

Brucellosis in the United States: Current Perspectives

**Clinician Outreach and
Communication Activity (COCA)
Conference Call
August 25, 2011**



Objectives

At the conclusion of this session, the participant will be able to accomplish the following:

- ❑ **Describe populations at risk for brucellosis in the United States**
- ❑ **List brucellosis diagnostic methods available in the United States and advantages and disadvantage of each**
- ❑ **Discuss main causes of *Brucella* laboratory exposures and risk assessment**
- ❑ **Discuss treatment regimens for brucellosis and patient follow up**

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TODAY'S PRESENTER



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Brucellosis in the United States: Current Perspectives

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**Clinician Outreach and
Communication Activity (COCA)**

Conference Call

August 25, 2011

National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases

Division of High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology




Outline

- ❑ **Introduction**
- ❑ **History and Epidemiology**
- ❑ **Sources of Infection in the United States**
- ❑ **Surveillance**
- ❑ **Clinical Presentation**
- ❑ **Diagnosis**
- ❑ **Treatment**
- ❑ **Risk Groups**
- ❑ **Summary**

Introduction

- ❑ **Brucellosis - worldwide zoonotic infection**
- ❑ **Economically important disease of domesticated animals**
- ❑ **Worldwide incidence of human brucellosis unknown**
 - Varies from <0.01 to >200 per 100,000 population



Identification of Species

- ❑ 1887: Bruce isolates *B. melitensis* from ill patient
- ❑ 1895: Bang identifies *B. abortus* in cattle – Denmark
- ❑ 1920: K.F. Meyer/E.B. Shaw- named changed to *Brucella* gen. nov.
- ❑ 1929: I.F. Huddleston *B. suis*
- ❑ 1956: M.B. Buddle *B. ovis*
- ❑ 1957: H.B. Stoenner *B. neotomae*
- ❑ 1968: L.M. Jones *B. canis*



Sir David Bruce

<http://www.the-icsp.org/subcoms/Brucella.htm>

Identification of Species

- ❑ 2001: A. Cloeckart *B. ceti*, *B. pinnipedialis*
- ❑ 2008: Scholz et al. *B. microti*
- ❑ 2010: Scholz et al. *B. inopinata*

- ❑ **Species have primary animal host preference**
 - Secondary hosts may have lesser role in maintenance and/or transmission
- ❑ **Four *Brucella* species- well known human pathogens**

<http://www.the-icsp.org/subcoms/Brucella.htm>

History - Steps toward Eradication in the U.S.


❑ Brucellosis Eradication Program

- Implemented in 1934 in cattle
- Expanded in 1954 and 1970s
- 2008- no affected herds for first time (only lasted 3 months)
- Continued surveillance by USDA and states




❑ Laws regulating milk products- pasteurization

- Pasteurized Milk Ordinance (PMO) – 1924
- Model regulation helping states and municipalities have an effective program to prevent milk borne disease



Epidemiology - Incidence and Prevalence

Annual Numbers of Reported Human Brucellosis Cases and Cattle Herd Reactor Rates in the US, 1951-2001



Sources of Infection in the US - *B. abortus*

❑ Reproductive disease

- Cattle - primary host
- Other primary hosts - bison, buffalo, elk, camels
- Secondary hosts - goats, horses, dogs, wolves

❑ Persistence in wildlife - bison and elk

- Present in Yellowstone Park and vicinity
- Obstacle to eradication in US

❑ Risk of importation

- Continued surveillance
- Vigilance along southern border



http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/brucellosis/downloads/yearly_rpt.pdf

Sources of Infection in the US - *B. suis*

❑ Primary host: swine


- Secondary hosts- horses, caribou and reindeer (Alaska)

❑ USDA Eradication Program

- Commercial swine
- Expansion of the USDA cattle program to swine herds in 1972
- Currently, only Texas not declared free of swine brucellosis

❑ Brucellosis present in feral swine populations (4-5 million)


- Reported in 33 states
- Largest populations in California, Texas, Florida and Hawaii
- Range in U.S. increasing



