

Army Regulation 50-5

**Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and
Materiel**

Nuclear Surety

**Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
1 August 2000**

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 50-5

Nuclear Surety

This revision-

- o Implements DOD Directive 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program.
- o Updates the responsibilities to reflect the fact that the Army no longer has custody of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems (para 1-4).
- o Designates the DCSOPS (DAMO-SS) as approval authority for waivers and exceptions to policy requirements and reclaims to nuclear surety inspections
- o Deletes the requirement that commanders with nuclear surety missions establish a nuclear surety board, making it an optional requirement as determined by the commander; and retains guidance on the functioning of a surety board to assist commanders who want to establish one (para 1-6).
- o Deletes guidance on Physical Security and Survivability. AR 190-54 now covers applicable physical security requirements at Army nuclear reactor facilities (chap 2).
- o Reorganizes the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), to more closely follow the sequence of events in certifying an individual into and out of the PRP (chap 2).
- o Consolidates PRP related information formerly located in appendix B with the Personnel Reliability Program (chap 2).
- o Aligns the nuclear PRP with the chemical PRP in AR 50-6 (chap 2).
- o Provides additional flexibility in the assignment of certifying officials (para 2-3f).
- o Deletes the listings of critical and controlled nuclear duty positions and refers readers to DOD Directive 5210.42 for the current DOD guidance (para 2-4a(1)).
- o Expands narrative on technical proficiency requirements for PRP positions and provides additional guidance for on-the-job-training (OJT) programs (para 2-6).
- o Expands the narrative on PRP qualifying factors/requirements (para 2-8).
- o Updates PRP disqualifying factors per revised guidance in DOD Directive 5210.42 (para 2-9).
- o Clarifies that drug abuse screening/urinalysis is not required to complete the administrative screening process prior to a PRP assignment (para2-11c).

- o Updates guidance on personnel security investigations and clearances to reflect revised guidance in DOD Directive 5210.42 (para 2-14) and DOD Directive 5200.2-R (para 2-14).
- o Summarizes clearance requirements for requesting personnel security investigations to meet DOD 5200.2-R (tables 1-1).
- o Provides additional guidance on interim certification (para 2-14e).
- o Includes nurse practitioners in the definitions of a competent medical authority (CMA), along with physicians and physician assistants (para 2-16a).
- o Clarifies that properly trained medical personnel, other than the competent medical authority (CMA), may annotate the SF 600 when a PRP member receives medical care and sign the medical screening section (Part III) of DA Form 3180 (para 2-16a).
- o Gives certifying officials the option to maintain the original copy of DA Form 3180 at the installation or to send it to the applicable personnel office (para 2-18c).
- o Adds a new table 2-1 summarizing screening requirements and changes rules on rescreening of previously screened personnel to meet DOD Directive 5210.42 requirements (para 2-19).
- o Provides additional guidance on responsibilities of individuals and supervisors regarding continuing evaluation (para 2-23).
- o Deletes periodic reinvestigation requirements for PRP purposes for military personnel per revised guidance in DOD Directive 5210.42 (para 2-26).
- o Requires all requests for PRP requalification for personnel no longer assigned to commands with a PRP to be forwarded through command channels to DCSOPS, DAMO-SSD (para 2-33d).
- o Prescribes new DA Form 7422 (Annual Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Status Report) to assist organizations in making their annual submissions (para 2-38c).
- o Deletes all discussion of nuclear qualification and nuclear certification of Army units since the Army no longer has nuclear-capable units (para 3-1b).
- o Establishes the DAIG nuclear surety inspection (NSI) of Army units with nuclear weapons support missions as the principal HQDA oversight of organizations with nuclear weapons support missions (paras 3-3 and 3-5).

- o Deletes Transportation of Nuclear Weapons and Components information since the Army no longer stores or transports nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components (chap 4).
- o Adds information on Positive Control Material, to provide guidance on storing and handling requirements for sealed authenticators and other positive control materials which Army activities may possess in support of the Joint Staff, unified commands or other Services (chap 4).
- o Updates Army response to radiological accidents to reflect new DOD guidance which tasks U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to take the lead in response to radiological accidents/incidents in CONUS and modifies Army response requirements to reflect the fact the Army no longer stores, handles or transports nuclear weapons (chap 5).
- o Deletes information on Counterintelligence and Operations Security, which was applicable to nuclear weapons storage sites (chap 6).
- o Deletes information on Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR), which applied to nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons security systems (chap 7).
- o Deletes information on PRP-Related Military Occupational Specialties, since there are no longer any Army military occupational specialties that "normally" require assignment to critical nuclear duty positions (app C).
- o Updates several definitions, deletes many definitions unique to nuclear weapons operations and adds new definitions to include: active service, administrative termination, alcohol abuse, competent medical authority, continuing evaluation, DOD personnel, drug abuse, nuclear duty position, permanent disqualification, positive control material, random testing, and temporary disqualification (glossary).


Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel

Nuclear Surety

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:



JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

History. This publication publishes a revision. Because the publication has been extensively revised, the changed portions have not been highlighted.

Summary. This regulation prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the Army Nuclear Surety Program and

implements DOD Directive 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).

Applicability. This regulation applies to all active U.S. Army commands, agencies, organizations, and contractors that have nuclear surety related responsibilities. This regulation also applies to the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). This regulation also applies during full mobilization.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans may delegate this authority in writing to a division

chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent.

Army management control process. This regulation does not contain management control provisions.

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval of HQDA, DCSOPS, ATTN: DAMO-SSD, Washington, D.C. 20310-0400.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to HQDA, DCSOPS, ATTN: DAMO-SSD, Washington, DC 20310-0400.

Distribution. Distribution of this issue is available in electronic media only and intended for command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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* This regulation supersedes AR 50-5, dated 7 August 1989 and rescinds DA Form 5549-R, August 1986.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. This regulation establishes Department of Army (DA) policies, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the Army Nuclear Surety Program. It implements Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5210.42.

b. This regulation designates the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) as the proponent for the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

c. Although the U.S. Army no longer has nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems, Army units may be called on to support nuclear weapons programs of other Services, the Joint Staff, or unified commands. These nuclear support missions, which could include duties such as storage of positive control materials (e.g., sealed authenticators), transmission of release / execute orders, and security duty at nuclear weapons storage areas, require Army units/activities to establish nuclear Personnel Reliability Programs (PRPs). Furthermore, DOD Directive 5210.63, Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials, requires operators and security personnel at Army nuclear reactor facilities to be in the PRP.

1-2. References

Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1-4. Responsibilities

a. The DCSOPS has overall Army Staff (ARSTAF) responsibility for the Army Nuclear Surety Program, including response to radiological accidents/incidents. The Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (DAMO-SS), as the HQDA focal point for nuclear surety will—

- (1) Establish overall policy for the Army Nuclear Surety Program.
- (2) Function as the ARSTAF focal point for nuclear surety matters.
- (3) Establish operational policies for nuclear surety programs, including mission requirements and the scope of training and evaluations necessary to verify mission capability.
- (4) Establish policies for radiological emergency response procedures (RERP).
- (5) Review reports, summaries, and analyses of inspections and evaluation reports for identification and correction of systemic problems.
- (6) Resolve reclaims to nuclear surety inspections conducted by the Inspector General (TIG).
- (7) Will establish policy and guidance in the management of Army nuclear reactor facilities used exclusively for research, development, and testing.

b. The Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA), will—

- (1) Provide advice and assistance to the ARSTAF, major Army commands (MACOM), and other Army organizations on surety matters by providing interface between policy developers and operators.
- (2) Conduct surety assistance visits to Army units with nuclear weapon surety missions and to Army nuclear reactor facilities.
- (3) Provide surety related information through USANCA publications.
- (4) Prepare and forward the annual PRP status report to DOD.

c. The Director, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization (DAMO-OD) will provide the overall policy guidance and establish minimum physical security standards, criteria, and procedures for Army nuclear reactor facilities, special nuclear materials (SNM), and positive control materials such as sealed authenticators and permissive action links (PAL).

d. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) will provide general staff supervision for personnel reliability and establish personnel policies to support implementation of the Army Nuclear Surety Program. The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), will monitor personnel standards and procedures to ensure effective and uniform implementation of the personnel reliability program (PRP).

e. The Director of Army Safety will—

- (1) Develop and manage an Army-wide nuclear reactor safety and radiation safety programs IAW AR 11-9 and AR 385-10.
- (2) Coordinate on all reactor studies and on any other action identified by the Army Reactor Office that involves reactor safety or radiation safety.

f. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) will—

- (1) Establish policy for the logistical support for the Army Nuclear Surety Program.
- (2) Develop policy and guidance for support to emergency radiological accidents/incidents.

g. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) will ensure counterintelligence support to Army units with nuclear weapons support missions and operational nuclear reactor facilities.

h. The Inspector General (TIG) will—

(1) Direct and perform independent assessments of the Army Nuclear Surety Program to ensure compliance with the nuclear operational policies established by HQDA, supported unified commands, and NATO.

(2) Establish standard inspection policies, procedures, and techniques for the conduct of these inspections.

i. The Surgeon General (TSG) will establish medical policies and procedures in support of the Army Nuclear Surety Program.

j. The Chief of Public Affairs (CPA) will manage public affairs activities in support of the Army Nuclear Surety Program and Emergency Radiological Response Procedures.

k. MACOMs will ensure that command nuclear surety programs are consistent with this regulation and assigned installation/activities are prepared to support a radiological emergency response per chapter 5.

l. Commanders of major subordinate commands possessing nuclear reactor facilities will—

(1) Implement a surety program per this regulation.

(2) Operate a safe, secure and reliable nuclear reactor facility per AR 50–7.

(3) Safeguard Army nuclear reactor facilities and SNM per AR 190–54.

m. Commanders/Directors of Army organizations and activities with nuclear duties in support of DOD's nuclear weapons program will implement a surety program per this regulation.

n. Directors of reactor facilities will implement a surety program per this regulation.

o. Commanders of Army components of unified or specified commands will be guided by the policies and procedures of this regulation. When unified or specified command policies and procedures and those of this regulation differ, the more stringent will govern.

1–5. Surety program concept

a. The Army Nuclear Surety Program is designed to ensure the safety, security, reliability and survivability of Army operations in support of DOD's nuclear weapons program and at Army nuclear reactor facilities.

b. Nuclear surety activities include the following:

(1) Compliance with mandated safety, operational, and technical procedures.

(2) Physical security measures to preclude unauthorized access or use of nuclear reactor facilities, SNM, and positive control materials.

(3) Procedures to assess the reliability of personnel designated for or assigned to nuclear duty positions through the PRP.

(4) Training and/or experience applicable to the position assigned and verification that each individual in the PRP is proficient in the nuclear duties to be performed.

(5) Storage, handling, maintenance, transportation, and accountability of SNM and positive control materials.

(6) Emergency response to radiological accidents/incidents.

(7) Assessment of organizations and activities with nuclear surety missions.

1–6. Surety boards and officers

a. *Surety boards.* Commanders/directors of installations, brigades, and other organizations responsible for nuclear surety programs will appoint surety officers and may establish local surety boards to assist in accomplishing their surety duties. The composition of the board depends on the command's mission and available external supporting agencies. Surety boards may be consolidated at installation level. Commanders/directors should assign duties to surety boards as needed to assist in the administration of the nuclear surety program.

b. *Surety board functions.* An active and dynamic nuclear surety board can assist in successfully managing a command's nuclear surety program. Surety boards assist by:

(1) Serving as a focal point for surety issues.

(2) Reviewing surety directives of higher headquarters to determine impacts on the organization's surety program.

(3) Developing the command's surety program.

(4) Reviewing and recommending administrative procedures, operational and contingency plans, and procedures.

(5) Developing solutions to command surety problems.

(6) Recommending allocation of resources to support nuclear surety-related operational and training activities.

(7) Recommending local procedures to implement PRP screening procedures.

(8) Fostering close coordination among all staff sections and activities that participate in the command's surety program.

(9) Reviewing procedures and criteria for submitting waivers (i.e., information, requirements, compensating measures, etc.).

c. Surety officers. Commanders/directors should select surety officers who have technical knowledge of nuclear-related missions and practical experience in surety procedures. Surety officers will—

- (1) Manage day-to-day operations of the command's surety program.
- (2) Monitor and evaluate the command's surety program.
- (3) Act as the focal point for surety matters.
- (4) Provide oversight for the safety, security, accountability, and PRP to ensure these programs receive the necessary emphasis.

1-7. Supplemental guidance

a. This regulation does not restrict the authority of commanders to deviate from its policies and procedures in an emergency.

b. Commanders may cite this regulation as the authority for requesting resources necessary to enhance the safety, security or personnel reliability of Army operations in support of DOD's nuclear weapons program or at Army nuclear reactor facilities.

c. Commands will forward requests for exceptions and waivers to the policies in this regulation through command channels to HQDA (DAMO-SSD), Washington, DC 20310-0400, with a copy furnished to Director, USANCA (ATNA-OP), 7150 Heller Loop, Ste 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3198.

Chapter 2 Personnel Reliability Program

Section I Introduction

2-1. General

This chapter establishes the nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), as required by DOD Directive 5210.42. The purpose of the PRP is to ensure that each person who performs nuclear duties in support of DOD's nuclear weapons program or at Army nuclear reactor facilities meets the highest possible standards of reliability. The determination of reliability is accomplished through initial and continuing evaluations of individuals assigned to PRP positions. The PRP applies to U.S. citizens who are active duty military personnel, DOD civil service employees, and, in special cases, DOD civilian contractor employees.

2-2. PRP elements

The PRP is a DOD program. This program includes—

- a.* Identifying and designating critical and controlled PRP positions.
- b.* Selecting, screening, and evaluating candidates on the basis of valid and favorably completed personnel security investigations (PSIs), screening of local records, and medical evaluations.
- c.* Conducting personal interviews and briefings by a certifying official.
- d.* Certifying of PRP suitability by a certifying official.
- e.* Assigning PRP certified personnel to critical or controlled nuclear duty positions.
- f.* Continuing evaluation by supervisors, fellow workers, certifying officials, and support agency personnel.
- g.* Issuing medical restrictions from performance of nuclear duties when required.
- h.* Disqualifying unreliable personnel temporarily or permanently when warranted.
- i.* Terminating PRP status administratively when an individual is no longer assigned to a PRP position.
- j.* Self-monitoring by individuals certified into the PRP.

2-3. PRP policy

a. According to DOD policy (DOD Directive 5210.42), only those personnel who have demonstrated the highest degree of individual reliability for allegiance, trustworthiness, conduct, behavior, and responsibility will be allowed to perform duties that meet the criteria established for critical or controlled nuclear duty positions (nuclear duties).

b. Commanders/Directors having nuclear support missions or operating an Army nuclear reactor facility will implement a PRP. Individuals certified into the PRP will be under continuing evaluation to ensure adherence to safety, security and reliability standards. Individuals who do not meet or maintain program standards will not be selected for or retained in the PRP or assigned nuclear duties.

c. In peacetime, the PRP applies to personnel who have access to, or control access to, war reserve nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, SNM, positive control materials (to include transmission or receipt of nuclear release / execution orders) and nuclear reactor facilities. These personnel perform nuclear duties (also see para 2-4).

d. Although adherence to PRP procedures during the transition to war and during wartimes may be impractical, particularly in a combat theater, the intent of PRP policy shall apply.

e. It is DOD policy that only DOD military or civilian personnel who are U.S. citizens will be assigned to nuclear duty positions. However, in cases where such limitation is not in the best interest of the Army, MACOM commanders may authorize use of contractors to perform nuclear duties. DOD contractor employees who perform nuclear duties will meet the reliability standards of this chapter.

f. Commanders/Directors will designate in writing, certifying official(s) to certify individuals' suitability for the PRP. The certifying official is normally the commander or DOD military or civilian supervisor responsible for the performance of the assigned nuclear mission. Commanders or directors who delegate this authority become reviewing officials. Certifying officials are supervisors, team leaders, managers or department heads who maintain close personal contact with the individuals being certified and are responsible for implementation of the PRP. Although the certifying official may request information or advice from any support agency or activity capable of providing or interpreting such information, the decision to qualify an individual for, or to disqualify an individual from the PRP, is the sole responsibility of the certifying official.

g. Certifying officials must be military or DOD civilian personnel. DOD contractor personnel are prohibited from acting as certifying officials.

h. No one will be assigned to a PRP position until the certifying official screens and certifies the individual as suitable for the PRP. Prior to assumption of certifying official duties, the reviewing official must screen and certify the certifying official into the PRP, except as stated in paragraph 2-10.b. Unless otherwise required, the position of the reviewing official need not be identified as a PRP position.

i. Certifying officials will—

(1) Determine PRP suitability and ensure that individuals are qualified, trained, and proficient prior to being assigned to nuclear duties.

(2) Continuously evaluate personnel assigned to PRP positions.

(3) Promptly remove, or in contracted operations, direct the contractor to remove from nuclear duties, any individual whose reliability becomes suspect. In such cases, the certifying official will take prompt action to expeditiously resolve the issue and either reinstate or permanently disqualify the individual.

j. Privacy Act considerations according to the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 apply. Additionally, all personnel wishing to be considered for assignment to the PRP must grant authority for release of information and records to allow the certifying official and other authorized officials to review medical, personnel, and security files. If an individual does not grant permission for the records check and review, the individual is not eligible for the PRP.

k. For government facilities with nuclear duties that require contractor personnel to be in the PRP, the Army contracting officers representative (COR) (or properly designated subordinate) will serve as the certifying official for DOD contractor employees authorized to perform nuclear duties. Section VIII contains supplemental guidance for PRP certification of contractor employees.

l. Certifying officials may appoint PRP monitors to assist in administering the day-to-day functions of the PRP. PRP monitors may also be appointed at installation or activity level to administer the consolidated day-to-day functions of multiple certifying officials. PRP monitor duties include: coordinating and disseminating PRP information, indoctrinating and training PRP personnel on program objectives and procedures, and conducting staff assistance visits to all subordinate units with a PRP. The PRP monitors are not required to be in the PRP unless they are assigned nuclear duties (see para 2-4a).

m. Changes in the PRP assignment status of military personnel will be reported per AR 680-29, AR 600-8-104, DA Pam 600-8-23, and AR 600-8-11.

