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US ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(Case 10-004)

AUTHORITY: On 12 November 2009, the Secretary of the Army directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to conduct an investigation into alleged improprieties at Arlington National Cemetery (ANC). Specifically, DAIG was directed to focus on the following:

- a. Hostile work environment, including use of inappropriate racial comments or vulgarity, and intimidation of subordinate employees;
- b. Inappropriate hiring practices, including instances of favoritism or nepotism;
- c. Improper interment and trans-interment of remains, including non-compliance with applicable internal regulations and policies regarding approval authority, accountability, and notification of next of kin.

BACKGROUND:

1. Since the first interment of a military service member on 13 May 1864, over 330,000 personnel have been laid to rest at ANC. In Fiscal Year 2009, ANC employees conducted between 27 and 30 funerals on an average day. These include in-ground burials (interments) and placement of cremated remains (inurnments) in the Columbarium. ANC operates 250 days a year conducting approximately 6,400 funerals annually. General Orders No. 13, dated 29 October 2004, states that the Superintendent of ANC will oversee day-to-day execution of the Army National Cemeteries Program in accordance with applicable law and policy, including the administration, operation, and maintenance of the Army National Cemeteries. Public Law 93-43, Section 1004(c), states that each grave in a national cemetery shall be marked with an appropriate marker.

2. Mr. John C. Metzler, Jr., Senior Executive Service, has been assigned as the Superintendent, ANC, since 1991, and is responsible, under the provisions of General Orders No. 13, for overseeing the administration, operation, and maintenance of ANC. Mr. Thurman Higginbotham, YC-3, has been assigned as the Deputy Superintendent since 1990, and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the cemetery. The Administrative Services Division, the Field Operations Division, and the Facilities Maintenance Division all work under Mr. Higginbotham's supervision and report directly to him. The Administrative Services Division and Field Operations Division are primarily involved in the preparation and conduct of daily funerals. The Administrative Services Division includes the Interment Services Branch (ISB), which is responsible for preparing all associated burial documentation, generating temporary markers for gravesites, and ordering all gravesite headstones; the Administrative Services Branch;

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and the Quality Inspector. The Field Operations Division includes the Interment Operations Branch; the Maintenance Branch; the Engineering Technician; and the Quality Assurance Specialist.

3. On 25 July 1997, the Inspector General (IG), Military District of Washington (MDW), completed an organizational climate assessment of ANC which had been conducted from November 1996 to July 1997. The command climate assessment was an examination of the management operations, systems, and procedures of ANC. The methodology included a review of historical records pertaining to ANC Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) evaluations, IG safety and logistics inspections, and other documentary information. The IG conducted division sensing sessions with the entire work force and individual interviews with key supervisory personnel. The 1997 assessment identified numerous issues, two of which specifically relate to the current investigation.

a. Employee morale: The 1997 MDW IG assessment noted that during a 1992 EEO and IG inquiry, "allegations of poor employee morale" were substantiated and attributed to the working relationship between the Superintendent and the Deputy. On 22 December 1992, the Commanding General, MDW counseled both the Superintendent (Mr. Metzler) and his Deputy (Mr. Higginbotham), and directed them to "work together to establish programs that will foster cohesion, esprit de corps, and camaraderie among your workforce." The assessment also noted that an atmosphere of turmoil, distrust, mismanagement, and poor employee morale had continued to the present (1997). It further noted an overwhelming sense of frustration among employees and the senior leadership of ANC. This feeling of frustration was present during every sensing session and almost every management interview. The assessment found enough evidence to support a finding that the Superintendent had an "autocratic leadership style when his workforce needs more team leadership, more sharing and consideration of others, empowerment and unified direction." Additionally, the assessment noted that unfortunately, since the EEO and IG inquiry of 1992, there had been "no indication that the Superintendent has changed and employees have lost confidence in his leadership ability."

b. Working relationship between the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent: The 1997 assessment also noted that the 1992 EEO inquiry at ANC had "concluded that there existed a perception among the ANC workforce of friction between the Superintendent and his Deputy." The 1992 inquiry determined that the "single most disruptive factor" in the ANC organization was the "rift" that existed between the Superintendent and the Deputy. When counseling the Superintendent and the Deputy, the Commanding General, MDW, noted the "dysfunctional relationship" between the Superintendent and the Deputy which created a less than desirable working environment and "contributed significantly to a decline in morale and in the operating efficiency of the cemetery." The 1997 assessment further noted that although

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not as overt as 1992, "dissension and discord" still existed between the Superintendent and the Deputy and was still having a significant impact on the overall efficiency and day-to-day operation of ANC. The IG, MDW, opined in the assessment that the "split between the two will never be resolved as long as they both occupy their current positions."

4. On 23 July 2009, the Chief of Staff, US Army MDW, directed an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation into reports that at least one gravesite at ANC was improperly marked. The AR 15-6 investigation, approved on 7 October 2009, found that:

a. On 21 or 22 May 2003, ANC workers, while preparing gravesite 68/449 for a 22 May 2003 interment, unexpectedly discovered a casket of remains. This gravesite had been unmarked and was believed to be unoccupied. Mr. Norman Owens, Engineering Technician, ANC, notified Mr. Higginbotham of this discovery. Mr. Higginbotham went to the gravesite, assessed the situation, and told workers from the Field Operations Division to close the gravesite. Mr. Higginbotham asked some questions and checked the burial records to determine the identity of the remains interred in gravesite 68/449. ANC could not, however, find any documentation to indicate a prior interment in gravesite 68/449. Mr. Higginbotham testified that he ordered a temporary marker be placed on the gravesite and that a headstone be ordered. Mr. Higginbotham further testified that he informed Mr. Metzler on the same day as the discovery. Mr. Metzler, however, testified that he was not informed of the discovery in gravesite 68/449 until 20 July 2009. Because of conflicting testimony and the absence of any written documentation, the AR 15-6 investigating officer (IO) could not confirm if Mr. Metzler was informed of this discovery back in 2003.

b. No evidence was found to indicate that gravesite 68/449 was properly marked with a temporary marker or a permanent headstone between May 2003 and July 2009. In July 2009, Mr. Metzler attempted to re-establish accountability by directing a comprehensive review of cemetery records. Mr. Metzler ensured that a temporary marker was placed at gravesite 68/449 pending the receipt of a permanent headstone. The 15-6 IO could neither determine the identity of the remains in 68/449, nor how accountability for this interment had been lost.

c. ANC workers identified a second discovery of a casket of remains in an unmarked gravesite (42/1186) on 15 January 2009. The AR 15-6 investigation could not confirm if Mr. Higginbotham or Mr. Metzler were informed when this discovery was made. The AR 15-6 IO's analysis concluded that gravesite 42/1186 was likely partially obstructed from an adjacent gravesite (42/1185). In August 2009, Mr. Metzler directed the preparation of a revised burial card to more clearly describe the obstruction in gravesite 42/1186.

d. The approved AR 15-6 investigation recommended that:

(1) The Superintendent, ANC, take non-invasive measures, and potentially invasive measures, to regain accountability of the remains interred in 68/449.