* <http://www.usda.aphis.gov>

Sources of Infection in the US - *B. melitensis*

- ❑ Primary hosts- sheep and goats
- ❑ Secondary hosts-cattle, camels, wild ruminants
- ❑ *B. melitensis* -found in sheep and goats in the U.S. until the early 1970s
- ❑ 1999- last diagnosis in US
 - Texas border county
- ❑ Considered FAD - foreign animal disease



Sources of Infection in the US - *B. canis*

- ❑ **Dogs considered principal reservoir**
- ❑ **Cause of abortion and reproductive failures in dogs**
 - Female dogs may shed *B. canis* through vaginal discharge
 - Male dogs may shed *B. canis* in urine
- ❑ **Euthanasia versus treatment**
 - Even with repeated testing- may be difficult to conclude that dog testing negative for *B. canis* is not infected
- ❑ **Outbreaks – kennels and shelters**
- ❑ **Reportable disease- varies by state**



Hollett RB. Canine brucellosis: Outbreaks and compliance. *Theriogenology*. 2006; 66: 575-587


Shin S and Carmichael LE. Canine brucellosis caused by *Brucella canis* (23 Nov 1999) In: Recent Advances in Canine Infectious Diseases, L.E. Carmichael (Ed.) Publisher: International Veterinary Information Service (www.ivis.org)

Surveillance

- ❑ **Brucellosis – nationally notifiable disease**
- ❑ **Select agents - *B. abortus*, *suis* and *melitensis*, not *B. canis***
- ❑ **Cases reported through NNDSS - National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System**
 - Minimal number of variables – age, sex, state of residence
 - Species not reported
 - Method of confirmation not reported

Human Cases of Brucellosis in the US 1979-2009


BRUCELLOSIS. Number of reported cases, by year -- United States, 1979-2009



http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5853a1.htm?s_cid=mm5853a1_w

Human Cases of Brucellosis in the US by State- 2009

BRUCELLOSIS. Number of Reported cases -- United States and U.S. territories, 2009



Surveillance -Revised CSTE case definition -2009

□ Clinical description

- An illness characterized by acute or insidious onset of fever and one or more of the following:
night sweats, arthralgia, headache, fatigue, anorexia, myalgia, weight loss, arthritis/spondylitis, meningitis, or focal organ involvement (endocarditis, orchitis/epididymitis, hepatomegaly, splenomegaly)

Surveillance -Revised CSTE case definition -2009

❑ Laboratory criteria for diagnosis

▪ Confirmed

- Culture and identification of *Brucella* spp. from clinical specimens, or
- Evidence of a 4-fold or greater rise in *Brucella* antibody titer between acute- and convalescent –phase serum specimens obtained ≥ 2 weeks apart

▪ Probable

- *Brucella* total antibody titer ≥ 160 by standard tube agglutination test (SAT) or *Brucella* microagglutination test (BMAT) in 1 or more serum specimens obtained after onset of symptoms, or
- Detection of *Brucella* DNA in a clinical specimen by PCR assay

Surveillance -Revised CSTE case definition -2009

□ Case classification

- Confirmed: a clinically compatible illness with definitive laboratory evidence of clinical infection
- Probable: a clinically compatible illness with at least one of the following;
 - Epidemiologically linked to a confirmed human or animal brucellosis case
 - Presumptive laboratory evidence, but without definitive laboratory evidence, of *Brucella* infection

Surveillance

- ❑ New Case Report Form developed
- ❑ Capture additional information:
 - *Brucella* species – etiology
 - Risk factors
 - Mode of transmission
 - Demographics-ethnicity
 - History of travel

- RISK FACTORS -

In the 6 months prior to illness onset,
 Did the patient have contact with animals? yes no unknown
 Check all that apply: cattle goat sheep pigs dogs elk deer bison
 other(s): _____
 Type of contact: hunting skinning/slaughter birthing animal and/or products
 other(s): _____

Did the patient consume unpasteurized dairy (milk or milk products)? yes no unknown
 Check all that apply: cow goat sheep other(s): _____
 Who owns the animal(s)? case other private owner commercial owner unknown
 What products (check all applicable)? milk fresh/soft cheese other: _____
 Acquired the product in the U.S. Mexico other: _____

Did the patient travel? yes no unknown
 Out of county state country When and where? _____

Did patient have an occupational risk? yes no unknown
 If yes, indicate: veterinarian/animal technician dairy worker slaughterhouse worker

