MAJ Greg Tomlin Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, History Department
U.S. Military Academy at West Point
Lecture Date: Jan. 16, 2013

When Greg Tomlin deployed to Baquba, Iraq, in March 2004, he began a mission that would redefine how conventional U.S. army forces fight an urban war. Leading his field artillery platoon through a transition into a counterinsurgency rifle platoon and carrying out daily combat patrols in one of the region's most notorious hotspots, Tomlin chronicles Task Force 1-6 Field Artillery's year in Iraq and its response to the insurgency that threatened to engulf their corner of the Sunni Triangle. After Tomlin relinquished control of his platoon, he spent five months in the Diyala provincial police headquarters in Baquba. In this environment he found himself living with and advising senior Iraqi security leaders, many of whom had served as colonels and general officers in the former Iraqi army. Together they planned security operations for the province's 165 polling stations during the January 2005 national elections, Iraq's first democratic elections in nearly thirty years. Rather than presenting a snapshot dominated by battle scenes, Tomlin presents a wide-angled view of his experiences. He assesses the implications of his platoon's mission, starting with their pre-deployment training in Germany and ending with the handing over of duties to the replacement task force at the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Tomlin discusses his impressions of the benefits and liabilities of working with embedded journalists and relates both his frustrations with and his admiration for the fledgling Iraqi security forces. From chaotic security planning and grieving the loss of fallen comrades - both U.S. and Iraqi - to late-night debates with Iraqis about democracy, Tomlin discusses how Iraqis perceived the value of their post-Saddam elections and the political future of their country as it tried to reinvent itself in the wake of a dictator's fall. Length: 82 Minutes

John Gordon
Independent Scholar
Lecture Date: Dec. 12, 2012

During the early months of World War II as the American forces fought for the Philippines, tensions grew between Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Navy. Using a rich collection of American and newly discovered Japanese sources, Dr. John Gordon details the unusual missions of the Navy and Marine Corps in the largely Army campaign. He recounts sailors fighting as infantrymen alongside their Marine comrades at Bataan and Corregidor, crews of Navy ships manning the Army's heavy coastal artillery weapons, and Navy submarines desperately trying to supply the men with food and ammunition. He also chronicles the last stand of the Navy's colorful China gunboats at Manila Bay. Gordon also provides a detailed account of the Japanese bombing of the Cavite Navy Yard outside Manila on the third day of the war, which was the worst damage inflicted on a U.S. Navy installation since the British burned the Washington Navy Yard in 1814. It also closely examines the surrender of the 4th Marines at Corregidor, the only time in history that the U.S. Marine Corps lost a regiment in combat. Gordon also draws on the recently discovered diary of a leader of the Japanese amphibious assault force that fought against the Navy's provisional infantry battalion on southern Bataan, and uses the U.S. ship logs and the 4th Marine unit diary that were evacuated from Manila Bay shortly before the U.S. forces surrendered.
Dr John Gordon is a Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. He holds a BA in History from The Citadel, an MA in International Relations from St. Mary's University, and MBA from Marymount University, and a PhD from George Mason University. Since joining RAND in 1997 after a 20 year US Army career, he has participated in and led numerous studies for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Departments of the Army and Navy. Dr Gordon has authored or co-authored several RAND studies on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. He has led or participated in RAND research projects for the governments of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Germany. Dr Gordon is also an adjunct faculty member at Georgetown and George Mason Universities where he teaches graduate-level courses on counterinsurgency and military operations. In addition to the book on which tonight's lecture is based, he has authored numerous articles on military subjects in a variety of professional journals. Length: 66 Minutes

LTC Thomas E. Hanson, Ph.D
Department of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Lecture Date: Nov. 14, 2012

In the decades since the "forgotten war" in Korea, conventional wisdom has held that the Eighth Army consisted largely of poorly trained, undisciplined troops who fled in terror from the onslaught of the Communist forces. The generalizations historians and fellow soldiers have used regarding these troops do little justice to the tens of thousands of soldiers who worked to make themselves and their army ready for war. This careful study of combat preparedness in the Eighth Army from 1949 to the outbreak of hostilities in 1950 shows that the U.S. soldiers sent to Korea suffered gaps in their professional preparation, from missing and broken equipment to unevenly trained leaders at every level of command. But after a year of progressive, focused, and developmental collective training - based largely on the lessons of combat in World War II - these soldiers expected to defeat the Communist enemy. By recognizing the constraints under which the Eighth Army operated, Hanson asserts that scholars and soldiers will be able to discard what Douglas Macarthur called the "pernicious myth" of the Eighth Army's professional, physical, and moral ineffectiveness.
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hanson enlisted in the US Army as an infantryman in 1988. He earned a commission as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry from the US Army Officer Candidate School in 1992. He has commanded infantry units from fire team to battalion, and has served as a staff officer in several Army and joint organizations. He earned a PhD in history from The Ohio State University in 2006, and served as both an instructor at the US Military Academy and as a professor of military science. Since redeploying from Iraq in April 2012 LTC Hanson has served as Deputy Director, Combat Studies Institute, at Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant Colonel Hanson is married to Lieutenant Colonel Karen S. Hubbard. They have three adult children and a son and daughter in high school. Length: 56 Minutes

Benjamin Patton
Independent Film Producer
Patton Veterans Project, Inc
Lecture Date: Oct. 10, 2012

The grandson of the legendary World War II general George S. Patton Jr., documentary filmmaker Benjamin Patton explores his family legacy and shares the inspirational wit and wisdom that his grandfather bestowed upon his only son and namesake. In revealing personal correspondence written between 1939 and 1945, General Patton Jr. espoused his ideals to Benjamin's father, then a cadet at West Point. Dispensing advice on duty, heroism and honor with the same candor he used ordering the Third Army across Europe, the letters show Patton to be as dynamic a parent as a military commander.
Following in those famous footsteps, Benjamin's father became a respected and decorated hero of both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Ironically, as he rose to Major General, he also proved himself just as brave, flamboyant, flawed and inspiring as his father had been. A study of a great American original, Growing Up Patton features some of the pivotal figures in Benjamin's father's life, including Creighton Abrams, the WWII hero who became his greatest mentor; Charley Watkins, a daredevil helicopter pilot in Vietnam; Manfred Rommel, the son of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; Joanne Patton, the author's mother and a resourceful fighter in her own right; and Benjamin's mentally challenged brother, George. Growing Up Patton explores how the Patton cultural legacy lives on, and in the end, reveals how knowing the history of our heritage-famous or not-can lead to a deeper understanding of ourselves.
Benjamin Patton, the youngest grandson of WWII's General George S. Patton Jr., is the co-author of Growing Up Patton: Reflections on Heroes, History and Family Wisdom (Berkley, 2012). Formerly a producer at New York City's PBS affiliate, he recently established the Patton Veterans Project, which holds filmmaking workshops designed especially for veterans coping with Post Traumatic Stress as a tool for healing and self-expression. Length: 65 Minutes

