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THE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE
 OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

VOLUME TWO

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE
 IN WORLD WAR II

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VOLUME TWO

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE
IN WORLD WAR II

A.

ORGANIZATION, CHAINS OF COMMAND, OPERATIONS, and COMPOSITION
OF THE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE SHORTLY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CENTER AT HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE

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VOLUME
PART 2

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE RADIO INTERCEPT SERVICE
IN WORLD WAR II
CHAPTER TEN
A

ORGANIZATION, CHAINS OF COMMAND, OPERATIONS, AND COMPOSITION OF THE INTERCEPT SERVICE SHORTLY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II IN THE SUMMER OF 1939 AND ITS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD FOR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC HEADQUARTERS AT THE OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE

I. STATUS PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION IN THE SUMMER OF 1939

1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HEADQUARTERS UNDER THE ~~AIR FORCE~~ CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, AIR MINISTRY, BRANCH 3. §

Early in May 1934 Major Martin~~k~~, Chief of the Air Branch, Signal S

Signal Service, Reich Air Ministry (Chef der Abt. LA/NVW,

RLM) established within his branch a Section III (Radio) under

Major Lindner (Ret.) which included a Sub-Section IIIc (Ra-

dio Interception, Air Force) under Captain Gottschling (Ret.).

On 1 July 1937 Sub-Section IIIc of the Air Branch, ~~RLM~~

Signal Service (at the time Branch 7 of the Air Force General

Staff) was reorganized in Sub-Section IIIc-1 under Major

Gottschling, and Sub-Section IIIc-2 under Captain Immisch. The

latter of these two sub-sections became the central processing

and deciphering agency handling all intercept messages and

reports received from the various field agencies. It was

moved out of the Reich Air Ministry offices to premises at

Lehrter Rail Depot, Berlin. Sub-Section IIIc-1 retained the

Chi-Stelle bei Chef NVW- RLM/Chef NVW Abt. 3 (Chi.).

(4) responsibilities of the former Sub-Section IIIc for development of the Intercept Service, personnel replacements, training, organization, and operations and remained in premises at the Reich Air Ministry in Berlin.

In 1938 the two sub-sections were consolidated to form the Cryptographic Center under Captain Immisch and moved to premises in the Friedrichstrasse close to the Reich Air Ministry. The newly established section had no receiving and DF installations of its own. On 1 July 1938 Captain Kohl-
morgent took over the Cryptographic Center which was then de-
signated Reich Air Ministry, Chief Signal Officer/~~EMIXXXI~~ Radio
Cryptographic Center (RIM Chef NVW/Fu, Chi) and in the next
year was redesignated Branch 3 (Cryptographic) (RIM/Chef
NVW Abt 3 (Chi)).

2. Status in the Summer of 1939. Following the develop-
ments of foreign policy in 1938 and the establishment of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939 the ten-
dency of future military-political developments appeared to
indicate that Britain also must be counted as a future enemy
in the event of any war.

Consequently, the Radio Intercept Service, operating at
the time under circumscribed missions in permanently located
intercept stations designated for purposes of concealment as
Radio Weather Report Receiving Stations, was reorganized and

5 consolidated to operate in conformity with the new pattern of probable future enemy powers.

3. Operating Areas and Missions.

<u>Units</u>	<u>Areas Covered</u>	<u>Mission</u>
	<u>Area Northwest</u>	
Weather Stations in Second Air Fleet Command Zone	Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Skandinavia	Intercept radio communications
	<u>Area West & South</u>	
Weather Stations in Third Air Fleet Command Zone	France w/North African Colonies, Iberian Pe- ninsula, Italy	as above
	<u>Area Southeast</u>	
Weather Stations of Fourth Air Fleet Command Zone	Balkans, Turkey plus individually assigned missions against Russia & Poland	as above
	<u>Area East</u>	
Weather Stations of First Air Fleet Command Zone	Russia, Poland, peripheral States	as above.

To carry out the reorganization a central Radio/Control Sta-
tion was newly established in each air fleet command zone.

The mission of the new control stations was in each case to insure uniformity of operations by all intercept stations within its air fleet zone in respect of the areas covered and to consolidate all intercept results obtained. In this way the the Cryptographic Center at the Office of the Chief Signal Officer received from each such control station the consolidated reports of its individual stations, the only exception

6 being when, in individual cases, important intercepts were reported directly to the Cryptographic Center for urgent reasons.⁺ All deciphering and interpretation, however, was handled centrally, although the individual intercept stations also with good results handled the interpretation for their local purposes in addition to their normal processing responsibilities.

4. Organization.

MONITORING AREA EAST

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Stationed at</u>
First Air Fleet Control Station	XXXXXXXXXXXXX Pulsnitz/Saxony
Weather Station 11	Breslau (at mobilization transferred to Fourth Air Fleet Control Station as Weather Station 24
" " 21	Deutsch-Krone, East Pomerani
" " 16	Kobbelbude, near Koenigsberg, Eastern Prussia
Redesignated 11 at mobilization.	

MONITORING AREA NORTHWEST

Second Air Fleet Control Station	Telgte/Westphalia, near Muenster
Weather Station 12	Telgte
Weather Station 22	Husum-Milstedt

MONITORING AREA WEST & SOUTH

Third Air Fleet Control Station	Oberhaching-Deisenhofen, near Munich
Weather Station 13	Oberhaching-Deisenhofen
" " 23	Baden-Baden (during war to Kressbronn, Lake Constance)
" " 33	Trier-Petersberg, moved to Mainz-Ginsheim before the war

1. See Appendix to Chapter 11, A: "Anweisung der W.-Leit. 1 bezueglich Abfassung der h-technischen Berichte v.5.6.39."
2. Then to Kerema, Brittany. See Chapter 11, B, IV, Item 2b, and 2e, (6) and (8) for details on Station 23, Kressbronn

MONITORING AREA SOUTHEAST

Fourth Air Fleet Control Station	Vienna
Weather Station 14	Wien-Hirschstetten
Special Purposes Weather Station	Budapest-Mátyasfoeld (during war to Constanza, Rumania)

II. DEVELOPMENT DURING THE WAR.

1. Cryptographic Center, HQ Air Force High Command - III
Radio Intercept Battalion, AF Headquarters Signal
Regiment.

a. The Mobilization Headquarters and Wartime Mission of the Cryptographic Center. At mobilization the Cryptographic Center moved to premises in the stable buildings of the new palace at Potsdam (Marstall-Neues Palais, Potsdam) in the vicinity of Command Post Wildpark of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and was redesignated CINC AF Cryptographic Center (Chf-Stelle Ob.d.L.) Corresponding with its wartime mission it was expanded. The center consolidated all data arriving from the permanently placed and the motorized intercept units and interpreted it for use by the Air Force Operations Staff. It also cooperated with the Army Intercept Service, the Navy Observation Service, and the Joint Military High Command Intercept Center.

b. Organization and Special Missions. The Cryptographic Center remained organized in a Processing Branch staffed by processing personnel and translators for all areas covered, a special DF Processing Branch, and a large Deciphering Branch.

9

The Processing Branch, as its principal areas, dealt with all material on France and her colonies, Britain, America, Russia, Poland, and as its subsidiary areas Italy, the Balkans, Skandinavia and the Baltic States. The deciphered messages received from the Deciphering Branch, under Chief Decoder Voegele, were interpreted for useful information and also served statistical purposes. The codes deciphered were made available to units on line.

The intercept services organic to the air fleets through their radio reporting, radio locating and the local processing and in some cases ~~interpreting~~ ^{decoding} of the ~~information~~ ^{messages} thus obtained provided a basis for radio intelligence activities. In most cases, a final processing and interpretation, in particular for higher level operational purposes, was only possible at the Cryptographic Center of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Only this center had adequate decoding personnel and only it was in the position to consolidate the reports of a number of air fleets and to interpret the overall results.

c. Expansion of the III Battalion (Radio Intercept) of the CINC Headquarters Signal Regiment . Another measure taken was the reorganization of the Cryptographic Center, which at mobilization had moved out of the Reich Air Ministry to premises at Potsdam³ in the immediate vicinity of the barracks of the CINC HQ Signal Regiment, as a field unit by integrating it with the III Battalion of that regiment.

10 The battalion now contained the following units:

- (1) Battalion HQ at Potsdam,³ CO: Captain Kohlmorgen, Adjutant: 1st Lieutenant Kobisch, replaced in November or December 1939 by Captain Hensel
- (2) Cryptographic Center, (see above), stationed at Potsdam,³ CO: Captain Kohlmorgen
- (3) 9th (Mtz) Radio Intercept Company, activated at the regiment's barracks in Potsdam-Eiche, Company Commander: 1st Lt. Boehme
- (4) 10th (Mtz) Radio Intercept Company, also activated at the regiment's barracks, Company Commander: 1st Lt. Hellwig, also assigned: 2d Lt. Moisel and 1st Lt. Meyer

Each of these intercept companies comprised a company headquarters and two motorized intercept platoons. The companies were formed from the peacetime intercept platoons of the 2d Radio and Intercept Company of the Air (Mtz) Training and Experimental Regiment, stationed at Koethen/Anhalt, and of the 6th Radio Intercept Company, CINC HQ (Mtz) Air Signal Battalion. The motorized intercept ~~platoon~~ platoon of the Training and Experimental Regiment was integrated with the 9th Company of the CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment.

The CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion, stationed in the General Wever Caserne at Potsdam-Eiche and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Schneider, was expanded at mobilization to form the CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment under Major (Reserve) Ruschke.

11 The two intercept companies were committed in concentration at the front, initially one in the western and one in the eastern theater and after conclusion of the campaign in 3. See p. 5, above.

11 Poland both in the western theater. Further details are given under the headings First, Second, and Third Air Fleets, respectively.

The successive commanders of the III Battalion were as follows:

Until 14 March 1940 Captain Kohlmorgen (then CO, III Radio Intercept Battalion, 3d Air Signal Regiment)

1 April-August 1940 (Acting CO) Major Grunewald (until 30 November 1939 CO, 10th Company, 3d Air Signal Regiment (officially designated as Weather Station 23) at Baden-Baden)

August 1940 Major Wurm (peacetime assignment: CO, 1st Company, CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion)

4 August 1940-15 March 1941 Major Ulrich (formerly CO, 10th Company, 3d Air Signal Regiment and killed in action at Stalingrad in 1942)

Approximately mid-1942 to end of war Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Friedrich, GSC.

d. Commitment of the III Battalion, CINC HQ Air Regiment and Its Transfer by Sections to France

d-1. Transfer to France. Events at the opening of the 1940 campaign in France revealed that the distance separating the intercept units at the western front (at the time the area of main effort) from the Cryptographic Center at Potsdam was too great so that too serious delays occurred in the reception and processing of intercepted material at the center and in the forwarding of the results from the Potsdam center to the Air Force Operations Staff, which had meanwhile displaced to the western front. Furthermore, the Air Force Operations

12 Staff insisted with pressing urgency that the Cryptographic Center should be transferred so as to be once again in its immediate vicinity, so that it could receive the intercept intelligence reports as speedily as possible.

For the above reasons the Headquarters staff of the III Battalion together with the cryptographic center moved from its premises at Potsdam, under Major Ulrich, to the Air Force Operations Staff at Noisy, near Beaumont on the Oise River, 18 miles miles northeast of Paris on ~~19XXFebruaryXX1941~~ ^{10 October 1940}, some of its elements going to Asnières sur Oise and Viarmes, villages in the near vicinity. Up to 19 February battalion headquarters remained located in a number of villas in Noisy/Asnières together with the radio locating section. ~~XXX~~ The personnel were also quartered in the same village. A decoding agency was also established in Noisy, but the bulk of the cryptographic center and Weather Station 3, under Major Kohlmorgen, were then transferred to La Celle-St Cloud to the headquarters staff of the battalion. This larger part of the Cryptographic Center was headed by the chief of the center, Voegele, and its responsibility was to insure that the interpreted re-
 decoded
 ults of ~~received~~ messages ~~WEREXIXXWAXXNEXXspedillyXXIXX RECEIVED~~
~~FROMXXIXXIXXWARDXXINTERCEPTXXIXX~~ were forwarded speedily to the forward Army units to be translated promptly into action by their air forces. A large receiving station was

13 established at Viarmes. For security reasons the staff members were in most cases billeted in Villas or castles with high surrounding walls.

A small staff was left behind at Potsdam as a second echelon to serve as a supply base.⁺ The Air Force Operations Staff was quartered at Noisy in three or four rail passenger coaches which served simultaneously as offices. Usually this railway train stood in the Noisy rail depot, coupled to a locomotive which was constantly under steam to remove the train to shelter in a tunnel roughly 100 yards away in the event of any air threat. prearranged switchboards made immediate contacts for the telephone and Top-Secret and other teletype instruments possible. General Martine, Chief Air Force Signal Officer, his radio consultant, Lieutenant Colonel Gosewisch--who ~~XXXXXXXX~~ at the same time controlled the intercept service, and the Commander of the CINC HQ Signal Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Huschke had their quarters and offices in a castle/half-way

14 Air Force and Noisy. The alleged name of the previously mentioned rail depot was "La Deluge...."; so that it was situated

farther northwest on the Beaumont/Asnières-Chambley-Bornel

+ For the Eastern, southern and southeastern networks.

+ on p. 9: Together with Sub-Section B(2) England, of the CINC HQ Cryptographic Center.

14

rail route.

d 2. Transfer to the Eastern Theater. With the shift of emphasis in military ^{planning} ~~operations~~ to the eastern theater ~~at~~ prior to commencement of the campaign in Russia, Major Ullrich on 21 February 1941 returned to the premises at Potsdam/Marstall. The forward Cryptographic Center for the time being remained at Noisy/Beaumont and was transferred only gradually for commitment supporting operations in the east.⁺

At the opening of the campaign in Russia the bulk of the III Battalion was in Eastern Prussia, together with the CINC HQ Cryptographic Center, in premises in the Panzer caserne at Goldap. The Air Force Operations Staff was some distance outside of Goldap, in the Rominter Heathlands in Command Post Robinson. Only a small echelon remained behind in Potsdam under Captain Weinen, responsible for intelligence interpretations, together with Captain Kobisch and Lieutenant Seichter to handle the military personnel.⁺⁺

e. Intercept Service Retraining Course for Adaptation from Western to Eastern Conditions. On 16 March 1941 Major Dr. Ulrich was relieved of his command over the III Battalion and transferred to Dresden-Nichern. Here he assumed command over the Motorized Special Purposes Radio Intercept Battalion and direction of the retraining course organized and controlled by the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center to prepare personnel

15 from the western theater for operations in the eastern theater.* The personnel were retrained in intelligence interpretation and in decoding methods. Radio operators also received further training to increase their intercepting capabilities to a high status. All companies received full motorized equipment, having each a total of 30-40 vehicles including omnibusses equipped for the necessary processing work. In addition to a headquarters staff, the battalion had three or four of these companies (motorized), and the company commanders included Captain Joerdens and Lieutenant Thoma, the latter killed later in Russia. ++

Starting in June 1941 the companies were dispatched one after the other for assignment in the field. The battalion headquarters was deactivated and the headquarters personnel assigned to the III Battalion, CINC AF HQ Signal Battalion. . On 15 June 1941 Major Dr. Ulrich assumed command of the III Battalion, 5th Signal Battalion, in Norway.

16 2. Basic Factors Governing the Mobilization Status of the Stationary and Mobilized Intercept Service Units and Later Development of the Service.

a. Mobilization Status. The Weather Stations of the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets together with the intercept platoons of the 2d and 6th Companies of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Signal Regiments were consolidated to form one

Footnote +, p. 11: For further details on personnel assignments at Noisy/Asnières see A III, 5, above.

Footnote ++, p. 11: For composition of the echelons at Potsdam and in Goldap see A, III, (Fifth Air Fleet, above.

Footnote ++, p. 12: Captain Joerdens activated the 9th Company, 35th Regiment. The training course opened early in April 1941. In Early June 1941 the company transferred to Zamość in Poland, and on 22 June advanced into Russia as V Air Corps ~~Intercept~~ (CO, Ritter von Greim) Intercept Company in the southern sector. See also B, V, Fourth Air Fleet. Lieutenant Thoma commanded the 9th Company, 32d Regiment. For particulars see B, IV, Second Air Fleet, and B, V, II Air Corps. The other two company commanders were Lieutenant ~~XXXXXX~~ Helbig and 2d Lieutenant Krueger(Acting)

16 III Company for the III (Radio Intercept) Battalions of the ~~IXIX~~ Headquarters Signal Regiments of the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets, respectively.

Each of these III (Radio Intercept) Battalions comprised

Battalion Headquarters
 One Weather Report Control Station
 9th Radio Intercept Company
 10th " " "

Each of these companies contained

Company Headquarters Echelon
 1 Intercept Platoon, also known as a weather station,
 1 (Mtz) Intercept Company.

Under the Fourth Air Fleet a III (Radio Intercept) Battalion was also organized for the headquarters signal regiment. However this battalion also controlled the independently operating units assigned under the Fourth Air Fleet insofar as their intercept operations were concerned, the former weather stations (now designated companies), 1 motorized intercept company activated at mobilization, and one motorized intercept platoon, also organized at mobilization.

b. The Activation of Single-Purpose Motorized Intercept Companies. With commencement of the campaign in France the stationary weather stations in the zone of interior were again assigned as weather stations under the III (Radio Intercept) Battalions of the respective Regiments, and their motorized intercept platoons became motorized intercept companies, each with two intercept platoons, assigned to the

17

15

respective III Battalions. Provisionally motorized, the weather reporting control stations followed the German advance into enemy territory with the respective battalion headquarters. The need very soon arose to also activate special intercept companies for the various air corps. These were integrated, each as a 9th Company, with the respective air signal regiments as corps headquarters intercept companies. They were controlled directly by the corps headquarters and in each corps zone were assigned particularly in support of the fighter control posts, but in intercept service matters were required to cooperate with the III Battalions of the respective air fleets. The numbering system for corps intercept companies was as follows; the example given being that of the 9th Company of the 32d Regiment:

The digit "9" denoted that the unit was an intercept company organic to an air corps HQ signal regiment;

The digits "30" denoted an air corps signal regiment;

The digit "2" denoted the II Air Corps, so that "32" was the identification number of that corps signal regiment. As an example, the designation 9./40, denoted the 9th Company of a "30" type regiment of the X Air Corps, the "30" of the regiment plus the number of the corps (10) giving the number 40.

The weather reporting control stations later became motorized intercept companies with the corps identifying numbers and the designation "processing company (Auswertekompanie)."

The development of the numerous theaters of operations led to an enormous expansion of the Intercept Service through the activation of new units. On the west front DF observation units were also integrated with the service, a measure also introduced in the southern and southeastern theaters.

c. Further Developments in Respect of the Stationary Intercept Stations. Within the zone of interior the stationary intercept stations retained their importance, particularly for radio locating operations, when the motorized units of the service moved into enemy territory. The following stations remained in existence to support the forces in the western theater: Stations W-22 Husum, W-12 Telgte,⁺ W-33 Mainz-Ginsheim, W-13 Oberhaching-Deisenhofen⁺, Station W-23 Baden-Baden was transferred to Kerema, near Brest in Brittany and later became the intercept company of the III Battalion in the zone of the Third Air Fleet. To replace it, a new station was activated in Kressbronn from the former station Wo-123.

On the eastern front Station W-11 remained at Kobbelbude as a stationary units of the First Air Fleet until Eastern Prussia was evacuated. Towards the end of the war it was redesignated 15./1., later 4.353., and was

⁺ Although Station W-12 was transferred in 1940 to Shepdael, west of Brussels, Telgte remained an intercept post of this station. At the end of the war an Air Force construction company was quartered in the premises, which now house the Telgte hospital.

