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If an enemy force after the pursuit lands on neutral terrain, combat action against it shall cease.

The acts of air warfare permitted over neutral terrain have one single objective, namely, combat action against the enemy, but not combat action against the neutral. Combat action against a neutral nation shall commence only under orders from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

Reference: Rule 2, Item I.

ACTS OF AIR WARFARE OVER NEUTRAL TERRITORIAL WATERS

Even in those cases in which military air vehicles are permitted to cross over neutral territorial waters (see Rules 5 and 6), they shall not while over such waters attack enemy aircraft. However, thay shall have the right to defend themselves if they are attacked by the enemy.

Reference: Rule 2, Item 2.

AREAS OVER WHICH ACTS OF AIR WARFARE ARE PROHIBITED BY REASON OF TREATIES ENTERED INTO BY GERMANY

Such areas and waters are:

The Aaland Islands and the Suez Canal.

Operations against the Aaland Islands and the Suez Canal are subject to approval by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Germany is not a party to the treaties concerning the Dardanelles and the Panama Canal, so that she would have a free hand to act there if Turkey and the USA should participat

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in the war.

B. AIR SOVREIGNTY DURING WAR

Reference: Rule 5.

FLIGHT OVER NEUTRAL TERRITORIAL WATERS

It is to be assumed that neutral nations will prohibit flight over their territorial waters. The territorial waters over which air vehicles are permitted to fly will be made known by the Commander In Chief of the Air Force.

Reference: Rule 6.

FLIGHT OVER THE ENTRANCES TO THE BALTIC SEA

The Little Belt will only be flown over in cases of emergency and danger, because it is so narrow in parts that violations of the territorial rights of Denmark can hardly be avoided.

In war the limitation imposed for times of peace on flight over the entrances to the Baltic Sea (amximum size of unit to be 1 squadron at one time) will be rescinded.

Reference: Rules 7-9.

CIVILIAN AIR TRAFFIC OVER GERMAN TERRITORIES

The measures stated in Rules 7-9 shall at all times be ordered by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. In the case of a traffic prohibition in terms of Rule 7, the

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conditions stated in Rule 27 will apply. In the case of a traffic prohibition imposed in terms of Rule 8, special instructions will be issued.

C. MILITARY AIR FORCES

a. Military Air Vehicles.

Reference: Rule 10, Item 2.

PERSONNEL OPERATING MILITARY AIR VEHICLES

Appendix 3--19

Officials of the military establishment naturally are also members of the military forces.

Medical officers may only fly medical air vehicles.

Reference: Rule 11.

TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN AIR VEHICLES FOUND PARTICIPATING IN ACTS OF AIR WARFARE

Enemy and neutral air vehicles commiting acts of air warfare (see explanations to Rule 1) or transporting troops will be destroyed. The crew will be tried under martial law.

Reference: Rule 14.

CONVERSION OF CIVILIAN AIR VEHICLES TO SERVE AS MILITARY AIR VEHICLES

The change of status shall only be valid if the conditions stated in Rules 10 and 12 are fulfilled. By German concepts a change of status on or over the high seas is permissible.

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b. Crews of Military Air Vehicles.

Reference: Rule 15.

SPIES

Rule 16 naturally does not apply to spies.

Reference: Rule 17.

ESCAPE BY PARACHUTE

If such persons resist capture after landing, attack against them is permissible.

D. THE MEANS OF AIR WARFARE

No Remarks.

E. AIR ATTACK

Reference: Rule 20.

MILITARILY IMPORTANT TARGETS

It is necessary to refrain with intent from enumerating the targets which may be attacked. Every target is of military importance which is of significance in the conduct of war by the enemy. Of military importance, for example, are such targets as water, gas, and electricity supply systems, food storage depots, bread factories, and refrigeration storage houses.

Reference: Rule 20.

Terrorizing attacks against the civilian population

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are contrary to international law. Nevertheless, the military situation might even make attacks of this type necessary. Orders to carry out such terrorizing attacks will be given exclusively by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. "Property without military significance....." will not be attacked anyway because such action would not serve military interests. Their mention in the Rules is only for formal reasons.

Reference: Rule 24.

TARGETS FOR ATTACK LOCATED IN DENSELY POPULATED AREAS

Targets in densely populated areas or in the immediate vicinity of objects against which air attack is prohibited (in terms of Rules 21 and 25) may only be taken under precision bombing attack.

Reference: Rule 25.

THE IDENTIFICATION MARKING OF OBJECTS AGAINST WHICH ATTACKS ARE PROHIBITED

The opponent shall make known the nature of the markings used to identify objects to be spared attack in accordance with this Rule. If any cases of abuse are determined during a war, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force will issue orders that attacks against such objects as are not entitled to protection are authorized.

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If the buildings of foreign missions are marked with identification markings, they will be spared attack. The

Appendix 3--22

residential houses of nationals of countries not participating in the war are not included under this heading, since, in contrast with the buildings of the missions, they do not have extraterritorial status.

Reference: Rule 26.

ATTACKS AGAINST TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN THE ZONES OF OPERATIONS OF THE GROUND FORCES

In the case of Army requests for air strikes against towns or villages the decision as to "whether military forces or installations of such importance are situated there, that they justify the attack....." will be a responsibility of the locally responsible army commander.

F. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST CIVILIAN AIR VEHICLES

Reference: Rule 27, Item 1.

BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ENEMY CIVILIAN AIR VEHICLES OVER GERMAN TERRITORIES OR OVER TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY GERMAN FORCES

Enemy civilian air vehicles encountered over German territory or over territories occupied by german forces will be destroyed, since the strong suspicion exists that they will be participating in the conduct of warfare.

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Item 2

AIR TRAFFIC WITH NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

The possibility exists that air traffic between neutral countries (for example the Skandinavian states) and certain parts of Germany might be reestablished subject to certain special conditions (such as specified operating altitudes, routes, and stopovers). The establishment of such air traffic will be made known by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

Reference: Rule 28, Item 2.

AIR WARNING AREAS OVER ENEMY TERRITORIES OR TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ENEMY FORCES

Practical experience in the operations in the Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia, and Memel show that it is impossible to forego such air warning areas. Our own air forces must be as precisely as possibly informed on currentl conditions in the air over the enemy.

Reference: Rule 28, Item 2.

AIR WARNING AREAS OVER ENEMY TERRITORIES OR TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ENEMY FORCES

Remark: Since the subject of air warning areas over the high seas is subject to completely different circumstances under International Law, because of the principle of

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Freedom of the Seas, no conditions concerning this subject have been included in the Rules. Behavior towards civilian

aircraft encountered over the high seas will be governed exclusively by Rule 30. If the necessity for air warning areas over the high seas should arise, the matter will be clarified by the political authorities.

Reference: Rules 29 and 30.

ACTS OF AIR WARFARE SUPPORTING THE ENEMY

Acts of air warfare in support of the enemy are as follows:

Air attack

Reconnaissance activities, including weather reconnaissance

The maintenance of contact.

Intent to Attack.

The intention to attack ships exists

When the course and operating altitude of the suspect aircraft allows the assumption that it is preparing at a great altitude for a high-level of dive-bombing attack, or is preparing at an altitude just above the surface for an air torpedo attack.

Reference: Rule 29, Item 2.

THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS BY ENEMY OR NEUTRAL CIVILIAN AIR VEHICLES

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While an enemy or neutral air vehicle is airborne it is not possible by external evidence to ascertain whether it is transporting elements of the enemy military forces. Here, one has to

depend on the radio intercept service or on reports from reliable agents. Only if such reports are available will action be taken against such aircraft.

Reference: Rule 29, Item 3.

The Intent to Carry out Reconnaissance or Contact Activities

That suspect aircraft intend to carry out reconnaissance or contact missions can be considered established if, outside of the customary air traffic routes, they follow the same course at varying distances for a considerable time as our own naval or land-based air forces are flying, or if one and the same suspect aircraft is sighted repeatedly at brief intervals (even if in varying directions).

Reference: Rule 29, Item 4.

CONVOY ESCORT BY AIRCRAFT

The condition of escort by aircraft exists when the aircraft to be escorted have the military air vehicles dispatched to protect them in sight, or if it is evident from the behavior of the military air vehicles that they operatin to protect the convoy. Air convoys escorted by enemy air

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vehicles and consisting of enemy and neutral or exclusively of neutral civilian aircraft are to be attacked.

Appendix 3--26

Air convoys escorted by neutral military air vehicles and consisting of neutral civilian air vehicles will not be attacked.

Reference: Rule 29, Item 5.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH ENEMY OR NEUTRAL AIR VEHICLES WHILE AIRBORNE

The possibilities are small at present to establish radio or wireless contact with a strange aircraft while airborne. The item is included nevertheless as a precaution against possible future developments in the field of signal communications technology.

G. THE USE OF ARMED FORCES AGAINST MERCHANT SHIPS

RECOGNITION OF TROOP TRANSPORT SHIPS

Troop transport ships when carrying troops are identifiable externally by the numerous soldiers in evidence on the decks and if the ship is not marked with the insignia of a hospital ship (painted white-green, with the Red Cross on its sides).

Reference: Rule 31, Item 4.

CONVOY ESCORT BY NAVAL SHIPS

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The condition of convoy escort by naval ships exists if the merchant ships under escort are within sight of the ships of war committed to protect them, and if it is evident from the behavior of the ships of war that they are operating to protect the convoy.

Whether it consists of enemy or neutral merchant ships a convoy under escort by neutral ships of war will be attacke (sic),

a convoy consisting of neutral ships will not be attacked.

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The basic target data sheet intended for inclusion here is not available at writing.

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LONDON AS A CENTER OF ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES

Symbol	Symbol
Aircraft factories	Iron industries
Aircraft accessories	Measuring instrument
Railroad installations	Armament industries
Warehouses	

Symbol

Ammunition factories

Explosives depots

Shipbuilding yards, docks, etc.

Optical industries

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Map of Poland

Scale 1:1 000 000

Legend

Transportation Routes	Interdiction Targets
Multi-track Railroads	Shunting yards
Single-track railroads	Rail depots (switch installations)
	Tunnel
	Dam, embankment, ditch
Motor highway	Bridge, viaduct
Road	Steep grade
	Narrow road
	Siding
Lake	Dam (Valley)
River	Weir
	Lock
Canal	Canal basin
Port	Timber)) Jetty, quay Stone)
	Swamp

Limited Air Reconnaissance

LUBLIN Population exceeds 100 000

Thorn " " 10 000

" less than 10 000

Forest area

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Heavy Industries				Military Industries	
Symbol	Mine	Symbol		Symbol	
	Mine		Aluminium		Aircraft
	Fuel Production		Lead		Engines
			Lignite		Fuselages
	Blast Furnaces		Iron, Steel		Aircraft weapons
			Potash		Other weapons
	Foundry		Coal		Ammunition
			Copper		Gunpowder and other explosives
	Cokery		Machinery		Chemicals
			Petroleum		Optical and other instruments etc.
			Mercury		
			Salt		Vehicles
	Metal works		Roller mills		Ship building yards, docks, et
			Zinc		Miscellaneous:
					Rubber,
					Leather,
					Textiles

Industrial region

Other Targets

Permanent air ports

Barracks

Radio broadcasting station

Fortified area

Field type fortofocations

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Photo

Layout of Blast Furnace Installations

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Photo

Layout of a Cement Factory, as a Target
of Military Improtance

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MINERAL OIL PROCESSING IN THE LINGEN REFINERY

Verdampferkolonne	Evaporator tower
Roboel	Crude oil
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~	
Rohrofen	Tubular oven
Verkokungsofen	Coking column or furnace
~~XXXXXXXX~~	
Krackturm	Cracking tower
Rauchgasabzug	Smoke-gas escape
Liftrohr	Elevating pipeline
Katalysator	Catalyzer
Reaktor	Reactor
Regenerierung des Katalysators	Regeneration of catalyzer
Kuehlung	Cooling System
Regenrierung	Regeneration
Rauchgas zum Heben des Katalysators	Smoke-gas to elevate catalyzer
Petrolkoks	Petroleum coke
Schornstein	~~XXXXXX~~ Smoke stack
Raktionierung	
Oeldampfe	Oil vapor
Heizoel	Heating oil
Kolonne 2	Column 2
Kolonne 3	Column 3

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Benzin Raffination	Gasolin refining
Fluessiggas und Polymerbenzin Anlage	Liquified gas and polymerization plant
Dieseloelraffinerie	Diesel oil refinery
Misch-und Verbeleiungs-anlage	Mixing and octane processing plant
Fertigprodukt	Finished product
Heizgas fuer den Betrieb	Heating gas for own use
Polybenzin	Poly-gasoline
Krackbenzin	Cracked gasoline
Fahroenzin	Motor gasoline
Propan	Propane
Butan	Butane
Fluessiggas	Liquified gas
Dieselkraftstoff	Dieselfuel oil
Verdampfer	Vaporizer
Heizoel	Heating oil
Fursurol	
Dieseloeldestillat	Destillated diesel oil

The technical drawing of the factory layout with the explanations given does not correspond in details to the photographic overall view of the factory used.

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Photo

1940

French Airfield after an Attack

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Photo

Russia

A Complete Air Unit Destroyed on the Ground

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Photo

1940

Result of a Bombing Attack to Put Take-off and Landing Area of a French Airfield out of Operation

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Photo

No caption. No text.

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Photo

Destroyed Air Force Supply Depot
at Nanterre

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Photo

The Citroen Factory, Paris

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Air Photo

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IV Air Corps

US four-engine bombers destroyed on ground at Russian Airfield Poltava by German bombers.

Units participating in German attack:

4th Bomber Wing as Pathfinders and Target Markers

53d Bomber Wing

55th Bomber Wing.

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Air Photo

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AIR FORCE DISPOSITION IN SOUTHERN UK.

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ARMY SUPPORT OPERATIONS OVER THE FIELD

OF BATTLE

CHAINS OF COMMAND AND COMMAND CHANNELS

(Outbreak of War to 1942)



Legend.

——— ~~Conferences and requests~~ Orders

------- Conferences and requests

1. Tele-and radio communications, liaison planes, motor vehicles

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AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR THE ARMY ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE
CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COMMAND CHANNELS
1941-1942



1. Issued directives to air fleets for conduct of air operations
2. Allocated forces and assigned missions to air or antiaircraft artillery corps or divisions . Contact maintained (see Footnote 3, below).
3. Contact maintained by teletype, telephone, radio, aircraft, and surface motor vehicles
4. If no tactical support headquarters, the air corps or air division issued orders directly to the tactical units.
5. Army forces not currently being supported by air units channeled their requests for air support through AF channels to their superior army headquarte

---------- Required to cooperate

———————— Directives and orders

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EXAMPLE OF AIR SUPPORT FOR ARMY OPERATIONS

Situation. Agreement between Army Group A and First Air Fleet is that main emphasis in air support will be in south flank area of Fourth Army.

Fourth Army has requested II Air Corps to support III Panzer Corps; III Panzer attacked at daybreak. Its 6th Panzer Division has made good progress on the right, but its 5th Panzer Division, on the left, has been halted by heavy antitank gunfire.

0810 5th Panzer Division through its attached Air Signal Liaison Detachment requests from II Air Corps a strike against antitank gun positions north of (15) /the request could be made by radio or telephone/. Air Signal Liaison Detachment at III Panzer Corps monitors request message.

0820 Warning order by II Air Corps to 44th Ground Attack Group and 22d Fighter Group: "Strike against heavy antitank gun positions north of (15) at approximately 1000 hours."

0830 II Air Corps order to 44th Ground Attack Group and 22d Fighter Group:

"Attack by 5th Panzer Division halted immediatel north of (15) by fire from heavy antitank guns.

"44th Ground Attack Group will attack antitank

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0830--Cont.

gun positions . Attacking units to be over target at 1015 hours.

22d Fighter Group will provide escort protection and will then neutralize enemy air forces over III Panzer Corps zone.

5th Panzer Division will renew attack in direction of (16) at 1020 hours. From 1010 on colored marking ammunition will be placed on target.

Appendix 21--2

Ground-attack directing team will take over 44th Ground Attack Group during approach route.

0850 <u>II Air Corps to 5th Panzer Division, through Air Liaison Detachment</u> /III Panzer Corps monitoring message/:

"Ground attack units attacking north of (15) at 1015 hours."

0900 <u>Air Liaison Detachment, 5th Panzer Division, to Ground-Attack Directing Team</u>:

Message givingsituation, plans, time the air units will attack.

0945 Attacking air units leave ground.

0955 Ground attack directing team takes over direction of air units.

1010 Artillery commences firing marking shells.

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1015 Air units attack antitank gun positions north of (15).

1020 5th Panzer Division jumps off to attack in direction of (16).

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ANNEX TO 1st PANZER DIVISION ORDER, 13 MAY 1940, 2000 HOURS, FOR ATTACK ACROSS THE MEUSE RIVER ON 13 MAY 1940

COMBINED ARMY AND AIR FORCE FIRE PLAN

1st Panzer Division

Action Phase	Time under Alert	Infantry	Point Fire Weapons	Artillery	Air Force
Preparations to cross Meuse River	0800 to 1500	Attack targets in Target Area K	Attack Bunkers & strong-points at Meuse River, in Glaire & Torcy	a. Support advance through fire against targets in Target areas K and L. b. Fire lane at Meuse c. Fire on bunkers d. AA & other arty fire in Target Area G,H,L,M,O.	See time schedule: II Tactical Support Group a. Harass bombing on localities in Target Area H,L, M,O. b. Attack arty firing positions.
Preparations to cross Meuse River	1500 to 1550	as above	Attack bunkers at Meuse River	a. Adjustment fire at crossing points b. Attack targets in Target Area K,L. c. AAA and other artillery fire	

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Action Phase	Time under Alert	Infantry	Point Fire Weapons	Artillery	Air Force
Shortly before river crossing operation	1550 to 1600	Concentrated fire at crossing points	as above	Fire concentrations on crossing points	See time schedule Tactical Support Group harass bombing, destroy Glaire and Torcy Attacks in Target Area L, 1-7.
Jumpoff and penetration	From 1600 on	Support fire	Attack bunkers before and after troops cross River	Fire support for infantry in division attack zone	See time schedule

Remark: Smoke Projector Battalion place smoke screen on Glaire-Torcy road from 1600-1630, on Bellevue-Torcy road from 1730-1830 hours.

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Photo

Near Montmort Bois du Brie

Results of a strike by German ground-attack air units

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Photo

A March Route under Bombing Attack

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Appendix 25

Photo

Vyazma-Bryansk Pocket

Appendix 26

Photo

1942

Direct Hit on Ammunition Depot

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Appendix 27

Photo

Kiev

Results of an Air Attack on a Motor Park

Appendix 28

Photo

Russian Tanks Destroyed on the Field of Battle

by German Air Attacks

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Appendix 29

Photo

Stalingrad

Russian Tanks under Air Attack

Appendix 30

Photo

Russia

Results of an Air Attack on a Road to the Front

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Photo

Air Attacks against Field and Battery Positions
in Northern Don River Bend Area

Appendix 32

Photo

Bunker Damaged by Near Hit

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Photo

Hit by a 550-pound (250-Kilogram) Bomb

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AIR SUPPORT OF ARMY OPERATIONS IN THE 1940

CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE

Dive-bomber forces open the way for the armored forces on the ground.

Bomber forces protect the flank of the armored forces.

Fighter forces provide cover against enemy air attack.

Legend.

Situation approximately on 19 May 1940

German — Allied

German → — Allied →

6. Army designation number (Sixth Army)

E. English

.....Belgian forces at time of capitulation on 27 May 1940

Nord See North Sea

Der Kanal English Channel

Pz. Kps. Reinhardt Panzer Corps Reinhardt

Pz. Kps. Guderian Panzer Corps Guderian

Geeresgruppe 3 Third Army Group

Dünkirchen Dunkirk

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Top Secret

Air Force Operations Staff 9 November 1943

Ia op Nr. 8865/43 g. Kdos.

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Eight Copies
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Inclosure: "Brief Study: Warfare against the Russian Armament Industry."

Attached is a brief study "Warfare against the Russian Armament Industry" ("Kurze Studie: Kampf gegen die russische Rüstungsindustrie").

1. In the Eastern campaign (Russian campaign) German air power was properly and logically employed up to the time when the Dnepr line was reached in the autumn of 1941. The rapid advance was made possible only by destruction of the Russian air forces and direct air support for the Army.

From that point on, however, at least elements of the Air Force should have been committed as follows:

a. Against rail routes far in the Russian interior in order to prevent the movement of forces from the far rear to the front, and above all to prevent the evacuation of the extensive armament industry, or at least hamper that movement, to the interior.

b. Against Russian armament factories still operating within striking range.