Dr. Donald J. Stoker
Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College, Monterey Program
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Lecture Date: Sep. 12, 2012 

Despite the abundance of books on the Civil War, not one has focused exclusively on what was in fact the determining factor in the outcome of the conflict: differences in Union and Southern strategy. In The Grand Design, Donald Stoker provides for the first time a comprehensive and often surprising account of strategy as it evolved between Fort Sumter and Appomattox. Reminding us that strategy is different from tactics (battlefield deployments) and operations (campaigns conducted in pursuit of a strategy), Stoker examines how Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis identified their political goals and worked with their generals to craft the military means to achieve them--or how they often failed to do so. Stoker shows that Davis, despite a West Point education and experience as Secretary of War, ultimately failed as a strategist. Lincoln, in contrast, evolved a clear strategic vision, but he failed for years to make his generals implement it. And while Robert E. Lee was unerring in his ability to determine the Union's strategic heart--its center of gravity--he proved mistaken in his assessment of how to destroy it. Historians have often argued that the North's advantages in population and industry ensured certain victory. In The Grand Design, Stoker reasserts the centrality of the overarching prosecution of the war by each side, arguing convincingly that it was strategy that determined the result of America's great national conflict. Length: 61 Minutes

Dr. Ethan Rafuse
Professor, Department of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Lecture Date: July 18, 2012 

The Civil War in the Eastern Theater in 1862 was the stage for a grand confrontation between two distinctly different armies and commanders. When the year began, Robert E. Lee languished in relative obscurity, while George McClellan strode the Union war effort like a colossus. By June, McClellan had led his Army of the Potomac to the proverbial gates of Richmond and ultimate victory for the Union seemed within sight. Then, however, Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia struck back and by the middle of September had carried the war to the outskirts of Washington and then across the Potomac River into Maryland before McClellan managed to turn back the Confederate tide. This talk will look at both of these commanders and how the dialogue between their respective approaches to the war--and their mutual understanding of the strategic and operational dynamics in the East--colored its conduct in 1862 and cast a long shadow over the entire war.

Ethan S. Rafuse earned his Ph.D. in history and political science at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. A former park ranger at Manassas National Battlefield and Harry S Truman National Historic Site, in 2001-03 he taught military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point and since 2004 has been a member of the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, where he is a professor of military history. He is the author, editor, or co-editor of several books, including McClellan's War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union, Robert E. Lee and the Fall of the Confederacy, 1863-1865, and the forthcoming Army War College Guide to the Richmond and Petersburg Campaign of 1864-65. Length: 73 Minutes

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley Memorial Lecture
General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Chief of Staff, Army
Lecture Date: Aug. 15, 2012


The decade of the 1990s saw the end of the Cold War, conflict in Southwest Asia, emerging threats from new actors, retrenchment of US military activities around the world and a concomitant drawdown of forces. The reduced budgets of the post Desert Storm era forced the Army to make painful but necessary cuts in personnel and equipment, while transforming to meet new threats and ways of war. Civil and political leaders hoped for a "peace dividend" that would mean a smaller, cheaper military, yet one no less effective than the one that had served the Cold War so well. The Army's senior leaders worked to balance projected requirements, changing roles and missions, emerging technology, re-stationing, and personnel drawdown requirements against reduced budgets and the need to modernize the force and continue to care for Soldiers and their families. General Sullivan will discuss the issues he faced as Army Chief of Staff and discuss some of the methods he used. The strategic leader must manage the complexity ever changing situations while simultaneously building the joint, combined and interagency teams necessary to operate in a dynamic environment. Dealing with the present is not enough, and the successful leader must also shape the future of the Army to continue to fight and win the nation's wars.

General Gordon R. Sullivan is the President and CEO of the Association of the United States Army a dynamic organization with over 100,000 members that represents Soldiers, families, and the defense industry. GEN Sullivan was commissioned an Armor officer in 1959 from Norwich University. He holds a BA in History from Norwich and an MA in political science from the University of New Hampshire. His professional military education includes the U.S. Army Armor School Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. In addition to his many awards on active duty, he is also the recipient of the West Point Association of Graduates Sylvanus Thayer Award and a member of the Sergeants Major Academy's Hall of Honor. General Sullivan retired from the Army on 31 July 1995 after more than 36 years of active service. He culminated his service in uniform as the 32nd Chief of Staff of Staff of the Army. He is the co-author of Hope Is Not a Method (Random House, 1996), which chronicles the enormous challenges encountered in transforming the post-Cold War Army through the lens of proven leadership principles and a commitment to shared values. He is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Norwich University and the Marshall Legacy Institute as well as a member of the MITRE Army Advisory Board and a Corporate Member of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Length: 94 Minutes

Dr. Peter Schifferle
Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Lecture Date: May 16, 2012

When the United States entered World War II, it took more than industrial might to transform its tiny army--smaller than even Portugal's--into an overseas fighting force of more than eight and a half million. The determination of American Army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. The Army schools at Fort Leavenworth became crucial to that preparation. Interwar Army officers, haunted by the bloodshed of World War I's Meuse-Argonne Offensive, fully expected to return to Europe to conclude the "unfinished business" of that conflict, and they prepared well. Schifferle examines for the first time how they accomplished this through a close and illuminating look at the students, faculty, curriculum, and essential methods of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. He describes how the interwar officer corps there translated the experiences of World War I into effective doctrine, engaged in intellectual debate on professional issues, conducted experiments to determine the viability of new concepts, and used military professional education courses to substitute for the experience of commanding properly organized and resourced units. The Fort Leavenworth education provided intensive instruction in general staff procedures, hands-on experience with the principles and techniques of combined arms, and the handling of large division-sized formations in combat. This readied Army officers for an emerging new era of global warfare and enabled them to develop the leadership decision making they would need to be successful on the battlefield.

