

June 21, 1993

## Epilogue

Events moved at a rapid pace between the last interview for this oral history, August 1991, and the time this epilogue was written in June 1993. In the interim I finished writing my book, *It Takes One to Tango*, on May 15, 1992. The book is an anecdotal account of how five presidents I served: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, approached the problem of dealing with the former Soviet Union. The book recounts, in summary form, some of the biography dealt with in greater detail in this oral history. Rather than repeat the material covered in the book, which should be read as a companion piece to this oral history, I will deal here only with some of the events which led to the writing and publication of the book.

The title was suggested by Georgie Anne Geyer. I recounted to her that on one occasion I became frustrated with General Ivan Beletsky's stalling tactics during SALT II. I told him that I had been taking all the initiatives while he had done nothing to reciprocate. "It takes two to tango," I said. "No," he countered, "you're thinking like an American." He then told me how young Soviet officers met dancing partners. "At Saturday night dances, rather than ask a young woman to dance, an officer would pick up a chair and dance with it. When one of the women smiled approvingly, the officer knew he had her hooked. So, you see, it takes only one to tango."

I was encouraged during the arduous process of writing my book by Bert Brown, Tom Clancy Peggy Noonan, Bill Safire, and Larry Ring. For research and advice I called upon Susan Munro, Patricia Barwinczak, and Richard Smith. I was fortunate in getting Al Sanoff, a senior writer for *U.S. News and World Report*, to edit my book. Sanoff read the draft chapters carefully and made major suggestions on the contents and style of writing. Virginia McGuire patiently and faithfully typed the numerous drafts. My good friend Betty Ladd kept my nose to the grindstone when I became discouraged.

By a stroke of luck, I met Frank Margiotta at a National War College reception. A former Air Force colonel, Margiotta had founded the U.S. branch of Brassey's, a publisher of military and political books in England. Margiotta was enthusiastic

about publishing the book, and after agreeing to do so, gave me many good suggestions.

The book was originally scheduled for publication on November 15, 1992. But when Margiotta saw that a draft chapter was critical of President Bush, he advanced the publication date to October 1. He wanted the book to be in the bookstores during the final weeks of the presidential campaign. When I submitted my manuscript on May 15, I had no idea who the Democratic candidate would be. The chapter on President Bush was written more in sorrow than in anger. I was disappointed that he had not taken a more forthright stand on foreign policy, did not stress fixing the domestic economy, and was conducting a poor campaign. The net result, of course, was that William Clinton was elected.

Before the election I tried to get President Bush and candidate Clinton to pay more attention to foreign policy, and in particular to the deteriorating state of affairs in Russia. After the election, I talked to several persons close to President Clinton to try to get him to pay more attention to the coming crisis in Russia. I was worried that without support of the United States Yeltsin would be further rebuffed by the Soviet Parliament and Congress of Deputies. I feared that Yeltsin might lose out at the meeting of the Congress of Peoples Deputies on December 5, 1992. In order to placate his opponents, Yeltsin dismissed his acting premier, Yegor Gaidar, who had been his principal advisor on economic matters. In an effort to be conciliatory, Yeltsin took the extraordinary step of giving the parliament the right of veto over his selection of principal cabinet officers. Yeltsin barely survived the parliamentary crisis in early December.

I continued to talk to several persons-Note: they have asked me to protect their anonymity-who later became officials in the Clinton administration, urging them to persuade the President to show support for Yeltsin. In March Yeltsin, sensing that he was losing control of the situation, called for a referendum on April 25, 1993, at which Russian citizens could vote him in or out.

The parliament, however, trumped his ace. They added three more questions to the referendum ballot. One question was whether the people had confidence in Yeltsin's economic policies. A second question was whether new presidential elections should be held. The final question was whether there should be elections for a new parliament. The parliament cleverly protected itself on the last two questions. To be valid, the parliament ruled, there would have to be a majority of not only those who voted, but of all persons eligible to vote. The parliament was safe because this was not, of course, even a remote possibility.