2-4. Identifying nuclear PRP positions/nuclear duty positions

a. Certifying officials will identify nuclear duty positions required to accomplish their mission and designate each position as either critical or controlled (see Glossary).

(1) Use DOD Directive 5210.42, enclosure 3, as a guide for designating critical or controlled positions for Army nuclear support missions.

(2) PRP positions at Army nuclear reactor facilities are all controlled positions and include personnel whom—

(a) Perform or supervise operations on nuclear reactor facilities.

(b) Serve as armed personnel for security posts at nuclear reactor facilities.

(c) Monitor intrusion detection systems (IDS) for limited and exclusion areas.

(d) Are IDS maintenance personnel for limited and exclusion areas containing SNM.

(3) Personnel who receive, or store, or distribute sealed authenticators or related nuclear codes, or transmit / receive nuclear release / execution orders are required to be in the PRP (see chap 4).

(4) Only the minimum number of positions necessary to meet mission requirements will be designated.

(5) Determination of whether or not a position is critical or controlled will be based on the actual duties performed.

(6) Vacant nuclear duty positions will be filled as rapidly as possible.

b. The position of certifying official will be designated as the highest category nuclear duty position certified. Unless otherwise required, the position of the reviewing official, the person who appoints and certifies the acceptability of the certifying official, need not be identified as a PRP position.

c. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and other Army emergency personnel responding to the scene of a nuclear weapon or SNM accident or incident as part of the Initial Response Force (IRF) (see chap 5) are not required to be in the PRP.

2–5. Nuclear duty position roster (NDPR)

a. The NDPR will—

(1) Identify the minimum number of PRP positions required to accomplish the assigned nuclear mission. Vacant PRP positions will be listed.

(2) Identify individuals who are certified in the PRP, and trained and proficient in assigned nuclear duties.

b. The certifying official will provide a copy of the NDPR (and any changes) to the supporting personnel office, medical activity or contract physician (to include those activities that maintain the records identified in paragraph 2–20), dental facility, alcohol and drug control officer, and security officer.

c. The certifying official, or an individual designated in writing to sign for the certifying official, will authenticate the NDPR by signing the last page. Individuals who authenticate the NDPR must be assigned to a PRP position listed on the NDPR. Certifying officials who authenticate NDPRs for contractor personnel do not have to be listed on the contractor's NDPR.

d. The NDPR, which may be in any format, will contain the following information:

(1) Unit or organization designation.

(2) Effective date.

(3) Name (last, first, MI).

(4) Social security number (SSN).

(5) Category (critical or controlled) of each position.

(6) PSI type/date investigation completed (e.g., SSBI/5 Feb 1998, NACI/23 Feb 2000, Periodic Reinvestigation–Secret/17 Feb 2000, NACLCL/25 Oct 1999).

(7) When an individual is assigned additional nuclear duties, all assigned nuclear duties should be listed; however, separate line entries for each nuclear duty are not required.

(8) Page number of total number of pages (e.g., page 4 of 5).

e. Certifying officials (or designated representative) will designate only the minimum number of PRP positions to meet nuclear mission requirements. The certifying official's signature on the NDPR serves as the annual review of PRP positions required by DOD Directive 5210.42.

f. Individuals who are interim certified (see para 2–14b) will be clearly indicated on the NDPR. This documents the certifying official's justification of the need for interim certification.

g. Units may have individuals who are in the PRP undergoing continuing evaluation (completed DA Form 3180 (Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record)), but who are not yet assigned to a PRP position (e.g., personnel in training, personnel on levy for PRP assignments). Certifying officials will also list these individuals on their NDPRs provided they are clearly identified as being in a training status.

h. Certifying officials will delete from the NDPR individuals who are administratively terminated or permanently disqualified. Certifying officials will not delete names of personnel medically restricted or temporarily disqualified.

i. Each certifying official will maintain a NDPR. It is permissible to consolidate NDPRs at the organization or installation level provided the NDPR information of each subordinate activity is listed separately and authenticated by each subordinate activity's certifying official or designated individual. The designated individual must occupy a PRP position on the subordinate activity's section of the NDPR.

2–6. Technical proficiency

a. Prior to authorizing an individual to perform nuclear duties, the certifying official will ensure that any required formal instruction is completed, and/or the individual has requisite experience applicable to the PRP position assigned and is proficient in assigned nuclear duties. On-the-job training (OJT) is authorized. Normally, OJT entails the restriction of the individual's access to two-person control for nuclear weapons, SNM and positive control materials during the training period. However, if the training requires access, the individual being trained may be granted access providing he/she is under the direct supervision of two fully trained and PRP certified individuals capable of satisfying the two-person rule.

b. The certifying official's verification of technical proficiency takes place initially when an individual's name is added to the NDPR. The certifying official must also ensure that members in the PRP receive any required refresher training for currently assigned nuclear duties and receive appropriate new training if additional nuclear duties are assigned.

Section II

Reliability standards

2-7. General

The certifying official will make a judgment on the reliability of an individual based on an investigation and evaluation of the individual's personnel security eligibility, physical and mental capability, personnel and medical records, and a personal interview. The certifying official will consider all relevant facts on the individual's current and past duty performance, the recommendations expressed in the personnel security investigation and medical evaluation, and the opinion of other agencies and personnel, as appropriate, in making the final judgment about an individual's reliability when performing nuclear duties.

2-8. Qualifying factors/requirements

Certifying officials will use the following PRP qualifying standards/requirements in determining an individual's suitability for the PRP.

a. Criteria. The following are the reliability standards expected of all PRP members.

- (1) Physical competence, mental alertness, and technical proficiency commensurate with duty requirements.
- (2) Evidence of dependability in accepting responsibilities and effectively performing in an approved manner; flexibility in adjusting to changes in the working environment.
- (3) Evidence of good social adjustment, emotional stability, and ability to exercise sound judgment in meeting adverse or emergency situations.
- (4) Positive attitude toward nuclear duties and the PRP.

b. Personal interview. The certifying official will conduct a personal interview with each candidate for PRP duties to look for evidence of the individual's perception of responsibility, exercise of sound judgment, effective performance, and ability to adjust to changes in the work environment.

c. Personnel security investigation (PSI). A favorable investigation conducted in accordance with AR 380-67 should reflect an affirmative finding that an individual's personnel security eligibility is consistent with the interest of national security.

d. Personnel records review. Look for evidence of the individual's acceptance of responsibility, exercise of sound judgment, effective performance, and ability to adjust to changes in the working environment.

e. Medical evaluation. The certifying official must be totally confident that the individual being certified is both capable and reliable. To accomplish that, the Competent Medical Authority (CMA) (as defined in Glossary) must provide the certifying official an evaluation of the individual's physical capability and mental reliability to perform PRP duties. All potentially disqualifying medical information must be documented in the individual's health records and dental records. The CMA will provide the certifying official with sufficient medical information to make a sound judgment on an individual's suitability for the PRP.

f. Urinalysis testing. Personnel will undergo urinalysis testing per paragraphs 2-17 and 2-25.

g. Position qualification. The individual must have technical proficiency commensurate with assigned nuclear duties.

2-9. Disqualifying factors/actions on detection

Any of the following traits, diagnoses, conditions, or conduct are grounds for the disqualification of individuals from the PRP. The list is not all encompassing and contains only examples of disqualifying factors.

a. Alcohol dependent/alcohol abuser. Based on the circumstances, certifying officials will either permanently or temporarily disqualify (see section VI) any individual diagnosed as alcohol dependent or an alcohol abuser. A CMA will determine whether an individual is alcohol dependent or an alcohol abuser.

(1) An individual diagnosed as alcohol dependent, or already permanently disqualified for alcohol dependence, may be requalified for PRP duties only after meeting the following conditions:

(a) The individual successfully completes an initial intensive rehabilitation, if prescribed, followed by a one-year period of strict compliance with aftercare requirements, regular and frequent participation in meetings with Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, and total abstinence from alcohol for this one year period.

(b) A PRP qualification screening, including mental health evaluation and a favorable prognosis by CMA, has been completed and forwarded in the request for requalification. (See para 2-32 for guidance on the requalification process.)

(c) The responsible certifying official must determine that the value of the individual's presence in the PRP outweighs the risk from potential future alcohol-related incidents and must document that fact that he/she has full trust and confidence in the member's reliability.

(2) An individual temporarily disqualified for alcohol dependence may have the temporary disqualification removed and be returned to PRP duties after successfully completing at least 180 days of the 1-year aftercare program. A favorable prognosis by the CMA is required before an individual can be returned to PRP duties.

(3) An individual diagnosed as an alcohol abuser already temporarily/ permanently disqualified as an alcohol abuser, may be returned to PRP duties only after meeting the following conditions:

(a) The individual successfully completes a minimum 180-day rehabilitation program, or treatment regime, prescribed by the CMA.

(b) The individual demonstrates positive changes in job reliability and lifestyle.

(c) The CMA provides a favorable medical prognosis.

b. *Alcohol-related incidents.* Certifying officials will temporarily disqualify any individual involved in an alcohol-related incident. The certifying official will investigate the circumstances and request a medical evaluation. An individual not diagnosed as alcohol dependent/abuser may be returned to PRP duties when the certifying official determines the individual to be reliable, based on results of the investigation and the medical evaluation.

c. *Drug abuse.*

(1) Except for the category of individuals identified in subparagraph 2-9c(6) or otherwise provided in this regulation, any use, admitted or otherwise disclosed, of illicit drugs such as heroin, heroin derivatives, cocaine, "crack," phencyclidine (PCP), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), "ecstasy," or other "designer" drugs, amphetamines, barbiturates, or other narcotic drugs not prescribed by proper medical authorities, and anabolic steroids will render an individual ineligible for admission to or retention in PRP duties. Certifying officials having any doubt on the status of a certain drug (illicit, illegal, or controlled) will consult the CMA. Additional assistance may be requested from the MACOM or supporting legal office. If the substance is deemed illicit, illegal, or controlled, the individual will be permanently disqualified for the PRP.

(2) Inadvertent overdose of prescription or over-the-counter medication that does not result in a long-term side effect should not necessarily require the individual to be permanently disqualified.

(3) Any individual suspected of using illegal drugs while in the PRP will be temporarily disqualified and referred for an Alcohol Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP)(ASAP) evaluation or one provided by a private accredited substance abuse counseling service. Upon receipt of the evaluation, the certifying official will either initiate permanent disqualification action or reinstate the individual into the PRP as appropriate.

(4) Any individual found to have been involved in unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacturing, or sale of any narcotic or dangerous drug such as those mentioned above, or marijuana or cannabis-based products, will be ineligible for PRP duties. Such individuals will be permanently disqualified.

(5) Any individual found to inappropriately use other substances to alter perceptions or mental faculties; such as sniffing glue, aerosol fumes or any other substance not intended for human ingestion, will be permanently disqualified.

(6) It is not the intent of this regulation to automatically render ineligible for the PRP any individual who before 25 May 1993, has disclosed pre-Service/pre-employment drug abuse, or who has not yet been asked to make such disclosure and who is currently certified for PRP duties after having been formally screened in accordance with then-existing guidance. Further requalification of such individuals for future PRP status will be in accordance with this regulation, except that previously disclosed and considered drug abuse and pre-service/pre-employment drug use not required previously to be disclosed, will not be the sole grounds for denial of requalification or mandatory disqualification.

(7) Pre-service/pre-employment marijuana, hashish, or other cannabis-based products used on an experimental or infrequent basis does not necessarily render an individual ineligible for consideration for, or retention in, a PRP position. It is incumbent on the certifying official, with CMA consultation, to determine the degree to which the pre-service/pre-employment use impacts the reliability of the individual. An individual being screened for the PRP (having disclosed pre-service/pre-employment use of marijuana, hashish, or other cannabis-based products) may be certified in the program if a CMA's medical evaluation establishes no cannabis dependency, and there is no additional information that would cause the certifying official to doubt the individual's reliability. If the pre-service/pre-employment cannabis use is discovered after an individual is already in the PRP, and there is no other information that would cause doubt about the individual's reliability, the certifying official, with CMA consultation, may retain the individual in the PRP. If the certifying official has reason to doubt or suspects the individual's reliability for PRP duties, the certifying official will—

(a) Temporarily disqualify the individual.

(b) Conduct an evaluation of the individual's drug abuse involvement and current and past duty performance.

(c) Initiate a PRP qualification screening, including a complete medical evaluation.

(d) Justify and document any decision to retain the individual in the PRP. The documentation will include a determination that retention is in the best interest of the service and national security, and statements by the reviewing and certifying officials that the individual's reliability is not in doubt.

(e) Permanently disqualify individuals determined to be unsuitable for retention in the PRP.

d. *Negligence or delinquency in performance of duty.* Because a good indication of reliability is past performance, the certifying official will review the PRP candidate's job or duty history for evidence of desirable traits such as dependability, flexibility, and good judgment. In determining reliability, the certifying official must evaluate all aspects of an individual's actions. For example, clear instances of youthful indiscretion are not necessarily proof of negligence or unreliability.

e. *Conviction of, or involvement in, a serious incident.* A PRP candidate's background will be reviewed for behavior patterns that show or suggest a contemptuous attitude toward the law, regulations, or other duly constituted authority.

Serious incidents include, but are not limited to assault, sexual misconduct, financial irresponsibility, inordinate number of traffic tickets, and child or spouse abuse.

f. Medical condition. Any significant mental or physical medical condition substantiated by a CMA or aberrant behavior considered by the certifying official to be prejudicial to reliable performance of PRP duties may be considered as grounds for permanent disqualification from the PRP.

g. Hypnosis. The CMA will evaluate personnel treated with hypnotherapy and make a recommendation on their suitability for duty in the PRP.

h. Serious progressive illnesses. Certifying officials will be notified immediately of any individual being considered for, or currently performing in a PRP position who has been diagnosed with a serious progressive illness, to include Acquired-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or testing positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).

(1) The certifying official will take the necessary actions to screen the individual both medically and psychologically. However, individuals with AIDS or who are HIV positive will not be treated differently than other individuals with other serious progressive illnesses solely on the basis of being diagnosed with AIDS or testing HIV positive.

(2) Specifically, HIV-infected personnel who do not demonstrate progressive clinical illness or immunological deficiency during periodic evaluations will not be involuntarily reassigned away from surety positions solely because they are HIV-infected.

(3) As with all potentially disqualifying medical conditions, the certifying official must decide each case on the specific medical and other pertinent evaluations of the individual involved. The primary consideration in all determinations must be that of personnel reliability.

i. Poor attitude or lack of motivation. Any display of poor attitude or lack of motivation as evidenced by aberrant attitude (arrogance, inflexibility, or suspiciousness), behavior (impulsiveness, destructiveness, or suicide threats), or mood (unusual happiness, sadness, or agitation) may be grounds for permanent disqualification.

j. Suicide attempt. Any suicide attempt, disclosed and considered after the date of this revision, will be cause for permanent disqualification.

k. Protective equipment. Inability to wear personal protective equipment required by the assigned position (i.e. security guards).

Section III

Administrative screening

2-10. Administrative screening prior to PRP assignment

a. The losing organization will screen and evaluate all military and DOD civilian personnel with orders directing reassignment to a nuclear PRP position prior to travel. The individual must meet qualifications cited in assignment orders. Orders of permanently disqualified soldiers will be cancelled per AR 600-8-11.

b. Personnel who act as certifying officials only for the purpose of administrative screening need not be in the PRP.

c. Personnel assigned or scheduled for assignment to PRP positions must have their personnel and medical records screened, and have a current and favorably completed PSI.

(1) Follow the procedures outlined in paragraphs 2-14, 2-15, and 2-16 to complete this screening.

(2) The sequence of medical and personnel screening and administrative processing may be adapted to meet the needs of the certifying official or agencies.

d. If the certifying official finds the levied individual suitable for PRP duties after completion of the screening, the certifying official will brief the individual per paragraph 2-18.

2-11. DA Form 3180, Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record

a. DA Form 3180 will be completed for each individual screened and evaluated for the PRP. Copies of the signed DA Form 3180 (through part V) will be distributed per paragraph 2-18, and the individual will be placed under continuing evaluation.

b. The administrative screening of medical records for the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program is authorized under paragraph 6-9 of AR 600-85, except in the cases of civilian PRP personnel (para 2-16e(1)).

c. Drug abuse screening/urinalysis testing (para 2-17) is not required to complete the PRP administrative screening process however all DOD military and civilian personnel who are candidates for the PRP must undergo urinalysis testing (para 2-17) prior to being certified into the PRP.

d. Individuals pending reassignment to a nuclear PRP position who are currently in the PRP will not be administratively terminated (see para 2-31).

e. The certifying official will permanently disqualify any individual found unsuitable for the PRP (see para 2-30).

Section IV

Certifying official's screening

2-11. General

The concept of personnel reliability is a vital element of the nuclear surety program. An individual is presumed reliable when there is no evidence of unreliability. In the absence of a test for reliability, the PRP provides a process for initial screening and continuing evaluation of an individual's health, attitude, behavior, and duty performance while assigned to a PRP position, or in the case of paragraph 2-10 above, being transferred into a PRP position. The certifying official, based on the absence of evidence to the contrary, determines an individual's suitability for and retention in the PRP.

a. PRP screening occurs—

(1) By the losing organization before departure when orders direct reassignment to a PRP assignment at another organization or installation (see paragraph 2-10).

(2) Before being assigned to PRP positions.

b. DA Form 3180 will be completed for each individual screened and evaluated for the PRP. The sequence of medical and personnel screening and administrative processing may be adapted to meet the needs of the certifying official or agencies. Facsimile stamps will not be used for signatures on the DA Form 3180. The certifying official may make a determination of unsuitability at any time during the screening process.

c. Certifying officials of organizations receiving medical support from non-Army facilities or from U.S. civilian contract physicians will provide a copy of this regulation to the supporting medical facility contract physicians for use in evaluating personnel for the PRP.

