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THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

1939-1940

PART TWO

THE WAR OF WAITING

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PHENOMENON OF "THE WAR OF WAITING"

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The following Part Two of the present study on the Campaign in Western Europe--1939-1940 deals with what has been called the period of the War of Waiting in the West. More precisely, it deals with the period between the German strategic assembly in the West after the end of the Polish campaign (early October 1939) and the opening of the German offensive in the West on 10 May 1940, thus, a period of seven months. During these seven months the belligerent powers faced each other, waiting and probing, without either side seeking any decisive action in the air or on the ground.

This phase of the war in the West might therefore at first glance appear uninteresting. Viewed in the light of the traditional concept of the conduct of a war by an army, this would be a true assumption. In line with its orders, the German Army during the whole period actually endeavored to maintain an attitude of extreme reserve--apart from outposts skirmishes, patrol activities, an occasional exchange of artillery fire, occasional action to improve positions in the Saar segment of the front, and similar small-scale actions of no significance in the overall situation.

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The situation was different with the German Air Force.




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According to the directives received from the Supreme Military Command, the Air Force also was restricted to defensive action in the operational sense. In contrast with the Army, however, there were the following fundamental differences:

1. Although only on a very modest scale, Britain had commenced aggressive operational air warfare immediately after the beginning of the war, and this called for air defense action on the German side. In air warfare, however, the decisive element of defense is the attack. During the whole period of the War of Waiting the German fighter arm was thus uninterruptedly in a state of alert and in action. The same applied to the Antiaircraft Artillery Arm.

2. The state of complete uncertainty as to when the definitely expected air warfare between the Western Powers and Germany would begin not only necessitated planning to provide instantaneous effective counteraction by the entire Air Force whenever required and to meet the exigencies of any possible situation, but also required that all aggressive air forces must be constantly ready for immediate action.

As German planning developed during this period, the basic methods of direct and indirect air support for the Army were gradually raised again to the fundamental



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principle of air operations, a principle which had already proved so sound in the Polish campaign. At the same time,

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however, the possibility had to be borne in mind that the Air Force at any time, within a matter of hours, might have to engage in all-out air warfare, the conduct of which would, at least in the initial stages, have to be independent of the intentions and plans of the Army.

3. Planning against such an eventuality necessitated a continuous watch and continuing posting of the intelligence picture on the air deployment and air action of the enemy. In other words: air reconnaissance was not at a standstill during the seven months. After a hesitant start air reconnaissance developed into a system of planned patrols over enemy territory, producing good results but also incurring losses.

4. The final but most important difference between the inactivity of the Army and the activity of the Air Force, however, was that elements of the Air Force were to be committed in attacks during the War of Waiting. Developments will show that combat operations against British naval forces in the North Sea areas became an important part of the air mission.

The situation and the mission of the German Air Force were thus radically different from those of the German Army

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In military history, the Air Force thus merits a study from viewpoints differing considerably from those applied to the Army during the period of the War of Waiting.

In retrospect, the War of Waiting at the turn of the year 1939-1940 appears a simple fact of military history, both belligerent sides were practicing more or less the same policy. At the time, however, this fact was naturally only realized at a late stage, and the name for this type of warfare was only coined later. Neither side had anticipated this type of warfare, and while it lasted the feelings of uncertainty, expectation, tension, and nervousness were possibly more intense than those any actual military operation of the later phases could have caused. This applies above all to the German Supreme Command, but in an intensified measure to those responsible for the control of the Air Force, and here particularly to the intermediate and lower field commands.

Whereas the decisions by the Supreme Command (Hitler) were determined largely by factors of the overall political and military concept, but dictated later in a decisive measure by events, the field commands, and thus also the troops, lived in an atmosphere of uncertainty subject to uncounted fluctuations. Added to this uncertainty concerning the daily possibility of combat action, came the continuous

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vacillations in directives and orders from higher headquarters. Added to this uncertainty came the daily worries of the troops themselves to remain operable in personnel and materiel, anxieties which the higher levels at no time took seriously. Instead, the higher and highest levels of command simply calculated with numerical quantities--with figures, what was behind these figures did not concern them in the least. While the field commands and the troops themselves thus strove continuously to maintain and improve ~~operability~~ training standards, and equipment status, they had at the same time to remain constantly ready for action.

To fully appreciate this state of flux during the War of Waiting, together with all its command and psychological implications, it is essential to first obtain a clear picture of the repeated vacillations in the intentions and decisions of the Supreme Command which kept the troops in a constant state of unrest throughout the seven months. A complete insight here is an essential condition for a proper understanding from which to appraise all measures taken by the command and troops during this period.

This insight should have been provided the reader in an introduction to this chapter. However, a thorough treatment of the subject precedes Part 3 of a former edition of this

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study.¹ The reason why this factor, which was the governing feature of the whole War of Waiting on the German side, was given such early treatment is, as stated in the introduction to Part 3 of the former edition, that time and other considerations made it necessary at the time to treat the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ 1940 German offensive in the west preferentially and postpone treatment of the War of Waiting period, which is now being treated in this present chapter. The author of the previous study therefore thought it essential to preface his work with a broad outline of the development of the command decisions preceding the offensive.

Reading the introduction to Part 3 of the previous study before reading this Part Two of the present study, the fact becomes obvious that commencement of the offensive in the West, an operation which Hitler at no time doubted would be executed, was postponed no fewer than twenty times. The ~~major~~ field and varied results for the ^{field commands and} troops are also described. For the sake of brevity, the present author has avoided treating the same points here, and the reader is advised to refer back to the previous study quoted before commencing the present chapter.

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The reasons for the repeated postponements of the German 1940 offensive in the West were all due exclusively to

1. Part 3, Chapter I, "Ein Versuch zum Westfeldzug," pp. 1-5.

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weather considerations, in other words: to the requirements of the Air Force. This stresses the remarkable fact that the most modern weapon was subject to factors beyond the influence of strictly human decisions. The fact also evolves that one military branch--in this case the Air Force, determined the deadline for the entire operation, including the operations of the Army forces on the ground. In the final essence such absolute dependence on weather conditions indicated in practice a return to the methods of Frederick the Great in the conduct of warfare: during the unfavorable seasons of the year, the troops settled down in their winter quarters.

This comparison, which naturally must be taken with a grain of salt, applied during the actual conditions of the War of Wiping only to the Army, the forces of which were more or less "in winter quarters," although they did have to displace from area to area in consequence of the changes in operational planning and of training requirements. The Army still measured the time required to prepare for operations by days.

The Air Force, in contrast, was at all times ready for action and at all times had strong fighter, reconnaissance, bomber, and antiaircraft artillery units actually committed in action.

II/8 The German Air Force intentionally avoided taking the initiative for any aggressive action on an appreciable scale, leaving this to the enemy, who did so on a modest scale.

This conduct of air warfare on a limited scale will be a part of the subject matter in the following presentation of events. A more important factor, however, will be an examination of the changing plans for attack during the War of Waiting, since, besides the repeatedly changed deadline, this was the factor which determined the activities of the German Air Force.

Planning for airborne operations, a separate segment within the whole complex of planning for the offensive, can only be treated incidentally here in connection with the other planning activities for operations by the operational air arm. This special subject has also received preferential treatment (see Footnote 1) in a previous study, where the development of planning for airborne operations, right up to the final plan of operations which was actually executed, is dealt with as a completely separate subject.² Development ^{plan} up to the execution of the final actually belongs within the scope of this present chapter, but owing to the conditions under which the present study is being compiled, the present author is restricting himself to information supplementing that given in the previous study.

2. Part 3, Chapter IV: "Die Luftlandeunternehmen in Fall G.3b" particularly "G.3b.111".

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Another subject which cannot be treated exhaustively enough here is that of antiaircraft artillery operations during the War of Waiting. This refers not so much to the AAA units committed in the Home Air Defense System (coastal areas and the Ruhr region) but to the "operational" AAA forces of the Air Force, namely, the I and II Antiaircraft Artillery Corps deployed together with the Army forces near the border but under command by the two air fleets committed in the Western Theater.

The units of these two AAA corps were also in a constant state of alert throughout the period of the War of Waiting, ready to take instant action to protect the Army assembly, supply and communication lines, traffic centers, and the Air Force ground organization. The real mission for these new type corps was only to develop at the beginning of the offensive on the ground. Their actual operations have already received detailed treatment,³ and it is necessary to avoid appraising their performances within the scope of this treatment of the period of the War of Waiting.

The background, or the "initial situation" for the following treatment of the War of Waiting has been stated in the final chapter of Part One, above.

3. Part 3, Vol. 2, Chapter X: "Der Einsatz der Flakcorps."

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The distribution of forces and computation of available strengths which must serve as a basis for the period immediately after 1 October 1939 have been stated in Chapter IV of Part One, above.⁴

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The Assembly of the Second Air Fleet has also been stated in Appendix 4 to Chapter IV of Part One, above.

The operational objectives, based on Hitler Directive No. 4 are given on p. of the same chapter.

The organization and distribution of command headquarters, status from October 1939 on, is shown in Chapter V, Part One, above.⁵

The reasoning of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force concerning the conduct of operations have also been presented in the same complex of subjects,⁶ as well Hitler Directive No. 6,⁷ which was the governing factor in all coming events during the War of Waiting.

The presentation which now follows is based on the above. That presentation will cover the end of the strictly defensive attitude of the German Air Force Command during the War of Waiting and during the period of weakness which followed until the redeployment in the West was completed, as well

4. Part One, Chapter IV, above, with Charts 1-3. ~~LA~~

5. Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V, above.

6. Chapter I, Section III, above.

7. Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V, above.

II/10 as the beginning of the aggressive attitude and aggressive
planning up to the actual opening of the Offensive in the
West on 10 May 1940.

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CHAPTER TWO

CHANGES IN THE PLANS OF OPERATIONS AND
ASSEMBLY OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

The initial situation for operational planning during the War of Waiting was created by Directive No. 6 of 9 October 1939.⁸

So far as the missions and the planning of the German Air Force were concerned, the decisively important passage in that directive was as follows:

The Air Force will prevent action by the France-British air forces against the German Army, and, so far as necessary will directly support the Army's advance. The important point here will be to prevent the Anglo-French air forces from gaining a foothold in Belgium and Holland and the landing of British troops there.

The mission for the Air Force was thus clearly stated in broad outline:

1. Action to hold down the enemy air forces, as indirect support for the Army;
2. To give the Army direct air support "insofar as this was necessary."

Some time later, the Army and the Air Force issued their operational orders.

8. Part One, Chapter V (and Appendix 4), above. Also Source 3 to Section I, No. 3a (where the complete text is given).

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The Commander in Chief of the Army on 19 and 29 October 1939 issued Assembly Order Gelb (Aufmarschanweisung Gelb)⁹.

The operational objective was ".....to annihilate the enemy forces in the area north of the Somme River and to break through to the Channel coast."¹⁰

Main emphasis in the attack was to be with the northern army group, Army Group B, which was to advance westwards on both sides of Liege. Broadly speaking, Army Group A had the mission of protecting the south flank of this movement.

Apparently the Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued his Directive No. 5, which is not available at writing,¹¹ on 20 October 1939.

However, the lack of the text of this directive does not appear too important, since the text of Directive No. 5 issued by the Second Air Fleet pursuant to the Air Force High Command directive is available. There can be no doubt that the air fleet directive is based on the High Command directive, and it clearly reveals the plans of the air fleet committed in the northern area, the area of main effort.

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Directive No. 5, issued by the Second Air Fleet on 7 November 1939,¹³ is a relatively late consolidation of a number of previous detailed orders issued by the air fleet since 27 October as advance measures to initiate a new disposition of the air fleet's air units in keeping with the new intentions of higher headquarters.¹²

For footnotes see p. 126.

Footnote 9, p. 125: For authentic text see Source 3, Section II, Par. 10 and 11. The second directive was the ruling factor in the following developments.

Footnote 10, p. 125: Par. 2a of the Army Assembly Order dated 29 October 1939.

Footnote 11, p. 125: The facts and the time can be inferred from the later Directive No. 5, dated 7 December 1939, revoking the Instructions of 20 October 1939 (Ob.d.L., Fuehrungsstab Ia Nr. 5223/39 g. Kdos. Chfs.) or modifying them. The text of this later directive was to replace that of 20 October 1939.

Footnote 12, p. 125: This relatively late issue of basic orders and directives by the Air Force will become evident time and again as the story of preparations for the offensive unfolds. In an increasing measure it becomes due to the necessity for coordination of Air Force instructions with those of the Army. As indirect and even more so direct support for the Army came more and more into prominence the operational intentions and orders of the Army (Army group and field army levels) represented the basis on which Air Force operations could be planned. For this reason Air Force orders were always issued later than those of the Army. The time between was taken up by innumerable conferences, inquiries, and requests by the Army for modifications, and so forth. Another complicating factor in the present case was that the Army still had to do its operational planning and execute its assembly movements. From the available War Journal of Army Group A, for example, it is evident that the Army Group Commanding General had only assumed command over Army Group A on 25 October.

Footnote 13, p. 125: Text from Source No. 2.

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From this directive the more important features of the operational mission assigned to the Second Air Fleet can be summarized as follows:

1. The VIII (Close Support) Air Corps was to support the advance by the Sixth Army through the frontier fortifications north of Liege; later, it would support the continued advance by this army, particularly the XVI (Armored) Corps.

2. The IV Air Corps as its first action was to attack the enemy air forces in the bases within the Ostende-Dunkirk-Calais-Euclagne-Abbeville-Cambrai-Charleroi-Brussels-Antwerp area, in order to prevent their participation in operations on the ground. Another mission was to attack enemy troop concentrations and forward movements by the Anglo-French armies westward across the Belgian frontier. In addition, units of the corps were initially to attack British army forces, with particular emphasis on tank and motorized units, in the general area of Calais-Abbeville-Arras-Lille, and were then to ^{attack} all targets detected during the anticipated advance by enemy forces.

3. The 7th Air Division was to "assemble in accordance with special instructions." It can be assumed with certainty that this was in connection with the first plans for operations against the Belgian "Reduit national"

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around Ghent, namely, plans for Operation G.¹⁴

4. The II. Luftflotte Artillery Corps had the initial mission of protecting the assembly and deployment of Army Group B forces. Then, when the German advance commenced, it was to support the Sixth Army in action to capture the Meuse River bridges and reduce the frontier fortifications as well as other enemy lines of resistance.

The directive also contains the following "orientation on the Third Air Fleet:"

This air fleet ".....committing the bulk of all bomber forces available to the German Air Force, will attack the French air forces in their bases and prevent their participation in operations on the ground. In later action it (the Third Air Fleet) will prevent any generally north-eastward advance by the French armies from their assembly areas in Northern France."

In the northern segment of the Third Air Fleet zone, the I Air Corps was also to support Army Group B.¹⁵

As previously mentioned, orders had already been issued to initiate the redeployment of air forces necessitated by this directive.¹⁶

This redeployment, which entailed considerable changes

14. See also Part Two, Chapter III, and Part Three, Chapter IV.

15. Whether the I Air Corps was then to be transferred to the Second Air Fleet in Army Group B area of main effort cannot be clarified here.

16. Pursuant to Order: Luftflottenbefehl 2--Continued.

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in strength allocations and area assignments when compared with the previous preliminary assembly,¹⁷ has been reconstructed from previously mentioned sources, namely,^{17a} "Truppen-Verordnung und Einsatzorte der Fliegerischen Verbände der Luftflotte 2 im Rahmen des neuen Fliegeraufmarsches auf Grund der Weisung Nr. 5 der Luftflotte 2 vom 7. II. 1939."¹⁸

The order of battle and assembly orders just described were to become effective on 28 October 1939, that is already ten days prior to issue of the actual Directive No. 5 by the Second Air Fleet. This meant that, according to orders, the displacements had to be completed by 5 November, and what is more, for purposes of concealment, the units moved first to interim airfields not marked in the chart included in Appendix 2. At these interim airfields, the measures to bring the units up to full strength in personnel and material were to be completed. Furthermore, the interim airfields were to remain available to the units for "rest and repair purposes."

Second Air Fleet Headquarters had reserved the decision as to when the units were to displace from their interim to their final assembly areas in accordance with the chart in Appendix 2. The movement was not to take place before 6 November 1939 at the earliest."

Footnote 16, p. 123--Continued: Fuehrungsstab Abt Ia, Nr. 7192/39 - Kdes. Chfs. vom 27. 10. 1939, mit Berichtigungen vom 6. 11. unter Leichter Nr. "Source No. 2.

Footnote 17, XXXXXX: Part One, Chapter IV, Appendix 4.

Footnote 18: Owing to the lack of suitable maps, a map presentation is not possible here.

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A comparison with this disposition of forces for the offensive with the previous temporary "defense" disposition of mid-October, as shown in Appendix 4 to Part One, Chapter IV reveals the following:

1. The bomber units had been moved forward from the far rear, where they had been stationed for "rehabilitation" to areas in the West so as to be on bases from which their striking range would be adequate for all requirements evolving from their operational missions.

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2. The VIII (Close Support) Air Corps had in the meanwhile transferred from Poland to the Western Theater. After rehabilitation at its peacetime home bases, it had moved into its tactical area at the Rhine River. It was ready for action in support of the Sixth Army.

3. The fighter units had been so reorganized that they ^{were} on airfields from where their striking range would be adequate for their mission of tactical support for the air corps and from where they could at the same time support the fighter units of the Home Air Defense System until the offensive commenced.

4. The chains of command had by now been finalized.¹⁹ The order of battle was destined to undergo continuous changes, which applied also to the allocation of airfields.

¹⁹. See also Table of Organization in Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V.

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5. The II AAA Corps, for which no table of organization is given, was at the same time to assemble in the general area of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Mönchen/Gladbach-Aachen-Bonn-Krefeld, and provide protection for the assembly against air attack besides supporting the units of the Home Air Defense System. The batteries had orders to be ready for fire on 5 November.

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6. The 7th Air Division was to transfer to the base areas of its transport units (see chart).

The above clarifies the assembly of the Second Air Fleet plus the I Air Corps of the Third Air Fleet and the X Air Corps controlled directly by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and thus of the bulk of all units of the German Air Force. No such complete and reliable information is available on the assembly of the Third Air Fleet (II and V Air Corps and I AAA Corps).

The actual air assembly status is thus known as it existed on 7 November, the day on which the Second Air Fleet issued its consolidated Directive No. 5 to its various subordinate commands.

To complete the picture of the air assembly it is stated below in relation to the operational decisions of the Supreme Military Command:

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1. According to orders by the Second Air Fleet, the air units were to displace to their ultimate tactical airfields "on 6 November at the earliest."

2. The Second Air Fleet issued its Directive No. 5 on 7 November, and at least a few days passed before the troops could effectuate the instructions it contained.

3. On 5 November, however, Hitler had already given the word that the attack was to commence on 12 November.

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4. On 7 November the deadline for attack was postponed by three days.

5. On 9 November the 19 November was stated as the earliest deadline for the attack.²⁰

In spite of these discrepancies in time between what was desired and the actual facts, it is safe to assume that the Air Force was ready for commitment by the first stated deadline for attack, the 12 November, since, as previously stressed, all necessary measures had been initiated in good time by means of detailed orders before these detailed orders appeared in the consolidated form in Directive No. 5 of the Second Air Fleet.

20. The dates given in Items 3, 4, and 5, are taken from the table given on page 5 of Part One, Chapter 1, Paragraph I: "Operation Gelb: Deadline Postponements, (Die Terminverschiebungen des Falles Gelb.)"

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The basic and initial situations for the first aggressive operation planned as well as the first assembly carried out for the planned operation having now been clarified, the further examination of command plans and measures must remain confined to incisive phase divisions in objectives, planning, and assembly movements. Hence, it is not possible to interpret and use the existing documentary evidence available for the period which now follows.

It is self-evident that continuous changes occurred in the basic directives given by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and by the Air fleet headquarters. These changes involved supplementary orders, corrections, and mission expansions in all fields, only a few of which are mentioned below:

Reconnaissance planning

Interpretation of reconnaissance information

Changes in the troop assemblies

Troop training measures during the waiting period

Planning and supervision of preparations for airborne operations

Development of the communications networks--Commitment of the Air Signal Corps

Development of the Air Force ground organization

Direction of Home air defense

Definition of the missions of the AAA corps.

In line with the principle adopted in this study to treat only fundamental operational developments in this Chapter Two.

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the next few weeks must be omitted until the next new directives from the Supreme Command entailed new planning by the Army and the Air Force.

The next phase is thus introduced by Hitler Direction No. 8 of 20 November 1939, the text of which will be found in Appendix 3.

The new directive contained no new intentions affecting the Air Force. The underlying tendency was that operability was to be maintained and further improved. This requirement applied particularly to the Army, since the Air Force was at all times ready for instant action.

On the whole the instructions concerning impending Army operations remained unchanged, the only difference of importance in the light of later developments being the statement that the possibility must be taken into account that a shift of emphasis from Army Group B to Army Group A might become necessary under certain conditions.

A point which seems important for the Air Force was the fact that, contrary to heretofore, an attack against Holland was now authorized. Otherwise the directive states: "The missions for the Air Force remain unchanged."

So far as the execution of these missions in detail is concerned, the following idea seems new and at the same time surprising: The 7th Air Division was only to be committed in

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to execute its large-scale airborne operation forming part of the overall plan for Operation Ghost "if and when possession of the bridges across the Albert Canal is secured." This planning places the two intended airborne operations in a cautive and time relation one to the other. What appears important here is that the hope of achieving surprise in Operation Ghost had apparently been abandoned.²¹

The next basic directive for the Air Force is the revised version of Directive No. 5, dated 7 December 1939, from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the text of which will be found in Appendix 4. This directive revokes all former instructions and, as a continuation of former directives, states the principles to be effective in the future.

It is not to be assumed that the new directive was an immediate result of Hitler Directive No. 8, since it will be seen that Air Force Directive No. 5 contains ideas and orders for the future conduct of operations by the air forces which differ radically from those hitherto in force.

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Here, a gap is perceptible, so far as time and evolution are concerned, between the old and the new concept. The only possible explanation is that conferences must have taken place ^{21.} Enlightenment is also the passage that the past orders "have been amplified by special oral instructions from the Fuehrer for the airborne operations and support of the Army in action to seize the Meuse River bridges west of Maastricht. This explains the almost complete lack of written sources. More will be said on this subject in Chapter III, which follows.

II/23 and agreements must have been reached between the Joint Military, the Army, and the Air Force High Commands for which no documentary evidence is available. It can be assumed with some degree of certainty that it was primarily ~~XXXXXX~~ demands by the Army which led to the changeover from the policy of primarily operational air warfare ordered in the past to the shift of emphasis in Air Force operations to action in support of the Army. This return to the "recipe for victory" of the Polish campaign thus occurred between the date of issue of the first Air Force directive on 20 October and that of the second Air Force directive on 7 December.

The primary mission of the Air Force was now formulated: ".....with the bulk of its units (the Air Force) will support the attack by the Army, concentrating its forces heavily in the areas of main effort."

Continuous air action against the Anglo-French air forces ".....insofar as they could take action against our attacking armies....." was now a secondary mission. This is the new feature, but at the same time it is a repetition of the old "recipe for victory." A logical result was that not only the Second Air Fleet, in the area of main effort, but also the Third Air Fleet in the southern areas, would have to commit stronger forces than hitherto planned to provide direct and indirect support for the Army. Only the southernmost V Air

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Corps was to combat the France-British air forces, but here also only ".....insofar as these could be committed against the (German) attack armies....."

Even the X Air Corps under direct command by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, which was to continue its air warfare against British naval forces and British merchant shipping, was required during the Army operations to attack British troop transports to the Continent and the ground service installations of the Royal Air Force in England ".....insofar as operations occurred from there against the Continent."²²

Briefly stated: the primary mission for the entire German Air Force now was to provide support for the Army.

The distribution of forces according to Directive No. 5 will be seen from Appendix 5 to the present chapter, with explanatory and supplementary information following in Appendix 6.

The new distribution of forces reveals the following basic features:

Main emphasis for the Air Force was now clearly in the South (Third Air Fleet and Army Group A), while main emphasis in the conduct of Army operations was just as clearly in the North (Second Air Fleet and Army Group B). For example, the Third Air Fleet had eight bomber wings, the Second Air Fleet only two. In contrast, the Army area

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area of main effort had the large majority of all specifically close air support units in the VIII Air Corps under the Second Air Fleet.

This obvious imbalance between operational planning and distribution of forces was partially balanced by the fact that the I Air Corps, although under the Third Air Fleet supporting Army Group A, was to commit the bulk of its forces on the south of the Army area of main effort from its bases on the north flank of the Third Air Fleet. In addition, the X Air Corps by virtue of its mission to attack targets in the south of England would also provide indirect support for the Army in its area of main effort.

In itself, the distribution of forces available thus gives no clear indication of the intensity of the planned Army support operations.

Hitler Directive No. 8²³ had mentioned the possibility that main emphasis in the overall offensive might be shifted later from north to south, namely, from Army Group B to Army Group A. In his Directive No. 5²⁴ the Commander in Chief provided against this contingency by reserving his decision ~~XX~~

~~XXXX~~ concerning all measures "after breaking through the

23. Appendix 3.

24. Paragraph 4, c, of the Directive.

Footnote 22, p. 157: In addition the 26th Bomber Wing was to be given to the Second Air Fleet at least for the first day of the offensive.

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Meuse River defense line" including the possibility of also shifting main emphasis for the Air Force from the North to the center (in which case VIII Air Corps would transfer to south and V Air Corps to north).

The chain of command as ordered by Directive No. 5 ~~KAH~~ ~~KAXFENNIK~~ on 7 December 1939 was to remain unchanged, and actually was still in effect when the offensive began on 5 May 1940. Only the distribution of forces was to be changed in some details.²⁵

Finally, a boundary map will be found in Appendix 7 showing the boundary lines between Army Groups A and B and between the Second and Third Air Fleets. One noticeable feature here is that the army group and air fleet boundaries do not coincide, but that the zone of operations of the Third Air Fleet extended into the southern areas of Army Group B. The reasons for this arrangement are unknown. The Polish campaign had already shown that it was essential, in order to secure uniform command in the conduct of an operation and to insure smooth Air Force-Army cooperation, to assign identical zones to the army groups and air fleets required to cooperate, and to avoid any overlapping. This experience was disregarded in the Western Theater.²⁶

25. For distribution of forces on 10 May 1940 see Part Four, Chapter II, Appendix A.

26. See study by same author on the Polish campaign.

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The reader is referred to Directive No. 5, Annex 2 for details on the expected or presumed enemy strengths and the enemy action thought probable, at the time.

In view of the actual reaction of the Western Powers during the German offensive in May 1940, it appears important in this discussion of German planning to emphasize what the Air Force expected as far back as at the end of 1939; namely,

1. Commitment of the bulk of the Allied air forces against the German advance on the ground.
2. Attacks against German rear communications.
3. Attacks against the German Air Force ground organization.

What actually happened in the offensive reveals to what extent these expectations, which were in every respect justifiable at the time, were vindicated by events.²⁷

The reader is referred to Directive No. 5, Annex 4 for details on the views concerning the conduct of combat operations by the German Air Force.

New and clear-cut principles for the revised planning of air operations now existed.

On the basis of the revised text of Directive No. 5 by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Second and Third Air Fleets issued their also revised and re-drafted directives 27. See Part Three "Studia West."

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and orders.

The Second Air Force retained the previous designation of "Directive No. 5" the revised version of which cancelled and replaced the former draft.

The Third Air Fleet issued "Directives for the Conduct of Operations in the Defensive Battle (Weisungen fuer die Kampffuehrung in der Abwehrschlacht)" based on the directive from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

The original text of both of the above operational orders is available, so that it is possible here for the first time to place the plans and measures of the two air fleets side by side, for a comparative study, as they existed at the turn of the year 1939-1940.

I. SECOND AIR FLEET: DIRECTIVE NO. 5 FOR THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE.

In this case the Directive from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, ~~xxx~~ dated 7 December 1939, was followed very soon by the Second Air Fleet directive of 11 December, a copy of which is attached to this chapter as Appendix 8.²⁸

It is self-understood that the orientation given on the situation and on intentions on the whole corresponded to the information given in the Air Force High Command directive.

Formulation of the mission assignment for the Second Air Fleet corresponds in all respects to the new objectives stated by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force:

28. See p. 142

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The Second Air Fleet will commit the bulk of its air units and the 7th Air Division together with the assigned 22 Infantry Division in action directly supporting the advance of the Sixth Army.

II/29

The attacks against the air forces of the Western Powers and their ground organization provided for in this mission assignment were also designed to support the Army, and altogether the new course was clearly obvious.

The missions for the IV and VIII Air Corps were also formulated in consonance with the new tendency. There is no need to repeat these here since the original text of the directive is available.

Once again only vague reference is made to the airborne operations planned against the fortress of Eben-Emael and the canal bridges west of Maastricht, as well as against the "Reduit National" around Ghent (according to special orders).^u

The mission for the II AAA Corps also is exclusively one of support for the Sixth Army.

Consonant with the primary mission of supporting the Army, the Air Force operational orders included in an annex a detailed Army order of battle in the area of main effort, and a statement of the combat missions for the Sixth and Fourth Armies.

Footnote 23, p. 141: "Der Chef der Luftflotte 2 und Befehlshaber Nord, Fuchr. Abt. Ia, Nr. 7500/51, z. Kdes., Chofs. vom 11. 12. 1939."

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The units which the Second Air Fleet was to commit in the execution of its combat mission are listed in Appendix 9: "Order of Battle for the Units of the Second Air Fleet--December 1939 (Truppenliederung der Verbände der Luftflotte 2--

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Dezember 1939)"which for the first time presents a complete and fully documented picture of the forces available and of assembly area involved.

Appendix 10: "Explanations to Second Air Fleet Order of Battle (Erläuterungen zur Truppenliederung der Luftflotte 2)" includes not only the flying units, given in Appendix 9, but also all other tactical forces.

The Second Air Fleet followed up its Directive No. 5 already on the following day, 12 December 1939, with "Special Instructions No. 1 to Directive No. 5 for Combat and Reconnaissance Operations,"²⁹ the text of which will be found in Appendix 11. It is not possible to go into an interpretation of these instructions here.

In closing this review of the orders issued by the Second Air Fleet it is necessary to discuss the concept of "Interdiction Points (Steerstelle)" mentioned in the directive.

These interdiction points, sometimes also called interdiction lines, were points which had been determined at an early stage on maps on the basis of tactical and traffic
2. "Luftflotte Kommando 2, Flugzeugabtt. Nr. 7301/39, v. 1. Aufl. vom 12. 12. 1939."

II/30

considerations and with a view to the assumed enemy advance routes, assembly areas, and assembly movements. The main targets here were points at which traffic converged, such as bridges, road intersections, and the entrances to and exits from built up areas, at or within which the enemy might become involved in congestions, concentrations, or other march difficulties. Such points were ideal targets for attack by dive- and other bomber units. Plans for attacks of this type were worked out far in advance on the basis of careful map and photo reconnaissance, which had made it possible to furnish the attack units with photographic data on all targets involved. This method proved very sound in practice.

Appendix 12 to the present chapter is the text, with outline maps, of an order by the Second Air Fleet which is a good illustration of this type of preparatory work.

II! THIRD AIR FLEET: INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE DEFENSE BATTLE.

The Third Air Fleet issued its new instructions later than the Second Air Fleet, namely on 23 December 1939. Although this late issue can be explained by the necessity for coordination with the Army, it is nevertheless to be assumed that another directive was issued previously of which no copy is available at writing.³⁰

³⁰. This can be assumed from a remark "New Version of 23 December 1939 (Neu-Fassung vom 23.12.1939)."

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In any case, however, the available text of the "New Version of 23 December 1939," a copy of which is included as Appendix 13 to this chapter, determined the developments which were to follow.³¹

Unlike the directive issued by the Second Air Fleet, the Order of Battle and Allocation of Airfields which formed part of the Third Air Fleet "Instructions" is not available, so that there is no possibility to give details on the subdivisions of the air corps and other large units, although a rough indication is available in the distribution of forces given in the Air Force High Command Directive No. 5.³² Other details have been taken from various orders issued by the Third Air Fleet concerning the allocation of installations of the ground organization and are to be found in Appendix 14 to this chapter. The two tables thus given supplement each other.

Compared with former orders and directives by the Third Air Fleet, the tone of the Air fleet's new "Instructions" also reveals a change in line with the tendency evident in the Second Air Fleet directive, in that support for the Army is a far more prominent feature. Because of the whole Army assembly, the basic mission, and the planned Army operations in the south, the change was naturally not quite as emphatic

31. "Der Chef der Luftflotte 3 und Befehlshaber West, Fuehrungsabt. Nr. 32/39 - K. u. K. Chefs. vom 23. 12. 1939."

32. See Appendix 5 to Chapter II.

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as in the case of the Second Air Fleet. Nevertheless, the Third Air Fleet from this juncture on had to base its orders on the operational plans and force dispositions of the Army,

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which are given in detail.

The new tendency is best clearly expressed in the basic order with which the "Instructions" open (Paragraph 4):

With close concentrations of its forces, the Third Air Fleet will support the attack by the Fourth, Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies.

This purpose was served not only by operations directly supporting the ground forces but also by indirect support operations, such as continuous attacks against the Anglo-French air forces and against enemy army forces moving forward from the deep rear.

In one respect, however, the original plan remained unchanged, namely, that of commencing air operations with "a surprise attack against the enemy air forces!"³³

For this initial massed attack, the air fleet precisely designated the targets. These targets were in the far rear of the French ground service organization and included air bases and air supply depots. The I, II, and V Air Corps with a total strength of twelve bomber groups were designated to carry out this first surprise attack. The three corps also had authority ^{33.} Paragraph 9 of the "Instructions."

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to commit another twelve dive- and other bomber groups. However, these also were to be committed in a surprise attack against installations of the French ground service organization with main emphasis against the bases of enemy fighters in the Cambrai-Aliens-Chateau-Thierry-Troyes-St. Dié-Diedenhafen area.

Only a small number of dive-bomber units were to be committed "for direct support of the Army in breaching the frontier fortifications;" the rest were at the disposal of the corps.

All long-range bomber forces were thus to participate in the "great attack" against the enemy air forces.

From that point on, however, the mission assignment changes drastically from past planning:

After execution of the initial powerful surprise attack against the enemy air forces, direct support for the German Army's attack, and combat action against enemy forces moving forward by rail and/or road will take precedence over all other missions.

Direct and indirect air support for the Army comes into prominence:

the I Air Corps was to give direct support to the Fourth Army;

the II Air Corps was to give direct support to the ~~XXXX~~

II/34 Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies and the XIX Army Corps.

As a secondary mission besides action to support the Army attack, action was also to be taken against the enemy air forces.

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The Third Air Fleet was to employ the V Air Corps in operational missions, with main emphasis on attacks against enemy reinforcements which it was assumed would be moved forward into the combat areas. Otherwise, the V Air Corps was earmarked for continued operations against the enemy air forces, particularly if the other two air corps could not release units for this secondary missions of theirs.

The boundary lines between the two air corps of the Third Air Fleet for reconnaissance, bombing, and bling navigation operations are shown in Appendix 15.

The zone of the V Air Corps, which extends beyond the areas shown on the map must be projected west and south as follows:

a. Boundary line in southwest from Meret-north of Orleans-Chateau du Lair (24 miles southeast of Le Mans)-Ille d'Yeu (off the Atlantic coast south of St Nazaire)

b. The zone extended southwards as far as a line from Montbard (39 miles northwest of Dijon)-the section shown in Appendix 15-Dijon-Peliguy-Swiss border west of southern tip of Lake Neuenburger See.

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One feature in the directives by the Third Air Fleet which appears particularly worthy of note is the great foresight in providing for possible operational developments: at this early stage already, clear-out missions are stated for the three air corps in the event of Army Group A developing certain operations as soon as the Meuse River would be reached between Dinant and Sedan.³ This appears particularly in-

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teresting in view of the actual execution of the operations later under the entirely different conditions of plans for the main operation through the center. Within the first few days following the opening of the offensive on 10 May 1940 the Third Air Fleet was actually to place main emphasis in the same area in its Army support operations.

34. Paragraph 12 of the Third Air Fleet "Instructions."

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Around the turn of the year 1939/40 the Air Force all along the entire line from the North Sea to the frontier of Switzerland thus had clear-cut operational orders. These operational orders provided an initial situation for action as soon as the code word to commence operations should arrive, which now as before had to be expected daily.

In the midst of the implementation of the 1st operational orders, which were to be the final orders for the time being, came a new directive from the supreme command. This directive introduced an entirely new concept, that of the "instant operation (Sofortfall)". The plans here provided against the eventuality of the Western Powers suddenly taking the initiative and rendering all German planning for the "defensive battle", meaning the westward offensive, illusory.

The possibility had to be taken into account that the enemy might open a drive east before the German offensive commenced; that Anglo-French forces might move into Belgium and Holland in a surprise operation; and that French forces also might attack the Westwall.

Against the eventuality that such instantaneous action might become necessary, the Joint Military High Command (OKW) and the Army High Command issued separate "Precautionary Directives," which necessitated new planning by the Army, in particular to insure immediate readiness for action and

II/38 an accelerated assembly for instantaneous counteraction. The Army was to be ready within the shortest possible time to launch a counterattack.

II/39 No documents are available on this subject from the Army side, so that it is not possible to appraise the results of the actual planning done in the new case.

In the case of the Air Force, it can be assumed with certainty that the results were far less incisive, since the Air Force in any case at all times had to be ready for instantaneous action. The necessity to adjust to the changed situation for the Army nevertheless necessitated certain modifications in planning and in the existing operational orders.

On 31 December 1939 the Second Air Fleet issued a Directive for Instant Action (Weisung fuer den Sofortfall), pursuant to an order received from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force of which no copy is available.

The text of the new directive will be found in Appendix 15 to the present chapter.³⁵

35. A discussion between the present author and General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff from 1938 to 1942, produced information which throws some light on the interaction between the "instant action" plans for the Army and the Air Force, which is supplemented by information from another discussion with General von Salsuth, at the time under discussion Chief of Staff Army Group B.

