Engineer Construction Command (ENCOM) that was set up under him, assigned to USASOS to coordinate and supervise all construction in the Southwest Pacific. How did that function?

A: It wasn't to supervise all construction in the Southwest Pacific. It was primarily to undertake all the construction there on Luzon. That was a major construction job. So we set up this Engineer Construction Command so that all of our engineer units would be under a central engineer headquarters.

Q: Did it work as you planned it?

A: Yes, it worked well.

Q: Simplified the construction and the management of construction?

A: Yes.

Q: Colonel Thomas Lane, who was then Sverdrup's operational chief, suggested a separate district be set up to rehabilitate Manila. Now MacArthur asked Reybold to supply the personnel for this, which he did; and he established the General Engineer District at Manila. Did it do its job well?

A: I think I was ahead of myself when I talked about the organization of the Western Ocean Division. I think the first phase was this establishment of GENED, this General Engineer District, to take care of the peacetime reconstruction in Manila. It worked effectively. As I say, it was a prelude to later on the setting up of the Western Ocean Division with separate engineer districts in Manila, Okinawa, and Guam.

## General Comments

Q: Was ENCOM what the engineers had wanted since Australia? Was it what you wanted to have as your construction agency all throughout the war?

Was it the ultimate development, or were there still other problems that it didn't solve?

A: Well, the way we had been functioning, with moving task forces and the principal engineer operations here and here and here–it wasn't as though the engineer construction was all in an area such as the Philippines or Luzon or all in an area such as Australia. But with the flexibility and diversity of action, I think the setup that we had with task forces and so on was preferable.



***Major General Hugh J. Casey, Office of the Chief of Engineers, at his desk in the city hall building, Manila, Luzon, 21 July 1945.***

Q: In June, USASOS became Army Forces Western Pacific under Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer, and it had its functions expanded to control all logistic support for Army troops in the Southwest Pacific. Did it present any problems for you?

A: No, it didn't present, I would say, any particular problems. I didn't see either where it presented any special advantages. They were not going to have any control over our operations up in Japan, the invasion there. At that time we were looking forward to completion of Okinawa and our projected operations in Japan. We now would have a headquarters that was going to take care of, you might say, all of the other miscellaneous problems down in the rear, and that was okay.

Q: Did the B-29 bases on Okinawa present any severe engineering problems?

A: Not particularly, other than its extent. On Okinawa the terrain was relatively well suited to airdrome development. We had lots of coral and so on and various suitable sites, so we had no insuperable difficulties. Also, you might say we owned, or rather controlled, the land, so we didn't have to get permission from the landowner for rights of way or for acquisition of terrain, such as we had in peacetime when we were trying to develop airdromes in the Philippines just prior to the war. We had carte blanche to go and do whatever was necessary. Airdromes, roads, base development, POL [petroleum-oil-lubricants] installations were all given very high priority, so we had fine support. We had a concentration of effort there instead of the diversion on many, many other operations at the same time.

Q: What were the differences between building an air base for a B-29 to use versus an airfield for a B-17?

A: So far as we were concerned, there were no major differences outside of increased length of runway and width of runway, taxiways, and hardstands. Some airdrome site might be marginal for B-29s but still potential for B-17s. You had to concern yourself a bit more for a B-29 operation and give greater attention and concentration to the base preparation and the materials that you had, not only for the runway but also the taxiways and hardstands, where they were going to be located in dispersed areas off the field.

Q: Could you discuss the engineer planning for Operation OLYMPIC, which was to be the invasion of Kyushu?

A: We were engaged in that for quite some time. It was a major planning operation. It was going to involve—I don't recall now the number of troops-maybe a force 600,000 to 700,000 with about 200,000 to 250,000 engineers.

For the subsequent operation on Honshu [CORONET], I think we were planning on a force of maybe a million or more men. I think our engineer force was going to approach 300,000 or more. That meant that our engineer mission was big, important; our logistic requirements were going to be very high—steel landing mat, oil tanks, oil pipeline, asphalt, lumber, whatever would be needed for water supply improvement, for shelter, for depots, extra special equipment, and pile drivers. So we had a major task. So we set up bills of materials, supplemental equipment, and supplies that we would need and the priority in which we wanted those delivered before and during the operation. It also involved review of our troop list, the units that we had, and maybe if there were some specialized requirements, what special units and modifications we'd need. We'd be needing dredges and such outside of what normal engineer requirements might be.