2-13. Initial interview

a. To initiate the screening process, the certifying official (or representative designated in writing) will interview each PRP candidate. The certifying official will—

(1) Inform the candidate of the provisions of the Privacy Act and provide the candidate with a copy of the Privacy Act statement (a copy of the Privacy Act is provided at the back of this regulation). If the candidate objects to the required screening, the screening process will be discontinued.

(2) Review with the candidate the concept of the PRP and the reliability standards, both qualifying and disqualifying (Section II) for assignment to, or retention in, a PRP position. The certifying official will ensure that the candidate understands the traits and conduct normally considered disqualifying. The certifying official will—

(*a*) Determine whether the candidate has ever used illicit drugs or has been involved in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacturing, or sale of any narcotic or dangerous drugs or cannabis products.

(*b*) Determine whether any of the other traits or conduct normally considered disqualifying exists.

(*c*) Explain the importance of PRP assignments and the responsibilities involved in associated nuclear duties.

(*d*) Explain the continuing evaluation aspects of the PRP to include each individual's responsibility to actively participate in this evaluation and that personnel found suitable for PRP duties remain under continual evaluation until either permanently disqualified or administratively terminated.

(*e*) Complete Part I of DA Form 3180.

b. Should the certifying official determine that the candidate is unsuitable for the PRP (see paragraph 2-9), the certifying official will terminate the PRP screening process and follow procedures for permanent disqualification (paragraph 2-30). For civil service applicants who are not current federal employees, the certifying official will return the interview referral slip to the placement specialist. Contractors may terminate the PRP screening process in accordance with internal procedures at any time prior to the involvement of the government certifying official. Procedures for permanent disqualification do not need to be followed unless the contractor employee is currently in the PRP or being administratively screened. *c.* Should the certifying official determine that the candidate is acceptable for further screening, the screening process will be completed per local procedures.

2-14. Personnel security investigations (PSI) for initial assignments

a. Critical position. Personnel scheduled for initial assignment to critical nuclear duty positions must have a current Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) conducted in accordance with DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program and a current security clearance at a level commensurate with the security classification of information required in the position

(1) The certifying official must review the results (dossier) of the investigation (see paragraph 2-14b) if the U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) determined that the investigation revealed potentially disqualification information (PDI). The certifying official will make a determination of the individual's reliability based on this review using the criteria in paragraph 2-8.

(2) Pending dossier review, the certifying official may place an individual being considered for assignment to a critical nuclear duty position under continuing evaluation and begin nuclear-related training. However, the individual will not be assigned to a nuclear duty position until the dossier is reviewed and a determination of reliability is made.

(3) After review of the dossier and determination that the individual is suitable for assignment to a critical position, the certifying official may assign the individual to a critical nuclear duty position.

b. Dossier review. Evidence of potentially disqualifying information will be reflected in Part III (Remarks) of the computer-generated DA Form 873 (Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination) from CCF by the notation "Dossier review required for critical nuclear duty." When this notation is present, CCF will forward the dossier to the address in the "return results to" block if —

(1) Both "Nuclear Weapon Position" and "Other" with the notation "PRP/Surety Required" are checked in block 6, Reason for Investigation, of DD Form 1879 (DOD Request for Personnel Security Investigation); and the statement "DOD 5200.2R, paragraph 3-504, applies, the annotation Personnel Occupying Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Position" is present in block 20 (Remarks) or,

(2) The "Top Secret" and "PRP/Surety" blocks in item 8 (Reason for Request) are checked and "Critical Nuclear Duty" is annotated in item 14 (Remarks) of DA Form 5247-R (Request for Security Determination).

(3) If Part III of the computer-generated DA Form 873 from CCF is blank, a new DA Form 873 must be requested by submitting a DA Form 5247-R to CDR, CCF (PCCF-M). (Blocks indicated in preceding paragraph must be annotated.) The certifying official may assign the individual to a nuclear duty position pending receipt of the new DA Form 873. Individuals for whom a DA Form 873 has been locally prepared per AR 380-67 may also be assigned to a nuclear duty position pending receipt of the CCF computer-generated DA Form 873.

(4) When a dossier is devoid of potentially disqualifying information, the notation "PRP/Surety Considered" will appear in Part III of the DA Form 873.

(5) Units will normally receive the dossier within 10 working days of receipt of DA Form 873 from CCF. If the dossier is not received, contact CCF's Customer Assistance Branch.

c. Controlled position. Military personnel scheduled for initial assignment to controlled nuclear duty positions must have a current and favorably completed PSI (in the form of a National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Checks (NACLCL). Civilian personnel scheduled for initial assignment to controlled nuclear duty positions must have a current and favorably completed PSI (in the form of an Access National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (Access NACI)) and an appropriate security clearance at a level commensurate with the security classification of information required in the position.

d. PSI investigative files. Certifying officials do not have to review PSI investigative files (dossier) for personnel being assigned to controlled nuclear PRP positions. However, certifying officials may request a dossier be made available for review whenever they believe it is necessary (see AR 381-45).

e. Interim certification for personnel scheduled for PRP assignment. Minimum investigative standards, implementing Section 3.3 of Executive Order 12968, are established for all DOD military personnel, civilian employees, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other personnel who require access to classified information before the appropriate investigation can be completed and a final determination made.

(1) In exceptional circumstances where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the investigation and adjudication process, interim certification for PRP purposes, may be granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated. If it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a critical or controlled nuclear duty position and the required SSBI, NACLCL or Access NACI have not been completed, interim certification may be made under the following carefully controlled conditions:

(a) The NACLCL (required for access to Confidential or Secret classified information) or SSBI (required for access to Top Secret information) must have been requested and all other requirements of the PRP screening process must have been completed. For civilian personnel, either the Access NACI (required for access to Confidential or Secret classified information) or the SSBI (required for access to Top Secret information) must have been requested and all other requirements of the PRP screening process must have been completed.

(b) Additionally, a Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII) check and an individual's records check will be conducted with local law enforcement agencies prior to the certifying official's decision to grant interim certification.

(c) Once granted, interim certification will be valid until completion of the personnel security investigation and adjudication; however, the certifying official granting interim certification may revoke it at any time based on unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation, or if the certifying official has reason to suspect the individual's reliability.

(d) All other criteria concerning use of interim certified personnel will be adhered to (para 2-14f.)

(2) Interim certification to a critical nuclear duty position is as follows:

(a) Interim certification to a critical nuclear duty position is authorized for an individual who does not meet the requirement of a current SSBI, that is, completed within the past five years, subject to the following conditions:

1. The individual must have had a favorable National Agency Check (NAC) and/or National Agency Check plus written inquiries (NACI) in the past five years without a break in active federal service or employment longer than two years; or the individual must have had a favorable SSBI, SBI or BI conducted more than five years ago and has not

had a break in active federal service or employment longer than two years. Service as a cadet at any of the four Service academies may be considered “active service.”

2. A new SSBI must have been requested and all other requirements of the PRP screening process must have been completed.

3. If the SSBI is not completed within 150 days after the date it was requested, the certifying official will ascertain from the Defense Security Service (DSS) or the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as applicable, the reason for delay. The certifying official will then determine whether to continue or withdraw the interim certification.

(b) All other criteria concerning use of interim certified personnel will be adhered to (para 2–14.f.)

(4) Interim certification to a controlled nuclear duty position.

(a) Interim certification to a controlled nuclear duty position is authorized for an individual who does not meet the requirement of a current NACLIC, that is, completed within the past five years, subject to the following conditions:

1. The individual’s favorable ENTNAC, NAC, NACI, BI, SBI or SSBI is more than five years old, and no break in active federal service or DOD employment has exceeded two years. Service as a cadet at any of the four Service academies may be considered “active service.”

2. A new NACLIC or Access NACI must have been requested and all other requirements of the PRP screening process have been completed.

3. If the NACLIC or Access NACI is not completed within 90 days after the date it was requested, the certifying official will ascertain from the Defense Security Service (DSS) or the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as applicable, the reason for delay. The certifying official will then determine whether to continue or withdraw the interim certification.

(b) All other criteria concerning use of interim certified personnel as outlined in para 2–14.f. will be adhered to.

f. Use of interim certified personnel.

(1) Interim certified personnel must be identified to supervisory personnel, entry controllers who directly control access to exclusion areas, and others (as necessary) as having interim certification status.

(2) The NDPR, entry authorization lists, and individual access badges must be specifically marked to designate interim certification status.

(3) Interim certified individuals will not be paired in a two–person team with another individual also having only interim PRP certification.

g. Supplemental guidance.

(1) DA Form 873 issued by the commander, U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) is evidence of a favorable investigation. The security manager will request DA Form 873 for those individuals who have been issued them. In the absence of a DA Form 873, the certifying official must coordinate with the local security manager to determine if the existing PSI is favorable. For civilians or contractors who do not possess a security clearance, evidence of a favorable investigation is an over stamped Standard Form 86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions), or a Standard Form 85P (Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions), or a certificate of investigation issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

(2) PSIs completed on reservists/national guardsmen or ROTC cadets are valid for PRP purposes as long as the individuals enter active duty within two years of the PSI completion date. DOD contractor employment with access to classified information or contractors in the PRP under the DOD Industrial Security Program is considered the same as DOD employment.

(3) During administrative screening (see para 2–10), individuals will not be found unsuitable for the PRP on the basis of an inadequate or outdated security clearance or PSI. If the security clearance or PSI is invalid for the PRP, a request for a new security clearance or PSI will be submitted as part of the administrative screening prior to travel. (Use table 2–1, in determining requirements). Due consideration must be given to the length of time required to process a PSI and the impact of having an individual transferred to a gaining organization while still pending a favorably completed PSI. Travel will not automatically be delayed pending completion of a PSI. However, if the command is aware that the PSI has developed derogatory information potentially reflecting on PRP or security clearance eligibility, travel will be delayed. Commands will only deny travel if final PSI results are unfavorable and/or the security clearance, if required, is denied.

Table 2-1
Which Investigation to Request

If the requirement is for	And the person has this access	Based on this investigation	Then the investigation required is
CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET	NONE	NONE	NACLCL (military) or Access NACI (DOD civilian or contractor)
CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET	Confidential, Secret, or "L"	Out of date NAC, ENTNAC, NACIC, NACLCL, BI, SBI, or SSBI	NACLCL (military) or Access NACI (DOD civilian or contractor)
TOP SECRET or SCI	NONE	NONE	SSBI (Military and DOD civilian and contractor)
TOP SECRET or SCI	NONE, Confidential, Secret or "L"	Current or out of date NAC, ENTNAC, NACIC, NACLCL, BI, or SBI	SSBI (Military and DOD civilian and contractor)
TOP SECRET, SCI	TS, SCI, or "Q"	Out of date SSBI	SSBI-PR (Military and DOD civilian and contractor)

2-15. Personnel records screening

The supporting personnel officer or a designated representative will screen the local unit file or the civil service employee's Official Personnel Folder (OPF) and complete the appropriate portions of Part II, DA Form 3180. The contractor's personnel manager or a designated subordinate will do the screening. The screening official will:

- a. Coordinate with the security manager to determine whether the PSI is valid for PRP purposes (para 2-14). Verify that the individual has not had a break in active duty military service or DOD employment of more than two years since the PSI was completed. If the PSI is not valid, a request for a new PSI will be submitted per AR 380-67.
- b. Determine the individual's citizenship. If not a U.S. citizen, advise the certifying official that the individual is ineligible for the PRP. As appropriate, initiate a request for deletion from the assignment.
- c. Determine if the individual's records contain information that may preclude assignment to a PRP position. When potentially disqualifying information is identified (see paragraph 2-9), place it in a sealed envelope marked "EXCLUSIVE FOR" and provide it to the certifying official per local procedures (see paragraph 2-9). Process the DA Form 3180 (as appropriate) per local procedures.

2-16. Medical evaluation

a. As part of the required screening process, medical histories and local records, if they are sufficiently comprehensive and current, will be evaluated to determine the candidate's physical and mental qualifications under the standards for the PRP.

(1) Health records (HREC) and civilian employee medical records (CEMR) of all personnel being screened and evaluated for the PRP will be personally screened by a CMA, a U.S. military physician, a PA (physician's assistant), a U.S. civilian physician or (physician's assistant) under DOD contract or employed by the U.S. Government, or other qualified non-physician medical personnel (officer or enlisted) specifically trained and designated by the supporting U.S. military MTF (nonfixed medical treatment facility) commander to screen medical records and complete part III, DA Form 3180.

(2) The screening individual will—

(a) Annotate the individual's SF 600 (Health Record-Chronological Record of Medical Care) with the following or similar statement: "Preceding entries screen under provisions of AR 50-5" followed by his or her printed name, grade, and signature.

(b) This entry on SF 600 will be made at the time the screening was accomplished and dated accordingly.

(c) In addition, the SF 600 will indicate whether or not any potentially disqualifying information (PDI) was identified and if so, whether it has or has not been forwarded to the certifying official.

b. When the review is accomplished by other than the CMA and raises a question or identifies potentially disqualifying information about an individual's physical capability or mental suitability for assignment to a PRP position, the records will be referred to the CMA for further evaluation or medical examination.

c. If available medical records are inadequate, the CMA will conduct a medical examination to determine medical qualification under PRP standards. The medical evaluation will include a mental health consultation when deemed prudent by the CMA or at the request of the certifying official. The CMA will document all potentially disqualifying information of a medical nature in the individual's medical records.

d. The CMA or designated non-physician medical personnel (see 2-16.a.(1)) will complete Part III of DA Form 3180 and check the appropriate block indicating whether information which may preclude assignment to the PRP is or is not attached. The CMA will advise the certifying official of any condition that may reflect on an individual's suitability for assignment to a PRP position. This includes any prescribed medication or treatment that may detract from the ability of an individual to perform nuclear duties. The CMA will also provide a recommendation to the certifying official as to whether the identified potentially disqualifying information will preclude the individual from performing nuclear duties. The CMA will identify any limitations in duties or reasonable accommodations that might allow the individual to safely and reliably perform such duties (see Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101-12111, and implementing regulations in 29 CFR Part 1630). The CMA will not recommend any accommodations that could cause injury to the individual or another worker. Safety will be considered and the Safety Officer will evaluate any change. Persons with a disability will not be discriminated against, but worker safety will not be compromised. When the CMA identifies potentially disqualifying information, it will be placed in a sealed envelope, marked "EXCLUSIVE FOR" and provided to the certifying official per local procedures. Because PDI is often confidential medical information covered by the Privacy Act, electronic mail systems will not be used to transmit PDI. However, electronic mail may be used by the CMA to notify a certifying official that a memorandum transmitting PDI has been prepared and is being forwarded or awaiting pickup.

e. Certifying officials and reviewing officials may review health records of personnel being screened for the PRP or those currently in the PRP at any time to make suitability determinations required by this regulation or as otherwise permitted by the Privacy Act of 1974.. This review will normally be done with the assistance of a CMA who can advise on health record data that might otherwise be misinterpreted. Because of the sensitive and confidential nature of health records, authority for review extends only to certifying officials and reviewing officials. Certifying officials may not delegate this authority to contractor employees assisting the certifying official without the written consent of the employee.

(1) The authority to review medical records also pertains to Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) information (authorized under paragraph 6-9 of AR 600-85), except in cases of civilian PRP personnel. In these cases, 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2 prohibits ADAPCP counselors from disclosing any related information to the certifying official without the patient's written consent. (2) Certifying and reviewing officials may not release or discuss the content of health records except as provided in the preceding paragraph. Questions should be referred to the servicing legal office.

(2) For contractor operations, which require the establishment of a PRP, contracts must include provisions for official access to contractor PRP health records as a prerequisite for certifying and reviewing employee PRP eligibility.

f. Upon completion of medical screening, the DA Form 3180 will be processed per local procedures.

g. Certifying officials of organizations receiving medical support from non-Army medical facilities or from U.S. civilian contract physicians will provide a copy of this regulation to the supporting medical facility contract physicians for use in evaluating personnel for the PRP.

2-17. Drug abuse screening/urinalysis

All military and DOD civilian employees who are candidates for the PRP must undergo urinalysis testing per AR 600-85 prior to being certified into the PRP. DOD contractor employees also have to undergo drug abuse screening before the certifying official may certify a contractor employee into the PRP. See paragraph 2-25 for special handling requirements on urinalysis results for DOD civilian and DOD contractor employees.

2-18. Certifying official's evaluation and briefing

After the personnel record screening and medical evaluation are complete, the certifying official will review DA Form 3180 and any potentially disqualifying information provided during the screening process. The certifying official will also verify the required PSI is current or initiated.

a. For individuals found suitable for the PRP, the certifying official will complete Part V, DA Form 3180 and brief the individual in the following areas:

- (1) That the individual has been found suitable for the PRP.
- (2) The duties and responsibilities of the individual's PRP position.
- (3) Any hazards associated with the individual's assigned nuclear duties.
- (4) The two-person rule, to include restrictions placed on interim status personnel.
- (5) The current threat and physical security procedures used to counter this threat.
- (6) Each person's obligations under the continuing evaluation aspects of the PRP. The individual will be instructed to observe and report directly to the certifying official any factor, behavior, or condition (to include use of prescribed medication) that may adversely affect either the individual's duty performance or that of fellow workers. The certifying official will also emphasize that the individual must immediately report any medical treatment received, or medication prescribed by non-DOD medical or dental facilities.

b. At the close of the briefing, the individual and the certifying official will complete Part VI, DA Form 3180. The individual's signature indicates that a briefing on the standards and objectives of the PRP was received and understood.

c. The DA Form 3180 will be distributed as follows:

- (1) The installation will maintain the original or a copy.
 - (2) One copy (or original if not maintained at local installation) will be sent to the custodian of the individual's local unit file or OPF, or to the contractor's personnel management office.
 - (3) One copy will be sent to the supporting medical activity and maintained in the individual's file.
 - (4) One copy will be sent to the supporting dental activity and maintained in the individual's file.
- d. If the certifying official determines an individual unsuitable for a PRP assignment, the certifying official will terminate the screening process, complete Part V and part IX of DA Form 3180, and follow procedures for permanent disqualification (paragraph 2-30).

2-19. Previously screened personnel

a. Whenever a PRP certified individual transfers to another PRP position under a different certifying official, the gaining certifying official must interview the individual prior to assignment to the new PRP position. A re-screening of medical and personnel records will be conducted whenever the records move to a new organization or location. The re-screening of records helps ensure that the new certifying official has current and complete information about the individual's job performance and reliability before the interview.

b. If the reassignment does not involve movement of medical and personnel records, the certifying official may assign the individual to a PRP position based upon an interview and the previous screening and evaluation. The certifying official will use the DA Form 3180 from the individual's last assignment. The certifying official will complete the next blank line in Part VI, DA Form 3180, to indicate that the required interview and briefing was done. If all lines in Part VI are filled, the current DA Form 3180 may be continued by entering the individual's name, grade, and SSN and completing Part V of a new DA Form 3180 and stapling it to the current form. If the certifying official decides to use the individual's DA Form 3180 from the last assignment, the certifying official will:

- (1) Verify PSI; and security clearance (if applicable).
- (2) Interview and brief the individual per paragraph 2-18.
- (3) Distribute copies of the individual's DA Form 3180 per paragraph 2-18c.

c. When an individual arrives from a non-PRP assignment with a DA Form 3180 completed from administrative screening (paragraph 2-10), the gaining certifying official will completely rescreen and execute a new DA Form 3180 prior to assigning the individual to PRP duties.

d. Figure 2-1 provides a summary of the above screening requirements. A new PSI is required under the following conditions:

- (1) The individual has been out of the PRP for more than five consecutive years and the PSI is over five years old.
- (2) A break in active military, DOD civilian or DOD contractor employment exceeding two years.
- (3) If the certifying official requests a new PSI based on significant derogatory information or allegations.

2-20. Identification of personnel records

Upon receipt of the signed DA Form 3180 (original or duplicate), showing an individual is in the PRP and under continuing evaluation (Part V and VI, DA Form 3180 completed), the personnel officer will affix DA Label 164 (Nuclear/Nuclear Personnel Record Label) to the personnel records.

2-21. Identification of health records (medical and dental)

Upon receipt of a copy of the signed DA Form 3180 showing an individual is in the PRP and under continuing evaluation (Part V and VI, DA Form 3180 completed), the medical treatment facility will identify the individual's health and dental records per AR 40-66. If an Army medical or dental treatment facility maintains the records, DA Form 4515 (Personnel Reliability Program Record Identifier) will be inserted in the folder. When another Service's medical treatment facility maintains the records, the host service's comparable form(s) may be used to identify Army PRP records. The following types of records will also be identified when maintained apart from the individual's health records:

- a. Inpatient (clinical) treatment records.
- b. Outpatient treatment records.
- c. Dental records.
- d. Clinical psychology individual case files.
- e. Social work individual case files.
- f. Alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation files.

Section V

Continuing evaluation

2–22. General

a. Certifying officials will ensure that all personnel assigned to PRP positions are subject to a continuing evaluation of their reliability. Certifying officials are responsible for ensuring that all military, civilian and contractor personnel assigned to PRP positions meet all requirements of continuing evaluation.

b. To ensure that continuing evaluation is effective, certifying officials will establish and maintain close-working relationships with supporting activities to ensure they are fully aware of their PRP-related responsibilities and that they provide required support.

2–23. Individual and supervisor responsibilities

a. Individuals assigned to PRP duties are responsible for monitoring their own reliability and the reliability of others performing PRP duties. Failure to discharge those responsibilities may cast doubt on an individual's reliability. Individuals must be aware of how problems, concerns, and circumstances may reduce their effectiveness and impair capability or reliability. Individuals will advise their supervisors or certifying official of any factors that could have an adverse impact on their performance, reliability, or safety while performing PRP duties. Individuals will inform support agencies of their active PRP status before treatment or consultation and will inform their supervisor or certifying official when another individual in the PRP appears to be involved in situations that may affect reliability.

b. Supervisors are responsible for monitoring the reliability of their subordinates and notifying the certifying official of any potentially disqualifying information. An individual whose assignment is subject to the reliability standards in this regulation will be identified to other supervisors so information that raises questions about that individual's judgment or reliability can be reported and acted on without delay.

2–24. Medical treatment and dental treatment

a. Each time a PRP-certified individual visits a government medical treatment facility (including mental health clinic or dental facility), the CMA must determine reliability effects and notify the certifying official in writing, when the medical /dental treatment could impact the individual's reliability or duty performance. The CMA will ensure that all potentially disqualifying information of a medical nature is documented in the individual's health records (medical and/or dental as appropriate). The CMA's principal responsibility is to provide the certifying official with sufficient medical information to make a sound decision concerning an individual's suitability to perform PRP duties and whether a change in the individual's PRP status is warranted. Dental authorities are responsible for notifying the certifying official if they believe the dental care or treatment will impair the individual's duty performance.

(1) When medication is prescribed, notification is required only when the medication could affect the patient's physical or mental abilities. The certifying official will be advised promptly of any prescribed medication or treatment that may detract from the ability of an individual to perform assigned PRP duties. Notification is mandatory when narcotics, sedatives, or tranquilizers (mood or mind-altering medications) are prescribed, regardless of anticipated effects.

(2) The CMA will promptly notify the certifying official if an individual's behavior suggests emotional instability, current drug or alcohol abuse, or the need for treatment with narcotics, sedatives, or tranquilizers.

(3) When the CMA has any doubts concerning an individual's reliability, the certifying official must be promptly notified.

(4) If there is potential disqualifying information, the medical (or dental) entry will document the medical information and reasoning on why the condition will or will not impact upon the individual's suitability to perform PRP duties. A copy of this documentation will also be forwarded to the CMA for his use in making a medical recommendation to the certifying official. When potentially disqualifying information is identified, it will be placed in a sealed envelope, marked "EXCLUSIVE FOR" and provided to the certifying official per local procedures.

b. When a PRP individual receives nonmilitary medical or dental treatment (including TRICARE referrals), the CMA will review and determine the effect of the care on the individual. The CMA will record results of that evaluation in the individual's medical records and notify the certifying official when the medical treatment could impact the individual's reliability or duty performance.

c. Hypnosis should not be administered to individuals in the PRP without the knowledge and consent of the individual's certifying official. The certifying official should determine, in coordination with the CMA, if any potential for degraded job performance or diminished reliability exists.

2–25. Drug abuse screening/urinalysis

a. Military and DOD civilian employees in the PRP will receive periodic urinalysis testing per AR 600–85. DOD contractor employees in the PRP will undergo periodic testing on a random basis to ensure the deterrent value of testing.

b. Physicians acting as medical review officers for DOD civilian or DOD contractor urine drug testing programs

will not contact certifying officials with positive urine drug screening results until the employee has had an opportunity to document the use of prescription drugs and discuss the test results with the physician. Upon verifying the positive urine drug test result as evidence of unauthorized use, the physician will notify the certifying official. If the physician determines the positive urine drug test is the result of authorized use of prescription drugs, the physician will not notify the certifying official. The physician should counsel the individual to promptly report the use of any prescription medication to the certifying official.

2–26. Personnel security investigations/periodic reinvestigations for PRP purposes

a. Military personnel: Subsequent to initial assignment to the PRP, reinvestigation for PRP purposes is not required so long as the individual remains in the PRP at one location, has consecutive PRP assignments, or nonconsecutive PRP assignments within five years (or less) of each other. A new PSI is required if the individual was out of the PRP for more than five consecutive years and the PSI is over five years old; or a break in active federal service or employment exceeds two years.

b. Civilian and contractor personnel: All civilian and contractor personnel assigned to PRP duties will be subject to a periodic reinvestigation (PR) every five years.

c. Certifying officials may at any time require a PR or local records check if an individual's reliability is suspect.

d. Individuals requiring a PR should initiate the PR six months prior to expiration and will remain qualified while the PR is being conducted. If the PR is not submitted prior to expiration, the certifying official will temporarily disqualify the person from the PRP until the PR is submitted. Once the PR is submitted, the certifying official can return the individual to a fully qualified status.

e. If the assignment requires a security clearance, the PR requirements of AR 380–67 must be met.

f. When the certifying official receives a new DA Form 873 based on completion of a PR for an individual in a critical nuclear duty position and Part III states "Dossier review required for critical nuclear duty," the certifying official will request and review potentially disqualifying information. Assignment to a critical nuclear duty position may be continued pending dossier review. For subsequent assignments, review of the same investigative results within a current five-year PSI interval is not required. See paragraph 2–14 for additional information on dossier reviews.

Section VI

Temporary and permanent removal from PRP duties

2–27. General

Removal from the PRP can be either temporary (medical restriction or temporary disqualification), permanent (permanent disqualification) or administrative (administrative termination) depending on the particular circumstances. Subsequent sections discuss each of the options for removing an individual from the PRP. General guidelines follow:

a. The type of disqualification (temporary or permanent) depends on the circumstances, character, and transitory or continuing nature of the cause of the unsuitability or suspected unsuitability.

b. When making a reliability determination, the issue is not an individual's guilt or innocence of some particular offense; rather, the issue is whether the individual should be retained in a PRP position. It is not necessary to complete an investigation, to take disciplinary action (either civil or military), or to complete other personnel actions before the certifying official decides whether to disqualify or retain an individual in the PRP. Determination of an individual's reliability rests with the certifying official.

c. Permanent disqualification from the PRP is neither an adverse personnel action nor the basis for disciplinary action. However, the reason for disqualification may be adverse and warrant action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or civil law or require other personnel actions (e.g., separation, suspension, revocation of access to classified information, or reassignment).

d. If PRP certification is a condition of employment/service, and the individual is permanently disqualified from the PRP, and other positions for which the individual is qualified are not available, separation from employment/service may be appropriate.

2–28. Medical restriction

When performance of PRP duties may be temporarily impaired by the use of prescribed medication, a temporary medical condition, or short-term stress, the certifying official will (after consultation with a CMA) restrict the individual from performing those affected PRP duties for up to 30 days. If the condition persists longer than 30 days, the certifying official may review and extend the restriction at 30-day intervals.

a. Medical restriction is used when the problem is of short duration. Medical restriction may be imposed while conducting an investigation or medical evaluation to determine if a situation or incident could have an adverse effect on an individual's suitability and the individual's reliability is not suspect.

b. Medical restriction requires that the certifying official temporarily remove the individual from affected PRP duties, notify the individual and immediate supervisor in writing of the nature and circumstances of the restriction, and resolve the issue promptly. When the temporary condition or situation is resolved, the certifying official will restore the

individual to assigned PRP duties. If the condition has become prolonged or permanent, the certifying official will initiate either temporary or permanent disqualification procedures, as appropriate.

c. Examples of when medical restriction is appropriate include:

(1) An individual taking a medically prescribed drug that may impair duty performance.
(2) Emotional disorientation due to family problems or the death or illness of a relative, family member, or close friend.

(3) A physical injury or other condition (including pregnancy) that temporarily impairs the individual's ability to perform assigned PRP duties. Medical restriction may be extended to include both a pregnancy's full term and postpartum recovery period. Medical restriction is not appropriate for personnel who are or may be intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs.

d. No entry on the DA Form 3180 is required for individuals in a medically restricted status.

2–29. Temporary disqualification

When the basis for medical restriction from assigned PRP duties becomes prolonged, or the certifying official determines that an individual's reliability is suspect; the certifying official will temporarily disqualify the individual from the PRP. Temporary disqualification action is appropriate when the certifying official has information about a condition or event that could affect an individual's job performance or reliability, and medical restriction, in the opinion of the certifying official, is not appropriate.

a. The certifying official will immediately remove the individual from assigned nuclear duties, restrict access, and advise the individual in writing, within 15 working days, of the reason for temporary disqualification. However, the individual will remain under continuing evaluation. The original DA Form 3180, part VI, will be annotated (pencil entry) to reflect the temporary disqualification.

b. The certifying official will promptly investigate all circumstances that may impact the reliability of an individual. During suspected alcohol or drug abuse, the investigation will include a medical evaluation by the CMA. The certifying official will promptly obtain information required to determine whether to reinstate or permanently disqualify the individual. If reinstated, the certifying official will inform the individual and the custodian of the original DA Form 3180 if appropriate. (The pencil entry in Part VI, DA Form 3180 will be erased upon notification.)

c. Temporarily disqualified military personnel will not be permanently reassigned or separated until either reinstated or permanently disqualified, unless temporary disqualification is the result of a medical condition. In that case, the individual will be administratively terminated prior to separation or reassignment.

d. Temporary disqualification will not normally exceed 180 days. The certifying official may extend the period of temporary disqualification in 30-day increments when there is not sufficient information to either remove the temporary disqualification and return the individual to PRP duties or to permanently disqualify the member. Extensions must be documented.

2–30. Permanent disqualification

When the certifying official determines that an individual does not meet the reliability standards of this chapter, the certifying official will terminate access to nuclear reactor facilities, SNM and positive control material, remove the individual from nuclear duties, and permanently disqualify the individual from the PRP. The certifying official will advise the individual in writing, within 15 working days, of the determination, to include the reasons for initiating permanent disqualification procedures and the requirement for review by the reviewing official. This written notification will cite specific circumstances that support the certifying official's decision to disqualify. Except for a physical or mental condition documented in the individual's health record, statements such as "Alcohol abuse," "Drug abuse," "Contemptuous attitude," or "Court-martial conviction" are inadequate by themselves.

a. The notification letter will—

(1) Provide the rationale for disqualification in sufficient detail so that, if required, a future-reviewing official will have adequate information to act on a request for requalification. (Part IX, DA Form 3180, will be similarly detailed.)

(2) Advise the individual that the disqualification action is subject to mandatory review by the reviewing official before any permanent entries are made in the individual's records and that the individual will be advised of the outcome of the review.

(3) Inform the individual that a written explanation or rebuttal may be submitted within five workdays of receipt of the letter.

(4) Request written acknowledgement of receipt of the letter of notification. If the individual refuses to acknowledge receipt, the certifying official will attach a statement to the notification letter explaining its absence.

b. Pending review of the action, disqualified personnel will not conduct nuclear duties.

c. The reviewing official will review each permanent disqualification action to ensure uniform application of the reliability standards specified by this chapter and effective use of personnel, consistent with the purpose of the PRP. The reviewing official may seek additional information or explanations of extenuating circumstances from the certifying official, CMA, personnel officials, and the individual concerned if needed.

(1) The certifying official will forward a copy of the letter of notification, the signed acknowledgement or an

explanation for its absence, a written explanation or rebuttal submitted by the individual, and any other pertinent information to the reviewing official within ten work days of the disqualification.

(2) The reviewing official will review the case and, within 15 workdays of receipt of the disqualification documents, furnish a written decision to the individual through the certifying official. If the reviewing official approves the disqualification, the certifying official will complete the remaining administrative procedures below. (If the individual has departed the certifying official's organization, the certifying official will forward a reproduced copy of the approval either directly to the individual, or through the individual's new chain of command.) In the case of a DOD contractor employee, the contractor will be told only that the employee has been permanently disqualified from the PRP and must be reassigned to non-PRP duties in compliance with contractual requirements.

(3) When the reviewing official does not approve disqualification, no entries will be made in the individual's records. The individual's records will continue to show the individual as PRP certified.

d. Permanent entries concerning the disqualification will not be made on either the DA Form 3180 or in the individual's records before final action by the reviewing official. If the reviewing official approves permanent disqualification of an individual being screened for the PRP, the certifying official will complete Parts V and IX of the original DA Form 3180. If the reviewing official approves disqualification of an individual already in the PRP, the certifying official will complete Part IX of the original DA Form 3180. In the block titled "Reason for disqualification," the certifying official will check the appropriate block(s) and provide a brief summary of the rationale for permanent disqualification.

e. Within 10 workdays of receipt of the reviewing official's review of disqualification, the DA Form 3180 will be distributed as follows (for contractor personnel see paragraph 2-34d).

(1) Original, with copies of the letter of notification, the signed acknowledgment or an explanation for its absence, and a copy of the reviewing official's approval, will be forwarded through the supporting personnel administration center to the permanent section of the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) or directly to the civilian personnel office (if civil service) for filing in the OPF.

(2) One copy of the reviewing official's approval will be provided to the custodian of the local unit file for necessary action and filing.

(3) One copy or other written notification will be provided to the custodian of the individual's health and dental records for necessary action.

f. When a reviewing official approves disqualification of military personnel, the certifying official will notify the supporting personnel administration center to submit the appropriate SIDPERS PRPAS transaction per AR 680-29.

g. DA Form 2-1 (Personnel Qualification Record, Part II) of disqualified enlisted personnel will be annotated with the following statement – Disqualified (date) for assignment to nuclear PRP positions per AR 50-5 – as prescribed in AR 600-8-104.

h. DA Form 4515 and DA Form 3180 will be removed from the individual's medical records and destroyed. DA Label 164 will be removed from the local unit file or OPF.

i. If the individual is disqualified for medical reasons, the physician will annotate SF 600 with the following or a similar statement – Disqualified (date) for assignment to nuclear PRP positions per AR 50-5 – and will annotate the medical reason for permanent disqualification.

j. The servicing CPO will provide assistance on placement action for a permanently disqualified civilian employee.

k. When the disqualification is based on credible derogatory information that could affect the individual's security clearance, the supporting security manager will be notified for appropriate action per AR 380-67

2-31. Administrative termination

a. Administrative termination—

(1) Occurs when an individual transfers from a duty position requiring PRP certification to one not requiring PRP certification.

(2) Establishes the date an individual was removed from a PRP position for reasons other than permanent disqualification.

(3) Eliminates the requirement for continuing evaluation.

b. Certifying officials will administratively terminate personnel in PRP positions when individuals are permanently removed from nuclear duties within their organization, unless reassignment instructions indicate the individual is projected for assignment to a PRP position in the gaining organization.

c. The certifying official will notify supporting medical and dental facilities and the personnel officer in writing that the individual is no longer in the PRP and that the individual no longer requires continuing evaluation.

d. The following actions will be taken:

(1) Complete Part VIII, DA Form 3180. If the original 3180 is maintained at the local installation, it will be transferred to the personnel office and filed in the local unit file, OPF, or contractor's personnel files. Remove DA Label 164 from personnel files.