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Continuation of the operations [on the ground] however made it impossible for the time being to divert air forces for the execution of such missions. However, after the front had stabilized to repel the commencing Russian winter offensive, all available air forces still had to be committed in direct support of the Army on the field of battle. Even the bombing of Leningrad and Moscow time and again had to take second place to the urgent requests of the Army. And this was all at a time when the Russians were clearly inferior in the air and had only weak ground defenses against air attack.

2. With the opening of our summer offensive in 1942 the Air Force was again committed with all of its forces in missions of direct support for the Army, and so it has remained right up to the present.

In spite of all this, the Air Force whenever it had attack forces temporarily available directed destructive attacks against the enemy armament industry, for example against Moscow and Tikwin in the winter of 1941-42, and, besides numerous continuous attacks against Leningrad, against Voronezh, Saratov, and Grosny in the summer of 1943. The results achieved in these attacks were at all times great.

3. In the meanwhile, however, the Russian air

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forces, and particularly the Russian fighter arm, have again increased in strength, while our own air power in the east has not increased in point of numerical ~~XXXX~~ strengths of modernization. At present one can even speak of Russian numerical superiority in the air.

Furthermore, the withdrawals which have become necessary on the ground have moved our air bases farther and farther from the large targets of the Russian armament industry, some of which are already beyond the range of our aircraft models presently in service.

4. Thus it must be stated that we have missed the most opportune time, as such, and that the difficulties have become very great in the meantime. In addition, our air forces in the east are tied down even more severely than ever before.

In the meanwhile, the Russian armament industry, measured by Russian strengths in materiel at the front, has shown steadily increasing capacities. If the Russian armament industry is able to continue operating without interference, as in the past, it is to be expected that during the winter months and in the coming year it will produce aircraft, tanks, guns, etc., in such large numbers that the question must be faced seriously whether our forces on line will be able to defend their positions

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against the Russian masses armed with this materiel.

Can the German Air Force not make a bigger contribution towards victory by attacking the very source of Russia's striking power--the armament industry--to the extent that this is still possible, instead of serving as artillery and placing its bombs immediately ahead of the infantry?

6. The Russian air forces are admittedly already very strong in fighters, which means that their defenses in the far rear have probably been improved and that attacks against industrial targets have become more difficult. Many very important targets today are beyond our striking range. On the other hand, possibilities still exist for the German Air Forcewith its presently available means to strike and paralyze important parts of the Russian armament industry. The possibilities for point target bombing have improved with the introduction of new weapons, so that good results can be achieved nowadays even with relatively small forces.

The only basic condition is that this weapon /the bomber arm/ be at least temporarily relieved of its mission of direct support in the eastern theater, and of other missions.

With the new aircraft types (He-177,Ju-290, etc),

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presently being placed in service, even bigger successes could be achieved, particularly far inside the Russian interior, the only important requirement being that these new types are delivered soon and in adequate numbers.

7. The compilation of the brief study is motivated by the conviction that a neutralization of as large parts as possible of the Russian armament industry would be of greater importance for the fighting front in the east, and in certain circumstances even for the outcome of the entire war, than the present use of air power in missions of direct support for the ground forces.

The presently available target data in the Intelligence Division of the Air Force Operations Staff have been examined and revised by Professor Steinmann of the Air Service (LD) Office, and by President Dr. Karl of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Wartime Production, so that the present target appreciation arrived at can claim a high degree of reliability and validity. Besides the attached appendixes, true-to-scale air photos, which have been specially processed, and individual models are available.

8. The brief study has proved that neutralization of Russian armament industries, at least in the large

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industrial regions of Moscow and the Upper Volga River, is possible with relatively small forces and with the types of aircraft and weapons presently available.

It would be essential, however, to concentrate these forces in special units and prepare them for their mission. When this would be possible under present condition the present author cannot judge; this point must be decided at a higher level of command.

It is my opinion that we should accept the risk of compromising our latest weapons (the FX [here the author is referring to an air-to-surface radio or wire controlled glide bomb]) if all other conditions for execution of the mission exist.

I recommend that the blow against the Russian armament industries be approved in the form suggested in the study, and that a basic approval be obtained from the Fuehrer to withdraw the bomber units from action in the eastern theater.

In the priority schedule to be compiled for operational missions of the Air Force, combat action against the Russian armament industries in the Moscow-Upper Volga River region under any circumstances should be given first place.

In this connection attention is once again drawn

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to the fact that the Operations Division, Army General Staff, Army High Command in its letter # 10038/43, Top Secret, also states as follows:

"One reason for the Russian successes is their increased firepower and flexibility, due to the equipment of their forces with large numbers of mechanical weapons, artillery guns, tanks, and motor vehicles, which has been made possible by a high-capacity armament industry, and remains possible. In the impending battles, properly planned and intensive combat action against the armament industries therefore could materially relieve the strain at the front caused by the materiel weight of the Red Army."

Distribution:

Adjutant's Office, Reich Air Ministry for the Reich Marshal

Chief of Air Force General Staff--Chief, Air Force Operations Staff

Operations Division, Air Force Operations Staff

Operations Division (Air Operations Section) Air Force Operations Staff. Serves simultaneously to inform the Intelligence Division and the Chief Signal Officer).

War Journal

Reserve supply for later distribution to authorized headquarters.

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Appendix 36

Air Photo

No Caption. No Text

Appendix 37

Air Photo

No Caption. No Text.

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AIR FORCE-NAVY COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN THEATER

From September 1939 on

CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COMMAND CHANNELS



Legend.

———T Tactically assigned

------- Required to cooperate

-·-·-·- Administratively assigned.

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Outline Map

North Sea and Helligoland Bight

Legend.

Nord See	North Sea
Deutsche Bucht	Bight of Helligoland
Luettich	Liege
Frankreich	France

Shaded areas of Helligoland Bight, bordered by 5°30' longitude east and 55°30' latitude north, was the area in which air combat action against ships was authorized by Directive # 4, 23 September 1939.

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Photo

Outside Kronshtadt

Battleship Marat under Dive-Bomber Attack

Appendix 41

Photo

Kronshtadt, September 1941

Armored Cruiser October Revolution under Attack in

Port by German Ju-87 Dive-Bombers.

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Appendix 42

Photo

Near Odessa

Ship sunk by Dive-Bombers

Appendix 43

Photo

Gulf of Finland

Sinking of a Troop Transporter

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THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958

Photo

Sevastopol

Naval Ships and Troop Transporters Sunk

Appendix 45

Photo

The Port of Tuapse under Attack by

Ju-88 Dive-Bombers

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Appendix 46

Photo

A Polish Destroyer in the Drained Basin of the Port of Dunkirk. Showing Damage Done by Attacking Bombers.

Appendix 47

Photo

Bomb Hits on an American Ammunition Ship at Sicily

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EXAMPLE OF ATTACKS AGAINST A RAIL DEPOT

Legend.

Stellwerk	Switch Tower
Gueterhalle	Warehouse
Rangier- u. Abstellgleise	Marshalling and siding tracks
Bahnhofs Gebaeude	Railroad Station
Lok Schuppen	Locomotive Shed
Versorgungs Anlagen	Servicing Installations
Wasserturm	Water Tower
Werk-Halle	Repair Shop.

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PROFITABLE TARGETS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST
TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE
(See attached Sketch)

Excerpt from Order CG, Second Air Fleet and CINC North, # 7220/39, Top Secret, Command Personnel Only, 8 November 1939.

A. Railroads. (Map 1:1 000 000)

Profitable targets for rail interdiction action have been grouped in two zones, a western, and an eastern zone (See Outline Map in Appendix 2).

In the western zone the following are some of the profitable points for rail interdiction attacks:

1. Between Hazebrouck and Armentieres
2. East of Merville
3. Between Bethune and Fouquereuil
4. Target Halloy # 4268 northeast of Doullens at Mondicourt
5. Rail Depot St. Pol
6. Target Authulle # 4269, north of Albert at Miraumont
7. Bridge Marcoing Target # 4256, 6 miles southwest of Cambrai.

In the eastern zone:

8. Middle of the Bruegge-Gent section
9. South of Thorout
10. Crossrails at exit from Coutrai
11. Wervicq 3 miles southwest of Menin
12. Middle of the Hersaux-Avelghem section east of Lottignies
13. West of Tournai before tracks to Lille and Coutrai cross

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14. Middle of Leuze-Ath section

15. Between Valenciennes and Mons at Quievrain.

Attached to Appendix is an outline map: Overlay A to Appendix 2. This refers to the original order from which the above is an excerpt).

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Photo

Bomb Hit on an Armored Railway Train

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Photo

Ronconay, roughly Seven Miles South Of Troye, France
Showing Rail Installations Destroyed in an
Attack by the 77th Dive-Bomber Wing (Ju-87) Using 550-Pound
Bombs

Photo

Ammunition Destroyed at the Pavlovgrad
Rail Depot, Russia

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Photo

Bomb Hits on a Rail Depot in the East, 1942

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RAILROAD INTERDICTION

DURING OPERATIONS TO SEAL OFFE THE BATTLEFIELD OF KIEV

1-25 September 1941

Map

Legend.

Pz. Gr. 1	First Panzer Group
Pz. Gr. 2	Second Panzer Group
2. (17.) Armee	Second (Seventeenth) Army

Attacks by units of the V Air Corp (Fourth Air Fleet), and II Air Corps (Second Air Fleet) against:

Rail depots, sheds, and trains in depots

Points for special attack

Railway trains and locomotives between depots (Railcars destroyed and escaping troops attacked)

Floating targets (naval vessels)

Railroad bridges

Railroad, open way

Date of attack

-·-·-·- Boundary between II Air Corps (above line) and V Air Corps (below line).

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TYPICAL TARGET-EFFECT PHOTOS TAKEN AFTER
ATTACKS AGAINST LARGE RAIL DEPOTS

Appendix consists of two photos without caption or text.

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PANAMA CANAL

Showing Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, Gatun Lake with weir, and the trace of the first canal attempted by France

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Appendix 56

Photo

Bomb-Stricken Volga River Ships

Appendix 57

Photo

Bridge across Bzura River, Poland, Destroyed
in Dive-Bombing Attack

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Photo

Bridge at Novgorod under Dive-Bomber Attack

Appendix 59

Photo

Vyazma Bridgehead Pocket after an Attack by Dive-Bombers, 1941. In a Previous Attack the Same Dive-Bomber Units had Destroyed the Bridges

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Photo

A Bridge under Attack by Bombers

Appendix

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PROFITABLE TARGETS FOR ATTACKS TO INTERDICT TROOP MOVEMENTS ON ROADS IN FRANCE

(See attached outline map)

From Order by Commanding General, Second Air Fleet and Commander in Chief North, # 7220/39, Top Secret, Command Personnel only, 8 November 1939.[1]

B. Roads (Map 1:500 000), see Overlay B, Annex 2.

If possible, attacks against transportation movements on roads will be directed at the following profitable interdiction points. Roads and rail routes will be considered as primary targets for tactical reconnaissance.

Road	Interdiction Points
1. Dunkirk-Bailleul-Lille section	a. Rail and road bridge over canal northwest of Bergues exit
1a. Dunkirk-Ypers-Menin-Courtrai-Audenarde-Ninove-Brussels section	b. Road intersection at Cassel, 15 miles south of Dunkirk c. Bridge west of Ypres Road intersection Avelghem and Nederbrarel
2. Calais, St. Omer, Bethune, Lille	a. Rail-road-river intersection north of Ardres 6 miles southeast of Calais b. Rail-road-river intersection La Bassee

1. Auszug aus "Chef Lfl.2 u Befehlshaber Nord Nr.7220/39 g. Kos. Chefsache vom 8 11.1939."

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Road	Interdiction Points
2.--Continued	b. Continued:
3. Boulogne, St. Omer	Road intersection Colombert, 10.5 miles east of Boulogne
4. Etaples, Arras, Cambrai	a. Rail and road bridge Maresquiel 15 miles southeast of Etaples
	b. Rail and road bridge Roellecourt, southeast of St. Pol
	c. Road bridge across river 6 miles northwest of Cambrai
5. Abbeville, Doullens, Arras, Douai, Lille	a. Road intersection 1½ miles northwest of Doullens
	b. Road bridge over Scarpe 3 300 yards northeast of Douai
6. Amiens, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Mons, Brussels	a. Road intersection Baupaume
	b. Road brodge 1100 yards east of Denain
	c. Braine le comte 18 miles southeast of Brussels
7. Valenciennes, Gent	a. Road bridge northeast exit from Peruwelez
	b. Audenarde
8. Ghislenghien, Gent	a. Lessines, narrow-gauge railroad-river intersection
9. Ostende, Thorout, Lichtervelde, Thielt, Gent	a. Lichtervelde,
	b. Road intersection Thielt

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Road	Interdiction Points
2.--Continued	b. Continued:
3. Boulogne, St. Omer	Road intersection Colombert, 10.5 miles east of Boulogne
4. Etaples, Arras, Cambrai	a. Rail and road bridge Maresquiel 15 miles southeast of Etaples
	b. Rail and road bridge Roellecourt, southeast of St. Pol
	c. Road bridge across river 6 miles northwest of Cambrai
5. Abbeville, Doullens, Arras, Douai, Lille	a. Road intersection 1½ miles northwest of Doullens
	b. Road bridge over Scarpe 3 300 yards northeast of Douai
6. Amiens, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Mons, Brussels	a. Road intersection Baupaume
	b. Road brodge 1100 yards east of Denain
	c. Braine le comte 18 miles southeast of Brussels
7. Valenciennes, Gent	a. Road bridge northeast exit from Peruwelcz
	b. Audenarde
8. Ghislenghien, Gent	a. Lessines, narrow-gauge railroad-river intersection
9. Ostende, Thorout, Lichtervelde, Thielt, Gent	a. Lichtervelde,
	b. Road intersection Thielt

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Road	Interdiction Points
10. Lille, Gent	a. Road intersection 7½ miles north east of Courtrai b. Road intersection Cruyshautem
11. Bruegge, Gent	Road bridge across river 12 miles east of Bruegge east of Maldegen
Lille-Tournai-Leuze-Ath-Enghien-Hal	Road intersection Chislenghien Road intersection Orchies.