(2) The Superintendent, ANC, publish an ANC policy document outlining specific actions ANC staff members must take if equipment operators discover caskets or liners in gravesites designated as available.

DISCUSSION: DAIG conducted 90 interviews of current and former ANC employees and collected and reviewed documentary evidence. Our investigation determined the following:

1. Concerning a hostile work environment:

a. **The preponderance of credible evidence did not indicate the existence of a hostile work environment at ANC**, nor did it indicate widespread use of inappropriate racial comments or vulgarity, or acts of intimidation towards subordinate employees. Although no hostile work environment exists, ANC does exhibit an unhealthy organizational climate. This unhealthy climate is largely attributable to the poor working relationship between Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham. The long-standing rift that exists between the Superintendent and the Deputy appears to be the single most disruptive factor in the organization. Their on-going dysfunctional relationship contributes to the poor morale within the organization and has negatively impacted its operating efficiency. Of note, while it was apparent that neither can work effectively with the other, Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham differed completely in the manner in which they describe the other's work performance. Mr. Metzler testified neutrally that Mr. Higginbotham was performing satisfactorily, while Mr. Higginbotham made little effort to hide his contempt for the way in which he perceives Mr. Metzler has managed ANC. Mr. Higginbotham was vocal and animated in expressing his disapproval of Mr. Metzler's management ability and leadership style, whereas Mr. Metzler presented a benign assessment of Mr. Higginbotham's performance. Regardless of the tone each uses to describe the other, it is clear that their failure to effectively communicate with each other, coupled with their obvious lack of mutual trust and respect for the other, has completely undermined their ability to work effectively as a leadership team and is largely responsible for ANC's unhealthy and ineffective organizational climate. Despite being counseled by the Commanding General, MDW, in 1992, Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham never overcame their inability to work effectively with each other.

b. **The majority of the employees interviewed testified that morale was very low.** The current command climate mirrored the level of poor morale identified during the 1992 EEO/IG inquiry and the IG Follow-Up in 1997. The employees interviewed described an atmosphere of distrust and mismanagement. Those removed from daily

interaction with the Superintendent or Deputy had few comments concerning their leadership style. They did, however, comment on the perception that they were not appreciated by the leadership as a whole. Broadly stated, there was an overwhelming sense of frustration among employees concerning ANC's leadership.

c. Mr. Metzler's leadership style negatively affects the cemetery's organizational climate. While the workforce showed some semblance of team cohesion at lower levels, team effort at the senior leadership level is nearly non-existent. This lack of unified and mutually supportive team leadership has further contributed to the unhealthy organizational climate. Mr. Metzler's inability or unwillingness to develop, implement, and maintain policies and procedures to effectively manage cemetery operations evidences a lack of management skill necessary to be fully effective at his level of authority. Additionally, he has issued little to no guidance to his subordinate leaders, specifically to Mr. Higginbotham. The few documents governing cemetery policy and procedures are outdated and do not reflect the visionary perspective necessary to alleviate past and present cemetery operations errors.

d. The working relationship between the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent continues to be strained and their lines of communication almost non-existent. Except for cordial greetings and limited conversations, evidence indicated that Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham do not discuss management issues and operational matters in the manner expected of and necessary for a Superintendent and Deputy. Neither individual apprises the other of what he is doing. Division chiefs and lower level leaders often receive contradictory guidance from the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent concerning cemetery operations. This conflicting guidance forces the ANC workforce to choose sides for direction, authority, and loyalty. The friction between the two is felt in meetings, in delegations of authority and responsibility, and in daily operations. This, in turn, has contributed to many of the burial errors and mistakes addressed in this investigation.

e. Evidence indicated that no forms of counseling for subpar performance were ever conducted, to include Mr. Higginbotham's last annual appraisal. As an example, the automation of records initiative for ANC was spearheaded by Mr. Higginbotham. Mr. Metzler stated that his involvement with this initiative was minimal as he left it to Mr. Higginbotham to accomplish. Although this mission was a failure, Mr. Metzler conducted no form of written or oral counseling with Mr. Higginbotham to address the continued lack of satisfactory progress in automating ANC's records system.

f. ANC reacts to problems, it does not seek systemic solutions to prevent them. Testimony and other evidence gathered during this investigation reflected repeated instances where Mr. Metzler failed to exercise the initiative necessary to prevent foreseeable issues and resolve reported problems. For example, he repeatedly

ignored opportunities to develop and implement policies and procedures to prevent recurring problems from continuing.

g. Mr. Higginbotham's attempts to address ANC issues and concerns with Mr. Metzler were not acted upon. In a memorandum to Mr. Metzler, dated 1 March 2009, Mr. Higginbotham raised numerous personnel issues that concerned him. He stated there was a perception that Ms. Kaitlin Horst, Public Affairs Officer (PAO), ANC, and Ms. Amanda Muro, a Cemetery Representative received preferential treatment because of Mr. Metzler's relationships with the fathers of these two employees. He then stated that the overall climate of ANC was permeated with racial and anti-management overtones and that if these issues were not addressed the organization was headed towards future EEO complaints and potential IG investigations. Mr. Higginbotham stated that he and Mr. Metzler were responsible for these matters because they continued to allow them. He raised these and other concerns about supervisor and employee relations and offered to take the lead into looking at several of these issues. Noting that ANC would face allegations of discrimination and/or a hostile work environment, Mr. Higginbotham strongly suggested that he and Mr. Metzler resolve these issues before other agencies did it for them. Mr. Metzler testified that he remembers receiving the memorandum but didn't think the issues had much merit. He didn't think ANC had these problems and even though he told Mr. Higginbotham that he would discuss the issues with him, he never did. This lack of cohesive leadership at the top of ANC permeates throughout the organization and has singularly undermined the morale, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of ANC as an organization.

h. Mr. Higginbotham's outward attitude towards Mr. Metzler clearly conveys distrust and disapproval, while Mr. Metzler claims their relationship was satisfactory. Mr. Higginbotham testified that he has lost confidence in Mr. Metzler's leadership ability and it is apparent that he harbors animosity towards Mr. Metzler. Since Mr. Higginbotham directly supervises the three branches within ANC, his open animosity towards Mr. Metzler's leadership resonates throughout ANC, which further contributes to the unhealthy organizational climate. Mr. Metzler, in turn, has apparently retreated from this dysfunctional relationship to the point where he appears content to simply not deal with Mr. Higginbotham if he doesn't have to do so.

2. Concerning inappropriate hiring practices, including instances of favoritism or nepotism:

a. Testimonial evidence indicated that there was a perception among some ANC employees of favoritism as it related to temporary and summer hiring practices. The preponderance of documentary and testimonial evidence indicates, however, that there was no impropriety concerning temporary and summer hiring practices. Temporary hires were selected from candidates who submitted resumes through the proper personnel channels. Nevertheless, personal relationships between Mr. Metzler and

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some of the summer hires' family members gave the appearance of preferential treatment for selection. Exacerbating this perception was that vacancy announcements did not appear to be widely advertised, especially for summer hires.