According to this information the subject was first raised by Army Group B in December 1939. The concept as such was not new, but obviously it had "not been taken seriously." Army Group B now insisted on plans against the eventuality stated, apparently without any initial results. The Army opinion was that in the initial stages only the Air Force would be affected by the requirements for instantaneous action. This was due to Goering, who intended to settle the whole matter without the Army.

Continued.

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The cardinal points in this directive were as follows:

On the whole, the plans and missions remained unchanged; even more emphasis was placed on direct and indirect air support for the Army.

The two planned airborne operations were not to be executed.

The air units thus released could be committed for direct support of the Army: both air corps would support the advance by the Sixth Army.

The new objectives thus stated also resulted in slight changes in the allocation of the air units which would be released from other missions. Other commands decisions were to be made contingent on information procured through long-range air reconnaissance.

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The Third Air Fleet had been able to incorporate the requirements of this new directive for "instant action" in its "Instructions for the Conduct of Combat Operations in the Defensive Battle," dated 25 December 1939.³⁶ In the event of execution of the "instant action" plan, all air units of the I and II Air Corps were to be committed immediately, from the very outset, in direct support of the Army.

Footnote 35, p. 152--Continued: The plan, accordingly, initially applied only to the Air Force. According to the two sources previously quoted, the Army only gave serious consideration to the "instant action" arrangements from mid-January 1940 on, after the Mecheln incident, which made an enemy counter-operation seem feasible if not probable. As Generals Halder and von Salmuth put it, it was only then that new directives resulted in the movements of assembled forces across the

--Continued

Rhine River

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In such case the V Air Corps alone would carry out the planned initial assault against the enemy air forces. Its units were to attack air bases and detected airfields in operation in the Cambrai-A Lens-Reuilly a.S.-Troyes-St. Dié-area
Diederhefen, with main emphasis on the northern parts of the area.

At the turn of the year the German Air Force in the West was thus ready for action in the case of either of the two contingencies considered possible:

1. It was ready for the execution, according to plan, of its missions in the repeatedly postponed German offensive.

2. It was ready for unscheduled action supporting the Army in the event of a genuine battle of defense which might develop from an Allied offensive, but which was to be a completely aggressive defense on the German side.

In dealing with this period, which was once again so extremely critical, it seems wise once again to state the preparations of the Air Force within the scope of the major command decisions.

Footnote 35, p. 152-153--Continued: forces across the Rhine River to the western side. From ~~XXXXXX~~ mid-January on the "instant action" plan of operations was to become the "normal" plan of operations.

This version is offered here with all reservations. It is based on notes prepared by the present author immediately after the discussions with Generals Halder and von Selsuth.

Footnote 36, p. 153: Appendix 13, Item 10, c.

II/41 During December 1939 Hitler had five times postponed his decision concerning the opening of the offensive.³⁷ On 27 December the decision was once again postponed, this time by a full two weeks, that is to 9 January 1940. On 10 January Hitler then decided to establish 17 January as D-Day; on 15 January D-Day was again postponed to 20 January, and then came the long postponement, until May 1940.

Prior to all of this, however, an event had occurred which caused a severe shock within the German command circles as well as among the enemy.

On 10 January, the date on which Hitler postponed D-Day to 17 January, two air officers from the Second Air Fleet lost their bearings and landed at Mechelen, near Maastricht, in Belgium. These officers had in their possession a copy of the current German plan of operations, namely Directive No. 5 for the Conduct of Operations in the Defensive Battle, issued by the Second Air Fleet.³⁸

For quite some time it was not known whether and to what extent these top-secret documents had been destroyed, and the German Command had to assume that the German plans were known to the Allies.

The compilation "Dokumente zur 7-jährigen Geschichte des Westfeldzuges"³⁹ gives full details on this matter, generally

37. Part Three, Vol. 1, Chapter I, p. 5.

38. Appendix 8 to the present chapter.

39. Source 2, Section VI.

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known as "Fall Reibherer" in German circles and as "Affaire Mechelen" abroad, and particularly on what parts of the German plan of operations actually fell into Belgian hands, so that the matter needs no further treatment here.

Repercussions within the Second Air Fleet came immediately: the Commanding General, General Felay, and his Chief of Staff Colonel Kasmhuber, GSC, were immediately removed from their posts in a brusque manner, although neither of them could in any way be held responsible for what had happened. On the same day General Keaselring was named to succeed General Felay as Commanding General, and Brigadier General Speidel (the present author and until then Chief of Staff of the First Air Fleet) as Chief of Staff, Second Air Fleet.⁴⁰

This unfortunate incident seriously damaged the reputation of the German Air Force, ~~xxx~~ but its general repercussions on the whole complex of operational planning were not as direct and decisive as was assumed at the time or as they have been portrayed at times in post-war publications. The

40. The present author was attached to the Second Air Fleet shortly before Christmas 1939 for orientation, and was to relieve Kasmhuber as Chief of Staff at an as yet unknown date. It was his good fortune that the incident occurred while Kasmhuber was still in office as the Air Fleet Chief of Staff.

The present author was also personally present when Goering, in Berlin, reprimanded General Felay, who had rendered highly meritorious services in preparations for the Western Campaign, in a most brutal manner and literally "threw him out." General Felay was never again given an assignment in the Air Force.

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fact is that the Affaire Mechelen was not considered as a reason to immediately cease current planning; otherwise Hitler would not five days later have fixed the 20 January as the deadline for execution of the plans prepared.

Other facts, developments, and considerations in January 1940 had brought about a fundamental change in operational planning by the Joint Military High Command, a detailed discussion of which would exceed the scope of the present study. The following are only a few of the factors, very briefly stated:

Unfavorable weather conditions for air operations in the winter months;

Expansion of the war to the Scandinavian territories as a result of Operation "Weserübung."

The changed concept for operations in the West by shifting the area of main effort from north to the center, where the breakthrough was to be achieved;

The first indications of these new developments became evident in an order from the Joint Military High Command on 17 January calling for "intensified measures for naval and air warfare. Excerpts from this order will be found in Appendix 17 to the present chapter.

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The actually important outcome of Affaire Mechelen, so far as the Western Theater was concerned, was a complete new

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planning for the offensive. The plans for Operation Gelb, as described in Part Three of the present study represent the connecting link with past developments.⁴⁰

Very few records are available on the last few months of the War of Waiting, namely, the first few months of 1940

This whole period was relatively quiet, undisturbed by ^{past} the daily expectation of orders setting or altering the deadline for the western offensive and devoted entirely to the interminable preparations for Operation Gelb. The tension of waiting was also overshadowed by the new and entirely unexpected developments in Scandinavia.

Both the command and troops now at last had time and quiet in carrying out the planned preparations. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Here
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the question evolved--and it was a question which could never be answered to full satisfaction--whether the preparations made were adequate to insure success on the scale actually achieved later in the offensive which commenced on 10 May 1940. ~~XX~~

The new "directives," which this time were to be final, for Operation Gelb⁴¹ first of all formed the basis for a conference between the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commanding Generals of the Second and Third Air Fleets.

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Records are available on this conference, which took place

^{40a.} Part Three, Chapter II: "Planung und Aufmarsch fuer den Fall Gelb."

^{41.} Part Three, Chapter II.

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on 29 January. However, the origins of these records are unknown, and the records themselves are not very informative. On the subject of operational problems they nevertheless reveal that Army Group C Headquarters was to cooperate with the Third Air Fleet in ".....attack preparations on a large scale, with large Air Force commitments" in the southern segment of the Army Group's zone of operations. This whole matter can only have been intended as a deceptive maneuver.

At the conference, directives were also given governing measures to increase the readiness for action. Main emphasis in training was to be on the subjects of "blind navigation flight, integrated action between aircraft crews and defense units, bombing, and high-altitude aviation." These were the subjects in which serious weaknesses had become evident in the Polish campaign, and which it had not yet been possible to remedy during the past winter.

Following this conference with the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the air fleets and the Army High Command conducted numerous carefully prepared field exercises and war maneuvers, with both the Air Force and the Army participating, to clarify all tactical and operational problems involved in the mutual offensive to be launched. One war maneuver arranged by the Army High Command on 18-19 March 1940, for example, dealt primarily with air support for mobile ground

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forces operating east and west of the Meuse River. A series of war games arranged by intermediate Air and Army commands followed.

Preparations for the airborne operations were particularly intensive, and involved sand-table games with a model of the Eben Emael fortress in which all details of the combat action to be taken by the various individual combat teams were played through to an exercise of the whole operation against what was called Fortress Holland. However, preparations did not remain restricted to theoretical activities and training: the newly developed cargo gliders (Lastenaeeler) were tried out in an exercise simulating the precise conditions of the coming operation in timing and locality; air transport units exercised with the covering forces in the air; and everything was done to promote integrated action by the various commands involved.

By early May 1940 the Air Force could with justification feel convinced that everything possible had been done to insure success in the coming offensive.

COPY OF ORIGINAL ORDER

COMMANDING GENERAL

SECOND AIR FLIGHT AND

COMMAND HQ NORTH

Operations Branch Ia

No. 7220/39, T. Secret

headquarters, 7 November 1939

Ninth of twenty-two copies

Officer Courier only!

DIRECTIVE NO. 5

1. General situation. The behaviour of the Western Powers might make it necessary for the German military forces to take the offensive in the West.

2. Intelligence. After withdrawing to the fortifications along the French northeast frontier, the France-British Army with strong mobile forces is holding the line Diedenhofen-Dunkirk for the advance across the France-Belgian border. According to reports hitherto received, the British Army in this disposition is on the left flank in the area between Douai and Calais. Back of the whole area strong operational reserves are in the far rear of Northern France.

The Belgian Army with the bulk of its forces is holding the line Liege-Antwerp, with weaker forces farther forward at the Meuse-Schelde Canal and along the frontier.

Of the Dutch Army only small forces are deployed south of the Waal River for defense purposes.

For air situation and enemy appraisal see in detail see

"Ic 1 No. 7212/39 g. Kms. Chefsache v. 3. 11. 1939."

3. The German Army of the West will attack between the Moselle River and the North Sea coast, in order to defeat the enemy opposing the advance in Belgium and Northern France and to reach the Channel coast.

Once this objective is reached the Air Force will conduct short-range air warfare against England.

4. Army Group B (North Wing of the Attack) will breach the Dutch-Belgian frontier fortifications between Venlo and the northern tip of Luxemburg and with the bulk of its forces will drive forward initially to a line generally from Brussels to the Charleroi region-Chinay. The intention is for mobile forces to drive forward as speedily as possible into the plains of Belgium in order by means of all-out attack action to prevent the establishment of an enemy battle front and in order to create favorable conditions for the attack by all German forces.

5. Order of Battle for Army Group B.

Sixth Army Mission	}	See Annex 1
Fourth Army Mission		
Boundaries		

6. Second Air Fleet, committed in Army Group B operations zone

VIII Air Corps will support advance by Sixth Army by means of direct close support action;

IV Air Corps as its initial mission will attack the

enemy air forces in their assembly air ports and prevent their participation in ground operations; later its units will attack troop concentrations as well as the Anglo-French forces moving forward from their assembly areas and, by means of continuous attacks against their march columns and transportation movements will prevent or delay their northeasterly movement towards Brussels-Ghent. If necessary, elements of the air corps will neutralize the Dutch air forces.

7. Adjacent: Third Air Fleet, employing the bulk of all bomber units of the German Air Force, will attack the French air forces in their assembly air ports and prevent their participation in battles on the ground. Later, it will prevent a northeasterly movement by the French Armies from their assembly areas in Northern France.

With its north wing forces (I Air Corps) the Third Air Fleet also will support Army Group B.

8. Reconnaissance.

a. Air Force High Command will be responsible for reconnaissance west of the line Le Havre-Orleans-Bourges-Lyon-Geneva.

b. Second Air Fleet, using the 122d Reconnaissance Group, will conduct reconnaissance west of the line Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi (localities included).

Reconnaissance Mission.

aa. Ascertain enemy air forces stationed in the Northern France-Belgium area.

bb. Maintain observation over assembly area of British Army, ascertain as early as possible troop and other transportation movements from the area ~~XXXXX~~ into Belgium in the direction of Brussels-Ghent.

cc. Detect possible landing operations in Channel ports.

c. IV and VIII Air Corps, using their headquarters reconnaissance squadrons, will insure early detection of enemy troop movements so that these can be taken under immediate attack.

In operations against the enemy air forces in their bases, tactical reconnaissance prior to the first attack is prohibited.

Special attention is drawn to the use of intruder planes (Klebeflugzeuge).

d. II AAA Corps within the scope of its missions will be assigned the AAA Air Reconnaissance Squadron II, for battle reconnaissance.

c. Air reconnaissance Boundaries.

Right Boundary: Sixth Army north boundary line

Left Boundary : Sixth Army boundary line to Diege, from there through Namur-Charleroi-Maubenge-Cambrai-Amiens-Dieppe.

f. Reconnaissance authorized for air corps on D-Day not

before Zero-Hour.

9. VIII Air Corps, in very closely integrated action with the Sixth Army will support the advance by the armored and motorized forces across the fortified defense lines and waterways, particularly in the XVI Army Corps zone of attack.