Fortunately, President Clinton, who had up to this point remained passive, now sprang into action. During a meeting with Yeltsin in Vancouver in early April,

shortly before the referendum, Clinton announced that the United States backed Yeltsin. The President also offered \$8 billion in U.S. aid and promised to work for a \$30-billion commitment to Russia from the world's industrial nations.

Yeltsin did better than predicted in the April 25th referendum, receiving more than a 60-percent vote of confidence. He also won surprisingly large numbers of votes on the other questions. The votes were not large enough, however, to amount to a majority of all eligible voters, and no new elections were called for. Yeltsin now moved quickly and announced that he would soon submit a new constitution for approval. The constitution, modeled on the French, would give the president of Russia greater powers.

During the last three months of 1992 and the first several months of 1993, I appeared on a number of radio and TV talk shows to promote my book. Larry King was the master of ceremonies at my book party in early October 1992, and shortly thereafter had me on his radio show. William Safire wrote a generous endorsement of my book in one of his "On Language" columns in the Sunday *New York Times*. *The Washingtonian* magazine also wrote about my book, highlighting the story about Amy Carter. I was pleased to **learn** that the book is being used as a textbook in several colleges and universities. Although not a best seller, it has done moderately well. When I asked the publisher if it was selling "like hot c&es," he said, "No, like warm cakes."

My book has been reviewed or mentioned in about 40 publications. Of these, 39 were moderately to highly favorable, only one was lukewarm. The critical review was written by a long time friend of Leslie Gelb, who did not fare well in the book. On the whole, the reception of my book has been gratifying.

### **Teaching at George Washington University**

One of the things I decided to do after retiring from the government was to teach. One of my reasons for doing so was that I felt it important that the tactics and techniques of international negotiating were important and should be taught at the graduate level in our colleges and universities. Another reason was that I felt the contact with younger persons would be stimulating and force me to stay current on foreign affairs.

After meeting with Maurice "Mickey" Fast, dean of the Elliott Graduate School at George Washington University, I agreed to conduct a seminar on international negotiating in the fall of 1990. I wanted to restrict the attendance to about 15, but over 20 students applied for the course. I held the attendance to 16, a number I felt would be most conducive to student participation. Most of the course covered

my experience in SALT II and START, but there were three sessions devoted to negotiating with other countries: Germany, Japan, and China.

I enjoyed preparing for and conducting the classes, but was disappointed in the caliber of the students. I found that most had poor backgrounds in history and in recent international events and most had poor analytical and writing skills. I put major emphasis on term papers and found that I had to return more than half of them for rewriting before I could give them passing scores.

Despite my disappointment, I decided to teach again in the fall of 1991. I cut the attendance down to 12 and changed the time of the classes from early evening to afternoon sessions. I found that this change brought in more full-time and fewer part-time students. I originally thought that part-time students-most of whom worked in various government agencies-would be better students. However, either because they were not as well motivated or because the standards for acceptance were lower, or perhaps because they were simply too tired at the end of the day, I found that full-time students made for a better class. The students seemed somewhat better grounded in history and current events, but their analytical and writing skills were still poor.

Once again, I had to return over half of the papers for more work and rewriting. There were, however, several notable exceptions. One was a paper by a naval officer who worked in the Pentagon on international affairs. He wrote a paper on the disposition of the Black Sea fleet. Another outstanding paper was written by a young woman who did an original, in-depth study of Henry Kissinger's difficult early childhood. She did a brilliant job of explaining why Kissinger's early years caused him to think and act the way he did in later years.

After two disappointing years I was not certain I wanted to teach a course in the fall of 1992. However, after having lunch with Dean East, I decided to teach the course for a third time. East's reasoning was that members of the older generation had an obligation to train the younger generation. He pointed out that almost all of the students, in their confidential final evaluations, said that they were forced to work hard and had learned a great deal.

I decided to repeat the course. I again scheduled the course for afternoon sessions where I could attract more full-time students. I also cut the number of sessions devoted to arms control and devoted about half of the course to negotiating with other cultures. As before, I found the quality of analysis and writing poor. But, having placed a great deal of emphasis throughout the early part of the course on the need for good research, careful analyses, and good writing, I found that the students produced better term papers.