Q: One of the most severe problems you had in planning for both OLYMPIC and CORONET was a very bad lack of information on Japan.

A: Well, I don't know that it was terribly deficient when compared to lack of information on other areas. We were conducting aerial reconnaissance missions. At that time our Air Force had attained superiority in the air; our Navy had attained superiority on the sea. So we were able to get reconnaissance photograph y. As far as detailed dispositions of the Japanese forces and so on were concerned, we didn't know as much as we might have. But our intelligence agencies had tried to assemble every bit of information they could.

We got a reasonable insight, I think. We knew that much of Japan had been largely destroyed. We knew that its railroads and its roads, its industrial establishments, its principal areas around Tokyo and Yokohama had been badly devastated. So we knew we were going to have a lot of problems in connection with reconstruction as we advanced regarding the facilities,

airdromes and so on, that we'd require. Their airdromes were not capable of handling our B-29 or heavy American aircraft, so we'd have major problems that we anticipated in that phase as well as others.

Q: Did you have any long discussions or any discussions at all with General MacArthur during the planning phase for OLYMPIC or CORONET?

A: Well, on and off at staff conferences where we discussed various phases of it. But he didn't call me aside and spend hours just on the engineer phase, if that's what you mean. It was just in connection with our general discussion with G-3, G-4, signal, special staff sections, with the Air Force and Navy and whatnot—you know, general staff conferences such as we had. He did not, for instance, have any special conference at all with me insofar as just the engineer phase was specifically involved.

Q: Was General MacArthur very worried about the potential loss of life involved in the invasions?

A: Well, he was naturally concerned. But I think we all felt that the great superiority of our Air Force, with the support of the Navy, with the equipment that we had and the trained manpower-we were now the first priority theater, so we'd have no major problems with procurement-we could get, we thought, what we wanted. And through aerial photography we saw the extent to which Japan had been damaged. There was sort of a feeling that Japan was about to throw in the sponge. In fact, we prepared an alternative contingency plan covering that possibility [Blacklist. If they had held out, the way the Japanese do, fighting to the last man, our casualties could have been high.

But I think he sensed more the fact that Japan had been greatly destroyed and damaged, rather than being concerned with their great capacity to destroy us and make the invasion difficult. My reply pertained to the situation prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs.

Q: Was there any consideration given at all by any member of the AFPAC staff to the idea of letting the Air Force bomb Japan into submission and the Navy strangle it, rather than invading?

A: Well, you might say that the Air Force had carte blanche in connection with the air bombing, because they were doing that continuously. But it was not expected that we'd stop everything else and just count on the Air Force going in and hitting them and hitting them until they finally said, "We surrender, " because we did not expect or anticipate that that alone could have accomplished it.

Q: As the war in the Southwest Pacific had progressed, your organization had changed to meet the changing conditions. Did you find that the final organizational structure you ended up with solved the major problems you had faced?

A: I think basically, yes. You're talking now of the organization. At that time, General MacArthur's headquarters commanded the entire Pacific, including the Central Pacific Theater. It was organized in connection with the planned operations right into Japan, so it was a major headquarters organization. But I think it was well organized and adapted to that proposed program.

Q: Was the key to your success in engineer operations in the Southwest Pacific the ability to adapt your organization?

A: I think it was a major factor, certainly. I don't think you can carry on war by the book. I think there was too much of a tendency in connection with people, let's say, who had gone to Leavenworth and they had map problems and so on, to seek set solutions based on set circumstances. But with the type of warfare that we had, you had to adjust your thinking, your thoughts, based on whatever the immediate problem was, what the difficulties were in terrain, what the problems were in getting materiel, in getting equipment, getting supplies. So you had to have a great degree of flexibility in mind and thought and action.

Q: Do you think that the failures and shortcomings of the Japanese engineers were as important to the defeat of Japan as the American engineers were to our victory?

A: It certainly was a major factor. Let's take the Hollandia operation. We went in there after they had occupied that area for some time. They'd tried

to develop airdromes. They'd tried to develop roads to it. They'd made very little progress compared to what the total need was. They had no fuel pipelines or storage tanks, having to rely on the handling of oil drums. It's just basically due to the fact that they were not set up and organized and equipped with heavy construction equipment, such as our American engineer units were. You saw the effect of that, I think, on most of the major operations.