Dr. Peter J. Schifferle is a graduate of the U.S. Army Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds Masters Degrees from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in German History, and the School of Advanced Military Studies in Theater Operations. He was awarded a Ph.D. in American History from the University of Kansas in 2002. He is the author of America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Kansas, 2010), several journal articles in Military Review and Armor, as well as numerous book reviews. Length: 74 Minutes

Judy Barrett Litoff, PhD
Professor of History, Bryant University
Lecture Date: June 20, 2012

This presentation examines the challenges and opportunities encountered by Rita Pilkey, an American Red Cross Club Director stationed in China’s Yunnan Province from January 1944 until August 1945. Pilkey’s first assignment at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center, twelve miles outside of Kunming, provided her with the opportunity to witness the training of Chinese soldiers in modern artillery warfare. These soldiers would go on to play a critical role in the Salween Campaign and the reopening of an overland supply route from India to China in early 1945. Her second assignment at Luliang, eighty miles southeast of Kunming, brought her to a remote airfield where the roar of bomber, fighter, and transport aircraft was a constant reminder of the war that was raging nearby. Rita Pilkey’s feisty and daring spirit, her grit and determination, her ingenuity, and her equanimity served her well during her assignment in China. Indeed, she epitomized the energetic fortitude of the 5,000 American Red Cross recreational workers assigned to distant and remote overseas postings during World War II. Her Red Cross story helps to broaden and modify our definition of war so that we no longer perceive as a phenomenon belonging exclusively to men. In the early 1990s, to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War, an outpouring of books, memoirs, films, and public programs helped to move the discussion of war to include the varied and complex stories of women. Rita Pilkey’s story is a continuation of this quest to insure that women’s voices remain an integral part of our understanding of war. Length: 69 Minutes

COL Gregory Daddis
Academy Professor of History, U.S. Military Academy
Lecture Date: Apr. 18, 2012

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina. Length: 74 Minutes

Dr. Chad Williams
Assistant Professor of History, Hamilton College
Lecture Date: Mar. 21, 2012

On April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson thrust the United States into World War I by declaring, "The world must be made safe for democracy." For the 380,000 African American soldiers who fought and labored in the global conflict, these words carried life or death meaning. Relating stories bridging the war and postwar years, spanning the streets of Chicago and the streets of Harlem, from the battlefields of the American South to the battlefields of the Western Front, Chad L. Williams reveals the central role of African American soldiers in World War I and how they, along with race activists and ordinary citizens alike, committed to fighting for democracy at home and beyond. Using a diverse range of sources, Williams connects the history of African American soldiers and veterans to issues such as the obligations of citizenship, combat and labor, diaspora and internationalism, homecoming and racial violence, "New Negro" militancy, and African American historical memories of the war. Democracy may have been distant from the everyday lives of African Americans at the dawn of the war, but it nevertheless remained a powerful ideal that sparked the hopes of black people throughout the country for societal change. Torchbearers of Democracy reclaims the legacy of black soldiers and establishes the World War I era as a defining moment in the history of African Americans and peoples of African descent more broadly. Length: 69 Minutes

COL (Ret) Donald W. Boose
Faculty Instructor, U.S. Army War College
Lecture Date: Feb. 15, 2012

During World War II, the U.S. Army gained an enormous amount of amphibious knowledge and experience with most of the Army’s amphibious operations taking place under General Douglas MacArthur. General MacArthur also carried out four major amphibious operations in the early months of the Korean War. The Inchon landing spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division was the most famous, but two of those amphibious operations were conducted exclusively by U.S. Army units and Navy ships that bypassed enemy forces to land in unexpected or lightly-defended areas. The Army also used amphibious vessels to insert and extract special operations forces, to shape enemy perceptions and actions through the threat of amphibious landings, and to sustain forces across unimproved beaches. During the last two years of the war, Army forces trained for and planned to conduct a major amphibious operation if circumstances had permitted. Since the Korean War, the Army’s amphibious maneuver role has greatly diminished, but Army over-the-shore logistics capability remains vital, and Army forces must be prepared to participate in amphibious operations as part of the joint force. Thus, this historical study chronicles an aspect of the U.S. Army’s history that may seem remote but continues to be very relevant. Length: 83 Minutes

Dr. Geoffrey Megargee
Applied Research Scholar
Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
Lecture Date: Jan. 18, 2012 

The myths surrounding the German high command in World War II deviate significantly from the reality. Many people have an image of the German high command (or, loosely, the German General Staff) as an entity that was independent; organized and centralized; expert; and anti-Nazi. While not wholly false, this picture is also far from accurate. This talk will examine the high command's structure, ideas, and culture, in order to reveal weaknesses that severely inhibited its performance and contributed to the onset, nature and ultimate loss of the war. Geoffrey Megargee received his undergraduate degree in history from St. Lawrence University in 1981. Following stints as an army officer and in the business world, he entered San Jose State University, where he received a Masters in European history in 1991, and then Ohio State University, from which he graduated with a doctorate in military history in 1998. He is the recipient of, among other honors, a J. William Fulbright grant for research in Germany, upon which he based his book Inside Hitler's High Command (winner of the Society for Military History's 2001 Distinguished Book Award). He is also the author of War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941. Dr. Megargee currently holds the position of Senior Applied Research Scholar at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, where he is editor-in-chief for the Museum's multi-volume Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945. The first volume of that work appeared in June 2009, and has received a National Jewish Book Award and a Judaica Reference Award, among other distinctions. Dr. Megargee is also a Presidential Counselor for the National World War II Museum in New Orleans, a member of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee, and has served for the last five years as treasurer of the United States Commission on Military History. Length: 69 Minutes

Dr. Gordon W. Rudd
Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Advanced Warfighting
Marine Corps University
Lecture Date: Dec. 14, 2011 