(2) Remove DA Form 4515 from the medical and dental records and destroy copies of the DA Form 3180 filed in these records.

(3) Submit a SIDPERS PRPAS transaction per AR 680–29 for all soldiers administratively terminated from the PRP.

Section VII

Requalification

2–32. Requalification of disqualified personnel

a. Individuals permanently disqualified (except those disqualified per paragraph 2–9c(1), 2–9c(3), and 2–9c(4)) may be requalified upon approval of a request for requalification by the reviewing official of the organization to which the individual is currently assigned. The reviewing official can take such action based on substantive evidence that the cause for permanent disqualification no longer exists.

b. The individual may submit a request for requalification to his/her immediate supervisor or COR as appropriate. This request will explain the circumstances leading to the disqualification, basis for disqualification, and the action taken to correct or eliminate the reasons for disqualification. Should the request be disapproved, the supervisor or COR will return it to the individual with the rationale for disapproval. If the supervisor or COR decides to recommend requalification, the individual will be screened and evaluated (completion of Parts I through IV, DA Form 3180). If found suitable for the PRP, the COR/supervisor will forward the request for requalification and the DA Form 3180 to the reviewing official.

c. If the reviewing official denies the requalification, the new DA Form 3180 will be destroyed and the request for requalification will be returned to the individual. The DA Form 3180 reflecting permanent disqualification and associated correspondence will be retained.

d. If the individual is no longer assigned/employed in a command with a nuclear PRP, request for requalification will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA, DCSOPS, ATTN: DAMO–SSD, for resolution.

2–33. Action upon requalification

a. Approval of requalification does not require assignment or reassignment to a PRP position; however, requalified personnel are eligible for certification into such positions.

b. The DA Form 3180 that reflected the permanent disqualification and associated correspondence will be removed from the personnel records, destroyed, and replaced by the new one. Additionally, DA Form 2–1 for enlisted personnel and SF 600 (if the individual was disqualified for medical reasons) will be annotated with the following statement – Requalified (date) for assignment to a nuclear PRP position per AR 50–5.

(1) If the individual is to be assigned to a PRP position, the certifying official will complete the procedures outlined in paragraph 2–18.

(2) Individuals NOT assigned to PRP positions will be administratively terminated (paragraph 2–31).

c. The original of the approved request/recommendation for requalification (less the DA Form 3180) will be endorsed to the individual. Copies will be forwarded to the custodian of the OMPF, OPF, or contractor as appropriate.

Section VIII

Personnel reliability program for contractor employees

2–34. Personnel reliability program (PRP) for contractor employees

In addition to previous guidance, the following additional information applies to the PRP for contractor employees.

a. *Certifying official.* The Army COR designated by the contracting officer will be the certifying official for DOD contractor employees authorized to perform nuclear duties. The contracting officer may authorize delegation of certifying official duties to subordinate military or DA civilian personnel. The Contracting Officer's Delegation Letter to the COR must stipulate such delegation. Certifying officials will ensure that contracts require contractor employees performing PRP duties in positions subject to this regulation to meet the PRP reliability standards outlined in this chapter and in approved surety contract clauses. Specifically, contractors will:

(1) Inform managerial, supervisory, medical, and other contract personnel of the purposes, standards, procedures, and responsibilities required for implementing the PRP.

(2) Inform and instruct each employee assigned nuclear duties of the significance of assignment, importance of reliable performance, PRP standards, safety and security considerations, and continuing evaluation requirements for self reporting and peer review of factors and situations that could affect job performance or reliability. The contractor will foster a positive attitude toward both the PRP and nuclear duties among PRP employees and will ensure that each PRP employee understands that maintaining PRP standards is a condition of continued employment.

(3) Ensure that each employee to be assigned to a PRP position is subjected to a PSI, medical record evaluation, substance abuse testing, personal interview, and continuing evaluation under the reliability standards of the PRP outlined in this chapter.

(4) Ensure that each employee assigned to a PRP position has received the formal course of instruction and/or experience applicable to the nuclear duties assigned and is proficient in those duties.

(5) Provide the certifying official with results of PSIs, medical record evaluations, and substance abuse testing of any contractor employee assigned, or proposed to be assigned to a PRP position. In addition, the contractor must report immediately any other information about an employee relevant to maintaining PRP reliability standards.

(6) Provide for the continuing evaluation of employees assigned to PRP positions by contractor supervisory personnel.

(7) Remove an employee from a PRP position upon notification by the certifying official that the employee has been disqualified and notify the certifying official in writing within 15 days of the removal action. Disqualification from the PRP requires that:

(a) The employee will be instructed to cease performance of nuclear duties.

(b) The employee will be prevented from entering any facility that would allow the individual access to nuclear reactor facilities, SNM, and positive control materials, and the employee's entry credential will be confiscated or removed from the system.

(c) The employee will be removed from a PRP position upon determination by the certifying official that the employee no longer meets PRP reliability standards and has been permanently disqualified. This action will be made a matter of permanent record.

(8) Provide to the Defense Security Service (DSS), ATTN: SO831, P.O. Box 2499, Columbus, OH 43216-5006, a list of all personnel in the PRP that have security clearances granted by DSS. Update lists as needed. Lists will include the full name and SSN of each employee; name and address of the employing contractor facility; and the title, address, and DSN telephone number of the Army certifying official for the contract.

b. PRP administration official.

(1) At contracted operations, the certifying official may designate one or more senior supervisory contractor employees to assist in administering day-to-day certifying official duties. This official will be nominated by the contractor and approved by the COR.

(2) The PRP administration official may perform all duties normally associated with the certifying official except for the decision-making functions of determining PRP suitability and disqualifying personnel from the PRP. The contractor may, however, administratively remove employees from PRP duties as needed. The certifying official must complete Parts V and VIII of DA Form 3180. The PRP administration official may be delegated the authority to sign Part V.

(3) The PRP administration official may be delegated the authority to medically restrict an individual from performing nuclear duties; however, in cases where the individual does not wish medical authorities to forward such personal information to the PRP administration official, the certifying official must perform the medical restriction function.

(4) The PRP administration official may be authorized to authenticate the NDPR.

2-35. Personnel security investigations (PSI) for contractor employees

a. The contracting office will submit PSI requests for all contractor employees considered for assignment to PRP positions. The contracting office will verify citizenship status prior to processing the PSI request.

b. For contractor employees requiring a security clearance, appropriate industrial security clearance forms will be submitted through the contracting office to DSS for security clearance adjudication. The contract should require the contractor to provide the contracting office with any information that would be sent to DSS if the employee were cleared under the DOD Industrial Security Program.

c. For contractor employees not requiring a security clearance, the contractor will send NAC requests to the contracting office using SF 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, and JUST Form FD 258 (Federal Bureau of Investigation Fingerprint Card), for submission to DSS.

d. The contracting office will establish processing procedures with DSS and ensure that any reports of investigation are returned to the contracting office. The certifying official will adjudicate the PSI for PRP purposes. Under no circumstances will the contracting office disclose to the contractor any information about a contractor employee developed in the course of official investigations. In the event the PSI is unfavorable for PRP purposes, the contractor will simply be told that the employee is unsuitable for the PRP. Permanent disqualification procedures will then be initiated.

2-36. Disqualification procedures.

a. When the certifying official determines that a contractor PRP employee is not suitable for the PRP, the certifying official will initiate permanent disqualification procedures IAW paragraph 2-30. If the disqualification is based solely on information developed from the PSI, the reasons for disqualification will not be disclosed to the contractor, to include the PRP administration official. The certifying official may communicate or correspond directly with the individual being disqualified. The permanent disqualification process may be completed through certified mail with

return receipt. The certifying official may waive normal suspense for notification and review. In all cases, however, the disqualification process must be accomplished promptly.

b. Distribution of the completed DA Form 3180 will be as follow:

(1) Original, with copies of the written notification and the signed acknowledgment, plus a copy of the final action by the reviewing official, will be kept by the certifying official.

(2) One copy to the contractor. The contractor should send copies, or memos, to appropriate personnel and medical offices for necessary action and to clear files. In the event disqualification was a government action resulting from adverse information developed during the PSI, copies of the DA Form 3180 will not be provided to the contractor. Instead, the contractor will be given written notice that the individual is disqualified because of an unfavorable PSI, without specifying the reasons.

c. If the individual has been cleared under the DOD Industrial Security Program and was disqualified for acts reflecting adversely on loyalty, character, integrity, or discretion; and the acts were clearly not consistent with national interest (as outlined in DOD 5220.22-M, para 6-B), the certifying official (or contractor) must also report this information to DSS.

Section IX

DA Form 7422, Annual Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Status Report (RCS DDP-C3I (A) 1403)

2-37. Information requirements

Each MACOM having personnel in the nuclear PRP will prepare an annual PRP Status Report as of 31 December of each year. This report will be sent to Director, USANCA, ATTN: ATNA-OP, 7150 Heller Loop, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3198, to arrive annually no later than 1 February.

2-38. Preparation guidance

a. Block 1. Identify your organization.

b. Block 2. Indicate current year.

c. Block 3. Check applicable PRP program (chemical or nuclear).

d. Block 4. For each category of personnel (i.e., military, civilian, contractor) indicate the number of personnel certified into the PRP program (critical and/or controlled) as of 31 December. If you have zero personnel in a particular category, leave that category blank.

e. Block 5. For each category of personnel (i.e., military, civilian, contractor) indicate the number of personnel decertified from the PRP program (critical and/or controlled) as of 31 December.

f. Blocks 6a through 6g. For each category of personnel (i.e., military civilian, contractor) indicate the total number of personnel decertified for the applicable reason.

g. Block 7. Use this block to clarify responses in Blocks 6a through 6g above, or to provide additional information, if needed.

(Note: The form generator will automatically sum the values and place a number in the total column found in Blocks 4, 5, and 6.)

Chapter 3

Nuclear Surety Program Evaluations

3-1. General

a. This chapter prescribes policies and procedures for the assessment of the U.S. Army nuclear surety program. It describes nuclear management evaluations (NME), nuclear surety inspections (NSI), and reactor facility inspections (RFI) conducted by the DAIG at organizations and activities that have nuclear support missions or operate nuclear reactor facilities.

b. Although U.S. Army organizations have missions supporting DOD's nuclear weapons program, there are no Army units considered nuclear-capable (see Glossary). If a U.S. Army organization is assigned responsibilities that fall within the definition of a nuclear-capable unit, evaluations and certifications of that organization will be IAW TM 39-25-1.

c. The areas to be Inspected During a NSI are as follows:

(1) Operations.

(a) Mission statement.

(b) Plans/SOPs.

(c) Nuclear command and control.

(d) Training.

(e) Publications.

- (f) Records and reports.
- (g) Inventory and accountability.
- (2) Personnel.
 - (a) PRP.
 - (b) PRP management.
 - (c) Manning.
 - (d) Levy management.
- (3) Security.
 - (a) Security planning and procedures.
 - (b) Storage requirements.
 - (c) Key and lock control.
 - (d) Access control.
 - (e) Intrusion detection and assessment.
- (4) Logistics and facilities.
 - (a) MTOE/TDA equipment.
 - (b) Specialized equipment.
 - (c) Custodial facilities.
- (5) External support such as conditions beyond the capability of the inspected organization to avoid, influence, or correct which are the responsibilities of supporting activities.

3-2. Nuclear management evaluations (NME)

A NME focuses on determining the root causes of systemic problems affecting nuclear surety programs. NMEs are special inspections conducted by the DAIG. A NME normally evaluates a functional issue involving multiple levels of command. The DAIG may schedule follow-up NMEs to ensure the problems have been resolved and corrective actions taken.

3-3. Nuclear surety inspections (NSI)

- a. The DAIG will conduct NSIs of all U.S. Army activities, organizations, and contractor operations with nuclear support missions. These inspections will be conducted approximately every 24 months.
- b. The DAIG conducts NSIs to—
 - (1) Determine the capability of each organization to accomplish its assigned nuclear missions in a safe and secure environment.
 - (2) Determine the adequacy of support and guidance provided to each nuclear surety organization.
 - (3) Determine and pursue systemic issues affecting the commander's capability to perform the nuclear mission.

3-4. NSI evaluation requirements

- a. The scope of a NSI is determined by the structure of the organization's mission statements or other appropriate mission directives. The functional areas to be assessed during a NSI typically include the elements reflected in paragraph 3-2.
- b. Evaluation ratings and inspection reports and procedures are contained in paragraphs 3-7 and 3-8. Army units with nuclear support missions will be given a failing deficiency in the appropriate functional area when any of the following conditions exist:
 - (1) *Mission capability.* Failure to achieve or maintain assigned mission capability. This may include shortages in personnel, equipment, or materiel that prevents accomplishment of the nuclear surety mission.
 - (2) *Insecure environment.* Failure to provide a secure environment for SNM, sealed authenticators or other positive control material.
 - (3) *PRP maintenance.* Failure to maintain the PRP per chapter 2 in a manner which could contribute to the nonsecure environment for SNM, sealed authenticators or other positive control material.
 - (4) *Mission deficiencies.* One or more deficiencies in mission operations which could result in an in an unreliable nuclear command and control system.
 - (5) *Performance deficiencies.* A number of deficiencies or manner of performance, which indicates unfamiliarity with or disregard for, prescribed procedures.
- c. External support will be given a failing deficiency when any of the situations in paragraph 2-4b above exist but are beyond the capability of the inspected unit or activity to avoid, influence, or correct and are attributable to the supporting activity.

3-5. RFI evaluation requirements

The DAIG will conduct a RFI at each active Army nuclear reactor facility every 24 months. Each RFI will include a

management review of the reactor facility's assigned mission and its capability to accomplish it. The following areas will be inspected:

a. Physical layout. All aspects of the facility design, construction, use of space, working conditions, experimental setups, housekeeping, and physical security will be examined.

b. Physical components.

(1) All components installed as parts of the main, auxiliary, emergency, and support systems for the nuclear reactor facility will be inspected. Design, installation, modifications, technical specifications, reliability, backup, condition, use, maintenance, testing, calibration, and plans concerning incidents, accidents, and malfunctions will be reviewed.

(2) All equipment used in support of the facility including emergency power, backup systems, and material-handling equipment will be inspected. A review similar to that for installed components will be conducted of radiation detection and measuring instruments, test and measuring equipment, hand tools, radioactive source sets, and repair parts.

c. Document inspection.

(1) Written procedures, manuals, logs, supply and maintenance records, reports, and other facility operational documents will be evaluated for adequacy and adherence to standards established by regulatory sources. Documents such as DA authorizations or approvals, safety analysis reports (hazards summary reports), technical specifications, and Army regulations will be used.

(2) Facility procedures and plans will be inspected pertaining to—

(a) Assignment of authority.

(b) Experiment and modification approval.

(c) Routine, nonroutine, and emergency operations of the reactor facility.

(d) Equipment and personnel.

(e) Health physics practices for control of radiation exposure and contamination including environmental monitoring.

(f) Supply, maintenance, and repair parts. (Includes physical inventory and authority for possession of SNM.)

(g) Handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous materials (radioactive, toxic, explosive, or others).

(h) Accidents, incidents, and malfunctions.

(i) Core physics measurements.

(j) Reactor staff training and qualifications.

d. Operational inspection. All aspects of reactor facility operation will be observed to determine the reactor staff's knowledge and adherence to prescribed and safe operating procedures. Observation and questioning of the reactor staff will provide the basis for evaluation of—

(1) Technical operations required to perform the facility's mission.

(2) Emergency procedures during a simulated emergency situation. (These procedures must be coordinated with and approved by the installation commander.)

e. Reactor facility operational parameters.

(1) Operational parameters of the reactor facility will be checked against design parameters to determine if the reactor is being operated within prescribed limits. Operational parameters are established in documents such as the safety analysis report (hazards summary report), technical specifications, and the facility technical publications.

(2) An evaluation will be made of the operating data to include the history (records) and the current status of the reactor core. Examples of data to be reviewed include –

(a) Control rod calibration.

(b) Shutdown margin.

(c) Control malfunction.

(d) Operating logs.

(e) Instrumentation data.

f. Personnel. The inspection will include examination of personnel qualifications, security clearances, and the PRP.

g. External support. The inspection will include a review of the adequacy of support provided to the nuclear reactor facility by installation activities outside the control of the commander to which the reactor staff is assigned. Support activities include, but are not limited to: safety, medical, radiation protection, security, and fire protection.

h. Evaluation ratings and inspection reports. Evaluation ratings and inspection reports and reclama procedures will parallel those used for NSIs. Reactor facilities will be given a failing deficiency when any of the following conditions exist:

(1) Inability of the nuclear reactor facility to perform its assigned mission.

(2) Operation of a nuclear reactor outside approved design concepts.

(3) A lack of adequate maintenance, equipment, repair parts, or personnel, which adversely affects reliable operation of the nuclear reactor facility.

(4) Failure to provide a safe environment for operating personnel and/or the public.

(5) Failure to provide a secure environment.

(6) Failure to maintain the PRP per chapter 2 in a manner that could contribute to an unsafe or nonsecure environment for a nuclear reactor or SNM.

(7) A number of deficiencies or manner of performance, which indicates unfamiliarity with or disregard for, prescribed procedures.

3-6. Inspection schedules

a. The DAIG will publish an annual schedule of NSIs/RFIs 90 days prior to the beginning of each fiscal year. Copies of this schedule will be provided to affected MACOMs, HQDA (DAMO-SSD/DAMO-ODL/DACS-SF), and Director, USANCA (ATNA-OP).

b. The DAIG will provide inspector access rosters to inspected organizations at least 30 days prior to scheduled inspections. DAIG access rosters will include security clearances and qualifications of inspectors.

3-7. Ratings

a. Inspected organizations will be given one of the ratings below in each of the functional areas listed in paragraph 3-4. As used in this rating system, the term “deficiency” applies to both deficiencies and factors affecting operations.

(1) NO DEFICIENCIES.

(2) DEFICIENCIES: NONE FAILING.

(3) DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, CORRECTION VERIFIED.

