APHIS FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE FRAMEWORK
ROLES AND COORDINATION

FAD PReP
Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness & Response Plan

National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management

United States Department of Agriculture • Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service • Veterinary Services

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National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management
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The *USDA APHIS Framework for Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response* was released as a draft for comment in July 2010. We were pleased to receive many comments, from a wide range of stakeholders including industry, academic experts, and Federal and State officials.

As we were revising this document, other FAD PReP documents were drafted and released for comment, including disease-specific response plans, National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines, and standard operating procedures. We have continued to revise this document to reflect the changes made in other FAD PReP materials, and to reflect the comments we received and continue to receive on these complex topics.

In this process, we elected to transform the 2010 document into two distinct new documents:

1. *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination* (FAD PReP Manual 1-0, May 2012), and
2. *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies* (FAD PReP Manual 2-0, May 2012).

While much of the material of these two documents remains the same, there have been critical changes both in substance and organization. The first of these two documents contains information on APHIS authorities and funding, incident management, Federal department roles and responsibilities, and communication for an FAD outbreak. The second document contains information on APHIS FAD response strategies, zone and premises designations, and critical activities in an FAD response. The bulleted list below summarizes the key changes we made in creating these new documents.

- Reorganization and separation of the overall concept of operations (approaches, systems, and relationships) for FAD preparedness and response from the more detailed information on response strategies and activities.
- Revision of all information, including information on response strategies, to ensure consistency with existing FAD PReP response plans.
- Clarification of zones, areas, and premises based on comments received.
- Modifications to the chapter on the Incident Command System to better explain multiagency coordination and the incident management structure, including new figures.
- Adjustments to preparedness and response goals to reflect practical realities and challenges.
- Corrections made in response to comments on the 2010 version.

We are excited about these new documents, but realize that further revisions will need to be made as planning continues and best practices are developed. As such, we will continue to accept comments on both of these new documents for incorporation into future versions. We realize that preparing for and responding to an FAD outbreak, particularly a highly contagious disease outbreak, will be a complex effort which requires collaboration from multiple stakeholders. Thank you for your participation and input into this effort.

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) mission is to raise awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD preparedness and response.

For more information, please go to:

https://fadprep.lmi.org (Request access)

http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml (APHIS employees)

or e-mail FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov.

The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Manuals provide an introduction to USDA APHIS FAD preparedness and response, and the framework for responding to an animal health emergency in the United States.

These manuals are under ongoing review. This document was last updated **May 2012**. Please send questions or comments to:

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Executive Summary

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is crucial to protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy. This document, the *Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Framework—Roles and Coordination* (Manual 1-0), is part of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) APHIS' Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP). It provides broad information about preparing for and responding to an FAD outbreak in the United States, based on the principles of the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS).

The *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination* covers

- an introduction to APHIS FAD preparedness and response,
- AHPIS authorities and funding,
- Federal department roles and responsibilities,
- an overview of incident management, and
- APHIS communication strategy for FAD incidents.

An FAD response is a complex and challenging process, requiring careful planning and diligent preparedness efforts. There will be disruptions to both interstate commerce and international trade. Resources, personnel, and countermeasures must be scalable and flexible to respond quickly as incidents evolve. There will be conflicting interests and competing priorities between stakeholders that need to be rapidly addressed in an outbreak. Effective coordination and cooperation between local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies, as well as between the government and industry stakeholders is necessary for successful planning and capable response. This document broadly discusses the roles and coordination mechanisms for APHIS FAD preparedness and response efforts.

As with any regulatory action, it is important to outline the statutes and regulations that delegate responsibility and authority to USDA APHIS for FAD response. The Animal Health Protection Act is the key act that delegates authority to APHIS to respond to an animal health incident; it also provides information on the emergency transfer of funds for a disease incident. Under this authority, further specific responsibility is delegated through the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Title 7 and Title 9 of the CFR, respectively, provide authority for the Secretary of Agriculture and APHIS Administrator, and provide specific regulations for the control and eradication of FADs.

While USDA will lead a response to an FAD outbreak, USDA may request Federal-to-Federal support from other Federal departments and agencies. Chapter 3 reviews the roles of Federal departments under the NRF Emergency Support Functions and provides information on the potential roles of USDA and other departments and agencies in an animal health incident, including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

APHIS has adopted NIMS and an Incident Command System (ICS) organizational approach to manage animal health incidents. All incidents, as prescribed in NIMS, begin and end locally. ICS will enable efficient and effective management, by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication within a common organizational structure. The ICS structure is both flexible and scalable, so it can be adapted to any animal health incident—large or small—regardless of cause or source.

For effective preparedness and successful response, APHIS has established internal and external communication processes to reduce the prospects of adverse public reaction and to mitigate the social and economic impact of an FAD outbreak. Both internal communication (between government authorities) and external communication (to the public and international partners) is critical to communicate procedures and protocols, achieve a coordinated response, gain the public's and our trading partners' trust, and raise awareness about preparedness and response activities.

The goal of FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, and de-conflict preparedness and response capabilities, as much as possible, before an outbreak by providing goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, comprehensive, easily readable, easily updated, and that comply with NIMS. As State, Federal, and Tribal government agencies and industry groups develop their own preparedness and response plans, it is critical they coordinate incident goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures on a local, regional, and national basis.

This document also has a companion document—*APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies* (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)—which provides significant detail on response strategies for an FAD outbreak. This document, and the documents referenced within this document, are available at https://fadprep.lmi.org. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive preparedness and response framework for an FAD outbreak.

Your comments on this document are invited, and can be sent to FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Preparedness and response planning for foreign animal disease (FAD) incidents is crucial to effectively protect public health, animal health, animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy. Collaboration among local, State, Tribal, and Federal government agencies and food and agriculture industries is necessary for achieving shared objectives in each phase of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The success of preparedness and response efforts depends on the effectiveness of cooperation among stakeholders. It is critical that stakeholders coordinate incident goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures before an incident. Communication and collaboration ahead of an FAD outbreak will reduce the likelihood of unmet expectations, and improve the speed and effectiveness of response.

This Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) document provides an overview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) FAD preparedness and response framework for incident management, funding, communication strategies, relationships, and authorities during an FAD incident or outbreak. This manual is complemented by the *APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies* (FAD PReP Manual 2-0), which provides detail on response strategies for an FAD outbreak. Together, these documents provide a comprehensive preparedness and response foundation for FADs.

1.1 Challenges of FAD Response

FAD incidents may present many logistical, technical, and strategic challenges. For example, in an FAD incident, large, diverse, and often geographically dispersed teams are assembled quickly with an expectation to perform rapidly. However, not all emergency responders and stakeholders may have prior food and agriculture specific knowledge or know the activities required for a successful FAD response. Additionally, some veterinary activities and countermeasures are complex and require significant preparation prior to an outbreak to effectively mitigate its severity. These activities include biosecurity, quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation and tracing, surveillance, diagnostic testing, cleaning and disinfection, depopulation, disposal, and possibly emergency vaccination.

Another challenge, especially for large-scale outbreaks, is the ability to rapidly scale up resources and trained personnel for veterinary activities and countermeasures, effectively manage scarce resources, and efficiently allocate resources.

There are likely to be competing interests and different priorities. For example, the goal of containing and eradicating an FAD within a Control Area (CA) by quarantine may be in conflict with the objectives of non-infected premises within the CA that seek to maintain or re-establish business by demonstrating freedom from infection and effective biosecurity.

While some competing priorities may be impossible to identify or resolve prior to an incident or outbreak, others can be partially resolved or mitigated by elevating the awareness of those competing priorities, identifying the resources needed to resolve those competing priorities, and establishing commonly accepted and understood response objectives before an incident. Past outbreaks both in the United States and in other countries also offer important lessons that can be applied to preparedness and response planning. To achieve successful outcomes in future FAD response, it is vital to understand and apply the following lessons learned:

- Provide a unified State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning process that respects local knowledge.
- Ensure the Unified Command sets clearly defined, obtainable, and unified goals.
- Have a Unified Command with a clear and proper delegation of authority and that acts with speed and certainty.
- Employ science-based and risk-management approaches that seek to protect public health and animal health, protect animal agriculture, and stabilize the food supply and U.S. economy.
- Ensure guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated to, and understood by, responders and stakeholders.
- Acknowledge that high expectations for timely and successful outcomes require the
  - rapid scale-up of resources and trained personnel for veterinary activities and countermeasures, and
  - the capability to quickly address competing interests before or during an outbreak.
- Ensure rapid detection and effective FAD tracing, essential for the timely control of FAD outbreaks.

1.2 FAD PREP

USDA APHIS has established FAD PReP to provide a framework for FAD preparedness and response. FAD PReP was also developed to meet the recommendations of many stakeholders to improve FAD response capabilities. It is intended to integrate and synchronize the principles and applied systems of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by providing outbreak response goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures for local, State, Federal, and Tribal responders. For additional information on stakeholders, please see the *National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide*.[1]

FAD PReP is intended to raise awareness of response activities and veterinary countermeasures, identify gaps or shortcomings in current preparedness planning, and provide a framework for States, Tribes, and other stakeholders to use in developing their own response plans.

1.2.1 Plan Development and Methodology

FAD PReP is developed iteratively by reviewing current local, State, Tribal, national, and international FAD policies and plans, conducting detailed literature reviews, and consulting a diverse range of subject matter experts from both the public and private sector. Appendix A contains a complete list of current FAD PReP documents, illustrated in Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. FAD PReP Suite of Documents and Materials

Note: NAHEMS = National Animal Health Emergency Management System, SOP = standard operating procedures.

[1] This document, and others referenced throughout this FAD PReP Manual, are available at https://fadprep.lmi.org and for APHIS employees at http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml.

To maintain the effectiveness of these planning documents and relationships, APHIS will review the FAD PReP material at regular intervals. To provide easy access and facilitate the review process, APHIS will take the following steps:

- Ensure that FAD PReP guidance is readily available to local, State, Federal, Tribal, and other stakeholders. FAD PReP documents can be found on the FAD PReP collaboration site at https://fadprep.lmi.org and for APHIS employees at http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml.

- Encourage all interested and responsible parties to review documents and provide recommendations for improvements or updates. APHIS will specify the date of the review for new information, but comments and collaboration are always welcome.

- Provide an e-mail address where improvements or updates can be sent. That e-mail address is FAD.PReP.Comments@aphis.usda.gov.

- Designate an individual or group responsible for updating the documents. That person or group will do the following:

  - Incorporate recommendations and comments from local, Tribal, State, Federal, and industry partners and stakeholders.

  - Incorporate updates from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and other international organizations.

  - Revise the document based on changes in policy or procedure.

  - Distribute and publish the updated document.

1.3 NRF, NIMS, AND NAHEMS INTEGRATION

Successful emergency preparedness and response requires integration between the NRF, NIMS, and NAHEMS. Each of these systems has a specific function in a hierarchical pattern from general to more specific. FAD PReP documents then provide more detailed information, including disease-specific information, and further direction on response requirements in the event of an FAD outbreak.

1.3.1 NRF

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It describes specific authorities and establishes a comprehensive approach for responding to domestic incidents that range from serious but purely local events to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. It builds on NIMS, which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. The NRF is available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/.

1.3.2 NIMS

NIMS, a companion document to the NRF, provides a systematic, nationwide, proactive approach guiding departments and agencies at all levels of government, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Its goal is to help these organizations work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents—regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity—to reduce the loss of life, liberty, property, and harm to the environment. NIMS information is available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/.

This framework forms the basis for interoperability and compatibility that will, in turn, enable diverse public and private organizations to conduct well-integrated and effective emergency management and incident response operations. It does this through a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, organizational processes, terminology, and standard requirements applicable to a broad community of NIMS users.

The system is a comprehensive, nationwide, systematic approach to incident management, including the Incident Command System, multiagency coordination systems, and public information. NIMS consists of five key components:

1. A set of preparedness concepts and principles for all hazards;
2. Essential principles for a common operating picture and interoperability of communications and information management;
3. Standardized resource management procedures that enable coordination among different jurisdictions or organizations;
4. Scalability, for use in all incidents (ranging from day-to-day to large-scale); and
5. A dynamic system that promotes ongoing management and maintenance.

1.3.3 NAHEMS

APHIS and its stakeholders established NAHEMS to provide a functional framework for responding to FAD emergencies. The purpose of the NAHEMS Guidelines is to ensure a successful response commensurate with the severity of the outbreak. Federal, State, and local agencies, Tribal Nations, and other groups involved in animal health emergency management activities should integrate the information provided in the NAHEMS Guidelines into their preparedness planning.

NAHEMS Guidelines (and other FAD PReP documents) offer

- competent veterinary guidance on cleaning and disinfection, disposal, mass depopulation, and other activities;
- information on disease control and eradication strategies and principles;
- guidance on health, safety, and personal protective equipment issues;
- biosecurity information and site-specific management strategies; and
- training and education resources.

In particular, NAHEMS Guidelines provide a foundation for coordinated national, regional, State, Tribal, and local veterinary activities in an emergency situation. These guidelines serve as a practical guide and complement non-Federal preparedness activities.

Chapter 2
USDA APHIS Authorities and FAD Emergency Funding

2.1 USDA APHIS Authorities for Foreign Animal and Emerging Diseases

The Code of Laws of the United States of America (U.S.C.) are the general and permanent Federal statutes of the United States, which are passed by Congress and signed by the President. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) are the regulations that spell out in further detail how the executive branch agencies interpret the U.S.C.

The two authorities (U.S.C. and CFR) represent different stages in the legislative and regulatory process. The U.S.C. provides the general and permanent statutes from which the executive branch agencies can develop detailed CFR regulations.

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) develops detailed regulations in the CFR through a public rulemaking process where the public is allowed to comment. The different stages of CFR rulemaking include proposed rules, final rules, and, if needed, interim rules. Interim rules may place immediate regulations—in the event of an outbreak of an animal disease—to prevent the spread of disease.