Was the patient exposed to a *Brucella* vaccine? yes no unknown Indicate: S19 RB51 Rev1
 Received PEP? yes no unknown
 If no, why not? unaware of exposure unavailable allergic pregnant unknown
 other: _____

Was the patient a laboratory worker? yes no unknown
 Exposure to: specimen isolate unknown
 Received PEP? yes no unknown
 If no, why not? unaware of exposure unavailable allergic pregnant unknown
 other: _____

Is this patient linked to a confirmed case? yes no unknown
 Does patient know of similar illness in contact? yes no unknown
 Who? household neighbor coworker other: _____

- LABORATORY DATA -

Laboratory 1 name: _____ City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Below, indicate Yes or No only if the test or procedure was performed. Lack of selection indicates that the test was not performed.

Serologic Tests	Date collected: ____/____/____		Date collected: ____/____/____	
	Serology 1 Titer	Positive?	Serology 2 Titer*	Positive?
SAT/EMAT <input type="checkbox"/> Total antibody <input type="checkbox"/> IgG	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown
SAT/EMAT <input type="checkbox"/> Total antibody <input type="checkbox"/> IgG	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown
Other:	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown
Other:	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown

*Was there a fourfold change in antibody titer between the two serum specimens? yes no unknown

Other Tests	Positive?	Value
ELISA: <input type="checkbox"/> IgG	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}
<input type="checkbox"/> IgM	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}
Rose Bengal	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}
Coombs IgG	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}
Other:	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}
Other:	<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	{_____}

Did a possible laboratory exposure occur?
 yes no unknown

	Specimen from?	Date collected: ____/____/____	Positive?	Species:
Culture	<input type="checkbox"/> blood <input type="checkbox"/> abscess/wound <input type="checkbox"/> other:		<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	
PCR*	<input type="checkbox"/> blood <input type="checkbox"/> abscess/wound <input type="checkbox"/> other:		<input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no <input type="checkbox"/> unknown	

*Was specimen cultured prior to PCR? yes no
 Were specimens sent to CDC for testing? yes no

Routes of Transmission

❑ Foodborne

- Ingestion of unpasteurized dairy products

❑ Direct or indirect exposure of organism to broken skin or mucous membranes

- Aborted fetuses, placental fluid and tissues
- Contaminated fomites
- Inoculation with animal vaccine
- Slaughtering and butchering process

❑ Aerosol transmission

- Inhalation or conjunctival inoculation

❑ Person-to-person transmission very rare



Transmission Potential

- ❑ **Products of parturition and abortion infectious**
 - Can contain up to 10^{10} bacteria/ml
- ❑ ***Brucellae* viable in placental tissues for 20 weeks**
- ❑ **Infectious dose (aerosol): 10^2 - 10^3 organisms**



Pathogen Characteristics


- ❑ **Small, aerobic, nonmotile, nonsporulating, Gram-negative coccobacilli**
- ❑ **Slow-growing in culture**
- ❑ **Intracellular pathogen**
- ❑ **Lipopolysaccharide is main antigen**
 - Smooth = more pathogenic
 - Rough = less pathogenic



B. abortus

Pathogenesis of Disease

- ❑ Systemic infection – can involve most organs
- ❑ Initially localize in regional lymph nodes
- ❑ Bacteremic phase (2-8 weeks)
- ❑ May localize in:
 - Spleen
 - Liver
 - Bone marrow
 - Joints
 - Reproductive organs
- ❑ Severity in humans: *B. melitensis* > *B. suis* > *B. abortus* > *B. canis*



B. melitensis inside macrophage

Clinical Presentation

❑ Incubation period variable: 2-4 weeks

- (range: 5 days to 5 months)

❑ Clinical presentations:

- Fever - undulant, periodic
- Often presents as fever of unknown origin (FUO)
- Nonspecific- muscle aches , chills, fatigue, headache, night sweats
- Arthritis, meningitis, osteomyelitis, endocarditis
- Relapse and chronic disease can occur
- Often difficult to recognize, diagnose, and treat