Q: Did you ever get a chance to talk to any of the engineers of the Japanese armed forces, either after they were captured or after the war?

A: No, not particular y.

Q: I want to ask you for your personal viewpoint and observations of some of the men you worked with during the war. Walter Krueger?

A: Krueger was a very fine and able commanding general. He was not the so-called "Lightning Joe" [J. Lawton Collins] type, such as General Eichelberger, who more nearly represented that type rather than the Krueger type. Krueger was a solid, substantial commander. I think he commanded the respect of his staff and all those under him. But I wouldn't sense him as one who could make quick changes in plans or adapt himself to a quickly changing solution. But he was a good, hard, solid sledgehammer type of commander.

Q: What about George Decker?

A: Decker was his chief of staff. Again, a solid type. I didn't gauge him as one of quick brilliance and adaptability to quick changes. But he also was a good, solid planning type and one who carried out the directives of General Krueger very well, coordinated staff activities, and did a very fine and outstanding job as his chief of staff.

Q: Would you have ever envisioned him as a future Army Chief of Staff?

A: I would not personally, as of then.

Q: What about Robert Eichelberger?

A: Eichelberger was, as I say, referred to as the "Lightning Joe" type. He was more of that type than Krueger. In the later phases of the war, for example, when Eighth Army was conducting the campaigns down in Mindanao and in the southern Philippine operations, he operated a very fast-moving type of warfare and did it quite ably.

General Eichelberger had ambitions to be the senior commander in the Pacific. He was, I felt, jealous of General Krueger, especially in the early phase when Sixth Army was conducting most of the operations. I think he sensed that possibly he should have been the senior commander.

I know he was disappointed, too, when hostilities ended, that General MacArthur didn't return home, because I think he had a strong ambition to be the senior commander over all the forces there, rather than the commanding general of Eighth Army under General MacArthur as Supreme Commander.

Q: What would you say was General MacArthur's evaluation of Krueger and Eichelberger? Whom did he rate more high] y, do you think?

A: I think he rated General Krueger higher. I think he had full confidence in Krueger. But in the early phase of our Buna operation in New Guinea, when we were having difficulties with the Japanese advancing over the Owen Stanley Mountain Range against Port Moresby, and the Australian troops were having difficulty with that advance, and our first American combat forces were suddenly thrown in, I remember he called General Eichelberger in and put him in personal charge of the offensive there and virtually told him that he had to capture Buna, or else. General Eichelberger interpreted that unless he did get Buna, and get it fast, it would be the end of the line for him. And I might say that General Eichelberger performed very well in pressing on to the Buna victory.

Possibly indicative of that, too, I think in the projected invasion of Japan General Eichelberger would be the one slated to head up the main force in the major Honshu [CORONET] landing operation after General Krueger on the Kyushu [OLYMPIC] operation.

Q: As far as not pressing ahead, what happened to Major General Edwin F. Harding, who was involved in that Buna operation? Removed, I believe?

A: They just felt that the American forces weren't making the progress that they felt that they should have made. However, I personally (and actually the only one on our staff) went up during the Buna campaign. I saw the forces in action. In fact, there's a citation in their recommendations for the Distinguished Service Cross in recognition of certain actions that I took.

But I don't think there's a proper concept among those who weren't there and didn't see it actually, which those on our headquarters did not do. As I have frequently said, they didn't do as much personal reconnaissance as I felt they should.

You have to visualize that here was the 32d Division, a National Guard outfit that had just come over to the theater. Then they were suddenly shipped by air over into the jungle, into combat; sent in there, you might say, just as foot troops with hand weapons. They had no artillery, very little in the way of transportation. I think they had seven jeeps in support of the whole division.

They had not been trained for the type of operation they encountered, against a well-trained Japanese force who were well set up in bunkers and heavily camouflaged. These were young troops with relatively untrained officers, at least inexperienced in that type of combat. They were not putting up a good showing, but it was not fully the fault of General Harding, the commander, in failing to have them take objectives that might otherwise have been taken more quickly by better trained and better equipped groups, with some artillery and/or tank support and transport.

In fact, with my having just come down from Bataan and seeing how poorly they were operating, I sensed some fear as to just how and whether we were going to succeed against Japanese troops. General Harding, as I say, had a tough job, and I don't think that the higher headquarters possibly understood fully the problems with which he was confronted.