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18 transferred to Heilighafen in Holstein, where it remained until the capitulation. Station W-21 Deutsch-Krone displaced first to Promberg, then to Warsaw and later to Smolensk, and became the motorized processing company of the III Battalion at Sixth Air Fleet Headquarters at Smolensk, while Station W-24 Breslau transferred to Reichshof/Galicia, where it remained as the 15th Company under the III Battalion of Fourth Air Fleet Headquarters until German troops evacuated Galicia. The Air Ministry weather station at Glindow near Werder/Potsdam ceased to exist as early as on 1 June 1939 and was absorbed by Station W-21 and Weather Reporting Control Station 1. The premises of the ^{stationary} ~~ARMY~~ intercept station at Pulnitz, ~~STATION XXXIX~~ were assigned to Station W-21, Weather Report Control Station 1, and the ^{Intercept} ~~ARMY~~ Training and DF Station of the III Battalion of First Air Fleet Headquarters. Later it became an Army intercept station and remained in operation as such until the end of the war. Weather Station W-14 Vienna released personnel for the reorganization of Fourth Air Fleet Headquarters Battalion III, and then served as the intercept training school for that battalion in Premstetten near Graz.⁺ The Special Purposes Weather Reporting Station at Budapest, activated in 1938, was first transferred to Constanza, in Rumania, and then, as the 16th Company of the Fourth Air Fleet Headquarters/^{III} Battalion was

+ See p. 18.

was assigned under Intercept Battalion Southeast and transferred to Atter-See in the Salzkammergut area.

3. Chain of Command for the Weather (Intercept) Units and Cooperation. Wartime Signal Communication Facilities and Their Capabilities.

a. Chain of Command and Replacement System. The AF CINC Headquarters Cryptographic Center reserved to itself special authority concerning the commitment of Intercept units for its own direct purposes. It was headed by the CO, III Radio Intercept Battalion, XIX AF CINC Headquarters Signal Regiment of which, besides its two motorized intercept companies (motorized), the Cryptographic Center was also a part. In matters of intercept operations, the Cryptographic Center was assigned under the Air Force Operations Staff. For details on the commitments and ultimate fate of the two intercept companies the reader is referred to what has been said concerning intercept operations under the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Air Fleets.

In all other cases the units of the Intercept Service were as a rule organically and tactically assigned according to the various air fleet zones of operations. For functional purposes the III Radio Intercept Battalions of the air fleet headquarters air signal regiments were controlled by

the AF CINC Headquarters Cryptographic Center; for

† Formerly the Intercept Training School of Fourth Air Fleet HQ III Battalion, Station W-14 at the end of March 1941 displaced to Athens-Vonliagmeni, directly under--
continued on p. 19

20 local matters and employment they were assigned under the Intelligence Officer of the respective air fleet. In matters of discipline and administration they were under the intercept battalions of the air signal regiments; the intercept teams attached by their parent battalions to the various fighter and reconnaissance units in the field came under disciplinary and administrative control of the units to which they were attached, which also had authority to state their requirements on the intercept operations to be conducted. For details on the air corps headquarters intercept companies the reader is referred to II, 2 b, above.

The military personnel, including personnel suitable for intercept activities, were assigned by the parent regiment or that regiment's replacement unit; the parent regiment also supplied all equipment. Specialized intercept personnel were assigned directly by the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center. Special items of intercept equipment as well as the installations themselves were also furnished by the Center, or by the Chief Signal Officer. These complicated systems of control, personnel assignment, and equipment supply at times created certain difficulties, but these were due to the unique position of the Intercept Service in the military establishment.

b. Collaboration and Observation Areas. The areas

21 to be covered by the intercept battalions were in the first place the zones of operations of the air fleets. The intercept units assigned under a battalion transmitted all data gathered to the appropriate weather reporting control ~~xxxxxx~~ station; these control stations later became processing companies. The companies assigned for special missions under air corps and other headquarters also sent copies of the data gathered to those headquarters insofar as it was of interest to them. These latter intercept companies were assigned to air corps primarily to support fighter operations. The control stations sent their data, immediately when necessary and otherwise in the form of daily reports, to the air fleet intelligence officers and also to the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center. In matters of intercept operations the battalion commander and chief of the weather reporting control station was not controlled by the radio section of the air fleet signal officer but directly by the air fleet intelligence officer. The intelligence officer was the authority which assigned the tactical missions and received all reports, while the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center, under authority from the Air Force Operations Staff, exercised general direction over all intercept operations in all theaters of operations, carried out the final decoding of messages, interpreted the accumulated data with special emphasis on the strategic aspects

and consolidated its interpretations in a final report to the Air Force Operations Staff.

Cooperation by each air fleet intercept battalion with the intercept battalions of adjacent air fleets was desirable; cooperation with the nearest intercept control centers of the Navy was ~~absolutely essential~~ required insofar as naval operations, such as action against enemy convoys, made this necessary. Cooperation with the Army was hampered by too restrictive regulations.

The Joint Military High Command Cryptographic Center (Chi-Stelle OKW), responsible primarily for decoding missions, was the highest authority over the intercept services of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Prior to and at the beginning of the war the intercept service was considered by the various air fleet headquarters staffs as a matter specifically of the commanding general and the air fleet operations officer with his section, a matter which did not really concern the rest of the headquarters intelligence officers staff. In the beginning the ~~other staff sections~~ hardly knew what to do with the data furnished directly to them by the weather reporting control stations. However, conditions changed very soon in this respect.

Experience in the campaign in Poland showed the desirability of establishing closer contact between the air corps then established from the former air divisions and t

23 the intercept service. For this reason individual intercept companies were activated for the newly established components of the air corps, in particular for the purposes of tactical ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ intelligence operations. During the Polish campaign it was not possible to estimate the great importance which this tactical/^{battle} intelligence function of the intercept units was to attain at a later stage, because there were hardly any operations by the Polish air forces which could have been registered by means of radio intelligence.

c. Military Communications Media and Their Capabilities. The media available for inter-service communications within the Intercept Service were, besides its own telephone, teletype, and secret teletype lines, radio, motorcycle messengers, and registered letter, all of which could be used for the dispatch of any data gathered. Where they had no direct lines of their own, intercept units were always able to arrange special connections by telephone or teletype lines of outside agencies to insure expeditious dispatch. The only types of messages which had a higher priority in such cases were command messages from army level up, air traffic control messages, and emergency messages concerning what were considered as catastrophic events.⁺ In intercept operations, speedy transmission is the main requirement.

⁺ For details on "special messages telephoned over the Air Force network and the civilian network see Appendix to Chapter 10, Paragraph 5.

24 Because of the danger of interception by the enemy, radio was used only with the greatest caution; furthermore too much time would have been lost encoding the messages. The use of radio was satisfactory only for DF communications.

On the whole the capabilities of the available wire networks were adequate and traffic functioned smoothly. Towards the end of the war efficiency was reduced because of frequent destruction by partisans, and our well-developed microwave network gained in importance for the dispatch of messages.

III. CONSOLIDATION OF THE INTERCEPT SERVICE AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS THE END OF THE WAR. THE END AND CAPITULATION.

1. Summary. ~~PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN PREPARATIONS~~

a. Principles to be observed in Preparations for the Activation of an Intercept Division. In the spring of 1944 General Martini, the Chief Signal Officer, ordered the consolidation of the Intercept Service units in a Radio Intelligence Division. Generalmajor Klemme, at the time AF Administration Headquarters XI, Hamburg, was assigned to command the new division as Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence (Foehere Kommandeur der Funkaufklaerung). He was to be the senior officer of all intercept unit personnel. This would have created a top-level authority for the handling of all service affairs. With this measure the

25 term "Radio Intelligence" in general replaced the existing term "Radio Intercept Intelligence." This new term had been coined when a start was made at incorporating the radar and jamming services with the intercept service. Owing to the long time the old designation had been in use, however, the new term did not come into very general use, and the former term is still in use today.

Operationally, however, all radio intelligence units still remained under the control of the highest intercept service authority in existence, together with the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center. This authority, formerly III Battalion Headquarters, AF CINC HQ Signal Regiment had meanwhile been redesignated as ^{Chief Officer} /Signal/~~REGIMENT~~ (General Nachrichtenfuhrung), ^{3d} III Battalion. CO of the 3d Battalion was Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich, GSC. The AF CINC HQ Signal Regiment's III Battalion had meanwhile ceased to exist because its two companies had both become corps headquarters companies, so that only the headquarters staff and the Cryptographic Center had remained in existence.

For further details on the III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Signal Regiment see A, III, 5, Volume 1.

b. Missions of the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence. The responsibilities of the newly appointed Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence were to be the following:

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military events also influenced implementation of the order creating the new post, so that the order could not be formulated in a way which would have insured smooth and speedy effectuation. Furthermore, the newly appointed Chief Radio Intelligence Officer had no opportunity to contact personally the units distributed throughout the various theaters of operations or their commanding officers and other superior authorities. Air travel was already prohibited at the time and road travel by the cars using wood gas was unreliable and in fact impossible for really long distances. The Senior Commander was therefore unable to obtain a clear picture of the whole service and to draft plans for the improvements and modifications which were actually long overdue.

It was early 1945 before the plans for the reorganization were ready, but by then it was no longer possible to put them into effect because the final struggle of the war was already in progress. In his isolated position General-major Klemme therefore requested the AF Chief Signal Officer to relieve him of his assignment, but at the request of the Chief Signal Officer nevertheless remained in his post.

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d. Compromise Solution. As a result of the above circumstances some of the air fleet staff signal officers were again given command authority over the individual air signal units, and the activities of the Senior Commander of

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were restricted to occasional measures supporting the units operating within the zone of interior.

During the last days of the war the intercept^{units} ~~with-~~ drawing southward were assigned under Home Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence Officer Forster, while those withdrawing northward remained under the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence, who also received instructions to continue furnishing radio intelligence reports to the Home Air Fleet in its zone of operations in Northern Germany, instructions which were carried out until the capitulation.

2. Organization. Owing to the loss of all documentary evidence the following is all that can be offered here concerning the consolidated organization of the intercept units and the chains of command in force until the end of the war.

(1) Chief Signal Staff Officer, Branch 3, AF High Command, Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich, GSC, Responsible only to the AF Chief Signal Officer. All units of Branch 3 were consolidated in Air Signal Battalion 350, under Captain Jordens.

(2) Air Signal Regiment 351, assigned under CO Lieutenant Colonel Ristow to the Third Air Fleet in the west and placed under Home ~~XXXX~~ Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence Officer.

(3) Air Signal Regiment 352, assigned under

29 CO Major Feitner to the Second Air Fleet AF Command South-
in Italy and southeastern Europe
west; placed under the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence.

(4) Air Signal Regiment 352, assigned under CO
Colonel Eick successively to the First, Sixth, and Fourth
Air Fleets in the eastern theater; placed under the Senior
Commander of Radio Intelligence.

(5) Air Signal Battalion 354 (Women Signal Auxil-
iaries), Replacement Battalion Luebeck-St. Hubertus (Tenth
Air Fleet), CO Major Vogler; placed under the Senior Commander
of Radio Intelligence (see also Chapter 10, A, III, 7).

(6) Air Signal Battalion 355, Norway (Fifth Air
Fleet, CO Major Camerlander; placed under the Senior Commander
of Radio Intelligence.

(7) Air Signal Battalion 356, Zone of Interior
(Home Air Fleet -- Luftflotte Reich), CO Captain Robert Tratt-
ner; placed under Home Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence
Officer. See Chapter 10, A, III, 9.

(8) Air Signal Battalion 357, western theater
(Third Air Fleet), CO Captain Rueckheim; placed under Home
Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence Officer. See Chapter 10,
B, IV, 6, and Chapter 10, A, III, 9.

(9) Air Signal Battalion 358, probably did not
exist.

(10) Air Signal Battalion 359, zone of interior

30 (Home Air Fleet), Radio Jamming Battalion, activated from Air Signal Regiment 351 of Home Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence Officer and integrated with Air Signal Regiment Reich; Commanding Officer and Radio Jamming Operations Staff Officer on staff of Home Air Fleet Chief Radio Intelligence Officer Major Dahl. See Major Dahl. See Chapter 10, A, III, 9.

During the last phases of the war the following radio intercept units were therefore in existence:

3 Air Signal Corps Radio Intercept Regiments, the 351st, 352d, and 353

4 semi-stationary Air Signal Corps Radio Intelligence Battalions, the 350th, 355th, 356th, and 357th.

1 Air Signal Corps Radio Jamming Operations Battalion, the 354th.

3. The End and Capitulation.

a. Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence, headquarters initially at Potsdam, then transferred successively to the Air Signal Corps School at Halle/Saale; St Hubertus, Luebeck; Intercept Station Husum-Milstedt. From here British forces removed him to the Neumuenster prison on 19 May 1945, then, on 12 June 1945 to the Neumuenster camp for civilian prisoners. Later he was removed to Eselheide and then to Adelheide, where he was released on 10 March 1948. More details on the retrograde movements of the Senior Commander

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31 of Radio Intelligence and the surrender of his headquarters will be found in A, III, 8.

b. AF High Command, Chief Signal Staff Officer, Branch

3. In the spring of 1944 only this branch with other branches of the Chief Signal Staff Officer were still at Goldap, Eastern Prussia; the Cryptographic Center was at Potsdam. Direct teletype communications existed between the two points, so that it was possible to transmit all reports and other information.

The branch at that time comprised

Branch Chief Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich, GSC

Section 1: Operations.

It was only in the autumn of 1944 that Major Beulmann, GSC, was assigned to head Section 1; until that time the duties of the section chief had been performed by the branch chief and the chiefs of Sections 2 and 3.

Section 2: Radio Intercept Service. Chief: Captain Oeljeschlaeger,⁺ assisted by Lieutenant Glass.

Section 3: DF and Radio Jamming operations. Chief: Major Dr. Kuhlmann, assisted by Lieutenant Schultz.

Equipment: Civilian Technician Schieren.

Personnel: Probably Civilian Technician Liebscher.

⁺ Captain Oeljeschlaeger was assigned to head Section 2 on 15 March 1944. Previously he had, since 15 December 1943, commanded the V Battalion, 4th Air Signal Regiment.

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On 16 July 1944 Branch 3 moved out of Goldap, arriving at Potsdam two days later.

It was probably at this time that the AF CINC HQ Battalion III was again activated, which in the autumn of 1944 was redesignated Air Signal Battalion 350.

In the stable buildings (Marstall) at Potsdam, the following units remained behind:

(1) AF High Command Chief Signal Staff Officer, Branch 3, as above.

(2) AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center, under Major Kupfer (for operations in the eastern theater). The Center handled only intelligence interpretations.

(3) 13th Company, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment. The personnel of the Cryptographic Center, all personnel required for communications operations -- telephone, teletype, and radio operators --, and interpreter-radio operations were incorporated in this regiment. A large percentage of the personnel were women signal auxiliaries.

(4) HQ Staff, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion III; CO: Captain Jordans, previously CO, III Battalion, 2d Air Signal Regiment.

Another company, the 14th AF CINC Air Signal Company was at Kottbus (presence there on 8 August 1944 proved) with the

33 entire East Sub-Section (Sub-Section D) of the Cryptographic Center. Allegedly, this unit became the Intelligence Processing and Interpreting Company of Air Signal Radio Intelligence Regiment 353. Another company was at Intercept Station W-13 in Oberheching, and another, the fourth, was at Intercept Station W Kressbronn under Captain Kohwalt.⁺

On 20 March 1945 Branch 3, HQ Chief Signal Staff Officer, transferred together with the other branches under the staff officer to Oberndorf in Thuringia. The Branch Chief himself remained in Potsdam and probably on 13-14 April moved with the remaining elements of his branch directly to Wasserburg on the Inn, close to the Air Force Operations Staff, which had transferred to Berchtesgaden. The staff at Oberndorf was designated Kurfuerst 2 and was quartered in an ammunition depot. On 2 April 1945 Branch 3 also moved to Wasserburg (Kurfuerst 3) and then from there withdrew to the Alpine Redoubt, the Branch proceeding in two omnibusses on 1 May 1945 initially to Viehoff, Lake Attersee. The branch chief only rejoined his branch during the withdrawal, approximately at Zell am See. At Viehoff Major Oeljeschlaeger and Major Beulmann burned all records of Branch 3.

On the overcrowded roads the withdrawal movement proceeded

⁺ See also B, VI, 6; Concerning III Battalion see particularly A III, 5 (2).

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only very slowly. On 10 May 1945 the Branch at Wagrain encountered
 encountered the headquarters staffs of Battalions II and III
 of Radio Intelligence Regiment 353. Together with these two
 units the branch continued the withdrawal movement and together
 with them then proceeded under escort by American troops to
 internment in the concentration area designated for Air Force
 troops at Gross-Helfendorf-Aschenbach, south of Munich, reach-
 ing the area on 22 May 1945. The two section chiefs, Major
 Oeljeschlaeger and Major Beulmann were flown on 5 July 1945
 to England, where they were placed in a special camp in which
 they met the Branch chief, Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich, who
 had arrived there before them.

Of the Cryptographic Center and elements of Air Signal
 Battalion 350 still in the stable building at Potsdam, cer-
 tain elements moved with receiver equipment as a decoding
 section to Station W-13 at Oberheching, near Munich, under
 Captain Huebner assisted by Lieutenant Becker. Another de-
 coding unit under Civilian Voegele had transferred to Station
 W Kressbronn.⁺ Further elements arrived at Kressbronn on
 15 April 1945. Operations continued here for another eight
 days, then everything was burned and the units awaited the
 arrival of enemy forces, at that time already in Friedrichs-
 hafen.

⁺ The decoding units which arrived at Kressbronn on Lake Con-
 stance was undoubtedly Cryptographic Section West, which
 was

35 Only a small staff about 9-11 strong remained at Potsdam ~~after~~ under Lieutenant Lindenberg after departure of Branch 3. This staff had orders to defend the stable premises, but owing to the rapid sequence of events no defense actions developed.

c. Details on reconnaissance and intelligence units in general will be found in Chapter 11, B.

4. Weaknesses of the German Air Force Peace- and War-time Radio Intelligence Service. The wartime organization of the service set forth in II, 2a and b should have been introduced during peace. In the organization as it existed at the beginning of the war the units intended for establishment at mobilization ,when they were activated, included only a certain percentage which could produce really useful radio intelligence results. These were the stationary units regularly established during peace.

A grave mistake in the peacetime organization was that of developing the mobile branch in composite radio operating and intercept companies, each with one radio operating and one intercept company. Another weakness was that these companies were assigned to the the air fleet regiments, the AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion, and the Training and Experimental Regiment at Koethen. All of these were units under the command of officers who were not specialists in this branch.

+ (cont. from p. 33): previously was at Asnières and St. Cloud. For details, also on Civilian Voegele, see Chapter 11, A, III, 5(1).

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To insure easy control and properly planned radio intelligence training the above units should have been used soon after their activation and under peace conditions to create the following:

(1) With support from the stationary intercept units, the first three radio intelligence battalions intended for assignment to the four air fleets (see A, II).

(2) One Special Purposes motorized radio intelligence battalion comprising the motorized units of the AF CINC HQ Intercept Battalion, then under Air Signal Regiment Koethen. This newly organized battalion should have been placed directly under control by the Cryptographic Center of the Reich Air Ministry.

From the intercept units which thus would have been in existence it would have been possible at mobilization to activate very speedily effective intercept companies for assignment to the air coppers. Under the system as it actually existed this only became possible at a later stage.

Under the peacetime circumstances as they actually existed the radio intelligence training given in the motorized intercept companies was inadequate, even that some of the personnel received through temporary assignment to the stationary units, ~~received through~~ and employment in cooperation with the stationary units close to the borders.

36 The only possible remedy here would have been to integrate into the organization intercept companies including stationary units. Furthermore, all intercept units should have been placed already during peace under an Inspector of Radio
37 Intelligence with the status of a regimental commander.

In comparison with the units assigned under the other air fleets, the Weather Reporting Control Station Vienna assigned under the Fourth Air Fleet was a radio intelligence unit only in name. By the nature of its composition it was no stationary radio intelligence or intercept station but merely an agency which collected and forwarded the intercept reports of the intercept units within its areas. It was only in 1940 that this station was developed into a real radio intelligence unit

Another weakness was that, owing to the nature of the peacetime organization, the mobilization organization of the service could not be carried out uniformly. Thus, only the First and Fourth Air Fleet immediately each had a battalion commanded by an officer with specialized radio intelligence training. The Second Air Fleet only received a properly trained commander for its radio intelligence battalion in October 1940. In the case of the Third Air Fleet the officer predestined for this assignment, namely, the CO, W Station 3, remained under the command of a non-specialist battalion commander, a

an impossible situation which was only remedied by a change of commanders in March 1940.

An even more serious flaw in the peacetime radio intelligence organization was that it had no wire communications network of its own and that no provisions were made for it to have one in the event of mobilization. Lacking excellent communication facilities an intercept service, particularly during war, cannot execute its mission, which calls for the most speedy transmission of messages possible, satisfactorily. It was only after a long and bitter struggle by the various unit commanders that a satisfactory condition was achieved in this respect. Later in the war, it must be admitted, the AF Radio Intelligence Service was excellently served in this respect.

5. Further Details on the Wartime Organization of the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center and the III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment.

(1) The Sub-Divisions of the Center and Their Operations. The peacetime organization of the Cryptographic Center was expanded and adapted to the requirements of war by the creation of the following sub-sections:

Sub-Section A. (1). This sub-section covered France and initially also Italy. The first chief is said to have been Captain Weinen, assisted by Barthold, Freiherr von Richthofen, and Dr. Hurrop. Later, Italy was presumably

38 combined in one area with Greece and covered by Sub-Section C (3). See B, VI.

Sub-Section B (2). This sub-section covered Great Britain and the British colonies, plus the United States air forces stationed in Britain. Chief: Lieutenant ~~Colonel~~ Huebner, with Captain Jordens and Lieutenant ~~Colonel~~ Becker.

39 Sub-Section C (3). This sub-section covered the south and southeastern areas. It was probably headed by Captain Weinen. For more details see also B, VI.

Sub-Section D (4). This sub-section covered Russia and was headed by Major Kupfer.

Sub-Section E (5). Under Civilian Voegele, this sub-section handled the decoding of messages.

Sub-Section Columbus. This sub-section covered the United States of America. See below for more details.

With the concentration of effort in radio intelligence against Britain after conclusion of the campaign in France, the III Battalion, AF COMC HQ Signal Regiment and Sub-Section B (2) transferred to the Air Force Operations Staff at Noisy/Asnières as forward echelon of the Radio Intelligence Command. The Cryptographic Center as such remained at Potsdam, and continued there during the further course of the war.

The III Battalions Station W-1, under Lieutenant

39 Feichtner (see B, V) , who at the same time had command authority over Sub-Section B (2), handled radio receiving operations at Asnières. Lieutenant Feichtner was succeeded later by Major Hensel, about whom more details will be found under the Head First Air Fleet in Poland, until Captain Jordens on 6 April 1942, as chief of Sub-Section B (2), also assumed command over Station W-1.

Sub-Section Columbus was first established at Asnières.⁺ Initially, it formed a part of Sub-Section B (2), but later became a separate sub-section with the sole mission of monitoring communications of the United States, including the northern and southern communications networks across the Atlantic and Africa. Special emphasis was on the interpretation of communications intercepted on the USA supply services and training services communications ^{networks.} The sub-section was headed by Lieutenant Friese.

When most of the units transferred to Goldap, Sub-Section B (2) remained at Asnières and only transferred from there during the German withdrawal from France. Captain Jordens was followed by Captain Heinrich Franke as CO Station W-1 and Chief of ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Sub-Section B (2). Sub-Section Columbus also remained at Asnières until both of these units withdrew with Radio Intelligence Regiment West 351 through Limburg on the Lahn.

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During preparations for the campaign in Russia, control headquarters of the Radio Intelligence Service (III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment) initially moved back to Potsdam. Later it transferred, together with the unit responsible for Russian coverage, Sub-Section D (4) under Major Kupfer), to premises at Goldap close to the Air Force Operations Staff (CP Robinson). The only elements remaining at Potsdam were AF CINC HQ Station W-10 under Captain Koppisch, at the same time CO of all military personnel remaining in Potsdam; Sub-Section C (3), South and Southeast, under Captain Weinen; and Sub-Section E (5), under Civilian Voegele.

Sub-Section E (5), as the principal decoding agency, cooperated closely with the other sub-sections and with the decoding elements of units in the field. It remained throughout under Civilian Voegele and did not leave Potsdam. However it had elements widely distributed among the various areas of main effort, such as at Athens, Asnières, La Celle St. Cloud; it also appears to have had ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ elements at Collecting Center Zeist near Utrecht ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ (III Battalion, ~~XXXXSignalXRegimentXXXX~~ Regiment West (351)⁺⁺ and at Kressbronn on Lake Constance. It also had an attached

Hollerith Computing Battalion which for some time was

+ (p. 39): By Captain Jordens, controlling Station W-1 and Sub-Section B until April 1943.

++ According to Captain Rueckheim, CO I Bn, 351st and Aig Sig. Bn 357 at Zeist, the decoding unit of Civilian Voegele was not at Zeist, but the Collecting Center under him had a decoding element of its own.

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41 stationed in the Cottbus area with a number of decoding personnel. Because of the importance of these widely dispersed operations, Civilian Voegele was personally present at the various points on frequent occasions.

(2) III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment and Its Composition. The battalion was activated at mobilization to serve as the top-level control headquarters of the entire intercept or Radio Intelligence Service. (see also A, II, 1, c., also Chapter 10, A, II, 1, c.).

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The two companies forming the battalions, the 9th and 10th of the AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment, were initially assigned under the First and Second Air Fleets' Radio Intelligence Battalions in order to intensify the intercept coverage in the east and west. Later they were assigned under the Second and Third Air Fleets in the West, and finally became Companies 9/38 and 9/32.

III Battalion HQ thereupon activated AF CINC HQ Station W-1 (an intercept company), which operated as a receiving station ~~XXX~~ at Asnières for Sub-Section N (2) and Sub-Section E (5) and later also for Sub-Section Columbus.

Another unit activated was the AF CINC HQ Station W-10, which served the elements in the stable buildings at Potsdam and was in position either there or at Eiche. At the same time it served as the lodger unit for all members of the

42 Cryptographic Center in the stables area at Potsdam.

The mission of DF reception for the forward echelon of the Cryptographic Center at Goldap was probably assigned to the existing Station W-11 at Kobbelhude near Koenigstein.

The III Battalion was also assigned the Weather Stations of Kressbronn on Lake Constance and Oberhaching-Deisenhofen, Station W-13. Station W-14 at Athens also became ^{the local} AF CINC HQ Station W-3 coupled with Sub-Section 3 at Potsdam. However, this weather station in the winter of 1941-42 became Weather Report Control Station Southeast. See also Chapter 10, B, IV, 7, a, b, c.

(3) Establishment of Air Signal Battalion 350 from III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment and Organization of Branch 3 under AF Chief Signal Officer. After establishment of Branch 3 in the Office of the AF Chief Signal Officer to direct operations of the Radio Intelligence Service and in the process of activating Radio Intelligence regiments, in the autumn of 1944, the III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion became Air Signal (Radio Intelligence) Battalion 350. For some time it remained under Major Friedrich, who also retained control of the new Branch 3.⁺ On 1 November 1944 Captain Jordens, hotherto CO, III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment in Italy, (see B VI), assumed command over Air Signal

⁺ See A, II, 1, c, d, e, above and III, 3, b, and 5.

43 Battalion 350. At the same time he took over control over the Cryptographic Center, redesignated as the Radio Intelligence Control Center. Branch 3 had in the meanwhile moved its echelon stationed at Goldap back to the stable area of Potsdam on 16 July 1944, so that the entire Cryptographic Center was again at Potsdam with the exception of Sub-Sections B (2) and Columbus, which, together with their AF CINC HQ Weather Station W-1, had reached Limburg on the Lahn with the general German withdrawal from France.

On 1 November 1944 the disposition of Air Signal Battalion 350, the companies of which had in the meantime also been redesignated, was as follows, but it is not certain whether the number sequence offered is quite accurate:

Battalion HQ in Stable Premises, Potsdam

1st Company (former AF CINC HQ Station W-10) also at Potsdam

2d Company at Oberhaching/Deisenhofen, near Munich

3d Company at Kressbronn on Lake Constance

4th Company at Limburg on the Lahn (former AF CINC HQ Station W-1 at Asnières)

5th Company at Potsdam/Eiche. This company, under Captain Sys, was a DF data processing unit and had been newly assigned to the battalion.

The 5th Company, Air Signal Regiment 350 as the DF data processing unit was responsible for the processing of all data gathered by radar, its interpretation from technical and tactical viewpoints, and for the direction of operations by the various DF companies. These companies of the radio

44 Intelligence Service had one exclusive mission, that of intercepting enemy radar messages transmitted from the ground or from the air, including navigational and identification instruments, to determine their location, the frequencies they used, and to report on all other technical aspects. For this purpose they had ultrashortwave and decimeter receivers and DF instruments, which were also equipped with oscillographs. When necessary, they could also be required to participate in operations to jam enemy communications with these types of instruments.

45 They had no responsibilities for radar tracking, such as that carried out by the Aircraft Reporting Service with its Freya and other types of radar instruments. See also Chapter 10, C, 2.

6. Summary Account of Development of the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center.

(1) The Cryptographic Center as it existed under peacetime conditions became a unit of the III Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment at mobilization. This battalion comprised only a battalion headquarters, the Cryptographic Center, and two radio intercept companies. The Chief of the Cryptographic Center remained in that post and at the same time became CO of the newly activated battalion.

The two intercept companies were initially assigned in east and west under the First and Second Air Fleets; after the

45 campaign in Poland, they were both assigned in the west under the Second and Third Air Fleets, and were placed under the Radio Intelligence Battalions stationed in the western theater. Later, they became air corps headquarters radio intercept companies. See also Chapter 10, A, II, 1, c, and III, 5, (2), 1.

(2) It soon became obvious that the Cryptographic Center must have an intercept unit of its own; the ^{radio} receiver operating team already operating in the stable premises, Potsdam, headquarters premises of the battalion and of the Center, was therefore expanded to form AF CINC HQ Station W-10. After battalion headquarters transferred, together with Sub-Section Britain of the Cryptographic Center, to premises close to the Air Force Operations Staff at Asnières sur Oise, north of Paris, another intercept station was organized there and designated AF CINC HQ Station W-1. See also Chapter 10, A, II, 1, d, 1.

The III Battalion therefore now had two stations operating directly for it, each headed by a chief with the status of a company commander.

Fourth Air Fleet

(3) Following the occupation of Greece, ^{Station W-14} was transferred from Premstetten, near Graz, (See Chapter 10, B, III, 1, a (3)), and was assigned a decoding platoon from the Cryptographic Center. As a result of this close contact between the decoding Sub-Section E (5) at Potsdam and the newly established Sub-Section C (3), also at Potsdam, Station W-14

46 was taken from control by the Fourth Air Fleet and became AF CINC HQ Station W-3. With the expansion of the radio intelligence service within Greece, Station W-3 shortly thereafter became Weather Report Control Station Southeast of the Radio Intelligence Battalion Southeast formed in the area. See also Chapter 10, B, IV, 7, a (at end); 7,b, and 7, c.

(4) With activation of Branch 3 (Cryptographic) at the Office of the AF Chief Signal Officer from the III (Radio Intelligence) Battalion, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment the III Battalion continued in existence for a while and was then expanded in the autumn of 1944 to form Air Signal ~~ESRFE~~ (Radio Intelligence) Battalion 350, still a headquarters unit of the AF Chief Signal Officer but now commanded by Captain Jordens instead of by the Chief of Branch 3.

(5) The new Air Signal Battalion 350 still retained the AF CINC HQ Station W-1, until then at Asnières and withdrawing from there to Limburg together with Sub-Sections B (2) and Columbus-Britain and America (See Chapter 10, A, III, 5, (1)) and AF CINC HQ Station W-10 (13th Company, Air Force CINC Signal Regiment). According to its commander, the battalion meanwhile had also received other W stations, namely, the stations at Kressbronn, Lake Constance; and Oberhaching/Deisenhofen, near Munich (formerly Station W-13), which formerly had been under the Third Air Fleet HQ

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48 Radio Intelligence Battalion. See Chapter 10, A, III, 3, b.

The CO, Air Signal (Radio Intelligence) Battalion 350 also assumed control over the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center, which was redesignated as Radio Intelligence Control Center. "This position spelt the consolidation of radio intercept, radar, and general radio intelligence activities under one control," as the CO, Battalion 350 puts it. As a further measure, the battalion was assigned the Radar Data Interpreting Company at Potsdam-Eiche and was reorganized in five companies (See Chapter 10, A, III, 5, (3)).

(6) During the withdrawal from Berlin to the Alpine Redoubt area, the battalion on 13 April 1945 moved to Oberhaching-Deisenhofen, near Munich, and on 24 April to Wiese, in Tyrol: "During the transfer to Oberhaching and then to Wiese only elements of Battalion 350 and of the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center moved; the rest remained where they were and were there taken prisoner or deserted." Those elements which had moved to Oberhaching and then to Wiese were taken prisoner on 9 May 1945 and interned in camp at Heilbronn. For more details on this subject see Chapter 10, B, VI, 6,

and on the withdrawal of the Cryptographic Center and

+ (p. 46): See Chapter 10, A, III, 1, a, 2 (1) and 3, b. On p. 32, above, the 13th Company, AF CINC HQ Signal Regiment is listed as having remained at Potsdam. The units concerned was the AF CINC HQ Station W-10. The designation 13th Company was given by Major Oeljeschlaeger, who took it from records of Branch 3. The designation had probably already been changed at the time.

Air Signal Battalion 350 see Chapter 11, A, III, 3,b.

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7. Air Signal (Women Auxiliary) Replacement Battalion 354; Training of Women Auxiliaries for Radio Intercept Service⁺

The following is based primarily on information from Major Vogler, CO, Air Signal Battalion 354.

On 1 January 1942 Captain Vogler, promoted to the rank of Major on 1 August 1942, was assigned to command the III Air Signal Training Battalion for women auxiliaries of the Air District Command Signal Regiment 11 in Luebeck - St. Hubertus. At the same time he commanded the I Air Signal Operating Battalion of the same regiment. However, he was soon relieved of this second responsibility, since the scope of his mission in the III Battalion made it impossible for him to hold both assignments simultaneously.

The womens auxiliary training battalion comprsed a battalion headquarters and a training company containing approximately 1 000 women auxiliaries, ^{male military personnel} 50/~~XXXXXX~~ as instructors (~~under~~ in rank of 1st and 2d lieutenants, master and other sergeants, corporals) and 30 Air Signal Women Auxiliary officers, all numbers approximate. In addition to the normal headquarters personnel, both the regiment and the battalion headquarters staff each had one air signal

⁺ See also Chapter 10, A, III, 2, (5).

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49 womens auxiliary officer and a number of women auxiliaries.
 The battalion headquarters also had a motor pool. The 11th
 regiment was organic to Air District Command XI, Hamburg.
 It was Generalmajor Klemme, Signal Staff Officer of this
 50 headquarters, who established the womens auxiliary battalion
 in Luebeck - St. Hubertus.

 As senior officer of the caserne, the battalion com-
 mander also controlled the permanent local caserne admini-
 stration with its male and female employees, including
 the uniform issue and repair depots and the other repair
 shops.

 Air Signal women auxiliaries had the following ranks:

 Woman auxiliary (Luftnachrichten HelferIn); Senior woman
 auxiliary (OberhelferIn); Chief woman auxiliary (Haupt-
 helferIn), and wore rank insignia made up of stripes and
 stars on the sleeve. The battalion's staff of women aux-
 iliary officers consisted of 20-25 highly qualified women
 headed by ~~ENIAX~~ Senior Air Signal Woman Auxiliary Mrs Gummershei-
 mer, who was promoted Senior Auxiliary in about 1944. Her
 sister, Mrs. Blume was secretary to the Signal Staff Officer,
 General Klemme, at Air District Command Headquarters Ham-
 burg. In addition to the above ranks, the Women Auxiliary
 officer corps also included Staff auxiliaries, and the
 whole corps at the highest level was represented by Mrs.
 Scholtz-Klinck, National Leader of Womens' Activities (Reichs-

51 (Reichsfrauenfuhrerin), who did much to support the activities at Luebeck-St.Hubertus.

Training was given in the subjects of telephone, teletype, and radio operating, including instruction on aircraft reporting and weather reporting.

The majority of the women auxiliaries were volunteers; the rest were referred to the training battalions by the various labor offices after tests to insure their suitability. They were required to undertake in writing to serve the Air Force within the Home zone of operations and in enemy territories, and were also sworn to secrecy. They were not required to take the oath normally administered to male military personnel. They were subject to disciplinary penalties on the following ascending scale: deprivation of leave; reprimand; fines; report to higher headquarters. Authority to impose penalties rested with the company commander, the battalion commander, the regimental commander, and courts-martial. Auxiliaries received free meals, lodging, and uniforms, and pay according to a special tariff. They were able to save quite substantial sums, which they invested in the post savings bank.

Women auxiliaries lived in barracks and were subject to a strict service discipline. After duty hours they were permitted to leave the barracks area, but only with written

51 authority. All duties within the barracks area were performed
52 under supervision by female personnel, and male personnel
were not permitted to enter the area.

In 1943 the battalion was expanded by the assignment of approximately 2 000 women auxiliaries newly drafted through the labor offices. These were assigned to Air Base Magenau-Land. The Luebeck-St. Hubertus depot contained practically only volunteers.

In about 1944 the battalion was taken out of the regiment and, retaining its designation, was assigned under the newly activated Air Signal Training Regiment Guetersloh. This regiment was under direct command by the Ninth Air Fleet, with headquarters at Bad Saarow-Pieskow, Lake Scharmuetzsee, east of Berlin. This air fleet headquarters had been organized on 13 May 1944 as a training and replacement headquarters, and was under the command of General der Flieger (Lieutenant General, AF) von Seidel, as CG, Replacement Air Force. On 1 October 1944 Lieutenant General (General der Nachrichtentruppe), Air Signal Corps, Fahnert was assigned as Air Fleet Signal Officer. In January 1945 he was replaced by Generalleutnant (Major General) Haenschke. After his appointment as Senior Radio Intelligence Officer on 10 November 1944, General Klemme (see above) finally succeeded in persuading General Fahnert to take the battalion out of the regiment and place it di-

52 directly under his command. It then became an independent battalion and, as a unit of the Radio Intelligence Service was redesignated Air Signal Battalion 354.

53 Major Vogler was given the disciplinary authority of a regimental commander.

In addition to the duty roster already in force, special instruction in radio intercept operations was now included in the training program. After four to six weeks of training the auxiliaries were examined by an examination board and were then transferred, as requested, to field units in all theaters of operations for service in radio intelligence and all other air signal branches.

At capitulation the battalion was disbanded. The auxiliaries and their auxiliary officers were assigned mutual quarters in Luebeck on about 20 May 1945 and were then discharged and sent to their homes. All male military personnel were taken prisoner. The battalion commander and about twenty enlisted men remained at the caserne Luebeck-St. Hubertus for a while to wind up affairs and attend to general duties in the barracks and kitchens. The barracks were then taken over by the British for use as a hospital.

The following is a cursory account of events during the last few days at St. Hubertus prior to occupation by the British:

Towards the end of the war, when the German military forces commenced withdrawing northward and southward under pressure by the enemy forces penetrating German territory, St. Hubertus still continued to play quite a role as a final location for higher level headquarters. The AF Chief Signal Officer, for example, had prepared a command post in the thickly wooded area to serve as his headquarters. However, he was ordered to retire southwards, but the Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, General Klemme moved into the command post, where he stayed until he also withdrew to Heiligenhafen and then to Husum. Tenth Air Fleet Headquarters, the training and replacement command, also moved under General der Flieger von Seidel from Saarow-Pieskow to Lake Scharmuetzlesee, east of Berlin. Others who arrived in the area included the following:

General Fahnert, former Tenth Air Fleet HQ Signal Staff Officer and CG, Air Signal Replacement Division, in which assignments he had meanwhile been succeeded by General Maenschke, previously Third Air Fleet HQ Staff Signal Officer, Paris. From the Senior Radio Intelligence Officer, who had moved from Potsdam to St. Hubertus, General Fahnert had received instructions assigning him to the defense of Luebeck and on 22 April 1945 had become Post Commander of Luebeck-St. Hubertus;

54 General Loebell and Brigadier General Duerr of the Air Signal Corps;

General der Flieger Christiansen with his headquarters staff;

Field Marshal Ritter von Gleim with his air pilot Miss Hanna Reitsch. Field Marshal von Gleim had meanwhile replaced Reich Marshal Goering as CINC, Air Force;

The wife and daughter of General von Seidel.

55 The casino of the Air Signal battalion was overcrowded with members of the various staffs, and General Klemme ordered that not more than two potatoes per person were to be served with meals.

In addition to other workshops, the air signal battalion at St. Hubertus during the past year had also received a repair workshop for Me-109 aircraft. Shortly before the arrival of British troops, General Fahnert, assisted by a number of noncommissioned officers, personally blasted an aircraft fuselage standing in this workshop. He also gave the battalion commander, Major Vogler, written orders to surrender the caserne, occupied almost exclusively by Air Signal women auxiliaries, to the British without resistance. A few hours prior to the arrival of the British, who were advancing from Ratzeburg, the battalion commander ordered white bedsheets to be hoisted on the mast at the guardhouse,

55 which was occupied by women auxiliaries. Immediately a telephone message arrived from the adjutant of the nearby Blankensee Air Base inquiring whether the battalion commander had lost nerve and stating that such action was sheer madness and that the consequences would follow. However, events took their course.

After dispatch of the 900 women auxiliaries to their homes, and after the battalion commander had spent eight days together with the British who had taken over the caserne, he was ordered suddenly to leave the caserne and was not even permitted to take along his personal field kit.

56 The Luebeck-St. Hubertus womens auxiliary battalion was generally considered an exemplary unit because of the meticulous training its members received and their conscientiousness and sense of order. The strict discipline of the male military personnel, the devotion of the trainees to duty and their at all times ladylike behaviour, together with the high quality of the exceedingly competent auxiliary officer corps, with particular emphasis on Chief Woman Auxiliary Mrs. Gummersheimer, will continue in the future to serve as a shield of honor for the Luebeck-St. Hubertus Womens Auxiliary Battalion

Luebeck-St. Hubertus is situated approximately five miles southeast of Luebeck. The beautiful buildings which

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served formerly as an Air Signal troops caserne and ~~is~~ are now occupied by a Border patrol unit, are at the side of the Luebeck-Ratzeburg road in forest surroundings not far from Trave (Muggenbusch) River, which is now the demarkation line between the east and west zones of Germany. Owing to the healthy climate in the forest surroundings and its tasteful architecture, the caserne bears comparison with a sanatorium, and one can therefore well understand the British using it as a hospital.

The following information is offered on Air District Command HQ Signal Regiment 11 and Air Signal Training Regiment Guetersloh (No. 4 ?):

(1) Air District Command HQ Signal Regiment II,
Headquarters at Pinneberg, near Hamburg.

Commanding Officers (Colonel) Weil in 1939; Aigner in 1940; Arlt in 1942; Ginnandt in 1944.

I Battalion (Air Signal Operating) Stationed at Luebeck-St. Hubertus from 1940 to 1942; then at Pinneberg.

Commanding Officers: 1940-42 Lieutenant Colonel von Frowein; 1942 Captain Vogler, until the battalion transferred to Pinneberg.

II (Aircraft Reporting) Battalion, stationed at Hamburg.

Commanding Officer, probably Colonel Dr. Oetker in the initial years. Later Colonel Dr. Oetker activated the

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regiment's V (Aircraft Reporting) Battalion.

III Air Signal Womens Auxiliary Training Battalion, at Luebeck-St.Hubertus. The battalion was taken out of the regiment in about 1944 and, retaining its designation, assigned to the newly activated Air Signal Training Regiment Guetersloh, which was controlled directly by the Ninth Air Fleet, a training and replacement headquarters. In 1944-45 the battalion was taken out of this regiment and placed, as Air Signal Battalion 354, under the Senior Radio Intelligence Officer.

Battalion Commander: From 1 January 1942, Captain Vogler, who was soon relieved by Captain Sellow, followed, again after only a short while, by Captain Vogler, reassigned to this post which he was to hold, with promotion to the rank of major on 1 August 1942, to the end of the war.

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IV Air Signal Womens Auxiliary Training Battalion, at Pinneberg. This battalion was activated after the III. Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel David.

V (Aircraft Reporting) Battalion, at Aarhus, Denmark (see II Battalion, above).

Commander Officer: Colonel Dr. Oetker; later Colonel Frowein (see I Battalion, above).

VI (Training) Battalion, at Heidenau bei Postedt.

Commanding Officer: Autumn 1941-1 January 1942, Captain Vogler.

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(2) Air Signal Training Regiment # (?), Guetersloh (See III Battalion, 11th Regiment, above).

Regimental Commanders: 1943 Colonel Kock; 1944 Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Fursch (?); 1945 Colonel K (?).

8. Withdrawal of AF Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence and his Surrender at Husum. (Supplementing information given in Chapter 10, A, III, 3, a).

When withdrawing from Berlin, the AF Chief Signal Officer originally had no intention of transferring to the Alpine Redoubt area but northwards. For this reason the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence was ordered to move from Potsdam to the Signal School, Halle, and from there to Air Signal Womens Auxiliary Replacement Battalion 356 at St Hubertus, where General Martini, AF Chief Signal Officer, had a large command post established. In the meanwhile the Home Air Fleet (with Air Fleet Signal Staff Officer General Bohner) had also transferred northward. General Martini thereupon decided to move south and ordered that all radio intelligence units north of a line approximately from the Harz Mountains to the Thuringia Forest area, were to move northwards under command by General Klemme. All units south of the line were to withdraw southwards under General Forster. It was no longer possible to check the execution of these orders, since both radio and wire communications failed

59 within a few days. In consequence, the units which grouped around the remnants of General Klemme's Radio Intelligence Division Headquarters when he finally transferred to Husum-Milstedt by way of Heiligenhafen presented a very informative picture, as will be seen from the following strength report, copied from the report intended for the Home Air Fleet:

1. Intercept Station Husum-Milstedt.

	Off Pers	Civ Off	Enl Pers	Women Auxs.	
1/3 of Div HQ Staff (under Major Schobinger)	3	2	5	7	Rest left at Heiligenhafen owing to failure of transport vehicles
HQ, III Bn, 351st Regt (under Captain Riedinger)	6	3	23	4	
14th Co., 351st Regt	2	-	53	-	
5th Co., 357th Regt	4	1	156	77	Staff of old Husum Station of former Station W-22.
	15	6	237	88	

2. Milstedt Village.

16th Co., 351st Regt	4	-	69	17	
15th Co., 351st Regt	6	-	77	42	
I Gp., 1st Night Fighter Wing	20	-	157	4	Night fighter units only under housekeeping & disciplinary control because without aircraft
III Gp., 1st Night Fighter Wing	16	-	194	22	
	61	6	734	173	giving an over-

all total of 974 personnel.

Besides the remnants of the division headquarters staff, the I Battalion, 353d Regiment, under Captain Scheidl, was also at Heiligenhafen, further details on which will be found in Chapter 10, B, V, 2, e. After an omnibus and a truck had been irreparably damaged while being hauled out of an air

60 shelter, the headquarters staff remnants were assigned administratively and for housekeeping to this battalion.

The 5th Company, 357th Air Signal Regiment was from that regiment, which was under command by Captain Rueckheim. For further information see Chapter 10, A, III, 2, 8, and B, IV, 6.

For more details on the III Battalion, 351st Regiment, under Captain Riedinger, see Chapter 10, B, IV, 3, b (4) and B, IV, 5, c.

61 The Husum Intercept Station was in the outskirts of Milstedt Village, in which village German troops were also quartered at the time of the German capitulation. A German (English-speaking) interpreter company lived in perfect harmony with a British company in one and the same shed. After a polite request, the British made use of the sports field of the intercept station.

9. Commanding General, Home Radio Intelligence Command; Missions, Operations, and Experience. Air Signal Regiment 351 and Air Signal Battalions 356, 357, and 359. Supplementary Information to Chapter 10, A, III, 1, c. On 3 November 1944 Colonel Forster was assigned to head the Home Radio Intelligence Command (Funkaufklaerungsfuehrer Reich). From the outbreak of the war he had been at the head of the Aircraft Reporting ~~XXXX~~Section, AF High Command HQ, until assigned

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on 25 July 1940 as Signal Staff Officer at headquarters of the night fighter division of Fighter Command Center, which assignment he held until 9 July 1941. The night fighter division had been activated under the Second Air Division in Brussels and transferred to Zeist, Holland. His further assignments were as follows: 1 August 1941-9 July 1942: Signal Staff Officer, XII Air (Night Fighter) Corps, Zeist; 17 July-~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 31 October 1942: temporarily returned to XII Air Corps to orient his successor, Colonel Bohner; 1 January 1943-2 November 1944: Signal Staff Officer Air District Command VI, Muenster; 28 March-2 November 1944: attached to headquarters staff, Home Air Fleet. While serving this assignment he headed a special staff reorganizing the aircraft reporting service, and spent one month under General Bogatsch in Wiesbaden receiving and reorganizing the signal units returning from the west.

As CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command, Colonel Forster was assigned the radio intelligence units committed in the west, with the same command authority over them as that of the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence. As a field commander he had the status of a brigade commander and exercised command over Air Signal Regiment 351 and Air Signal Battalion 356 and 357, which at that time were already all committed in the Home theater of operations. The battalions were in-

62 independxntly operating units and were not organic to Air Signal Regiment 351. The 357th Air Signal Battalion was organized from the former I Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 351.

The CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command also controlled the "central command post for Radio Intelligence (Zentrales Gefechtsstand fuer Funkaufklaerung)" at Treuenbrietzen. More details on the central command post and on Air Signal Battalion 357 will be found under the heading "Reporting Center Zeist" in Chapter 10, B, IV, 6; on Air Signal Regiment 351 in Chapter 10, B, IV, 3, a, b, c, and 5.

In the autumn of 1944 the Radio Intelligence Service was no longer able to execute its mission of tracking the course of enemy aircraft as effectively as had been the case in the past. The German withdrawals had deprived it of its forward warning zones in the Franco-Belgian areas and in parts of Holland, and the British had become more cautious in their use of radio communications. It was to be assumed that, through interrogation of radio intelligence personnel captured at the invasion of France, the enemy had learned much concerning the nature of our radio intelligence activities and the successful results achieved. Only the Americans, fully confident of victory as they were, still applied very few restrictions on radio communications during their

63 air operations, so that the results achieved against them remained equal to those of former times.

These circumstances made it absolutely essential to recover lost ground in the detection of enemy air routes, and in particular the routes followed by enemy air forces at night.

For the above reasons, the following immediate measures were introduced:

(1) Reorganization of radio intelligence covering areas in the west;

(2) A redistribution of missions, consonant with the changed circumstances, to the individual units of the Radio Intelligence Service;

64 (3) The establishment of forward listening posts to detect enemy radar operations in a line through the Vosges Mountains, Lorraine, and Trier;

(4) The establishment of new and expansion of the existing stations in the coastal areas of Holland;

(5) The establishment of a line as described above on the right banks of the Rhine River.

At the same time orders were issued that in aircraft route tracking operations main emphasis was to be placed on tracking enemy bomber forces. However, care was also to be taken to include enemy escort fighters and thereby bring

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64 about a satisfactory solution to the difficult problem of keeping these escort fighter units under observation.

In this program of reorganizing the radio intelligence/^{operations} in the west the AF Chief Signal Officer also made his contribution by increasing the number of companies designed for radar observation of the enemy, so as to reduce the large size of the areas individual companies had been required to cover in the past.

Other measures of general reorganization of the units under the Home Radio Intelligence Command went hand in hand with those outlined above. After its I Battalion had been taken from Air Signal Regiment 357, the regiment was reorganized with three reinforced battalions, the II and III of which each received a radar observation company. The IV Battalion currently in process of activation for the regiment was also taken away. This battalion was intended for jamming operations and for the time being it was redesignated Air Signal Battalion 359 and placed under the Home Air Fleet, with headquarters at Berlin-Wannsee, from where it was later integrated with the Home Air Signal Regiment (Luftnachrichtenregiment Reich). This temporary measure was considered essential because the Signal Staff Officer, Home Air Fleet, was the only authority who had adequate personnel available to establish the numerous jamming installations. For jam-

65 jamming operations in support of home air defense Battalion 359 was committed under the I Fighter Corps.

Besides the Air Signal Regiment 351, Air Signal Battalions 356 and 357 also had Radar Observation Companies.

The command post of the I Fighter Corps, under General Pelz, was at Treuenbrietzen, together with the Central Command Post for Radio Intelligence of the Home Radio Intelligence Command.

The I Fighter Corps was identical with the former XII Air Corps, Zeist in Holland (see heading "Reporting Center Zeist" Chapter 10, V, IV, 6) and at the time of its commitment at Treuenbrietzen controlled the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 8th Fighter Divisions. Under Defense Command Center (BeFeFlsHaber Mitte) fighter action in home defense was the responsibility of the I Fighter Corps.

Air Signal Battalion 356 was activated in 1943 in the command zone of the Home Air Fleet exclusively for the mission of tracking enemy bomber forces. It was probably formed from the Aircraft Reporting Service. During the reorganization of the radio intelligence units in October 1944 it no doubt was designated with the number 356. It continued as a unit of the Home Air Fleet; its reporting center and headquarters were at ~~XXXX~~ Berlin-Wannsee, as was the case with the Home headquarters of the Air Fleet. As previously stated, however,

66 it was assigned under the CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command. Its training status was not equal to that of Air Signal Regiment 351, which had received its training in the western theater, and this high standard of training was now also essential for Air Signal ~~REGIMENT~~ ^{Battalion} 356. A gradual improvement in this respect was only achieved through the reception of well trained personnel from other battalions and from the Air Signal Women Auxiliary Replacement Battalion at Luebeck.

The disposition of the Air Signal Battalion 356 was as follows:

1. Battalion HQ at Berlin-Wannsee, CO: Captain Robert Trattner (a certified engineer from Nuremburg);
2. Reporting Center 3 at Berlin-Wannsee: Aircraft tracking, zone of interior;
3. 1st Co., Regiment 356, Berlin-Wannsee: Radar data interpreting;
4. 2d Co., Regiment 356, Hamburg; Radar data interpreting (battle intelligence North);
5. 3d Co., Regiment 356, Schleissheim, near Munich: Radar data interpretation (Battle intelligence South);
6. 4th Co., Regiment 356, Koeniggraetz, Bohemia: Radar observation;
7. 5th Co., Regiment 356, Boebhingen, near Stuttgart: Radar observation.

1st Lieutenant Wilhelm Jaeger (presently Senior Judge, District Court, Hankenbuettel, County Gifhorn) commanded the 2d Company, Regiment 356 in Hamburg from September 1944 to

67 the end of the war. On 9 April 1945 he and his company were relieved of the responsibility for Battle Intelligence (Radar data interpreting) North by 1st Lieutenant Adolf D. Niemeyer (presently Director of the Continental Gummi Werke, Hanover) with his company, the 16th Co., "egiment 351, which he had been assigned to command on 9 April. Previously, Lieutenant Niemeyer had been adjutant and intelligence officer to General Klemme, Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence. This change in the control of Battle Intelligence radar interpretation activities North was due to the recent withdrawal of the German forces and the consequent necessity for regrouping and to the transfer of the III Battalion, Air Signal "egiment 351 northward. 1st Lieutenant Jaeger reports as follows:

(1) The designations "Interpretation North" and "Battle intelligence North" in reality signified no real difference. The one signified the interpretation as such, the other the interpretation in combat operations. The interpreting elements were quartered in the large bunker at the "eiligengeistfeld, Hamburg. The Air Signal Women Auxiliary Replacements came to the 2d Company from the Air Signal Battalion Luebeck-St. Hubertus.

2. The 2d Company in the autumn of 1944 had in operation sixteen field stations, distributed in the

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in the areas from the mouth of the Rhine River, through Holland, northwestern Germany, and Denmark to the Isle of Bornholm. The majority of these field stations were permanently connected with the "Interpretation North" center by direct telephone line; special connections were established through switchboards with the other stations for the duration of combat operations. The possibility also existed for the transmission of reports by radio. The reports coming in from the individual intercept stations were processed and interpreted in the center at Hamburg and ^{and simultaneously} currently/~~reported~~ by direct telephone lines to the battle ~~inter~~ data computing sections of the fighter corps in Berlin and of the 2d Fighter Division in Stade. During the interpretation processes the interpreting officer at Hamburg spoke through a laryngophone. The 2d Company, Air Signal Battalion 356 and the Interpreting Center North operated specifically for the "fighter forces committed in home defense." On this subject see also Appendixes 1-3.

3. The Air Signal Radio Intelligence Companies had the mission of endeavoring to detect the enemy air forces if at all possible already during their concentration and then to track the course on which they were flying. This was done by keeping receivers constantly

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tuned in to certain radio frequencies on which the shortwave, ultrashortwave, and decimeter instruments installed in enemy aircraft operated (such as the Rotterdam and Night Fighter Warning instruments); this applied to both radio and radar receiving sets. As soon as a field station by these means detected enemy aircraft, it immediately reported the number of transmitting instruments registered and the course on which the enemy aircraft were flying, which was determined by DF instruments. If other field stations in the vicinity failed to detect the enemy aircraft at the same time, they were oriented by the Interpreting Center North. The combined radar data from a number of radar stations made it possible to establish the current station of the enemy aircraft. The extent of large forces was easy to determine and it was also a simple matter to track individual aircraft, such as weather reporting and pathfinder aircraft. During combat operations the field stations took fixes as ordered at regular intervals of two or three minutes.

Besides taking fixes to determine the whereabouts of the enemy forces or individual aircraft, the stations intercepted the communications of the enemy units. This necessitated the presence of language interpreters as radio operators at the field stations . All other in-

intercepted messages of all types were also interpreted immediately and the resulting data was forwarded to the appropriate fighter units by or through the Battle Intelligence Center North (also referred to as Interpreting Center North).

4. Besides the specialized radio receivers and DF instruments used, use was also made of instruments using a screen. As a rule the impulses coming from such enemy transmitters as the Rotterdam sets were given by the receiving instruments as sounds, so that the DF operator would hear a certain type of note at certain intervals from a certain direction.

5. The radio intelligence battalion operated on exclusively radio intercept principles and was not equipped with the DF type instruments used by the Aircraft Reporting Companies. The 2d Company, Air Signal Regiment 356 detected the British and American air forces while they were still assembling in the air over England and tracked their course without a gap. The current station and extent of an enemy air division could be established precisely, but not the ~~high~~ altitude at which it was flying; this could only be computed by the DF instruments of the aircraft reporting companies. In many cases the intercepted messages of the weather reporting units

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which flew ahead of every large enemy force made it possible to predict the target to be attacked, but this was only so when the messages were in clear text, which was the case with the Americans. Such information made it possible to recognize deceptive maneuvers of the enemy force, such as a change of course.

6. The Radio Intelligence Battalion did not have the mission of jamming ground or airborne radio communications traffic.

Another of these units in existence was Air Signal Battalion 359. It was activated in the autumn of 1944, during the reorganization of Air Signal Regiment 351, from the IV Battalion of the regiment. This battalion was in process of activation at the time. It was intended for jamming operations and for this purpose had probably absorbed the jamming units of the II Battalion of the same regiment (See Air Signal Regiment 351 in Chapter 10, B, IV, 5). As a jamming battalion the new unit was assigned initially under the Home Air Fleet and was then incorporated with Air Signal Regiment Reich (Home Air Signal Regiment), a measure due to the fact that the Signal Staff Officer of the Home Air Fleet was the only authority having the personnel available to establish the required jamming installations. The battalion was under the command of Major Dahl. As Chief of Jamming Operations

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71 on the staff of the Home Radio Intelligence Command, his command post was at that of the CO of the Home Radio Intelligence Command.

In addition to its former areas of responsibility, the Radio Intercept Service during the war had increasingly been compelled to assume responsibility for the tracking of enemy bomber units attacking the German zone of interior and for the associated missions involved in supporting the fighter forces. This complex of activities was more than the Aircraft Reporting Service had been able to cope with in the long run, even after Reich Marshal Goering in the summer of 1944 had ordered the assignment of the Aircraft Reporting Service under the Fighter Arm and the consolidation of the Radar Observation with the Home Aircraft Reporting Service. Until that time home air defense had been directed by Defense Command Center and, as previously stated, the XII Air Corps had directed fighter defense operations while the various air district commands had directed antiaircraft artillery defense operations. These latter had also controlled the Home Aircraft Reporting Service.