I employed the technique of having students submit a précis for approval. From the **précis** I could gauge whether the students were doing enough original research and devoting sufficient attention to the caliber of their writing. The two most difficult term papers to grade were those written by a young woman from Egypt and a young man from Ethiopia. They had both worked hard, but their papers were not up to an acceptable standard of writing. I prevailed upon them to seek outside tutoring and assistance at writing good English. They both did so and in the end, after several reiterations, submitted acceptable papers. As in the preceding year, there were several outstanding papers. The best was by a young woman who wrote about how American women could be trained to negotiate with Japanese.

At this writing I am undecided as to whether to teach for a fourth time. However, I will probably do so for several reasons. First, because I feel a continuing obligation to bring along the younger generation. And second, because I find it does keep me on my toes and forces me to stay abreast of current events. Finally, several of my better former students have been accepted for jobs where they can make valuable contributions. It is this last reason, perhaps more than the others, which will cause me to teach again in the fall of 1993.

### **Return of Paderewski's Remains to Poland**

In the fall of 1991 I resumed my efforts to see to it that the remains of Paderewski would be returned to Poland. I had worked out all the details to return Paderewski's remains to Poland on June 29, 1991, the 50th anniversary of his death. However, in April 1991, on a state visit to the United States, President Lech Walesa threw a monkey wrench into the works. He told several reporters that Poland was not ready to receive Paderewski's remains. He said that Poland would not be completely free until a new parliament was elected in the fall of 1991.

I had no choice but to scrap the elaborate arrangements and plan to return the remains in 1992. Since I was no longer in the government, the White House put Edward Derwinski, the secretary of Veterans Affairs, in charge of the arrangements.

It became immediately obvious that Derwinski and I had opposing views concerning the type of ceremony to be held in the United States prior to the return of the remains. I thought the ceremony should be a large one and held in the amphitheater at Arlington Cemetery. Derwinski thought the ceremony should be small, and held in the chapel. I felt there should be a maximum of publicity. Derwinski thought that the publicity should be held to a minimum. I thought that the pallbearers should be high ranking Polish--Americans, like Brzezinski, Senator Muskie, and Congressman Rostenkowski. Derwinski thought the pallbearers should

be representatives of various Polish-American societies and veterans groups. I felt that Clarence Paderewski, the next of kin, should be offered a major role. Derwinski thought he should be in the background.

Because Derwinski was in charge and since he excluded me from most of the planning, the ceremony was conducted according to his wishes. Held in the Arlington Chapel on June 27, 1992, the ceremony, although small, was a dignified affair at which Vice President Quayle spoke.

After the ceremony, the body was transported on a horse-drawn caisson to the main gate of the cemetery. Several thousand soldiers, airmen, and sailors lined the route. We flew to Shannon, Ireland, on Sunday, June 28th spent the night there, and flew to Warsaw the next morning. We arrived at 10 A.M. June 29, 1992, the 51st anniversary of Paderewski's death. An official delegation of the Polish government met us and together we followed the casket in a motorcade to the Warsaw Castle, where the body lay in state for two days. Following that it was then taken to Poznan for two days and then returned to Warsaw.

On Sunday, July 5th, President Bush stopped off in Warsaw for a three-hour visit. He and Lech Walesa attended a high mass at noon at the Warsaw Cathedral, after which the body was put into a side altar until the crypt in the cathedral would be completed.

For a week after our arrival with the remains, there were a number of ceremonies in Warsaw and other cities honoring Paderewski. The gala concert, however, was to me a great disappointment. The music chosen for the ceremony was not by Paderewski, but the Requiem Mass by Bach.