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LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST PORTS AND
INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS IN ENGLAND
September 1940

Outline Map

Legend.

Ost-England	East)	
Mittel-England	Middle)	England
Sued-England	South)	
Sued-Westengland	Southwest)	
Nordsee	North Sea	
Map Scale 1:6 000 000		
Der Kanal	English Channel	
Frankreich	France	

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LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST PORTS AND
INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS IN ENGLAND
October 1940

Outline Map
Scale 1:6 000 000

Legend.

160 km westl. Irland
Empress of Britain

SS Empress of Britain attacked
160 kilometers west of Ireland

Also see legend Appendix 62.

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LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST PORTS AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS IN ENGLAND

November 1940

Outline Map

Scale 1:6 000 000

Legend

See Appendix 62

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Photo

In Astrakhan

Oil Bulk Storage Tanks Set on Fire by

Bombing Attack

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Target Effect Photo

Film 305 SK/143 Sovietunion 8047

Photo 007 Scale 1:9 000

1st (Strategic) Squadron Altitude 7 000 meters
100th Reconnaissance Group

MOTOR VEHICLE FACTORY # 1

"MOLOTOV"

Gorkij-Awtosawod

After night attack 7-8 June 1943,

Time of attack: 2140-2355 hours

Time of photo : 1545 hours, 8 June 1943.

Units participating in attack: 3d Group, 1st Bomber Wing; 2d Group, 4th Bomber Wing; 2d Group 51st Bomber Wing.

Legend.

O	Bombhits on buildings
(	Bombs in terrain
1.	New hits in assembly plant
2.	" " " turning and milling shop
3.	" " " foundry
4.	" " " carpenter shop
5.	" " " Forge shop
6.	" " " tank assembly plant
7.	" " " " " "
8.	" " " engine construction plant
9.	" " " tank assembly plant
10.	" " " tank proving station
11.	" " " mechanics department
12.	" " " outbuildings.

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Photo

Oil Farm on Fire in Lower Thames River, London
Following German Bombing Attack on 9 September 1940

The following passages on this subject are quoted from "The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force," published by the British Air Ministry:

> On 5 September.....Later in the day others made up for this mistake by striking the oil farm in Thameshaven. This may have been an alternate target in place of the airfields in the estuary area, but the success achieved encouraged the enemy to repeat the attack on the sixth. Heated by further enemy bombs, giant fires roared throughout the whole night. Theywere still burning when the heavy attack of 7 September commenced.

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Photo

A Convoy at Sea

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THE FAR NORTH THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1942

Map, Scale 1 2 000 000

Legend.

Noerdliches Eismeer	Arctic Ocean
Halbinsel Kola	Kola Peninsula
Weisses Meer	White Sea
Bottnischer Meerbusen	Gulf of Bothnia
20. Geb. Armee	HQ, 20th Mountain Army
XXXVI Geb. K.	XXXVI Mountain Corps
Finn.(III,V,VI,VII)A.K	Finnish (III,V,VI,VII) Corps
Ladoga See	Lake Ladoga

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Appendix 70

Map Showing Value of Cargos Arriving in England by

Various Shipping Routes

Appendix 71

Map Showing Routes, Numbers of Ships, and Tonnage of

Cargoes Arriving in Britain from Overseas

Plus Coastal Routes, Ships, and Tonnages

Scale 1:8 000 000

Legend.

Dpf /abbreviation for Dampfer/	Steamers
BRT /Abbreviation for Brutto Register Tonnen/	Gross Register Tons

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MAP of WARSZAWY (Warsaw)

Targets

Legend.

Flugplatz	Airfield
Eisenbahn und Strassenkreuz	Rail and road intersection
Vorortbahn	Suburban railway
Bahnhof Warschau-Ost	Rail Depot Warsaw East
Motorenfabrik Avice	Motor Factory Avice
Elektr. Werk	Electric Power Station
Schule d. chem. Waffen	Chemical Service School
Sender	Radio transmitter
Bahnhof West	Rail Depot West
Kaserne	Caserne
Flugzeugwerk	Aircraft factory
Muna	Ammunition Installation
Angriffe am	Attacks on

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OVERLAY TO MAP OF SE LONDON AND DARTFORD

(Order I Air Corps, # 10285/40 Top Secret, 6 Sep 40)

Legend.

K.G. 30	30th Bomber Wing
K.G. 1	1st " "
K.G. 76	76th " "

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MODLIN AND WARSAW

25-26 September 1939

Legend.

Warschau	Warsaw
Luftflotte 1	First Air Fleet
Luftflotte 4	Fourth Air Fleet
Fliegerfuehrer z.b.V	Special Purposes Air Command

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Photo

1939

Warsaw on Fire

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THE GERMAN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST WARSAW
IN THE LIGHT OF MILITARY LAW

Eberhard Spetzler, D. L.: "Der Weg zur Luftschlacht um England in Kriegsrechtlicher Betrachtung," in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 6th Year, August 1956, Volume 8, pp. 445-6.

.....

On any appreciable scale only the civilian population of Warsaw became affected when that city, after annihilation of the Polish armies in the field, was enveloped and was defended.

a. Since 16 Sptember 1939 the /Polish/ Government and military authorities had been called upon by means of leaflets to surrender within twelve hours, and had been informed that otherwise Warsaw, as a defended city would be attached, the attacks to be directed at its military targets and utility installations, and that then the Government, by reason of its senseless resistance, would itself be responsible for any losses which thereby might be inflicted. At the same time, the polulation was called upon to leave the areas of road exists (cf. OKW Berichte 18 and 19 September 1939).

Appendix 75--2

After this ultimatum had expired without response, approximately 800 bombers of all types commenced daylight attacks against Government buildings, casernes, military

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camps [Lager: could also mean depots]; rail depot, signal communication, and supply installations; aircraft factories antiaircraft artillery positions; and airfields. In the course of several days, these attacks were gradually extended to include the whole area of the city, the objective being to speed up its capture.

These were the first large-scale operations against the installations of a town or city, and at this time already 2 200-pound (1 000-Kilogram) bombs were used against special targets.

Compared with population figures, civilian losses were not very high. On the other hand the destruction was considerable and, primarily because of the complete interruption of the water and sewage systems, brought about a quick surrender, so that the civilian population was spared the suffering of a siege of long duration (Cf. Liddell-Hart, B. H.: The Revolution of Warfare, London, 1946, p. 72).

b. In an appraisal from the viewpoint of military law, the decisive point is that these air attacks were carried out in support of the ground operations of the investing army forces, and in cooperation with those forces, and therefore were subject to the terms of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. Consequently, the commitment of

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all weapons, and thus also of air forces and artillery, in terms of Article 25 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, was not prohibited, since Warsaw was a defended city and was to be captured. On the same basis, for example, nothing can be said against the artillery fire directed by the Poles themselves from 10 September 1939 on against the western part of Warsaw, which was occupied by German troops, while the Poles used guns of all calibers from the eastern part of the city.