The Fighter Arm, which in a steadily increasing measure was assuming the lead in Home Defense had quite justifiably demanded authority to issue directives to the Radio Intercept Service and in the western theater had even achieved a

72

72 closer interrelation.

This new arrangement created the danger that the efforts of the Radio Intercept Service, which had other highly important missions to perform for the air fleets and their headquarters, would become scattered. The Director General of Signal Services (Generalaachrichtenfuehrer) therefore decided to meet the demands of the Fighter Arm as far as possible, but he was not prepared to place the consolidated Radio Intelligence Service under the Fighter Arm in all respects. He therefore created the post of a CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command (Tank-Aufklaerungsfuehrer Reich), assigned tactically to the AF High Command and attached to the CG, I Fighter Corps as an adviser, with a command post at the corps' headquarters in Treuenbrietzen.

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Another post created was that of a Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence (Hoeherer Kommandeur der Tankaufklaerung) as the service superior of all radio intelligence units. The CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command was assigned tactically to the AF High Command, administratively under the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence, and not under the Home Air Fleet. His radio intelligence units, Air Signal Regiment 351 and Air Signal Battalions 356 and 357 were assigned to him tactically and administratively.

The creation of the post of a Senior Commander of

73 Radio Intelligence failed to produce the desired effects (See Chapter 10, A). This is evident, among other things, from the fact that the CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command, was only placed administratively under him.

The CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command, besides the reporting centers of the Radio Intelligence Forces West over which he had tactical and administrative command authority, also had the authority to issue operational directives to Reporting Centers East and South. His request that these should be assigned under him had been rejected.

74 The aircraft tracking reports from the units of the Radio Intelligence Service were transmitted by radio through the appropriate Reporting Centers to the Central Radio Intelligence Command Post at Treuenbrietzen. As long as the home defense system was still intact and during the period late 1944 to early 1945, the following reporting centers were in operation:

(1) Reporting Center 1. Unit of Air Signal Battalion 357 at Wiedenbrueck near Bielefeld; later at Heiligenstadt/Eichsfeld: Advance warning, detection of enemy air penetrations, outpost area for zone of interior.

(2) Reporting Center 2. Unit of Air Signal Regiment 351 at Limburg on Lahn, later at Triefenstein near Markt Heidenfeld on Main; Feuchtwangen, south of Rothenburg; Landshut on Isar: Advance warning for low-altitude attacks, operations, ground situation, fighters.

(3) Reporting Center 3. Units of Air Signal Battalion 356

74 at Berlin-Wannsee with assigned Battle Intelligence Sections North -- Hamburg; South -- Schleissheim near Munich, and East -- Cosel, Upper Silesia: Aircraft tracking over zone of interior.

(4) Reporting Center 4. Unit of Air Signal Regiment 352 in Vienna covering southern areas: Advance warning and detection of penetrations from south.

75 (5) Reporting Center 5. Unit of Air Signal Regiment 353 at Coburg covering operations in the east: Advance warning and detection of penetrations from the east.

The tracking of aircraft over the zone of interior for units committed in the western theater was a mission primarily of Air Signal Battalions 356 and 357 of Reporting Centers 3 and 1. Whereas Battalion 356 had only this one mission and was responsible for coverage of the entire area from Hamburg to the Alps, the Battalion 357, whose operating points were in northwest Germany also had other radio intercept missions to perform.

Reporting Center 2 operated for Intercept and DF Stations of the II and III Battalions of Air Signal Regiment 351 in aircraft tracking. However, these stations were required to place prior emphasis on intelligence reports for the higher levels of command.

Towards the end of the war the increasing frequency of penetrations into the zone of interior from the south made cooperation with Reporting Center 4 a matter of steadily mounting importance. Frequent damage to the long lines of wire communications often made this difficult, but did not

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75 result in the home defense forces being taken by surprise.

Owing to the fact that penetrations by operational air forces from the east were a rare occurrence, "eorting Center 5 hardly came into prominence at all.

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The missions of the CO, Home Air Intelligence Command who, as previously stated was assigned under Branch 3 (Cryptographic), Office of the AF Chief Signal Officer at AF High Command in matters of radio intercept operations and under the Senior Commander of Radio Intelligence for administrative purposes, were as follows:

He was responsible for the tracking of operational enemy air forces and for compilation of the air situation report; he was adviser to the CG, I Fighter Corps, responsible for home fighter defense operations. For the purposes of compilation of the radio intelligence reports received and for the purposes of directing aircraft route tracking operations he was responsible for all other radio intelligence operations in the western theater and for direction of all jamming operations within the zone of interior.

His command post was the Central Radio Intelligence Command Post at Treuenbrietzen, which was in the bunker of his superior commanding general. Being the Commanding Generals adviser on all matters of aircraft route tracking and on the messages received, he was usually at the fighter

76 command post.

His headquarters staff comprised a tactical section for radio intelligence in the western theater of operations and in the zone of interior, an intelligence data interpreting section, a personnel officer, and a jamming operations officer.

All messages received were delivered to the Chief of Staff and the radio intercept and DF data interpreters and entered on a situation map; from this map and the general picture evolving from radio intercept and DF reports compared with the air situation map prepared by the Aircraft Reporting Service, the final air situation map was compiled. The reports and the interpretations were delivered to the Air Force Operations Staff (Intelligence Section: Intelligence Data Interpretation Sub-Section West); to the Home Air Fleet ~~XXXX~~ through the radio intercept liaison officers stationed at that air fleet headquarters; and to the I Fighter Corps Command Post, which committed its fighter and other units accordingly.

These activities of the CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command also included the processing of radio intercept reports, other than those concerning aircraft tracking operations; for the higher levels of command, including Branch 3, Air Force Chief Signal Officer, and the handling and execution of requests and orders from that branch.

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The Jamming Operations Command Center was also a part of the Central Radio Intelligence Command Post. During penetrations by enemy air forces the chief of this post was at the Command Post of the I Fighter Corps, where he oriented himself currently on the operational intentions of the fighter forces. Jamming operations were directed primarily at interference with the ~~KYXXXXXXXX~~ British hyperbel navigational system in operation during penetrations by enemy air forces. When the intention existed to commit against the enemy forces fighters operating with navigational aids, the Chief of Jamming Operations had to instruct his units to order silence for the jamming instruments directed at the areas in question. These orders were transmitted simultaneously over Radio Command Center of the central office of the postal services, the transmitting stations of the fighter divisions, and particularly over the radio transmitters held available specifically for this purpose, as well as over the transmitting stations of the air district commands responsible in the areas concerned. These orders to cease jamming operations had to be transmitted within a very short space of time.

All air and ground units were required to report daily to Branch 3, AF Chief Signal Officer, concerning any interferences with their communications due to German jamming

78 operations.

Generally speaking, the German Radio Intercept Service was opposed to radio and radar jamming, since it caused the enemy to change over to different frequencies which it was only possible to detect and intercept after long effort or not at all.

As was shown previously in the account of Battle Intelligence Norththe DF observation units assigned under the CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command had no DF or radar instruments such as those of the Aircraft Reporting Service companies.

Their only mission was to receive enemy radar, navigational, and identification signals, determine their location and their technical methods and the tactical features revealed

79 thereby. By detecting and locating the enemy aircarried panoramic instruments of the Rotterdam or Meddo type they effectively supported aircraft route tracking operations.

They were equipped with ultrashortwave, decimeter and DF receivers furnished with oscillographs.

The Radio Intelligence Central Command Post was staffed by a company 200 strong, which ~~with 200 personnel~~ ~~it~~ was organized in 1 Operating, 1 Command Post, 1 Radio Intercept Liaison Officers, and one Interpreting platoon. The company was activated by the I Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 351 (later 357) at the time when that battalion was fitting out the command post. When the

79 CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command took over the command post, the company passed under his command and was no longer part of Air Signal Battalion 357.

The organization and operating procedures of the radio intelligence units assigned under the Commanding Officer and their reporting channels are shown in Charts 1-3 at the end of this chapter.

At this point the valuable services merit mention which Captain Rueckheim, CO, Air Signal Battalion 357 rendered in connection with the establishment of Reporting Center Zeist and of the Radio Intelligence Central Command Post at Treuenbrietzen, services which are appreciated particularly by the former CO, Home Radio Intelligence Command. As a 2d lieutenant and CO, Intercept Station Pewsum, Rueckheim on the basis of his experience in this post and from the German air victory in Heligoland Bight on 18 December 1939 recognized at that early stage that the Radio Intercept Service was destined to serve not only as a source of information for the higher levels of command but also as an instrument supporting the conduct of tactical warfare. What strengthened him in his views was the fact that the whole aircraft reporting system at the time was based on reports from visual observers, which necessarily reached the defense commands too late, and on DF instruments which could operate over only short distances

80 whereas the radio intercept service could track enemy units from the moment of their takeoff, so that its reports would insure far more timely and more effective action by the defending forces. Later, when the entire radar service was paralyzed by the enemy use of tin foil, no responsible command authority could afford to reject any longer the use of the Radio Intercept Service as one of the most important elements in the defense system.

 Another point which contributed largely towards the success achieved by the Radio Intercept Service was the fact that its units in their monitoring and detecting operations included the navigational aids used by the enemy, and the fact that this interception of directional beams, ground radar stations, air-carried panorama (Rotterdam and Meddo type), and identification signal instrument traffic provided exceptionally reliable information for use in the tracking of aircraft (see also Chapter 11, B, IV, 6).

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 Radio Intelligence had thus attained a position of decisive importance in the conduct of active air defense. As the war continued its areas of activities and responsibilities in the zone of interior steadily increased. These areas now also included civilian authorities, the economy, industry and transportation. The service was able to furnish data on the air situation directly to the civilian regional command

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headquarters and to the various air raid warning centers. When favorable conditions existed for intercept operations, the service succeeded already in the late evening hours in predicting what penetrations would take place on the next day in the forenoon, a measure which had a particularly important impact on timely, uninterrupted, and secure action to provide large cities and industrial centers with rations, essential consumer goods, and raw materials.

When the shortage of aviation fuel paralyzed the striking power of the German Air Force units, cooperation between the Air Force Radio Intelligence Service and the various Army agencies became steadily increasingly close. Thus, timely warnings of impending air attacks served to insure the proper movements of supplies and replacements to Army units, and also had a marked influence on the conservation of the rolling stock of the railways. The Army Radio Intercept Service was organized and trained exclusively for ground operations and therefore was not very effective in the specialized field of air radio intelligence, and the Army gratefully appreciated the support it received in this way from the Air Force.


At the end of the war the CG, Home Radio Intelligence Command was to withdraw southwards. Of the units under his command Air Signal Regiment (minus its III Battalion), and the headquarters staff of Air Signal Battalion 357 with one-half

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of its strength retired to the Alpine Redoubt area, while the other half of the latter battalion and the III Battalion, Air Signal Battalion 351 retired northward (See Chapter 10, B, IV, 5, 6). According to the nature of its current missions, Air Signal Battalion 356 probably split, one part moving south and the other part north.

For the Radio Intelligence Central Command Post, which was to be transferred south, a temporary station was contemplated at Hirschau, south of the Fichtel Mountains. Plans provided for it to move later from there to Zell am See. At the end, the CO with his advance party (an aircraft reporting team) was in "end. Air Signal Battalion 359 probably followed the same route as the Commanding Officer.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART




Legend.

— Assigned for all purposes

..... Authority to issue directives in all matters of aircraft tracking

AS = Air Signal

For organization of I, II, III Battalions, 351st Regiment, Air Signal Battalions 356 & 357 see p. 84.



+ Later transferred successively to Triefenstein near ~~Wiesbaden~~ Markt Heidenfeld on Main; Feuchtwangen, south of Rothenburg; Landshut on Isar.
 ++ Previously at Wiedenbrueck near Bielefeld.

Legend.

Z.A.F	Radio Intelligence Central Command Post
Gef.Ausw Nord/Sued/Ost	Battle Radio Intelligence Data Interpreting North/South/East
Meldekopf	Reporting Center
Luftflotten-Kdo Reich	Home Air Fleet HQ
LW Fuehrungsstab Ic, Auswertestelle West	AF Operations Staff, Intelligence Div. Data Interpreting West
1.2.3., etc	1st, 2d, 3d, etc.
Jagd-Division, Jagd-Div., J. Div)	Fighter Division
Kdr. General d.dtsch. Luftwaffe Daenemark	German Air Force Command, Denmark
Jagdfliegerfuehrer) Daenemark)	Fighter Command, Denmark
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
Gaubefehlstand Weimar	Regional Command Post Weimar (Civilian Air Defense)
Admiral Deutsche Bucht	Naval Command Helligoland Bight
Fuehrer der Schnellboote	E-Boat Command
Befehlshaber der Sicherungstreitkraefte)	Commander of Security Forces
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
Marine Peilabtlg) Deutsche Bucht)	Naval DF Battalion, Helligoland Bight
Luftwaffenkdo West	German AF Command HQ West
J.G.	Fighter Wing
III, IV, Flak-Korps	III, IV, AAA Corps
Oberbefehlshaber West	Commander in Chief West
Heeresgruppe A,B,D.	Army Group A, B, and D
A.O.K 25.,3., etc	Twentyfifth Army, Third Army, etc.
Pz. AOK	Panzer Army
Pz. Division	Panzer Division
Weitere 5-6 A.K's	Further 5-6 Army Corps
Warnkdo	Air Raid Warning Center or Detachment
Wa-Kdo.	" " " " " "
Kdr. General d.dtsch.) Luftwaffe Norwegen)	German AF Command Norway
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	
Fliegerfuehrer 5	Air Command 5
Torpedo Flieger Geschwader Norwegen	Torpedo Bomber Wing Norway

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Befehlshaber Sicherungs-)
streitkraefte Norwegen)

Commander of Security Forces
Norway

Marine Peilabt. Norwegen

Naval DF Battalion Norway

HVO

Intercept Service Liaison Officer

HVK

Intercept Service Liaison Detach-
ment

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B

ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS, AND OPERATIONS OF THE
GERMAN RADIO INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THE RE-
SULTS ACHIEVED IN THE VARIOUS AIR FLEET ZONES
AND THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

I. IN FIRST AND FOURTH AIR FLEET ZONES DURING THE CAMPAIGN
IN POLAND--1 SEPTEMBER 1939--END OF CAMPAIGN ON 1 OCTOBER
1939.

1. Brief Review of Intercept Service Developments in
Zone of First Air Fleet in 1939 Prior to the War.

a. The Static Intercept Stations in First Air Fleet
Zone and in the Zone of Air Force Command Eastern Prussia at
the Beginning of 1939.

(1) Reich Air Ministry Weather Station Glindow (W.-
Glindow). This station was in a newly constructed masonry
building specially erected for the purpose of radio intercep-
tion roughly two miles (3 kilometers) south of Glindow near
Werder (Potsdam), combined with a group of DF buildings
(Peilderf) in Kaminer Luch about 5 miles (7 kilometers) south-
west of it. The weather station was temporarily in the Air
Signal caserne at Potsdam-Eiche from 1 April 1937 until it
moved to Glindow towards the end of 1937.

Tactically and administratively assigned under the HIND
AF HQ Air Signal Battalion, Potsdam-Eiche, General-Wever Ca-
Battalion
serne; /CO: Major Schneider, formerly Major Prinz.

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B-1 p.5 Station Chief: Lieutenant Colonel Gottschling; prior to
1 January 1938 Inspector Becker.

Area Covered : Russia and Poland.

Field Stations: Koschuetz, immediately north of Schneidemuehl,
Eastern Pomerania.

Cooperated with: An unidentified radio operating and intercept
(Mtz)
company, under Captain Rente, of the CINC HQ
Air Signal Battalion.

Remark : The Air Ministry Weather Station was deactiva-
ted on 1 June 1939. The caserne building con-
tinued in use as a radio monitoring post of
the Air Force. (See Weather Reporting Control
Station W-1, Pulsnitz).

(2) Weather Station W-21, Pulsnitz. In a newly con-
structed masonry building, specially designed for radio inter-
cept activities at the western exits of Pulsnitz, SaxonyOber-
lausitz, with DF posts at Friedersdorf roughly two miles (2
1/2 kilometer north of Pulsnitz.

Tactically and Administratively assigned under: II Battalion,
1st Air Signal Regiment, Dresden-Klotzsche, Hermann Goering
Kaserne (Battalion CO: Major Jakoby, simultaneously acting
regimental commander; Adjutant: Lieutenant Pie; former ~~XXXXX~~
Battalion CO: of II Battalion 1st Regiment of I Battalion, 13th
Regiment: Major von Weech; former Adjutant Captain Lemmel).
Station Chief: Captain Dr. Ulrich (promoted Major on 1 June
1938); Inspector Schieron, Kutter.

Area Covered: Russia, Poland, previously main emphasis on

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Czechoslovakia.

Field Stations: See Organization, below.

Organization : Weather Station W-21 was established, originally as Station W-23 in Villa Asparagus at the Dresden-Klotzsche airfield with personnel from Station W-13, Breslau, by Captain Mr. Ulrich and placed for administrative purposes under the 1st Company, 13th Regiment (CO Major von Weech) at Dresden-Klotzsche. Station W-23 cooperated closely with the 2d Radio Company (under Captain Fabig) of the 13th Regiment, which company also included an intercept platoon. Occasionally this intercept company was assigned completely to Station W-23 for employment at its field stations. When the I Battalion, 13th became the II Battalion 1st Air Signal Regiment on 1 July 1938, the 2d Company of the 13th became the 6th Radio and Intercept Company of the 1st Air Signal Regiment. Captain Fabig remained company commander until 15 August 1939. The company included on its staff Second Lieutenant Meyer and Master Sergeant Wegner, from the spring of 1939 on Master Sergeant Schoenberg. At mobilization Captain Fabig converted the peacetime 6th Company, 1st, to form the 6th Company, 11th Air Signal Regiment. Under Lieutenant Colonel Jakoby (promoted Colonel on 1 September 1939) was activated at mobilization, using the existing II and elements of the I Battalion, 1st Signal Regiment and committed on 15th August 1939 under the

7 First Air Fleet in the northern zone of the eastern theater. Captain Henkel (Reserve) assumed command over what remained of the peacetime 6th Company, 1st Regiment, together with the radio intercept platoon. This platoon was stationed at the Pulsnitz Weather Station and expanded to form the 10th Company, 1st Air Signal Regiment, which was transferred to the front. The remaining elements of the 6th Company remained at the Pulsnitz Weather Station as a housekeeping unit during the campaign in Poland, the operations of the station having been transferred to Bernau. Further details on this subject follow later.

To cover Czechoslovakia Station W-23 in 1937-38 had set up five intercept and DF posts (designated as weather research stations) along the Czech frontier extending from Upper Silesia to Bavaria. (See Chapter 8, II, 2,c). After German occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938, field stations were set up there at Saatz/Egerland and Zwittau/Moravia, the latter designated Weather Research Station Wo-201, ~~XXXXXX~~ 48 miles (80 kilometers) south of Glatz. At the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939 the field stations serving to cover Czechoslovakia were abandoned. Instead, Station Wo-Paradies was established for operations against Poland and Russia. On 1 July 1938 the I Air Signal ~~REGIMENT~~ Battalion, 13th Regiment became the II Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment and

8 Station W-23 was redesignated W-21. On 14 February 1939 the newly built masonry intercept station in Pulsnitz was taken over by Station W-21. Actually, it was ~~W-23~~ taken into service already in mid-summer 1938. On 30 May 1939 Major Dr. Ulrich, the departing ~~former~~ chief of Station W-21, Pulsnitz, ^{in a dignified} ceremoniously ^{upon the} appreciated the conversion of the station to the Weather Reporting Control Station of the First Air Fleet, ^{expressed his} ~~pathetic~~ ^{patience for the work done so far.}

(3) Station W-11, Breslau, in the Observatory premises of Breslau-Krietern.

Tactically assigned under: Air District Command HQ Air Signal Battalion 8, Breslau-Schoengarten.

Station Chief: Major Babel; previously, from October 1938 to March 1939, Major Eick. Inspector Besser.

Area Covered: Poland, Russia, previously also Czechoslovakia.

Field Stations: Kreuzberg, Upper Silesia; Steinau/on Oder River, transferred in mid-1939 to Frankenberg.

Organization: Station W-11 was established on 1 October 1936, originally as Station W-13, at Breslau-Krietern, in the local observatory, by Major Gottschling. Major Gottschling was dispatched for this purpose by the Staff Signal Officer, Air Branch, Air Ministry, to Air District Command HQ VIII, Breslau, and used military personnel detailed from the Army together with civilians to organize the station. Inspectors Besser and Schieron.

With the exception of its intercept functions, Station W-13 was initially assigned directly under Air District Command Breslau. When Major Gottschling was recalled to the Air

9 Ministry in February or March 1937 Major von Knobelsdorf, assisted by Inspector Pesser, of the I Battalion Air District Command HQ Signal Regiment assumed command over the Station. On 31 March 1937 Station W-13 released cadre personnel for the establishment of the new Station W-23^{Dresden} (see above) and in 1938 again~~st~~ released personnel to establish Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest (See Chapter 9, II, 2, c). In October 1938 Major Eich assumed command of Station W-13 and on his transfer to Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest in March 1939 he was succeeded by Major Pabel. On 1 July 1938 Station W-13 was redesignated W-11. When German troops entered Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 Air District Command VIII, Breslau was transferred from the First Air Fleet to the command of the Fourth Air Fleet, Vienna. It was only after the campaign in Poland that Station W-11, Breslau, was redesignated W-24 and assigned under Weather Reporting Control Station 4 in Vienna. During the campaign in Poland, also, this station was not under Weather Reporting Control Station 1. (For more details see Part 10, B, I, 3, b and 4, a, a, 2, a2/1, (2).

(4) Station W-16, Kobbelbude. Approximately 11 miles (18 kilometers) southwest of Koenigsberg, close to the road and Autobahn superhighway to Elbing. Located in prefabricated buildings.

Tactically assigned under: Air Signal Battalion 6, Air Force

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Command Headquarters Eastern Prussia, in Koenigsberg.

Station Chief : Captain Opitz; Inspector Blaschey.

Area Covered : Poland, Russia, Balkan States; if necessary Finland, Sweden.

Field Stations : Tussainen near Ragnit, Nimmersatt (Memelland) and in the Masurian area.

Organization : Station W-16 was formed, originally as Station W-11, on 1 March 1937 in the headquarters building of AF Air Port Insterburg, Eastern Prussia (Air Force Area 1), and transferred to Kobbelbude on 31 March 1939. On 1 July 1938 it was designated W-16. Because of the special situation of Eastern Prussia Air Force Command "Eastern Prussia" had been established, in place of the normal Air District Command 1, as an independently operating command. For this reason Station W-11 had to be redesignated W-13 because Air District Command 3, Dresden, of whose area Breslau had been a part had been deactivated and replaced by the First Air Fleet responsible for all eastern Germany with the exception of Eastern Prussia and Austria.

Also for this reason the planned assignment of Station W-16 under the First Air Fleet Weather Reporting Control Station created on 1 June 1939 could only take place after Eastern Prussia under mobilization conditions had been placed under the First Air Fleet and the Polish Corridor had come under German control in the Polish campaign. Station W-16 then, consonant

+ Air Signal Battalion 6, under which Station 16, Kobbelbude was tactically assigned, was a unit of AF Command "Eastern Prussia."

11 with the circumstance of its being located within the zone of the First Air Fleet was given a designation number referring to that Fleet, and since the existing Station W-11 together with the area of Breslau now came under the Fourth Air Fleet and was consequently redesignated W-24 after the campaign in Poland, the Kobbelbude station was given its former designation number of W-11.

b. 1939: Activation of Weather Reporting Control Station # -L-1, in Pulnitz, as the Intercept Control Center of the First Air Fleet. Activation of this unit was initiated on 1 June 1939 at the static intercept station in Pulsnitz, using personnel for the purpose from the Air Ministry Weather Station, which at the same time was being deactivated, and from Station W-21, Pulsnitz, the larger number of personnel coming from Station W-21, while the Ministry station only released qualified specialist personnel.

Tactically assigned under: II Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment, ~~BATTALION XXXX~~ Dresden-Klotzsche. Battalion CO: Lieutenant Colonel Jakoby, simultaneously in command of the regiment.

Station Chief: Lieutenant Colonel Gottschling; Inspector: Schieren.

Area Covered : Russia, Poland.

Field Stations: The Air Fleet control center assumed control over Weather Research Station Koschuetz near Schneidemuehl from the deactivated Ministry Weather Station Glindow, and over Weather Research Station Paradies at Meseritz from Station W-21, Pulsnitz, and assigned both weather research stations to the newly activated Station W-21,

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Deutsch-Krone prior to the outbreak of the war.

c. 1939: Transfer (or Activation) of Station W-21 to (or at) Deutsch-Krone. This occurred on 1 June 1939 and the new unit was lodged in a country house on the outskirts of Deutsch-Krone. The majority of its personnel came from the deactivated Ministry Weather Station Glindow, the rest from Station W-21, which supplied all its personnel not required for the activation of Weather ~~XXXXX~~ Reporting Control Station W-1. The site had been reconnoitered in May 1939 by Major Dr. Ulrich, with the Station W-21, using radio receivers and DF instruments for the purpose.

Tactically assigned under: I Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment, Bernau, near Berlin. Battalion CO: Captain Mensel, hitherto in Branch 3 (Cryptographic), Office of Air Ministry Chief Signal Officer; Inspector: Kutter. The chief of the deactivated Station W-21, Pulsnitz, became chief of the newly activated Weather Reporting Control Station 2, Telgte in Westphalia.

^A
Areas Covered: Poland, Russia.

Field Stations: Weather Reporting Control Station 1, through Station W-21, assumed control over Weather Research Stations Wo-Paradies at Meseritz, Eastern Pomerania, and Wo-Koschuetz at Schneidmühl and installed Station Wo-Schlochau, Eastern Pomerania.

d. 1939: The Reporting Areas of Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-1. For operations this unit was assigned

13 under Branch 3 (Cryptographic), Office of the Air Ministry Chief Signal Officer, and under the First Air Fleet Intelligence Officer,⁺ Colonel Dr. Dr. Seidel, later Colonel Kuehne. Its reporting area included the entire east, in cooperation with the weather stations committed in the zones of the First Air Fleet and of Air Force Command Eastern Prussia, Stations W-16, Koppelsbude; W-21, Deutsch-Krone; and W-11, Breslau.⁺⁺ During peace the weather stations were not assigned directly under the control stations. Control Station W-Leit 1 also established contact with the weather reporting control station of the Fourth Air Fleet, Station W-Leit-4, Wien, in premises at Vienna 50, No. 13 Schwarzenbergplatz, and the stations it controlled, Stations W-14, Wien-Hirschstetten and Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest-Mátyásföld for the interchange of important intercept reports. For further details on missions, organization and operations of a weather reporting control station and of a weather station the reader is referred to Chapter 9.

e. 1939: Mobile Intercept Units in Zones of First Air Fleet and Air Force Command Eastern Prussia. The following motorized radio and intercept companies were within the two zones at the points indicated:

(1) 2d Co., 1st Regiment, under the regiments I Battalion
at Bermau

6th " " " under the regiment's II Battalion
at Dresden-Klotzsche.

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(2) 6th Co., AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion, at Potsdam-Eiche

(3) 2d Co., Air Signal Training and Experimental Regiment, at Koethen, Anhalt.

For more details on the mobilization assignments of the units under (1), above, see B, I, 2a, (3), and 2b (3); and 5.

For those under (2), above, see B, I, 2b (4). The following information is offered concerning item (3), above:

The 2d (Radio and Intercept) Company of the Air Signal Training and Experimental Regiment had one motorized radio platoon, one motorized intercept platoon and 1 experimental platoon, and was assigned to the AF CINC HQ Signal Regiment in Potsdam-Eiche at mobilization. The intercept ~~company~~^{platoon} was assigned there under the regiment's 9th radio intercept company (motorized) and was later assigned to the 9th Company, 38th Regiment, under the VIII Air Corps.

Motorization of the intercept service made steady progress during the war, but the static intercept posts within the zone of interior, in the frontier areas, remained an important factor, and were also useful for DF purposes.

15

2. Mobilization and Wartime Intercept Operations against

Poland in the Zone of the First Air Fleet (Supporting Army

Group North; Results Achieved and Experience Gained.

Footnotes on p. 99: + The assignment under the air fleet intelligence officers only became really effective at mobilization.

++ For more details on Station W-11, Breslau, see Chapter on Fourth Air Fleet.

15

a. 1939: Mobilization of the Intercept Service Units of the First Air Fleet.

(1) Transfer of Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-1 from Pulsnitz to Bernau, and Occupation of Static Intercept Post Pulsnitz by the residue of 6th Company, 1st Air Signal Regiment at Mobilization. Approximately on 15 September 1939 the entire Station W-Leit-1 moved from Pulsnitz to the caserne of the I Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment at Bernau, roughly 19 miles northeast of Berlin. There it was assigned a company barracks together with outbuildings on the western edge of the caserne terrain. The intercept platoon of the 6th Company (radio and Intercept), II Battalion, (Dresden-Klotzsche), 1st Air Signal Regiment took over the Intercept Station Pulnitz, which had been expanded in July 1939 by the addition of a large prefabricated building for the intercept training of the platoon's military intercept personnel. A residual detachment of the platoon remained at the station throughout the campaign in Poland. See also under (3), below.

Control Station W-Leit-1 erected antenna installations at its new building in Bernau and was connected by telephone, teletype, and special secret teletype (G-Schreib-) channels through the Air Force exchange Riesenthal, 6 miles north of Bernau.

(2) Assignment of Station W-II, Breslau under

Control Station W-Leit-4 Wien (Vienna). As a result of the movement of German troops into Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Air District Command VIII (Silesia) with its headquarters at Breslau, was placed under the Fourth Air Fleet, with headquarters in Vienna. Station W-11 thus was taken out of the zone of the First Air Fleet, but was not assigned under Control Station W-Leit 4 and redesignated W-24 until after the campaign in Poland. At mobilization it was not placed under Control Station W-Leit-1. For more details see under Fourth Air Fleet.

The designation W-11 was reassigned to the existing Station W-16, Kobbelbude. Air Command Eastern Prussia became part of the First Air Fleet Command as a result of German occupation of the Polish Corridor.

(3) Activation of the III Battalion (Radio ~~AAA~~

Intercept), 1st Air Signal Regiment at Mobilization. At the same time as the above measures, and under mobilization conditions, the III (Radio Intercept) Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment, was activated by the creation of a battalion headquarters staff, the assignment of military personnel to reinforce Control Station W-Leit 1 and Station W-21, Deutsch-Krone, and activation of the 10th Company, 1st Air Signal Regiment as a provisional intercept unit. Station W-11,

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16 previously designated W-16, Kobbelbude, also a unit of the
 III Battalion 1st "egiment, had to be left to operate indepen-
 dently because of the separating Polish Corridor. The First
 17 Air Fleet was within the zone of Army Group North, under the
 jurisdiction of which Eastern Prussia also fell.

Personnel for the new III Battalion came from the 6th
 and 2d Radio and Intercept Companies of the II Battalion, 1st
 Air Signal "egiment (see Chapter 8, II, 4b) plus newly induc-
 ted reservists. The two companies were activated on 1 July
 and 1 October, respectively. Station W-21, Deutsch-Krone, be-
 came the 1st Platoon of the 9th Company, 1st Air Signal "egi-
 ment at mobilization, the motorized intercept platoon of the
 2d Company (a unit existing already during peace) of the 1st
 Air Signal "egiment, became that ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ company's 2d Pla-
 toon. Since Station W-11, Kobbelbude, because of the separa-
 ting Polish Corridor, could not be integrated with the other
 intercept company of the III Battalion, the 10th Company, a
 provisional 10th Company was organized, the tactical staff
 and one intercept ~~XXXX~~ ^{platoon} (motorized)/from the 6th Radio Inter-
 cept Company, ~~being~~ at Dresden-Klotzsche and Pulsnitz, respect-
 tively, being used for the purpose. Captain Benade (Reserve),
 assigned to command the new company, took over what was left
 of the 6th Company, under 1st Lieutenant Henkel after mobili-
 zation measures. For more details see B, I, 1a (2). The regi-

19 regiment's 10th Company was committed at the front from 26 August to 21 September 1939 at Glogau, in Silesia. Among its personnel, this company included 2d Lieutenants Queck and Plein, both officers of the reserve who had received training in intercept operations in the regiment's 6th Company and Station W-23. During the campaign in Poland the residual detachment of the regiment's 6th Company remained at Intercept Station Pulsnitz as a caretaking unit.

18 In practice the designations W-11 and W-23 remained in use for the two static intercept posts which had now become the first platoons of the 9th and 10 Companies of the 1st Regiment. During the campaign in France the two stations for a time regained their old status. Each gave its intercept platoon to form a new radio intercept company, and these two new motorized units, each with two motorized intercept platoons, became the 9th and 10th Companies of the 1st Regiment and were later assigned under the Third Air Fleet in France (see below). The III Battalion activated for each of the Air Signal Regiments of the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets at activation each consisted of a battalion headquarters staff heading the weather reporting control station and two radio intercept companies, in each regiment designated the 9th and 10th Company.⁺ The radio intercept companies, in turn, were organized in a command echelon, ~~which was the 1st Platoon, and~~

⁺ The III Battalion for Air Signal Regiment 4, Vienna, of the Fourth Air Fleet was activated later, in the spring of 1940.

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18 and two platoons, the 1st Platoon being a static intercept unit, the 2d Platoon being a motorized radio intercept unit. Mobilization plans provided that the peacetime chief of the Control Station was to be assigned as CO, III Radio Intercept Battalion. Actually, this occurred in only one case immediately at the outbreak of war, namely, in that of the III Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment, where Lieutenant Gottschling was assigned as CO on 1 September 1939. At Third Air Fleet the chief of Control Station W-Leit-3 remained in his old position right up to the French Campaign, until 15 March 1940, while a different staff officer was assigned as acting

19 battalion commander. Although the military superior of the station chief and of the intercept companies or intercept stations, this officer had no control authority in intercept activities, which were an exclusive responsibility of the control station chief, who in this respect was directly under the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center and the Air Fleet Intelligence Officer. In the case of the Second Air Fleet, the III Radio Intercept Battalion was only activated in October 1939, and the Control Station chief at the same time assumed command over the new battalion (see also Third and Second

Air Fleets).

+ All battalions, companies, platoons and weather stations mentioned are units of the 1st Air Signal Regiment unless otherwise stated (Note by Translator).

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(b) 1939: The Wartime Commitment of the III Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment, in First Air Fleet Zone.

(1) Battalion HQ Staff. CP. Caserne of the
+
I Battalion at Bernau.

Battalion Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Gottschling; Adjutant 2d Lieutenant Lange.

Senior Staff Officer : Captain Dr. Ristow
Staff Officer : Captain Rohne
Admin. Officials : Inspector Dittbrenner, Inspector Tolksdorf
Master Sergeant : Kuester (Hauptfeldwebel with rank designation of Stabsfeldwebel)
Personnel Clerk : Sergeant Weitzel

(2) Weather Reporting Control Station I.

CP. Caserne of I Battalion, Bernau

Station Chief : Lieutenant Colonel Gottschling

Technical Officials: Inspector Schieron, later Chief Inspector Klein, Inspector Sabien.

(3) 9th Radio Intercept Company (1st Platoon=Station W-21)

CP. : Deutsch-Krone

Company CO and CO 1st Platoon: 1st ~~KIAWIANAMI~~
~~SCHWINTZER~~ Captain Hensel

CO, 2d Platoon : 1st Lieutenant Schwintzer

Master Sergeant : Busche

Tech. Officials : Inspector Kutter, Inspector Ehrlich

As previously stated, the 9th Company was activated at mobilization and organized in a command echelon, Weather Station W-21 3 1st Platoon, and one motorized Intercept Platoon = 2d Platoon. Military personnel were assigned from the 2d Company of the I Battalion at Bernau. 1st Lieutenant Schwintzer was in command of this military reinforcing detachment, which

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20 also included a class of approximately 30 officer candidate noncommissioned officers of the 1st Air Signal Regiment. After German occupation of Bromberg, the company transferred to that town, where it initially moved into a fire brigade station and later to premises near the Bromberg airfield. The original plan had been to place the intercept station and company headquarters in an vacant cloister building in the Kujavska Road in Bromberg, but this plan was changed because of the unsatisfactory conditions for radio reception. An advance detachment of forty men under Captain Hensel reconnoitered the position on 3 September 1939 for wartime operations.

Field Stations: The field or sub-stations of the 9th Company in existence during the commitment at Deutsch-Wrone moved with the company to Bromberg. The 2d (Mtz) Intercept platoon was placed, as a new field or sub-station, on the estate of Polish Admiral von Unruh in Znin District (Warthegau).

(4) Station W-II Kobbeltade:

Chief: Captain Opitz; Inspector: Blaschey.

Field Stations: As in the past. In addition, the peacetime 6th Radio and Intercept Company, AF CINC HQ (Mtz) Battalion, under 1st Lieutenant Meyer was committed in Masuria, Eastern Prussia, to improve the coverage of Poland by Station W-11. After the Polish campaign this company was withdrawn from Eastern Prussia, reorganized as a 10th Company, and assigned under the III Battalion, 2d Air Signal Regiment at Cleve on the Dutch border. It later became the 9th Company, 32d Air Signal Regiment, with the II Air Corps in the zone of the Second Air Fleet. 1st L

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21 Lie Lieutenant Meyer assumed command of the newly formed 10th Company at Kobbelbude.

Station W-II Chain of Command.

a. Matters of Intercept activities.

1. Until German Occupation of the Polish Corridor.

- (1) Intelligence Staff Officer, AF Command, Eastern Prussia, HQ at Koenigsberg
- (2) Weather Reporting Control Station 1, Bernau
- (3) AF CINC Cryptographic Center

2. After German Occupation of the Polish Corridor.

Directly under control by Control Station W-Leit-1.

b. Tactical and Administrative.

- (1) Air Battalion 6, Koenigsberg (not a 1st Regiment unit)
- (2) from 17 October 1939 III Battalion, Bernau (on that date the station became the 10th Radio Intercept Company of the 1st Regiment.

Commanding General of AF Command Eastern Prussia was General der Flieger (Lieutenant General, AF) Wimmer; Colonel Sattler was Headquarters Signal Staff Officer.

(5) 10th Radio Intercept Company (Motorized), consisting of a command echelon and one motorized Intercept Platoon.

Command Post: State Graeditz, approximately 2 miles (3 kilometers north of Glogau, Silesia.

Commander : Captain Menade

Company Officers : 2d Lieutenant Queck, Plein

The company was returned to Pulsnitz already on 22 September 1939 and on 17 October was transferred to Eastern Prussia to improve the reporting coverage by Station W-11, its originally planned mission. The command echelon transferred

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22 Kobbelbude and the company's motorized radio intercept platoon, under Lieutenant Queck, to Lyk, in Masuria, to cover Russia. Station W-11 was now absorbed by the 10th Company, which from then on comprised: a command echelon, a 1st Platoon & Station W-11 Kobbelbude, and a 2d Platoon = the motorized intercept Platoon at Lyk.

Company Command and
Chief of Station W-11: 1st Lieutenant Meyer

CO, Mtz Intercept Platoon: 2d Lieutenant Queck
Special Missions Officer : 2d Lieutenant Plein
Technical Official : Chief Inspector Blaschy
Field Stations : As in the past.