[IO Note: Mr. Fritz, Human Resources Specialist, stated that summer hire vacancies were announced based on the availability of funds. The amount and availability of funds were inconsistent from one summer to the next.]

b. In August 2009, an anonymous complainant alleged that Mr. Metzler showed favoritism when he hired a female civilian, Ms. Kaitlin Horst, for the Public Affairs Officer position because her father was both a general officer and one of Mr. Metzler's friends. DAIG conducted a preliminary inquiry and determined that Mr. Metzler did not show favoritism in the hiring of Ms. Horst. Evidence indicated that in June/July 2007, Ms. Horst was appointed as a summer hire with ANC as an Office Automation Clerk, GS-0326-04. Subsequently, in the summer of 2008, she applied and was selected for a temporary position with ANC as an Administrative Assistant, GS-0303-05. Three of the other candidates for the position were veterans and all three declined the job offer for the Administrative Assistant position. Ms. Horst was among the other top candidates, all of equal ranking. As such, ANC could properly select any one of those candidates without prejudice. Ms. Horst was selected by Ms. Phyllis White, Director of Administrative Services, offered the job, and she accepted the position. In December 2008, Ms. Horst was then selected for a temporary Public Affairs Assistant, GS-0303-05 position at ANC. On 16 January 2009, ANC announced the Public Affairs Specialist, GS-1025-07 position. Ms. Horst applied for the position and there were no veterans on the list. Ms. White was both the direct supervisor for the position and the selecting official. Ms. White selected Ms. Horst for the PAO position and testified Mr. Metzler was not part of the hiring process and did not influence her selection of Ms. Horst.

c. Some ANC personnel testified that the working relationship between Mr. Metzler and Ms. Horst was preferential because Ms. Horst is MG Horst's daughter. While the close working relationship between the Superintendent and his PAO may have been perceived by some to be preferential, the preponderance of credible evidence indicated that interactions between these two individuals were professional and appropriate for the mission.

d. Although there were a few instances of family members employed at ANC, the preponderance of evidence did not support a finding that nepotism existed.

3. Concerning improper interment and trans-interment of remains, including non-compliance with applicable internal regulations and policies regarding approval authority, accountability, and notification of next of kin:

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a. Evidence established that mistakes have been made over recent years in ANC interment and trans-interment operations, and that mistakes continue to be made. Mistakes reported or identified during the investigation included: the loss of accountability of remains; remains encountered in gravesites believed to be unoccupied; unmarked gravesites; discrepancies in burial documentation; improperly marked gravesites; improper selection of gravesites; improper handling/disturbing of cremated remains; and the failure to notify the next of kin regarding the trans-interment of remains.

b. With respect to the five burial incidents reported by the media, evidence reflected that for each incident there were several systemic failures in the ANC interment process which individually and collectively reflected that ANC did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent such occurrences and, at times, further reflected that ANC failed to take appropriate actions to resolve known issues and procedural deficiencies.

c. Evidence reflected that ANC lacked established processes and procedures, the absence of which significantly hindered its ability to perform its mission. ANC did not proactively identify problems, as evidenced by the mistakes that were brought to the attention of ANC officials by family members of decedents interred at the cemetery, as well as by the IOs during the DAIG investigation. This was indicative of the reactionary manner by which ANC addressed issues.

d. Evidence indicated that ANC management failed to conduct analysis or to inquire into the causes of problems that occurred during operations, and consequently failed to ensure that effective measures were established to prevent similar occurrences. Leaders did not ask for, nor were they provided, management reports that could have assisted them in identifying potential systemic issues that undermined ANC operations. Evidence also indicated that incidents or mistakes that occurred at ANC were not treated as "serious." Instead, they were seemingly viewed as inevitable, and therefore personnel were not held accountable for errors.

e. After seven years of effort to upgrade ANC automation used to support interment operations, ANC still uses a scheduling system, implemented in 2003, that is inefficient and has significant functional limitations. The lack of effective automation has forced ANC to have to continue to manually process, update, and maintain burial records, which has contributed to the repeated mistakes made concerning its interment operations.

[IO Note: Burial records include: 1) Department of the Army Form 2122, Record of Interment, which includes decedent personal information, next of kin contact information, date of interment, and section / grave number of the gravesite; 2) Burial card, which is a 3x5 index card with decedent name, date of interment, and section /

grave number of the gravesite; and, 3) Burial map, which shows all occupied and empty gravesites for each section of the cemetery. The record of interment is the official burial record. Records of interment are filed alphabetically by decedent name, and burial cards are filed by section and grave number.]

f. **The poor working relationship between Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham resulted in a lack of information flow between ANC's key leaders, which further undermined the operational efficiency of the organization.** The poor communication between these ANC leaders resulted in a lack of involvement and cooperation in identifying problems, a lack of guidance with respect to cemetery operations, and a lack of follow-up to ensure that problems were appropriately resolved.

g. **The lack of documented procedures, the lack of analysis to identify cause(s) of problems, the lack of information provided to ANC leadership, the lack of key leader involvement to help identify issues and develop solutions, the lack of automation, the reactive approach to addressing problems only as they arose, and the lack of follow-up by ANC leaders all contributed to the mistakes that were made, and continue to be made, regarding ANC burial operations.** Indicative of the systemic nature of the problems afflicting ANC operations is the fact that some of the mistakes identified during the investigation continued over several years.

4. Based on the investigation into these matters, DAIG identified allegations against Mr. Metzler, Mr. Higginbotham, and Ms. Vicki Tanner, YC2, Supervisor, Interment Services Branch, Administrative Services Division, ANC. The allegations are addressed in the remainder of this report. Annex 3 provides a further detailed analysis of the allegations.

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION: Mr. John C. Metzler, Jr. failed to properly execute his oversight responsibilities for the administration, operation, and maintenance of ANC.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Mr. Metzler has been assigned as the Superintendent, ANC since 1991. General Orders No. 13, dated 29 October 2004, states that the Superintendent of ANC will oversee day-to-day execution of the Army National Cemeteries Program in accordance with applicable law and policy, including the administration, operation, and maintenance of the Army National Cemeteries.