(4) DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, RESOLUTION/REINSPECTION REQUIRED.

b. A rating of NO DEFICIENCIES or DEFICIENCIES: NONE FAILING will be given when an organization demonstrates that it can accomplish critical tasks while providing a safe and secure environment IAW approved publications and directives.

c. A rating of DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, CORRECTION VERIFIED may be given when one or more conditions found in paragraphs 3-4b or 3-5h existed but were corrected and verified by the inspection team.

d. A rating of DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, RESOLUTION/REINSPECTION REQUIRED may be given when one or more conditions found in paragraphs 3-4b or 3-5h existed but were not, or could not, be corrected for verification by the inspection team.

3-8. Inspection reports

a. When an organization receives ratings of NO DEFICIENCIES, DEFICIENCIES: NONE FAILING, or DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, CORRECTION VERIFIED, regardless of the rating given to its external support, the inspected organization will be provided a final report at the exit briefing. Reply by endorsement is not normally required; however, selected factors affecting operations or deficiencies may require reply by endorsement.

b. When the organization receives a rating DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, RESOLUTION/REINSPECTION REQUIRED, regardless of the rating awarded to its external support, a final report will be provided to the inspected organization at the exit briefing. All other organizations or activities required to take corrective actions will be provided appropriate extracts. The activity will forward a written response of corrective actions through command channels to HQDA (SAIG-IT). SAIG-IT will re-inspect failing deficiencies within 90 days. The scope of a re-inspection will be limited to the specific area, activity, or operation that was the basis for the failing deficiencies. The re-inspection may consist of the review and acceptance of the written response reporting the corrective action taken.

c. When external support is rated DEFICIENCIES: NONE FAILING; DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, CORRECTION VERIFIED; or DEFICIENCIES: FAILING, RESOLUTION/REINSPECTION REQUIRED, a written reply stating corrective action taken will normally be required. The activity cited for inadequate external support will be provided applicable extracts from the inspected organization’s final report. The report of corrective action taken will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (SAIG-IT).

(1) The external support activity will forward a copy of the corrective action taken to the inspected organization. The inspected organization will not delay its written reply pending receipt of the corrective actions taken by the support activity.

(2) Re-inspection of the external support activity may consist of review and acceptance of the written response of corrective action. If required, the scope of a re-inspection will be limited to the specific area, activity, or operation that was the basis for the failing deficiency.

d. Copies of the inspection report will be provided to selected agencies and to the headquarters of the inspected organization.

e. A copy of DAIG NSI report will be provided to the affected MACOM, HQDA (DAMO-SSD, DAMO-ODL, DACS-SF), and Director, USANCA (ATNA-OP). A copy of the DAIG RFI will be provided to the affected MACOM, HQDQ (DAMO-SSD, DAMO-ODL, DACS-SF), and Director, USANCA (ATNA-ARO).

3-9. Reclamas

a. Any commander in the chain of command of the inspected organization or external support organization may

submit a reclama. Reclamas must be sent through the organizational chain of command to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans, 400 Army Pentagon, ATTN: DAMO-SSD, Washington, DC 20310-0400, for adjudication. Reclamas should be submitted not later than 60 days after receipt of the final report by the inspected organizations.

b. Each commander in the chain of command will review, evaluate, and forward the reclama to the next higher headquarters. Any commander in the organizational chain of command may disapprove a reclama.

c. Final decisions on all reclamas will be forwarded through the chain of command to the organization requesting the reclama, and to HQDA (SAIG-IT), other staff elements as appropriate, and Director, USANCA (ATNA-OP).

3-10. MACOM nuclear surety staff assistance visit (SAV)

MACOMs with organizations and activities assigned nuclear surety missions will include nuclear surety elements in its command inspection program.

Chapter 4 Positive Control Materials and Devices

4-1. General

Army units/activities may be called on to support the joint staff, unified commands, and other services by storing and handling positive control materials, (such as sealed authenticators and permissive action links (PAL), used in the authentication, release, unlock, lock termination, and destruction of nuclear weapons) and transmitting / receiving nuclear release/execution orders. Communications security personnel who receive and distribute sealed authenticators or related nuclear codes fill critical nuclear duty positions (see DOD Directive 5210.42).

4-2. Policy

a. No single person will be allowed the capability or opportunity to have access to positive control material or devices. All positive control devices are subject to two-person control.

b. Army units/activities will store and handle positive control material IAW CJCSI 3260.01 (S-FRD), Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices (U). When Army guidance conflicts with CJCSI 3260.01, CJCSI 3260.01 takes precedence.

Chapter 5 Radiological Emergency Response

5-1. General

a. Army assets may be called upon to respond to an accident or incident involving nuclear materials to include other service or Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons. These incidents could be in the form of, but not limited to:

(1) An accident/incident involving radiological materiel in DOD custody occurring in the vicinity of an Army installation, both CONUS and OCONUS.

(2) An accident/incident involving radiological material in the custody of DOE.

(3) Support to Federal, State, local and foreign radiological emergencies.

(4) An accident/incident involving an Army nuclear reactor facility.

b. Except for accidents/incidents involving Army nuclear reactor facilities, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) or the Army Operations Center (AOC) will notify Army elements tasked as part of an initial response force (IRF).

5-2. Radiological policy

It is DOD policy to—

a. Respond to and resolve radiological accidents resulting from radioactive material in DOD custody.

b. Provide DOD resources, consistent with operational availability, to assist Federal, State, and local responses to radiological emergencies as outlined in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FREPP), the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and DOD Directive 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND).

c. Assist foreign governments under DOD Directive 5100.46, 10 USC 404, and EO 12966.

d. Conduct recurring radiological emergency training and exercises, using credible scenarios, at DOD facilities where the potential exists for a radiological accident. Training and exercises should address assistance to civilian authorities in maintaining safety, health, and well being.

e. Neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons except as authorized under DOD Directive 5230.16.

5-3. Radiological responsibilities

a. DOD Directive 3150.8 tasks U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to plan, establish, maintain, and exercise a response task force (RTF) to respond to radiological accidents/incidents within CONUS. Flag rank officers will command RTFs. Additionally, the RTF commander should be selected from the service and, if possible, the installation with nuclear material custody responsibility at the time of the accident/incident.

b. U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will be prepared to designate a flag-rank officer to USJFCOM to act as Commander, Response Task Force (C-RTF), for accidents/incidents involving Army nuclear reactor facilities.

c. ATEC will plan, establish, train, and fund IRFs for Army nuclear reactor facilities. The IRF for these activities will be structured as outlined in paragraph 5-4. Radiological emergency response plans will address all areas in paragraph 5-4 and will be coordinated with USJFCOM.

d. Commanders of MACOMs and Army components of unified or specified commands will ensure that all subordinate organizations with a specialized radiological accident response capability update the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) annually as outlined in appendix B. In the event of a radiological accident, these elements may be tasked to become part of an Army IRF or to support other response operations as directed.

e. Commanders of Army installations will provide an IRF when directed to a radiological emergency occurring off-post in the vicinity of their installation. The IRF will provide immediate safety, security, rescue, command, control, and communications at the accident/incident site, to save lives and reduce exposure to hazards (AR 500-60, paragraph 2-1f). An IRF will consist of available installation assets. Except as required by paragraph 5-3c, installations do not have to create specially trained and/or dedicated organizations. The senior military member or designated civilian official will be responsible for all actions at the accident/incident site until arrival of the RTF.

f. Director of reactor facilities will be responsible for all actions at the accident/incident site in coordination with the installation commander until the arrival of the response task force (RTF).

5-4. Initial response force (IRF)

a. *General.* The IRF provides initial emergency response actions necessary to maintain command and control on-site pending arrival of the RTF. Because of the fluid environment a radiological response operation takes place in, the functions listed below are not necessarily in order of priority. The IRF commander will have to take into account the "total picture" in determining the priority of the following actions. Functions, which the IRF should perform (within its capabilities), are:

- (1) Establishment of command, control, and communications.
- (2) Firefighting.
- (3) Rescue operations.
- (4) Accident site security.
- (5) Initiation of appropriate EOD procedures, if necessary.
- (6) Radiation monitoring and contamination control.
- (7) Public affairs.
- (8) Preparations for arrival of the RTF and other specialized response assets.

b. *Composition.* At a minimum, the IRF will contain the following elements:

- (1) Command element.
- (2) Communications element.
- (3) EOD element.
- (4) Medical element.
- (5) Security element.
- (6) If possible, the IRF should include elements that can perform the following functions:
 - (a) Public affairs.
 - (b) Legal.
 - (c) Engineering.
 - (d) Contamination control.

c. *Functions.* Upon arrival at the accident/incident site, the IRF should:

- (1) *Establish command and control.*
 - (a) If responding to an accident/incident off DOD property, establish DOD command and control and contact the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Once notified, the NMCC will maintain open communications with the reporting unit.
 - (b) If responding to an accident/incident on foreign territory, establish contact with the U.S. Chief of Mission and chain of command.

(c) If responding to an accident/incident on an Army nuclear reactor installation, establish command and control through the host installation to USJFCOM IAW approved emergency response plans. Required reports are outlined in appendix B. The initial response force (IRF) will initiate and continue reporting IAW CJCSM 3150.03 until relieved by the RTF commander.

(2) *Extinguish fires and begin rescue and evacuation of casualties.*

(a) Initial emergency actions will take priority over security and PRP requirements. As the situation stabilizes, security and PRP requirements will be enacted.

(b) Medical and firefighting responders will coordinate with EOD personnel to determine hazards in the accident area. If at all possible, EOD personnel should make an initial assessment of the accident/incident site, but firefighting and rescue and evacuation of casualties will not be delayed solely to perform an initial survey of the site.

(c) If a nuclear weapon is involved and is exposed to high temperature, civilian fire departments will require advice on proper cooling of the weapon and additional precautions to take. EOD personnel can provide this information from TM 39-20-11 (C), General Firefighting Guidance (U).

(d) Local ambulances and hospitals may be used for evacuation and treatment of casualties. Casualties will be decontaminated, if possible, prior to evacuation, but in no case will treatment be delayed solely for the purpose of decontaminating casualties. Contaminated casualties will be identified to the receiving facility.

(3) *Establish local security.* If sufficient security personnel are available and the accident/incident involves nuclear material in either DOD or DOE custody on non-federal property, establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) IAW DOD Directive 5200.8. If military security forces are unavailable or insufficient, local law enforcement personnel may be asked to restrict access to the area until an NDA or NSA can be established.

(4) *Perform necessary EOD procedures.* If the accident involves nuclear weapons, EOD personnel will perform a damage assessment and, if necessary, perform necessary electrical render safe procedures IAW TM 9-1185-217 (S). If the accident/incident involves explosives, EOD personnel will make an assessment of the situation and recommend courses of action to the IRF commander.

(5) *Conduct radiation monitoring and limit spread of contamination.*

(a) Initial radiation monitoring will be accomplished. EOD personnel have organic radiation detection and monitoring equipment to support EOD operations and often will provide the initial confirmation of the presence of radioactive contamination at the accident/incident site. Additional assets will be required to monitor personnel and equipment used during the initial phases of the response effort.

(b) Contamination control measures should be enacted to limit spread of contamination. If no local decontamination assets are available, EOD personnel can recommend appropriate actions to take, to include establishment of a temporary contamination control line. EOD personnel responding to an accident/incident site have limited emergency contamination control capabilities and will not be tasked to perform large-scale contamination control or decontamination functions. See FM 9-15 for information on EOD emergency contamination control station capabilities.

(c) Army nuclear reactor facilities will develop radiation detection/monitoring and contamination control plans as part of their overall emergency response plans.

(6) *Supporting Army elements.*

(a) Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) assists and furnishes radiological health hazard guidance and exposure level criteria to the commander, response task force (C, RTF), other responsible officials at the accident/incident site, and to the installation and local medical authorities.

(b) Radiological Control (RADCON) Team is a special radiological team organized to provide technical assistance and advice to the C, RTF in all levels of radiological emergencies.

(c) The nearest Army regional medical center and/or the nearest Army community hospital with a nuclear medicine clinic can provide personnel and equipment to the IRF commander to help with initial monitoring.

(d) Rapid and timely characterization of contamination can greatly reduce the further spread of contamination to personnel and the environment.

(7) *Initiate a public affairs program as necessary.* Pending arrival of the RTF, only the Deputy Director of Operations, NMCC, or the ATSD (PA) in coordination with the Chief, or designee, of the responsible military department may grant exceptions to DOD Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance. Confirmation or denial of the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components will be made when there is significant danger to the public of radiation exposure or other danger associated with nuclear weapons or components.

Appendix A References

Section I Required Publications

AR 40–66

Medical Record Administration and Health Care Documentation. (Cited in para 3–18.)

AR 50–7

Army Reactor Program. (Cited in para 1–4m(2).)

AR 190–54

Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials. (Cited in para 1–4m(3).)

AR 380–67

The Department of the Army Personnel Security Program. (Cited in paras 2–8c, 2–14a, 2–25e, and 2–29k.)

AR 600–85

Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program. (ADAPCP). (Cited in paras 2–15b(1), 2–16, and 2–24a.)

AR 680–29

Military Personnel–Organizations and Type of Transaction Codes. (Cited in para 2–29f.)

Section II Related Publications

A related publication is merely a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this regulation.

AR 11–9

Army Radiation Safety Program.

AR 20–1

Inspector General Activities and Procedures.

AR 25–55

Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program.

AR 40–13

Medical Support–Nuclear/Chemical Accidents and Incidents.

AR 50–6

Chemical Surety.

AR 50–111

Temporary Storage of Energy Research and Development Administration Nuclear Shipments at Military Installations.

AR 71–32

Force Development and Documentation Consolidated Policies.

AR 75–15

Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

AR 190–13

The Army Physical Security Program.

AR 190–14

Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties.

AR 190-40

Serious Incident Report.

AR 360-5

Public Information.

AR 380-13

Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations.

AR 381-12

Subversion and Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army (SAEDA).

AR 381-45

Investigative Records Repository.

AR 385-40

Accident Reporting and Records.

AR 500-60

Disaster Relief.

AR 530-1

Operations Security (OPSEC).

AR 600-8-104

Military Personnel Information Management.

AR 600-37

Unfavorable Information.

AR 600-85

Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program.

AR 614-200

Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management.

DA Pam 600-8

Military Personnel Management and Administrative Procedures.

DA Pam 600-8-1

SIDPERS Unit-Level Procedures.

DA Pam 600-8-2

Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Military Personnel Office Level Procedures.

DA Pam 600-8-11

Military Personnel Office Separation Processing Procedures.

DA Pam 600-8-23

Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) Database Management Procedures.

TM 39-4-1

Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms.

TM 39-20-11 (C)

General Firefighting Guidance (Cited in para 5-4c(2)(c)).

TM 39-25-1

Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System.

TB 9-1100-811-40

Security Classification of Nuclear Weapons Information.

TB 385-2

Nuclear Weapons Firefighting Procedures.

DoDD 1205.18

Full-time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components.

DoDD 3025.1

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

DoDD 3150.5

DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents.

DoDD 3150.8

DOD Response to Radiological Accidents.

DoDD 5100.46

Foreign Disaster Aid.

DoDD 5200.8

Security of Military Installations and Resources.

DoD 5200.2-R

Personnel Security Program.

DoDD 5210.41

Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons.

DoDD 5210.42

Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program.

DoDD 5210.41-M

Nuclear Weapons Security Manual.

DoDD 5210.63

Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials.

DoDD 5230.16

Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance.

DoDD 5500.7-R

Joint Ethics Regulation.

CJCSM 3150.03

Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports.

CJCSI 3260.01 (S-FRD)

Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices.

FM 9-15

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations.

Section III

Prescribed Forms

Except where otherwise indicated below, the following forms are available on the Army Electronic Library (AEL) CD-ROM (EM 0001) and the USAPA web site, www.usapa.army.mil.

DA Form 3180

Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record. (Prescribed in para 2–11.)

DA Label 164

(available through normal supply channels) Nuclear/Nuclear Personnel Record Label. (Prescribed in para 2–30.)

DA Form 4515

(available through normal supply channels) Personnel Reliability Program Record Identifier. (Prescribed in para 2–21.)

DA Form 7422

Annual Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Status Report. (Prescribed in para 2–37.)

DD Form 2325

Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report. (Prescribed in par B-8.) This form is available through normal supply channels.

Section IV

Referenced Forms

DA Form 2–1

Personnel Qualification Record–Part II.

DA Form 873

Certificate of Clearance and/or Security Determination.

DA Form 5247–R

Request for Security Determination.

DD Form 1879

(available through normal supply channels) DOD Request for Personnel Security Investigation.

SF Form 85P

Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions.

SF Form 86

Questionnaire for National Security Positions.

SF Form 600

Health Record – Chronological Record of Medical Care.

JUST FORM FD 258

(available through normal supply channels) Federal Bureau of Investigation Fingerprint Card

Required Reports and RCS numbers

Annual PRP Report

(RCS–DPP–C3I(A)1403)

Appendix B Required Reports

Section I Radiological accident/incident reports

B-1. Introduction

a. The reporting of accidents or incidents involving nuclear weapons or radiological material is governed by CJCSM 3150.03, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports. The following is a brief summary of the types of reports that may be transmitted in the event of a radiological accident or incident, or received to initiate support for a response effort.

b. CJCSM 3150.03 establishes the OPREP-3 reporting system, which is used by military units at any level of command to report significant events and incidents to the highest levels of command.

c. The OPREP-3 PINNACLE report is used by any unit to provide the National Command Authority (NCA) (through the National Military Command Center (NMCC)), the Unified Commands, and the Services with information on any significant event or incident. The OPREP-3 (no flagword) is used by any unit to notify the appropriate Unified Commands and Services of any incident or event where national-level interest is not indicated or has not been determined.

d. Any commander having knowledge of an occurrence requiring an OPREP-3 report will submit the appropriate report IAW CJCSM 3150.03. A summary of the reports most applicable to a nuclear weapon or radiological accident/incident is located in table B-1. See CJCSM 3150.03 for the complete list of reports.

