

not muster the necessary 66 votes to ratify the treaty. In fact, they had about 55 votes, a majority but not the two-thirds majority required by the **Constitution** for ratification of a treaty. The Senate Arms Services Committee wrote a report stating that more than a dozen serious errors would have to be corrected before they would vote for the treaty.

In late December, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. President Carter withdrew the treaty from consideration by the Senate, citing the Soviet invasion as his main reason for doing so. It was at this point that President Carter said he had learned more about the Soviets in two weeks than he had up to that time. SALT II, which had been dead in the water for several months, was now sunk.

Q: What did you do after you retired? Obviously you testified before the Senate. But what else did you do?

A: In addition to testifying, I became a scholar at the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution. I spent the next year writing a book about my experiences in negotiating with the Soviets.

Cochairman, Advisory Group for Governor Ronald Reagan

In late 1979 I received a call from Governor Reagan who said he had read my testimony before the Senate. I was pleasantly surprised that he was familiar with the main faults of SALT II and quite pleased that he agreed with my views. He asked me if I would talk to him when he came to Washington. I met with him in January 1980 in a downtown hotel. We talked for about three hours. At the end of our conversation Reagan asked me if I would come to work for him. I said, "Governor, I want to ask you a question point-blank. Are you in favor of arms control agreements, because you should know that I am. If you are not in favor of arms control, then I'm not your **man.**"

"Yes," said Reagan, "I am in favor of arms control but I'm in favor of good arms control agreements and not arms control agreements for agreements' sake." He said he favored only those arms control agreements which were equitable and verifiable. He added that a bad arms control agreement would be worse than no agreement at all.

I told **Reagan** I agreed with him completely. He also queried me quite extensively on strategic defenses. "Isn't there a better way of deterring a would-be aggressor who had a pistol at your head than holding a pistol to his head?"

“Yes,” I said, “you could put on a helmet.”

“Then why not do so?” he asked.

“Because our scientists have not been able to design one,” I said. “There is no cost effective defense system available to protect against in-coming ballistic missiles.”

“I have more confidence in our U.S. scientists than you,” he said. “I believe that if our scientists were challenged they would design an effective system of defenses.” He added that he simply did not agree with the currently popular theory of MAD, mutual assured destruction. “It is,” he said, “just what its acronym implies, it’s mad.”

I again said I agreed with him. From this early time onwards I found myself working with candidate and later President Reagan on developing strategic defenses, something which later became known as SDI, strategic defense initiative, and which the media dubbed “Star Wars.”

Reagan also asked if I would co-chair a group to advise him on national security and arms control matters. I co-chaired a group with Richard Allen. We brought together 50 prominent scholars, journalists, and experts to study these matters.

In November 1980 Reagan was elected to be our next President. About this time I had finished my book and had sold it to a publishing company.

Q: Was the book published?

A: No, before it was published I was offered a job in the Reagan administration, and the White House thought a book by me at that time would be inappropriate. I have redone the book since then and expect to publish it in 1992. [Note: The book, *It Takes One to Tango*, was published by Brassey’s, USA, in November, 1992.]

Soon after President Reagan’s inauguration, he called and asked me if I would take the job of director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. I said I accepted with pleasure but on condition that I would not also become the chief arms control negotiator. I said I thought combining the two jobs in the past was a mistake. President Reagan said he agreed.

Two weeks later I had finished calling on the senators on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. Seven of the eight senators said they favored me for the job. One, senator, Charles Percy of Illinois, held out. He said he wanted to be certain I was

really in favor of arms control and not simply trying to slow the process. He thought I was wrong in opposing SALT II. On a Friday afternoon, two weeks after I had been nominated, Senator Percy withdrew the objections he had against me. He said he would notify the White House that the committee was now unanimous that I should become the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I was quite surprised therefore, when I picked up the *Washington Post* on Monday morning, to read that the directorship of ACDA had been offered to Eugene Rostow. It was especially surprising because I had met Gene for lunch on the preceding Friday, seeking his advice on how to proceed with my plans for taking over ACDA.

Q: And he didn't tell you he had been offered the job?

A: No. On Monday, after I had read about the switch, I called him. Rostow said he had been approached on the job but told to keep it to himself.

He said he felt he was not at liberty to tell me that the ACDA job had been offered to him. I called the chief of staff at the White House and asked him what was going on. He said it was true that the White House had withdrawn my name and submitted Rostow's.

I said I would like to talk to President Reagan about the matter. He said, "Come over and let's talk."

The next day I went to the White House and talked to the chief of staff and several members of the California Mafia: Raker, Darman, and Deaver. Their explanation was that General Haig was named the Secretary of State and that it would not be well to have too many military men in the administration. Furthermore, they said, the administration had the Republicans on board and they needed support from the Democrats. Rostow was a prominent Democrat and could serve this purpose. I made no bones about being unhappy with their explanation and the stealth-like way in which the switch had been carried out. I said I wanted to talk to President Reagan about it.

Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

They hemmed and hawed. It was obvious to me that President Reagan had not been consulted on the switch. The following day they said they felt that I was highly qualified to head the negotiating team, saying I could do more good in that job than being the director of ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency].