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Kinser v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 2003-AIR-7 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2003)


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Issue Date: 04 March 2003

Case No. 2003-AIR-7

In the Matter of

JAISON KINSER
    Complainant

    v.

MESABA AVIATION, INC.
d/b/a MESABA AIRLINES
    Respondent

BEFORE: RUDOLF L. JANSEN
    Administrative Law Judge

ORDER GRANTING COMPLAINANT MOTION TO COMPEL
COMPLETE RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND TO
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

   This case is scheduled to be called for hearing on April 8, 2003 in Cincinnati, Ohio. On February 12, 2003, Karen L. Dingle, counsel for Complainant, filed a Motion to Compel Responses, Requests, and Production of Documents under authority conferred by 29 C.F.R. § 18.21. She seeks an Order compelling the Respondent to submit more complete responses to the Complainant's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Request for Production of Documents. On February 21, 2003, Douglas W. Hall, counsel for Respondent, filed a responsive statement. He argues that for a variety of reasons, proper responses have been made to the discovery requests in each instance. Following the filing of the responsive statement by counsel for the Respondent, Ms. Dingle then filed a Responsive Memorandum on behalf of the Complainant and Mr. Hall then filed a statement in rebuttal. Pending Motions to Strike any of these filings are hereby DENIED.

   The regulations implementing the handling of discrimination complaints under Section 519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the Twenty-first Century are found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1979.100 et seq. These regulations were essentially patterned after the whistleblower regulations of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1978 and the Energy Reorganization Act which are codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 24. They also provide that the 29 C.F.R. Part 18 procedural rules together with those offered in the applicable regulations set forth the procedures for submission, investigation, issuance of findings and litigation in these matters. Section 1979.100(b). Formal rules of evidence do not apply but rules or principles designed to assure the production of the most probative evidence available are to be applied. 1979.107(d)


[Page 2]

   The Part 1979 regulations do not provide specific guidance as to the manner in which discovery is to be conducted or directives of the Administrative Law Judge concerning discovery problems are to be enforced. Therefore, I must refer to the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges which are codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 18 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 C.F.R. § 18.1' See also Nolder v. Kaiser Engineers, Inc., Case No. 84-ERA-5, Sec. Dec. (June 28, 1985) slip op. at 5-6).

   The procedural regulations compel the adoption of a standard which provides for the application of very liberal1 discovery rules. Twenty-nine C.F.R. § 18.14 governs the scope of discovery and provides as follows:

(a) . . . the parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding, . . ..

The scope definition also includes reference to the existence, description, location of documents or other tangible things, and it notes a specific reference to the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. Any interpretation of the scope provisions requires a broad application. That having been said, the discovery rules cannot be used to harass or to increase the cost of litigation. O-Sullivan, et al. v. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., No. 88-ERA-37/38, Rec. D&O of ALJ at 15-16 (1989). Conversely, the Administrative Law Judge has considerable authority to impose sanctions where a party fails to comply with a discovery Order. 29 C.F.R. § 18.6(d)(2).

   The procedural rules also provide guidance as to the grounds for limiting discovery. 29 C.F.R. § 18.15. That section reads:

(a) Upon motion by a party or the person from whom discovery is sought, or for good cause shown, the administrative law judge may make any order which justice requires to protect the party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, . . ..

A variety of remedies are then offered by the regulation and rules have also evolved from Court interpretations.

   Courts have allowed extensive discovery in employment discrimination cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Failing to adhere to a liberal "spirit" of discovery is an abuse of discretion. Duke v. University of Texas at El Paso, 729 F.2nd 994 (5th Cir. 1984) Cert. Denied 105 S.Ct. 386, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Morrison v. City & County of Denver, 80 FRD 289 (D. Col. 1978). Any evidence which is not privileged and which is relevant to the subject matter is discoverable. LaChemise LaCoste v. the Alligator Co., 60 FRD 164 (D. Del. 1973). Evidence which is otherwise inadmissable, but which is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, is discoverable. LaChemise LaCoste v. the Alligator Co., supra.

   As the regulation indicates, the information to be discovered must be relevant or must lead to information which is relevant. Section 18.14(a). The fact that the information sought to be obtained may not be introduced at trial does not affect its relevancy for discovery purposes. Fonseca v. Ragan, 98 FRD 694 (E.D. NY 1983); Zahorik v. Cornell Un., 98 FRD 27 (N.D. NY 1983). The facts of each case will determine the scope of relevancy; Roseberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 FRD 292 (E.D. Penn. 1980); Shang v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 77 FRD 468 (S.D. NY 1978); and the consensus feeling seems to be that the term "relevancy" should be broadly construed. See LaChemise LaCoste v. the Alligator Co., supra.


