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**Appendix F**  
**“Memo to: Deputy Chief of Staff”**

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22 January 1942.

Memo to: Deputy Chief of Staff,  
(Thru ACS - GS)

1. It is appreciated that a decision having been issued should be executed. It is urged however that serious consideration be given to the possibility of review of the estimate of situation which dictated the directive to move our forces back to occupy the reserve battle position by Jan 26th.

2. Estimates indicate that the enemy force opposing our present position is not large and greatly inferior to ours in total strength. The unit commanders in the front feel they can hold their present position. Morale is high in most units. The enemy situation on the west has been cleared up in the rear and under control in the front. The present front, tho longer than that of the reserve battle position, is stronger, better wired and organized than the rear position. The artillery positions and field of fire are stated to be superior for the forward position. The Bagac 8 guns now being installed will be lost if we move back to the RBP. Pilar airfield will be lost and Bataan Field subject to long range artillery. The lateral communication available to us on the Pilar-Bagac road for lateral movement of forces for counterattack will no longer be available. By withdrawal we shall lose our wire communications, barbed wire as well as the fertile Balanga area.

3. The concentration of our entire force in a small area will increase enemy serial concentration and losses as compared to dispersed targets over the present enlarge occupied area.

4. Virtually nothing has been done in the way of organization of the west sector of the RBP. It is jungle country, difficult for emplacement of units, organization, communication and defense. Field of fire is limited.

5. Enemy activity in the center has been exaggerated in virtually all reports received. It consists to a great degree of strong enemy patrols and snipers, which

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\*Note: This document has been retyped but retains the spelling, punctuation, and style of the original. The original is in the Research Collections of the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hugh J. Casey Papers, Folder 9.

if met by properly organized and trained sniping groups can be controlled without fear of forward elements being cut off and surrounded. Such enemy groups will have a difficult supply problem in replenishment of foot, ammunition, etc. and should be readily handled. Conversely enemy supply will be simplified.

6. It is felt that an organized reserve force maintained as a trained unit to meet and clear such enemy detachments as will continuously break thru the heavily wooded areas of either position, which would be withdrawn and reconstituted as a mobile reserve immediately after each such encounter could handle our principal present enemy operations.

7. The withdrawal of our entire long range artillery will make the present position difficult to hold, subjecting it to unharassed enemy artillery. If the slow moving long range artillery is to be evacuated with a view to ultimate withdrawal, some guns should still be left forward if our forward position is held, (for destruction, if they cannot be moved, as we have 155 MM guns in excess of requirements or possible emplacement in the small rear area of Bataan).

8. Our principal requirement is to hold for TIME until reinforcements come. The longer we can delay the enemy on our present front, the more time we can save including our later defense of the RBP. The enemy should be forced to pay dearly for every foot of advance to make his final effort more difficult with reduced forces. Above all it is hoped that history will not show that small enemy infiltration sniping patrols will have caused a mass withdrawal of our entire force at a time when we must continue to hold.

9. As General MacArthur indicated January 15 in his message to the command, "No further retreat is possible - - - if we retreat we will be destroyed. "

H. J. C.