On March 10, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) issued a Recommended Order Dismissing Complaint (R.O.) in
this case which arises under the employee protection provision of
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), 42
U.S.C. § 5851 (1988). Pursuant to the regulations
implementing the ERA, the ALJ's decision is now before me for
review. see 29 C.F.R. § 24.6 (1990).
Respondent moved to dismiss the case after
Complainant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for
September 26, 1988.1
1The ALJ's
references to the hearing date as September 27, 1988, R.O. at 13,
14, are hereby corrected. The ALJ's reference to Friday,
September 26, 1988, R.O. at 6, is also corrected to September 23,
1988.
(4) Dismissal for cause. (i) The
administrative law may, at the request of any party, or on his or
her own motion, dismiss a claim
(A) Upon the failure of the complainant or
his or her representative to attend a hearing without good cause;
(B) Upon the failure of the complainant to
comply with a lawful order of the administrative law judge.
(ii) In any case where a dismissal of a
claims [sic], defense, or party is sought, the administrative law
judge shall issue an order to show cause why the dismissal should
not be granted and afford all parties a reasonable time to
respond to such order. After the time for response has expired,
the administrative law judge shall take such action as is
appropriate to rule on the dismissal, which may include an order
dismissing the claim, defense or party.
The administrative law judge shall issue a
recommended decision within twenty days after the
termination of the proceeding at which evidence was
submitted.
4Section
24.5(c) contemplates that a hearing site within 75 miles of
Complainant's residence will not always be appropriate. Also,
since the regulation pertains to convenience, not jurisdiction,
and is akin to the concept of venue, I agree with the ALJ that
any "right" conferred by the regulation may be waived.
Accordingly, and especially under the circumstances presented
here, where the alleged discrimination occurred many miles from
Complainant's residence, the ALJ did not err in suggesting a
hearing location in the vicinity of Chicago, Illinois, on the
basis of convenience to Complainant's witnesses. The ALJ's
consideration of convenience to Complainant's witnesses was
reasonable and tended to promote the expeditious handling of the
complaint. See 29 C.F.R. S 24.1(b); see also 29
C.F.R. § 18.27(c).
5In responding
to the ALJ's decision and Respondent's briefs, Complainant has
referred to and attached certain documents, which were not
submitted to the ALJ. Respondent has not objected to these
filings. I, therefore, grant Complainant's request that I review
these documents, as an unopposed motion to supplement the record.
SeeAmerican Min. Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617,
627 (l0th Cir. 1985); see alsoThompson v. U.S. Dept.
of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555-S6 (9th Cir. 1989); cf.
Spencer v. Hatfield Electric Co., Case No. 86-ERA-33, Sec.
Final Dec. and Order, Oct. 24, 1988, slip op. at 2-3.
6Complainant
alleges that his failure to comply with the discovery request and
prehearing order we" the fault of his attorney, i.e.,
that he provided the attorney with all the necessary information
and the attorney failed to act. The record does not support this
claim. Complainant has shown only that he and his attorney had
preliminary and tentative discussions concerning potential
witnesses and he has presented no evidence of a response to
Respondent's discovery request. Even if the attorney were at
fault, which I do not find, Complainant was aware of the failures
and must be held responsible for them. See Link, 370 U.S.
at 633-34; Anderson, 915 F.2d at 315-16. Additionally,
contrary to Complainant's assertion, the fact that Respondent
submitted its witness list several days late does not excuse
Complainant's complete disregard of the order. SeePyramid Energy, Ltd. v. Heyl & Patterson. Inc., 869 F.2d
1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1989). It is, after all, Complainant's
burden to present and establish his case before Respondent is
obliged to present any defense (or witnesses). Complainant does
not allege any other circumstances militating against dismissal
nor do I find any in light of the clear record of contumacious
conduct presented here. See generally Daniels v.
Brennan, 887 F.2d 783, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1989); Roland,
811 F.2d at 1178-79. I add that in this case, which arises within
the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the ALJ was neither required "to
fire a warning shot," Patterson v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 852 F.2d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1988), nor to impose any
lesser sanctions as a prerequisite to dismissal, Daniels,
887 F.2d at 788.
7Inasmuch as
the case is dismissed pursuant to regulatory Section 24.5(e)(4),
I do not consider Complainant's arguments concerning the merits
of his complaint.