1st Lieutenant Meyer, peacetime commander of the 6th Radio and Intercept Company, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion, and at mobilization in command of that company's intercept platoon in Masuria, when assuming command over the 10th Company at the same time became chief of Station W-11, relieving Captain Opitz for another assignment. The former company headquarters staff, under Captain Menade, was also transferred to other duties.

c. 1939: Chain of Command, Intercept Results, Experience Gained in the First Air Fleet Zone of Operations. The military chain of command resulted logically from the units being part of the 1st Air Signal Regiment. At mobilization Major Meyer, until then CO, I Battalion, Bernau, assumed command over the regiment. The primary mission of the 1st Air Signal Regiment

23 was to provide services within the home areas of the First Air Fleet zone of operations, while the newly activated 11th Air Signal Regiment was committed with the advancing troops. Lieutenant Colonel Jakoby, in command of the II Battalion in Dresden and Acting Commander of the 1st Regiment, was promoted to colonel rank on 1 September 1939 and placed in command of the newly created 11th Air Signal Regiment of the First Air Fleet. The new regiment was committed during the advance into Poland in the Bromberg, Thorn, Wloclawek, and Bialystok areas. On 29 September 1939 it paraded before Lieutenant General Kesselring, CG, First Air Fleet, in Danzig, on which occasion sixteen of its members were decorated with the Iron Cross. After this it returned victoriously back to Dresden and from 4 or 5 October 1939 on its units were employed at the Westwall, primarily at telephone construction work in the regions of Aachen, Monschau, and in the town of Kuell. For more details on the 1st Air Signal Regiment see under Campaign in Russia.

Controls in the matter of intercept activities remained as in the past: AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center and First Air Fleet Intelligence Staff Officer (Colonel Kuehne). The First Air Fleet had its command post in Henningsholm, closely east of Stettin;+ the AF CINC HQ Cryptographic Center remained at the stable premises (Marstall), New Palace, Potsdam; the AF Chief Signal Officer had his command post at Wildpark,

24 near Potsdam. After German occupation of the Polish Corridor, the First Air Fleet transferred its headquarters to Koenigsberg.

The necessity had been realized long before the war to provide a special Air Force communications network for the communications intercept service, but at the beginning of the war the network had not yet been provided. Owing to a shortage of cables it was not possible to furnish the special telephone and teletype (including Secret) lines urgently requested by the III Battalion, a circumstance which interfered seriously with the speedy transmission of intercept reports from the forward intercept units. These units had only very inadequate overhead wire lines, indirectly connected, which they had to share with other units. Even when a connection was established, it was practically impossible to make oneself understood over these lines. Even the reports sent by special secret teletype channels to the Cryptographic Center and to First Air Fleet Headquarters at times were seriously delayed, in spite of the direct connection which the Control Station had through the Air Force telephone exchange at Biesenthal. In most cases the Air Force lines were overloaded, and use of the sea cable to Eastern Prussia to communicate with Station W-11 proved even worse, since here also connections were by no means satisfactory. In view of the unique position of

25 Eastern Prussia, some excuse can, however, be found for these unsatisfactory communications.

Even during peace the radio communications traffic of the Polish air forces had proved remarkably insignificant. Since these air forces were destroyed on the ground at their bases immediately at the beginning of the campaign, their war-time radio communications became even less voluminous and finally ceased altogether. The intercept coverage provided by Control Station W-Leit-1 in Tarnau was amply sufficient to secure ~~provide~~ a reliable picture of the condition and situation of Polish air power and post the superior headquarters accordingly. For more information on this point the reader is referred to what is said in Chapter 10, B, I, 4b, 5b, and c.

3. Brief Review of the Radio Intercept Service in Fourth Air Fleet Zone of Operations up to the Beginning of the War
(See also Appendix to Chapter 10, B, I).

a. 1938: The German Air Force Takes Over the Intercept Service of the Austrian Federal Army and Commences Its Expansion. With the annexation of Austria on 13 March 1938 the German Air Force took over in its entirety the radio intercept service of the former Austrian Federal Army, and initially the service continued in its existing form. This service was controlled by the Decoding and Interpreting Center, ~~Meidlinger~~ Caserne, Vienna, under Generalmajor (Brigadier General)

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26 ~~XXXXX~~ Adametz, who was responsible directly to Branch 5, the Signal Branch, of the Federal Ministry for National Defense. Generalmajor Boehme was at the head of this branch.

The former Austrian Air Force Headquarters (Kommando der Luftstreitkräfte), under Generalmajor Loehr in Vienna, Elisabeth Street, became headquarters of the German Air Force Command Austria (Der Kommandierender General der Luftwaffe in Oesterreich). General Loehr remained in command and was promoted to the rank of major general. To handle ^{air}/signal communication matters a headquarters signal staff officer was assigned at this headquarters, the first time such an assignment was made during peace in the history of the German military forces. The officer thus assigned was not only responsible for the handling of signal matters at headquarters, as was the case with his counterpart on other staffs, but also had command authority over all air signal units assigned directly under the headquarters of which he was a staff member. The officer assigned to this post in Vienna was Lieutenant Colonel Haenschke.

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1938

In July/this headquarters moved to its new premises at 13 Schwarzenbergplatz, in what was called the Guttman Palace. At the same time it received a new designation as Air Force Command Ostmark. The Decoding and Interpreting Center under General Adametz, retaining its responsibilities, was

27 became a sub-section of the staff of the Signal Staff Officer and moved from the Weidlinger Caserne to No. 13, Schwarzenbergerplatz.

From then on all intercept reports went to Air Force Command Ostmark instead of to Branch 5 of the Federal Ministry for National Defense, as they had done in the past. At the same time these reports went to the German Reich Air Ministry.

28 Another change introduced a little later was the redesignation of the Decoding and Interpreting Center as Weather Reporting Control Station, AF Command Ostmark. In spite of this it remained a staff sub-section and was not an intercept station in the sense of the weather stations created in the zones of the other air fleets from June 1939 on. Its integration with the AF Command Ostmark Headquarters staff enabled it to cooperate with the Intelligence Division of that command, which later became the Fourth Air Fleet, already during peace; this direct cooperation of control stations with air fleets ~~which~~ under the set-up in Germany proper only developed logically at the beginning of the war.

In the past the Decoding and Interpreting Center had operated two field stations for radio reception, one in Klosterneuburg ~~Klosterneuburg~~ and one in Graz. They were each operated by a radio company and were required to cover Italy, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. These receiving stations had no interpreting elements, and all intercepted material was decoded

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28 and interpreted at the Decoding and Interpreting Center in
Vienna. Considering the small staff employed in intercept
activities and the simplicity of the receiving sets used,
the results obtained were astoundingly good. With great
foresight and a proper appreciation of the existing circum-
stances, Lieutenant Colonel Haenschke, as Signal Staff Officer
of Air Force Headquarters Ostmark allowed the Austrian in-
tercept services to continued operating as in the past for
29 some time and only gradually adapted them to the German pat-
tern. In this way he secured willing and devoted cooperation
with the intercept personnel taken over and avoided the fail-
ures experienced in some other quarters in spite of the ini-
tial enthusiasm of the Austrian personnel.

These two companies in Klosterneuburg and Graz were
taken over as cadres in the newly created 2d Radio and Inter-
cept Company of the newly established (German) Air Signal
Battalion 18, Meidlinger Caserne, Vienna, under Captain Frei-
herr von Camerlander, who until then had commanded the Radio
Telegraphy Company in Graz. Second Lieutenant Meyer, who had
been in the same company at Graz, and 2d Lieutenant Frenzel
were assigned as company officers. The new company trans-
ferred to Wien-Gross Enzersdorf in the summer of 1938. The
receiving station at Klosterneuburg, covering Czechoslovakia,
was moved to Wien-Hirschstetten and there for a time served

29 merely as an intercept operating post of the new company. The receiving station at Graz intended to cover Italy was closed down and its personnel consolidated with the staff at Hirschstetten, since intercept operations against Italy were not considered important and receiving conditions for operations against Yugoslavia were not favorable. The station at Hirschstetten was now designated Weather Station W-Hirschstetten, and its chief was simultaneously CO, 2d Company, Air Signal Battalion 18, Captain Freiherr von Camerlander.

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The CO, Air Signal Battalion 18, Meidlinger Caserne, Vienna, was the Signal Staff Officer, Air Force Headquarters in Austria, namely, Lieutenant Colonel Haenschke, whose adjutant was 2d Lieutenant Koerner. The battalion had three companies:

- 1st (Telephone and Teletype) Company
- 2d (Radio Operating and Radio Intercept) Company
- 3d. (Air Traffic Control) Company.

In the autumn of 1938 the headquarters and one company of Air Signal Battalion 18 moved to a new barracks camp at St. Georgenberg in Mauer, southwest of Vienna; its other two companies moved to Gross Enzersdorf, east of Vienna, to a caserne newly built by the former Austrian Army.

In the meanwhile the Air District Command HQ Signal Battalion 17 had also been activated at the Meidlinger Caserne, where it remained quartered for the time being, under Major

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Schleich, whose adjutant was 2d Lieutenant Jochmann.

(1) Weather Reporting Control Station (Decoding and Interpreting Section) AF Command Ostmark HQ, Vienna 50, Schwarzenbergplatz 13.

Chief: Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Johann Adametz

Tech. Sig Inspector: Oetlbauer

Controlled by: a. as HQ staff section by the Intelligence Officer, AF Command Ostmark

b. in matters of intercept activities by the Intelligence Officer, AF Command Ostmark and by the Cryptographic Center, Reich Air Ministry.

(2) Weather Station Wien-Hirschstetten.

Chief : Captain Freiherr von Camerlander, formerly chief of the Cryptographic Center in the Air Ministry; transferred to Weather Station Hirschstetten and there after about four weeks became chief. He was succeeded in November 1938 by 2d Lt. Meyer, formerly in 2d Company, Air Signal Battalion 18. 2d Lieutenant Immisch became chief of Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest-Mátyásfoeld.

Tec Sig Inspector: In succession Oetlbauer, Querfurt, and Becker. For more details on Oetlbauer see under (1) above.

Areas Covered : Poland, Russia, Balkans, Italy; initially, Czechoslovakia was also covered.

Field Stations : The following were at least in the initial stages of establishment as early as in July 1938:

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- (1) Poisdorf, 31 miles (52 kilometers) north of Vienna at the Czechoslovak border
- (2) Halbturn, approximately 4 miles (7 kilometers) southeast of Neusiedl am See.

Controlled by: (a) in matters of intercept activities by the Decoding and Interpreting Section (General Adametz), Signal Staff Officer, AF Command HQ, Vienna, later by Cryptographic Center, Reich Air Ministry.

(b) tactically and administratively by 2d Company (Radio Operating and Radio Intercept), Air Signal Battalion 18, and later directly by the battalion.

(3) Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest-Mátyasfoeld. Plans for Operation Stephan, in September 1938, which envisaged close cooperation between the Hungarian air units and AF C AF Command Ostmark, provided among other things for the commitment of intercept personnel of the German Air Force in Hungary. For this purpose Captain Morgenstern (GSC) was attached to the German Air Attaché in Budapest, Lieutenant Colonel Fuetterer, to handle air signal matters. Captain Morgenstern established and took control of the Special Purposes Weather Station at the Budapest-Mátyasfoeld airfield. Transfer of the staff organized at Wien-Hirschstetten in a strength of between 80-100 for intercept activities took place on 8 October 1938, the military personnel wearing civilian clothes.

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Chief : From September 1939 Captain Morgenstern;
from November 1938 Major Immisch, previously
at Weather Station Hirschstetten.

See Sig Inspector: Luedtke

Areas Covered : Poland, Russia, Balkans.

Field Stations : (1) Nyiregyháza, between Tokaj and Debreczen, North Hungary. Operated from mid-October 1938 to early February 1939. This was a large receiving station, with DF instruments, and with advanced operating posts at Máramaros-Sziget, ~~100X~~ 104 miles east, and at Szolyva-Nagy-Bistra, 117 miles northeast of Nyiregyháza.

Chief: Senior Officer Candidate NCO Harold, promoted to 2d Lieutenant and transferred to another post in February 1939.

- (2) Szegedin (Szeged), in Eastern Hungary
- (3) Pápa, 27 miles south of Raab, Western Hungary, in operation from October-December 1938.

Controlled by : (a) in matters of intercept activities by the Decoding and Interpreting Section (General Adametz), Signal Staff Officer AF Command Ostmark HQ.
(b) territorially by the Air Attaché at the German Embassy, Budapest
(c) tactically and administratively by Air Signal Battalion 18, Vienna.

Reporting Channels: Exclusively through Signal Staff Officer, AF HQ, Vienna, who maintained a direct motor courier service

34 between Vienna and Budapest. A special line was also available for telephone and teletype communications between Vienna and the Air Attaché in Budapest.

b. 1939: Further Development. On 16 March 1939, the day on which German forces entered Czechoslovakia, AF Command Ostmark became HQ, Fourth Air Fleet, and the commanding General, Generalleutnant (Major General) Loehr was promoted to the rank of General der Flieger (Lieutenant General); Lieutenant Colonel Haenschke, the Staff Signal Officer, had been promoted to the rank of Colonel on 1 March. On 1 April he handed over to Major Schroeder command of the Air Signal Battalion 18, which now became the I Battalion, 4th Air Signal Regiment.

Besides Air District Command XVII, Vienna, which had been established in July 1938 under AF Command Ostmark, the Fourth Air Fleet was now also assigned Air District Command VIII, Breslau, which turned over the western part of its past command area to Air District Command IV, Dresden, and instead assumed control over the entire territory of Bohemia. Air District HQ Signal Battalion 8, Breslau was organic to Air District Command VIII, and was stationed in Breslau, Schoengarten.

On 1 June 1939 orders were issued to activate Air Fleet HQ Air Signal Regiment 4, which was organized as follows:

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HQ. Air Signal Regiment 4, at Wien-Mauer

CO: Major Loewe

Adjutant: 1st Lieutenant Berlin

4th (HQ) Company (already activated on 1 April 1939),
at Wien-Mauer

I Battalion (the former Air Signal Battalion 18 (under which see)

CO: Major Schroeder, deceased 1 May 1939
from 1 May 1939 Captain Goebel-Henscholek

II Battalion at Reichenbach, Lower Silesia.

In addition Air Fleet Signal School 4, Budweis, was activated for the Fourth Air Fleet.

Reporting

The Weather/Control Station, HQ AF Command Ostmark in March 1939 became Fourth Air Fleet HQ Weather Reporting Control Station 4 and for the time being remained a section of the staff of of Colonel Haenschke, Signal Staff Officer, Fourth Air Fleet. It was only at the establishment of Air Signal Regiment 4 on 1 June 1939 that this station became an independently operating unit; however, it remained at Wien-Schwarzenberplatz. In Fourth Air Fleet Command zone a weather reporting control station was thus established on the same pattern and on the same date as was the case with the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets within Germany proper.

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Pursuant to an agreement reached with Slovakia in March 1939, which was similar to that reached with Hungary concerning

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cooperation in AF matters, a small staff under Colonel Schwarz to handle affairs of the Air Signal Corps joined the German AF Attaché in Pressburg, Slovakia. Intercept Platoon Herold of the AF CINC HQ Regiment was held available for intercept operations in Slovakia.

Under peacetime conditions in 1939 the radio intercept services in the zone of the Fourth Air Fleet were thus organized as follows:

- (1) Weather Reporting Control Station 4, Vienna, Schwarzenbergplatz 13.

CO : Generalmajor Adametz
 Tec Sig Inspector: Querfurt, Marchl.

Missions and Controls. Even after its designation as Weather Reporting Control Station 4 this station for some time was not reorganized as an intercept station, as was a basic requirement in the activation of the control stations in the zones of the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets.

With proper regard to its development, the station remained with the Staff Signal Officer at Schwarzenbergplatz, Vienna. It had no receiving installations and had a smaller staff and remained the "Decoding and Interpreting Station" of the other weather stations and later of Intercept Platoon Herold under the Fourth Air Fleet and under control in intercept matters of the Cryptographic Center of the Reich Air Ministry.

- (2) Station W-14, Wien-Hirschstetten.

CO : from 1 February 1939 on, 1st Lieutenant Oeljeschlaeger of the intercept platoon of 2d Company, Air Signal Training and Experimental Regiment, Koethen, who was transferred to the 2d (Radio

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Operating and Radio Intercept) Company, I Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4. 2d Lieutenant Meyer was transferred to the 6th (Radio Intercept) Company, AF CINC HQ Signal Battalion, Potsdam-Eiche.

Tec. Sig. Inspector: Becker, replaced by N. Letsch when he was transferred as Personnel Officer to the Cryptographic Center of the Air Ministry.

Field Stations:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| (1) Station Wo-(Weather Research)-114, Halbthurn/Burgenland | } with intercept and DF teams |
| (2) Station Wo-314 Pörsdorf/Lower Austria | |
| (3) Station Wo-214 Fehring/Styria | |
| (4) Another weather research station, with one intercept team, was committed in Liezen on the Enns, Styria, in October 1939 and the air signal agencies at the Wels and Wiener-Neustadt air bases were also assigned missions supporting the intercept services. Two or three intercept operators from Station W-14 were temporarily attached to each of these to train radio operators for the purpose. However, these three points had only a supporting value. | |

Controlled by: as stated previously, above.

(3) Special Purpose Weather Station Budapest-Mátyásföld.

CO : from March 1939 on, Major Eick, until then at Station W-11, Breslau. Major Immisch returned to his post in the Office of the AF Chief Signal Officer.

Tec Sig Inspector: Luedtke

Field Stations : Nyiregyháza post was transferred to Debreczen early in February 1939.

2d Lieutenant Scheel was assigned as chief at Debreczen, re

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at Debreczen, replacing 2d Lieutenant Herold, who was transferred to the Air Signal Training and Experimental Regiment, Koethen to take over the Radio Intercept Platoon of the 2d Radio Operating and Radio Intercept Company. The forward operating post at Sziget remained, headed by a sergeant. Otherwise there were no changes from the set up previously described.

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(4) Intercept Platoon "Herold," Zipser-Neudorf/Slovakia.

The AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment organized Intercept Platoon Herold for operations in Slovakia. Initially the platoon had been intended for operations in Esthonia, but was then transferred to Vienna and brought up to strength with personnel from the area of Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-4, taken particularly from Station W-14. Adaptation for operations in Slovakia and negotiations with the Slovakian Government took up some time and delayed the commencement of operations. For this reason the first elements of the platoon only arrived at Zipser-Neudorf in July, the bulk of personnel a month later.

Chief : 2d Lieutenant Herold, from the 2d Company, Air Signal Training and Experimental Regiment, Koethen, and later transferred to the AF CINC HQ Air Signal Battalion or Regiment, Potsdam. The platoon was designated after Lieutenant Herold (see 3 a,(3), 3 b,(3), above.

Centre etc.: Similar to the pattern of the Special Purposes Weather Station at Budapest, explained above.

4. Mobilization and Wartime Operations of the Intercept Services against Poland in Fourth Air Fleet Zone (Army Group South); results and Experience (See also Appendix to Chapter 10, B I.).

a. Mobilization and Intercept Operations. The command staff of the Fourth Air Fleet moved into its Command Post in Reichenbach, Lower Silesia, in the permanent type barracks camp of the II Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4 constructed there. At mobilization the Fourth Air Fleet was assigned the 2d Air Division, under General Loerzer, the Special Purposes Air Command under Generalmajor (Brigadier General) von Richthofen, and Special Purposes Air District Commands 8, 13, and 17.

In each air fleet the headquarters signal staff officer was given the status of a divisional commander. Colonel Maenschke remained with the Fourth Air Fleet as signal staff officer.

In each air district command the staff signal officer was given the status of a brigade commander. The officers involved under the Fourth Air Fleet were

Air District Command VIII, Breslau: Major Thoenissen
 " " " XVII, Vienna: Lieutenant Colonel Afheldt.

The air fleet's Special Purposes Air District Commands were

40 also assigned signal staff officers with the same status,
as follows:

Special Purposes Air District Command 8:	Colonel Aschen-
	brenner
" " " " "	13: Lieutenant Colonel
	Klemme
" " " " "	17: Lieutenant Colonel
	Saul, later Major Arlt.

41 The mobilization table of organization of Air Signal
Regiment 4 was as follows:

Headquarters with an Equipment Company

I Battalion (Operating)
II " (Construction)
III " (Radio Intercept)
IV " (Air Traffic Control)

Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-4
7th (Ntz) Radio Intercept Company
Intercept Platoon Herold
Weather Station W-14
Special Purposes Weather Station.