The official U. S. party was given a number of briefings by various Polish officials. At one of these briefings, Professor Edward Rozek, of the University of Colorado in Boulder, spoke out in criticism of Walesa's choice for prime minister, Waldemar Pawlak. Rozek said that the leader of the Peasant Party was a dedicated communist and, being in his early forties, inexperienced. Asked by Lech Walesa's representative who he would pick, Rozek said that Poland should emulate Great Britain and choose a woman. Pressed as to who that should be, he said, "Hanna Suchocka." Rozek's bold and outspoken criticisms made a number of the official party nervous. I was greatly surprised when watching CNN several days later in my Warsaw hotel that Walesa had named Hanna Suchocka to be the new prime minister. Whether this was pure coincidence or because Rozek knew something we didn't, I have never been able to determine. When I asked him about it later, he simply smiled.

## **U. S. Poland Action Commission**

Early in 1992 Zbigniew Brzezinski asked me to join a group called the U. S. Poland Action Commission. He wanted me to undertake the military aspects of political-military advice which the commission would give to the Polish government. I agreed and chaired a panel of government and private experts which drew up three recommendations for the Polish military to follow. The first was that the Polish Minister of Defense should transform his entirely military staff into a predominantly civilian one. The second was that the Polish military should offer to contribute forces to U.N. peacekeeping efforts, such as in the former Yugoslavia. The third was that the Polish military should increase its contacts and improve its relationship with NATO.

When we presented the report to the Polish government in mid-November, 1992, the Polish officials accepted the first two of our recommendations. But instead of accepting our recommendation that the Poles increase their contacts with NATO, they said that they would like Poland to be granted early membership into NATO. I tried to explain as diplomatically as I could that full membership of Poland into NATO was simply not in the cards for some time to come.

## **Receiving a Polish Flag from the Polish Government**

At a banquet following the U. S. Poland Action Commission meetings, I received a pleasant surprised. President Walesa's personal representative presented me with the Polish flag that had draped Paderewski's coffin. I said that I was honored and flattered, but that the flag should go to Paderewski's next of kin. His reply was: "The Polish government wishes to give the flag to you, but what you do with it is your affair. \* Accordingly, I presented the flag to Clarence Paderewski, Ignacy's second cousin, at a ceremony in St Stanislaus Kostka church in Chicago on May 23, 1993. He in turn presented the flag to the Polish American Museum in Chicago.

## **Project for the Atlantic Council on Ukraine**

In January 1993 General Goodpaster, cochairman of the Atlantic Council, invited me to lunch to discuss United States' relations with Ukraine. He said he was impressed by my work on the U.S. Poland Action Commission and felt that a similar effort should be undertaken on Ukraine. He said, and I agreed, that it was in the United States' interest to improve its relations with the new independent state of Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials had signed the Lisbon Protocols in early 1992, agreeing to transfer their strategic weapons to Russia for dismantling and destruction, and expressing their intention to sign the Non-Proliferation treaty [NPT]. However, soon afterwards the Ukraine parliament had second thoughts about turning over Ukraine's weapons to Russia. On the one hand, they feared that Russia might one day use the weapons against them. On the other hand, they wanted to use the possession of nuclear weapons as leverage to get some badly needed hard currency.

President Bush had set back U.S./Ukraine relations when he made his "Chicken Kiev" speech in 1991, several weeks before the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev. The President urged the Ukrainians to put off their desires for independence and throw their support behind Gorbachev. It was an ill-conceived appeal which was resented by the Ukrainians. Soon after the USSR was dissolved, the Ukrainians went to the polls and by a 90-percent vote opted to become independent.

I told Goodpaster that I was highly interested in seeing Ukraine work out a satisfactory arrangement with Russia over the weapons, especially since Russian officials said they would not implement START until Ukraine signed the NPT. Goodpaster asked me to arrange for a grant from a foundation to fund a joint U.S./Ukrainian study effort on Ukraine. I called six or seven of my friends in various foundations, but all, for one reason or another, said that they were not interested. Nevertheless, Goodpaster said that one of the foundations, PEW, would fund the study group.

At this writing [June 1993] I am waiting for further word from General Goodpaster about the project. Meanwhile, I have met with some prominent Ukrainian Americans, among them Vitalij Garber, Michael Yarymovych and Bo Denysyk. I also met with Oleh Bilorus, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States. In March 1993 I hosted a lunch for Anatoly Zlemko, Foreign Minister of the Ukraine, at which I introduced him to General Goodpaster and others. Meanwhile, I am gathering more information about Ukraine on how we can strengthen U.S./Ukrainian relations.