B-2. OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH

a. *Short title OPREP-3PNF.* The OPREP-3PNF report is used to report an incident or event involving the actual or possible detonation of a nuclear weapon that could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. This message has the highest precedence in the OPREP-3 reporting structure. The initial report is a voice report and must be made as quickly as possible after the incident and sent at FLASH precedence. Report any of the following:

- (1) Accidental, unauthorized, or any other unexplained nuclear detonation, or possible detonation.
- (2) Accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable missile in the direction of, or having the capability to reach, another nuclear-capable country.
- (3) Unauthorized flight, or deviation from an approved flight plan, by a nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable aircraft with the capability to penetrate the airspace of another nuclear-capable country.
- (4) The detection of unidentified objects by a missile warning system or interference (experienced by such a system or related communications) that appears to be threatening and could create a risk of nuclear war.

**Table B-1
OPREP-3 Reports**

FLAGWORD	PURPOSE	SUBMITTED BY	SUBMITTED TO	HOW SUBMITTED	REMARKS
PINNACLE	Event of National Interest	Lowest Level of Command ¹	NMCC Cognizant CINC Parent Service HQ Intermediate Commands ²	Voice TTY FLASH ³	1. Immediate NCA attention; actual or potential international repercussions. 2. National-level interest that changes current operations or involves natural or human made disasters or civil disorders. 3. Timely notification at highest levels.
PINNACLE/ NUCFLASH	Nuclear detonation with war risk	Lowest Level of Command	NMCC Cognizant CINC Parent Service HQ Intermediate Commands	Clear voice, FLASH record follow-up	Accidental or unauthorized detonation or launch of nuclear armed or capable aircraft.
PINNACLE/ BROKEN ARROW	Nuclear detonation (without war risk)	Lowest Level of Command	NMCC Cognizant CINC Parent Service HQ Intermediate Commands	Voice TTY FLASH	Detonation, burning, radioactive contamination, jet-tisoning, or public hazard of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
PINNACLE/ EMPTY QUIVER	Seizure or loss of a nuclear weapon	Lowest Level of Command	NMCC Cognizant CINC Parent Service HQ Intermediate Commands	Voice TTY FLASH	Seizure, loss or theft of nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
FADED GIANT	Nuclear reactor accident or radiological incident	Lowest Level of Command	Service Headquarters	Voice TTY FLASH or IMMEDIATE	Uncontrolled criticality that damages core, uncontrolled release of radioactive material that exceeds acceptance limits for exposure
PINNACLE/ FADED GIANT	Forward of FADED GIANT	Service Headquarters	NMCC Cognizant CINC	Voice TTY FLASH or IMMEDIATE	

Notes:

¹ Lowest level of command having knowledge of the event and access to communications to get the report to the NMCC.

² Inform higher level first if all levels cannot be informed simultaneously.

³ FLASH for initial PINNACLEs, as required for follow-up reports. Use IMMEDIATE if FLASH precedence is not available.

b. Voice report. The initial voice report will always be unclassified and will provide a narrative description of the event usually by unclassified voice or telephonic transmission to the NMCC. The initial voice report will be identified by the flagword, OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH, RCS DD-A&T(AR)1168. A record communication follow-up message must be sent at FLASH precedence within one hour of the incident. The initial message report will contain the following information in the header line: OPREP-3 PNF/UNIT DESIGNATION/001.

c. Amplifying reports. If all required information was not provided in the initial report, amplifying reports will be submitted to NMCC within five minutes after the initial report. The message report header line will be: OPREP-3 PNF/UNIT DESIGNATION/002.

d. Report format. The OPREP-3PNF is a U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) message. USMTF set identifiers for required information is included in parentheses next to required information below.

(1) The following information, when applicable, will be included in OPREP-3PNF reports. Include as much of the following information as possible in the initial voice report, but do not delay the report for lack of information.

- (a) Time and location of the occurrence and report type (TIMELOC).
- (b) Time on target and unit involved (NUCTM).
- (c) Weapon type, armament status, and warhead type (NUCTYP).
- (d) Detonation location, aim point, travel direction, air speed, flight duration time, and time on target (NUCCRS).
- (e) Other pertinent information (GENTEXT).

(2) See figure B-1 for example voice and record OPREP-3PNF report.

B-3. OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW

a. Short title OPREP-3PBA. The initial report will begin with the flagword, OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN

ARROW. The OPREP-3PBA report will be used to report an accident, incident, or event involving nuclear weapons or other nuclear components where creating a risk of outbreak of a nuclear war does not exist. Included are:

- (1) Nuclear detonation.
- (2) Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon.
- (3) Radioactive contamination.
- (4) The jettisoning of a nuclear weapon.
- (5) Public hazard, actual or implied.

b. Voice report. The initial report will be a voice report and is identified by the flagword, OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW, RCS DD-A&T(AR)1168. The report must be made as quickly as possible after the incident and sent at FLASH precedence. The initial report will contain only as much of the requested information as is immediately available. The initial report must not be delayed in order to gain additional information.

c. Report content. The following information, when applicable, will be in OPREP-3PBA reports. USMTF set identifiers for required information is included in parentheses:

- (1) Date and time, location, and report status (TIMELOC).
 - (2) Quantity and type of weapons or components, and ship or aircraft identification (EVTYP).
 - (3) Personnel casualties (CASUALTY).
 - (4) Damages (GENTEXT/DAMAGES).
 - (5) Cause of accident or incident and description of the event (GENTEXT/INCIDENT CAUSE AND DETAILS).
 - (6) Radiation information (5RAD).
 - (7) Fallout prediction data (5STRKWRN).
 - (8) Condition of weapons or nuclear components and safety measures (GENTEXT/WEAPON CONDITION and SAFETY MEASURES).
 - (9) Actions taken or in progress (GENTEXT/ACTIONS TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS).
 - (10) News release information (GENTEXT/NEWS RELEASES).
 - (11) Public and political implications (GENTEXT/PUBLIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS).
 - (12) Corrective action recommended (GENTEXT/CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDED).
- d. See figure B-2 for example voice and record OPREP-3PBA report.*

B-4. OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER

a. Short title OPREP-3PEQ. The QPREP-3PEQ report will be used to report the seizure theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

b. Report content. The following information, when applicable, will be in OPREP-3PEQ reports. The initial voice report will be identified by the flagword, OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER, RCS DD-A&T(AR)1168. USMTF set identifiers for required information is included in parentheses.

- (1) Date and time, location, and report status (TIMELOC).
- (2) Quantity and type of weapons or components, and ship or aircraft identification (EVTYP).
- (3) Casualties and property damage (HEADING/CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES).
- (4) Incident cause and details (GENTEXT/INCIDENT CAUSE AND DETAILS).
- (5) Weapon condition and safety measures (GENTEXT/WEAPON CONDITION and SAFETY MEASURES).
- (6) Amplifying information, including known or suspected route of diversion or escape, composition of recovery force, controlling authority, and communication links established with hot pursuit (recovery) team (GENTEXT/SEIZUREW, THEFT, OR LOSS INFORMATION).
- (7) Public and political implications (GENTEXT/PUBLIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS).
- (8) Assistance required (GENTEXT/ASSISTANCE REQUIRED).

c. Voice and record report. See figure B-3 for example voice and record OPREP-3PEQ report.

B-5. OPREP-3 BENT SPEAR

a. Short Title OPREP-3BS. This report is for an unexpected occurrence involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that does not fall under the NUCFLASH or BROKEN ARROW categories, but:

(1) Results in damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or recertification by the DOE is required.

(2) Requires immediate action in the interest of public safety, nuclear weapon security, or may result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or premature release of information. (This requirement includes any damage to nuclear weapon carriers such as submarines or aircraft that could lead to loss of or damage to nuclear weapon components.)

(3) Raises suspicion that a nuclear weapon has been partially or fully armed.

(4) Could lead to nuclear weapon accident category events and warrants the informational interest or action of any of the following officials or agencies:

- (a) Joint force commander.
- (b) Appropriate Military Department or Service.
- (c) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).
- (d) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Regional Security Affairs).
- (e) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).
- (f) FEMA (incident in USA).
- (g) DOE.

b. Report content and sample reports. This report format is the same as the OPREP-3PBA. The initial voice report will be identified by the flagword, OPREP-3 BENT SPEAR, RCS DD-A&T(AR)1168. The flagword PINNACLE may be added at any level of command to expedite forwarding of this message to the NMCC. See figure B-2 for example OPREP-3PBA reports.

B-6. OPREP-3 FADED GIANT

a. Short Title OPREP-3FG. The OPREP-3FG report is used by any unit to provide the joint force commander, appropriate commanders, officials, and agencies with notification of nuclear reactor or radiological accidents or incidents. Such events do not involve nuclear weapons but are of vital interest to all levels of government. Included in this category are:

- (1) An uncontrolled criticality resulting in damage to the reactor core or an event such as a loss of coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the reactor core.
- (2) The uncontrolled release of radioactive material which presents a hazard to life, health, or property, or which may result in any person exceeding the acceptable limits for exposure to ionizing radiation.
- (3) Any expected event involving radioactive materials or radiation exposure that prudence dictates to be of such consequence to warrant the informational interest of those officials listed in paragraph B-5a (4) (OPREP-3BS). Included in this category are those events, which could have domestic or international implications, and those, which could be of significant interest to the public.

b. Reactor occurrences.

(1) Reactor accidents (flagword: OPREP-3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD A&T(AR)1168, will be reported at once to the NMCC IAW DODD 3150.8 and the AOC, DSN: 227-0218; commercial: (703) 697-0218 by the fastest voice means available. The initial report will begin with the flagword, OPREP-3 FADED GIANT. An amplifying report will be forwarded by electrical means within four hours. Supplemental reports will be submitted to the AOC as of 1000 hours Zulu daily, or sooner if significant information becomes available.

(2) Reactor seizure reports (flagword: OPREP-3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD-A&T (AR)1168, will be submitted by electrical means immediately after the incident occurs. Notification by telephone is authorized, if the severity of conditions justify. A telephonic seizure report, made to the AOC, will begin with the flagword, OPREP-3 FADED GIANT.

(3) Reactor significant incidents (flagword: OPREP-3 FADED GIANT), RCS DD-A&T(AR)1168, will be submitted by electrical means immediately after the incident occurs. Supplemental reports will be submitted to the AOC as of 1000 hours daily.

c. Report content and sample reports. This message format is the same as the OPREP-3PBA. The flagword PINNACLE may be added at any level of command to expedite forwarding of this message to the NMCC. See figure B-2 for example OPREP-3PBA report.

Section II Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report

B-7. Purpose

The Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report is used by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to compile the Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing (NARCL). The NARCL provides a comprehensive list of all DOD and DOE installations and facilities with nuclear accident/incident response and radiation detection capabilities. The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) maintains the NARCL.

B-8. Requirements

DOD Directive 3150.8 directs all units with a specialized nuclear response capability to inform the JNACC of their capabilities annually no later than 1 Oct using DD Form 2325 (Nuclear Accident Response Capability Report). Information will be current as of 1 Sep. Interim reports are required whenever a capability is significantly changed (i.e., deletion, transfer, new capability). Minor changes in quantities may be deferred until the annual update. Reports should be addressed to: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), ATTN: NSES, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310-3398. To contact the JNACC by telephone, use DSN 221-2102 or commercial (703) 325-2102.

Voice Report.

"This is an OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH from CTR122.2.0 as of 180419Z. At 180415Z, an F106 carrying - a Mark 1 nuclear warhead crashed near a Russian battle group."

Record Communications Report.

FROM: CTU122.2.0
TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//
(Other addressees as appropriate)
CLASSIFICATION
MSGID/OPREP-3PNF/CTU122.2.0/001//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/NUCFLASH//
REF/A/TEL/CTU122.2.0/180419ZMAR93//
AMPN/INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//
TIMELOC/180415ZMAR93/4005N13235E/INIT//
NUCLC/4000N13400E//
NUCTYP/ACTYP:F106/NUCSTAT:Y/MARK: 0001//
RMKS/AIRCRAFT DOWN IN SEA. ESTIMATE 100 MILES OFF COAST.
PILOT EJECTED. ADDITIONAL REPORTS WILL FOLLOW//
DECL/OADR//

Figure B-1. Example of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH report

Voice Report

"This is an OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW from CTU1111.3.1 for the NMCC. (a) 170755Z OCT 92. (b) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (c) One TRIDENT 1 missile. (d) Casualties: two killed, three wounded. Damages: One truck destroyed by fire, one missile exposed to gas fire, did not explode or burn. (e) Missile transport. (f) Truck hauling missile experienced engine flash fire. (g) Driver and assistant killed, three personnel injured in rescue attempt. (h) No nuclear or radiation hazard. (i) Weapon is being cooled by fire hoses. (k) News media is enroute to the scene. No information has been released. (l) No public reaction has been received. Adverse publicity is anticipated. (m) Corrective action recommendation not yet available."

Record Communications Report

FROM: USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//
(Other addressees as appropriate)
CLASSIFICATION
MSGID/OPREP-3PBA/CTU122.3.1/001//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW//
REF/ATEL/CTU122.3.1/170755Z OCT 92//
AMPN//INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//
TIMELOC/170754Z OCT 92/PEARL HARBOR/INIT//
EVTYP/1/TRIDENT 1/
HEADING/CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES//
CASUALTIES/KILLED:2/WOUNDED:3/MISSING:0//
GENTEXT/DAMAGES/ONE TRUCK DESTROYED BY FIRE. WEAPON
EXPOSED TO GAS FIRE BUT DID NOT DETONATE OR BURN//
GENTEXT/INCIDENT CAUSE AND DETAILS/TRUCK EXPERIENCED ENGINE
FLASH FIRE. DRIVER AND ASST WERE KILLED AND 3 NAVPERS INJURED
WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SAVE TRUCK CREW AND RECOVER WPN//
HEADING/RADIATION INFORMATION//
5RAD/1 TRUCK CAB/170810z/0.0/-/-//
GENTEXT/WEAPON CONDITION AND SAFETY MEASURES/MINOR BURN
DAMAGES ON EXTERIOR OF WPN//
GENTEXT/ACTIONS TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS/FIRE HAS BEEN
EXTINGUISHED. INJURED PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN TRANSPORTED
TO LOCAL HOSPITAL. INVESTIGATION CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO
DETERMINE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT AND SAFETY MEASURES FOR
FUTURE OPNS//
GENTEXT/NEWS RELEASES/INITIAL REPORT MADE TO LOCAL
TELEVISION AND RADIO//
GNETEXT/PUBLIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS/LOCAL MEDIA AT
SCENE, SPECIAL REPORT AIRING ON LOCAL TELEVISION STATION//
RMKS/ADDITIONAL REPORT TO FOLLOW//
DECL/OADR//

*Format also used for OPREP-3 BENT SPEAR and FADED GIANT

Figure B-2. Sample OPREP-3 PINNACLE BROKEN ARROW report

Voice Report.

"This is an OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER from USS BULLET for the NMCC. 151000Z OCT 92. Norfolk, VA, Two TLAM-N missiles. Casualties: none killed, three wounded. Damages: Two TLAM-N missiles damaged, warheads removed by terrorists. Incident Cause and Details: USS BULLET boarded by 10 armed terrorists, who removed warheads from 2 TLAM-N missiles. Three crew members wounded in attack. Seizure Information: Terrorists departed by helicopter and are headed for Mexican coast. Attempting to notify Mexican Government."

Record Communications Report

FROM: USCINCOM NORFOLK VA
TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//
(Other addressees as appropriate)
CLASSIFICATION
MSGID/OPREP-3PEQ/USS BULLET/001B//
FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/EMPTY QUIVER//
REF/A/TEL/USS BULLET/151000ZOCT92//
AMPN/INITIAL VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//
TIMELOC/151000ZOCT92/NORFOLK VA/FOLUP//
EVTYP/2/TLAM-N/DDG/
HEADING/CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES//
CASUALTY/KILLED: 0/WOUNDED: 3 MISSING: 0//
GENTEXT/DAMAGES/TWO TLAM-N MISSILES DAMAGED,
WARHEADS REMOVED BY TERRORISTS//
GENTEXT/INCIDENT CAUSE AND DETAILS/USS BULLET
BOARDED BY 10 ARMED TERRORISTS, WHO REMOVED
WARHEADS FROM 2 TLAM-N MISSILES. THREE CREW
MEMBERS WOUNDED IN ATTACK.
TERRORISTS DEPARTED BY HELICOPTER//
GENTEXT/SEIZURE INFORMATION/HELICOPTER HEADED
FOR MEXICAN COAST. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES NOTIFIED.
SHORE-BASED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES
NOTIFIED. AIR SEARCH IN PROGRESS//
GENTEXT/PUBLIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS/MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT NOTIFIED AND PROMISE FULL COOPERATION//
GENTEXT/ASSISTANCE REQUIRED/REQUEST MEDEVAC OR
INJURED CREW MEMBERS//
RMKS/ADDITIONAL REPORT WILL FOLLOW//
DECL/OADR//

Figure B-3. Sample OPREP-3 PINNACLE EMPTY QUIVER report

Glossary

Section I Abbreviations

AC

Active component

ADACP

Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program

AIDS

Acquired-Immune Deficiency Syndrome

AMC

U.S. Army Materiel Command

AOC

Army Operations Center

ARG

Accident Response Group

ARNG

Army National Guard

ARSTAF

Army Staff

ASA(RDA)

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

CCF

U.S. Army Central Personnel Clearance Facility

CMA

Competent Medical Authority

CONUS

Continental United States

COR

Contracting officer's representative

CPA

Chief of Public Affairs

CPO

Civilian personnel office

DA

Department of the Army

DAIG

DA Inspector general

DCII

Defense Central Index of Investigations

DCSINT

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DCSLOG

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

DCSOPS

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DCSPER

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DOD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

DOMS

Director of Military Support

DOT

Department of Transportation

DSS

Defense Security System

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

ENTNAC

Entrance National Agency Check

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FORSCOM

U.S. Army Forces Command

FPM

Federal Personnel Manual

HIV

Human immunodeficiency virus

HQDA

Headquarters, Department of the Army

IAW

in accordance with

IDS

Intrusion detection system

IND

Improvised nuclear devices

IRF

Initial Response Force

JIC

Joint Information Center

JNACC

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center

JNWPS

Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications System

MACOM

major Army command

MEDCOM

U.S. Army Medical Command

MOS

Military occupational specialty

MTOE

Modification table of organization and equipment

NAC

National Agency Check

NACI

National Agency Check and Written Inquiries

NACIC

National Agency Check with Written Inquiries and Credit Check

NACL

National Agency Check, Local Agency Checks and Credit Check

NAIRA

Nuclear accident and incident response and assistance

NARCL

Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing

NCCD

Nuclear certified computer data

NDA

National defense area

NDPR

Nuclear duty position roster

NEST

Nuclear emergency search team

NMCC

National Military Command Center

NME

Nuclear management evaluation

NSA

National security area

NSI

Nuclear surety inspection

OCONUS

Outside the continental United States

ODCSOPS

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

OJT

On-the-job training

OMPF

official military personnel file

OPF

Official personnel folder

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

PA

Physician's assistant

PAO

Public affairs officer

PCS

Permanent change of station

PDI

Potentially Disqualifying Information

PERSCOM

U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

PR

Periodic Reinvestigation

PRP

Personnel Reliability Program

PRPA

Personnel Reliability Program assignment

PSI

Personnel Security investigation

RADCON

Radiological Control Team

RAMT

Radiological Advisory Medical Team

RFI

Reactor facility inspection

ROTC

Reserve Officers Training Corps

RTF

Response Task Force

SBI

Special background investigation

SIB

SIDPERS Interface Branch

SNM

Special nuclear materials

SOP

Standing operating procedures

SSBI

Single-scope background investigation

SSN

Social security number

TDA

Table of distribution and allowances

TRADOC

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSG

The Surgeon General

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

USANCA

U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

USAR

U.S. Army Reserve

USATEC

United States Army Technical Evaluation Command

USJFCOM

United States Joint Forces Command

Section II**Terms****Access**

a. Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon or critical nuclear weapon system component. Normally, a person would not be considered to have access if an escort or guard were provided for either the person or the weapon when the person is in close proximity of it.

b. The capability and opportunity to obtain, alter, or substitute the internal values of sealed authenticator systems or permissive action link material used in the release/execution of nuclear weapons and authenticators used to authenticate nuclear control orders, including wrapped packages of authenticators. NOTE: A person does not have access if the ability to obtain, alter, or substitute the internal values is prevented by observation by a person who is authorized access or by physical controls that prevent access.

c. Close physical proximity to a nuclear reactor or special nuclear materials (SNM) in such a manner as to allow the

opportunity to tamper with or damage the reactor or to steal SNM. Normally, a person is not considered to have access, if an escort or guard were provided for the person, the reactor, or the SNM, when the person is in close proximity.