When President George W. Bush stood on the decks of the U.S.S. Lincoln in May 2003 and announced the victorious end to major combat operations in Iraq, he did so in front of a huge banner that proclaimed "Mission Accomplished." American forces had successfully removed the regime of Saddam Hussein with "rapid decisive operations"-and yet the United States was unprepared to effectively replace that regime. Between the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that May, the Allied forces struggled to plug the governance gap created by the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plugging that gap became the job of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Cobbled together with staff from diverse federal agencies and military branches, ORHA was led by Jay Garner, a key figure in assisting Kurdish refugees following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Garner and ORHA were given mere weeks to stabilize a nation that had come completely apart at the seams. Iraq's infrastructure was in such a shambles-thanks to years of poor maintenance, international sanctions, and massive looting-that the mission was doomed to fail from the start. Length: 88 Minutes

Mr. Ed Bearss
Independent Scholar
Lecture Date: Nov. 16, 2011

The Union Army scored its first major victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in 1862. Here, Gen. U.S. Grant took the first big step that would take he and his soldiers on to bloody Shiloh, to Chattanooga, and to Vicksburg . Many of the troops who stood with Grant at Donelson were destined to march with Gen. William T. Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas. The road ahead took Grant from Chattanooga to General-in-Chief and on to Appomattox Court House. In early February, 1862 , Grant moved against Fort Henry on the Tennessee River with an amphibious force supplied by four ironclad gunboats under army administrative control. The fort surrendered on Feb. 6, and Grant boasted that "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." Grant was not able to do so, but Bearss argues that few could. Some 16,000 soldiers defended Fort Donelson, and Grant's vanguard arrived in front of it on Feb. 12. By the following day, Grant had partially invested the Confederate stronghold. Rebel water batteries defeated Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote and his fleet (four ironclads and two timberclads) on Feb. 14 as they exchanged "iron valentines." The following day, the Confederates boldly seized the initiative and rolled back the Union right. With victory seemingly in Union grasp and the road to Nashville opened, Grant ordered a counterattack. The Confederates retired into the fort's perimeter and the next day surrendered unconditionally. The Union had a legitimate hero as Captain Sam Grant morphed into "Unconditional Surrender" Grant. Length: 78 Minutes

Dr. Lewis Sorley
Independent Scholar
Lecture Date: Oct. 19, 2011 

Is this man the real reason the Vietnam War was lost? How did he get there, why did he fail, and how did he last so long? Unless and until we understand General William Westmoreland, we will never understand what happened to us in Vietnam, or why. An Eagle Scout at fifteen, First Captain of his West Point class, Westmoreland fought in World War II and Korea, rising rapidly to command the 101st Airborne Division and become Superintendent at West Point, then was chosen to lead the war effort in Vietnam.

That turned out to be a disaster. He failed to understand a complex war, choosing a flawed strategy, sticking to it in the face of all opposition, and misrepresenting the results when truth mattered most. In so doing he squandered four years of support by Congress, much of the media, and the American people. The tragedy of William Westmoreland provides lessons not just for Vietnam, but for America's future military and political leadership. Length: 89 Minutes

Dr. Dominic Tierney
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College
Lecture Date: Sep, 21, 2011
 
Americans love war. We've never run from a fight. Our triumphs from the American Revolution to World War II define who we are as a nation and a people.

Americans hate war. Our leaders rush us into conflicts without knowing the facts or understanding the consequences. Korea, Vietnam, and now Iraq and Afghanistan define who we are as a nation and a people.

Why are we so often at war? Do we fight conflicts in a uniquely American way? Why do we win and lose? Tierney has created a secret history of American foreign policy and a frank and insightful look at how Americans respond to the ultimate challenge.

Dominic Tierney is assistant professor of political science at Swarthmore College, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and a correspondent at The Atlantic. He completed his PhD in international politics at Oxford University in 2003, and has held fellowships at the Olin Institute and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. His latest book is How We Fight, which Ambassador James Dobbins, former Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, described as, "A great theme, beautifully written and compellingly organized, it's an important contribution to a national debate over the war in Afghanistan which is only gathering steam." Tierney is also the author of FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America, and Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics, with Dominic Johnson, which won the International Studies Association award for the best book of the year, and was nominated for the best book of the decade. Tierney's work has also appeared in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Economist, and on NPR. Length: 61 Minutes

Dr. David J. Ulbrich
Historian, U.S. Army Engineer School
Lecture Date: July 13, 2011

Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, numerous challenges confronted the U.S. Marine Corps, including fiscal restraints, manpower shortages, promotion bottlenecks, and isolationist sentiments. An entirely different set of difficulties emerged after Pearl Harbor.
Despite these obstacles, Commandant Thomas Holcomb supervised the Marine Corps' mobilization in the Second World War's initial twenty-four months. During his entire commandancy, the Corps grew from 18,000 men in 1936 to 385,000 in 1943. Not only did Holcomb leave the Corps much larger, but he also guided its transition into an armed service capable of making amphibious assaults thousands of miles across the Pacific.

Although a visionary leader, shrewd publicist, meticulous planner, and progressive manager, he has been ignored or given short shrift in most histories of the Corps. This presentation will write Holcomb back in the history of the Second World War. It will evaluate him as a manager using such case studies as the development of amphibious warfare, the reorganization of Headquarters Marine Corps, and the introduction of women and African Americans into the Corps. Ultimately, Commandant Holcomb did more than any other Leatherneck to transform the Marine Corps into the modern force-in-readiness that would help win the Pacific War and see action during the Cold War and more recent conflicts. Length: 68 Minutes

Dr. Wayne Hsieh
Assistant Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy
Lecture Date: June 15, 2011

Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh demonstrates how the "old army" transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how "old army" methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War. Hsieh demonstrates the importance of the Old Army's post-War of 1812 professionalization to American military success during the Mexican War, and he examines both the strengths and the weaknesses of the U.S. Army's institutions during the antebellum period. He reveals how an antebellum American military culture that idealized the citizen soldier allowed regular army men a virtual monopoly on professional military expertise, and how that forced both sections to use old army veterans as the leadership cores of their armies. Hsieh draws out the implications of that reliance, which produced an equilibrium of competence between both armies that helped prolong the conflict, because both sections' armies began with roughly comparable levels of military competence, and learned the business of war at roughly the same rate. Furthermore, the weakness of American military institutions gave an outsized importance to individual military leaders, the two most important being Lee and McClellan, who could thus stamp their respective armies with distinctive command cultures. Length: 69 Minutes

Dr. Kyle F. Zelner
Associate Professor of History, University of Southern Mississippi
Lecture Date: may 18, 2011