Within USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture delegates authority for development of regulations to the Under Secretary of Marketing and Regulatory Programs (MRP), who then delegates authority to the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The Administrator of APHIS delegates authority to the APHIS Associate Administrator and Deputy Administrators (DAs).

2.1.1 Foreign Animal Diseases, Emerging Diseases, and Wildlife

APHIS defines an FAD as a terrestrial animal disease or pest, or an aquatic animal disease or pest, not known to exist in the United States or its territories. An emerging animal disease is any terrestrial animal, aquatic animal, or zoonotic disease not yet known or characterized, or any known or characterized terrestrial animal or aquatic animal disease that changes or mutates in pathogenicity, communicability, or zoonotic potential to become a threat to terrestrial animals, aquatic animals, or humans. An FAD or emerging animal disease may involve livestock, poultry, other animals, and/or wildlife.

In the event that an FAD or emerging animal disease outbreak in domestic livestock involves wildlife, USDA APHIS will work in close collaboration, communication, and coordination with State, Tribal, and Federal wildlife agencies that have primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife.

2.1.2 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.

APHIS receives its permanent and general regulatory authority from the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.

The AHPA enables the Secretary of Agriculture to prevent, detect, control, and eradicate diseases and pests of animals, including foreign animal and emerging diseases, in order to protect animal health, the health and welfare of people, economic interests of livestock and related industries, the environment, and interstate and foreign commerce in animals and other articles. The term "animal" means any member of the animal kingdom (except a human), 7 U.S.C. 8301-8302.

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement in the United States, or order the destruction or removal, of animals and related conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities respecting exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles for movement into the United States.

The AHPA provides a broad range of authorities to use in the event of animal disease outbreaks in the United States and to prevent the introduction of FADs or emerging animal diseases into the United States. The Secretary is specifically authorized to carry out operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of livestock, which includes poultry, 7 U.S.C. 8308, and to promulgate regulations and issue orders to carry out the AHPA (see 7 U.S.C. 8315). The Secretary may also prohibit or restrict the importation, entry, or interstate movement of any animal, article, or means of conveyance to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303-8305).

Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. 231, transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or restrictions imposed by USDA.

2.1.2.1 RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORT, EXPORT, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to prohibit or restrict the importation or entry into the United States or interstate movement of any animal, article, or means of conveyance, or use of any means of conveyance or facility, if the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303 and 8305). Livestock is defined as "all farm raised animals" (7 U.S.C. 8302). The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations requiring that any animal imported or entered be quarantined under supervision of APHIS for the purpose of determining whether the animal is or may be affected by any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303(b)(2)).

2.1.2.2 REMEDIAL MEASURES

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to order the destruction or removal from the United States of

- any animal, article, or means of conveyance that has been imported but has not entered the United States, if necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock;
- any animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that has been imported or entered in violation of the AHPA; or
- any animal that has strayed into the United States, if necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(1)).

If an owner fails to comply with an order of the Secretary, the Secretary may take remedial action, destroy, or remove from the United States the animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance and may recover from the owner the costs of any care, handling, disposal, or other action incurred by the Secretary in connection with the action (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(B)). The AHPA authorizes similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to hold, seize, quarantine, treat, destroy, dispose, or take other remedial action with respect to any animal or progeny of any animal, article, or means of conveyance that

- is moving or has been moved interstate or has been imported and entered and the Secretary has reason to believe may carry, may have carried, or may have been affected with or exposed to any pest or disease of livestock at the time of the movement or that is otherwise in violation of the AHPA;
- is moving, is being handled, has moved, or has been handled in interstate commerce in violation of the AHPA;

- has been imported and is moving or being handled, or has moved or been handled, in violation of the AHPA; or

- the Secretary finds it is not being maintained, or has not been maintained, in accordance with any post-importation quarantine, post-importation condition, post-movement quarantine, or post-movement condition (7 U.S.C. 8306(a)).

2.1.2.3 DISINFECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to require the disinfection of (1) articles or any means of conveyance used in connection with the importation of an animal and (2) an individual involved in the importation of an animal and personal articles of the individual (7 U.S.C. 8303(c)(2)(A)). The AHPA authorizes similar actions with respect to exports (7 U.S.C. 8304).

2.1.2.4 EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY

If measures taken by a State or Tribal Nation to control or eradicate a pest or disease of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture—after notice to and review and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials—to declare that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of a pest or disease of livestock and because the presence of the pest or disease threatens the livestock of the United States (7 U.S.C. 8306).

If an extraordinary emergency is declared and it is necessary to prevent the dissemination of the pest or disease of livestock, the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to

- hold, seize, treat, apply other remedial actions to, destroy (including preventively slaughter), or otherwise dispose of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance; and

- prohibit or restrict the movement or use within a State, or any portion of a State, of any animal or article, means of conveyance, or facility.

Upon a declaration of extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of Agriculture may, in writing, order the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance to maintain in quarantine, dispose of, or take other remedial action with respect to the animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance. If the owner fails to comply with such an order, the Secretary may take similar action and recover from the owner the costs of such action (7 U.S.C. 8306(c)).

2.1.2.5 COMPENSATION

The AHPA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to compensate the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance that the Secretary requires to be

destroyed, unless the item destroyed meets certain conditions set forth in 7 U.S.C. 8306(d)(3).

2.1.2.6 INSPECTION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to stop and inspect, without a warrant, any person or means of conveyance moving

- into the United States, to determine whether the person or means of conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the AHPA;
- in interstate commerce, on probable cause to believe that the person or means of conveyance is carrying any animal or article regulated under the AHPA; or
- in intrastate commerce from any State, or any portion of any State, quarantined under a declaration of extraordinary emergency, on probable cause to believe that the person or means of conveyance is carrying any quarantined animal or article (7 U.S.C. 8307).

2.1.2.7 WARRANTS

The Secretary of Agriculture may obtain a warrant and enter, with a warrant, any premises in the United States for the purpose of making inspections and seizures under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8307(c)).

2.1.2.8 VETERINARY ACCREDITATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a veterinary accreditation program, including the establishment of standards of conduct for accredited veterinarians. The Secretary is authorized, after notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record, to suspend or revoke accreditation of any veterinarian who violates the AHPA or the regulations (7 U.S.C. 8309).

2.1.2.9 COOPERATION

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate with other Federal agencies, States or political subdivision of States, national or local governments of foreign countries, domestic or international organizations, domestic or international associations, Indian Tribes, and other persons to prevent, detect, or control animal diseases (7 U.S.C. 8310).

2.1.2.10 PAYMENT OF OVERTIME

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to pay overtime for an employee performing services under the act related to imports and exports (7 U.S.C. 8311(c)).

2.1.2.11 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES

The AHPA authorizes civil penalties for violations of the AHPA and criminal penalties for those who knowingly violate it (7 U.S.C. 8313). The Secretary may also request the Department of Justice to initiate an injunction action (7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.12 INVESTIGATIONS AND SUBPOENAS

The AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to gather and compile information and conduct any inspection or investigation that is necessary for the administration of the AHPA. It authorizes the Secretary to issue administrative subpoenas to compel the attendance and testimony of any witness and the production of any documents relating to the administration or enforcement of the AHPA or any matter under investigation under the AHPA (7 U.S.C. 8314).

2.1.2.13 EMERGENCY TRANSFER OF FUNDS

In connection with an emergency, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to transfer from other appropriations or funds available to the agencies or corporations of the USDA such funds that the Secretary deems necessary for the arrest, control, eradication, or prevention of the spread of a pest or disease of livestock that threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States and for related expenses (7 U.S.C. 8316).

2.2 USDA APHIS EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE

The Secretary of Agriculture may declare an agricultural emergency or an extraordinary agricultural emergency when additional Federal assistance is needed to protect U.S. agriculture. With the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), additional funding and authority may be made available for FAD emergency response.

2.2.1 Funding Request Process

The process for funding is as follows:

- Emergency Management and Diagnostics (EM&D) identifies a need for submitting a funding request on the basis of the scope and projected needs of the incident.
- EM&D notifies Veterinary Services (VS) Planning and Finance Staff (PFS) of the need to request funds.

- EM&D alerts the VS DA's Office of the projected resource needs related to the incident.
- The VS DA meets with the Administrator's Office to provide information regarding the incident and the projected resource requirements.
  - Rule of thumb: Less than $1 million is most likely a contingency fund (CF) request. More than $1 million will be a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) request.
- Upon the Administrator's agreement, EM&D contacts the VS PFS and the Program and Policy Development (PPD) Budget and Program Analysis Staff (BPAS) regarding the need for emergency funding.
- After assessing the need, BPAS provides EM&D with direction on the source the agency will pursue for emergency funds.
- The EM&D Associate Deputy Administrator (ADA) or the Incident Command (IC) requests funding information from the Eastern Region Office (ERO), Western Region Office (WRO), and National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) on the basis of the current situation.
- Funding information is requested on the basis of the major object class (MOC) breakout. The MOC breakout varies from incident to incident and is decided on by the management of the National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM).
- The information collected from the ERO, WRO, and NVSL is compiled and additional anticipated funding requirements are added. Such cost includes APHIS Emergency Operations Center operational costs, which are 2 percent of the total request and any cost NCAHEM incurs such as overtime.
- PPD-BPAS works with the IC to develop the language for both a decision memorandum for the Secretary and an informational memorandum that accompanies the MOC funding breakout. The informational memorandum will be drafted while the decision memorandum is under consideration by the Secretary.
- The decision memorandum will be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary.
- The informational memorandum includes background information, current situation information, and funding requirements.
- In the majority of cases when using CCC or CF funding, BPAS, the Department, or OMB may require EM&D to supply performance measures

related to the emergency activities. BPAS will assist EM&D in the creation of these measures.

- PPD-BPAS then compiles the total package. VS DA, EM&D (the ADA), and the IC review and approve it.

- Once approved by VS, the funding request package is submitted by BPAS to the Administrator's Office for approval.

- *CF***.** If approved, the CF request is transmitted by the Administrator's Office to the Department's Office of Budget and Program Analysis (OBPA) for review. Generally, CF requests can be processed faster since the account is held by the Administrator and, therefore, do not require the approval of OMB.

  - CF request is reviewed by OBPA and questions are answered by BPAS/EM&D.

  - CF request is then forwarded to the Under Secretary for MRP.

  - If approved by the Under Secretary for MRP then Budget Execution and Support Branch (BESB) allocates the funds to VS.

- *CCC funding***.** If approved, the CCC request is then sent to the Under Secretary for MRP for review and concurrence. If the Under Secretary for MRP concurs, then the CCC request is sent to OBPA for review. OBPA works with BPAS to answer any questions regarding the request. Depending upon the nature of the questions, BPAS may request a conference call with OBPA and EM&D.

  - The CCC request is then transmitted by OBPA to the USDA Secretary for approval.

  - If approved by the Secretary, OBPA transmits the request to OMB. OMB reviews it and often asks questions of APHIS through OBPA.

  - OBPA communicates these questions to BPAS, which works with EM&D to provide answers.

  - To expedite request approvals, OMB may request a conference call between OMB, OBPA, and an APHIS representative.

  - BPAS provides any written answers to the questions to OBPA, which then provides them to OMB.

- CCC funding is held by the USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA).

- OBPA works with APHIS and FSA to ensure the transfer happens.

- Once the request is approved, the funding goes to APHIS Marketing and Regulatory Programs Business Services BESB and is allocated to VS.
- The IC distributes the funding to the program or programs involved. The program then assesses and disburses it on the basis of accounting codes and reporting categories.

2.3 Triggering Events for USDA APHIS Emergency Funding for Foreign Animal Disease

To transfer funds from appropriations or funds available to other agencies or corporations of USDA, the Secretary of Agriculture must find that an emergency exists under which a pest or disease of livestock threatens any segment of the agricultural production of the United States.

To take actions specified under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture must make a determination that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or disease of livestock and that the pest or disease of livestock threatens livestock in the United States. The Secretary may take action in a State under this section only upon finding, after review and consultation with the Governor or other appropriate official of the State affected, that the measures being taken by the State are inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease.

Figure 2-1 identifies the steps that must take place from the time that an FAD event is triggered to the time that funds are allocated for the APHIS VS responses. In the event of a highly contagious FAD incident or outbreak, APHIS will respond rapidly in field operations, logistical operations (including the National Veterinary Stockpile [NVS]), and planning functions before the emergency funding processes are completed.

Figure 2-1. USDA APHIS FAD Emergency Funding Process



Note: VSDA = Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator; VSEM = Veterinary Services Emergency Management & Diagnostics.

2.3.1 Limitations on Preventive or Preparatory Measures Created by Triggering Event

Before taking action in a State under 7 U.S.C. 8306, the Secretary of Agriculture must notify the Governor or other appropriate animal health official of the State, issue a public announcement of the proposed action, and publish a statement in the *Federal Register*.

2.3.2 Coordination

APHIS closely coordinates with other Federal and State governments and agencies.

NOTE: See section 321(a) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1961(a)), which allows emergency loans resulting from a quarantine imposed by the Secretary under the Plant Protection Act or animal quarantine laws.

2.4 Additional USDA APHIS Authorities and Responsibilities for FAD

Additional APHIS authorities come from the CFR, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, all of which are discussed is this section.

2.4.1 Code of Federal Regulations

Below are several of the regulations to safeguard public health, animal health, animal products, interstate commerce, and international trade.

2.4.1.1 Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations

Title 7 of the CFR provides regulations for the delegations of authority for the Secretary of Agriculture, Under Secretary for Agriculture, and the APHIS Administrator (7 CFR Parts 1, 2, 15, 15f, and 371).

