowiecki said that in my contacts with Paderewski's family and with members of the Polish-American community, they felt that Poland would be free by June of 1991. Therefore, we began making plans to return the body on June 29, 1991.

During these meetings in Poland, I had several conversations with the head of the Polish Parliament, Bronislav Geremek. Geremek and I had been scholars at the Wilson Center in 1979 and 1980. In addition to being head of the Parliament, Geremek was one of Walesa's principal advisors. It was interesting to me that Geremek was one of those persons who believed that the presidency should not necessarily go to Walesa. He felt that there should be free elections and that the people should decide who should be their next president. There was a split within Solidarity about this issue. Some members felt that Walesa was moving too fast politically and too radically economically. Others thought that he was too ambitious. They wanted to be sure that other candidates would be given a chance to run for the office of the presidency.

Q: What did you plan to do after you retired?

A: I planned to do five things. First, I planned to become a distinguished scholar at CSIS, the Center for Strategic International Studies. Under their auspices, I intended to write a book on the lessons learned while negotiating with the Soviets.

Second, I planned to teach a course in negotiating styles and techniques at the graduate level at George Washington University.

Third, I planned to join the Board of Visitors for the University of Maryland College Program. I planned to inject some of the negotiating styles and techniques I learned into their business and commercial courses.

Fourth, I planned to work at getting the remains of Ignacy Paderewski back to Poland in June 1991. This would entail having President Bush name the honorary pallbearers who would accompany the body back to Poland. It was planned that Paderewski would be returned with full military honors in *Air Force One*.

Fifth, I planned to become a consultant for the Department of Defense, especially on matters relating to the Soviet Union.

Q: Now, a year later in August 1991, how have your plans worked out?

A: The first plan has worked out reasonably well. I became associated with CSIS and began writing my book. However, with everything else I wanted to accomplish and with the rapid evolvement of events in the Soviet Union, writing the book has progressed very slowly. At this time I'm still trying to finish it. In large part the delay occurred because in January 1991 I changed the focus of my book. Having practically finished it, I decided that the public was no longer highly interested in arms control. The events in Eastern Europe after the Berlin Wall was tom down and the increasing deterioration of the Communist system caused me to shift direction. I decided to compare how the five Presidents I worked for: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, negotiated with the Soviet Union. I also decided to put more emphasis on negotiating at the international level in the commercial field.

The second plan turned out quite well. I taught a course in the fall semester at the Elliot School of George Washington University. Although I found the preparation time for teaching to be quite demanding, I enjoyed teaching the course and plan to repeat it in the spring of 1992.

The third plan also worked out quite well. I gave several seminars at the University of Maryland on negotiating at the international level. I also participated in several of their Board of Visitors meetings.

The fourth plan, returning Paderewski's body to Poland, went awry. Prime Minister Mazowiecki sent the letter I had drafted for him to President Bush in the fall of 1990. In December, President Bush replied, stating his intention to return

Paderewski's remains with full military honors. Lech Walesa was subsequently elected president of Poland and paid a state visit to Washington in April 1991. I thought he would put the finishing touches on the plan to return Paderewski's body on June 29, 1991. However, Walesa **stunned us** by telling reporters that he did not feel Poland was ready to receive Paderewski. He wanted to wait until after the parliamentary elections, scheduled for the fall of 1991. After those elections, he said, the last vestiges of the Communist Party would be out of the Polish government. I had to abandon my plans to return the body on June 29, 1991, and instead planned and executed a memorial service at Arlington Cemetery on that date. I am now [August 1991] planning to have the body returned on June 29, 1992.

The fifth plan, to do consulting work, turned out quite well. In fact, in view of the rapid events in Eastern Europe, then the Gulf War, and subsequently the coup in August 1991, I have been quite busy. I continued to give advice to Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, on how to privatize and improve their economy. During the Gulf War I opposed the idea that sanctions alone could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I also opposed the idea, held by many in the U.S., that air strikes could do the job alone. I predicted that the Gulf War be a short one with moderate casualties, lasting only a month. In retrospect, I was too conservative, since the war lasted only 100 hours. I did, however, advise against stopping the war so soon. I felt that we should have completely destroyed, or caused the surrender of, the Iraqi forces.

With respect to the Soviet Union, I predicted that a crisis would occur before the end of 1991. I did not, however, anticipate the coup by the "Gang of Eight" on August 19, 1991. Nor did I think Gorbachev would resign from the Communist Party. While I was shocked, I was not surprised when Marshal Akhromeyev committed suicide. Although he was a military professional who wanted to reform the Soviet military, he was-as he told me on several occasions-a believer in the Communist system. He felt, like his patron Gorbachev, that the system could be reformed. Nor was I surprised that Gorbachev would relieve his foreign minister, Alexander Bessmertnykh. It was predictable that Gorbachev, badly shaken by the perfidy of his former colleagues, would not like to keep anyone on who did not openly and immediately denounce the plotters of the coup.

Q: What do you think will be the future of arms control?

A: Arms control will, of course, be affected by what happens in the former Soviet Union. I have always thought that the Soviet Union would be replaced by a loose confederation of the center with six or more republics, including Russia, Khazakstan Byelorussia, and Ukraine. I believe, as Akhromeyev told me in 1989,

that the Soviets would be interested in conventional arms control. They do not need, nor do they want, large conventional forces. But, as Akhromeyev told me, the Soviets will make only token cuts in their strategic forces. Without a stockpile of nuclear weapons, Russia cannot remain a superpower. I believe, therefore, that arms control will continue in both the conventional and strategic fields. But we would be well advised, however, to continue to negotiate in several other important fields. We should try to limit nuclear proliferation and we should try to reduce, and if possible eliminate, biological and chemical weapons.

The Communist Party, as I predicted it would, has disintegrated. The Communist system, still trying to revive itself, may continue to exist on life support machines. But the system is brain dead. I, for one, am not overly worried about the breakup of the Soviet Union. While we need to treat the question of control of nuclear weapons carefully, I do not think it is a major problem. Yeltsin, who has over 90 percent of the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles in the Russian republic, is smart enough to keep strict controls on them. I believe, therefore, that this problem is manageable.

We should, therefore, adopt a wait-and-see attitude about what happens within the Soviet Union. I believe that we should not give massive economic aid to the Soviets. I disagree with President Bush that the fragmentation of the Soviet Union will be a disaster. I also feel that he waited entirely too long to establish diplomatic relations with the Baltics. But for the most part, I believe that President Bush's inclination to be cautious and prudent is not the right solution for our dealing with the republics of the former Soviet Union. We should work with President Yeltsin to see that he brings about democracy and a free market economy to Russia.