While it lasted only sixteen months, King Philip's War (1675-1676) was arguably one of the most significant of the colonial wars that wracked early America. As the first major military crisis to directly strike one of the Empire's most important possessions: the Massachusetts Bay Colony, King Philip's War marked the first time that Massachusetts had to mobilize mass numbers of ordinary, local men to fight. In this exhaustive social history and community study of Essex County, Massachusetts's militia, Kyle F. Zelner boldly challenges traditional interpretations of who was called to serve during this period. Drawing on muster and pay lists as well as countless historical records, Zelner demonstrates that Essex County's more upstanding citizens were often spared from impressments, while the "rabble" - criminals, drunkards, the poor- were forced to join active fighting units, with town militia committees selecting soldiers who would be least missed should they die in action. Enhanced by illustrations and maps, A Rabble in Arms shows that, despite heroic illusions of a universal military obligation, town fathers, to damaging effects, often placed local and personal interests above colonial military concerns. Length: 71 Minutes

Dr. Richard J. Sommers
Senior Historian, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
Lecture Date: Feb. 16, 2011 

Ulysses S. Grant was neither a magnetic leader of Soldiers (such as George McClellan or George Patton) nor a military genius (in the mold of Robert E. Lee or Douglas MacArthur). Yet his qualities of command mark him as the best general in the Federal Army and one of the most successful generals in all of American history. Most significantly, he understood how to convert advantages into achievements. Our February program analyzes the generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, identifies his many strengths as a military commander, and yet also acknowledges limitations in his leadership. The presentation proceeds to place his generalship in the overall context of the American Civil War. Length: 81 Minutes

Col. Ha Mai Viet, ARVN
Independent Scholar
Lecture Date: Apr. 20, 2011

Colonel Ha Mai Viet presents a historically accurate and detailed account of the Vietnam War from the perspective of the South Vietnamese armored forces. Highly decorated for his valor and leadership of the armored units, he spent ten years documenting what went on so he could offer an analysis of the war based on facts. He interviewed hundreds of people, including all senior South Vietnamese officers involved and many of lesser rank, as well as American advisers. Viet tells the story without glossing over the shortcomings of his fellow soldiers. His efforts serve as an invaluable record of his army's organization, combat operations, and interaction with U.S. advisers. Colonel Viet will provide background on himself and his family, then describe research for his history of the South Vietnamese armored force, publication of the book in Vietnamese (in 2005) and in English (2008), and highlights of the account. Length: 60 Minutes

Dr. Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr.
Lecture Date: Jan. 18, 2006 

On February 8, 2010, the history community of the United States lost a very learned scholar in the untimely death of Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr, Ph.D. Presented is Dr. Bergeron's perspectives lecture from 18 January 2006.
Born in Bavaria, Godfrey Weitzel moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, with his family while a young boy. He graduated from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point and became a lieutenant of engineers. During the American Civil War, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and later major general. Weitzel commanded the Twenty-Fifth Army Corps (an all black unit) during the closing months of the war, and his men occupied the former Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia, on April 3, 1865. Weitzel’s somewhat meteoric rise in rank and responsibility was somewhat unusual because he had been an engineer officer rather than having served in a combat unit. He was a protege of the notorious General Benjamin F. Butler, but that relationship seems not to have had an adverse impact on his Civil War career. Art Bergeron will explore the background, education, and experiences of this fascinating and complex officer and assess his generalship. Length: 61 Minutes

Dr. Edward Drea
Historian, Joint History Office
Lecture Date: Mar. 16, 2011

Following World War I, the Imperial Japanese Army sought to modernize its weapons and equipment and transform its force structure. For almost two decades, the best and the brightest staff officers assigned to the War Ministry and General Staff grappled with transformation issues as they sought to create a modern force capable of protecting Japanese interests in Northeast Asia. The fundamental question revolved around how to prepare Japan for a future conflict that would require national, industrial, and military mobilization to fight and win a protracted war. Shifting political trends and Japan’s weak industrial infrastructure limited the parameters for transformation. This resulted in fierce debates about Japan’s future military strategy and diverse theories about total war in the offices of the Army General Staff and the War Ministry that set officer classmates against one another.

The Imperial Army’s story of military transformation involves more than weapons procurement and acquisition policies. It was a twenty-year struggle for the soul of the Army. The officer education and promotion systems played central roles in the drama because these determined the choice assignments for future advancement and high command. Between the early 1920s and the mid-1930s, multiple transformative initiatives faltered until one brilliant but eccentric Army colonel seemed on the cusp of achieving the Army’s goal of a national mobilization state. Length: 66 Minutes

LTC Mark A. Viney
Director, U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center
Lecture Date: Jan. 19, 2011 

LTC Mark A. Viney, the Director of the U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, synthesizes new oral history with recently declassified documents to provide a fresh perspective on Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, who as a senior strategist during the Vietnam War, consistently advocated an offensive strategy for victory over North Vietnam. The centerpiece of General Wheeler’s strategy was Operation Mule Shoe, a heretofore unknown Joint Chiefs of Staff operation plan for a limited invasion, or “lodgement”, into southern North Vietnam to reduce enemy sanctuary areas above the demilitarized zone. Primarily intended to reveal new information about a heretofore unknown aspect of Joint Chiefs of Staff activity, this presentation also challenges perceptions of General Wheeler and his JCS colleagues as derelict, passive accomplices to civilian mismanagement of the war. Length: 51 Minutes

LTC Mark A. Viney
Director, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
Lecture Date: Jan. 19, 2010

Commencing in December 1995, Operation Joint Endeavor sought to implement a peace agreement concluding a bloody, ethnically motivated civil war in Bosnia. Over 57,000 NATO Soldiers participated in the year-long operation, which was the first-ever ground operation conducted by NATO and the largest military operation in Europe since World War Two. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Quarterhorse) was one of the first combat units of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) to enter Bosnia, where it played a pivotal role in the international effort to mend that nation still smoldering from three and a half years of brutal civil war. Despite the mountainous terrain, bad weather, tens of thousands of land mines, the periodic threat of terrorist attack, and the political imperative to minimize American casualties, Quarterhorse upheld the peace in one of the most challenging parts of the American sector. A useful case study of stability operations during the Age of Interventions (1989-2001), the American experience in Bosnia contributed to the development of military leaders who would go on to lead combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Length: 77 Minutes