2.4.1.2 Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations

2.4.1.2.1 Secretary of Agriculture to Issue Rule Governing Quarantine and Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals, Including Poultry (9 CFR 71.2)

When the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine the fact that poultry or other animals in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia are affected with any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease of livestock or poultry for which,

in his opinion, a quarantine should be established or that other basis for a quarantine exists, notice will be given of that fact, and a rule will be issued accordingly, placing in quarantine such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or specified portion thereof. This rule will either absolutely forbid the interstate movement of the quarantined animals from the quarantined area or will indicate the regulations under which interstate movements may be made.

2.4.1.2.2 Interstate Movement of Diseased Animals and Poultry Generally Prohibited (9 CFR 71.3)

Title 9 of the CFR provides detailed USDA APHIS administrative regulations for the control and eradication of animal diseases, including FADs and emerging animal diseases. For example, animals or poultry affected with any of the following diseases, or any other communicable foreign disease not known to exist in the United States, shall not be moved interstate, which is defined as from one State into or through any other State (9 CFR 71.3 (b)):

- African swine fever
- Classical swine fever
- Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
- Contagious equine metritis
- Dourine
- Exotic Newcastle disease
- Foot-and-mouth disease
- Glanders
- Highly pathogenic avian influenza (European fowl pest)
- Rinderpest
- Scabies—sheep
- Teschen disease
- Screwworm
- Swine vesicular disease
- Vesicular exanthema.

Please see Section 2.4.1.2.4 for the requirements and standards for accredited veterinarians.

2.4.1.2.3 Foot-and-mouth disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain Other Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry (9 CFR 53)

This CFR covers the following:

- determination of the existence of disease;
- agreements with States;
- appraisals of animals or materials;
- destruction of animals;
- disinfection or destruction of materials;
- disinfection of animals;
- disinfection of premises, conveyances, and materials;
- presentation of claims;
- mortgage against animals or materials; and
- claims not allowed.

2.4.1.2.4 Requirements and Standards for Accredited Veterinarians and Suspension or Revocation of Such Accreditation (9 CFR 161.3, 9 CFR 161.4)

Accredited veterinarians must report immediately to the Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) and the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) all diagnosed or suspected cases of a communicable disease for which APHIS has a control or eradication program in 9 CFR Chapter I, and for all diagnosed or suspected cases of any animal disease not known to exist in the United States as provided by 9 CFR 71.3 (b) (9 CFR 161.3 (f)).

The Administrator is authorized to suspend or revoke the accreditation of a veterinarian when he or she determines that the veterinarian has not complied with the "Standards for Accredited Veterinarian Duties" as set forth in 9 CFR 161.3 (9 CFR 161.4).

2.4.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9

HSPD-9 establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-9 provides that the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall work

with State and local governments and the private sector to develop an NVS containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine and antiviral or therapeutic products for responders to respond appropriately to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of an outbreak.

2.4.3 The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002

The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 and the Federal implementing regulations under "Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins" (7 CFR Part 331 and 9 CFR Part 121) mandate that the United States prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies that could threaten public health and safety or American agriculture. The act requires that individuals possessing, using, or transferring agents or toxins that are deemed a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health, or to animal or plant products, notify either the Secretary of HHS or the Secretary of USDA. 9 CFR Parts 121.3 and 121.4 list the VS select agents and toxins and the overlap select agents and toxins, respectively. 9 CFR 121 provides further detail on the safeguarding and restrictions for the possession, use, and transfer, of select agents.

Chapter 3
Federal Department Roles, Responsibilities, and Planning Assumptions

3.1 Federal Departments—Overview

Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments and agencies involved in responding to a domestic incident of a foreign animal disease (FAD) promotes an effective, coordinated emergency response. The information below provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the Federal departments and agencies that could be involved in an FAD response. The roles and responsibilities described below are consistent with those outlined in the National Response Framework (NRF).

The NRF is the primary mechanism for coordinating the Federal response to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Federal response to the detection of an FAD will be based on the response structure of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as outlined in the NRF. The NRF defines Federal departmental responsibilities for sector-specific responses and provides the structure and mechanisms for effective coordination among Federal, State, local, and Tribal entities, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations.

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) may request Federal-to-Federal support (FFS) from other Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to the circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another policy mechanism. This support is coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) using the multiagency coordination structures established in the NRF, and in accordance with NIMS. Federal agencies participating in the NRF will request and provide FFS by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable agreements, in accordance with the Economy Act (31 United States Code 1535) or other applicable authorities. Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures.

During the course of an FAD outbreak response, if the outbreak becomes overwhelming or a catastrophic event, then the President of the United States may declare a Federal disaster, or the Secretary of Agriculture may request that the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS assume lead for the coordination of Federal resources in the response effort.

3.2 EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE NRF

Part of the NRF's methodological approach is to define the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for incidents of national significance. The ESF structure assigns responsibilities and authority, and includes the mechanisms used to provide Federal support to States and FFS for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. The National Response Coordination Center, a component of the Homeland Security Operations Center, develops and issues operation orders to activate individual ESFs on the basis of the scope and magnitude of the threat or incident.

The ESFs, as categorized in the NRF, are displayed in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Roles and Responsibilities of the ESFs

ESF	Scope
ESF #1–Transportation	Aviation/airspace management and control
	Transportation safety
	Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure
	Movement restrictions
	Damage and impact assessment
ESF #2–Communications	Coordination with telecommunications and information technology (IT) industries
	Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure
	Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and IT resources
	Oversight of communications within the Federal incident management and response structures
ESF #3–Public Works and Engineering	Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
	Infrastructure restoration
	Engineering services and construction management
	Emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services
ESF #4–Firefighting	Coordination of Federal firefighting activities
	Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations
ESF #5–Emergency Management	Coordination of incident management and response efforts
	Issuance of mission assignments
	Resource and human capital
	Incident action planning
	Financial management

Table 3-1. Roles and Responsibilities of the ESFs

ESF	Scope
ESF #6–Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services	Mass care
	Emergency assistance
	Disaster housing
	Human services
ESF #7–Logistics Management and Resource Support	Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability
	Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.)
ESF #8–Public Health and Medical Services	Public health
	Medical
	Mental health services
	Mass fatality management
ESF #9–Search and Rescue	Life-saving assistance
	Search and rescue operations
ESF #10–Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response
	Environmental short- and long-term cleanup
ESF #11–Agriculture and Natural Resources	Nutrition assistance
	Animal and plant disease and pest response
	Food safety and security
	Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restoration
	Safety and well-being of household pets
ESF #12–Energy	Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration
	Energy industry utilities coordination
	Energy forecast
ESF #13–Public Safety and Security	Facility and resource security
	Security planning and technical resource assistance
	Public safety and security support
	Support to access, traffic, and crowd control
ESF #14–Long-Term Community Recovery	Social and economic community impact assessment
	Long-term community recovery assistance to States, local governments, and the private sector
	Analysis and review of mitigation program implementation
ESF #15–External Affairs	Emergency public information and protective action guidance
	Media and community relations
	Congressional and international affairs
	Tribal and insular affairs

ESF designates agencies and departments as either "coordinator," "primary," or "support." An ESF coordinator is an entity with management oversight for that particular ESF. An ESF primary agency is a Federal agency with significant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular function. A single ESF may have multiple primary agencies. An ESF support agency is an agency with specific capabilities or resources that support the primary agency or agencies.

Table 3-2 displays the designation of the ESF coordinator, primary, and support agencies, reproduced from the ESF Annexes Introduction, January 2008, of the NRF.

Table 3-2. ESF as Outlined in the NRF

Agency[a]	ESF														
	#1–Transportation	#2–Communications	#3–Public Works and Engineering	#4–Firefighting	#5–Emergency Management	#6–Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services	#7 –Logistics Management and Resource Support	#8–Public Health and Medical Services	#9–Search and Rescue	#10–Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	#11–Agriculture and Natural Resources	#12–Energy	#13–Public Safety and Security	#14–Long-Term Community Recovery	#15 –External Affairs
USDA			S		S	S	S	S		S	C/P/S	S		P	S
USDA/FS	S	S	S	C/P		S	S	S	S	S			S		
DOC	S	S	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
DoD	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S
DoD/USACE	S		C/P	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
ED					S										S
DOE	S		S		S		S	S		S	S	C/P	S	S	S
HHS			S		S	S	S	C/P	S	S	S			S	S
DHS	S	S	S		S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	C
DHS/FEMA	S	P	P	S	C/P	C/P/S	C/P	S	C/P	S	S			C/P	P
DHS/NCS		C/P					S					S			
DHS/USCG	S		S	S				S	P	P			S		
HUD					S	S								P	S
DOI	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	S	P/S	S	S	S	S
DOJ	S				S	S		S	S	S	S		C/P		S
DOL			S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S	S
DOS	S		S	S	S			S		S	S	S			S
DOT	C/P		S		S	S	S	S		S	S	S		S	S
TREAS					S	S							S	S	S
VA			S		S	S	S	S					S		S

Agency[a]	ESF														
	#1–Transportation	#2–Communications	#3–Public Works and Engineering	#4–Firefighting	#5–Emergency Management	#6–Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services	#7 –Logistics Management and Resource Support	#8–Public Health and Medical Services	#9–Search and Rescue	#10–Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	#11–Agriculture and Natural Resources	#12–Energy	#13–Public Safety and Security	#14–Long-Term Community Recovery	#15 –External Affairs
EPA			S	S	S			S		C/P	S	S	S	S	S
FCC		S			S										S
GSA	S	S	S		S	S	C/P	S		S	S				S
NASA					S		S		S				S		S
NRC			S		S					S		S			S
OPM					S		S								S
SBA					S	S								P	S
SSA						S							S		S
TVA			S		S							S			S
USAID								S	S						S
USPS	S				S	S		S			S		S		S
ACHP											S				
ARC			S		S	S		S			S			S	
CNCS			S			S								S	
DRA														S	
HENTF											S				
NARA											S				
NVOAD						S								S	

[a] Abbreviations are found in Appendix D.

Note: C = ESF coordinator P = Primary agency S = Support agency.

3.3 Federal Departments: Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness, and Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

A macro-level overview of agency responsibilities in the event of an FAD outbreak is provided throughout the remainder of this chapter. For a more exhaustive listing of agencies and their ESF responsibilities, regardless of the specific scenario, please refer to Table 3-2 (courtesy of the ESF Annexes Introduction, as outlined within the NRF). ESFs such as Search and Rescue, Firefighting, etc., will be listed in this table, although they will not be considered a typical function of FAD response.

3.3.1 USDA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

USDA is the lead Federal agency (primary and coordination roles) for incident management during an FAD incident affecting domestic livestock or poultry. As such, the USDA would do the following:

- Coordinates Incident Management Teams, manages incident response, manages public messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate the disease.
  - Measures used to control and eradicate an FAD include quarantine and movement control, epidemiological investigation, appraisal and compensation, depopulation (euthanasia) of affected animals, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, disease surveillance, diagnostics, and, potentially, emergency vaccination.
- Acts as the primary interface between Federal, State, Tribal, and local partners; provides interagency coordination necessary to respond to and control an animal disease event.
- Acts as the primary Federal liaison to the animal industry.
- Provides on-scene support and response capability in collaboration with State partners.
- Maintains surveillance for animal health anomalies that may indicate the presence of foreign or emerging animal diseases.
- In close cooperation with State Animal Health Officials, assigns Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians to investigate possible cases of foreign or emerging animal diseases.
- Operates the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, the national reference laboratories for many FADs, which are World Organization for Ani-

mal Health (OIE) Reference Laboratories for identifying and confirming FADs.

- After diagnosis of a disease, circulates warning notices to appropriate Federal and State officials in order to facilitate a more timely and efficient response.

- Assesses, with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), whether animals and animal product processors, distributors, and importers in the affected area are able to provide safe and secure food and feed.

- Works to prevent the introduction of disease from domestic animals to wildlife and conducts a broad range of disease research, surveillance, and management activities.

- Administers a National Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response Program that is responsible for conducting coordinated disease surveillance on the wildlife diseases it manages and responding to a variety of emergencies, including natural disasters and animal disease outbreaks.

- Evaluates and modifies, if necessary, regulations regarding inspection and quarantine of animals and animal products at ports of entry (Animal Health Protection Act).

- Maintains the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance database that documents imports of animal products, allowing for more targeted inspections at ports of entry and tracing the disposition of products.

- Requires quarantine and diagnostic testing of imported animals. For example, quarantine is required for birds imported from Canada and returning pet birds of U.S. origin; prohibits the importation of live birds and bird products from countries or regions affected by highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), with the exception of returning U.S. origin pet birds, which must go through USDA quarantine and avian influenza (AI) testing.

- Gathers intelligence for emerging issues, including electronic scanning of current open-source information and text mining. Information gleaned from these processes may, upon filtering and analysis, indicate the emergence and/or spread of animal diseases in the United States or abroad. Potential and confirmed disease outbreaks identified via electronic scanning are verified, tracked, and prioritized for further action, including follow-up, assessment, analysis, and communications. Current pathway analyses and risk assessment methodologies focus on predicting the likelihood of movement of known diseases to new locations.

- USDA performs the primary role in ESFs #11 and #14, coordination role in ESF #11, and support roles in ESFs #3, #5, #6, #7, #8, #10, #11, #12, and #15.

3.3.2 USDA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the lead Federal agency (primary and coordination roles) with responsibility and authority for animal disease control and will coordinate Federal, State, Tribal, and local eradication efforts. Accordingly, USDA APHIS planning assumptions include the following:

- USDA is responsible for coordinating the response to livestock or poultry diseases and will request support as necessary from other Federal agencies under its own authorities to control a livestock or poultry disease. In situations where a declaration of emergency or major disaster[1] is issued by the President, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests DHS lead coordination, then the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS will lead the coordination of FFS and Federal resources.

- An FAD outbreak in the United States would have international trade ramifications; it is automatically a primary Federal responsibility of the USDA and is handled in cooperation with State, Tribal, and local governments.

- For an animal health event in the United States, USDA will determine the timing and content of all public message releases, press releases, and fact sheets related to the event, except for the occurrence of human cases, for which human health authorities will have the lead on communications.