2. Evidence reflected that ANC typically performs 27 to 30 funerals daily, almost always to a high professional standard due to the dedicated efforts of the entire ANC staff. That said, however, Mr. Metzler has, over the years, failed in several important aspects to properly execute his oversight and management responsibilities by repeatedly failing

to take appropriate steps to ensure ANC conducted its interment operations in accordance with applicable laws and policies.

a. **Unmarked gravesites:** Contrary to Public Law 93-43, which requires each grave in a national cemetery to be marked with an appropriate marker, evidence established instances of unmarked gravesites at ANC. Documentary evidence indicated several of the unmarked gravesites identified during the investigation had improperly gone unmarked for at least two years and at least two gravesites improperly remained unmarked for over six years. Evidence reflected that Mr. Metzler failed to: establish procedures setting forth the actions to take after the discovery of an unmarked grave at ANC; establish procedures to identify unmarked gravesites; or to analyze or otherwise investigate the causes of unmarked gravesites to prevent their future occurrence.

b. **Improper handling of cremated remains:** Evidence reflected that there were no documented procedures regarding the preparation of gravesites containing interred cremated remains. Evidence identified at least four occasions when urns of remains were found in the ANC spoils area. These cremated remains were presumably removed from gravesites by mistake and deposited in the spoils area during the preparation of gravesites for burials of other family members. One set of cremated remains were re-buried as "unknown" because there were no identifying marks on the urn. In still another case, an urn of cremated remains was recently discovered in the spoils area during the DAIG investigation. The past and recent instances of the mistaken removal of cremated remains from ANC gravesites are indicative of Mr. Metzler's failure to adequately address this issue.

[IO Note: The ANC spoils area is a location where excess dirt from gravesites is stored and then used to fill in gravesites following the burial of remains. The ANC spoils area was also referred to as the ANC landfill in witness testimony, but does not refer to an area where garbage is deposited.]

c. **Improperly marked gravesites at ANC:** Evidence established repeated instances of improperly marked gravesites at ANC, and several occasions where these errors were first brought to an ANC official's attention after complaints by family members. During a walk-through of one section, the IO identified that ANC was not marking all of the remains of family members interred in the same gravesite (after recent interments). ANC does not currently have a policy with respect to the marking of graves. Evidence reflected that Mr. Metzler often did not receive information about mismarked graves, and consequently did not inquire into their occurrences to determine the cause(s) and magnitude of the problem. The improperly marked gravesites at ANC represent a violation of Public Law 93-43, which requires all national cemetery gravesites to be marked appropriately.

d. Discrepancies between burial maps and ANC gravesites: Evidence established many discrepancies between burial maps and ANC gravesites. In three sections of the cemetery, the following discrepancies were identified:

- 117 gravesites were marked as occupied on the maps, but none of these gravesites had a headstone or a burial card;
- 94 gravesites were marked on the maps as unoccupied, but each had a headstone and a burial card;
- Some gravesites were not reflected on the burial maps.

Mr. Metzler acknowledged that map inaccuracies were a systemic problem, but evidence indicated he failed to adequately inquire into these discrepancies to ensure they were properly identified and resolved.

[IO Note: In November 2009, Mr. Erik M. Dihle, Supervisory Horticulturist, ANC, provided a list of gravesite discrepancies to Mr. Metzler. These discrepancies were identified by Mr. Stephen J. Van Hoven, Urban Forrester, ANC, while conducting a survey of the trees in three sections of ANC. The IOs did not review additional burial maps because testimony established that map inaccuracies were a systemic problem.]

e. Improper burial and trans-interment: Evidence established that ANC improperly buried an urn of cremated remains in a gravesite that was already occupied with the casketed remains of another decedent. Mr. Higginbotham was notified of the problem and supervised the trans-interment of the cremated remains to a new gravesite. Mr. Metzler was informed of the trans-interment, but did not investigate it to determine what caused this unintended double burial of remains or what needed to be done to prevent a similar situation from occurring again. Additionally, ANC failed to properly document the trans-interment and failed to provide the next of kin with the corrected burial documentation after the trans-interment was completed, both of which were in violation of the ANC Trans-interment Policy. The improper burial and consequent trans-interment of the cremated remains represented multiple failures in the ANC burial process.

f. From July to November 2009, a media outlet reported on five burial incidents at ANC. Regarding these incidents, evidence established:

- The loss of accountability of an urn of cremated remains;
- An unmarked gravesite for which ANC failed to take action to determine the identity of remains for over six years;
- An unintended double burial of an urn of cremated remains on top of a casket of remains of a non-family member;
- The failure of ANC to notify next of kin of the trans-interment of remains; and,
- The loss of accountability of a casket of remains.

For each burial incident, there were several failures in the ANC interment process, which collectively indicate Mr. Metzler failed to establish adequate processes and

procedures to prevent such occurrences and, at times, that he failed to take appropriate actions to resolve known issues.

3. Lack of automation to support ANC mission: Evidence reflected that Mr. Metzler was not adequately engaged in ANC automation efforts, and that he failed to ensure that the efforts to automate ANC's interment operations were managed effectively. The current automation in use at ANC does not adequately support its interment operations, is inefficient, and consequently it likely contributed to the repeated mistakes made by the ISB. Evidence established that at least three contractors over a seven-year time period were awarded multiple contracts to upgrade the original Interment Scheduling System (ISS) and to digitize ANC's burial records. None of these efforts, however, resulted in the implementation of any automated systems currently in use at ANC, as ISB continues to use manual records and continues to use the original version of ISS implemented in 2003. Despite Mr. Metzler's assertion that obstacles beyond his control (i.e., lack of funding; loss of data due to server reconfiguration, contracting issues) hindered ANC automation efforts, evidence indicated Mr. Metzler failed in his supervisory responsibility to ensure that such efforts were responsibly and effectively managed.

4. Unhealthy organizational climate: Evidence indicates that ANC has an unhealthy organizational climate. This unhealthy climate is directly related to the poor working relationship that has existed between Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham for over 18 years. Their dysfunctional relationship has significantly contributed to ANC's poor morale and its inability to properly address recurring operational problems. Mr. Metzler's failure to effectively address the friction between he and Mr. Higginbotham, and his failure to exercise initiative in addressing systemic problems and inefficiencies significantly contributed to both the poor organizational climate at ANC and to many of the burial mistakes identified in this investigation.

5. Lack of management actions: Evidence reflected that Mr. Metzler failed to ensure that problems related to ANC operations were appropriately addressed to prevent future occurrences. Even with recent media reports and the scrutiny of a DAIG investigation, ANC continued to make the same types of mistakes with respect to its interment operations, confirming that ANC did not have adequate processes and procedures for its daily operations. Evidence reflected that Mr. Metzler did not ask for, nor was he provided, any type of management report to assist him in identifying potential systemic issues undermining ANC operations. Evidence indicated that no incident or mistake committed at ANC was treated as "serious," and that no one was ever held accountable for an error. Instead, Mr. Metzler's testimony suggests he thought the repeated mistakes were inevitable. Testimony reflected that Mr. Metzler failed to gather ANC's key leaders together to discuss problems identified with ANC operations or to solicit their feedback / insight to determine causes and identify corrective measures. Mr. Metzler's management approach was reactive in nature, focused on fixing specific

errors as they arose, but failing to exercise initiative in addressing the underlying problems or issues causing the mistakes. Mr. Metzler did not develop, implement, or maintain the policies and procedures necessary to effectively manage cemetery operations, which reflects a failure to exercise proper supervisory responsibility over ANC. The existing documents governing cemetery policy and procedures are outdated and do not reflect a proactive approach to preventing problems related to past and present cemetery operations.