Dr. Michael Neiberg
Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History
U.S. Army War College
Lecture Date: Dec. 15, 2010

The First World War set in motion the train of events that gave us fascism, World War II, genocide, the Cold War, and the modern Middle East. Most also know that the war supposedly started when the assassination of an Austrian archduke unleashed the nationalist hatreds that dominated the European continent. Almost one hundred years after the start of the war, this explanation is no longer sufficient. To understand why this most important of all wars began, we must get beyond the simple, yet incorrect, views of Europe that have dominated this discussion for a century. Dr. Neiberg provides a more accurate picture of Europe and the impact of the events of 1914 presenting the context of the First World War in all its complexity. Length: 75 Minutes

Dr. Richard Harrison
Independent Scholar
Lecture Date: Nov. 17, 2010 

The Red Army's leading operational theorist in the 1930s, Georgii Samoilovich Isserson was the mastermind behind the "deep operation"--the cornerstone of Soviet offensive operations in World War II. Drawing from an in-depth analysis of Isserson's numerous published and unpublished works, his arrest file in the former KGB archives, and interviews with his family. Length: 68 Minutes

Dr. John W. Hall
Ambrose-Hesseltine Asst. Professor of US Military History
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Lecture Date: July 21, 2010

In the spring of 1832, when the Indian warrior Black Hawk and a thousand followers marched into Illinois to reoccupy lands earlier ceded to American settlers, the U.S. Army turned to rival tribes for military support. John Hall explores these alliances and provides a rare view of Indian attitudes and strategies in war and peace. Hall deepens our understanding of Native Americans and the complex roles they played in the nation’s history. More broadly, he demonstrates the risks and lessons of small wars that entail an “uncommon defense” by unlikely allies in pursuit of diverse, even conflicting, goals. Length: 67 Minutes

Col (Ret.) Lee Burcham
Veteran
Lecture Date: Sep. 15, 2010

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the leaders of the victorious powers convened to negotiate the necessary protocols, territorial occupancy agreements, rites of passage, and myriad other details as to how Germany was to be governed. Generally, the powers agreed that Germany would be treated as an entity and not as a partitioned state. As time passed, however, it became apparent that the occupation of Germany was not only costly to the victors but also was increasingly harmful to the prospects for a recovered, democratic state as a member of the European community once again. The Soviets were unalterably opposed to a revitalization of the economy because such recovery would render the German and western European populations less vulnerable to the expansion of communism, which fed vigorously on poverty. The Soviets opposed cooperation on any of the four-power coordinating committees, and shut down access to Berlin in the early summer of 1948. The U.S. Air Force reallocated transport aircraft to Europe and recalled reserve officers and airmen with scarce personnel skills, and built an unequalled task force, while the world looked on-- in disbelief. In a twelve-month period the Berlin Airlift fed people and maintained industry, while averting an armed confrontation. Length:77 Minutes

Dr. Mark E. Neely, Jr.
McCabe Greer Professor of History, Pennsylvania State University
Lecture Date: Aug. 18, 2010

Abraham Lincoln's record on the Constitution and individual rights has fueled a century of debate. Now, in the Pulitzer Prize-winning "The Fate of Liberty", Mark Neely depicts Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus as a well-intentioned attempt to deal with a floodtide of unforeseen events: the threat to Washington as Maryland flirted with secession, disintegrating public order in the border states, corruption among military contractors, the occupation of hostile Confederate territory, contraband trade with the South, and the outcry against the first draft in U.S. history. Drawing on letters from prisoners, records of military courts and federal prisons, memoirs, and federal archives, he paints a vivid picture of how Lincoln responded to these problems, how his policies were actually executed, and the virulent political debates that followed. Length: 66 Minutes

Dr. Robert Citino
Professor of History, University of North Texas
Lecture Date: June 16, 2010

The 1942 campaigning season ended in disaster for the German Wehrmacht, with twin and nearly simultaneous defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Analysts have usually assigned responsibility for the catastrophe to the amateurish strategy of Adolf Hitler, or to miscalculations on the part of the German General Staff, or to various mistakes by the field commanders at critical junctures. But what if we have misconstrued the true causes of the catastrophe? What if, in fact, the Wehrmacht failed in 1942 not because of fundamental problems within the classic "German way of war," a unique combination of doctrines, attitudes, and assumptions whose roots lay deep in the history of Prussia and Germany?

In Death of the Wehrmacht, military historian Robert Citino offers not only a detailed analysis of the German campaigns in the Soviet Union and North Africa, but also ties them into the traditional pattern of German operations extending back hundreds of years. In a major reevaluation of the campaigns of 1942, Citino shows how the German army’s emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement" as they were in Hitler’s deeply flawed management of the war. Citino examines how one of history’s most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination. Length: 78 Minutes

Dr. Andrew A. Wiest
Professor and Director International Studies, University of Southern Mississippi
Lecture Date: Apr. 21, 2010

Pham Van Dinh and Tran Ngoc Hue were two of the brightest young stars in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Both men fought with valor in a war that seemed to have no end, exemplifying ARVN bravery and determination that is largely forgotten or ignored in the West. However, while Hue fought until he was captured by the North Vietnamese Army and then endured thirteen years of captivity, Dinh surrendered and defected to the enemy, for whom he served as a teacher in the reeducation of his former ARVN comrades.
An understanding of how two lives that were so similar diverged so dramatically provides a lens through which to understand the ARVN and South Vietnam’s complex relationship with Americas government and military. The lives of Dinh and Hue reflect the ARVNs battlefield successes, from the recapture of the Citadel in Hue City in the Tet Offensive of 1968, to Dinhs unheralded role in the seizure of Hamburger Hill a year later. However, their careers expose an ARVN that was over-politicized, tactically flawed, and dependent on American logistical and firepower support. Marginalized within an American war, ARVN faced a grim fate as U.S. forces began to exit the conflict. As the structure of the ARVN/U.S. alliance unraveled, Dinh and Hue were left alone to make the most difficult decisions of their lives.
Once both military superstars, Dinh is viewed by a traitor by many within the South Vietnamese community, while Hue, an expatriate living in northern Virginia, is seen as a hero who never let go of his ideals. Their experiences and legacies mirror that of the ARVNs rise and fall as well as the tragic history of South Vietnam. Length: 69 Minutes

Richard B. Frank
Historian
Lecture Date: May 19, 2010

American military strategy in the Pacific during World War II hinged on the debates over the rival end game strategies of invasion versus blockade and bombardment, and in particular, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King’s role in the development of the strategy and what light it sheds on U.S. civil-military relationships. 
King, in keeping with carefully honed navy strategy between the wars, was adamantly opposed to any invasion of Japan. But he also realized that if he forced a showdown on this in the first half of 1945, he likely could not prevail. He advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he agreed that the JCS must issue the order for the invasion so that this could be prepared as an option, but that he expected they will revisit the issue of whether they really must invade Japan in August or September of that year. 