Chronic Manifestations I

- ❑ **Undulant fever (continuous or intermittent)**
- ❑ **Localized infections in 30% of patients**
- ❑ **Hepatomegaly or splenomegaly (20-30%)**
- ❑ **Osteoarticular complications (20-60%)**
 - Sacroilitis - most common, spondylitis
- ❑ **Genito-urinary complications (2-20%)**
 - Orchitis and epididymitis- most common

Chronic Manifestations II

- ❑ **Endocarditis (2-3%)**
 - Primary cause of mortality
- ❑ **Neurobrucellosis- rare**
- ❑ **Neuropsychiatric symptoms**
 - Depression
 - Difficulty concentrating
 - Sleep disturbance

Diagnosis I

□ Culture – diagnostic gold standard

- Best yield from blood, bone marrow
 - Occasionally from tissues, cerebrospinal fluid, joint aspirate, urine if focal infection present
 - May require prolonged incubation
- Sample obtained before antimicrobial treatment
- Species identification – reference laboratory
- PCR- performed after isolation
- Select agent - must be reported (not *B. canis*)

Diagnosis II

- ❑ **Serology- most common method of diagnosis**
 - Acute-phase serum specimens- as soon as possible after fever onset
 - Convalescent-phase specimens- 14-21 days after symptom onset
- ❑ **Serum agglutination test (SAT)- standard**

Serodiagnostic Tests

❑ Serum agglutination test (SAT)

- Measures agglutinating antibodies
- Detects IgM, IgG1&2, IgA

❑ Rose bengal plate test (RBT)

- Useful for screening, highly sensitive
- Detects IgG1



Serodiagnostic Tests

❑ **Complement fixation test (CFT)**

- Useful for confirmation, highly specific
- Detects IgM & IgG1

❑ **Anti-globulin Coombs test**

- Detects IgG2
- Confirmatory, useful when SAT is positive and CFT inconclusive

Serodiagnostic Tests

- ❑ **Enzyme-linked immunoassay (ELISA)**
 - Commercially available
 - Cross-reactivity with *Yersinia enterocolitica* Y0:9
 - Positive results confirmed by second method
 - Not useful for screening

Serodiagnostic Tests

- ❑ ***Brucella* microscopic agglutination test (BMAT)**
 - Performed at CDC
 - Uses less antigens, shorter incubation time
 - More sensitive
 - Useful for testing large number of specimens (up to 70-100 specimens in a single run)
 - Use 2-mercaptoethanol and rivanol tests to separate IgM and IgG agglutinating antibodies



Diagnostics - Issues

❑ Serology – primary method of diagnosis

- Commercially available tests not validated
- IgM tests result in increased number of false negatives
- Need acute and convalescent samples
- BMAT and other agglutination tests may not diagnose chronic infections
- Lack of awareness that available serological tests cannot diagnose *B. canis* infections
- Qualitative versus quantitative tests

❑ Culture and isolation

- High rate of laboratory exposures
- Identification of species performed at Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratories
- PCR performed on isolates, not clinical specimens

Treatment

□ Uncomplicated brucellosis

- Doxycycline 100mg bid + rifampin 600- 900 mg/day (for 6 weeks)
- Doxycycline 100mg bid (6 weeks) + streptomycin 1g/day (for first 2-3 weeks)

□ Pediatric patients (uncomplicated)

- Doxycycline + rifampin (children >8 yrs)
- Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole + rifampin (6 weeks)


□ Relapses

- Late initiation of therapy
- Premature discontinuation of therapy

Risk Groups

Dairy Consumers

- ❑ Ingestion of unpasteurized dairy products (soft, fresh cheeses, e.g. queso fresco)
- ❑ *Brucella melitensis*
- ❑ Persons at risk
 - Immigrants from endemic countries
 - Travelers to endemic countries



Interventions/Collaborations

- ❑ Collaboration with Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Program (CDC), US border states and Mexico
- ❑ Development of educational materials for US Hispanic population
- ❑ Assessment of seroprevalence of brucellosis among Iraqis immigrating to the US
- ❑ Collaboration with USDA to assess risk of *B. melitensis* in US- sheep and goat farms, ethnic markets



¿Por Qué Pueden Ser Dañinos Algunos Quesos Frescos?

El queso fresco que NO es hecho en la fábrica se hace a veces en áreas sucias de casas y cocheras.