6. Over the last 19 years the assigned strength of the ANC work force has dropped from 140 employees to its current strength of 97 employees, even though the cemetery's mission has expanded and become more complicated. Mr. Metzler testified he needed additional personnel to conduct quality assurance (QA) and prevent mistakes, and that he had to assume risk with respect to certain aspects of ANC operations so he could focus on successfully performing the high volume of daily funerals. When asked if he ever requested authorization for additional personnel from OMB, Mr. Metzler testified that he did but that OMB would not support these requests. He explained that over the last few years he was challenged to justify his current force structure to OMB, and could not obtain approval for additional personnel. But Mr. Metzler acknowledged he never specifically requested additional QA personnel. Even with additional QA personnel, it would have been difficult for Mr. Metzler to mitigate risk without first establishing standard operating procedures for the effective administration of ANC operations. Mr. Metzler testified that he has recently requested a manpower survey to determine the appropriate personnel structure for ANC.

[IO Note: Mr. Higginbotham stated that he suggested and coordinated a manpower survey for ANC in the past. He further stated that Mr. Metzler was unreceptive to conducting the survey and disallowed his (Mr. Higginbotham's) efforts to proceed.]

7. Evidence reflected that ANC is finally developing policies for marking gravesites and for preparing gravesites with interred cremated remains. Additionally, after being questioned by the IOs, Mr. Metzler recently directed that gravesites in three burial sections be probed for potential remains and that the associated burial maps be updated to correct all identified discrepancies. Evidence indicated, however, that not all map discrepancies were properly checked before the maps were updated.

8. Under the provisions of General Orders No. 13, Mr. Metzler was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day administration, operation and maintenance of ANC in accordance with applicable law and policy. ANC's repeated mistakes with respect to interment operations, its lack of documented procedures, the lack of analysis to identify the root cause of recurring problems, the lack of communication and cooperation between ANC's two most senior leaders, the lack of key leader involvement to help identify issues and develop solutions, the unhealthy organizational climate, and the reactive approach to addressing ongoing issues resulted in repeated violations of Public

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Law, Army Regulations, and ANC Policy. Taken together, these problems demonstrate that Mr. Metzler failed to effectively fulfill his oversight responsibilities regarding the management of ANC.

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION: Mr. Higginbotham failed to ensure that gravesites in Arlington National Cemetery were appropriately marked.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Public Law 93-43, Section 1004(c), states that each grave in a national cemetery shall be marked with an appropriate marker. Mr. Higginbotham was responsible for the day-to-day operations of ANC and directly supervised each division involved in the interment process.

[IO Note: While General Orders No. 13 does not state the duties of the Deputy Superintendent, testimony from both Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham, as well as Mr. Higginbotham's position description, established that Mr. Higginbotham was responsible for the day-to-day operations of ANC.]

2. Evidence established that there were many instances of unmarked or improperly marked gravesites at ANC while Mr. Higginbotham served as the Deputy Superintendent. Evidence further reflected there was neither an established policy for marking gravesites at ANC nor any established procedures to identify or report unmarked gravesites. The lack of an effective system to ensure all gravesites at ANC were properly marked was evidenced by the several documented occurrences of gravesites that were unmarked for at least two years. Mr. Higginbotham admitted that ANC did not track gravesites that were identified as unmarked. In the case of an unmarked gravesite, as soon as it was discovered, ANC would simply re-order the headstone (after checking the burial records to identify the decedent name), and presumably ANC employees would emplace a temporary marker. There was no tracking and no analysis accomplished to inquire into the cause(s) of missing headstones or incorrect headstones as a means to prevent their future occurrence. Additionally, Mr. Higginbotham did not request or receive any type of information with respect to gravesite deficiency reports, even though some of these reports submitted by family members identified unmarked gravesites or other gravesite discrepancies. Evidence indicated that Mr. Higginbotham only recently directed the cemetery administrator to develop a policy to address the marking of gravesites at ANC.

3. ANC is responsible for properly marking its gravesites. Evidence established many instances of unmarked or improperly marked gravesites at ANC while Mr. Higginbotham served as the Deputy Superintendent. Evidence further reflected there were no established policies for marking gravesites at ANC, and no established procedures to identify unmarked gravesites. Further, Mr. Higginbotham failed to analyze or otherwise

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investigate the cause(s) of unmarked gravesites with a view towards preventing their future occurrence. While Public Law requires all gravesites to be appropriately marked, evidence established that under Mr. Higginbotham's direct oversight, ANC repeatedly violated, and continues to violate, this standard.

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION: Mr. Higginbotham failed to conserve government resources.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations Part 2635, section 101, states that employees shall protect and conserve Federal property and shall not use it for other than authorized activities. Mr. Higginbotham was responsible for the management of all information technology (IT) related efforts for ANC.

2. Evidence reflected that Mr. Higginbotham was assigned the responsibility for IT, and consequently developed a plan to automate ANC operations under an over-arching system referred to as the Total Cemetery Management System (TCMS). The key component of TCMS was the ISS, implemented in 2003 and currently used by the ISB to receive decedent interment information, schedule funerals, and assign gravesites. Evidence reflected there are many limitations to the ISS which forces ISB personnel to manually process and maintain burial records. This inefficient practice likely contributes to mistakes made by ISB. Mr. Higginbotham testified that he was identified as the point of contact for all IT contracts, to include TCMS. While he did not believe he was designated as a contracting officer representative (COR), he acknowledged that as the point of contact, he effectively had the same responsibilities as a COR. Mr. Higginbotham further testified that he had been trained as and served in the capacity of a contracting officer. Mr. Higginbotham was responsible for the management of three primary TCMS developmental efforts between 2003 and 2010:

a. Digitization of burial records: Mr. Higginbotham testified that ANC burial records were digitized during the 2003 to 2004 timeframe. Evidence reflected that the contractor delivered approximately 60 CDs that contained mostly scanned files of burial documentation, and that the contractor was paid at least \$800,000 for this work. These records were not delivered in a standardized format and were not stored as part of a database. ANC could not use the data developed under this effort. Evidence reflected that ANC received digitized records sometime in 2004, and that these records were never implemented or used by ANC other than in a test environment for a few months in 2008.

b. ISS Version 2: Mr. Higginbotham testified that during the development of ISS Version 2, both Ms. Vicki Tanner, Chief, ISB, and Ms. Patricia Lawmaster, former IT Manager, ANC, told him that the new system was functional. He relied on this