As a mobilization measure the air district command HQ
signal battalions were expanded to regiments organized in
three Battalions:

I (Signal) Battalion, II (Aircraft Reporting) Battalion
III (Replacement) Battalion.

At mobilization the regimental commanders for some time
remained the signal staff officers of the individual air dis-
trict commands, a circumstance which was only changed later.

However, the organization provided for in mobilization

41 plans was disrupted right at the beginning of the Polish campaign to a considerable extent by the temporary assignment of whole companies and of battalion headquarters staffs to the air divisions and special purposes air district commands.

a2. Intercept Services.

(1) Intercept units (motorized)

(1) HQ, III Radio Intercept Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4 (Mtz): Stationed at Vienna-Mauer, with an advanced command post at Fourth Air Fleet Command Post in Reichenbach, Lower Silesia. This headquarters staff was activated at mobilization.

Battalion Commander: General Adametz, simultaneously Chief, Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-4.

Senior Staff Major : Major Klitzsch

Adjutant : Lieutenant Colonel Berger.

(2) The 7th Radio Intercept Company, of ~~the~~ Signal Regiment 4 (Mtz) operated together with Station W-11, Breslau, initially in Silesia and later in Czyżny, at the eastern exit from Krakau.

Company Commander: Captain Freiherr von Camerlander, replaced on 6 November 1939 by Lieutenant Colonel Oeljeschlaeger, whose post he took over as chief of Station W-14, Vienna.

The 2d (Radio Operating and Radio Intercept) Company,

42 commanded by Captain Freiherr von Camerlander and a units of Air Signal Regiment 4, was divided at mobilization to form the 6th (radio) and the 7th (Radio Intercept) Companies. The latter company comprised only a headquarters section with a receiving platoon and interpretation elements. After the company personnel had been orientated in intercept operations at Station W-14 in Hirschstetten, the 7th Company was not employed as a independently operating unit in the field but was used to reinforce Station W-11, Breslau, and that station's weather research stations.

43 Station W-11 had committed its weather research stations Wo-111 and Wo-211 Frankenberg and Kreuzberg, respectively, as its field sub-stations in Upper Silesia. From there the 7th Company was to cooperate with Station W-11 (CO:Major Babel; Tec Air Inspector Besser) in Breslau.

Station W-11 was not assigned under the company during the campaign in Poland. It was only after the Polish campaign, when Major Babel was transferred and Station W-11 became Station W-24 of the Fourth Air Fleet that this station, now under 2d Lieutenant Kuschel and Technical Signal Inspector Luedtke (Inspector Besser also having been transferred to the Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest in the meanwhile) was incorporated with the 7th Company, Air Signal Regiment 4. Major Babel took command of the III Radio Intercept Battalion,

43 Air Signal Regiment 1 at Ternau.

Although within the zone of Air District Command VIII, assigned under the Fourth Air Fleet, Vienna, from 16 March 1939 on, Station W-11 had not during the campaign in Poland been assigned under the III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4 and thereby under Control Station W-Leit-4, Vienna. It had also not been assigned under the III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 1 of the First Air Fleet, in the zone of which it had formerly been. As previously mentioned it was only assigned under the Fourth Air Fleet after the Polish campaign.

Not being assigned under Control Station W-Leit-4, Station W-11 prior to the war reported directly to the Cryptographic Center of the Reich Air Ministry, as did all weather stations of the First, Second, and Third Air Fleets. Since it was also not assigned under Control Station W-Leit-4, or under the III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4 during the Polish campaign, it continued to report directly to the Cryptographic Center, now under the CINC, Air Force. In view of its cooperation with the 7th Company, Air Signal Regiment 4 and in view of the circumstance of war, however, its ~~reports~~ intercept reports must also have reached Control Station W-Leit-4 and the Intelligence Officer of the Fourth Air Fleet.

On 6 November 1939 1st Lieutenant Oeljeschlaeger took command of the company, which was stationed at Czyżny, near

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Krakau⁺, after the German advance into Poland. Later, when the regiments 10th Company was expanded, ~~THESE COMPANY~~ Captain Freiherr von Camerlander activated the 9th Company, also for the regiment, at Hirschstetten. See Chapter 10, B, V, 4

4a, a (1) and a (2).

Field Stations:

- (1) Weather Research Station Wo-1, Tarnow
- (2) " " " Wo-2, Radom
- (3) " " " Wo-3, Kielce

The above weather research stations had DF and receiver instruments. Radio communications were maintained with the company as well as DF command communications.

(3) Intercept Platoon Herold (Lt); Committed in Zipser-Neudorf, Slovakia, and later in Humenée, Eastern Slovakia and Krakau.

CO : 2d Lieutenant Herold.

This intercept platoon, which had commenced operations at Zipser-Neudorf, Slovakia, one month prior to the outbreak of war, displaced at the beginning of the war to Humenée in Eastern Slovakia, and from there moved later into Galicia, where it operated at Krakau. Communications were maintained with Station W-Leit in Vienna by ~~WIRE RADIO AND WIRE~~ wire and with the Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest by radio.

At the conclusion of its mission after the campaign in Poland + The company HQ echelon was in Czyżyny with a receiver platoon and an interpreting section.

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the platoon returned to Vienna. There it ~~RECEIVED PERSONNEL~~ returned the personnel it had received from the Fourth Air Fleet and also returned the civilian processing and translating personnel to Control Station W-Leit-4. The remnant together with Lieutenant Herold returned to the AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment at Potsdam-Eiche and was there used as the cadre for a new intercept company, which was assigned to the VIII Air Corps.

a2.(2). Static Intercept Units (Weather Stations).

(1) Control Station W-Leit-4, Vienna.

CO : Generalmajor Adametz

Officer Personnel: Major Janowski (ret. on recall status)

Captain Richter (Reserve)

Captain Partilla (Reserve).

Technical Signal Officials: Querfurt, Wirth, Marche.

Missions and Chains of Command: Weather Reporting Control

Station W-Leit-4 was created prior to the war to replace the former Austrian "Decoding and Interpreting Center" and continued in this role. Already during peace all weather stations had to report to it. In Germany proper a similar system was only introduced when a III Battalion (Radio Intercept) was activated for the air signal regiment of each air fleet in accordance with mobilization plans, so that no change in the reporting procedure was necessary in Austria, namely, in the case of Control Station W-Leit-4. Also the coopera-

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46 cooperation of the intercept stations, or weather stations as they were still designated for deceptive purposes, with the individual air fleet intelligence officers ordered in Germany proper was already an established fact in Austria since Control Station W-Leit-4 was at the same time a section of the staff of the Fourth Air Fleet Intelligence Officer. In other respects, also, mobilization required few changes in Control Station W-Leit-4. General Adametz continued as Station Chief and also assumed command over the III Radio Intercept Battalion activated in accordance with mobilization plans. Control Station W-Leit-4 now became part of this intercept battalion, 47 but remained in its premises at Schwarzenbergplatz. After the campaign in Poland it was assigned Station W-11 (redesignated Station W-24) . Initially this station still remained part of the 7th Company, Air Signal Regiment 4, but later was taken out of that company and assigned directly under the control station in intercept matters. Expansion of Control Station W-Leit-4 to form an independently operating intercept unit only took place as part of the preparations for the campaigns in the Balkans and in Russia. See also Chapter 11, B, III and B, V, 4 a, a 1, and a 2.

(2) Station W-14 Wien-Hirschstetten.

CO : 1st Lieutenant Oeljeschlaeger, later
CO, 7th Company, Air Signal Regiment
4. He was probably followed by Captain

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Freiherr von Camerlaender, who until then had commanded the 7th Company.

Technical Sig Inspector: Letsch

Otherwise no changes occurred.

(3) Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest-Mátyás-
Föld.

CO : Major Eick. On 10 January Major Eick was transferred to the III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 4 at Vienna and replaced by Captain Dr. Ristow, until then in command of the 9th Radio Intercept Company, Air Signal Regiment 1, Bromberg.

Deputy CO: Captain Richter (Reserve), later at Control Station W-Leit-4.

Tec Sig Inspector: Luedtke, transferred to Station W-11, Breslau after the campaign in Poland and replaced by Besser, from Station W-11, Breslau.

Field Stations: A new weather research station was established in the Carpathian Mountains, in the Huszt area, 33 miles northwest of Mármaros-Sziget or Berecgyas near Munkács.

Other wise no changes.

b. Results and Experience in the Polish Campaign in
Fourth Air Fleet Zone. (See also Chapter II, B I, 5).

Control Station W-Leit-4 and its two weather stations remained in their permanent rearward peacetime premises. The weather stations had excellently developed receiver and DF installations, and the same applied to their weather research stations. The fact that they remained in their peacetime rearward locations insured to Control Station W-Leit-4, its

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weather stations, and their weather research stations secure wire communications, so that the transmission of reports to Control Station W-Leit-4 and from there to Fourth Air Fleet Headquarters at Headquarters as well as to the Cryptographic Center at Headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force functioned satisfactorily.

The intercept and interpreting personnel of the static intercept stations were thoroughly trained and were able, in spite of the very small and within a short time almost non-existent volume of radio traffic by the Polish air forces, to maintain an uninterrupted picture of developments at the front.

The motorized intercept units were not able to achieve results equal to those of the static branch of the service. A large percentage of their personnel were only assigned at mobilization and had not yet the thorough training in intercept operations which the personnel of the static weather stations had after their long training. Furthermore, their communications facilities for the transmission of reports showed serious defects because of the frequent displacements of the units in following the German advance and because the wire communication networks in the front areas were by no means satisfactory.

Performances of the 7th Company, Air Signal Regiment 4

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suffered during the campaign from the fact that the planned cooperation did not function with the Station W-11, Breslau, which station itself performed admirably, from the inadequacy of the Polish air forces radio communications, and because of the short duration of the campaign, which did not afford an opportunity for proper integration of the newly assigned personnel and their proper familiarization with intercept activities. The operations of this company only began to produce results when the fighting was over and the work began of intercepting Russian radio communications with the great possibilities the Russian radio traffic offered.

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The results achieved by Intercept Platoon Herold were insignificant as far as the Polish air forces were concerned but satisfactory in the matter of Polish army voice radio communications. The operations of the platoon did not produce results on the expected scale. The reasons were: the fact that in this isolated region which was so underdeveloped in the field of technical signal communications as was to be expected in Slovakia with its mountain passes in the Carpathians to Galicia, the wire communications to the rearward reporting centers were necessarily inadequate; the fact that radio communications could not be used satisfactorily to replace the lacking wire communications; the rapid pace of the German advance; and the short duration of the campaign which allowed

50 no time for any improvement of the existing communications and familiarization of the personnel with the radio communication idiosyncracies of the enemy.

5. Comments on the Findings of the Historical Branch of German Air Force General Staff concerning the Intercept Services in the Zones of First and Fourth Air Fleets during the Polish Campaign. Supplementary to the information on intercept results given in Chapter 11, B I, 2c and 4b.

During World War II the German Air Force Historical Branch published a number of volumes on the history of Air Warfare, among them Volume 4: "Operations of the Air Signal Corps in Air Warfare against Poland (Der Einsatz der Luftnachrichtentruppe im Luftkriege gegen Polen)" compiled by 51 1st Lieutenant Gruetzl. That study has been used as a contribution by Karl Klee in the Military Science Journal (Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau) Volume 2/1954. This fact makes it possible to examine the statements in the study concerning the operations and achievements of the intercept services and at the same time to add to what has been said so far concerning the intercept services in the zones of the First and Fourth Air Fleets.

a. Intercept Operations.

al. Operations under Air Signal Regiment I, of the First Air Fleet. In the Historical Branch study the intercept units of the Signal Regiment 1 listed are as follows:

51 "the III Battalion (Radio Intercept), Air Signal Regiment 1 comprising the 9th (Mtz) Radio Intercept Company and the 10th (Mtz) Radio Intercept Company." Mention is thus lacking of of the intercept control station of the First Air Fleet, the Weather Reporting Control Station W-Leit-1, transferred at mobilization from Pulsnitz to Wernau, of the III Battalion, activated at mobilization. Also not listed is Station W-23, Deutsch-Krone, which was organic to the regiments 9th Company and was transferred to ~~ILAXXXXI~~ Bromberg after German troops occupied that town. The 9th Company was not motorized, as stated in the study but only partly motorized, since it consisted only of one motorized intercept platoon while its other platoon was represented by Station W-21, the static intercept station at Deutsch-Krone and later at Bromberg.

52 Furthermore, Station W-11 was assigned under Control Station W-Leit-1 in matters of intercept activities (see below).

a2. Intercept Operations in the Zone of Air Force

Command Eastern Prussia. According to the Historical Branch study the entire intercept services commitment consisted of Station "W-11 Kobbelbude" alone. However, after capture of the Polish Corridor area by German troops, that station was reinforced ^{by} a motorized intercept platoon, assigned under Control Station W-Leit-1 for intercept operations from the

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10th Radio Intercept Company, AF CINC HQ Air Signal Regiment (formerly the 6th Radio Intercept Company, AF CINC HQ Signal Battalion), which company was returned to its parent regiment at the end of the Polish campaign, whereupon the 10th Radio Intercept Company (Mtz), Air Signal Regiment 1, comprising only headquarters elements, 1 motorized intercept platoon, and processing elements, and which had been transferred to Eastern Prussia, was incorporated with Station W-11. That station was from then on designated 10th Radio Intercept Company, Air Signal Regiment 1 and, as ~~was~~ ^{was} the case with the 9th Company, now consisted of a headquarters section, Station W-11 as its 1st Intercept Platoon, and a second motorized intercept platoon. With this measure Station W-11 was integrated with the III Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 1, whereas in the past it had only been assigned under that battalion in matters of intercept activities.

a3. Intercept Operations in the Zone of Air Signal Regiment, 4, Fourth Air Fleet. In the Historical Branch study the following intercept units of this regiment are listed: III Radio Intercept Battalion, Control Station W-Leit-4, Special Purposes Weather Station, and Intercept Platoon Herold. The following remains to be said here: Even during peace the following static intercept stations were already in existence: Station W-14, Vienna and Special Purposes

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53 Weather Station Budapest. At mobilization the following units were activated: Intercept Platoon Herold (motorized) as a special intercept detachment of Control Station W-Leit-4, and the 7th (Mtz) Radio Intercept Company, Air Signal Regiment 4, to cooperate with Station W-11, Breslau. Since the 7th Company was committed close behind the front combat lines, these two units operated separately for the time being, but in accordance with the same directives.

b. Intercept Results. On this subject the Historical Branch study states as follows:

(1) as early as in July/August 1939 the major share in the mission of intercept operations against Poland was assigned to the intercept units of the First Air Fleet, Berlin.

The following information is offered to supplement that statement:

In the northern segment of the area to be kept under radio intercept observation Station W-11, Breslau and Station W-16 Kobbelbude were committed besides the intercept units of the First Air Fleet, namely, Control Station W-Leit-1 Pulsnitz (transferred at mobilization to Bernau) and Station W-21 Deutsch-Krone, to cover Poland.

Station W-16 was under Air Force Command Eastern Prussia; Station W-11, Breslau until 13 March 1939 had been under the First Air Fleet, but when Air District Command VIII, Breslau,

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was excluded from the First Air Fleet Command, Station W-11 on the same date came under the Fourth Air Fleet. However, neither before the war nor at mobilization was it placed under Control Station W-Leit-4 of the Fourth Air Fleet in matters of intercept operations, nor was it at any time placed under Control Station W-Leit-1, of the First Air Fleet in matters of intercept operations. It was assigned under the III Battalion (Radio Intercept), Air Signal Regiment 4, and thereby under Control Station W-Leit-4, only after the campaign in Poland and then as Station W-24. Station W-16, Kobelbude, was assigned under the III Radio Intercept Battalion, Air Signal Regiment 1, and redesignated W-11 after German occupation of the Polish Corridor.

~~(X)~~ (2) Southern Poland was kept under radio intercept observation by the Fourth Air Fleet which for this purpose had radio intercept observation posts in Budapest, Szegedin, Debreczen, and Szolyva.

On the subject of this statement in the Historical Branch study, the following remains to be said:

The Fourth Air Fleet employed the following peacetime weather stations: Station W-14, Vienna, Special Purposes weather Station Budapest together with its field or weather research posts. The posts at Szegedin, Debreczen, and Szolyva were field stations of the Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest. All of these stations and posts came

54 Control Station W-Leit-4 of the Fourth Air Fleet, and were required even prior to the war to transmit their intercept reports to that control station for decoding and interpretation. Control Station W-Leit-4 had no receiver installations of its own.

(3) This commitment of an intercept ^{team} ~~ARRANGEMENT~~ in (Zipser-Neudorf) Slovakia/did not prove effective, however, because the report transmitting facilities were defective.

The unit referred to here in the Historical Branch study was not a team but Intercept Platoon Herold, committed initially at Zipser-Neudorf but transferred at the outbreak of the war to Humenée in Eastern Slovakia and then to Galicia for commitment in Krakau. The platoon maintained communications with Control Station W-Leit-4 in Vienna by wire, with the Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest by radio.

(4) A total of 54 receivers and 20 medium and short-wave DF instruments were employed against Poland

(5) On 23 August intercept observation activities were extended to include the Polish broadcasting service and on 26 August to include British, French, Italian, Czechoslovakian and Russian stations.

What is meant with the above statements in the Historical Branch study is naturally the broadcasting stations. This broad intercept mission, if it is correct must have encountered difficulties in view of the translating personnel assigned to Control Stations W-Leit-1 and 4 and their

55 sub-stations and posts, which were the units in question.
Russian and Polish communications could be intercepted by
all five weather stations of the First and Fourth Air Fleets
and of Air Force Command Eastern Prussia, as well as by Con-
56 trol Stations W-Leit-1 and 4. The agencies primarily concer-
ned with Czechoslovakian communications were Control Station
W-Leit-4 and Weather Station W-14 in Vienna, besides Special
Purposes Weather Station Budapest. Station W-11, Breslau,
may also still have had Czech translators on its staff from
its former intercept mission against Czechoslovakia. For com-
munications in the Slovakian language only Station W-14, Vienna,
and Special Purposes Weather Station Budapest were appropriate.
Station W-14 may have been able to handle Italian. Otherwise,
Italian, French and English translating personnel were avail-
able only on the staffs of the weather stations in western
and southern Germany.

(6) From 29 August on Polish radio communications increased heavily. New code names came into use. The number of coded messages increased. The sound-volume of all transmitters, and particularly of the "r" system (stationary Army air units-ground radio stations) was strongly subdued. From 30 August on Polish amateur transmitters were used for Army purposes and positions in ground-ground communications were given in a grid-map code system which initially could not be understood.

(7) Already on 1 September the stationary transmitter

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transmitters at Posen (rp) and Krakau (rk) could not be heard.

Similarly, no Polish air traffic control messages could be detected any longer. Monitoring of the Polish ground-ground radio communications repeatedly made it possible to determine the stations of Polish air units and the locality of hitherto unknown Polish airfields. In such cases the proper reports were dispatched immediately to our twin- and single-engine fighter units. On 2 September the static ground radio stations of the Polish Army air forces were no longer heard. From 6 September on all other Polish radio communications decreased considerably in volume. On 16 September there was complete radio silence.

c. Conclusions. From the account given by the Historical Branch of the results obtained by intercept operations it is evident that the operational and tactical data procured from radio communications of the Polish air forces must be considered as having been of inconsiderable value and that they could not have fulfilled expectations.

As indicated previously in B, I, above, this was due largely to the outdated structure of the Polish air forces and the resultant small volume of radio communications. It was further due to the fact that the heavy bombing of the Polish airfields immediately at the outbreak of the war put a large percentage of the Polish air forces, including the air traffic control system out of action. That communication lines for the German intercept units for a more speedy transmission of reports were lacking in some sectors

58 of some tactical headquarters was admittedly an error of omission in our preparations for mobilization in that the essential wire lines were not assigned to or constructed for the intercept service; however, this weakness was offset by the fact that the static intercept stations farther in the rear were able to intercept the same communications and report through the communication channels of the higher levels of command, even though these were at times seriously overloaded.

quite apart from the difficulties listed here, the fact remains that the singular situation in regard to radio communications on the Polish side made it impossible for the intercept services of the German Air Force, although excellently trained and highly efficient, to achieve the performances of which it was capable.