Aun peor, algunos quesos frescos se hacen con leche que NO ha sido pasteurizada (leche cruda o bronca). La leche pasteurizada es leche que ha sido lo suficientemente calentada para poder matar las bacterias.

El queso fresco hecho con leche NO pasteurizada puede tener bacterias dañinas, por ejemplo:

- *Listeria* • *Salmonella* • *E. Coli*
- *M. bovis* (causa tuberculosis)

Tenga cuidado!
El queso fresco contaminado con bacterias puede parecer, oler y saber normal.

¡Protéjase a sí mismo y a su familia de queso fresco peligroso!

Si	No
Consuma queso fresco sólo si está hecho con leche pasteurizada .	No consuma queso fresco hecho con leche NO pasteurizada.
Compre queso fresco de la sección refrigerada del supermercado o tienda. El queso fresco debe estar: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• sellado (junto a la fábrica) y tener una etiqueta, y• Debe tener como ingrediente leche pasteurizada (pasteurized milk).	No compre queso fresco en los mercados ambulantes en la calle, o de aquellos que venden queso en casa. Este queso fresco a menudo es hecho: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• en condiciones NO higiénicas y• con leche NO pasteurizada.
Siempre mantenga su queso fresco frío y refrigerado.	No transporte queso fresco a menos que usted lo pueda mantener muy frío.

¡Las mujeres embarazadas tienen más alto riesgo de contraer algunas enfermedades!

Si usted está embarazada, asegúrese que el queso que consume está pasteurizado. ¡Esto le ayudará a usted y a su bebé a protegerse contra las infecciones graves!

¡Consumir queso fresco durante el embarazo puede ser peligroso!

El queso fresco que no ha sido hecho correctamente, puede causar una enfermedad llamada listeriosis. La listeriosis afecta gravemente a mujeres embarazadas y a niños recién nacidos.

- En mujeres embarazadas, la listeriosis puede causar aborto espontáneo, parto prematuro o nacimiento del bebé sin vida.
- En los niños recién nacidos, la listeriosis puede causar infecciones en la sangre y el cerebro.



Risk Groups Hunters

- ❑ **Contact with meat and other tissues from infected animals**
- ❑ *Brucella suis*
- ❑ **Persons at risk:**
 - Consumers of infected wild game
 - Hunters
- ❑ **Feral swine – important source of human brucellosis infection through field dressing and butchering**



Interventions/Collaborations

□ Investigation of cases of brucellosis in feral swine hunters

□ Development of educational brochure with USDA for hunters

CDC Home Search Health Topics A-Z

MMWRTM

Weekly

June 12, 2009 / 58(22);618-621

***Brucella suis* Infection Associated with Feral Swine Hunting --- Three States, 2007--2008**

Protect Yourself

As a hunter, you can protect yourself and your family from diseases commonly found in wild hogs:

- Use safe field dressing techniques
- Follow food safety tips

If you get sick with a flu-like illness, tell your doctor that you hunt wild hogs.



Wear gloves when field dressing to protect yourself.



To contact your state health department for information about brucellosis, visit:
www.usga.edu/scwds/othersites.html

For more brucellosis information from CDC, visit:
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/d/bmd/diseases/info/brucellosis_g.htm
Or call 1-800-CDC-INFO


To contact your state wildlife agency for information about wild hogs, visit:
State Fish and Wildlife Agencies
www.fishwildlife.org/where_us.html

For more information about wild hog damage management, visit:
USDA Wildlife Services
www.aphis.usda.gov/wildlife_damage/
Or call 1-866-4-USA-WS



Photos courtesy of USDA-APHIS-WS National Wildlife Disease Program

Wild Hog Hunting



Stay Healthy on Your Hunt!

http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/divisions/dfbmd/diseases/brucellosis/brucellosis_and_hoghunters.pdf

Risk Groups

Dog Breeders / Kennel Workers

- ❑ Exposure to *B. canis* – materials associated with birthing process
- ❑ First human cases – 1968
- ❑ Considered mild disease, but reported human cases of: osteomyelitis endocarditis

Symptom	% with symptom (n=32)	
Fever	66%	(21)
Fatigue	34%	(11)
Headache	31%	(10)
Chills	28%	(9)
Weight loss	28%	(9)
Malaise	22%	(7)
Sweats	22%	(7)
Vomiting	16%	(5)
Cough	13%	(4)
Diarrhea	6%	(2)

