

on my salary and she invested hers, buying **IBM** stock when it was quite cheap. As a result, we always had money to send our children to the best of schools. I could not have paid for that kind of education on my Army salary.

Q: What prep schools did they go to?

A: In the States my daughter went to Holy Trinity and in France went to Sainte Clotilde Academy. This preparation allowed her to win a scholarship to Smith College. Two of my sons went to Landon Prep School and Priory in the States. Overseas three of my sons went to Haute Savoie in France and two went to Montana Zugerberg in Switzerland. These schools were among the very best.

Q: And did they become linguistically proficient in French and German?

A: Yes, except for my youngest son. He spent the first three years of his life in France and spoke only French when we returned. But he was made fun of by his classmates and abandoned French when he was about five. Later it came back to him.

Q: Thank you, Ambassador Rowny. I consider one of the more important parts of an officer's career the support he gets back home. Obviously you were supported and your family turned out well.

A: Yes, I was very fortunate.

### **Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division**

Q: On June of 1965 you took command of the 24th Division in Germany and kept that job for over a year. Can you tell me something about the time you spent with the 24th?

A: In the first place, I was pleased that the new policy was that commanders overseas would serve for two years. There had been too much rotation and the new policy was designed to stabilize command tours. Second, I took command of the 24th Division when it was at its lowest point in terms of training and morale. I had nowhere to go but up. The previous commanding general, a personnel specialist, had had very little experience with troops. He believed that he could build morale by coddling and babying the troops. He gave them lots of time off and did not

train them hard. I gathered that for a short time he was very popular with the troops. But they soon became bored and unhappy.

Q: Who had been in command of the 24th Division before you? Did he serve a full two year term?

A: My predecessor was Major General William A. Cunningham III. He was relieved by General O'Meara after about a year in command. The Army commander had gone to inspect the division on a maneuver. The troops were doing poorly and referred to one another as "Cunny's Bunnies." General O'Meara, looking for Cunningham during a critical part of the maneuver, found him comfortably seated in his van. That was enough for O'Meara.

Q: When you took over the command, did things change?

A: Yes, in large part because the troops themselves were ready for a change. I instituted a hard regime of training and maintenance. They responded beautifully. Our ratings soon began to rise and we went from the bottom of all the divisions in Europe to a position after a year when we were number one or two in every category. It was a great joy to command the division.

Q: How were the officers below and above you?

A: I was given a degree of latitude to choose my brigade and battalion commanders. My three brigade commanders were outstanding officers as were six or seven of my nine battalion commanders. I had a fine deputy commander, an excellent chief of staff, and a good artillery commander. My immediate superior, the VII Corps commander, was Lieutenant General T. J. Conway, who had been my division commander when I was an ADC [assistant division commander] in the 82d Airborne Division. He was later replaced by Lieutenant General Frank Mildren who had commanded the Rock of the Marne Regiment in Korea where I had been his deputy. These were two of the best officers in the Army. Both rose to be four-star generals. It was fortunate that I had worked for both of them and knew what was expected of me. The Army commander was General A. P. O'Meara. I had not worked for him but knew of his reputation. He was a highly demanding commander. He was death on officers who could not produce results, but gave those who could a great deal of leeway and strong support.

Q: Were you getting new equipment or was it, at that point, all going to Vietnam?

A: We were not getting any new equipment. In fact, much of our better vehicles and weapons were taken from us and sent to Vietnam. As a result, we had to put a great deal of emphasis on maintenance. In this connection, I had one advantage over the other four divisions in Europe. My division was assigned the mission of augmenting the Berlin contingent. This amounted to sending a battalion of infantry, 25 tanks, and 25 armored personnel carriers to Berlin for a 60-day period.

The Berlin command could draw on counterpart funds. With these funds and the excellent German civilian mechanics in Berlin, we were able, in a 60-day period, to completely overhaul the battalion's equipment, including its attached tanks and armored personnel carriers. We put all our worst weapons, vehicles, tanks, and APCs [armored personnel carriers] from the entire division into the force we sent to Berlin. Sixty days later, the unit would come back with refurbished equipment. In fact, some of it was better than new because the mechanics made a number of the parts in their machine shops, which were better than the spare parts designed and fabricated in the States.

Q: But aside from this windfall, didn't you need to spend a great deal of effort on maintenance?

A: Yes. To put more emphasis on maintaining our equipment, I designed a concept which we called TRAIN-MAIN. The idea was to devote as much time and command supervision to maintenance as was usually given to training. First, I let the commanders know that they would be rated on a dual standard, 50 percent on their ability to train their units and 50 percent on their ability to maintain their unit's equipment. This caused the commanders to shift some of their better subordinates into maintenance jobs and to establish training courses on how to care for equipment. Each company would train for a week, with everyone training except those needed to repair or keep equipment going, and then it would maintain for a week, with everyone turning a hand to taking care of the equipment. During the train week, commanders had the opportunity of discovering better mechanics than those assigned to the job. It also forced commanders at every echelon to supervise the maintenance, something which had not been done before. The added incentives to do better at maintaining, because it would be reflected on the commander's efficiency reports, plus the command emphasis at all levels proved to be highly effective. The maintenance scores awarded us by the USAREUR [United States Army, Europe] equipment inspectors shot up dramatically.