Furthermore, including the airdropped leaflets mentioned, the German attacks were preceded by demands for surrender repeated five times, which even fulfills the requirements of Article 26 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, which did not even apply in the case of air attacks.

In the matter of target selection the Hague Rules of Land Warfare in Article 27 impose only one restriction, concerning infirmaries, so that it would have been permissible to attack practically all the rest of the city (cf. Pohl: Luftkriegsrecht, Stuttgart, 1924, p. 22). In spite of this, the German units in the initial stages endeavored to concentrate the effects of their weapons exclusively against the military targets, in a manner from which the attempt is evident to spare the civilian population to the greatest possible degree (cf. Kesselring:

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p. 59. The contrary presentation in Spaight: Air Power, pp. 265 and 286, is not adequately established by the reference to the widespread destruction in Warsaw, which

Appendix 75--4

were an unavoidable result of the long battles for the beleaguered fortress and were not due to air attacks alone. It is also likely that the low-altitude attacks he claims, without evidence, were directed at civilians andeavoring to extinguish the fires were in actual fact directed at Polish troops within the city areas or even still engaged in ground combat.). As the defense perimeter steadily contracted, this would have been impossible because of the very fact that the center of the city, which was organized in great depth for defense by approximately 100 00 troops, contained military targets in a steadily growing density.

The initial, and vigorously propounded,opinion of Germany's opponents that with these air attacks Germany had violated Military Law, was also later widely disavowed (cf. Fuller; Liddel-Hart; FJP.; Advance to Barbarism (German Edition, Hamburg, 1954, p. 145).

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THE GERMAN AIR ATTACK AGAINST PARIS IN JUNE 1940
IN THE LIGHT OF MILITARY LAW

Eberhard Spetzler, D.L.: "Der Weg zur Luftschlacht um England in Kriegsrechtlicher Betrachtung," in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 6th Year, August 1956, Volume 8, p. 451.

Likewise of a strategic nature was the daylight attack carried out by strong forces in June 1940 against airfields as well as aircraft fuselage and aircraft engine factories in the outskirts of Paris. The purpose here was to destroy these important military targets in order to prevent enemy acts of air warfare, but in additio obviously to speed up the surrender of Paris and the capitulation of France and thereby bring the whole campaign to a quick close through the demonstrative impact of a concentrated attack by strong air forces. This latter intention, however, can only be justified under the laws of warfare because it was effectuated as part of an attack which was important for the achievement of victory and which was justifiable under the laws of warfare even without such intent and was directed at the military targets involved.

The attacking German units had strict orders to avoid bombing the residential districts of Paris no matter what happened, an order they were able to abide by

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to the letter in conditions of good visibility.

The impact thus in full concentration struck the assigned targets, causing only few casualties; Paris itself remained practically untouched, so that in this attack also the laws of warfare were properly respected.

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ATTACK AGAINST ROTTERDAM, 13 MAY 1940

FieldMarshal A. Kesselring: "Soldat bis zum letzten Tag," Athenaeum-Verlag, Bonn, 1953, pp. 74-77.

Field Marshal Kesselring writes as follows concerning the German air attack against Rotterdam:

ACT I IN THE WEST

The first movements proceeded according to plan. I breathed a sigh of relief when the first favorable reports arrived about the capture of the bridges across the Albert Canal, of Fort Eben Emael; and about the jump landings at the Meuse River bridge at Mordyk and at the Rotterdam airfield, which came off as planned; as well as about the capture of the bridge and the airfield.

Very uncertain reports concerning troop landings by Ju-52 aircraft at the coast south of Den Haag; oral reports by the wing commander of an air transport wing concerning air landings on the main highway Rotterdam-Haag accompanied by enemy attacks on the ground and from the air, and reports concerning revived fighting all around the Rotterdam airfield involving considerable losses among the continuously landing aircraft; all of them arriving with conflicting contents and in conflicting tones satisfied neither me nor the Commander in Chief

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of the Air Force. Finally a reconnaissance flight by my operations officer brougnt in reassuring news of the situation at Rotterdam.

Reports from the landing corps came in very slowly; radio messages only became more frequent when air support of some kind was requested, but remained silent on the situation at the 22d Infantry Division.* Air Fleet Headquarters reconnaissance soon established that the operation to seize the Den Haag airfield had not succeeded.

On the forenoon of 13 May General Student repeatedly requested support in the form of bomber strikes against enemy strongpoints within Rotterdam, with main emphasis at the bridges, where the paratrooper forces had been held up. The time for the attack was to be 1400 hours. This attack was carried out and ultimately led to the capitulation of Holland on 14 May 1940.

Great as this military victory was, just as serious were the accusations levelled by the Dutch against the Reich Marshal and myself, at the end of the war , and repeated again during the trials before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg. I state here again that before the bomber wing took off on its mission Goering

* An air-carried infantry division organic to the Army. Not a paratrooper force; paratrooper units were organic to the Air Force. Air-carried infantry were trained and equipped specifically for air transportation. (Note by translator).

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Goering and I spent hours in agitated discussion of the question as to how the requested attacks were to be carried out and whether they should be acrried out at all;

Appendix 77--3

these hours of discussion caused me to repeatedly remind the wing commander to watch out for the signal lights and identification markings within the zone of operations, and to insure maintenance of constant contact with the radio station of the landing corps and with me. Anxiety developed because no radio contact could be established after the early morning radio message from Student, for which reason Air Fleet Headquarters was no longer informed on the tactical situation within and around Rotterdam. The danger also existed of bombing our own troops. That General Student had already entered into negotiations with the Dutch, or that he himself was seriously wounded and that General der Panzertruppe (Lieutenant General) Schmidt, CG of the panzer corps, had taken over the command was known neither to the Air Fleet headquarters nor to the Army Group Headquarters. For me as an experienced soldier, and artilleryman, and an aviator, it had become an everyday occurrence that signal communications were are particularly apt to be disrupted during the most important phases of a battle. This was the reason for my

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precautionary reminders to the wing commander, which then actually made it possible to avert the bomb release by the 2d Bomber Group. On this subject the wing commander reported as follows:

"The 54th Bomber Wing, which I commanded at the time, received through General Putzier (at that time in the rank of Brigadier General) the order to support the troops under General Student outside of Rotterdam, and that this support was to be in the form of action that would bomb the Dutch opponent out of certain districts of the city, from where they were flanking the bridges across the Meuse River and thereby preventing further advance by Student's troops. For this purpose the targets to be bombed were marked on a map.[1]

"Shortly before the takeoff, the message reached the wing that Student had called upon Rotterdam to surrender; the message also contained the order to attack an alternate target if Rotterdam should have surrendered in the meantime (meantime: the time before takeoff and arrival over the target area). As a signal that the surrender had taken place, red signal flares were to be fire from the island in the Meuse River before Rotterdam.