Compiled data of symptoms from 32 human cases reported in the literature

Interventions/Collaborations

- ❑ **National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians (NASPHV) - assembled working group during CSTE 2010 mtg. to study *B. canis***
- ❑ **Goals:**
 - Increase awareness of diagnostic issues
 - Develop and standardize guidelines for public health investigations
 - Explore options for development of diagnostic tests
- ❑ **CDC assisting in survey led by IA and WI PH veterinarians to collect information on *B.canis* among state health departments and laboratories**

Risk Groups

Populations Working with Marine Mammals

- ❑ **Marine *Brucella* species-** few reports of human cases of neurobrucellosis
- ❑ **Populations at risk:**
 - American Indian/Alaska Native- hunt marine mammals
 - Marine mammal rescue workers
 - Wildlife researchers
 - Veterinary staff

Interventions/Collaborations

- ❑ **Collaboration with Alaska state health dept. and CDC Arctic Investigations Program**
 - Assessment of laboratory submissions
 - Serological survey among AI/AN population
- ❑ **Collaboration with National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and CDC Rickettsial Zoonoses Branch**
 - Serological survey of persons working with marine mammals at a rescue and rehabilitation facility

Risk Groups


Laboratory Workers

- ❑ **Brucellosis - one of 10 most frequently reported lab-acquired infections (LAIs) in the US***
- ❑ **Transmission can occur via:**
 - Inhalation
 - Direct or indirect exposure of organism to broken skin or mucous membranes
- ❑ **Infections due to:**
 - Direct handling of organism or close vicinity to handling
 - Routine clinical laboratory procedures completed outside of a Biological safety Cabinet**
 - Accidents- e.g. malfunction of centrifuge

*Harding AL, Byers KB. Laboratory-associated infections: summary and analysis of 3921 cases. In: Fleming DO, Hunt DL, eds. Biological Safety: Principles and Practices. 4th ed. Washington DC: ASM Press; 2006:53-77.

**Pike RM. Laboratory-associated infections: incidence, fatalities, causes, and prevention. Annu Rev Microbiol 1979;33:41-66.

CDC Guidelines: Laboratory Exposure



- ❑ **Multi-state multi-laboratory exposure - 2006**
- ❑ **Demonstrated need for published guidelines**
 - Tracking of isolate through laboratories
 - Risk assessment for potentially exposed laboratory workers
 - Recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis

Assistance to States with Laboratory Exposures

- ❑ **Follow up requires information on:**
 - number of exposed laboratory workers
 - demographics
 - pregnancy status
 - risk assessment
 - PEP compliance
 - serological results
 - development of disease
- ❑ **Information reviewed at CDC from three sources:**
 - Requests for assistance from state health departments
 - National Select Agent Registry reports (forms 3 & 4)
 - Sera and isolate submissions to CDC laboratory for ID or confirmation
- ❑ **Workers assessed as high or low risk based on exposure**
 - Serological monitoring
 - Post-exposure prophylaxis
- ❑ **Information analyzed to evaluate program efficacy**

Laboratory Exposure Incidents January 2008 – June 2011

Year	Exposure Incidents	Laboratories Involved	States
2008	12	15	10
2009	49	56	23
2010	58	72	27
2011 Jan-June	17	17	10
Total	136	160	44

Exposure Incidents

❑ Of cases reported to CDC:

- 2008: 12 of 80 (15%) had associated exposures
- 2009: 49 of 115 (43%) had associated exposures
- 2010: 58 of 115 (50%) had associated exposures
- 2011: 17 of 32 (53%) had associated exposures

❑ *B. melitensis* and *B. suis* - most common species identified

❑ CDC processed 2,728 serum samples—2008 - June 2011

- 1,090 *Brucella*-exposed laboratory workers in 21 states

5 Laboratory-acquired Infections Jan. 2008 – June 2011

<u>Case</u>	<u>Risk</u>	<u>Date of Exposure</u>	<u>Date Onset</u>	<u>Began PEP</u>	<u>Incubation</u>
A	Unk	Unk	8/15/08	NA	Unk
B	High	7/14/09	11/27/09	7/27/09	19 wks
C	High	12/2009	~5/25/10	NA	~22 wks
D	Unk	12/2009	~3/14/10	NA	~12 wks
E	High	6/2/10	~10/1/10	NA	~17 wks