Q: How about General Stephen J. Chamberlain?

A: General Chamberlain was both later a perfect chief of staff and initially a perfect head of the Operations Division of our headquarters. I think, considering the problems we had in our theater, with the difficulties of undeveloped terrain and distances, the problems of supply, and the problems of logistics, I think by reason of his background and his prior experience in the field of logistics, that qualified him even more for the important post as chief of the Operations Division. I think he had fine insight into all of the problems, and he coordinated personnel and staff and his agencies excellently. Most of the services that were involved, too, had a great respect for General Chamberlain and his judgment.

Q: You were saying yesterday that Charles Willoughby was a little bit strange-a very good intelligence officer, but a little bit of a strange character.

A: Yes. Charles was odd in some ways and in his characteristics. He was of foreign birth. And I know he changed his name from what it had been to his mother's family name, Willoughby. He spoke with a slight accent. He appeared to some to be a rather Prussianistic type. I don' t mean stem, but with a slightly foreign accent and his precise manner of speech. But I think he did a very fine job as G-2, chief of intelligence. One little characteristic that I sensed, I felt that in his formal presentations of an intelligence summary? the type of binding, the type of cover that he had on it and its form represented almost as much in importance as the contents or gist of the summary that he prepared on each intelligence situation.

He delegated to me, even though you might say the supervision of mapping is one of the phases of responsibility of G-2—Charles just took his hands off that completely and he delegated it to me as the chief engineer, every authority and every action pertaining to all mapping for the entire theater. He never did get involved or interfere at all. This gave the chief engineer complete carte blanche in that particular and important responsibility, which was also, incidentally, very helpful.

Q: How about Admiral Barbey?

A: Admiral Barbey was the amphibious force commander. I think he was well trained and prepared for that function, which in our theater was a very

important one. Fortunately, insofar as the engineers were concerned, we had excellent coordination and cooperation with him.

In case there had been any sense of jealousy at the beginning in connection with the attitude of the Navy toward our amphibian engineers, that was very quickly overcome. Throughout the campaign, our relationship between the amphibian engineers and the Navy amphibious forces remained excellent. In fact, in his book and other reports he paid high tribute to the effectiveness of the amphibian engineer efforts during the war.

Q: Admiral Kinkaid?

A: Admiral Kinkaid. His biggest exploit with which I'm familiar was his handling of the old battleship force he had during the Leyte operation, where he cut off and wiped out the Japanese naval force that was proceeding up through the Mindanao Straits channel and which, if they had come through and come on up to the Tacloban area, could have effectively wiped out the whole operation through the destruction of the ships that were in the port ready to be unloaded. It would have actually, I think, brought about the defeat of the entire Leyte operation and set back the war over many months, if that force had been destroyed. That was occasioned by Admiral Halsey's going off, up toward the northeast in pursuit of the phantom Japanese naval force which was not there. With Halsey's force away and not carrying on his primary mission of protecting that landing, it would have been a very serious event.

Q: What about Admiral Halsey?

A: I admired Admiral Halsey very much. He was a very impressive, active, and able Navy Air commander and would do everything to seek out combat against the Japanese. I had sensed previously an attitude on the part of the Navy that, after the loss of the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Navy wasn't ready to push as fast or as effectively as we felt that they should have done on other related naval activities that we had in our theater.

But Halsey was one who, I felt, was actually seeking combat. And he was a very, very able commander. He was greatly liked by all of his personnel and did an outstanding job of leadership. It was fortunate that all of that was

not destroyed, as it might have been if our Leyte operation had been wiped out by either of the Japanese fleet forces.

Q: Did you ever have much to do with Chester Nimitz?

A: I didn't have much to do with Admiral Nimitz. I saw him on a few occasions in connection with the staff conferences that we had. We got along very nicely. I liked and admired him. I know that Admiral Nimitz had hoped that he, rather than General MacArthur, might be designated as the Supreme Commander just toward the end of the war for the final invasion of Japan.