We did not, of course, slight our training. At least half of the time was devoted to it because we participated in maneuvers. But the increased knowledge the commanders gained about how to maintain equipment paid big dividends. They

found they could do better in the maneuvers because larger percentages of their equipment were in operable condition.

Q: What was your style of command? Did you go down to the company level to observe the troops when they trained and maintained?

A: Yes. Just as I had instructed my subordinate commanders to devote half of their time to training and half to maintenance, I followed the same pattern. When I went to inspect a company at training, I would have all the intermediate commanders as well as the division, brigade, and battalion operations officers accompany me. In this way I was assured we all saw the same thing and that my favorable comments and criticism was known to the company commander's entire chain of command. I used the same technique when I visited a company maintaining its equipment, except that in addition to the chain of command, I had the division, brigade, and battalion supply and maintenance officers accompany me.

When I inspected training exercises I would go by helicopter, thus saving a great deal of travel time. I would usually give the chain of command two hours' notice so they could drop what they were doing and join me. Only if there was some pressing business would I excuse the chain of command, and then I would have them send their deputies.

We also trained a great deal at night. I insisted that each unit spend half of its training time in night exercises.

I instituted one additional concept, that of giving company commanders one day a week as their own time. On that day they could stress whatever they felt was important, including taking care of personal business, such as going to the bank, the dentist, etc., and having their men do the same. Since I insisted that as close to 100 percent as possible of all the men be present at training or maintenance, I had to give them some free time to take care of these essential and, at times, menial tasks.

Q: Were you able to turn out 100 percent of the men for a training exercise or for a maintenance program?

A: No, but we tried to approach 100 percent. There were always several men per company on sick call. When the company took to the field for an exercise, we would leave the sick men back to guard the barracks. I put a high premium on getting every possible man to be with his unit, both during TRAIN and MAIN. For every missing person who was not sick or on emergency leave, I would dock

the company commander 1 percent of his grade. Since competition for scores was great, this got the people out in the field.

Q: How did you handle administration?

A: I tried to get it done on the one free day per week allowed the company commander. I also rotated administrative duties with my assistant division commander and had my subordinates rotate with their deputies. My assistant division commander was just as anxious as I was to supervise training and maintenance. Therefore, I let him get out as much as possible. But when some administrative chore required my presence at headquarters, I would alternate with him.

Q: What about your officer support? Was it good?

A: Yes. It was excellent. I was assigned very good officers. I would say that fully 90 percent of my officers were rated outstanding or excellent. Like all units, I wound up with a few duds. But after a while I learned that the better officers in USAREUR were gravitating to my unit. Officers have friends in the personnel assignment business and could often influence where they were sent. After the word got around that the 24th Division was scoring high in USAREUR tests, many of the better officers in Europe began to show up on my rosters.

A similar set of circumstances occurred in reverse. The word got around that officers who performed poorly were given poor efficiency reports. This caused a number of the poorer officers to pull strings to avoid being assigned to the 24th Division.

Q: What about Vietnam veterans? Did you have many in your outfit?

A: Very few. In 1965 and 1966 there was not a large portion of the Army in Vietnam. Those who had served in Vietnam for a year would usually be given two- or three-year tours in the States before being sent overseas again.

Q: What about the reverse? Did your division get levied to send officers to Vietnam?

A: Yes. During my time in command there was a rapid buildup in Vietnam and certain specialties were in critical supply. I was always between 35 and 40 percent short on officers.

Q: How did you manage with such a shortage of officers?

A: Every commander had his own solution. My approach was to fill every vacant command slot with a noncommissioned officer. My theory was that training and maintenance needed leadership and supervision. I would have each noncom in an officer slot display a tag on his uniform showing his brevetted rank, whether it be 2d or 1st lieutenant. Where captains were missing I would have these spots filled by lieutenants and would have them, like the noncoms, display their brevetted ranks. This was not only good training for noncoms and junior officers but was a big morale booster. I was able to get several noncoms promoted to the officer ranks, similar to battlefield commissions. Although the Army did not permit many such promotions, it was a big morale booster.

Q: By the time you gave up your command, had the 24th Division responded to your direction?

A: Yes, very much so. I was very pleased with the way the division responded to my direction. When I took over, the division was definitely on the bottom in all categories by which VII Corps and USAREUR rated its divisions. They kept score on such things as training, maintenance, administration, and discipline. By the time I left, the 24th Division was first in maintenance and first in training, including the tank gunnery competition. I was particularly proud of our tank gunnery award because we were a mechanized division, which had a relatively smaller number of tanks than the armored divisions against which we competed.

### **Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USAREUR**

Q: Why did you relinquish command of the 24th Division before your two-year tour was up?

A: General O'Meara, CG of USAREUR, brought me to Heidelberg to be a member of his staff. He made me his deputy chief of staff for logistics [DCSLOG] and put me in charge of FRELOC [fast relocation from France]. Six months prior to my arrival, General de Gaulle had severed his ties with NATO and ordered the U.S. troops and equipment out of France. He gave the U.S. one year to completely evacuate from France.

General O'Meara assigned this job to my predecessor, Major General Alden K. Sibley. Sibley was a brilliant officer, but very cautious and indecisive. After six months, at which time O'Meara expected one-half of the job to be finished, Sibley