The VIII Air Corps, using its fighter units, will also provide protection for Army battle reconnaissance units within the zone of the Sixth Army.

10. IV Air Corps, in an initial surprise operation will attack the Belgian-French-British air forces in the area of Ostende-Dunkirk-Calais-Boulogne-Abbeville-Cambrai-Charleroi-Brussels-Antwerp (localities included). The object is to detect and destroy the enemy forces on the ground as early as possible.

Unoccupied ground organization installations and destruction of airfield installations not known to be occupied is prohibited. Emphasis will be on attacks against airfields at which bomber and fighter forces have been detected or are presumed.

Later the IV Air Corps will attack the British Army forces assembled in the general area of Calais-Abbeville-Arras-Lille. Main emphasis to be on action against enemy tank and motorized units, which presumably will be the first to start moving northeast.

moving northeastward. Troop assemblies and troop movements must be detected and scattered as far west as possible. Still later, the infantry divisions starting to move out will be taken under attack along their march routes, if possible while still within their assembly areas. Attacks against railroads are authorized only if military rail movements are unmistakably identified. For favorable interdiction points see Annex 2.

IV Air Corps will also prepare for a sudden swift attack against the Dutch air forces if this should become necessary.

In the execution of attacks against moving columns, units are also authorized to attack built-up areas, narrows, bridges, and similar targets if their attack appears favorable in the effort to destroy the enemy. On the whole, however, all attack action against open cities and non-military targets are strictly prohibited. In like manner industrial and other economy targets will not be attacked until further notice.

Casernes, troop training grounds, localities, tent camps, etc., known to be occupied will be attacked.

A Special Directive will follow concerning cooperation of IV Air Corps with 7th Air Division (commitment of 23rd Twin-Engine Fighter Wing).

11. 7th Air Division. The 7th Air Division will concentrate within the command zone of Second Air Fleet in

accordance with a Special Directive.

12. Boundary Line between Second and Third Air Fleets for combat operations: South boundary of Sixth Army as far as Liege, then through Nivelles-Amiens, Dieppe.

13. II AAA Corps will have its batteries ready in firing positions west of the Rhine River within the zone of the western Army from 5 November 1939 on.

Mission. To protect assembly of Army Group B and the Air Force ground organization west of the Rhine River immediately adjacent to the forces of Air Defense Command IV.

The units of the II AAA Corps deployed within the zone of Fourth Army will be placed under command by the I Air Corps. During the advance the II AAA Corps (minus the units under the I Air Corps) will support the Sixth Army in action to capture the Meuse River crossings and in action against bunker positions. In these operations the II AAA Corps will act in very close cooperation with the locally assigned commands.

During the continued advance the corps' units will follow up the ground forces closely, particularly the motorized and tank units. The mission here will be to provide protection against air attacks and at the various bridges across waterways, and to participate in ground action to swiftly break enemy resistance (antitank fire).

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Furthermore, protection of the rear communications and of the ground organization serving the VIII Air Corps west of the German frontier, particularly in the attack zone of the Sixth Army at river and canal lines will become increasingly important. For fighter protection, the II AAA Corps will cooperate very closely with the VIII Air Corps.

14. VI Air District Command, will commit the bulk of its forces to protect the Ruhr region and the Air Force ground organization, insofar as this mission is not handled by the II AAA Corps west of the Rhine River.

After the II AAA Corps has crossed the German frontier with the advancing ground forces, VI Air District Command will again deploy adequately strong forces to protect the outmost area forward of Air Defense Area Duesseldorf.

The 26th Fighter Wing will remain assigned for direct defense of the Ruhr region. Its zone of operations will be delimited in the West by the German frontier, even if the fighting front on the ground goes farther west in the course of the offensive. This applies also to pursuit operations.

15. XI Air District Command will continue its mission of preventing enemy penetrations from across the North Sea coastline, with special emphasis on North Sea ports, and of protecting airfields in operation.

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16. From midday on the day prior to D-Day I shall be at
the command post of the Second Air Fleet in Karst near Neuss.

Signed: Felzy
General der Flieger

Annexes: 1 (Annex 2 to follow).

Verified
Signed: Kammhuber
Colonel GSC.

ANNEX 1

Army Group B Order of BattleMissions of the Individual Field ArmiesBoundary Lines

1. Order of Battle [Not copied in German text]
2. Mission of Sixth Army. D-Day H-Hour Sixth Army will cross the German frontier. With main concentration in the Rearmend-Maastricht sector it will break through the Dutch and Belgian frontier fortifications and, exploiting all success to the fullest, will drive westward against the Meuse River-Schelde River and Albert-Canal fortifications. Main direction of the drive will be Brussels. After the initial breakthrough firmly concentrated and uniformly directed mobile forces will drive on Brussels and then continue in the direction of Ghent, the mission being to attack and defeat Belgian reserves being rushed forward and forward France-British forces.

The army will move strong forces following up its drive on the right flank. Early and strong reconnaissance in the direction of Antwerp is important. The movement will be covered ~~EXHAUSTIVE~~ against Holland by forces deployed in the sector north of Venlo, where German forces will only cross the border insofar as is necessary to protect the German advance.

The continued advance in the North and east sectors will isolate Antwerp.

Liege will initially be cut off by forces east of the Meuse River and later in the advance from North and West, these forces will be under unified command. Local attacks and the capture of individual works of the fortress will be required to neutralize and contain the garrison forces.

For the execution of its missions the army during the operations can rely on the receipt of further forces from the General Headquarters reserve.

3. Mission of Fourth Army. Crossing the German frontier on D-Day, H-Hour, the army will break through the Belgian fortifications in the Ardennes mountains and, with the bulk of its forces will drive forward to and across the Meuse River south of Namur, advancing westward in the general direction of Thuin. After the initial breakthrough the important point is to briskly attack and defeat enemy reinforcements being rushed forward and thus gain freedom of movement for the advance by the army's mobile forces. Bridges across the Meuse River in the Luttreich-Namur sector will be captured as speedily as possible to enable the army to advance, as ordered, along both sides of the Meuse River, thus supporting the German crossing south of Namur and insuring coordinated action with ~~them~~

action with the Sixth Army.

Luettich will be enveloped from southeast, south and southwest end, as ordered for the Sixth Army, action will be taken to capture individual fortification works in order to prepare for the operation to capture the entire fortification system. As small forces as possible will be committed to isolate Hamur.

4. VI Deputy Corps Area Command will be responsible for defense of the German borders within its area. Field-type fortifications will be constructed. The border will not be crossed.

Remarks by Author of the Present Study to
Copy of Second Air Fleet Directive No. 5

1. In a copy of the original document the precise organization, underscrinings, and so forth, have been retained.

2. The annex to the directive. Here, only excerpts which have a direct bearing on the present study have been copied. The subdivisions, which extend down to corps level have been omitted.

The boundary lines between armies and corps, which were given on a 1:100,000 scale map have also been omitted.

The important point appeared to be the missions assigned to the armies.

3. The distribution has not been included in the copy.

ORDER OF BATTLE

AND TACTICAL BASES OF THE SECOND AIR FLEET AIR UNITS
IN THE ASSEMBLY BASED ON DIRECTIVE No. 5 ISSUED BY
THE SECOND AIR FLEET ON 7 November 1939

PREFATORY REMARKS.

1. The order of battle and the tactical air bases are taken from the orders quoted in the text of Chapter Two, Footnote 16, based on corrections, alterations, and supplements, representing what was to be the temporary final arrangement for the assembly. A number of obvious errors and discrepancies have intentionally been retained.

2. I Air Corps. This corps has been included since a large share of its units were based on airfields of Second Air Fleet's ground organization and because the units of the corps in their operations were to support Army Group B.

3. X Air Corps has been included because it was still under the Second Air Fleet when the air fleet issued its first order, and because its units remained based on airfields of the air fleet even after it was placed under direct command by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

4. It has been possible here for the first time to establish the aircraft types in service in the various units.

5. The abbreviation "Westa 26" indicated 26th Weather reconnaissance Squadron.

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 2--Continued

Command Hq	Unit	Aircraft Type	Tactical Base	
Second Air Fleet	122d Recon Gp (2d-4th Sq)	He-111-H	Eddenleide, Muenster	
	26th Weather Recon Squadron	Do-17-Z	" "	
	Courier Sq	Fi-156-u Ju-52	" "	
	Transport Gp	Ju-52	Padefborn	
IV Air Corps	HQ Recon Sq	He-111-H	Rees and Basinkeln	
	<u>4th Bomber Wing</u> HQ	He-111-P	Handorf	
	I Group	He-111-P	Handorf	
	II "	He-111-P	Achmer	
	III "	He-111-P	Plantlueene	
	<u>1st Tng Wing</u> HQ	He-111-H	Laagenhagen, Hano- ver	
	I II Group	He-111-H	"	
	III-Group	He-111-H	Wunstorf	
	<u>54th Bomber Win</u> HQ	He-111-P	Vechta	
	I Group	He-111-P	"	
	II "	He-111-P	Diepholz	
	I Dive-Bomb.Gp of 136th Wing	Ju-87-B	Kirchhellen	
	126th Fighter Gp	Bf-109-D	Bemmerherdt	
	VIII Air Corps	HQ Recon Squadron	Do-17-P	Schloss Dyk near Rheydt Moenchen-Gladbach
		<u>77th Bomber Wing</u> HQ	Do-17-Z	Dortmund
		II Group	Do-17-Z	"
		III "	Do-17-Z	Werl (see missing with Do-17-Z)
<u>77th Dive-Bomb.Wing</u> HQ		Ju-87-B	Duesseldorf	
I Group		Ju-87-B	"	
II "		Ju-87-B	"	
IV " of 1st Tng Wing		Ju-87-B	Duisburg	
<u>2d Dive-Bomb Wing</u> HQ		Ju-87-B	Koeln-Catharin	
I Group		Ju-87-B	" "	
II "		Ju-87-B	" "	
III "		Ju-87-B	Koeln-Buzweiler	

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Chapter Two
Appendix 2--Continued

Command HQ	Unit	Aircraft Type	Tactical Base
VIII Air Corps-- Continued	II Group-Attack Group of 2d Tng Wing	He-123	Mannheim-Gladbach
	<u>27th Fighter Wing</u> HQ	Bf-109-E	Krefeld
	I Group	Bf-109-E	"
	I Gr. of 1st Fighter Wing	Bf-109-E	"
	I Gr. of 21st Fight- er Wing	Bf-109-E	Koeln-Butzweiler
	I Gr. of 2d Tng Wing	Bf-109-E	Gyanich
I Air Corps	HQ Recon Squadron	Do-17-P	? Duenstekoven
	<u>1st Bomber Wing</u> HQ	He-111-H	Giessen
	I Group	He-111-H	Bracht
	II "	He-111-H	Dirve, Freitscheid
	<u>2d Dive-Bomb Tng</u> <u>Wing. HQ</u>	Ju-87-B	Wahn
	I Gr. of 1st Dive-Bomb Wing	Ju-87-B	"
	III Gr. of 51st Dive-Bomb Wing	Ju-87-B	Odenorf
	I Gr. of 76th Dive-Bomb Wing	Ju-87-B	Bonn-Hangelar
	<u>77th Fighter Wing</u> HQ	Bf-109-E	Bonn-Hangelar
	I Group	Bf-109-E	Wahn
	II "	Bf-109-E	Peppenheven
	I " 52d Wing	Bf-109-E	Bonn-Hangelar
	152d Fighter Wing	Bf-109-D	Odenorf
	X Air Corps	HQ Recon Squadron	Do-17-P
<u>26th Bomber Wing</u> HQ		He-111-H	Luebeck-Blankensee
I Group		He-111-H	" "
II "		He-111-H	Schwerin
<u>30th Bomber Wing</u> HQ		Ju-88	Parchim or Westerland
I Group		Ju-88	Westerland
100th Air Sig. Bn		He-111-H	Retenburg
1st Sq, 40th Gr		Fw-200	Uetersen (in ac- tivation)
Ju-52 Night Group		Ju-52	Passberg "
Ju-36 High-Alt- titude Group		Ju-36	Lueburg "

Command	Unit	Aircraft Type	Tactical Base
VI Air District Command	Headquarters		Muenster
	26th Fighter Wing HQ	Bf-109-E	Dortmund
	I Group	Bf-109-E	"
	II "	Bf-109-E	Werb
	III "	Bf-109-E	Essen-Muehlheim
XI Air District Command	Headquarters		Hanover
	I Gp, 26th Twin-Eng Fighter Wing	Bf-109-D	Stationed on 3 airfields along North Sea coastline
	II Gp, 135th Twin-Fighter Wing	Bf-109-E	
	10th Sq, 26th Twin-Eng Fighter Wing	Bf-109-E	
7th Air Division	Headquarters	He-111	Wiedenbrueck
	1st Spec Purpose Bomber Wing w/ 4 groups	Ju-52	Werb-Guetersloh-Dortmund
	2d Spec Purpose Bomber Wing w/ 4 groups	Ju-52	Handerf-Guetersloh-Liebstadt
	3d Spec Purpose Bomber Wing w/ 4 groups	Ju-52	Faderborn-Liepspringen-Handerf-Guetersloh

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 3CopyCINC, Joint Military
High Command
OKW/WEA H. 215/39
G.Kd.s. Net Def Branch IBerlin, 20 November 1939
8 Copies
Officer Courier only.