- USDA will determine at what point to stand up a Joint Information Center (JIC), which will consist of representatives from USDA, DHS, HHS, and industry. The Department of the Interior (DOI) will be included in the JIC if the incident involves any wildlife it manages.

- The Secretary of Agriculture will declare an emergency or extraordinary emergency as appropriate to the FAD agent and scale of outbreak; for HPAI and foot-and-mouth disease, the planning assumption is that the Secretary of Agriculture will declare an emergency or extraordinary emergency.

- Funding will be sought (through the Commodity Credit Corporation) to indemnify livestock and poultry owners, as necessary, and cover additional outbreak response costs for USDA.

[1] More information on the emergency disaster designation and declaration process is available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject=landing&topic=pfs&newstype=prfactsheet&type=detail&item=pf_20090721_insup_en_disaster.html.

- As part of the initial response to an outbreak, as the situation requires, USDA, State, and/or Tribal authorities will immediately quarantine the relevant regions or zones, restrict specific movements, humanely depopulate affected animals as determined necessary, dispose of carcasses, disinfect property, and increase surveillance in the area to ensure that the FAD has not spread.

- USDA will work with State and/or Tribal authorities, as the situation requires, to lift the quarantine when the region or zone is free of the FAD agent.

- USDA, in collaboration with HHS and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), will convey messages regarding the safety of the food and feed supply.

- Other agencies are available for supporting activities as requested by USDA under the Economy Act.

- USDA will coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in determining and conducting the most appropriate method of carcass disposal and cleaning and disinfection activities.

- DOI will coordinate enhanced surveillance in the wild animals it tracks, when needed, after the detection of the disease agent in the domestic animal population; USDA will collaborate with DOI and State and local agencies in enhanced wild animal surveillance as appropriate.

3.3.3 DHS Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Inspects people and cargo (including animals and animal products) at ports of entry per appropriate regulations. Implements any changes to regulations at ports of entry when determined necessary by a regulatory agency (e.g., USDA, DOI, HHS).

- Enforces the quarantine of people arriving at ports of entry, as ordered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

- Acquires, integrates, and reports interagency biosurveillance information to the National Biosurveillance Integration System to facilitate interagency cross-domain (human, animal, plant) biosurveillance situational awareness and to facilitate response activities.

- Monitors the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) on an ongoing basis and provides a coordinating vehicle to share information with CI/KR information-sharing entities (e.g., National Infrastructure Coordinating Center).

- In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, uses the ESFs as the mechanism for coordinating required support from other agencies. When such assistance is provided, coordinates Federal resources under the authority in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. In these situations, designates a Federal Resource Coordinator to perform the resource coordination function (rather than a Federal Coordinating Officer as under a Stafford Act declaration).

- In the event of a request from an agency with primary jurisdiction, establishes and manages a common operating picture through the National Operations Center, which establishes and maintains real-time communications links to other Federal Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at the National level, as well as appropriate State, Tribal, local, regional, and non-governmental EOCs and relevant elements of the private sector.

- May establish a National JIC to review public messages.

- When deemed necessary, activates structures within the NRF that are necessary for FFS.

- Provides logistics support, as appropriate.

- DHS (including the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], National Communications System [NCS], and United States Coast Guard [USCG]) performs the primary role in ESFs #2, #3, #5, #6, #7, #9, #10, #14, and #15; coordination roles in ESFs #2, #5, #6, #7, #9, and #14; and plays support roles in all other ESFs.

3.3.4 DHS Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The DHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- If the President of the United States declares a Federal disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests that the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS become responsible for the coordination of Federal resources, then DHS will have a significantly greater role in the response to an FAD outbreak. Without a Presidential declaration of disaster, USDA may request assistance from DHS through FFS.

- If the President of the United States declares a Federal disaster, or if the Secretary of Agriculture requests that the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS become responsible for the coordination of Federal resources, then the Secretary of Homeland Security will implement some or all of the applicable broad coordinating structures and processes contained within the NRF as required by the incident. For incidents of lesser severity, the NRF uses appropriate coordinating structures and processes in its compre-

hensive network of incident annexes and other standalone Federal plans integrated as components of the NRF.

- Without a Presidential declaration of disaster, USDA may request assistance from DHS through FFS. Pursuant to paragraph 16(b) of HSPD-5, the NRF shall be used as the overarching framework for all other Federal incident management and emergency operations plans developed under these and other authorities, as well as memoranda of understanding among various Federal agencies. These incident management and emergency operations plans shall be considered as either integrated components of the NRF or as supporting operational plans or annexes, as appropriate.

- The Secretary of Homeland Security periodically assembles an Incident Advisory Council (IAC) for situational awareness briefs. The IAC can be activated when there is a threat of an incident, for situational awareness purposes.

- An outbreak in the animal populations in the United States may have social and economic impacts.

- All sectors will be required to maintain essential and critical services.

3.3.5 HHS Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The HHS roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Serves as the lead Federal agency (primary and coordination roles) for coordinating and integrating Federal efforts to provide public health and medical assistance. For example, in the event of an HPAI H5N1 outbreak, the CDC will conduct epidemiological investigations as necessary to assess the risk of human infection and illness among persons exposed to HPAI H5N1 in poultry, provide occupational health guidance, conduct surveillance for human infections, conduct viral laboratory analyses, and engage in communications.

- Ensures, through the FDA, the safety of the food supply (except for meat, poultry, and processed egg products regulated by USDA). FDA, in collaboration with USDA, provides the food industry and the public with information and guidance on the influenza virus and the safety of the food supply.

- The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response develops policy on pandemic preparedness, deploys staff in emergency situations, and supervises the deployment of medical countermeasures.

- Formulates recommendations and guidance on using antiviral prophylaxis for personnel involved in responding to the outbreak and works with

USDA and the Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on personal protective equipment.

- Provides guidance to State, Tribal, and local public health agencies regarding diagnosing and managing potential human infections caused by zoonotic diseases.
- Performs epidemiological investigations of human cases and case clusters.
- Operates quarantine stations for international travelers arriving at designated U.S. ports of entry.
- Performs outreach to HHS stakeholders—especially National/State/Tribal/local healthcare partners, health authorities in other countries, the World Health Organization, and business groups.
- Provides technical assistance to, and collaborates with, the HHS/FDA-regulated food and animal health industries regarding zoonotic disease preparedness.
- Conducts research to investigate the presence and survival of specific disease agents in certain foods, like AI.
- Conveys messages to consumers regarding the safety of HHS/FDA-regulated foods.
- Assists in communicating actions the government is taking and releases information to the public through various media outlets.
- Expands U.S. border disease surveillance activities, including with Canada and Mexico.
- Performs the primary and coordination role in ESF #8, and plays support roles in ESFs #3, #5, #6, #7, #9, #10, #11, #14, and #15.

3.3.6 HHS Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The HHS planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- HHS leads the assessment of human health risk for animal diseases with zoonotic potential.
- HHS/FDA leads matters concerning FDA-regulated food and feed products and the regulated food, feed, and animal health industries.
- HHS works to ensure that sensitive and comprehensive laboratory, epidemiologic, and clinical systems are in place to reliably detect and monitor the occurrence of diseases with zoonotic potential.

3.3.7 DOI Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DOI roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Manages and protects certain wildlife under various laws and treaties, and protects public health on more than 500 million acres of Federal land across the country. Coordinates the Federal government's surveillance of wild migratory birds for the presence of diseases of concern, including HPAI, coordinates Federal surveillance with related surveillance activities of State fish and wildlife agencies, and provides leadership and support in the area of wildlife disease research and diagnostics to Federal and State natural resource agencies.

- The National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) of the U.S. Geological Survey works with department bureaus, as well as State, Tribal, and other Federal entities, on wildlife disease investigations, providing the best available science and technical support for issues related to wildlife health and disease. NWHC is an OIE Collaborating Center for Research and Diagnosis of Emerging and Existing Pathogens of Wildlife. NWHC includes a biosafety level 3 laboratory that provides analytical support to the targeted surveillance of migratory birds and conducts scientific investigations of wildlife morbidity and mortality events to identify causative agents of wildlife disease. In the event of a zoonotic outbreak in the wild animals DOI manages, it works with Federal and State natural resource, animal health, and public health agencies to support timely and effective response.

- The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) permits the inspection of wildlife and wildlife products in trade into and out of the United States. The USFWS partners with USDA to publicize wildlife management activities, including across jurisdictional borders, and if required, utilizes its own permitting authorities to restrict the import or export of the wild animals it manages.

  - USFWS regulates wildlife trade and trafficking, including its related enforcement expertise, and positions its wildlife inspectors and special agents to assist in detecting and detaining wildlife imports or exports that may violate bans imposed by other Federal agencies, and in intercepting smuggled animals or animals being moved illegally from State to State.

  - As part of its import and export monitoring activities, USFWS also maintains an extensive database that documents wildlife trade transactions. These records provide a basis for identifying companies and individuals involved in importing animals or animal products and tracing the entry and disposition of specific shipments.

- DOI performs the primary role in ESFs #9 and #11, and plays support roles in all of the other ESFs.

3.3.8 DOI Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

DOI is the executive agent for U.S. treaty obligations under several migratory bird treaties and other authorities. DOI regulatory responsibilities associated with migratory birds remain in effect throughout all phases of an avian disease. The planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- DOI is the lead agency for all wild bird surveillance, and is the primary Federal department responsible for addressing diseases of concern, including HPAI, in wild birds.
- If HPAI or another FAD is detected in wild free-ranging birds, DOI works with USDA to determine the timing and content of all public messages related to the incident.
- DOI is responsible for endangered species in the United States.
- DOI provides guidance to ensure that all personnel involved in response to a disease of concern in wildlife have appropriate personal protective equipment and that all proper biosafety precautions are taken for personnel handling wild animals and disease agents.
- DOI coordinates enhanced surveillance efforts among Federal, State, and Tribal agencies and other cooperators following a detection of an FAD. DOI cooperates with Federal, State, and Tribal agencies in response to wildlife disease events, offering full field investigations and diagnostic services.
- DOI supplies training as requested to State and Tribal entities in sampling strategies and techniques and works with them in communication on safely handling wildlife and disease agents, as well as information on meat consumption.
- DOI carries out its responsibilities as specified in the NRF in supporting a coordinated response to disease incidents and supplying resources under ESF #11.

3.3.9 EPA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

EPA's roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Exercises sector-specific jurisdiction over drinking water and water treatment infrastructure.

- Determines whether local water is suitable for use; assesses wastewater and solid waste facilities; provides biosurveillance, warning, and detection.
- Assists in locating disposal facilities for debris.
- Provides investigation and intelligence support.
- Provides technical assistance and environmental information for assessing the public health and medical aspects of situations involving hazardous materials.
- Assists in identifying alternate water supplies for critical care facilities.
- Provides technical assistance, subject-matter expertise, and support for decontamination and disposal issues, including on-site response personnel or other employees as requested.
- Approves suitable disinfectant pesticides and evaluates new requests from industry and governmental agencies regarding registration of disinfectants and questions regarding their approved uses.
- Promulgates regulations that implement environmental laws enacted by Congress, including regulations related to decontamination and disposal, and licensing the use of pesticides.
- Establishes minimum National standards for solid waste disposal that protect human health and the environment. Implementation—including permitting, monitoring, and enforcement of these standards—rests primarily with State and local governments. State and local governments implement their own programs, but must meet minimum Federal regulatory requirements. Similarly, EPA expects that decontamination will be conducted by farmers and owners with assistance and guidance from local and State authorities, and other Federal departments involved, as appropriate, consistent with their traditional missions.
- EPA performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #10; and support role in ESFs #3, #4, #5, #8, #11, #12, #13, #14, and #15.

3.3.10 EPA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The EPA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- EPA plays a support role to DOI and USDA animal disease control or eradication efforts.
- EPA supports USDA in its efforts to deal aggressively with an FAD outbreak.

- EPA supports DOI in its efforts to deal aggressively with an outbreak in the wild animal populations it manages.
- Upon the request of USDA or DOI, EPA provides advice, including guidance on applicable environmental statutes and technical considerations, on a range of options available for the disposal of animals and the use of disinfectants to inactivate FAD agents on environmental surfaces and fomites.
- EPA encourages State counterparts, who have authority to implement municipal solid waste management programs, to identify potential management options in their States and resolve any issues associated with the potential use of those facilities, such as concerns raised by the industries regarding their willingness to accept animal carcasses.
- EPA supports USDA and DOI in developing a health and safety plan that aggressively protects the response workforce during an FAD outbreak.

3.3.11 DOL/OSHA Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The DOL/OHSA roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- DOL/OSHA is the coordinating agency for the NRF Worker Safety and Health Support Annex and coordinates the safety and health of workers by achieving the following:
  - Responds to requests for assistance from Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies and the private sector that are requesting worker safety and health support.
  - Provides pertinent occupational hazard information and guidance regarding appropriate workplace precautions to the affected employers and employees.
  - Coordinates activities with State occupational safety and health agencies (for example, OSHA State plans and consultation programs) as they relate to potential zoonotic diseases.
  - Provides appropriate compliance assistance to affected employers.
  - Monitors employer compliance with precautions required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act and OSHA safety and health standards.

- Conducts investigations in response to employee fatalities, catastrophes, and complaints.
- Supports USDA and DOI in eradication efforts involving animals by coordinating worker safety and health support.

- OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its Federal cooperating agencies.
- Plays support roles in all of the ESFs, with the exception of ESFs #1, #2, #4, and #13.

3.3.12 DOL/OSHA Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

The DOL/OHSA planning assumptions for FAD response are as follows:

- DOL/OSHA play a support role to Federal departments involved in control and eradication efforts involving animals by coordinating worker safety and health support under the NRF.
- OSHA may perform these functions directly or in coordination with its Federal cooperating agencies and State partner agencies.
- Generally DOL/OSHA's role in Federal efforts to counteract potential zoonotic diseases is directed toward assuring the safety and health of workers.