There were some differences between MacArthur and Nimitz as to how certain phases of our campaign out in the Pacific should be conducted. I do know that over in the Central Pacific, with Admiral Nimitz controlling the Navy and being in an area that was closer to the United States, he seemed to be equipped with far more in the way of equipment, personnel, and such other items than we were out in the Southwest Pacific. He, too, had the large and new battleships and aircraft carriers, whereas we generally were furnished the old battleships, cruisers, and small escort aircraft carriers, but only for specific operations. I thought with their tasks, in the various areas in which they were operating, that they had more of everything for their particular tasks than did General MacArthur. I also thought, in comparison between the two, that MacArthur's operations were conducted much more effectively and certainly with less loss of life than were those carried on by the Central Pacific.

Q: Did you know General Robert Richardson, who was the Army commander in the Central Pacific?

A: Well, I'd known him when I was a cadet and he was stationed at West Point as an instructor. I knew him more as a senior officer at the Military Academy. I had little opportunity to have any contact with him during the war.

Q: Did you know General Thomas D. White, who was with the Air Force in the South Pacific?

A: Yes, I knew Tommie quite well. We had close association by reason of the relationship between the engineers and the Air Force. He was a smoother type than, let's say, General Kenney or General Whitehead, commander of the Fifth Air Force. I think everybody liked Tommy White. He ran the Army Air Forces in the South Pacific and later in our theater and did it extremely well. Insofar as the Engineer-Air Force relationship was concerned, it was very, very good and much smoother than it was, let's say, with the Fifth Air Force.

Q: Colonel Thomas Lane?

A: Tommie Lane was a very fine officer. He served as my executive officer and in our operations section. He was a very conscientious, very intelligent and articulate and able engineer officer and commander. I think he also was a very good analyst of problems and performed exceeding y well.

Q: Gene Reybold?

A: Gene Reybold was Chief of Engineers during the war. He came out to our theater, I know, on one trip. I don't think that he contributed anything personally, but it was a good opportunity for him to observe what our operations were like. On our presentation of these problems and recommendations toward their solution, I think he then tried to be helpful to resolve those problems and lent assistance and support to furnishing our requirements. But I think that the Chief of Engineers during major combat, whether in the European Theater or our theater—I think more would be accomplished if the Chief would get to such theaters early and more frequently to observe personally and to contact personally the senior commanders and engineers on such operations. It just goes along with the whole basic thought that I had throughout the war about the need for personal reconnaissance by senior commanders and by their staffs. I stressed that frequently in our own headquarters operations at GHQ.

Q: Did you know Thomas M. Robins who was the deputy chief?

A: I knew Tommy Robins not so much as deputy chief, more when he was in the Civil Works Division at the time I was on duty there. I don't know for

sure whether he was actually in the Civil Works Division there, but he was active in civil works duty during my association with him. I respected him as a very able engineer officer with a strong technical background as well as his other administrative capacities and abilities.

Q: George Nold?

A: George Nold I had known because we had both served on the Engineer Rifle Team. I'd also known him elsewhere on engineer activities. In fact, he succeeded me at the University of Kansas as PMS and T [professor of military science and tactics] of the engineer unit there. So I had known George very well.

My next contact with him was on Okinawa when I went up there after Okinawa was turned over to our headquarters at the time they merged the Central Pacific into the Southwest Pacific under General MacArthur as Supreme Commander. I saw George up on Okinawa, and I had a good opportunity to observe his actions and the engineer activities up there. I regarded his general control and direction of the engineer forces there as being very, very fine. George was a very able officer.

Q: Herbert Vogel?

A: I had known Vogel as a junior engineer and knew of his assignment over to Europe on hydraulic research. I succeeded him later as a Freeman fellow in Europe. We had a common interest in the Corps of Engineers activities, particularly pertaining to hydraulic laboratory research and that phase in which he was later involved. He did a very fine job down at the hydraulic laboratory waterways Experiment Station, WES] at Vicksburg.

It was at my request that he was ordered out to our theater. I requested him by name and because there was a need particularly to bolster up, I thought, the engineers side of USASOS, which was giving us logistics support for engineer effort and overall effort. When Vogel came out, he was assigned to my command at ASCOM, and I designated him as a base commander for the Lingayen operation where he rendered an excellent performance.

Later on, by reason of his past experience and so on, he assumed virtually the office of G-4 in USASOS. He did very, very well. It was unfortunate that he was not promoted to a brigadier general, for which he was recommended, but promotions were stopped largely by reason of the movement of General Styer and his staff of general officers [Army Service Forces], who came out to our theater after the termination of hostilities in Europe. With that bloc of generals that came in, they stopped the allocation of further promotions to the general officer quota in our theater.

