

better scientists, and even the chief scientists of the labs which received the highest ratings.

All in all, the management of the Army's labs was one of the most fascinating and most rewarding of my experiences.

Q: I understand you left the R&D job after about ten months. What were the circumstances of your departure?

Commanding General, I Corps

A: What happened was that General Harold K. Johnson retired as the Army chief of staff and was replaced by General William C. Westmoreland. One of Westmoreland's first official acts, in fact on his first day in office, he called me in and asked if I would like to be promoted to lieutenant general and take command of I Corps in Korea. I said I would be delighted to do so and was immediately placed on orders to Korea.

Q: Had you known Westmoreland personally? Why did he act so quickly to promote you?.

A: No, I did not know Westmoreland personally. I had, as do most general officers, become acquainted with other general officers and I had met him on a few official and social occasions. We got on quite well. Later, after he had promoted me, I learned that Westmoreland knew of my difficulties with Johnson and had told several people that I had been treated shabbily. He was enthusiastic about air mobility and believed that I had a hand in bringing it to fruition. I also heard that he felt my work on FRELOC deserved recognition. As a result, he apparently felt I had been treated unfairly and wanted to correct the injustice.

Q: Ambassador Rowny, you left research and development as deputy chief and went to Korea to become the commanding general of I Corps, United States Army from July of 1970 until June of 1971. What did that job entail?

A: That job entailed commanding all Korean and United States troops along the western half of the DMZ, the demilitarized zone. The eastern portion of the DMZ was under the command of the ROK First Army. I was in command of the more sensitive part of the DMZ because the two capitals-Seoul and Pyongyang-are in the west. Also, this is the area which includes the easier avenues of approach since the east was mountainous. In short, I Corps defended the more vital sector. I had

under me six Korean and two United States divisions. I was supported by U.S. atomic artillery-an Honest John battalion.

Shortly after I arrived, I was told that the U.S. **Army** and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering phasing out one of the two U.S. divisions under my command. I was to recommend whether the 2d Division or the 7th Division should be phased out. I was also to study whether we could turn the artillery mission over to the Koreans.

My recommendation was that the 2d Division should stay since it occupied the more important sector to defend.

I also said that if we were going to phase out a U.S. division that the ratio of seven Korean to one U.S. division called for a different command structure. We, of course, wanted to maintain overall control, and in fact the Koreans wanted us to continue to be in command. It was their way of assuring U.S. direct involvement in combat if the North Koreans attacked. My recommendation was that we should change I Corps from a U.S. corps to a joint corps headquarters which would still leave me in command. My deputy would be a Korean and we would have a staff which was half Korean and half U.S. The U.S. corps headquarters at Uijongbu would be replaced by an integrated US/ROK [United States/Republic of Korea] headquarters. I also recommended turning the artillery mission over to the Koreans.

The idea struck a responsive chord with the Koreans and the Americans. To work up the plans for an integrated staff, the Koreans assigned me a very fine major general, Lee Jae Jon. Subsequently Lee was promoted to lieutenant general and became deputy commander of I **US/ROK** Corps.

Our planning proceeded along several simultaneous avenues. The first involved phasing out one of our U.S. divisions and placing elements of the remaining one in the most strategic areas. The best Korean division would move into the next most strategic areas and the new Korean division would move into the easier sector to defend. The second avenue was to train Korean artillery to take over the Honest John battalion which would fire, if needed, the atomic weapons which we would keep under U.S. control. The third avenue was to design an integrated Korean-United States staff. The planning and execution would be done without any detriment to our mission or our state of alertness.

The phaseout of the U.S. division and its replacement by a Korean division went smoothly. So did the training of the Korean artillery. However, the transition of the corps headquarters into an integrated one went less smoothly. This was not

because there were any substantive matters between us, but because there were many administrative hurdles to overcome.

It was my thought that if we were to become a truly integrated staff we would not only have to work together but to live together. Since U.S. officers were not allowed to have their families in Korea and the Koreans of course did, the first question was whether to permit families to live with both the U.S. and Korean officers or to have families with neither side. I didn't think we could allow Korean officers to have their families live with them and the U.S. officers not do so. The Koreans opted not to have their families join them. The second question was where to house the Korean officers. My thought was that the Korean officers would move into the same housing vacated by the U.S. officers. But I immediately ran into administrative difficulties. The United States Army said, "No," we and the Koreans should have separate housing and not live together. I resisted this but lost out. In the end we struck a compromise. The deputy commander and principal staff officers would live among the Americans. But the other officers and enlisted men of the headquarters would live in separate buildings within our compound.