3.3.13 Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- The FBI coordinates the Federal investigation of criminal activities, if bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism are suspected, through the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
- The DOJ performs the primary and coordination role for ESF #13 and provides support roles for ESFs #1, #5, #6, #8, #9, #10, #11, and #15.

3.3.14 DOJ/FBI Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

- The DOJ/FBI is the Federal agency responsible for investigating cases of bio-terrorism or agro-terrorism. If animals, livestock, or poultry are suspected targets of a terrorist attack, or if any evidence suggests an FAD may have been or will be intentionally introduced, USDA will notify the FBI.

- If a terrorist act is suspected in connection with an FAD outbreak, the USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) notifies the Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit of the FBI. The USDA OIG, other appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies, and the FBI conduct a joint criminal investigation.

3.3.15 Department of Defense Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The Department of Defense (DoD) roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Serves as supporting agency to USDA for animal disease preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

- Provides available resources with the approval of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Army Veterinary Services (VS) supports other Federal agencies as required when directed by the SECDEF. On direction of the SECDEF, VS units and/or personnel would provide requested and agreed upon resources in support of the agency with primary jurisdiction. This includes but is not limited to assigning Defense Veterinary Liaison Officers, Defense Veterinary Support Officers to Incident Command Posts, operational support, training, surveillance, tracing, epidemiology, laboratory, and subject matter expert support. Roles and responsibilities are outlined in the DoD-USDA Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Response to Animal Diseases, June 2006.

- Performs the primary agency role for ESF #9, and plays support roles in all other ESFs.

3.3.16 Department of Defense Planning Assumptions for FAD Response

- In an FAD outbreak, DoD could provide a myriad of veterinary services through the Army, as executive agent for DoD VS, providing veterinary services to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and other Federal agencies as directed. VS responsibility is delegated to the Army Surgeon General and executed by Army VS units and personnel.

- In a large-scale outbreak, DoD could provide an installation in the vicinity of the outbreak to serve as a Federal logistical staging area/mobilization center, public affairs and communication support, personnel for depopulation and disposal activities, and facility and/or vehicle decontamination.

- In an FAD outbreak, DoD VS units could provide increased surveillance; risk communications; food safety; training; laboratory diagnostics; field

operations support that could include eradication of disease, identification of affected animals, quarantine implementation, euthanasia, carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, biosecurity, strategic vaccination and/or treatments, wildlife management, and vector control; and subject matter expert activities for DoD installations.

3.3.17 Department of State Roles and Responsibilities for FAD Preparedness

The Department of State roles and responsibilities for FAD preparedness are as follows:

- Facilitates a coordinated response between other countries when animal and/or plant disease outbreaks represent a transboundary threat.
- Plays support roles in ESFs #1, #3, #4, #5, #8, #10, #11, #12, and #15.

3.3.18 Additional Resources

More information on roles and responsibilities during an incident can be found in the following resources:

- Incident Command System Resource Center (http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm)
- *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide*
- *NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan*.

3.4 USDA APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT LEVELS

APHIS uses a three-level system (Figure 3-2) of emergency response. The levels range from Level III, which is the lowest significance level, to Level I, which is an event of national significance. The levels are used both within APHIS and externally to communicate the resource requirements for an event or incident. In Figure 3-2, sector refers to the agriculture sector and USDA. Additional information can be found in the *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide*.

Figure 3-1. Evolving Emergency Landscape

Traditional Incident Landscape	Evolving Incident Landscape
Versed in specific disasters in singular Agency/Department focal area such as program diseases	Versed in all-hazards, including CBRNE
Efforts focused on accidental/naturally occurring incidents	Expanded efforts to include international and catastrophic incidents
Skilled in localized incidents (contained outbreaks)	Skill in wide-spread incident (lacking discrete incident site and multiple incident sites)
Able to respond with single-agency capabilities	Events of magnitude that overwhelm individual agencies and demand large-scale interagency coordination
Limited media coverage of events	Aggressive incident media coverage requiring a joint information approach
Reactive surging of capabilities	Proactive interagency coordination of capabilities
Response Oriented	Prevention & Preparedness—Mitigation & Recovery Oriented

Note: CBRNE = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive.

Figure 3-2. Incident Management Levels



Level III is a response to an event or incident, the scope and severity of which the lead program unit is evaluating or that requires a limited response. In either case, enough resources (Federal, State, or local personnel) are available in the area or State to staff the evaluation or initial response effort. The lead program unit re-

ports all Level III responses to the Emergency Management Leadership Council (EMLC) to alert other APHIS units that a larger response may be needed.

Box 3-1. Incident Management Level III

Level III Incident Examples

- Equine piroplasmosis outbreak
- Screwworm detection in imported pet dog

Level II is a response to an event or incident that requires resources beyond an area or State's resource capacity but within the lead program unit's ability to provide resources to support the response. Requests for additional resources outside the lead program unit are not typically necessary for a Level II response. However, volunteers will be considered for assignment from outside the unit if they wish to be considered for assignment, have supervisory approval, and are qualified for the position requested.

Box 3-2. Incident Management Level II

Level II Incident Examples

- HPAI outbreak in domestic poultry
- FMD outbreak on a single premises

Level I is a response that requires resources or expertise beyond the lead program unit's capacity to respond. In many cases, these emergencies will be of National significance. If the lead program unit lacks the qualified resources to meet the response needs, it will make a request through the EMLC to the APHIS Administrator to declare total mobilization. Upon approval, the lead program unit will be authorized to request resources, APHIS-wide, through established channels. If qualified volunteers are insufficient, direct assignments will be made.

Box 3-3. Incident Management Level I

Level I Incident Examples

- Multifocal, multistate FMD outbreak
- Biological attack on livestock—aerosol anthrax

Chapter 4
Incident Management

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directed the development and administration of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS, in conjunction with the National Response Framework, provides the template for managing incidents and provides the structure and mechanisms for National-level policy for incident management. NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment.

A basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally. NIMS does not take command away from State and local authorities. NIMS simply provides the framework to enhance the ability of responders, including the private sector and NGOs, to work together more effectively. The Federal government supports State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed or anticipated to be overwhelmed.

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication within a common organizational structure. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has adopted NIMS and ICS organizational structures and processes to manage animal health incidents. Additional information on NIMS can be found at: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/. Additional information on ICS can be found at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm.

APHIS policy and procedures for APHIS Emergency Responder positions and APHIS Specialized Emergency Responder positions are described in the *APHIS Emergency Response Qualification Process* and *APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog*.[1] APHIS employees can find these documents at: http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_info/organization/resp_cat.shtml.

[1] Information on USDA policies and procedures can be found in Departmental Manual #1800-001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011; and Departmental Regulation #1800-001. Incident Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. November 2011.

4.1 MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION

Multiagency coordination (MAC) is a process that allows all levels of government and all disciplines to work together more efficiently and effectively. MAC occurs across the different disciplines involved in incident management, across jurisdictional lines, or across levels of government. The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* defines APHIS coordination for major agricultural disasters and agroterrorism responses (see Figure 4-1). In the event of an animal emergency, an APHIS MAC Group will be formed if the incident response needs more support. Fundamentally, the APHIS MAC Group will provide support, coordination, and assistance with policy-level decisions to the ICS structure managing an incident.

Figure 4-1. Coordination Structures: U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency[2]



Note: EMLC = Emergency Management Leadership Council, ESF=Emergency Support Function.

Figure 4-2 illustrates an overview of a MAC system according to NIMS. The figure shows the transition over the course of an incident. The incident begins with an on-scene single Incident Command (IC); as the incident expands in size or complexity developing into a Unified Command, the incident may require off-scene coordination and support, which is when MAC Groups are activated.

[2] USDA APHIS, 2009, *Emergency Mobilization Guide*.

Figure 4-2. Multiagency Coordination System[3]



Note: EOC = Emergency Operations Center.

4.2 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Figure 4-3 displays the APHIS foreign animal disease (FAD) incident management organizational structure, starting with the APHIS Administrator.

[3] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2008. *National Incident Management System.* http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

Figure 4-3. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Incident Management Team (Assuming a Single Incident)



Note: SAHO = State Animal Health Official, AVIC = Area Veterinarian in Charge.

The APHIS Administrator is the primary Federal executive responsible for implementing APHIS policy during an FAD outbreak. The APHIS Administrator will delegate many of the actual MAC functions to the Veterinary Services (VS) Deputy Administrator (Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States) and the APHIS Emergency Management Leadership Council (EMLC).

The VS Deputy Administrator and the EMLC will establish an APHIS Incident Coordination Group (ICG) to oversee the staff functions associated with the incident at the APHIS headquarters level. The APHIS ICG will work closely with the personnel in charge of establishing operations for the incident response at the Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post (ICP) in the field and coordinate with the APHIS MAC Group.

4.3 APHIS Multiagency Coordination Group

In the event of a significant FAD emergency, the EMLC typically serves as the APHIS MAC Group, unless it transfers responsibility for a specific incident. The EMLC is co-chaired by Plant Protection and Quarantine's Associate Director, Emergency and Domestic Programs and VS' Associate Deputy Administrator,

Emergency Management and Diagnostics. The EMLC is comprised of the following headquarters and regional members:

- Plant Protection and Quarantine,
- VS,
- Animal Care,
- Wildlife Services,
- International Services,
- Biotechnology Regulatory Services,
- Marketing and Regulatory Programs Business Services,
- Legislative and Public Affairs,
- Policy and Program Development,
- Investigative Enforcement Services,
- Emergency Management and Safety and Security Division, and
- APHIS Chief Information Officer.

The APHIS MAC Group may include additional members if the response requires them and may be activated if one or more of the following conditions take place:

- complex incidents that overwhelm local and regional assets;
- overlapping USDA agency jurisdictions;
- an incident that crosses international borders; or
- the existence of or potential for a high level of National political and media interest.

The APHIS MAC Group provides a forum to discuss actions that need to be taken to ensure that an adequate number of resources are available to meet anticipated needs. The APHIS MAC Group strategically coordinates the incident response, but does not typically direct the APHIS ICG.

The APHIS MAC Group offers guidance on the most efficient way to allocate resources during an animal health event. Specific responsibilities vary from disease to disease, but the general functions of the APHIS MAC Group include

- incident prioritization,

- resource allocation and acquisition, and
- identification and resolution of issues common to all parties.

4.4 APHIS INCIDENT COORDINATION GROUP

The APHIS ICG is responsible for supporting an IC and AC in acquiring resources, formulating policy options, and assisting in developing and implementing response and recovery strategies for FAD outbreaks. For additional information and details, see the *National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM) Incident Coordination Group Plan*. Figure 4-4 illustrates an example organizational chart for an APHIS ICG. The group has the following responsibilities:

- providing guidelines to ensure responder and public health and safety;
- supporting IC(s) and AC(s);
- assisting in developing response policy as needed;
- coordinating effective communication;
- coordinating resources;
- assisting in establishing epidemiological priorities;
- assisting in developing incident objectives and approving response strategies for emergency vaccination as needed;
- assisting in integrating response organizations into the ICS;
- assisting in developing protocols as needed;
- providing information to the Joint Information Center for use in media and stakeholder briefings;
- providing budget requests and projections as needed; and
- assessing response progress, response strategies, and providing economic analyses as needed.

Figure 4-4. Example APHIS Incident Coordination Group—Organizational Structure (for Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak)



Note: CDC = Centers for Disease Control, EPA = Environmental Protection Agency, EOC = Emergency Operations Center, FDA = Food and Drug Administration, FSIS = Food Safety Inspection Service, AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, NASDA = National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, GIS = Geographic Information System, NVSL = National Veterinary Services Laboratories, NAHLN = National Animal Health Laboratory Network, CF = Contingency Fund, CCC = Commodity Credit Corporation, BPA = Blanket Purchase Agreement, ESF = Emergency Support Function, NVS = National Veterinary Stockpile, NRMT = National Response Management Team, NAHERC = National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps.

4.5 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR A SINGLE INCIDENT

The ICP is a physical location that administers the on-scene IC and the other major incident management functions. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a physical location that is located separately from the on-scene ICP and supports the on-scene response by providing external coordination and securing of additional resources. A MAC Group does not have any direct IC involvement and will often be located some distance from the incident site(s). EOC/MAC Groups do not command the on-scene level of the incident, but rather supports the ICP's command and management efforts.

At the start of any FAD outbreak, the State Animal Health Official (SAHO), or designee, and Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC), or designee, will initially serve as the co-Incident Commanders for the Unified Command. The AVIC and SAHO may be relieved by an Incident Management Team (IMT) if there is a delegation of authority to the IMT. Figure 4-3 is an example of an APHIS organization chart for a single incident.

4.6 APHIS ORGANIZATION FOR MULTIPLE INCIDENTS

When more than one incident is occurring at the same time, more than one IC may be established. An AC may also be established. An AC is an organization that oversees the management of multiple incidents handled individually by separate IC organizations or to oversee the management of a very large or evolving incident engaging multiple IMTs. An AC should not be confused with the functions performed by MAC as AC oversees management coordination of the incident(s), while a MAC element (such as a communications/dispatch center, EOC, or MAC Group) coordinates support.

In terms of MAC Group structures, if the emergency response becomes too large for an APHIS MAC Group to handle efficiently—for example, a large multistate incident with numerous response activities—cooperation from other agencies or committees will be implemented. MAC Groups will coordinate additional resources and make decisions regarding the prioritization of incidents and the sharing and use of critical resources, but are not a part of the on-scene IC. Figure 4-5 is an example of the command structure when multiple incidents are involved.

Figure 4-5. APHIS Multiagency Coordination Structures and APHIS Emergency Operations Center: Relationship to Multiple Incident Management Team Structures (Assuming Multiple Incidents and a Unified Area Command)



4.7 APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS

Upon detection and confirmation of an FAD incident, the SAHO or AVIC establishes an ICP with an IMT, headed by an Incident Commander. Figure 4-6 depicts the organization of the APHIS VS IMT for managing an incident.