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1! For the time being the state of readiness to continue the initiated strategic concentration must be maintained. This is the only possibility to be able to immediately exploit favorable weather conditions.

The branches of the Armed Forces will make preparations to insure that the attack can be halted even if the command to halt it should arrive as late as D-Day minus 1st Day 2300hours (A-1. Tag 23.00) [sic] at headquarters. At the latest by that a code word will be dispatched to the headquarters meaning

Rhein (execute attack) or

Elbe (halt attack).

The Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force are requested, after the date for the attack has been fixed, to inform Joint Military High Command/Air Branch, of the time usually agreed upon for the attack to commence.

2. Contrary to former directives, all measures planned against Holland are authorized, the moment the general attack commences, without special orders to this effect.

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The behavior of the Dutch Army cannot be predicted. Whenever no resistance is encountered, the invasion will be given the character of a peaceful occupation.

3. Operations on the ground will be conducted in accordance with the basic instructions contained in the Assembly Directive of 29 October, supplemented by the following:

a. All necessary preparations will be made to make a swift shift of emphasis from Army Group B to Army Group A possible if speedier and larger successes should be achieved there, which seems probable from the current distribution of forces.

b. Dutch territory will be occupied up to a line from Grebbe to the Meuse River line, including the offshore islands but for the time being excluding Texel.

c. Contrary to former instructions, the Navy is authorized to take blockade action ^{with submarines} not only against Belgian, but also against Dutch ports and shipping lanes in the night prior to the attack, and with surface and air units from the time of the commencement of the attack by Army forces. However, the time between the commencement of submarine blockade action and commencement of ground operations must be kept as short as possible. Combat action against Dutch naval units is authorized only if they adopt a hostile attitude.

At the coastal areas to be occupied the Navy will assume

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responsibility for defense by coastal artillery. Preparations have already been made for this purpose.

5. The missions of the Air Force remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by oral instructions from the Fuehrer concerning airborne operations and support for the Army in action to seize the bridges west of Maastricht. The 7th Air Division will not be committed in the airborne operation before the bridges over the Albert Canal have been secured. Steps will be taken to insure the speediest possible exchange of reports to this effect between the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Air Force. Neither in Holland nor in Belgium and Luxemburg will large open cities or industries be taken under attack without compelling military causes.

6. Closing of Borders. [Omitted because not of interest in the present study].

Distribution:

By Order
S/ Keitel
Verified
S/v. Tr. tha
Captain.

[The above copy corresponds to the text of Directive No. 8 in the Compilation of Sources (Dokumentensammlung) by Jacobson, see Source No. 5, Section I, No. 47]

DIRECTIVE BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE
GOVERNING PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

CINQ OF THE AIR FORCE Headquarters, 7 December 1939
Operations Staff Ia No. 5330/39 Top Secret
5th Copy

DIRECTIVE NO. 5

Rescinding the instructions contained in "Ob.d.L. Fuehrungsstab Ia Nr. 5295/39 g.Klas. Chefsache vom 2.10. 1939" and partially amending these in "R.d.L. und Ob.d.L. Lw-Fuehrungsstab Ia Nr. 5323/39 g.Klas. Chefsache vom 20. 10. 1939 Ziff. 1. und 2." I herewith order execution of the preparatory measures in accordance with the following instructions:

1. Infingement of Dutch-Belgian neutrality by the Western Powers might compel us to take the offensive in the Western Theater. The attack in such case will be carried out with all military forces available.

2.a. The purpose of the offensive which would then be launched with the most powerful air support possible on the north flank of the western front through the Belgian and Luxembourg areas would be to defeat the largest possible forces of the French Army and their Allies on Belgian and French soil and, with a simultaneous occupation of Holland initially as far as the Grebbe-Meuse River line, to gain as much territory as possible in Belgium, Holland and Ger-

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Northern France as base areas for continued conduct of the war against Britain and France.

For these purposes the Commander in Chief of the Army has ordered as follows:

The objective in the attacks directed by Army Group B, with Headquarters at Bad Godesburg, and Army Group A, with Headquarters at Koblenz, is to annihilate the Allied forces in the areas north of the Saine River and drive through to the Channel coast.

After breaking through the frontier fortifications north and south of Liege, Army Group B will attack in a western direction. One attack force (Sixth Army) will initially be moved forward into the Brussels area, the other army (Fourth Army) will advance on both sides of Namur against the Mevelles-Chinay line.

In the zones of the two attack forces motorized units will be dispatched towards Ghent and Tournai as early as possible.

The Maastricht and Antwerp fortresses will be enveloped.

The intention is, furthermore, to seize the Dutch territory in front of Fortress Holland as an initial measure, using the smallest possible forces for the purpose. Army Group A will extend the attack front of Army Group B and will cover the attack by all Army forces against enemy

action from south and southwest. For this reason it will dispatch its Twelfth Army, in the right flank area, as speedily as possible across the Meuse River in the Fumay-Meuse sector, then through the French fortified frontier zone in the general direction of Meuse-Dongwy-Sierck and will hold this line to cover the south flank of the overall operation. Ahead of the bulk of its forces, the Army Group will dispatch its mobile forces (the XIX Corps) to exploit the open terrain for a ~~XXXXXXXX~~ drive along both sides of Arlon, Tesigny, and Floernville towards Sedan. The mission of this force is to defeat enemy mobile forces advancing into southern Belgium and reach the western side of the Meuse River in a surprise maneuver at and southwest of Sedan, thereby creating favorable conditions for further progress of the overall operation. Army Group C, with headquarters at Frankfurt on Main will defend the fortifications within its zone, employing the smallest possible forces for the purpose.

Boundary Line (Map Scale 1:1,000,000).

Between Army Group B and Army Group A Reesbach on Sieg River (Army Gp B)-Weyerbusch (Army Gp B)-Hennef (Army Gp B)-Ahrweiler (Army Gp A)-Ahr River line to south of Ahrweiler-Hillesheim (Army Gp A)-Pruen (Army Gp A)-Frensfeld (Army Gp A)-Luetzkampen (Army Gp B)-Hoffalige (Army Gp B)-

St-Hubert (Army Group A)-Haybee, north of Feumay (Army Group B).

Between Army Group A and Army Group C Lorch-Genueden-
Hennweiler-Diesdorf (localities Army Group A).

3. The mission of the Air Force will be:

while continuing combat operations against British naval forces and their bases, to concentrate the bulk of its forces for action supporting the Army in the areas of main effort.

Of main importance in the execution of this mission will be

a. direct air support for the armies in action to breach the frontier fortifications and break resistance in the numerous defense lines and furthermore, by means of all-out attack to delay the forward movement of Anglo-French forces and rear elements of the Belgian Army, and to prevent any landing operations which might occur.

b. through continuous combat action against Anglo-French air forces which could operate against our attacking armies, and through neutralization of the Belgian and, so far as necessary, Dutch air forces, to prevent any planned commitment of the Allied air forces over our armies and against their rear communications; and to prevent anticipated early efforts of the Anglo-French air forces to gain

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lodgment in Belgium and possible in Holland. Operations against the British air forces within Britain remains subject to special orders from me personally.

c. by concentrating strong antiaircraft artillery and fighter forces in the areas of main effort in ground operations to protect the troops, their reserves, and their rear communication lines against air attack.

During the initial stages, attacks by French and British fighter forces are to be expected, so that action against them is of prior importance. Enemy air action will probably be directed primarily against Army Group A and the south areas of Army Group B. Only when the enemy enter Belgium are they likely to shift the emphasis to the center and north flank of Army Group B.

delay

To ~~XXXXXX~~ the forward movement of Anglo-French Army forces to Belgium interdiction operations against rail and road routes in northeast France and in Belgium are necessary. Attacks will be directed primarily against marching troops and moving columns and rail transport movements.

The air fleets will plan attacks against rail and road routes in agreement with the army groups. Bridges will only be destroyed in agreement with the army groups.

Attacks against any sizable towns, including military targets within them, are subject to express prior approval.

The only exception here is that attacks against troop concentrations at the entries to or exits from such towns are authorized.

4. a. Second Air Fleet will give direct support to the attack by Sixth Army in the Wreven area; will prevent any movement of enemy reinforcements to the front areas, and will attack any troop landing operations detected at the coast of Belgium and ~~Holland~~ ^{the Netherlands}; will prevent action by the France-British, Belgian, and so far as necessary the Dutch, air forces against the northern forces of Army Group B; and will deny the France-British air forces the use of airfields in Belgium and Holland.

b. In detail, the following principles will govern the conduct of operations by Second Air Fleet:

Early and effective action to delay the movement of Anglo-French forces into Belgium is of paramount importance. Under uniform direction by the Second Air Fleet, the bulk of the bomber units of that air fleet will therefore at the commencement of the offensive be committed against the assembly and forward movements of enemy forces moving towards the front of Army Group B; for the time being only weak elements will be committed against the enemy air forces in Belgium and later also in the Lille area.

Combat action against the Dutch antiaircraft artillery and air forces and/or their ground organization is authorized only within the smallest scope unescapably necessary for the conduct of the overall operation and only if they participate in combat. However, if France-British ^{or Belgian} air forces are unmistakably detected on Dutch territory they will be attacked immediately, regardless of whether they are together with Dutch air units on one and the same airfield. Destruction of the lock installations of the Albert Canal will only be authorized under special orders from me or in response to urgent requests by Army Group B. The Ghent broadcasting station will be destroyed in the first attack.

IV Air Corps (under General der Flieger Keller) on the first day of attack will support an airborne operation by the 7th Air Division (more detailed instructions have been issued separately). The primary mission here is that of direct protection and support of the approach and air landing against enemy air and ground action. So far as necessary for the purpose attacks against the Dutch antiaircraft artillery forces along the approach route of the 7th Air Division between Waal and the Belgian frontier are also authorized. Furthermore, from the beginning of the operation on the corps will hold units in reserve for action against enemy forces which might approach the Brussels-Ghent line from

the Lille area.

VIII Air Corps (under Generalmajor van Richthofen) on the first day of the offensive will commit elements to support an airborne operation by the 7th Air Division (more detailed instructions have been given separately) and in other respects will be instructed to give the strongest possible direct support to the Sixth Army. The main mission of the air corps is to annihilate the Belgian Army west of the Meuse River. Attacks against built-up areas in these operations are authorized expressly only when the localities unmistakably are occupied by troops.

The fighter units will be committed to protect the corps and the Sixth Army against enemy surprise air attacks.

The 7th Air Division had special orders. It will separate from the zone and under the command of the Second Air Fleet.

The Second Air Fleet is required to make airfield of VI Air District Command available for the I Air Corps if necessary.

c. It is important to move the VIII Air Corps forward as early as possible. All preparatory measures will be taken for this purpose.

I reserve to myself the decision as to whether, after

The Meuse River line has been breached, dive-bomber units should be transferred to the I and II Air Corps, whether the V Air Corps should be moved to the north flank, and whether other areas should release fighter units to reinforce those with the VIII and IV Air Corps.

d. II AAA Corps (under Generalmajor Dessloch) will assemble initially east of the Rhine River. After assembling, the corps, in a regiment with Army Group B will move forward into its first area of operations in such manner that it will be ready for fire action the instant Army Group B begins its assembly. The order to move forward will be given in good time (has already been given).

The initial mission of the AAA corps is to protect the assembly of the Sixth Army and support the battle for the Juliana Canal and the Meuse River line in the line of advance of the Sixth Army.

Later in the offensive main emphasis will be on ground action supporting the advance by the Sixth Army.

The fighter units currently under command of the AAA Corps will be released. For their assignment see distribution of forces. Their later return to the corps is intended.

The II AAA Corps will also release one AAA regiment to the I Air Corps (has been done).

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--Continued

5. Third Air Fleet will give direct air support to the left flank forces of Army Group B and to Army Group A, will effectively delay the forward movement of enemy forces from France, and will take combat action against the Franco-British air forces insofar as these could be committed ~~effectively~~ effectively against the German attacking armies.

a. I Air Corp (under General der Flieger Gruert) will give continuous direct support to the Fourth Army (Dunkirchen area), and will take early combat action against enemy forces advancing from the line Valenciennes-Fumay to the Meuse River.

The AAA regiment received from the II AAA Corps will be committed in agreement with the Fourth Army to protect the army's assembly movements, and at the opening of the offensive will support operations to break through the frontier fortifications.

II Air Corps (under Generalmajor Lerzer) will delay the approach of enemy forces from France by means of attacks against the rail and road routes in use for the purpose across the France-Belgian border and, together with a composite bomber wing ~~XXXXXX~~ will give direct support to the XIX Army Corps.