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information to justify paying the contractor. Witness testimony, however, reflected that ISS Version 2 was never functional and that Mr. Higginbotham was never told that it was functioning properly by his staff. After the contractor, Offise Solutions, was paid, Mr. Higginbotham found out that the system was functional only at the contractor's location, but not at ANC. He went to the Fort Belvoir contracting officer once he realized that the system was not functional to see if something could be done to resolve the issue. Mr. Higginbotham testified that "I made the final payment and it was my fault that I didn't pay closer attention to the application." Mr. Higginbotham estimated that the contractor received at least \$200,000 for the development of ISS Version 2, even though a functional product was never provided to ANC.

c. ISS Version 3: Mr. Higginbotham testified that ISS Version 3 was developed and delivered as a functional system to ANC in October 2008. He testified that it was tested several times and was "ready to go," but that a Criminal Investigation Command (CID) investigation that was underway at that time prevented its deployment until the summer of 2009. Mr. Higginbotham further testified that after the CID investigation was completed, the contractor tried to deploy ISS Version 3 but, because a former ANC IT manager reconfigured the servers, it was no longer functional. When asked if the contractor maintained a backup of ISS Version 3 on its own server, Mr. Higginbotham responded that it did, that its server was at ANC, but claimed that some changes that it made to the system were permanently lost when the servers were re-configured. Evidence reflected that there was a test of ISS Version 3 sometime in 2008 but that it did not work, and that a recent test of ISS Version 3 still did not meet the needs of ISB. Mr. Higginbotham stated he did not know how much money was spent on ISS Version 3, while Mr. Metzler testified that "the actual effort for ISS is about a million in round numbers."

3. Mr. Higginbotham was the ANC official responsible for keeping the contracting officer apprised of the contractor's performance and the status of the contract. Evidence established that ANC expended substantial resources on the development of ISS Version 2, but received no viable product in return. Additionally, ANC expended at least \$800,000 on the digitization of burial records which, six years later, had neither been used nor implemented as part of any ANC function. Contrary to Mr. Higginbotham's testimony, evidence reflected that ANC has never determined ISS Version 2 or ISS Version 3 to be "functional," nor has ANC ever received a functional database of digitized records. Evidence further indicated that Mr. Higginbotham failed to ensure that ANC's technical requirements were clearly conveyed to the contractors and he did not involve key ANC personnel in the developmental efforts of either version of ISS or the digitized records.

4. Despite Mr. Higginbotham's attempt to blame others for the lack of automation progress, evidence reflected that he failed to properly carry out his management and oversight responsibilities for the TCMS-related contracts and that, because of this

mismanagement, he failed to properly conserve government resources. From 2003 to 2010, Mr. Higginbotham, as the de facto COR for ANC IT contracts, repeatedly allowed or condoned the expenditure of government resources for IT improvements despite grossly inadequate contractor progress to justify these expenditures. Evidence reflected that Mr. Higginbotham failed to ensure that ANC requirements were clearly defined in contracts; that he failed to involve key ANC personnel in the developmental process; and that he failed to ensure that adequate testing of contractor developmental work was conducted to guarantee that ANC received functional products that met its needs and justified payments to the contractor under the contract. Although it is not known with certainty how much has been expended on TCMS, evidence established that at least three contractors over a seven-year time period were awarded multiple contracts to develop ISS Version 2, Version 3, and to digitize ANC burial records. Despite these expenditures, at the time of this investigation, ANC still prepares and maintains manual records, and still uses the original version of ISS initially implemented in 2003.

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION: Mr. Higginbotham failed to adhere to Army Values.

SYNOPSIS:

1. AR 600-100, Paragraph 2-1a, states that every leader will set and exemplify the highest ethical and professional standards as embodied in the Army Values.
2. Evidence reflected that Mr. Higginbotham signed a memorandum, dated 6 August 2009, which stated: "ANC has identified all personally identifiable information (PII), has evaluated the risk of loss and unauthorized disclosure, has assigned impact categories for electronic PII records, and has established appropriate protection measures [IAW applicable DoD guidance]." This memorandum was addressed to the Fort Belvoir Installation Information Assurance Manager. Mr. Higginbotham signed the memorandum based on ANC's requirement to conduct a privacy impact assessment (PIA) to analyze, identify and ensure all PII in electronic form was collected, stored, protected, used, shared, and managed in a manner that protected privacy. Contrary to Mr. Higginbotham's signed statement, evidence established that this PIA was not completed by ANC and that he intentionally misled Fort Belvoir's Information Assurance Manager.
3. Mr. Higginbotham testified that ANC did not conduct the actions identified in the 6 August 2009 memorandum. He admitted that he prepared and signed this memorandum in response to an investigation which determined that ANC did not have PIA documentation on file, and justified his actions by planning to make the PIA part of ANC's annual Information Assurance certification. Evidence established that Mr. Higginbotham knowingly signed a memorandum that contained false information,

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which demonstrated his failure to adhere to the Army Value of exemplifying the highest ethical and professional standards.

[IO Note: CID initiated an investigation into an allegation against Mr. Higginbotham made by Ms. Gina Gray in the fall 2008. Ms. Gray alleged that someone from ANC improperly accessed her e-mail account. The investigation was completed in May 2009, and found that the allegation of improper interception and monitoring of email was substantiated, but it could not be attributed to a specific individual. CID further found that during the conduct of the investigation Mr. Higginbotham made statements that "were materially false" regarding his involvement in the improper access of Ms. Gray's e-mail account.]

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION: Ms. Tanner failed to ensure that a gravesite in Arlington National Cemetery was appropriately marked.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Public Law 93-43, section 1004 (c), states that each grave in a national cemetery shall be marked with an appropriate marker. Ms. Tanner has been the Chief, ISB, since 1985, and ISB had the responsibility to generate temporary markers and to order headstones for ANC gravesites.

2. Evidence reflected that in early 2002, a family member of [REDACTED] who was interred at ANC, contacted Ms. Tanner to inform her that there was no headstone or marker on [REDACTED] gravesite. In a response letter dated 20 February 2002, Ms. Tanner informed the family member that a headstone had been ordered for [REDACTED] gravesite. The family member stated that he returned to ANC approximately one year later and there was still no headstone on [REDACTED] grave. He then called Ms. Tanner again, and she told him she would look into it and call him back. He did not receive a call back from Ms. Tanner, so he sent her a letter in 2005 to remind her of their previous conversations and included a copy of her reply from 2002. He returned a year later and there was still no headstone on [REDACTED] grave. Ms. Tanner testified that she recalled being notified of [REDACTED] missing headstone back in 2002. She believed she entered the information into the burial operations support system to order a replacement headstone, but thought that she might not have submitted the order properly. Ms. Tanner did not recall being contacted by the family member after his initial phone call in 2002.

3. Ms. Tanner was responsible for ensuring all headstones were ordered for ANC gravesites. Evidence established that [REDACTED] gravesite remained unmarked for over seven years after it was first brought to Ms. Tanner's attention in 2002. It is not known how long the gravesite was actually unmarked but evidence reflected that a new headstone was placed on [REDACTED] grave around 5 January 2010.