### **Consulting Activities**

In 1992 and 1993 I undertook several consulting efforts. One project was with Science Applications International Corporation [SAIC] on the adequacy of the verification provisions of the START treaty. In another project I joined a panel at Rockwell International on a similar study. This led to work on a panel with

Rockwell on a study on how the Clinton administration could improve the productivity of the United States.

In March 1993 I suddenly found myself acting as an expert on base closures. Barbara Rohde, who had interned for me at the Wilson Center, is now the Washington representative for the State of Minnesota. Some friends of hers from North Dakota wanted to know what I thought about the Air Force's plan to close Grand Forks Air Force base. I said it would have undesirable consequences on START and the ABM treaty. Accordingly, I wrote letters to Secretary of Defense Aspin and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General McPeak, chief of staff of the Air Force; and General Sullivan, chief of staff of the Army. I later talked briefly to General Powell and at length to General McPeak. As a result, General McPeak dropped Grand Forks from its closure list. However, in late May 1993 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission put Grand Forks back on the list of bases which should be further examined. I went to Grand Forks on June 1st and 2d to testify on the spot to the commission about the inadvisability of closing the base. At this writing [June 1993] the outcome is uncertain.

My activities with respect to Grand Forks led Congressman Jim Courter, chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, to invite me to testify on the Army's plan to close Fort McClellan in Alabama. During my testimony, on April 5, 1993, I said that I thought the closure of the Chemical Warfare School was not in the U.S. interest. Tom Graham [acting director of ACDA], and Victor Rostow [Department of Defense] testified that the closure of Fort McClellan and the transfer of the Chemical Warfare Training Center to Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri would not harm our chemical warfare training program. At this writing I do not know how the proposed closure of Fort McClellan will be resolved.

Word then spread to Monterey, California, where the Army planned to close the Defense Language Institute [DLI] I wrote a letter to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission saying I thought this would hurt our country's language training. I do not know how this case will come out.

I have also occupied myself with such projects as being interviewed and writing articles about the importance of good negotiations to our economic well-being. An interview with the editors of the *Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute* was published in May 1993. An article will be printed in *The American Legion* magazine in the Fall of 1993.

Otherwise, I have continued to follow events in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, China, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other hot spots. On the situation in the Balkans, I spoke

out in favor of arming the Muslims, but not in favor of putting ground troops in the area or conducting air strikes except to protect enclaves for refugees.

### **Distinguished Graduate Award, West Point**

I was pleasantly surprised to learn in March 1993 that West Point would honor me on May 25, 1993, with a Distinguished Graduate Award, West Point's version of an honorary degree. The award was established in 1992, at which time it was awarded to Generals Ridgeway, Van Fleet, and Goodpaster. In 1993 two awards, other than mine, went to General Roscoe Robinson and Robert McDermott.

In my acceptance speech I told the cadets that there were three principles other than Duty, Honor and Country instilled in me at West Point. One was the primacy of peace over war. "Never be afraid of going to war to defend U. S. vital interests," I said, "but never fear to exhaust all other options before going to war." A second principle instilled in me was not to fight future wars with the weapons and tactics of the last war. This principle impelled me to help develop the air mobility concept and to introduce armed helicopters into Vietnam. The third principle was the importance of moral courage. This lesson stood me in good stead when President Carter signed the fatally flawed SALT II treaty in 1979. Not being able to support the treaty in good conscience, I resigned my post and retired from the Army. In retrospect, it turned out to be the correct decision; a fair and equitable agreement on strategic arms was signed in 1991.

### **Postscript**

In June 1995 I find myself in good health and active at teaching, writing, and consulting. I miss the busy schedule I previously followed, but find it satisfying to be able to pick and choose those things I want to work on. I have established three criteria for the rest of my productive life. First, to undertake projects which serve the country's interest. Second, to work on those projects where I have something significant to contribute. And third, to work only on those projects that interest me. I hope I can continue to work until the year 2000 observing these three criteria.