"For the execution of the mission the wing was

1. Appendix 77a: Rotterdam.

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divided into two groups of approximately equal strength. In spite of the ground defense fire, the attack (see map) was carried out at an altitude of roughly 2 500 feet (750 meters) because visibility was poor owing to a thick haze, and because the wing had received very emphatic orders to insure that its attack would only strike the targets marked in the map.

"I commanded the column attacking on the right, and since no red signal lights were in evidence on the Meuse River island the attack was actually carried out.

Appendix 77--5

"Our bombs were clearly within the assigned area. Ground defense fire ceased almost completely after release of the first bombs.

"Lieutenant Colonel Hoehne, leading the group attacking on the left, observed red light signals on the Meuse River island, deflected his course, and attacked the alternate target.

"When I telephoned in my report on the mission to General Putzier after landing, he asked whether we had not observed red light signals on the Meuse River island. I replied that the right group had not, but that the left group had observed a few signal lights, and asked whether Rotterdam had fallen. Thereupon I was informed that contact with General Student had again been interrupted,

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that Rotterdam apparently had not surrendered, and that the wing was to repeat the same mission without delay.

"The wing took off for its second strike, but was recalled by radio while on the approach route, because Rotterdam had surrendered in the meanwhile.

"Finally, I declare herewith that in this mission
Appendix 77--6
a tactical matter was clearly involved, namely, that of support by the Air Force for the ground forces."

Because of the international significance of the subject I have thought it proper to quote the essentially important parts of this report, although it differs somewhat from my own presentation of the matter.

To round out the picture I add the following, on the basis of valid international law and of personal investigations among the paratroopers in Rotterdam: In the light of international law, and from the tactical point of view, a bombing attack against the defenders of a town or city is permissible as a form of artillery support fire.[1]

The bombing attack struck the target area. The damages caused were due primarily to fires fed by burning oils and fats which escaped or leaked out. During the lull in combat action which had meanwhile set in, it would have been possible to take effective firefighting action.[2]

1. Appendix 77b. 2. Appendix 77c.

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BOMBING ATTACK AGAINST DUTCH FORCES DEFENDING ROTTERDAM

Legend.

//////////// Target approach route of group attacking on right.

-.-.-.-.-.-.- Target approach route of group attacking on the left.

M A A S Meuse River

Criss-cross Section City areas occupied by Dutch military elements

Stripe-shaded City areas occupied by Student's troops

Forward elements of Student's force

City area to be attacked with bombs by the 54th Bomber Wing.

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THE GERMAN AIR ATTACK AGAINST ROTTERDAM IN 1940
IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAWS OF WARFARE

Eberhard Spetzler, D. L.: "Der Weg zur Luftschlacht um England in Kriegsrechtlicher Betrachtung," in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 6th Year, August 1956, Volume 8, pp. 449-450.

Within Rotterdam German paratrooper forces were in positions. As was the case with those who had jumped at the Meuse bridge at Moerdyk on 10 May 1940, their mission was to prevent any contact between the Fortress of Holland and the Belgian Army until German ground forces could arrive. Without heavy weapons these troops were in a critical situation, having been halted at the Meuse River bridges in the center of the city by strong enemy points of resistance.

a. In response to their request of 13 May 1940, two groups of each approximately forty bombers of the 54th Bomber Wing were dispatched to attack a precisely defined triangle northwest of the bridges, with additional instructions to attack alternate targets if the city should have surrendered in the meanwhile in response to the German demand, (Contrary to Fuller, p. 73, these instructions still did not apply to all Dutch units, but only to those engaged in combat within Rotterdam, so that this was a permissible mission in the sense of Article 26 of the

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Hague Rules of Land Warfare)and if they were apprised of this fact by means of light signals fired by the paratrooper forces from the Meuse River island.

In spite of the initially very heavy ground defense fire, the attack was flown at a low altitude (approximately 2 500 feet--750 meters) so that, in spite of the hazy weather, only the marked targets would be struck. The bombs of the right group landed precisely within the target; favored by fires which broke out in the oil bunkers and by inadequate fire-fighting activities, these bombs caused serious destruction and, unfortunately, also relatively heavy casualties. The left group, in contrast, observed light signals of the prearranged type and therefor attacked an alternate target outside the assigned area.

Rotterdam had ceased resistance in the meanwhile, so that a second air attack was averted by radio messages On 14 May 1940 followed the capitulation of Holland, afte the other Dutch fortified lines had also in the meanwhile been breached (cf. Kesselring, pp. 74 ff.).

Numerous Allied sources have described the air attack against Rotterdam as contrary to the laws of warfare but in these treatments of the subject, on the other hand, there is no visible evi ence of any dispassionate

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examination of the historically recorded circumstances and their interrelations with the laws of warfare(for example, Spaight, Air Power, p. 265; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, London, 1952, p. 527).

Appendix 77b--3

b. For an appraisal of the attack against Rotterdam, a purely tactical act of warfare, the decisive point also is that, by virtue of the fact of German air landings at Moerdyk and Leyden, and by reason of the battles developing therefrom against Dutch troops, the city had become involved in the operations of the German Army and in the course of these operations was to be captured by German paratroopers, so that these battles are subject to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare.

Since Dutch troops in the center of the city, at the Meuse River bridge, tenaciously resisted the penetration by the paratrooper forces, the protection provided for under Article 25 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare became invalid, because Rotterdam due to these circumstances became a defended city.

Furthermore, the officer commanding the attacking troops, General Student, called on the city to surrender, in order to avert the loss of human lives and destruction, and thereby fulfilled the requirements of Article 26 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. When the city

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refused to surrender it was permissible to use all allowed weapons, also in the city areas, to break resistance. In contrast with the defenders, the attackers because of the status achieved at the time in the techniques of airborne operations did not have the necessary heavy weapons along with them, which is all the more reason to compensate for this lack by bombing attacks.

In the execution of the attack, all efforts were made to restrict the area struck by bombs to the assigned target area and thereby to abide by the requirements of Article 27 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. To this end an attack altitude of roughly 2 500 feet (750 meters) was chosen, although this brought the bomber forces within the particularly dangerous range of the enemy defenses, thus exposing them to the hazard of increased losses, in order to spare the city to the maximum extent possible.

In the critical situation at the time it would hardly have been possible to carry out the attack in a more humane manner or in a manner more commensurate with legal standards (By way of comparison it is only necessary to mention the gigantic blows by the Allies in 1943-45 in Italy, France, and Germany, and specifically the attacks delivered with almost tenfold

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intensity against the Monte Cassino Cloister, which actually was undefended.

On the other hand the German side could hardly have been expected to refrain from making the attack in view of the Dutch resistance, the crucial situation of the paratrooper forces, and the decisively important role their success played in the whole plan of operations on the German right.

Under these circumstances the attack was justified in the form in which it todk place, and its effects on the city, although extremely regrettable, were unavoidable.

For this reason the question need not be examined, whether the attack was at the same time intended as a demonstration of German air might in order to influence the Dutch Government to accept an armistice.

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Photo

RESULT OF THE GERMAN AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST ROTTERDAM IN 1940

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