Q: Did you have general resistance to your idea or was it the resistance of only a few?

A: I had general resistance from the administrators at the Army headquarters in Korea as well as widespread resistance from Washington. They didn't like the idea of providing jeeps and sedans for Korean officers and of allowing the Koreans to eat in our mess. I took the stand that if we were to live together and perhaps have to fight and die together, then the Korean officers should eat in our mess.

But the U.S. administrators had objections. They said our messes were subsidized and therefore the Koreans should pay full amounts for their meals, a large sum of money for the Koreans. They would have to give up almost their entire salary in order to be able to eat with us. Then there were other objections. The critics said we would have to set up two kitchens, that the Koreans wouldn't eat our food. And our headquarters invented other arguments and imposed additional obstacles. In the end General Lee Jae Jon convinced the Korean Army that they should reimburse the U.S. for meals eaten by the Korean officers. The Koreans would provide kitchens for Korean enlisted men. A compromise was worked out.

We grew to be a very closely integrated staff after that, I think in large part because the Korean officers and enlisted men saw how hard I fought to consider them equals. They worked very hard as a staff. At our officers mess we had two mess lines, one for U.S. food and one for Korean food. Each line had one or two dishes from the other line. But we sat together at the tables. The Korean enlisted

men had their own mess which served traditional Korean food. Despite the resistance from U.S. higher headquarters things worked out.

I organized a competition for the best design for a new patch for I US/ROK Corps-and then had the winning logo approved by the U.S. Army Heraldry Division. Over the next year we completed the phaseout of the 7th U.S. Division, the phase-in of a Korean division and the integration of the I US/ROK Corps staff. We also completed the training program for the Honest John battalion and set up the custodial unit and guards for the nuclear warheads.

It all worked out quite well. Actually it was a pretty exciting time. After a year the kinks had been ironed out and things were running rather smoothly.

Q: Let me ask you, while you were there, did you have any problems on the DMZ?

A: No, we had no major problems. There were always minor problems, but nothing on the order of the tree cutting incident which occurred later. We conducted periodic alerts and I must admit that the Korean units responded better than my U.S. units.

Q: Was there any rebuilding on the line? Or was the line substantial enough?

A: We worked at constantly upgrading the line. I inherited a long-range plan which included adding more lights and alert mechanisms. We also strengthened bridges and improved roads leading up to the line.

Q: Did American military engineers do this?

A: Yes, but Korean military engineers worked on the upgrade as well. I was assigned the control of a large Korean engineering unit which was quite good. When the weather was good, which was about half the year, the Korean engineers worked around the clock in two 12-hour shifts.

Q: Your mention of the integration of Korean officers into your staff brings to mind the problems athletes encountered during the Olympics. There were complaints that Americans gave the orders and the Koreans did the work. We also heard about the famous tempers of the "Irishmen of the Far East" flaring. Did you have similar problems?

A: No, I had no problems of that type. I found the Koreans to be well trained and disciplined soldiers. They cheerfully and loyally obeyed my orders. When I called an alert they met my standards, even though the U.S. units did not always do so. They had a great deal of pride. It was generally not recognized back home that the Korean military had come a long way since the Korean War of the early 1950s. Many of their younger officers were products of the Korean military academy which was patterned after West Point. Their officers were highly motivated and well qualified. I had full confidence in their ability.

Q: What about the Koreans in Vietnam. Did they do a good job?

A: Yes, they were good. The difference between the Korean units of 1950 and 1969 was nothing short of astounding. In 1950 there were a few good Korean units, but for the most part they were not well led, not well trained, and didn't have much in the way of weapons and equipment. By 1969 things had developed rather rapidly. I was pleasantly surprised by the high degree of alertness and soldierly qualities of the Korean officer corps and the Korean soldiers. We constantly pitted U.S. units against Korean units in competitions. Some, like maintenance of vehicles, were won by the Americans. But others, like moving out quickly to their battle positions, were won by the Koreans. There was a healthy, lively, and friendly competition between the U.S. and Korean troops, and the Koreans won most of the prizes.

Q: I gather the country had changed quite a bit.

A: Yes, very much so.

Deputy Chairman for the NATO Military Committee

Q: I understand that when you left Korea you went to Europe where you became the deputy chairman for the NATO Military Committee.

A: Yes.

Q: How did they manage to ship you overseas from an overseas assignment without going back to the States for a briefing in between?

A: It was a matter of getting someone aboard in a hurry. The officer I was replacing had left early in July for a new assignment and there was no deputy on board.