Figure 4-6. Current APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Short Team Configuration



The IMT includes an Incident Commander and staff for various types of communication, safety, and liaison purposes. This staff and the heads of the Incident Commander's line organization sections are considered the Incident Commander's general staff. The IMT also includes four line organizations to perform all of the efforts required to identify, contain, eradicate, recover, and return the situation to normal business practices. These line organizations include sections for operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. Within each of these sections is the capability to accomplish all of the tasks necessary to ensure a successful outcome to an FAD incident.

For single-incident outbreaks where the potential for spread is low, a short team configuration as depicted in Table 4-1 will suffice.

Table 4-1. List of Short Team Configuration Positions

APHIS VS IMT Short Team	APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog
Incident Commander	A800 Incident Commander
Deputy Incident Commander	A800 Incident Commander
Operations Section Chief	A810 Operations Section Chief
Deputy Operations Section	A810 Operations Section Chief
Planning Section Chief	A820 Planning Section Chief
Deputy Planning Section	A820 Planning Section Chief
Logistics Section Chief	A830 Logistics Section Chief
Deputy Logistics Section	A830 Logistics Section Chief
Finance Section Chief	A840 Finance Section Chief
Deputy Finance Section	A840 Finance Section Chief
Safety Officer	A805 Safety Officer (or A001)
Assistant Safety Officer	A805 Safety Officer
Public Information Officer	A803 Public Information Officer
Liaison Officer	A807 Liaison Officer
Assistant Liaison Officer	A807 Liaison Officer
Information Technology (IT) Specialist	A122 IT Specialist
Assistant IT Specialist	A122 IT Specialist
EMRS Specialist	A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)
Assistant EMRS Specialist	A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)
Epidemiologist	A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)
Assistant Epidemiologist	A813 Group Supervisor (or Specialist)

Note: EMRS = Emergency Management Response System.

When an outbreak occurs that is complex or large scale, a long team configuration, as listed in Table 4-2, will be established. The long team consists of additional team members beyond those in the initial short team configuration. Figure 4-7 shows an example long team configuration; however, the exact

makeup of the long teams will depend on the type of disease and magnitude of spread.

Table 4-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration	APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog
Deputy Operations Section Chief	A810 Operations Section Chief
Deputy Planning Section Chief	A820 Planning Section Chief
Deputy Logistics Section Chief	A830 Logistics Section Chief
Deputy Finance Section Chief	A840 Finance Section Chief
Disease Management Branch Director	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Appraisal Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Euthanasia Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Disposal Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Cleaning and Disinfection Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
Disease Surveillance Branch Director	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Mortality Surveillance Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Diagnosis and Inspection Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Disease Survey Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Vaccination Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Tactical Epidemiology Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
Disease Support Branch Director	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Education/Outreach Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Vector Control Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Biosecurity and Disease Prevention Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Movement and Permits Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
Air Operations Branch	—
Staging Area Manager (Operations)	—
Resources Unit Leader	A821 Resources Unit Leader
◆ Orientation and Training Group Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
Documentation Unit Leader	A823 Documentation Unit Leader
Situation Unit Leader	A813 Group Supervisor (or A822)
◆ Disease Reporting Cell Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Epidemiology Cell Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Geographic Information System (GIS) Cell Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor (or A825)
◆ Intelligence Cell Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor
◆ Wildlife Cell Supervisor	A813 Group Supervisor (or A045)

Table 4-2. Typical Positions—Long Team Configuration

APHIS VS Long IMT Configuration	APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog
Demobilization Unit Leader	A824 Demobilization Unit Leader
◆ Communications Unit Leader	A831 Communications Unit Leader
◆ Medical Unit Leader	A815 Team Leader (or A001 or A057)
◆ Information Technology Specialist	A122 IT Specialist
◆ Supply Unit Leader	A833 Supply Unit Leader
◆ Facilities Unit Leader	A834 Facilities Unit Leader
◆ Ground Support Unit Leader	A832 Ground Support Unit Leader
◆ Waste Management Unit Leader	A003 Environmental Protection Specialist
◆ Time Unit Leader	A842 Time Unit Leader
◆ Procurement Unit Leader	A841 Procurement Unit Leader
◆ Compensation/Claims Unit Leader	A844 Compensation/Claims Unit Leader
◆ Cost Unit Leader	A843 Cost Unit Leader

Figure 4-7. Example APHIS VS Incident Management Team—Long Team Configuration



4.8 RESPONSE RESOURCES

The IMT, ICG, and APHIS MAC Group can use a number of systems to aid in staffing and resourcing during an event such as the Emergency Qualification System (EQS) and the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS), which are discussed below. The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* and the *NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan* are two planning documents that are used as response resources.

4.8.1 APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide

The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* provides information and policy for mobilizing APHIS personnel for emergency events. The *APHIS Emergency Mobilization Guide* is available at:
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/emergency_response/.

4.8.2 NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan

The *NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan* provides details on how the VS program unit will provide incident coordination support during FAD outbreaks.

4.8.3 APHIS Emergency Qualification System

The APHIS EQS is used to store the skills and qualifications of emergency response personnel and other data imported from the National Finance Center and AgLearn and to feed certification data to ROSS. It is customizable to APHIS program needs and can house training documents. Training documentation flow into EQS from AgLearn for APHIS employees. If the National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) volunteers do not have access to AgLearn, their training documentation can be manually entered or imported through an Excel spreadsheet.

4.8.4 APHIS Resource Ordering and Status System

The APHIS ROSS allows APHIS to identify, track, and mobilize the resources needed to support emergency response. It provides a database of qualified emergency response personnel. The database can be searched according to personnel training levels and subject of expertise, such as procurement, epidemiology, or public information. Being able to quickly identify and dispatch appropriate personnel and supplies is a key component of emergency response, and ROSS facilitates that process. ROSS initiatives include the following:

- developing the *APHIS Emergency Responder Position Catalog*
- integrating ROSS into APHIS emergency management practices

- training and sustaining an APHIS dispatch community.

Figure 4-8 illustrates the relationships among the APHIS ICG, Dispatch Coordination Centers, ACs, and ICPs.

Figure 4-8. Resource Ordering Coordination[4]



Note: AEOC = APHIS Emergency Operations Center, DCC = Dispatch Coordinating Center.

[4] USDA APHIS, 2009. *Emergency Mobilization Guide*.

Chapter 5
Communication Strategy

5.1 COMMUNICATION

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has established internal and external communication processes to ensure an effective and efficient response in controlling and eradicating an outbreak of a foreign animal disease (FAD). These processes will also reduce the prospects for panic or adverse public reaction and mitigate the economic impact of the outbreak.

Internal communication between government authorities is critical to informed and timely decisions. Integrated communication forges a link among operational and support units to enable a common awareness of the incident and actions to achieve Incident Command (IC) objectives. Equipment, systems, protocols, and expertise are needed to achieve this integration. Procedures and protocols governing communication among emergency responders must be established well in advance of an outbreak.

External communication during an FAD outbreak is designed to ensure that the public, media, and international community are kept fully informed to calm anxiety, instill confidence, and ensure compliance with emergency directives. Effective communication can help to restore consumer confidence in the safety of animal products. The objective is to share accurate and timely information with the general public, the news media, and the international community.

Additional communication information can be found in the following documents:

- *Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) Emergency Response and Communication Guide*
- *Memorandum of Understanding between National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) APHIS Veterinary Services (VS), October 11, 2009* (see Appendix B)
- *National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM) Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide*
- *NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan*.

5.1.1 Communicating Internally

Communication processes during an event are designed to keep communication flowing throughout the Incident Command System (ICS). Consistent and clear communications provide an opportunity to address minor issues or resolve major problems and may include

- all-staff briefing sessions,
- daily meetings within units, and
- conference calls (especially for coordination between Area Commanders and Incident Commanders, on-site and off-site officials, and Task Force and producer organizations and other stakeholder associations).

APHIS uses the Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) as its basic information system. The system can adapt to a complexity of multiple needs and rapid changes in the course of disease progression during an outbreak. An effective information management system, like EMRS, should be used consistently over the course of the outbreak, support geographical information systems, have continual support for programming and updates both on-site and off-site, and be relatively user-friendly for a wide range of users with different skill levels.

During an emergency, the APHIS emergency staff leads and coordinates rapid response efforts through the ICS. The emergency staff supports USDA, other Federal and State agencies, and cooperators in responding to an animal disease outbreak and animal agriculture emergencies caused by natural disasters. This staff also coordinates the resources needed to develop notices, question and answers, fact sheets, and website content about an emergency. A VS Communications Manager works to ensure that the communication needs of the emergency staff are being met.

5.1.2 Communicating Externally

The outbreak of an FAD in the United States will be of major concern to those residing nearby and to people in other parts of the country, as well as to people throughout the world. In the initial phase of an emergency, misinformation and rumors can cause panic among people who have little or no control over unfolding events. Individuals and entire communities may worry that their livelihoods and even health and safety are at risk.

APHIS LPA will serve as the primary liaison with the news media. With the VS Communications Manager and the Emergency Management staff, LPA develops information materials to communicate with stakeholders and the public, and provide on-site public affairs support for VS program emergencies.

5.2 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION GOALS

Communication goals during an emergency include the following:

- manage public outreach and external communication during a time of crisis;
- open direct lines of communication with public affairs counterparts in Federal and State governments and the industry to exchange information and encourage them to be advocates on APHIS' behalf and utilize Agency messages;
- successfully communicate APHIS' messages to affected parties through the media, and monitor media coverage to ensure consistency in the delivery of public messages, responding to inaccurate or biased articles when appropriate;
- effectively manage communication between LPA representatives at headquarters and in the field to ensure the consistent and timely delivery of information;
- successfully communicate APHIS' messages to Congress through key committees and congressional staff, providing continuous updates as the situation progresses and comes to a resolution;
- coordinate with program leaders to ensure that accurate and appropriate information is shared with all APHIS audiences;
- prepare designated program leaders and experts to act as spokespeople to deliver APHIS' messages; and
- create outreach materials that deliver APHIS' messages and information to affected and interested stakeholders.

5.3 TARGET AUDIENCES

The following list highlights the key audiences that APHIS will target in an emergency. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive. Rather, the goal is to identify those audiences that will take priority when it comes to sharing Agency information.

- *Governments*. Federal as well as State, local, and Tribal governments/agencies that would coordinate with APHIS in an emergency. This also refers to elected leaders at the National, State, and local levels.
- *Industry stakeholders*. Agricultural/commodity groups that have a vested interest in APHIS' response efforts.

- *APHIS employees*. Employees of the Agency should be communicated with directly, early, and often, not only to keep them apprised of the work done by APHIS, but also to equip them with accurate information to share with others.

- *General affected public*. In large-scale emergencies, such as an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease or highly pathogenic avian influenza, the general public is likely to seek information about APHIS' response efforts. Most APHIS emergencies, however, generate interest only among members of the public directly affected by emergency response activities.

- *Trading partners*. This category includes all current and potential trading partners for the United States. LPA will work with APHIS International Services and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service to ensure that key messages and talking points are provided to personnel stationed at international posts. LPA will address the international angle in all informational materials.

- *Financial boards and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*. In a large-scale emergency, many trading partners may impose trade restrictions greatly affecting U.S. markets. LPA will communicate with these audiences through timely dissemination of information and may arrange to accompany the APHIS Administrator to present to financial boards and trading partners on APHIS' emergency response capabilities, in order to assure them that APHIS is committed to responding to the emergency and returning to normal trading activities.

- *Interagency partners*. In emergency situations, APHIS will likely partner with other affected agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, and so on. LPA will work to ensure that information on APHIS' emergency response capabilities is provided to partners' communicators and will also collaborate with them to develop materials as necessary.

- *Media*. This category includes print, radio, and television reporters at the international, National, and local level, as well as Internet-based media, including social media and blogs. During an emergency, the media will be contacting APHIS seeking information about program activities. The media also provide a means for sharing Agency information with interested audiences that may otherwise be difficult to reach.

- *Congress*. This audience includes staff of the House Committee on Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. When appropriate, LPA may extend its outreach to additional committees and House and Senate leadership. LPA will also communicate with congressional staff representing affected States, when appropriate.

5.4 APHIS' RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES

In the event of an animal or plant pest disease emergency, LPA provides communication support throughout three distinct phases of an incident: the initial response, ongoing response as the situation develops, and post-incident response. Effective and well-thought out communication in each of these phases is essential to the success of an emergency response.

5.4.1 Communication Tools Used During a Response

For incident management, APHIS' primary objective is to have an integrated communications network that promotes and facilitates the dissemination of information rapidly, efficiently, and accurately. Communication methods and automated information systems (AISs) ensure the efficient and accurate dissemination of information internally and externally.

During an animal health event, informed and timely decisions by IC can lead to success in coordinating response activities and ultimately accomplishing objectives. When communicating internally, IC uses a number of conventional methods and AIS applications:

- *APHIS EMRS.* EMRS is an information management system that provides VS personnel monitoring of FAD and emerging animal disease investigations performed by State or Federal Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians (FADDs). When an FADD initiates an FAD/emerging animal disease investigation, EMRS generates automatic e-mail notices to select VS personnel. EMRS can be adapted to FAD incidents or outbreaks, regardless of size and complexity, for tracing purposes and other veterinary response activities.

- *Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS).* During an incident, ROSS provides asset management information. It also communicates with EMRS, enabling IC to track the status and availability of personnel and physical assets. If IC needs additional staff resources, it can use ROSS to identify qualified individuals to fill the positions. Personnel selection is made in ROSS by qualifications and location.

- *SharePoint.* SharePoint is a web-based collaborative software application. IC staff members can easily create a secure, shared workspace to communicate, share information and resources, and manage documents and tasks.