Interventions/Recommendations

- ❑ **No changes to the current recommendations**
 - Consider obtaining additional serum samples from 8-24 weeks
 - Recommendations may require revision
- ❑ **Prevent exposures**
 - Increase physician awareness of brucellosis
 - Laboratory training
 - Proper handling of the organism
 - Use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
 - Use of Biological Safety Cabinets (BSL-3)
- ❑ **Prevent infection after an exposure**
 - Early identification of the exposure
 - Risk assessment of exposure for each worker
 - Use of antimicrobial PEP as indicated

Summary

❑ Source of infection

- ❑ Historically - an occupational disease – caused by *B. abortus*
 - Veterinarians, livestock/abattoir workers, dairy farmers
- ❑ Currently - most frequent sources of infection - *B. melitensis* and *B. suis*
 - *B. melitensis* from unpasteurized dairy products
 - *B. suis* associated with feral swine hunting

❑ Surveillance

- ❑ Case definition and laboratory criteria updated
- ❑ Utilization of new Case Report Form - capture of additional data to:
 - Characterize risk factors
 - Identify trends
 - Identify *Brucella* species

Summary – cont'd

- ❑ **Laboratory exposure intervention**
 - ❑ **Increase in reporting of laboratory exposures**
 - 50% increase of reported cases from 2008 to 2009
 - >300% increase of reported laboratory exposures
 - Increased number or increased recognition?
 - ❑ **Lab-acquired infections demonstrate the need for:**
 - Prompt identification and assessment of an exposure incident; prompt prophylaxis of workers
 - Adherence to CDC recommendations for PEP and monitoring
 - Banking of isolates from case patients for comparison if an exposed person develops brucellosis
 - ❑ **Role of clinicians, veterinarians**
 - ❑ **Role of laboratorians**

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The findings and conclusions in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

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Thank you

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National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases

High-Consequence Pathogens and Pathology



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Thank you for joining!

Please email us questions at coca@cdc.gov

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A-Z Index [A](#) [B](#) [C](#) [D](#) [E](#) [F](#) [G](#) [H](#) [I](#) [J](#) [K](#) [L](#) [M](#) [N](#) [O](#) [P](#) [Q](#) [R](#) [S](#) [T](#) [U](#) [V](#) [W](#) [X](#) [Y](#) [Z](#) <#>

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Brucellosis in the United States - Current Perspectives

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Presenter(s):

 **Marta A. Guerra, DVM, PhD, MPH**
CAPT, U.S. Public Health Service
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http://emergency.cdc.gov/coca/calls/2011/callinfo_082511.asp

Join Us on Facebook

CDC launched a Facebook page for Health Partners! “Like” our page today to receive COCA updates, guidance, and situational awareness about preparing for and responding to public health emergencies.



The screenshot shows the Facebook interface for the CDC Health Partners Outreach page. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the Facebook logo, a search bar, and login options for Email and Password. Below the navigation bar, a green 'Sign Up' button is visible. The main content area features the page cover photo, which is a collage of people, and the page name 'CDC Health Partners Outreach' with a 'Like' button. The page is identified as a 'Government Organization' located in 'Atlanta, Georgia'. The 'Wall' section shows a post from the CDC Health Partners Outreach page, dated Monday at 7:08am, with 1 like and 1 comment. The post text reads: 'CDC Health Partners Outreach CDC is partnering with NPHIC to host a webinar July 21 (3:00pm ET) on Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication – Radiation. A subject matter expert from the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) will address key elements of communicating during a radiation disaster, share CDC research on messaging, and provide lessons learned from Japan's recent nuclear emergency. Register for this FREE webinar today!'. Below the post, there are two event listings: 'Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication - Radiation Webinar' and 'AVMA Convention'. The left sidebar contains navigation links for 'Wall', 'Info', 'Photos', 'About', '2 check-ins', and '1,187 like this'. The 'About' section states: 'Health Partners Outreach Team is with the CDC Emergency Risk Communication...'. The 'Likes' section shows three profile pictures and the text 'See All'.

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