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   Taking into consideration the fact that formal rules of evidence do not apply and admissibility of discovered evidence is not a criteria for the limitation of discovery, it seems clear that the drafters of this legislation intended the discovery guidelines to be broad, consistent with limitations offered by privilege claims and relevancy. Consideration must also be given now to Homeland Security concerns. The Administrative Review Board has directed the following comments to an interpretation of the term "relevancy" in a whistleblower setting.

In ruling on the relevancy of evidence on remand, the ALJ must apply a standard consistent with the broad range of circumstantial evidence that may be probative of the question of retaliatory intent. See Seater, slip op. at 4-82 (construing controlling regulation regarding relevancy at 29 C.F.R. §§24.5(e)(1) (1995), in relationship with directory regulation at 29 C.F.R. §§18.403 and mandate of Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§556(d)). The standard provided by Section 24.6(e)(1) regarding the exclusion of only such evidence as is "immaterial, irrelevant or unduly repetitious," incorporates the standard provided by Section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§556(d), and differs from the analogous provision found in the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, at 29 C.F.R. §§18.403. See Seater, slip op. at 6 n.8. On remand, the ALJ must also re-examine the exclusion of evidence that he found to be cumulative, see, e.g., HT at 407- 12, in view of the foregoing standard, and he must provide the parties an opportunity to respond accordingly.

Melendez v. Exxon Chemicals Americas, ARB No. 96-051, ALJ 1993-ERA-6. These principles are applicable to this Aviation Investment and Reform Act matter.

   The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) at Rule 26(b)(2) offer additional guidance on the limitations of discovery. The rule provides limitation if the Court determines that:

(i) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or

(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.

This FRCP supplements the procedural provisions of § 18.14 and offers additional guidance in resolving discovery controversies. The rule also directs an element of reasonableness to any request being made.


[Page 4]

   While weighing all of these considerations and in considering the Complainant's Motion and the Respondent's Answers to the Motion, IT IS ORDERED that the Complainant's Motion to Compel Responses, Requests, and Production of Documents is hereby granted. The Respondent is directed to apply the legal discovery principles noted above and provide proper responses to each discovery request made by the Complainant. Complete responses will be made by April 4, 2003.

   This Order is entered subject to the following directive to counsel for both the Complainant and the Respondent. I have reviewed all of the written materials relating to this discovery motion and it is obvious that much of the data sought to be discovered is of a technical nature and a complete response to all data requested will require a voluminous filing. I will apply the discovery standards noted herein and a reasonableness standard in addressing any future problems with respect to this discovery process. I expect the Complainant to make requests only as to materials which satisfy the standards indicated, and I will expect the Respondent to answer discovery requests completely, timely and in a manner which is fully consistent with the stated legal principles.

   In the future, if a controversy arises as to any discovery matter, I direct the parties to confer by telephone and make every effort to resolve the matter between themselves. That is the quickest and most expedient method. I will make myself available for a telephone conference call in the event counsel believe that I can be of assistance in resolving any discovery controversy or in preparing this matter for trial.

   Complainant also makes a request that the Respondent should identify all witnesses presently known or contemplated. Reference is made in Complainant's Motion to a variety of interrogatory requests and also requests for production. It is intimated in the Motion that the information requested is needed and is relevant to show the identity and knowledge of any person of whom Respondent is aware and who may have knowledge of any discoverable matter in the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 18.14(a).

   Complainant alleges that incomplete responses have been made and that the witnesses names are necessary in order to conduct complete discovery. It is noted in the Motion that the Respondent has identified several employees but Complainant requests that Respondent be ordered to state whether those employees will be witnesses and also to provide the identity of any other witness to whom Respondent has knowledge presently.

   The scope of discovery regulation found at 29 C.F.R. § 18.14 indicates that the parameters of discovery include;

the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.

The regulation makes no reference to "witnesses."

   The Pre-hearing Order accompanying the Notice of Hearing provides the direction for the exchange of witness lists at least ten workdays prior to the scheduled hearing date. In addition, the procedural regulations at § 18.16(a)(2) indicate that a party who has responded to a request for discovery is under a duty to supplement his response to identify each person to be called as an "expert witness" at the hearing, the subject matter on which he or she is expected to testify and the substance of his or her testimony. I do not view either our procedural rules or the federal rules as compelling an exchange of witness lists this early in the proceeding and I expect the parties to fully comply with the provisions of the Pre-hearing Order. I can say that if complete discovery is not made and witnesses are offered


[Page 5]

at trial having significant information concerning essential facts, that absent good cause, I will treat this event as being a severe breach of the disclosure responsibilities and that breach will be dealt with harshly. I expect the parties to fully comply with the applicable regulatory provisions.

      RUDOLF L. JANSEN
      Administrative Law Judge

[ENDNOTES]

1 Donovan v. Prestomos Presto Puerto Rico, 91 F.R.D. 222, 223 (1981).

2 Seater v. Southern California Edison, ARB Case No. 96-013 Sept. 27, 1996, slip op. at 4-8



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