- *Videoconferences.* Videoconferences enable IC to bring incident personnel together from different sites simultaneously. Besides the audio and visual transmission of meeting activities, videoconferences also allow personnel to share documents using computer-displayed information.

- *Conference calls.* Like videoconferences, conference calling allows IC to bring many incident personnel together at the same time. Its main limitation is that it only provides an audio feed. Most incident communication takes place via conference calls.

- *E-mail, personal digital assistants, and phones.* IC uses these communication channels extensively for disseminating information quickly and effectively during an incident.

- *Daily staff meetings.* IC holds meetings several times during the day, and they are frequently used in conjunction with videoconferences and conference calls. Staff meetings take place at a minimum during shift changes and before beginning the day.

- *Situation reports and status reports.* These reports summarize the facts and details of the incident. They are produced and distributed daily or as required.

5.4.2 Initial Response

During the first 24 to 72 hours of an emergency, LPA takes numerous steps or actions, many of which occur simultaneously. For example, at the same time internal notifications are occurring, LPA will be working on drafting materials for public release.

5.4.2.1 NOTIFICATIONS

The timing for notifying target audiences about animal or plant pest disease emergency situations, while extremely important, cannot be systematically or consistently predetermined. The details surrounding each emergency are different and hard to predict. Moreover, because emergency situations are often market-sensitive, APHIS and LPA cannot give audiences and stakeholders as much notice of a situation as everyone would like. However, it's important to note that APHIS and LPA strive to notify all their partners at the earliest possible opportunity.

When programs become aware of a potential emergency, they immediately notify the Office of the Administrator (OA) and LPA, providing all current, available information. Once OA has briefed the Under Secretary's Office, LPA generally informs the Department's Office of Communications (OC). Timing and how widely to release information publicly, as well as other key operational information and potential trade implications, are all discussed with the Office of the Secretary and Department officials. Various factors are considered, such as whether an announcement would cause export markets to close or trigger financial market impacts, and timing of a release may be adjusted to occur after markets close on a given day.

5.4.2.2 MEDIA ANNOUNCEMENT PREPARATION

Depending on the significance of the animal or plant pest disease emergency, public notification of such a situation could occur via different means. If the situation warrants, LPA or OC will arrange for a live, televised press conference, most likely at USDA's headquarters in Washington, DC, where media are briefed by Department or Agency spokespeople and can ask questions related to the situation. In most cases, unless the Secretary of Agriculture is conducting the briefing or press conference, LPA will coordinate and facilitate logistics for the notifications. If the situation requires frequent information sharing, LPA will arrange for additional briefings within the first 24 to 72 hours of an emergency.

5.4.2.3 PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SUPPORTING MATERIALS

LPA will develop and clear a statement or press release, internal talking points, an internal question and answer document, one or more external fact sheets, remarks for speakers, a Hot Issue website, media advisory, and any other materials that are deemed necessary for the initial announcement. The statement or press release will briefly explain the emerging issue and will be sent to LPA's media list of interested reporters and posted on the Department's and APHIS' websites. An external fact sheet will provide basic information on the emergency situation, how the Agency is responding, what the public can do to help, and whom to contact regarding the emergency. It will be provided in press packets, posted on the website, and handed out as necessary. The fact sheet and other relevant information will be posted on APHIS' Hot Issues website, so the public can easily access the most current information.

5.4.2.4 COMMUNICATION RESPONSE AND SUPPORT FOLLOWING BRIEFINGS

Effective and coordinated communication support after the initial announcement of an emergency situation is critical. Because information demands occur at various locations, LPA takes a strategic approach, lending support not only on the ground at the actual emergency project site, but also providing staffing at APHIS' Emergency Operations Center (AEOC) in Riverdale, MD, and at USDA's headquarters. Specifically, at least one Public Affairs Specialist (PAS) will be deployed to the site of the emergency to work within the ICS. The ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in domestic incident management activities. It is used for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents. The PAS' role within the ICS is to act as the Public Information Officer (PIO). The PIO serves as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other organizations seeking information directly about the incident or event.

This PAS serving as the PIO will be responsible for handling various communication activities, such as developing a media response and outreach plan, responding to local media inquiries, working with State and local counterparts, and coordinat-

ing information dissemination locally. PIOs will also designate a local spokesperson, such as the Incident Commander, and prepare the designee to converse with the media. They will also coordinate with LPA at headquarters to ensure that we deliver consistent messages and address emerging issues. If APHIS' emergency response involves multiple locations, LPA will have PASs stationed at key sites to handle media coordination. Working within the ICS requires quick coordination and handling communication activities daily.

LPA will also station a PAS in the AEOC with the main responsibility of responding to media calls made to headquarters and facilitating information sharing. This PAS will work with other PASs as necessary to address the high volume of calls that may result. A second PAS will be stationed in the AEOC to liaise and share information with LPA regarding emergency response activities.

LPA will invite State, local, and industry communicators to participate in a Joint Information Center (JIC). The JIC is a collocated group of representatives from agencies and organizations involved in an event who are designated to handle public information needs. JICs may be established at various levels of government or at incident sites, or can be components of multiagency coordination groups. The JIC is usually set up at the regional level to handle on-site, day-to-day communication activities and to serve as a medium for coordinating messaging on the evolving event. The PASs in the ICS keeps the JIC representatives informed and utilize them to disseminate information quickly to the media and interested stakeholders. In some emergency situations, OC will establish a JIC housed at the Department. OC's JIC will consist of Department and other USDA agency communicators. LPA will use the OC JIC to share information with the other involved agencies. If an OC JIC is not established, LPA will share information with the other agencies through regular telephone briefings. The Department is committed to ensuring that agencies experiencing emergencies are fully supported and will assist LPA in recruiting additional PASs from other agencies to provide support for communication activities.

LPA's media coordinator will help to coordinate National or highly controversial calls with OC. In addition, the media coordinator will work with the affected programs to designate several high-level officials in Riverdale, MD and Washington, DC, who will be available to serve as Agency spokespeople. The media coordinator will prepare all spokespeople for interviews with the media and coordinate the logistics for these interviews.

LPA's media coordinator will work with the States and industry to identify third-party spokespeople to help deliver public messages and provide outside perspectives. Generally, LPA will turn to third-party spokespeople to talk to the media during ongoing emergency response efforts to help illustrate the importance of quick action in stamping-out a disease. LPA will also involve other public affairs contacts at other agencies in media response and in coordinating third-party spokespeople as necessary.

LPA will hold twice-daily meetings—in the morning and afternoon—to discuss communication strategy and share the latest information on APHIS' emergency response. These internal meetings will include all LPA personnel assigned to the emergency response effort, thereby ensuring consistent communication with the media, stakeholders, and congressional offices.

5.4.3 Ongoing Communication Support

Throughout the Agency's core emergency response effort, communication activities, like operational ones, will continue until ICS comes to a close. This period of ongoing communication could last a matter of weeks or continue for months. It will be critical during this phase of communication to maintain routine contact with various audiences.

APHIS and USDA have reputations for regularly and transparently communicating about ongoing animal or plant emergencies. Media, industry, trading partners, and other stakeholders appreciate this practice and have come to rely on such an open dialogue. Generally, throughout at least the early stages of an emergency project, LPA coordinates and conducts twice-daily communication briefings, to provide media and the public with updates on operational progress. However, LPA will tailor its communication briefings based on the media interest in the issue, and the twice-daily briefings may be scaled back to once every 2 days and then to once a week.

The APHIS PAS deployed to the site of the emergency to work within the ICS will continue to update APHIS headquarters on the situation. If media interest is still high, LPA will develop a schedule to allow for a rotation of PASs to handle on-site media coordination. After the Incident Commander, PIO, or other designated spokesperson is relieved with a replacement, the APHIS PAS within the ICS will train that individual to be the new on-site spokesperson as necessary, and this will be repeated as new Incident Commanders, PIOs, and other spokespeople are assigned.

During this time, LPA's media coordinator will continue to coordinate National or highly controversial calls regarding project activities with OC and provide updates of any changes in media interest. LPA will update the Hot Issues website to reflect ongoing response activities, such as daily surveillance numbers, new outreach materials, announcements on new funding, and other important activities. If emergency funding is provided for a large-scale outreach campaign, LPA will work with the program, OC, the affected States, and agencies to develop appropriate outreach materials. Throughout this phase of the emergency, regular updates and check-ins with the communicators and commissioners in affected States will continue, and any new material will be shared with them prior to providing it to the public.

The LPA personnel in the JIC and at headquarters will coordinate on media response with the communicators in the affected States as necessary, and LPA will

continue to provide updates to State departments of agriculture through conference calls with the Communication Officers of State Departments of Agriculture (COSDA) and National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA), which will be arranged on an as-needed basis.

As issues emerge, LPA will coordinate with the Office of Congressional Relations (OCR) to provide updates and follow-up briefings to key congressional staff. Additionally, key stakeholders will be notified of developments in the situation via media and the APHIS website. If a significant development occurs, LPA and the involved programs may provide additional briefings to interested stakeholders to update them on the situation.

5.4.4 Post-Incident Communication

Communication doesn't stop when emergency operations shut down. To ensure consistent messaging after the ICS ceases on-site operations, it is important to keep open the lines of communication between LPA and the States, other involved agencies, Tribal Nations, and stakeholders. This period of communication could last for many months to more than a year, and could include maintenance of an outreach campaign. Though interaction on the issue will be less frequent, LPA will ensure that any new information is provided to the public and the media on how operations are returning to normal. Providing timely information is crucial, as it can be helpful in restoring normalized trade and livestock or plant movement.

During the progress toward complete eradication and restoration of full trading, a number of milestones would be good opportunities to communicate with both the domestic and international audiences:

- lifting of a quarantine;
- results of trace-backs;
- completion of disinfection of formerly Infected Premises;
- restoration of exports from areas of the United States designated as being pest- or disease-free; and
- completion of an investigation.

These activities will be reported through updates to the website, press releases as necessary, and stakeholder announcements. LPA will also update industry as necessary on ongoing communication activities through industry communicators groups such as the Animal Agriculture Communicators Group and the Cross-Species Working Group.

LPA will continue to communicate updates to State departments of agriculture through monthly COSDA and NASDA calls and work with the affected States on any outreach materials that are produced. Additionally, LPA will continue to

coordinate with OCR to update key congressional staff as the situation comes to a resolution, providing follow-up briefings on any significant results, investigative findings, or future actions to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring.

5.4.5 Staying Ahead of Emergencies

LPA is always preparing for the next emergency through day-to-day work. LPA works proactively to build partnerships with the media, stakeholders, and Congress by responding quickly to requests for information and promoting agency and program initiatives. LPA has built strong relationships with agricultural reporters, as they will be on the front lines of providing information to the public, not only concerning normal regulatory activity but also any emergency.

LPA works closely with COSDA by holding monthly conference calls, sharing information on program activities, and attending their annual meetings. This relationship serves as a medium for coordinating training and sharing information on State and Federal animal and plant health regulatory issues. Additionally, LPA's State Liaison is working jointly with APHIS programs to continue to build strong relationships with the States. The State Liaison helps facilitate information sharing between the States and APHIS, and this role will be an integral part of getting emergency disease eradication and control information to the States quickly.

Appendix A
FAD PReP Document Structure

A. FAD PREP STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

- APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0)
- APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0)
- NCAHEM Stakeholder Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide
- NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan
- NCAHEM Incident Information Management Plan

B. NAHEMS GUIDELINES

- Health and Safety
- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
- Biosecurity
- Quarantine and Movement Control
- Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia
- Disposal
- Cleaning and Disinfection
- Vaccination for Contagious Diseases
  - Appendix A Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD)
  - Appendix B Classical Swine Fever (CSF)
  - Appendix C Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
- Wildlife Management and Vector Control
- Appraisal and Compensation

- Epidemiology, Surveillance, and FAD Tracing
- Continuity of Business
- Regionalization for International Trade
- NAHERC Deployment Guide

C. INDUSTRY MANUALS

- Dairy
- Swine
- Poultry
- Beef Feedlot
- Cow-Calf

D. DISEASE RESPONSE PLANS

- HPAI
- FMD
- CSF

E. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. Overview of Etiology and Ecology
2. Case Definitions and Laboratory Definitions
3. Surveillance
4. Diagnostics (Sample Collection, Surge Capacity, and Reporting)
5. Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing
6. Overview of Information Management
7. Communications
8. Health and Safety and PPE
9. Biosecurity

10. Quarantine and Movement Control
11. Continuity of Business
12. Overview of Regionalization for International Trade
13. Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia
14. Disposal
15. Cleaning and Disinfection
16. Vaccination
17. Overview of the National Veterinary Stockpile
18. Overview of Wildlife Management and Vector Control
19. Overview of Animal Welfare
20. Overview of Modeling and Assessment Tools
21. Appraisal and Compensation
22. Overview of Finance
23. Overview of the National Response Framework and National Incident Management System

F. CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS PLANNING

- Secure Egg Supply Plan
- Secure Milk Supply Plan
- Secure Turkey Supply Plan
- Secure Pork Supply Plan

G. OUTBREAK RESPONSE TOOLS

- Outbreak Surveillance Toolbox
- Tool for the Assessment of Intervention Options
- Case Definitions
  - African horse sickness

- African swine fever
- Avian influenza (notifiable)
- CSF
- Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
- Contagious equine metritis
- Eastern equine encephalomyelitis
- FMD
- Hendra-Nipah
- Japanese encephalitis
- Newcastle disease (virulent)
- Rift Valley fever
- Rinderpest
- Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis
- Western equine encephalomyelitis
- West Nile virus

Appendix B
Sample Memorandum of Understanding

Appendix B contains a sample memorandum of understanding between the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF STATE ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICIALS
AND THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE
VETERINARY SERVICES

ARTICLE 1 - PARTIES

The parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are Veterinary Services (VS), a program within the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials (National Assembly). The National Assembly represents State Animal Health Officials (SAHO) but has no regulatory or legally binding authority. Therefore this document is considered to be a consensus document only with the National Assembly serving as the general signatory on behalf of SAHOs.