The corps' fighter units and those released from the I AAA Corps will be consolidated under II Air Corps command.

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--Continued

and moved far forward for commitment over the zones of the Twelfth Army (Mayen area) and the Sixteenth Army (Bad Ems area).

c. V Air Corps (under Generalmajor von Grein) will take combat action against the France-British air forces insofar as these can be committed against the [Germany] attack armies and primarily those in the Cambrai-Amiens-Chateau Thierry-Chalons-St. Dizier-Toul-Metz areas. Elements will also be committed to delay the forward movement of enemy forces to and across the France-Belgian border.

d. I AAA Corps (under General der Flakartillerie Weise) will initially assemble east of the line Bad Wildungen-Harburg-Giessen-Friedberg. In agreement with Army Group A the corps will then move into its initial area of operations early enough to be ready for fire action when Army Group A commences its assembly. The initial mission will be to protect the assembly of Army Group A. After opening of the offensive emphasis will be on antiaircraft protection over the foremost units. In addition the corps, in close coordination with the army corps and particularly with XIX Army Corps, will participate largely in ground combat action to break through the frontier fortifications and other terrain lines. The Fighter units currently under the II AAA Corps temporarily will be released for other assignment. For their new

assignment see forces distribution chart. The possibility exists that they might be returned.

e. e. In direct agreement with the Third Air Fleet, the Second Air Fleet will make airports of VI Air District Command available for operations by the I Air Corps.

6. a. X Air Corps (under Generalleutnant Geissler), under my direct command, will operate against enemy naval forces and merchant shipping in accordance with instructions from me; for the time being its zone of operations remains restricted to the North Sea, the English Channel (including its western exits), and parts on the east and south coast of England. For this purpose, and in accordance with the current overall situation and weather conditions, the corps is authorized to commit small bomber forces in armed reconnaissance missions, and to dispatch reconnaissance units closely followed by bomber forces.

The necessary reconnaissance data on targets outside coastal waters will be furnished primarily by the reconnaissance services of Naval Air Command West. Reconnaissance over the east and south coast of England and reconnaissance preceding the execution of currently assigned combat missions are responsibilities of the X Air Corps.

b. At the beginning and Termination of Army

operations in the West the X Air Corps will increase the intensity of its combat action against

Floating targets and port installations

the ground service installations of the British Air Force in England, insofar as enemy forces are operating from there against the Continent

troop transports from England to France and ~~Belgium~~ Holland, both during embarkation and while at sea.

Combat action against debarkation ports are a responsibility of the Second and Third Air Fleets. Preparations will be made to transfer the X Air Corps to the area northwest of Oldenburg in close coordination with the Second Air Fleet.

7. a. Boundary lines between Second and Third Air Fleets

for reconnaissance and combat operations: Eupen (Second Air Fleet)-Verviers (Third Air Fleet)-Idage (Second)-Hannu (Second)-Charleroi (Second)-Valenciennes (Second)-Cambrai (Second)-Amiens (Second)-Dieppe (Second).

b. Reconnaissance Boundary Lines between Air Force

in the Channel and the Air Fleets: Le Havre-Orleans-Bourges-~~LXXI~~ Lyon-Swiss border west of Geneva (localities to Third Air Fleet).

6. Reconnaissance. It is of particular importance to detect:

a. the whereabouts of Anglo-French air units, in

particular transfers to Northeastern France to the areas between the Oise and Seine Rivers;

b. the appearance of Anglo-French air forces in Belgium or Holland;

c. the whereabouts of the Belgian and Dutch air forces;

d. enemy troop transportation movements from the Reims-Aisne line across the Charleville-Lille line by rail and/or road;

e. troop debarkation operations at the coasts;

West of the line given above in Paragraph 7, b, reconnaissance will be conducted exclusively by the Air Force High Command.

9. For distribution of forces see Annex 1. (On D-Day the 20th Bomber Wing will be assigned for one day under Second Air Fleet. Operational arrangements will be made directly between Second Air Fleet and X Air Corps [Handwritten note, presumably by General von Waldau])

10. Air Defense. Commitment of the air defense forces are governed by the instructions given in Decree "A. I. E. und
U. S. D. Nr. 525/39 Kd. Oberbefehl vom 20.
10. 1939." In addition the ^{special} instructions given in the foregoing directive for protection of the attacking armies are effective. In this connection, particular attention is

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directed to protection for the Rhine and Moselle River bridges and newly captured bridges at the various lines reached in the operations.

11. Up to the commencement of the offensive, the directives previously given to the Third and Second Air Fleets concerning the attitude to be maintained towards the enemy remain effective. The air fleets will be informed of the deadline for commencement of the offensive probably three days before D-Day. Preparations will be completed immediately. Reports in this matter to be made to Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Operations Staff Ia (Handwritten remark: Third Air Fleet Completion report by the Air Fleet on 17 January 1940)

12. The assembly of Army forces will be completed in areas east of the Rhine River in such manner that the concentration for attack can be completed in three night marches.

13. Intelligence: See Annex 2.

14. Special instructions for supplies: See Annex 3.

15. Tactical principles for the conduct of operations:

See Annex 4.

16. Special instructions for air signal services: see Annex 6.

For all notation of forces see Annex 1 and Decree 'Ob. d.

L. Chef MWV Abt. 1 Nr. 75/39 z.K. Chefstabe Ia vom 26.10.1939

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--Continued

17. Maintenance of Secrecy. It is essential that all preparations be carried out with the utmost secrecy. Particular attention must be given to the camouflaging of all measures. Briefing of subordinate commands, staffs, and troop units must be restricted to the indispensable minimum. Personnel assisting in the preparations will be kept to the smallest possible number and will be sworn in writing to secrecy.

and distributed

Written material will only be prepared if absolutely essential. The same applies to maps, etc. Their proper handling in accordance with security regulations will be checked continuously.

In teletype communications use will be made only of secret channels whenever it is possible to deduce certain plans from the message being sent.

Special caution will be observed in the use of telephones.

It is impossible to overstate the importance of the above.

18. Measures of deception and concealment: see Annex 5.

(forwarded with Ob. d. L. Fue. Stub Ia Nr. 5330/39 G. K. Chef-Sache 2. Aug. vom 25. 10. 1939).

S/ Goering

Verified

S/ v. Waldau

G. l. nel, GSC

Letter Ob. d. L. Fue. Stab Ia, 15 December 1939 lists the following corrections to Directive No. 5:

1. Attached allocation of forces, revised edition of 15 December 1939, replaced the former allocation chart; revised version of 1 November 1939, which is to be destroyed

2. To be inserted as final clause: "As a standard for the concept of "sizeable towns" can be assumed generally localities with a population exceeding 5 000.

ALLOCATION OF UNITS

1. Air Force High Command Reserve

General Headquarters Reconnaissance Group

X Air Corps

1st Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group
 26th Bomber Wing, minus 7th Squadron
 30th " " " 1st "
 100th " Group
 35th High-Altitude Ju-86 Group (after activation)

2. Second Air Fleet

Headquarters Staff w/

2d, 3d, 4th Squadrons, 122 Reconnaissance Group

IV Air Corps

1st Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group
 54th Bomber Wing
 4th " "
 1st Training Wing, (minus IV and V Groups)
 26th Twin-Engine Fighter Headquarters Staff
 1st Squadron, 1st Twin Eng. Fighter Wing
 1st " 76th " " " "
 (temporarily attached)
 II Group 26th Twin Eng. Fighter Wing
 IV " 4th Air Signal Regiment

VIII Air Corps

2d Squadron, 125d Reconnaissance Group
 77th Bomber Wing
 I Group, 77th Dive-Bomber Wing
 II " " " " "
 IV " 1st Training Wing
 2d Dive-Bomber Wing
 I Group
 III "
 II " 2d Training Wing--Continued

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--ContinuedVIII Air Corps--Continued

27th Fighter Wing

I Group

I " 21st Fighter Wing

I " 1st " "

I " 2d " "

126th Fighter Group (tactically under IV Corps
for initial attack)

Special Purposes Air Signal Battalion

II Antiaircraft Artillery Corps

Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron

201st AAA Regiment

103d " "

III (Heavy) Battalion, 33d AAA Regiment

9th Air Signal Battalion

I Battalion, 11th Air Dist. Comd Sig Regiment

7th Air Division

IX Air District Command Headquarters

1st Fighter Wing Headquarters w/

2d Squadron, 186th Tr. Fighter Group

II Group, 77th Fighter Wing

I " 75th Twin-Eng. Fighter Wing (tem-
porarily w/IV Air Corps)

101st Fighter Group

10th Squadron, 26th Fighter Wing

VI Air District Command Headquarters

26th Fighter Wing Headquarters Staff w/

I Group

II "

III "

3. Third Air Fleet

2 Recon Squadrons (1st & 3d of 123d Group)

I Air Corps

5th Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group
--Continued

~~201199~~CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--ContinuedThird Air Fleet

I Air Corps--Continued

1st Bomber Wing

76th " "

1st Dive-Bomber Wing, Headquarters w/
I Group

I Group, 2d Dive-Bomber Wing

III " 51st " " "

77th Fighter Wing, Headquarters w/

I Group

I " 26th Twin-Engine Fighter Wing

152d Fighter Group

102d " "

IV Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment

202d AAA Regiment

II Air Corps Headquarters w/

3d Squadron, 121st Reconnaissance Group

2d Bomber Wing

5d Bomber Wings

53d " Wing

I Group 77th Bomber Wing

I " 70th Dive-Bomber Wing

1st Squadron, 136th Tr. St. Group

V Group, 1st Training Wing

53d Fighter Wing, Headquarters w/

3 Groups (I, II, III)

2d Fighter Wing, Headquarters w/

I Group

I Group, 75th Fighter Wing

11th Air Signal Battalion

V Air Corps

4th Squadron, 121st Reconnaissance Group

51st Bomber Wing

25th Bomber Wing

27th Bomber Wing

V Air Corps--Continued

176th Fighter Group

I AAA Corps

Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron

101st AAA Regiment

102d " "

104th " "

3dI (Heavy) Battalion, 9th AAA Regiment

III " " E. G. G.

101st Air Signal Regiment

XII Air District Command Headquarters w/

52d Fighter Wing Headquarters w/

I Group

II "

I " 51st Fighter Wing

10th Squadron, 72d Fighter Wing

VII Air District Command Headquarters w/

II Group, 51st Fighter Wing

Ia " 54th " "

Headquarters Staff, 54th Fighter Wing.

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APPENDIX 4--Continued

ANNEX 2

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

A. Ground Situation:

1. General: (Excerpt from Annex 2, Commander in Chief Army, Army General Staff, Operations Branch, No. 44440/39, 19 October 1939.

"It can be assumed that Belgium is determined to resist invasion of her sovereign territory at latest in a line from Meuse River-Albert Canal. The objective of the Franco-British Command will be to support the Belgians in holding this line, particularly the two cornerposts of Antwerp and Liege. The speedy commitment of mobile forces for this purpose is to be expected. It is to be assumed that this will be followed by a northeastward advance of strong French and British forces between the Meuse River and the coast. Possibly, a force will attack in a northward drive through the Ardennes Mountains at the same time in order to narrow down the German operational area south of Liege.

"If the German attack should crush Belgian resistance in the frontier zones before the bulk of the Anglo-French forces arrive, it is assumed that these forces will attack frontally west of the Meuse River and that efforts will be made, by pushing forward strong forces on the left flank, to secure contact with Antwerp and turn the German right

202X

CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4
Annex 2--Continued

flank. In this case also, a northward attack through the Ardennes Mountains appears possible. For this operation approximately forty French divisions could be made available now and up to sixty later, in addition to approximately seven British divisions."

2. Addendum by Commander in Chief of the Air Force. The early arrival of troop transports from England must be anticipated. For debarkation ports along the French Channel and west coast could be used besides the following seaports ~~XXXXXXXX~~ and canals in Holland and Belgium:

North Sea Canal between IJmuiden and Amsterdam
Nieuwe Waterweg between the coast and Rotterdam
Zeebrugge and Ostende and from there on the
Sea Canal to Bruges, and in certain circumstances
Vlissingen and Antwerp.

B. AIR SITUATION.

1. In view of the small size of the air forces of Belgium and Holland, effective action by them against the operations is not to be expected.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that the Belgian air forces might have thirty operable Hurricane fighters available.

2. Presumably, the air units provided to support the Franco-British Army will also be in the north French air base area until operations commence. The following are

assumed in the Cambrai-Caen-Chaumont-Troyes-Bauvais-Abbeville area:

a. French.

300 Army tactical reconnaissance planes
70 long-range reconnaissance planes
130 fighter planes
120 twin-engine fighter planes
50 bomber planes

b. British.