This raises very interesting and provocative questions about King's conduct and how this fits into any model of U.S. civil-military relations. Should King have masked his views (and those of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas) to Truman in the June 1945 meeting which was for the explicit purpose of getting the doubtful Truman to agree to an invasion? Should he instead have forthrightly stated his objections before Truman in June? Did King's decision to postpone a showdown over the invasion strategy effect the effort of the navy contingent on the staff of the JCS in presenting casualty estimates to Truman when he asked for them? Finally, how does this episode tie in to the still larger issue of the significance of military factors in the end of the Pacific War on both sides in the ongoing controversies surrounding these events?

Richard B. Frank was born in Kansas in 1947. Upon graduation from the University of Missouri in 1969, he was commissioned in the United States Army, in which he served almost four years, including a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam as an aerorifle platoon leader with the 101st Airborne Division. In 1976, he completed studies at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. The following year he began research on his first book, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Campaign, which was published in 1990. He lives in Annandale, Virginia. Mr. Frank is a consultant to the HBO miniseries The Pacific, airing 14 MAR-16 MAY 2010. Length: 83 Minutes

Dr. Susannah J. Ural
Associate Professor of History, University of Southern Mississippi
Lecture Date: Mar. 17, 2010

On the eve of the Civil War, the Irish were one of America's largest ethnic groups, and approximately 150,000 fought for the Union. Analyzing letters and diaries written by soldiers and civilians; military, church, and diplomatic records; and community newspapers, Susannah Ural Bruce significantly expands the story of Irish-American Catholics in the Civil War, and reveals a complex picture of those who fought for the Union. While the population was diverse, many Irish Americans had dual loyalties to the U.S. and Ireland, which influenced their decisions to volunteer, fight, or end their military service. When the Union cause supported their interests in Ireland and America, large numbers of Irish Americans enlisted. However, as the war progressed, the Emancipation Proclamation, federal draft, and sharp rise in casualties caused Irish Americans to question and sometimes abandon the war effort because they viewed such changes as detrimental to their families and futures in America and Ireland. By recognizing these competing and often fluid loyalties, The Harp and the Eagle sheds new light on the relationship between Irish-American volunteers and the Union Army, and how the Irish made sense of both the Civil War and their loyalty to the United States. Length: 64 Minutes

Dr. Harold R. Winton
Professor of Military History and Theory, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University
Lecture Date: Feb. 17, 2010

If the Battle of the Bulge was Germany's last gasp, it was also America's proving ground-the largest single action fought by the U.S. Army in World War II. Victory in this legendary campaign was built upon the remarkable resurrection of our truncated interwar army, an overhaul that produced the effective commanders crucial to GI success in beating back the Ardennes counteroffensive launched by Hitler's forces. Understanding leadership during this period requires examining the largely neglected level of corps command. Focusing on the decisions and actions of six Army corps commanders-Leonard Gerow, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgway, John Millikin, Manton Eddy, and J. Lawton Collins, Dr. Hal Winton recreates their role in this epic struggle through a mosaic of narratives that take the commanders from the pre-war training grounds of America to the crucible of war in the icy-cold killing fields of Belgium and Luxembourg. Winton introduces the story of each phase of the Bulge with a theater-level overview of the major decisions and events that shaped the corps battles and, for the first time, fully integrates the crucial role of airpower into our understanding of how events unfolded on the ground. Unlike most accounts of the Ardennes that chronicle only the periods of German and American initiative, this study describes an intervening middle phase in which the initiative was fiercely contested by both sides and the outcome uncertain. His inclusion of the principal American and German commanders adds yet another valuable layer to this rich tapestry of narrative and analysis. Ultimately, Winton argues that the flexibility of the corps structure and the competence of the men who commanded the six American corps that fought in the Bulge contributed significantly to the ultimate victory. Length: 77 Minutes

Mark Grimsley, Ph.D
Harold K. Johnson Visiting Professor of Military History, U.S. Army War College
Lecture Date: Jan. 20, 2010 

The Virginia campaign of Spring 1864 was a single, massive operation stretching hundreds of miles. The story of the campaign is also the story of the demise of two great armies. The scale of casualties and human suffering that the campaign inflicted makes it unique in U.S. history. Mark Grimsley's study, however, is not just another battle book. Grimsley places the campaign in the political context of the 1864 presidential election; questions conventional interpretations; and explores the campaign as a touchstone of the Southern myth of the "Lost Cause."

Professor Grimsley is currently on leave from The Ohio State University where he teaches American military history with an emphasis on the Civil War. He is the author of The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (1995), which won the Lincoln Prize. His other work includes Warfare in the Western World; Civilians in the Path of War (2002) (with Clifford J. Rogers); The Collapse of the Confederacy (2001) (with Brooks D. Simpson); And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864 (2002), Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide (1999) (with Brooks D. Simpson), and Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (2006) (with Steven E. Woodworth). He is currently writing a book on the connections between the 1864 military and political campaigns for the "Pivotal Moments in American History" series, published by Oxford University Press. Length: 60 Minutes

Greg Jaffe
Journalist, The Washington Post
Lecture Date: Dec. 16, 2009

They were four exceptional soldiers, a new generation asked to save an army that had been hollowed out after Vietnam. They survived the military's brutal winnowing to reach its top echelon. They became the Army's most influential generals in the crucible of Iraq. Collectively, their lives tell the story of the Army over the last four decades and illuminate the path it must travel to protect the nation over the next century. Theirs is a story of successes and failures, of ambitions achieved and thwarted, of the responsibilities and perils of command. The careers of this elite quartet show how the most powerful military force in the world entered a major war unprepared, and how the Army, drawing on a reservoir of talent that few thought it possessed, saved itself from crushing defeat against a ruthless, low-tech foe. In The Fourth Star, you'll follow:

