TESTIMONY

DAVID SEDNEY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

April 15, 2010

Contracts for Afghan National Police Training

Chairman McCaskill, Members of the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear today with my interagency colleagues.

As you know, the President's strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan recommended heightened efforts to increase the quantity and quality of the Afghanistan National Security Forces as part of a strategy to enable an eventual transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan Government.

Improving the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) is particularly important as the police are the primary link to the Afghan Government for many Afghans, particularly in rural areas.

Moreover, the Afghan police are in the front lines of the fight against the Taliban and its affiliates. ANP are stationed in places where there is no Coalition or Afghan National Army (ANA) forces and are often the primary insurgent target. Based on

casualty rates, it is two times more dangerous to be a policeman today in Afghanistan than to be a soldier in the Afghan army.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and our non-NATO partners have made progress towards growing the endstrength of the ANP. The ANP achieved its previous end-strength goal of 96,800 in December 2009. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB), the international board charged with ensuring that international and Afghan ministerial plans align with the goals of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), agreed with the Afghan Government's plan, supported by ISAF and the U.S. Government, to increase the size of the ANP to 109,000 by October 31, 2010 and to 134,000 by October 31, 2011. The increase in 2010 will consist of approximately 5,000 Afghan Border Police (ABP); 5,000 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the mobile gendarme force that is equipped to act in a light infantry role throughout the country; and 2,000 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) and other specialized police and enablers. At the end of the March 2010 Afghan Ministry of Interior reporting period, the total ANP equaled 102,138, which was slightly above the overall February goal of 99,261.

Increases in the size of the ANP forces must come with a concomitant improvement in the quality of the force. Initiatives to improve the quality of the force include: improvements to the training infrastructure; increased pay equal to that of the Afghan National Army (ANA); better equipment; expanded literacy training; and

embedded partnering and mentoring. In addition, we are working hand in glove with the Department of State to build the rule-of-law structures and processes to support the ANP.

As part of our effort to improve the police training process, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (Amb. Karl Eikenberry) and the Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (Gen. Stanley McChrystal), recommended in an August 11, 2009 cable that management of the Defense-funded and State-managed police training contract used to hire civilian police trainers should be shifted from the Department of State to the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide unity of control and command. The Department of State and DoD subsequently approved this recommendation.

Due to the operational need to quickly award a new contract and the respective organizations' subject matter expertise and experience in support of Afghanistan operations, the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, selected the Counter-Narcoterrorism and Technology Program Office (CNTPO), through the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT), to oversee the development of an appropriate acquisition strategy for the ANP program.

The strategy called for procuring the required services through the issuance of task orders under existing Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (MAIDIQ) contracts with CNTPO. The task orders for the training of the ANP and ANP program logistic requirements were to be competed among five MAIDIQ holders.

Before orders could be issued, on March 15, the Government Accountability

Office (GAO) sustained the protest by DynCorp International LLC. GAO determined
that the task orders for the ANP program were outside the scope of the MAIDIQ
contracts. As a result, the ANP training effort will not be awarded under the MAIDIQ
contracts. DynCorp will continue performance under the current Department of State
contract while DoD weighs options to ensure the ANP program requirements are met in
an expeditious manner in consideration of this recent development.

Finally, it is important that any contractor DoD selects must be responsible and perform within the strict rules, regulations, performance expectations, and acceptable and ethical business practices we demand. Please be assured that we take seriously any allegations that a contractor fails to meet these expectations and requirements. The selection of DoD contractors responsible and capable to meet our requirements to assist in the training and development of the ANP is no exception.

I hope you find this information helpful. Thank you for your interest in this very important matter. I look forward to your questions.