It's interesting to note that in General Styer's command, I think, they had two or three general officers placed over Vogel, practical y handling the same functions and responsibilities which he had. They also kept him on as an assistant, and he was still doing largely much of the work by reason particularly of his previous experience in the theater on those problems.

Q: What improvements, if any, could have been made in the standard table of engineer equipment that the Army had during the war?

A: We submitted many recommendations for changes in the tables of authorized equipment for the various engineer units. The situation may be quite different, depending on where operations are conducted, so that it is hard for us to say that setting out the tables of equipment for the units that we had operating under jungle conditions, in undeveloped areas, and under the conditions that pertained in the Pacific would necessarily be the same type of tables of equipment that should be allocated to the same engineer units operating in a different area.

However, basically, I think that with any engineer construction unit they ought to look at it from the viewpoint of giving that unit the maximum amount of equipment that can be capably handled; and also reviewing the tables of organization to provide for double-shift operation, certainly in time of war, in combat operation, because equipment is too valuable just to have it out there working on, let's say, an eight-hour basis.

When engineer construction units are used under high pressure during operations, the need is to turn out the maximum in the minimum amount of time and that can be attained only with increased capacity of equipment, rather than, let's say, more manpower. But it should be set and recognized that two-shift operation is almost standard-sometimes even three shifts.

Operators should be provided and trained based on that probable requirement, with provision of supplemental engineer equipment units, engineer maintenance units, and so on.

Q: If you were asked to identify the one engineer officer who most influenced your career, who would it be?

A: For the life of me, I can't think of anyone in particular.

Q: Who was the best qualified, technically most competent engineer you knew in the Corps?

A: Well, if you're talking about technical engineers, let's say in the technical and administrative field rather than during the war in combat and who didn't attain any particular position there, that was George Spalding. I got to know him quite well in the civil works field and respected him highly. I might say that he probably was one of those that influenced me in connection with my objectives and my ambitions to serve on in the Corps.

Q: That's where you and General Moore agree. Who was the best military officer as an engineer officer that you knew? Best soldier engineer?

A: Well, probably based on my observation of our operations in the Pacific, it probably would be Sam Sturgis. He was the active engineer officer in Sixth Army, our major combat command. He had the most opportunity to serve in that capacity in our theater. Others did very fine work in smaller operations with smaller responsibilities, and I might cite in particular my junior assistant in the early phases of the war, Major Bill Gay.

Q: Who was your best friend in the Corps of Engineers during your career?

A: Probably my closest friend was not one who had been in the Corps of Engineers, but whom we commissioned in the engineers, and that was Leif J. Sverdrup. Sverdrup later became a major general. He was my deputy and therefore we were very close together throughout the war. Probably second to him would be Sam Sturgis, the engineer of Sixth Army.

Q: How important do you feel your civil works experience was in preparing you for the wartime duties as chief engineer of the Southwest Pacific?

A: I think that was of tremendous, even supreme, importance. I can't stress the importance of the civil works responsibility the Corps of Engineers has as a means of preparing the Corps officer for responsibilities that will be their lot in time of combat or major war. During the war period, those who have any degree of leadership in those operations must have had some background or preparation in heavy responsibility of working on matters or projects where time and materiel, manpower, and other administrative and executive controls were involved. I think the civil works duties a Corps of Engineers officer may undertake during his career are immeasurably fine preparation for those later duties.

I have in mind, let's say, officers of similar rank in other branches just going through their normal peacetime military functions. Then when war comes they are promoted to assume great and heavy responsibilities. I sensed that in most cases they had not had the training, preparation, or experience to equip them to handle such duties.

In fact, I've seen it in actual wartime operations later where I felt that some of the line officers in other branches who had to assume high command were not fully qualified for their task by reason of the lack of prior experience or preparation or training to assume such increasingly heavy responsibilities and duties.

Q: What particular skills or training do you think made engineer officers such excellent Army logisticians during the war?

A: Well, as I said, it's the experience that they have had, or should have had, and the responsibilities that they'd assumed on civil works activities. I think that some engineer officers probably hadn't or would not have had much civil works responsibilities prior to the war and were not as well prepared to assume such responsibilities later during actual war conditions under the expanded responsibilities and duties that they would then be called on to assume if they were advanced to higher office.