ARTICLE 2 - PURPOSE

The purpose of this MOU is to provide a detailed explanation of actions that will be taken by VS personnel and National Assembly members to effectively and clearly communicate in the event of an investigation or initial laboratory finding of a potential high consequence livestock disease. For the purposes of this MOU, a high consequence livestock disease is defined as any disease outbreak that spreads rapidly, involves multiple States, results in high morbidity or mortality, could affect public health, is novel, and/or could have significant trade implications. Diseases that are considered domestic or endemic to the United States do not apply. This MOU is not intended to replace VS Memo 580.4 (Procedures for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Incidents). Rather, this MOU complements VS Memo 580.4 by ensuring that communication between VS and the National Assembly occurs in a consistent, reliable manner. It is also important to clarify that this MOU is limited to communications between VS personnel and National Assembly members. APHIS already has an emergency communications plan in place to address external communication with the public, media and industry stakeholders in the event of a high consequence livestock disease investigation or incident.

ARTICLE 3 – STATEMENT OF MUTUAL BENEFIT

This MOU defines communication actions for VS personnel and National Assembly members in the event of an investigation or initial laboratory finding of a potential high consequence livestock disease. The office of the VS Deputy Administrator will automatically activate this protocol in the event of such an incident. National Assembly leadership may also request

activation of this protocol for other incidents that they feel require regular and timely communication. Adherence to this MOU will result in consistent and coordinated communication between VS and the National Assembly.

ARTICLE 4 - VS RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Area-Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) or their designee will immediately notify their Regional Office and State SAHO when they first become aware of a potential incident in their State.

2. When notified of a potential incident, VS will convene a conference call with relevant VS personnel and any affected SAHOs. In most cases, VS' National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management will be responsible for initiating conference calls, but in some cases this responsibility may fall to the Regional Offices. For the purposes of this MOU, we will generally reference VS. Affected SAHOs include those with potentially infected animals in their States and those with trace outs from the incident. Conference call information will be emailed by VS to AVICs, the relevant Regional Office(s) and SAHOs in affected States simultaneously with the word "Important" listed in the subject line. VS will make every effort to include all known affected States. SAHOs and AVICs from additional affected States will be included in calls, emails, etc. as soon as VS becomes aware of their involvement.

3. Unless SAHOs and VS personnel mutually and specifically agree to do otherwise, VS will hold at least one conference call each day with relevant VS personnel and affected SAHOs throughout the length of the initial incident. Ideally, this call will take place at the same time each day. Additional calls will be scheduled as needed by VS or upon request by SAHOs.

4. At least once each day during the initial investigation, VS will distribute a brief situation report that summarizes the status of the incident and will email the report to all affected SAHOs, AVICs and the relevant Regional Office(s).

5. VS personnel and National Assembly members will use the Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) to communicate trace information related to the incident. However, the AVIC responsible for entering the information into EMRS will provide notification of the first trace out to an affected State by calling and emailing the SAHO. The AVIC will courtesy copy the SAHO in their own State as well as the AVIC in the newly affected State on the email message. Thereafter EMRS will serve as the official notification system. Note: If multiple States are involved, a SAHO will receive multiple phone calls and emails if they have initial trace outs coming to them from more than one State.

6. If it is determined that the animals/animal involved in the incident were transported through an otherwise unaffected State(s) just prior to showing clinical signs, VS will provide courtesy notification of the investigation/incident to the appropriate SAHO(s) and AVIC(s). If multiple States are involved, VS will hold a conference call with these States to share available information. If appropriate, and depending on the circumstances of the situation, the SAHO(s)

and AVIC(s) may also be included in future daily conference calls with affected States and receive daily situation reports.

7. VS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) personnel will provide initial test results whether positive or negative to the AVIC in an affected State by phone and email. The email will be sent by return receipt and include a cc' to the Regional Director as well as other designated recipients in the AVIC's office to ensure the results are received immediately. The AVIC or their designee will then immediately notify their SAHO by phone and confirm personal notification was successful to their Regional Office. Please note that VS leadership at headquarters may be notified prior to AVICs and SAHOs. Only those results that have previously been provided to the relevant SAHO, AVIC and Regional Office will be reported or discussed on the daily conference calls that involve all affected SAHOs. Future notifications of test results will be provided electronically to the AVIC, relevant Regional Office and SAHO simultaneously using tailored email lists developed for each State.

8. If the test results from NVSL are negative, meaning that a high consequence livestock disease is not present in the United States, then VS will share this information on the daily conference call with all affected States (after responsibilities under No. 7 have been met) and issue a final situation report. VS and the affected SAHOs will stand down emergency operations and return to business as usual.

9. If the initial NVSL test results are positive, suspect or inconclusive (i.e., not negative), then the daily conference calls with affected SAHOs and daily situation reports will continue throughout the length of the incident. Call schedules and the frequency of situation reports may be adjusted as necessary in consultation with affected SAHOs.

10. In adherence with the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture/Communication Officers of State Departments of Agriculture/APHIS Emergency Communications Plan, if a public announcement is made about the disease incident, all States will be notified via conference call at least one hour prior to public notification. Please note that the timing of this call may be impacted by political decisions outside of APHIS' control.

11. Should an Agency press release be issued, APHIS' Legislative and Public Affairs Office will work with their communications counterparts in the affected States in advance of its release to ensure a consistent, coordinated message.

12. Once information about the disease incident is shared with the public, VS will hold at least weekly conference calls that will be open to all SAHOs to provide updates on the status of the incident. Ideally, these calls will be held at the same time(s) each week and lead jointly by VS and National Assembly leadership. Call information will be emailed by VS to all AVICs, the Regional Offices and SAHOs simultaneously. In addition, SAHOs will be briefed by conference call prior to any USDA/APHIS press conferences about the incident. Press releases and other publicly released materials about the incident will be emailed to all AVICs, the Regional Offices and SAHOs simultaneously as soon as they are posted to the APHIS Web site.

13. At least twice weekly VS will produce a national situation report that will be emailed to all SAHOs, the Regional Offices and AVICs simultaneously. The frequency of these reports may be adjusted as necessary in consultation with the National Assembly's leadership.

14. This communication protocol will remain in effect until VS and the National Assembly's leadership jointly agree that there is no longer a need for conference calls and situation reports.

ARTICLE 5 – NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The SAHO or their designee will immediately notify their AVIC when they first become aware of a potential incident in their State even if it is after normal business hours or on a weekend. If the AVIC is unreachable then the Regional Office should be contacted. In the event that neither the AVIC nor the Regional Office is reachable, the SAHO should call VS' foreign animal disease emergency hotline at 1-800-940-6524.

2. In the event of an investigation, or an initial laboratory finding of a potential high consequence livestock disease that impacts multiple States, affected SAHOs are responsible for the notification of adjacent, unaffected States. VS will not share information with SAHOs in unaffected States until just prior to a public announcement regarding the incident. This is in keeping with responsibility No. 10 under Article 4 of this MOU. Please note that it is VS' responsibility to notify neighboring countries of a disease outbreak. SAHOs should consult with VS to determine what information is being provided to border countries.

3. Affected SAHOs will notify their State wildlife health officials if the incident has the potential to impact wildlife species and their State public health officials if the incident has the potential to impact public health. VS will do the same for its Federal counterparts.

4. To ensure a consistent message and to minimize trade restrictions, affected SAHOs and their Communication Officers should consult with VS and APHIS' Legislative and Public Affairs Office before issuing a press release.

ARTICLE 6 – CONFIDENTIALITY

Unless instructed otherwise, information provided during conference calls and in situation reports should be considered confidential and for official use only until public notification is made. Official use allows for the sharing of information with other Government agencies and the affected industry. Should an exception to this article be necessary, it will be discussed by VS and the affected SAHOs. APHIS' Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) staff will provide information to the media, the public and external stakeholders. LPA will work with communication officers from affected States to ensure coordination of consistent messages.

ARTICLE 7 - AMENDMENTS

This MOU may be amended at any time by mutual agreement of all parties in writing.

ARTICLE 8 - EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION

This MOU will be in effect upon date of final signature and will continue unless amended. VS and National Assembly leadership will jointly review this MOU every five years.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE
VETERINARY SERVICES

Oct 11, 2009

Dr. John Clifford, Deputy Administrator — Date

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF STATE ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICIALS

OCT 11, 2009

Dr. Guy Hollenhaus, President — Date

Appendix C
Glossary

Animal product	Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, skins, and any by-product containing any of those components that originated from an animal or bird.
Case	Any individual animal infected by a foreign animal disease (FAD), with or without clinical signs.
Emergency vaccination	A disease control strategy using the immunization of susceptible animals through the administration of a vaccine comprising antigens appropriate to the disease to be controlled.
Etiology	The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.
Euthanasia	The humane destruction of an animal accomplished by a method that produces rapid unconsciousness and subsequent death with a minimum of pain or distress or a method that utilizes anesthesia produced by an agent that causes painless loss of consciousness and subsequent death.
Foreign animal disease (FAD)	A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal population.
Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)	Documents used to identify veterinary functions and countermeasures necessary to contain and control an FAD outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and countermeasures with emergency management systems and operations conducted in Unified Command by local, State, and Federal personnel.
Federal-to-Federal Support (FFS)	USDA may request FFS from other Federal departments and agencies. FFS refers to circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or other mechanism.
Fomites	Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal or person to another.

Incident Command System	A standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach that ◆ allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure; ◆ enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private; and ◆ establishes common processes for planning and managing resources.
Mass depopulation	Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks facing those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating.
Memorandum/Memoranda of understanding	A document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between parties. It expresses a scope of activities and expectations between parties, indicating an intended common line of action or communication. It does not indicate a financial commitment.
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)	NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two USDA agencies and the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and University laboratories, which use common testing methods and software platforms to perform diagnostics and share information.
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)	Organization that collects and publishes information on animal diseases from 178 (March 2012) countries and develops standards for animal health.
Outbreak	The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is normally expected in a given population.
Personal protective equipment	Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented to the fullest extent.
Premises	A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment.
Slaughter	The killing of an animal or animals for food, often by bleeding.
Trace-back	The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal products, possible fomites, people, possible vectors, and so on that have entered onto an Infected Premises (IP).
Trace-forward	The tracing of all animals, people, fomites, and so on that have left an IP. The premises that received the animals or goods should be investigated and kept under surveillance or quarantine.

Vector	An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or immediate surroundings.
Zoonotic	Any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from animals to humans.

Appendix D
Abbreviations

AC	Area Command
ACHP	Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
ADA	Associate Deputy Administrator
AEOC	APHIS Emergency Operations Center
AHPA	Animal Health Protection Act
AI	avian influenza
AIS	automated information system
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ARC	U.S. Army Reserve Command
AVIC	Area Veterinarian-in-Charge
BESB	Budget Execution and Support Branch
BPA	blanket purchase agreement
BPAS	Budget and Program Analysis Staff
CA	Control Area
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive
CCC	Commodity Credit Corporation
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CF	contingency fund
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CI/KR	critical infrastructure/key resources
CNCS	Corporation for National and Community Service
COSDA	Communication Officers of State Departments of Agriculture
CSF	classical swine fever
DA	Deputy Administrator
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOC	U.S. Department of Commerce
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy

DOI	U.S. Department of Interior
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
DOL	U.S. Department of Labor
DOS	U.S. Department of State
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
DRA	Delta Regional Authority
ED	U.S. Department of Education
EM&D	Emergency Management and Diagnostics
EMLC	Emergency Management Leadership Council
EMRS	Emergency Management Response System
EOCs	Federal Emergency Operations Centers
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EQS	Emergency Qualification System
ERO	Eastern Region Office
ESF(s)	Emergency Support Functions
FAD	foreign animal disease
FAD PReP	Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
FADD	Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	U.S. Federal Communications Commission
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFS	Federal-to-Federal support
FMD	foot-and-mouth disease
FSA	Farm Service Agency
FSIS	Food Safety and Inspection Service
GIS	geographic information system
GSA	U.S. General Services Administration
HENTF	Heritage Emergency National Task Force
HHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HPAI	highly pathogenic avian influenza
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HUD	U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAC	Incident Advisory Council
IC	Incident Command
ICG	Incident Coordination Group
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IMT	Incident Management Team
IP	Infected Premises
IT	information technology
JIC	Joint Information Center
LPA	Legislative and Public Affairs
MAC	Multiagency Coordination
MOC	Major Object Class
MOU	memorandum/memoranda of understanding
MRP	Marketing and Regulatory Programs
NAHEMS	National Animal Health Emergency Management System
NAHERC	National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
NAHLN	National Animal Health Laboratory Network
NARA	U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
NASA	U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASDA	National Association of State Departments of Agriculture
NCAHEM	National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management
NCS	National Communications System
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRF	National Response Framework
NRMT	National Response Management Team
NVS	National Veterinary Stockpile
NVSL	National Veterinary Services Laboratories
NWHC	National Wildlife Health Center

OA	Office of the Administrator
OBPA	Office of Budget and Program Analysis
OC	Office of Communications
OCR	Office of Congressional Relations
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAS	Public Affairs Specialist
PFS	Planning and Finance Staff
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPD	Program and Policy Development
PPE	personal protective equipment
ROSS	Resource Ordering and Status System
SAHO	State Animal Health Official
SBA	U.S. Small Business Administration
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SOP	standard operating procedures
SSA	U.S. Social Security Administration
TREAS	U.S. Department of Treasury
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S.C.	Code of Laws of the United States of America
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCG	U. S. Coast Guard
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USDA FS	USDA Forest Service
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
USPS	U.S. Postal Service
VA	U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
VS	Veterinary Services

VSDA	Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator (Figure 2-1)
VSEM	Veterinary Services Emergency Management and Diagnostics (Figure 2-1)
WHO	World Health Organization
WRO	Western Region Office

Appendix E
Selected References and Resources

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