Accountability

The obligation to keep accurate records of property, documents, or funds. Accountability is concerned primarily with records and does not necessarily imply possession.

Active service

For assignment to the PRP, active service includes active duty in the U.S. military, continuous federal service or full-time support personnel to Reserve components as defined in DOD Directive 1205.18. For PRP purposes, the following apply:

a. An interruption in active military service of over 24 months constitutes a break in service. Inactive service in the Armed Forces Reserve or National Guard components does not constitute active service, even though active duty periods for training or other temporary service of less than 180 days may occur.

b. Assignment as a midshipman or cadet at the Military, Naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard academy is considered active service for PRP purposes.

c. Assignment as a Reserve Officers Training Corps, Merchant Marine Academy, and Maritime Academy cadet or midshipman is not considered to be active service.

Administrative (levy) screening

For a person on orders directing reassignment to a critical or controlled nuclear duty position, a determination by the losing organization that the person is suitable/unsuitable to perform PRP duties.

Administrative termination

An action taken to remove an individual from the PRP when the individual transfers from a duty position requiring PRP certification to one that does not.

Alcohol abuse

The use of alcohol to an extent that it has an adverse effect on the user's health or behavior, family, community, or the Department of Defense, or leads to unacceptable behavior as evidenced by one or more acts of alcohol-related misconduct and/or the illegal use of such substances. Alcohol abuse may include a professional diagnosis as being alcohol dependent or an alcohol abuser, or evidence of alcohol abuse through alcohol-related incidents.

Alcohol-related incident

Any standard behavior or performance in which the consumption of alcohol by the individual is a contributing factor as determined by the certifying official with consultation from the CMA (e.g., intoxicated driving, domestic disturbances, assault, disorderly conduct, personal injury, failure to go, or voluntary consumption of alcohol by an individual previously diagnosed as alcohol dependent).

Certification

A determination by a certifying official that an individual meets the personnel reliability program criteria established for assignment to a PRP position.

Certifying official

For military and DA civilian personnel, the commander or DOD military or civilian personnel responsible for nuclear-related operations and having sufficient personal contact with all subordinate PRP personnel to permit continual evaluation of their performance and reliability. For Army contractor personnel, the Army COR designated by the contracting officer is the certifying official. The certifying official certifies that personnel being considered for assignment to nuclear duties meet the requirements of the PRP.

Competent medical authority (CMA)

A U.S. military medical officer, or a U.S. civilian physician employed by, or under contract to, the U.S. Government, responsible for providing medical services or clinical evaluation and who has training in the requirements of the PRP. A medical officer for PRP evaluation purposes refers to a physician, physician's assistant, or nurse practitioner or in the case of dental services, a military dental officer or authorized U.S. civilian dentist.

Continuing evaluation

The process by which a PRP-certified individual is observed for compliance with reliability standards. This is an on-going process that considers duty performance, and on and off duty behavior and reliability on a consistent and frequent basis.

Controlled nuclear duty position

A position to which any of the following applies because of the incumbent's assigned nuclear duties (see DOD Directive 5210.42 for further guidance):

- a. Has access, but not technical knowledge; or
- b. Controls entry into an exclusion area, but does not have access or technical knowledge; or
- c. Is armed, assigned duties relating to nuclear security, and in a direct line of sight to a nuclear weapon or special nuclear material (SNM) and could inflict damage upon the weapon or, when joined, to its delivery system or to SNM; or
- d. Has been designated as a certifying official with identified PRP positions at the controlled level only.

Critical nuclear duty position

A position to which any of the following applies because of the incumbent's assigned nuclear duties (see DOD Directive 5210.42 for further information):

- a. Has access and technical knowledge; or
- b. Can either directly or indirectly cause the launch or use of a nuclear weapon; or
- c. Has accountability, control, or use of positive control materials or devices such as sealed authentication systems, permissive action link (PAL) materials and related codes, strategic and tactical nuclear-certified computer data, nuclear targeting tapes or materials, emergency action messages, or releases for nuclear weapons; or
- d. Has been designated as a certifying official in activities with identified critical PRP positions.

Custody

The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components or special nuclear materials (SNM). Custody may or may not include accountability.

Deficiency

A variance from prescribed procedures or criteria prescribed in technical manuals or other applicable regulations or publications.

DOD Personnel

Active duty military personnel, full-time support personnel to Reserve components, civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DOD) or, for PRP purposes, DOD contractors and their employees.

Drug abuse

The wrongful use, possession, distribution, or introduction onto a military installation of a controlled substance, prescription medication, over-the-counter medication, or intoxicating substance (other than alcohol). (Wrongful means without legal justification or excuse, and includes use contrary to the directions of the manufacturer or prescribing health care provider, and use of any intoxicating substance not intended for human ingestion (e.g., glue and gasoline fumes sniffing)).

Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC)

A personnel security investigation (PSI) consisting of a records review of certain national agencies. It is similar to a National Agency Check (NAC), except that the check at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division consists of a name check only rather than a detailed technical fingerprint search. An ENTNAC is started on each first-term military enlistee entering military service.

Exclusion area

A designated area immediately surrounding one or more nuclear weapons/systems or special nuclear material (SNM). Normally its boundaries are the walls, floor, and ceiling of a structure, or are delineated by a permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive measures, access into the exclusion area constitutes access to the nuclear weapons/systems or SNM.

Factor affecting operations

A situation, condition, or deficiency that may or may not be attributable to the inspected unit but which significantly affects the unit's ability to accomplish its nuclear mission. It may pertain to such matters as command guidance, adequacy of support, availability or condition of facilities, or the status of personnel, equipment, supply, maintenance, or training; or the provision of a safe and secure environment for nuclear weapons.

Health records (HREC)

Combined, the treatment record and dental record.

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

A device incorporating materials designed to result in either the dispersal of radioactive material or the formation of a nuclear yield. Such devices may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an unauthorized modification to a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon as the result of sabotage, seizure, theft, or loss of custody.

Initial response force (IRF)

An emergency response force dispatched from the nearest military installation(s) having an appropriate response capability to the scene of a radiological event. The Commander of the IRF shall be in command of the DOD response until relieved by the Commander of the Response Task Force. IRF assets may be utilized by the RTF after change-of-command. The RTF Commander is the Federal On Scene Commander as defined in the FRERP.

Interim certification

Same as "certification," except performance of duty is subject to the restrictions of paragraph 2-14b pending receipt of the results of a new personnel security investigation.

Intrusion detection equipment system

A security system consisting of a sensor(s) capable of detecting one or more types of phenomena, signal media, annunciator(s), and energy source, for signaling the entry or attempted entry of a person or other target into the area protected by the system.

Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC)

A combined DTRA and DOE centralized agency for exchanging and maintaining information on radiological assistance capabilities and coordinating assistance activities, when called upon, in connection with accidents involving radioactive materials.

Limited area

A designated area immediately surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally, this is the area between the boundaries of the exclusion areas and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter security system.

National Agency Check (NAC)

A personnel security investigation (PSI), which is a part of all investigations and reinvestigations, consisting of records reviews of certain national agencies. As a minimum, it includes checks of the Defense Clearance and Investigation Index (DCII), the FBI Headquarters, FBI Identification Division, OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) and other national agencies (e.g. CIA, INS) appropriate to the individual's background. A technical fingerprint search of the FBI's files is started as part of a NAC. If the fingerprint is not classifiable, a "name check only" of those files is automatically conducted.

National Agency Check Plus Written Inquiries (NACI)

A personnel security investigation (PSI) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management that combines a NAC with written inquiries to law enforcement agencies, former employers, and supervisors, references, and schools.

National Agency Check with Written Inquiries and Credit Check (NACIC)

A personnel security investigation (PSI) conducted by the Office of Personnel Management that combines a NAC with written inquiries to law enforcement agencies, former employers, and supervisors, references, and schools and additionally, a credit check.

National Agency Check, Local Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

The standard initial investigation and reinvestigation for a SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL security clearance. Investigative requirements include a completed SF 86 (or EPSQ), completed NAC, financial review and local agency checks.

National defense area (NDA)

An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information, or protecting DOD equipment or material. (See AR 500-60.)

National security area

An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions, or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified or restricted data information, or protecting DOE equipment or material.

Nuclear-capable unit

A unit or activity assigned responsibility for employing, assembling, maintaining, transporting, or storing war reserve nuclear weapons, their associated components and ancillary equipment.

Nuclear component

A part of a nuclear weapon that contains fissionable or fusion able materiel.

Nuclear duty positions

Duty positions that require access to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, nuclear reactor facilities, special nuclear materials, and positive control material or involve the direct security of such systems. Nuclear duty positions are designated either critical or controlled per guidance contained in paragraph 2-4 this regulation and enclosure 3 to DOD Directive 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Individuals assigned to nuclear duty positions must be in the PRP.

Nuclear management evaluation

An evaluation conducted by the DAIG or MACOM IG of nuclear operations with inquiry into the nuclear functions and responsibilities of staff agencies, inspection teams, major and intermediate command levels, and assistance teams to determine management, systemic, or functional problem areas in the Army nuclear programs attributable to any echelon.

Nuclear qualification

A determination by a MACOM commander that a nuclear-capable unit is capable of performing its nuclear mission and has been authorized to do so.

Nuclear reactor accident or incident

Any unplanned or unauthorized event involving a nuclear reactor that results in an actual or potential hazard to life or property or that may cause adverse public reactions. (AR 385-40)

Nuclear reactor facility

A nuclear reactor system, associated buildings, auxiliary equipment, and the reactor staff required for its operation, maintenance, and support.

Nuclear reactor system

Any equipment or device, except a nuclear weapon, capable of neutron multiplication through nuclear fission of special nuclear material. This definition includes nuclear reactors, sub critical assemblies of special nuclear material, and the supporting associated equipment or devices (if any).

Nuclear surety inspection (NSI)

A DAIG inspection to examine the capability of specified organizations with assigned nuclear duties to provide a safe and secure environment for DOD nuclear weapons and related positive control materials and to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons command and control systems. An NSI also determines if essential administration and support is provided the unit.

Nuclear weapon

A device in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion or both.

Nuclear weapon accident and incident

Any unplanned or unauthorized event involving a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component that results in an actual or potential hazard to life or property or that may cause adverse public reaction.

Nuclear weapons technical inspection

A Service or Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) inspection of a nuclear-capable unit conducted to examine nuclear weapons technical assembly, maintenance, storage functions, logistic movement, handling, and safety and security directly associated with these functions.

Off-site

That area beyond the boundaries of a DOD installation including the area beyond the boundary of a NDA or NSA that has been, or may become affected by a nuclear accident or incident.

On-site

That area around the scene of a nuclear accident or incident that is under the operational control of the installation commander, on-scene commander, or DOE team leader. The on-site area includes any area that has been established as an NDA or an NSA.

Periodic reinvestigation (PR)

An investigation conducted at specified intervals for updating a previously completed personnel security investigation.

Permanent disqualification

An action taken based on the receipt of disqualifying information to remove from the PRP an individual who has been screened and certified into the PRP or to terminate the PRP qualification process of an individual being considered for assignment to PRP duties.

Permissive action link (PAL)

A device in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming or launching until a prescribed discrete code or combination is inserted into the PAL. Such devices can be mechanical, electronic, or electromechanical.

Personnel security investigation (PSI)

Any investigation required for determining the eligibility of DOD military or civilian personnel and contractor employees for access to classified information, acceptance, or retention in the Armed Forces, or assignment to, and retention in, sensitive duties.

Positive control materials (PCM) or devices

Sealed authentication systems, permissive action links (PAL), positive enable systems or nuclear certified computer data (NCCD).

Potentially disqualifying information (PDI)

Any information regarding, but not limited to, a person's physical, mental, emotional status, conduct or character, on-and off-duty, which may cast doubt about an individual's ability or reliability to perform nuclear duties.

PRP administration official

A contractor employed in a supervisory position and approved by the contracting officer's representative to facilitate the management of the PRP at the contractor facility, by performing duties normally performed by the certifying official except for the decision making functions of determining PRP suitability and disqualifying personnel from the PRP.

PRP monitor

An individual appointed by the certifying official to assist in the day-to-day administrative functions of the PRP.

PRP/surety considered

An annotation in Part III, DA Form 873, indicating that CCF has determined that a PSI is devoid of potentially disqualifying information.

Random testing

A program of testing where the selection of personnel for substance abuse testing is based on a random opportunity to be tested and is not imposed based on events about a particular individual. Random testing may be either testing of designated individual occupying a specified area, element, or position, or random testing of those individuals based on a neutral criterion, such as a digit of the social security number.

Reactor facility

A nuclear reactor system, the associated buildings, auxiliary equipment, and the staff required for operation, maintenance, security, and support of the nuclear reactor facility. As used in this regulation, this term includes both power and research nuclear reactor systems.

Reactor facility inspection

A HQDA IG inspection that includes examination of the capability of a nuclear reactor facility to perform specific tasks involving the nuclear reactor and associated equipment, to provide a safe and secure environment for the nuclear material and reactor, and to determine if essential administration and support is provided the unit.

Render-safe procedures

The application of EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of explosive ordnance items to preclude a detonation or munition function.

Response Task Force (RTF)

A DOD response force appropriately manned, equipped, and able to coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological accident or significant incident. The specific purpose of the RTF is to provide radiological accident/significant incident assistance. RTFs are organized and maintained by those Combatant Commanders whose component commands have custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components.

Reviewing official

The commander, or designated DOD military or civilian official, at a level immediately above that of the certifying official, who is responsible for operations involving nuclear weapons.

Safe environment

The condition that exists when all operations pertaining to nuclear weapons and reactor facilities are performed in accordance with applicable procedural and safety publications. Any deviation that could cause physical damage to or otherwise degrade the reliability of the nuclear weapon or nuclear reactor would cause a condition that would be considered an unsafe environment.

Sealed authenticator

A single copy from an edition of a sealed authentication system. It contains authenticator values sealed in plastic and is classified TOP SECRET CRYPTO or SECRET CRYPTO. A unique register number identifies each copy in an edition.

Secure environment

The condition that exists when nuclear weapons, reactor facilities, and their surrounding environment meet the security criteria established by applicable publications.

Special nuclear material (SNM)

a. Plutonium, uranium 233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or

b. Any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing but does not include source material.

Standby emergency power source

A separate and distinct source of power, internal to the site and in addition to the site's primary electrical power source.

Surety

Those controls, procedures, and actions, which contribute to the safety, security, reliability, and survivability of nuclear weapons and nuclear materiel, and to the assurance that there will be no nuclear accidents, incidents, or unauthorized weapon detonations.

Technical knowledge

Knowledge, however obtained, that would allow an individual to tamper with a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon component in a manner that such tampering would not be detected during normal prefire operations or weapon-monitoring (storage monitoring) inspections and could cause, then or later, unauthorized prearming, arming, launching, firing, releasing, or detonation of a nuclear weapon or degradation of weapon performance. It also includes knowledge that would allow an individual to tamper with a nuclear reactor or special nuclear materials (SNM) in a manner that such tampering would not be detectable during normal operations/surveillance and could cause unsafe operations at the reactor or potential radiological hazards.

Temporary disqualification

An action taken to temporarily remove an individual from the PRP when the certifying official has information that could be expected to affect an individual's job performance or reliability.

Two-person concept

A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by

requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed. (Also referred to as the two-man rule, two-man policy, or two-person rule.)

Two-person control

The close surveillance and control of materials at all times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed and each familiar with established security requirements.

Section III

Special Abbreviations and Terms

There are no special terms.

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