•Gen. John Abizaid, one of the Army's most brilliant minds. Fluent in Arabic, he forged an unconventional path in the military to make himself an expert on the Middle East, but this unique background made him skeptical of the war he found himself leading.
•Gen. George Casey Jr., the son of the highest-ranking general to be killed in the Vietnam War. Casey had grown up in the Army and won praise for his common touch and skill as a soldier. He was determined not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam but would take much of the blame as Iraq collapsed around him.
•Gen. Peter Chiarelli, an emotional, take-charge leader who, more than any other senior officer, felt the sting of the Army's failures in Iraq. He drove his soldiers, the chain of command, and the U.S. government to rethink the occupation plans–yet rarely achieved the results he sought.
•Gen. David Petraeus, a driven soldier-scholar. Determined to reach the Army's summit almost since the day he entered West Point, he sometimes alienated peers with his ambition and competitiveness. When he finally got his chance in Iraq, he–more than anyone–changed the Army's conception of what was possible.

Masterfully written and richly reported, The Fourth Star ranges far beyond today's battlefields, evoking the Army's tumultuous history since Vietnam through these four captivating lives and ultimately revealing a fascinating irony: In an institution that prizes obedience, the most effective warriors are often those who dare to question the prevailing orthodoxy and in doing so redefine the American way of war. Greg Jaffe is the Pentagon correspondent at the Washington Post and previously held the same position at the Wall Street Journal. In 1999, he was part of a team of reporters that won the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. Length: 77 Minutes

Lisa M. Budreau, Ph.D.
Research Historian, Office of Medical History, Office of the Surgeon General
Lecture Date: Nov. 10, 2009

World War I marked the first war in which the United States government and military took full responsibility for the identification, burial, and memorialization of those killed in battle, and as a result, the process of burying and remembering the dead became intensely political. The government and military attempted to create a patriotic consensus on the historical memory of World War I in which war dead were not only honored but used as a symbol to legitimize America's participation in a war not fully supported by all citizens. The saga of American soldiers killed in World War I and the efforts of the living to honor them is a neglected component of United States military history, and in this fascinating yet often macabre account, Lisa M. Budreau unpacks the politics and processes of the competing interest groups involved in the three core components of commemoration: repatriation, remembrance, and return. She also describes how relatives of the fallen made pilgrimages to French battlefields, attended largely by American Legionnaires and the Gold Star Mothers, a group formed by mothers of sons killed in World War I, which exists to this day. Throughout, and with sensitivity to issues of race and gender, Bodies of War emphasizes the inherent tensions in the politics of memorialization and explores how those interests often conflicted with the needs of veterans and relatives. Length: 68 Minutes

Colonel (Ret.) Peter R. Mansoor, Ph.D.
General Raymond E. Mason, Jr. Chair of Military History, The Ohio State University
Lecture Date: oct. 21, 2009

Baghdad at Sunrise presents an unparalleled record of what happened after U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, the on-the-ground commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division - the "Ready First Combat Team" - describes his brigade's first year in Iraq, from the sweltering, chaotic summer after the Ba'athists' defeat to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government a year later. Uniquely positioned to observe, record, and assess the events of that fateful year, Mansoor now explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency of unexpected strength and tenacity. Drawing not only on his own daily combat journal but also on observations by embedded reporters, news reports, combat logs, archived e-mails, and many other sources, Mansoor offers a contemporary record of the valor, motivations, and resolve of the 1st Brigade and its attachments during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet this is more than a personal memoir or unit history. Baghdad at Sunrise provides a detailed, nuanced analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and along with it critically important lessons for America's military and political leaders of the twenty-first century. Length: 80 Minutes

Dr. Fred Anderson
University of Colorado, Boulder
Lecture Date: Apr. 16, 2008

Histories of the American Revolution tend to start  in 1763, the end of the Seven Years’ War, a worldwide struggle for empire that  pitted France against England in North America, Europe, and Asia.  Among its surprising results was the  disruption of the British empire as a political system; indeed, within a dozen  years that empire fell into the civil war that produced in the American  Revolution.  Fred Anderson, Professor of  History at the University of Colorado at Boulder, will seek to explain the  significance of the American phase of the Seven Years’ War – commonly called  the French and Indian War -- in American history, affirming that the best way  to understand the Revolution is as part of a 40-year-long attempt to assert  imperial control over the Forks of the Ohio, where Pittsburgh now stands.  He will argue in favor of the perhaps  surprising proposition that winning an imperial war in a decisive way may  ultimately carry consequences more harmful to the victor than the  vanquished. Length: 70 Minutes

Dr. Buzz Aldrin
Astronaut
Lecture Date: Sep. 23, 2009

Forty years ago, Buzz Aldrin became the second human, minutes after Neil Armstrong, to set foot on a celestial body other than the Earth. The event remains one of mankind's greatest achievements and was witnessed by the largest worldwide television audience in history. In the years since, millions more have had their Earth-centric perspective unalterably changed by the iconic photograph of Aldrin standing on the surface of the moon, the blackness of space behind him and his fellow explorer and the Eagle reflected in his visor. Describing the alien world he was walking upon, he uttered the words "magnificent desolation." And as the astronauts later sat in the Eagle, waiting to begin their journey back home, knowing that they were doomed unless every system and part on board worked flawlessly, it was Aldrin who responded to Mission Control's clearance to take off with the quip, "Roger. Understand. We're number one on the runway." Length: 81 Minutes

Dr. John Grenier
Norwich University
Lecture Date: Aug. 19, 2009

The American conquest of Indian communities east of the  Mississippi River helps demonstrate how early Americans embraced warfare shaped  by extravagant violence and focused on conquest. Grenier provides a major  revision in understanding the place of warfare directed on noncombatants in the  American military tradition, and his conclusions are relevant to understand US  'special operations' in the War on Terror. He explores the evolution of  American war, showing how the first war waged against Indian noncombatant  populations and their agricultural resources became the standard method of war employed by early Americans and which ultimately defined their military heritage.Length: 65 Minutes