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OTHER MATTERS:

1. In addition to this investigation, there were other agencies inquiring into ANC matters. Annex 4 provides other agency actions regarding ANC.

2. Several witnesses testified that some of the ANC employees consumed alcohol while on duty. The evidence indicated that the consumption of alcohol occurred years ago and that the ANC leadership was aware of and took corrective actions to address the problem.

3. During the course of this investigation, allegations of sexual misconduct by ANC employees on cemetery grounds surfaced.

a. Witnesses testified that [REDACTED] committed sexual misconduct with former employees. Anonymous letters were distributed to ANC employees alleging similar improprieties by [REDACTED]. Mr. Metzler was made aware of the allegations. He determined that there was no credible evidence to substantiate the allegations and considered the matter closed.

b. A witness testified that [REDACTED], an ANC security guard, was sexually harassed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] supervisory chains were informed. Mr. Higginbotham and Mr. Metzler were also advised and then instructed the lower level supervisors to address the matter. Mr. Metzler accepted the lower level supervisor's recommendation to take no action against Mr. Johnson. Mr. Metzler testified that there was not enough evidence to take further action and that he considered the matter closed. Documentary evidence corroborated that Mr. Johnson committed some level of sexual harassment against [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] chose not to file a formal complaint with EEO and no further action was taken.

c. Witnesses testified that [REDACTED] committed sexual misconduct with former employees on the cemetery grounds. Testimonial evidence indicated that [REDACTED] privately displayed pictures of his sexual interludes with certain ANC employees. Although a witness testified that [REDACTED] showed him a picture depicting a former female guard exposing her chest, there was no direct evidence that sexual misconduct occurred. Lack of documentary evidence made it impossible to corroborate the alleged improprieties. Mr. Metzler and Mr. Higginbotham were unaware of these allegations.

4. The contracting procedures at ANC did not follow regulatory requirements and ANC contracts were not properly supervised. Additionally, ANC budget execution since 2002 has been questionable in many aspects. Exhibit A-19 provides a detailed analysis of the contracting assessment of ANC conducted by DAIG.

5. In the context of this investigation, Mr. Higginbotham raised issues with his and other employees' performance ratings under the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). These issues were not considered IG appropriate as there were other means of redress within NSPS.

6. Mr. Higginbotham alleged that Mr. Metzler allowed unauthorized individuals to be buried at ANC; however, he could not provide any information regarding these unauthorized individuals. Given this lack of identification, there was no credible evidence to investigate further.


7. During the legal review and approval process of this report, a former employee stated that on 19 April 2010, [REDACTED] was selected for a position/promotion within ANC by the Selecting Official, Mr. Jose Cala. Mr. Cala forwarded his selection to the ANC Human Resources Specialist who updated the CPOL website annotating the selection. This update rendered [REDACTED] resume "inactive." As a result, he was unable to apply for other vacancy announcements because the system reflected that he had already accepted this position. On 21 April 2010, however, Mr. Higginbotham directed the Human Resources Specialist to suspend the hiring action. Mr. Higginbotham held a meeting with Mr. Cala and other subordinate leaders and discussed the hiring action. Against Mr. Cala's and the other leader's recommendation to hire [REDACTED] Mr. Higginbotham refused to allow the hiring action and did not hire [REDACTED]. It appears that Mr. Higginbotham went over the approval authority's head and manipulated the hiring action. As of 10 May 2010, [REDACTED] resume is still inactive, making him ineligible to apply for other vacancy announcements.

8. Evidence regarding ANC burial operations was collected primarily from testimony and ANC interment-related documentation. The investigation did not include a complete audit of ANC gravesites and their associated documentation.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:


1. This report be approved and the case closed.
2. Conduct an audit of ANC contracts, contracting procedures, and ANC budget execution.
3. Audit / validate ANC interments to ensure accountability of remains.
4. Assign CIO/G6 responsibility to assess ANC IT requirements, and to provide oversight of future development of automated systems that support ANC burial operations.
5. Refer the allegation of sexual harassment against [REDACTED] and the allegation of the improper hiring action of [REDACTED] to the proper authority.



QUINT BOWMAN
Investigator


THOMAS NIGRO
Investigator

CONCUR:

APPROVED:


R. STEVEN WHITCOMB
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
The Inspector General


John M. McHugh
Secretary of the Army

Encls

- Annex 1: Directive, and Legal Reviews
- Annex 2: Analysis of Gravesite Discrepancies and Mistakes
- Annex 3: Analysis of Allegations
- Annex 4: ANC Chart depicting the Investigations, Inspections, and Legal Actions
- Annex 5: Exhibits

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ROI Abbreviations and Acronyms

The following abbreviations and/or acronyms appeared in this report:

1LT	First Lieutenant, US Army
ANC	Arlington National Cemetery
AR	Army Regulation
ASA-CW	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works
BOSS	Burial Operations Support System
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CID	Criminal Investigation Command
COL	Colonel, US Army
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
DA	Department of the Army
DA PAM	DA Pamphlet
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
E-mail	Electronic mail
GO	General Officer
GPR	Ground Penetrating Radar
HQ	Headquarters
IAW	In Accordance With
IG	Inspector General
IGAR	Inspector General Action Request
IO	Investigating Officer
IT	Information Technology
ISB	Interment Services Branch
ISS	Interment Scheduling System
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander, US Navy
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
MDW	Military District of Washington
MG	Major General
MSgt	Master Sergeant, US Air Force
NOK	Next of Kin
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PIA	Privacy Impact Assessment
ROI	Report of Investigation
SGT	Sergeant, US Army
SSG	Staff Sergeant, US Army
TCMS	Total Cemetery Management System
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs

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ROI Personnel Listing

Cala, Jose, Mr., Division Chief, Field Operations Division, ANC

Dihle, Erik, Mr., Supervisory Horticulturist, ANC

Harris, Bobby B., Mr., Cemetery Caretaker, ANC

Higginbotham, Thurman, YC3, Deputy Superintendent, ANC

Horst, Kaitlin, Ms., PAO, ANC

Johnson, Reginald, Mr., Cemetery Caretaker Supervisor, ANC

Lawmaster, Patricia, Ms., former IT Manager, ANC

Metzler, John, SES, Superintendent, ANC

Muro, Amanda, Ms., Cemetery Representative, ANC

Owens, Norman, Mr., former Engineering Technician, ANC

Parks, Alane, Ms., Security Guard, ANC

Sherlock, Thomas, Mr., Historian, ANC

Tanner, Vicki, Ms. YC2, Supervisor, Interment Services Branch, ANC

Van Hoven, Stephen, Mr., Urban Forrester, ANC

White, Phyllis, Ms., YC2, Director of Administrative Services, ANC

LIST OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT ITEM

A Documents

- A-1 MDW 15-6
- A-2 Jennifer Gray Congressional
- A-3 Shea Bennett letter to MG Horst
- A-4 1997 IG, MDW, organizational climate assessment
- A-5 [REDACTED] letter to SA
- A-6 Senator Grassley letter to DAIG, dated 15 December 2009
- A-7 Position Description for Mr. Metzler
- A-8 Position Description for Mr. Higginbotham
- A-9 Excerpts from AR 290-5, Army National Cemeteries, dated 1 November 1980
- A-10 Excerpts from DA PAM 290-5, Administration, Operations, and Maintenance of Army Cemeteries, dated 1 May 1991
- A-11 FAR, Subpart 9.1, Responsible Prospective Contractors, and Subpart 19.8, Contracting with the Small Business Administration
- A-12 Memorandum from Mr. Higginbotham to Fort Belvoir IAM, dated 6 August 2009
- A-13 Executive Summary, subject: Arlington Cemetery/Salon.com Query re Section 67-2133, dated 27 October 2009
- A-14 ANC Report to Congress FY08
- A-15 ANC Administrative Services Division Operating Procedure NO. 1AO, dated 17 October 1995
- A-16 Commander's Critical Information Requirements JFHQ-NCR, undated
- A-17 Public Law 107-347 (HR 2458), dated 17 December 2002
- A-18 DODI 5400.16, DOD Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance
- A-19 2009 Contracting Assessment of ANC Conducted by DAIG
- A-20 Gravesite Documentation: 7/9941-EH
- A-21 Gravesite Documentation (gravesites reported by salon.com): 33/4791; 42/1185 and 1186; 67/2133; 68/449 and 549; 69/5253
- A-22 Gravesite Discrepancy Documentation (Sections 59, 65, and 66)
- A-23 Gravesite Deficiency Reports
- A-24 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to DAIG-IN, dated 25 January 2010 (Gravesites 48/817 and 871)
- A-25 Memorandum for Record, Subject: Approval for Trans-interment of Cremated remains, Mary A. Paseur, dated 19 March 2010
- A-26 E-mail from Ms. Tanner to Mr. Stafford, dated 25 January 2010
- A-27 E-mail from Mr. Metzler to Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, dated 20 July 2009
- A-28 Funeral Schedule for 7 January 2010

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- A-29 Report of Discrepancies for Section 27
- A-30 E-mail from Mr. Higginbotham to Mr. Metzler, dated 3 March 2009
- A-31 DIG 09-00112, approved 26 October 2009
- A-32 CID Report, dated 18 May 2009, concerning Mr. Higginbotham

B Standards

- B-1 General Order 13, dated 29 October 2004
- B-2 ANC Administrative Services Division Operating Procedure NO. 1AN, dated 1 February 1999
- B-3 Title 5, Section 2635.101, CFR, Basic Obligations of Public Service
- B-4 AR 600-100, Army Leadership, dated 22 March 2007
- B-5 Public Law 93-43, National Cemeteries and Memorials, dated 18 June 1973

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C	Testimony	FOIA
C-1	Abbott, Sharon	NO
C-2	Annetti, Phillip M.	NO
C-3	Barnes, Brian K.	NO
C-4	Barnes, Eugene III	NO
C-5	Bennett, Shea	YES
C-6	Benson, David A.	NO
C-7	Bowman, Larry P., Sr.	NO
C-8	Bozeman, Gwendolyn L.	NO
C-9	Bunton, Joseph	NO
C-10	Cala, Avelino J.	YES
C-11	Callahan, Claude	YES
C-12	Campbell, Sharron R.	NO
C-13	Carson, Kenton	NO
C-14	Carter, Donald A	NO
C-15	Chavez, Edgardo C.	NO
C-16	Copeland, Marquette	YES
C-17	Coppage, Daniel R.	NO
C-18	Coppage, Ralph R.	NO
C-19	Dews, Lewis	NO
C-20	Dihle, Erik M.	NO
C-21	Dixon, Kelvin	YES
C-22	Dove, Shawn M.	YES
C-23	Dunlap, Barbara A.	NO
C-24	Flanagan, Tamara	NO
C-25	Flanagan, Vertyn J.	NO
C-26	Franklin, Thornton Jr.	NO
C-27	Gandy, John	NO
C-28	Gray, Jennifer	YES
C-29	Gilbert, Douglas A.	NO
C-30	Groves, Justin R.	YES
C-31	Harper, Abraham	NO
C-32	Harrell, Lionel	NO
C-33	Harris, Bobby	NO
C-34	Harris, Tina	NO
C-35	Higginbotham, Thurman	NO
C-36	Holland, Barry A.	YES
C-37	Horst, Kaitlin	NO
C-38	Jenkins, Bernard	NO
C-39	Johnson, Dexter	NO
C-40	Johnson, Floscelia	NO
C-41	Johnson, Reginald D.	NO

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C Testimony Continued

	FOIA
C-42 Joyner, Jeffrey	NO
C-43 Lee, Charles C.	NO
C-44 Lawmaster, Patricia S.	YES
C-45 Lucas, Loveninao	NO
C-46 Manning, Daniel Jr.	NO
C-47 McGill, Tony	YES
C-48 Meites, Charles	NO
C-49 Metzler, John C. Jr.	NO
C-50 Mitchell, Trina L.	NO
C-51 Montgomery, Charles Sr.	YES
C-52 Montgomery, Charles Jr.	NO
C-53 Murga, Abelardo	YES
C-54 Otts, Oscar	YES
C-55 Pack, Louis D.	YES
C-56 Parks, Alane	NO
C-57 Perez, Frankie	YES
C-58 Prather, Darius A.	YES
C-59 Richards, Delois	NO
C-60 Ritter, William	NO
C-61 Robinson, Clifford	YES
C-62 Roy, Russell	NO
C-63 Ruffin, James	YES
C-64 Sherlock, Thomas L.	NO
C-65 Shubert, Kevin	NO
C-66 Speight, Warren	NO
C-67 Spencer, James	YES
C-68 Spriggs, Michael	YES
C-69 Smittie, Calvin	NO
C-70 Stafford, Darrell C.	NO
C-71 Stephens - Jackson, Andrea	NO
C-72 Swann, Carlos	YES
C-73 Tanner, Vicki A.	NO
C-74 Taylor, Leilah O.	YES
C-75 Thomas, Kevin A.	NO
C-76 Torres-Nieves, Luis	NO
C-77 Tucker, Edward	YES
C-78 Turo, James A.	YES
C-79 Van Hoven, Stephen J.	YES
C-80 Velazquez, Carlos	YES
C-81 Wharton, Keith E.	NO
C-82 White, Phyllis	NO
C-83 Wiggins, Tonia	NO

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C Testimony Continued

C-84 Wiggins, Wade
C-85 Willett, Donnie
C-86 Williams, James D.
C-87 Williams, Ricardo
C-88 Wilson, Kelly D.
C-89 Zyla, Anthony
C-90 Zyla, John W.

FOIA

NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES

D Notifications

D-1 Mr. Metzler
D-2 MG Horst
D-3 Mr. Higginbotham
D-4 Ms. Tanner