30 Army tactical reconnaissance planes
54 fighter planes
160 single-engine bomber planes (Battle)

The majority of the French bomber units
totalling approximately 280 bomber
and elements of British bomber units
totalling approximately 130 planes
are assumed on airfields in the areas of
Paris-Orleans-Chateaudun Nantes
around Tours, Bourges, and around Lyon.

Including all elements remaining in home bases, the
British Air Force has a total strength of

350 tactical and strategic reconnaissance planes
700 fighters (approximately)
100 single-engine bombers (approximately)
380 twin-engine bombers (approximately).

It is not assumed that further British air units, particularly fighter units, will be moved to the Continent prior to the opening of the offensive.

3. In order to escape as far as possible the full ef-

effect of German air attacks, the enemy forces operating from airfields in France, besides dispersing the majority of their air attack units in the far rear areas, will probably have taken a number of other measures:

a. the preparation of tactical airfields in Northern France;

b. the subdivision of air forces into small elements based on a large number of alternate and dispersal fields;

c. the camouflaging of aircraft while on the ground and of the ground service installations;

d. the allocation of light weapons to protect the installations of the ground organization, particularly in the northwestern areas.

4. At the beginning of the offensive it is to be assumed that the majority of the Anglo-French air units deployed in Northern France, and particularly the fighter units will oppose the German advance and endeavor to prevent German penetrations on the ground and in the air, particularly in the south of Belgium and Luxemburg, and in the rear areas between the Rhine River and the German-Belgian and German-Luxemburg frontiers.

Preplanned operations by the British and French bomber units integrated with army operations are not expected on

the first day. On the other hand it is quite likely that elements of these units will attack the German ground organization, particularly in southern Germany ^{if} weather conditions permit.

As operations proceed, at the earliest on the second day, the bulk of French and British air power, including the bomber units, will be employed primarily in direct defense against the German attack on the ground. Attacks by the bomber forces will be directed primarily against the most important approach and supply routes, rail and road, and in particular against the Rhine River bridges. Later, it is also probable that strong elements of the French air forces will again be committed against German ground service installations in operation in southern Germany. At this stage the British bomber forces will almost certainly attack the German ground organization, particularly in northwestern Germany, employing for the purposes units stationed on French airfields and on fields in Britain. These operations will include low level attacks by small and very small units.

Later again, it is to be expected that British and French bomber forces will be moved forward to the ground organization in northeastern France and Belgium. It is

ossible but hardly likely that these forces might also make use of the ground organization in the Rotterdam-Antwerp areas.

5. Attacks by larger forces against the German armament industries need not be expected until later, namely most probably only then when it will be possible to create the impression that such attacks are being carried out as reprisals.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SUPPLY SERVICES
TO DIRECTIVE No. 5

Ref.: "OB:R.L. Garrison, T. Aft. Nr. 1017/39 - Kees. U.S. Air Force
van 5. 10. 1939."

The instructions given with the above order for the supply services and in subsequent directives and orders will be supplemented and corrected as follows:

1. The allocation of medium and light fuel transport columns, insofar as these are not required for the movement of surface vehicle fuels, for the I and II AAA Corps (including the supply branch) are cancelled. The fuel transport columns thus released will be available to Third and Second Air Fleet Headquarters. They will be assigned to the fighter corps again as soon as fighter units are assigned to the AAA corps. Accordingly, these fuel transport columns must be assembled and held available.

Since the I AAA Corps is to release the 103d AAA Regiment to the II AAA Corps, the I AAA Corps will also transfer to the II AAA Corps the following: 1 unit column (with the regiment), 5 unit column (with Supply Branch), 2 light aviation fuel columns for surface vehicle fuel (with the regiment), 3 light aviation fuel columns for surface vehicle fuel (with Supply Branch). In direct negotiations the Second and Third Air Fleets will arrange the transfer of the AAA ammunition provided for this regiment.

The order "Gen. Qu. 4. Abt. (III) Nr. 1065/59 vom 7.10."
and "II. Ann. vom 17. 10. 1959" will be amended accordingly:

In direct negotiations the Second and Third Air Fleets will arrange supplies for the AAA regiment to be transferred temporarily from the I to the II Air Corps. The Commander of the III AAA Corps will remain responsible for supplies to the regiment.

The allocation of one mobile (motorized) equipment distribution unit~~s~~ each to the I and II AAA Corps for Me-109-E aircraft is cancelled.

All orders hitherto given are cancelled and the allocation of the mobile equipment distribution units will be rearranged by teletype message.

~~The~~ other paragraphs of this annex deal with minor details and do not appear important at this juncture⁷.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT
OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATER

The numerous and diversified missions of the Air Force in the Western Theater of Operations make it essential to secure maximum results by means of well considered commitments and a carefully thoughtout conduct of combat operations.

Whereas in the Polish campaign the necessity existed, consistent with the characteristics of the opposing forces and their commands, for massed attacks and for operations disregarding the ammunition situation in order to break the command organization and the morale of the Polish troops, operations in the Western Theater from the outset must be designed to strike the enemy at sensitive points and actually inflict heavy losses by means of an effective but economic use of air power.

The following indications are to emphasize the points of major importance:

A. Bomber Forces, Reconnaissance.

1. General. The effectiveness of the bomber units will be increased if the individual wings are assigned permanent zones of operations. These should not be changed too soon without compelling reasons. The familiarity of a units with the terrain and defense conditions within its zone of

operations facilitates the approach, the direction of combat action, and the attack.

Very close cooperation is essential between the battle reconnaissance units and the attack units. It is particularly important that the reconnaissance units should report as early as possible the results achieved [in an attack]. This will avert unnecessary overlapping of attack operations and an unnecessary expenditure of forces. Experience shows that

a. the actual results achieved by attacks are often not accurately assessed ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ because of too superficial observation over the targets or are ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ overestimated because of chance phenomena, such as smoke or fires, at the target;

b. the troops do not fully appreciate the importance of immediate reports on the results achieved by an attack.

Therefore, it is essential that accurate reports on attack results are decisively important for the command and avert the unnecessary commitment of forces at wrong points.

A proper selection of the type of bombs appropriate to the target of attack is essential to achieve maximum results. A faulty selection of bomb types and faulty detonator timing alone can necessitate repeat attacks against one and the same target.

B. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE MESSIAH THEATER will be governed by the following conditions:

1. the elements are equipped with modern fighter aircraft and light defense weapons. Their effectiveness can only be reduced by:

a. taking the enemy by surprise at the target. For this purpose advantage must be taken of ~~cloud~~ ^{cloud} cover for the approach, and the bombing run must be reduced to a minimum;

b. the attacks must be carried out by small units, the concentrated fire power of which will be adequate to shake off attacking enemy fighter forces.

2. the elements have a ground service organization, developed and organized in width and depth, providing extensive opportunities for dispersal on tactical airfields at the front and on rest and recuperation airfields in the rear assembly areas. From this fact evolves

a. the necessity for a steady circulation of intelligence information, so that reconnaissance reports can be followed within the shortest possible space of time by attacks against the reported targets. It is particularly important for the air corps headquarters to currently exchange reconnaissance reports with the

tactical air support commands attached to Army commands within their zones.

b. the necessity for a complete reconnaissance coverage of the entire zone of operations by the battle reconnaissance units of the various wings and makes it a sound practice to hold intruder planes ready.

c. the necessity to maintain elements ready for dispatch at very short notice.

d. the necessity to dispatch individual aircraft on night harassing attack against the enemy ground organization when weather conditions are favorable. Particularly suitable airfields for this purpose must be prepared for the commitment of bomber aircraft in night missions.

3. Consistent with their operational principles, the enemy probably will concentrate initially, attention against the rear elements of our attacking armies and at the start will only commit small elements against those parts of our Air Force which invite attack through their close proximity to the front areas, lack of camouflage, or massing.

Front area units must be widely dispersed as far as this is possible, must be camouflaged, and must be protected by numerous ground weapons always ready for action as well by the fighter units assigned to the corps.

Supply operations on the ground must be so arranged that accumulations are avoided. The time loss resulting for dispersal must be accepted as unavoidable to secure increased safety against possible enemy air attack. The effectiveness of enemy attacks can be reduced by the preparation of shelter trenches at the airfields and the construction of dummy installations outside of the tactical airfield areas. Individual aircraft not operable for any length of time and units which cannot be committed because of weather conditions must be moved rearward to rest areas.

4. In combat action against the enemy ground forces it must be borne in mind that in open terrain troop movements will be largely restricted to nights. Daytime attacks against march routes should be directed against narrow points and carried out by small units and followed up by harassing attacks by individual aircraft at night. Rail interdictions must take the form of surprise operations by small units in continuous attack and preferably against open sections. More detailed instructions will be issued by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force in agreement with the Chief of Transportation.

C. Antiaircraft Artillery. For the operations by the AAA Corps the tactical principles remain unchanged as stated in the orders given with "R.d.D. and Ob.d.L. Chef Genst. Ia EWK 5016/39 G.R. Chiffre" and "Ta 2 Nr. 2530/39 G.R." During the advance and during attack operations AAA forces will be concentrated for defense missions consonant with the terrain phase lines. After each phase line had been gained by Army forces, elements will be advanced farther forward as soon as possible. For this purpose requests must be submitted in good time for march routes to be held open.

Ammunition resupply difficulties make it necessary to authorize fire action only when the chances of hitting targets appear favorable. Efforts must be made to deliver sudden concentrated bursts of fire at the most favorable moment. As a rule no fire will be delivered against aircraft returning from their missions. Plotted fire and fire against troops marching in feet will be an exception. Concerning plotted fire attention is drawn to order "Ob.d.B. rue. Stab Ia 2 Nr. 4947/39 Gen. ver 10.10.1939."

D. Fighter Units Assigned with Air and AAA Corps. The fighter units assigned with air and AAA corps must be stationed as far forward as possible. It will be necessary to reconnoiter forward airfields in advance during the advance

on the ground, so that the units can be moved forward at least by squadrons at an early stage. Very close contact will be maintained with the motorized aircraft repairing companies and fighter spotting teams which from wing headquarters will be moved forward to the front, to insure early warning on enemy aircraft which may penetrate. Attention is drawn to vast experience in air operations on the western front.

Particular attention must be paid to the necessity for a systematic program to give new crew members practical flight experience under front line conditions.

B. Air Defense Zones. The importance of the proclaimed air defense zones for the defense economy makes it necessary to confine the operations of fighter forces assigned ^{there} ~~their~~ to the target areas they are to protect. Crew members will be bound strictly by orders in order to counter the urge to secure success at the front in the face of enemy planes downed.

Air Defense Zone Duesseldorf. Authority to fire without warning within the air over the air defense zone is restricted to action against targets at altitudes above 1650 feet.

At altitudes lower than 1650 feet all forces are authorized to fly into or across the zone, and fire action against aircraft is authorized only if they are unmistakably identified as enemy units.

At altitudes above 1650 feet fire is authorized against any aircraft not clearly identified as friendly.

As a rule friendly bomber, dive-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft are still not permitted to enter any proclaimed air defense zone. In view of the possibility, however, that weather conditions or enemy action might compel friendly aircraft to enter such zones, the existing orders are herewith changed to the effect that fire will not be opened without warning against aircraft flying at altitudes up to 1650 feet if they are noticeably below the cloud ceiling.

To leave no room for doubt, the order is repeated that no special fighter operations areas will be provided within air defense zones. Fighter action will be given precedence over antiaircraft artillery action as soon as fighters are in close proximity to the enemy aircraft to be attacked.

The barrage balloon units presently committed in the Ruhr Region Air Defense Zone will be withdrawn immediately and committed in the Northwestern areas of XI Air District Command.

F. Ground Organization. Units will take all measures for local security. Partisan activities must be expected.....

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION

In addition to the preparations provided in Directive No 5 for camouflage and concealment, the following measures for such purposes are ordered:

1. Units will be moved to their intended tactical air ports, if these are in the near front areas, on the day of the attack at the earliest.

Concealment of the dive-bomber units assigned with the IV, VIII, and I Air Corps is particularly important, since knowledge of their presence would make it possible to draw conclusions concerning the main point of effort in the attack.

2. The following deceptive measures are provided for a few days prior to the opening of the attack:

a. increased air and radio traffic by the II and V Air Corps in the zone of the Third Air Fleet;

b. temporary displacement of elements of the 7th Air Division to forward tactical air ports in the general area of Stuttgart.

Orders to execute the above measures will be given by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

3. Displacements of air port operation companies will take place only in night movements.

4. After moving into their initial areas of operations the AAA corps will carry out entrenchment work in order to simulate plans for a lengthy stay in the areas.

5. In order not to reveal the presence of strong anti-aircraft artillery defenses, only a few duty batteries and fighter units will engage enemy reconnaissance planes.

6. Intentions to attack will be simulated in front of Army Group C by means of increased fighter and reconnaissance activities. The time for such action will be ordered by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

7. The Commander in Chief of the Air Force will provide for the transmission of deceptive messages to foreign countries.

8. Instructions supplementing the already existing measures for concealment and deception in the field of radio, teletype, and telephone communications will be given separately by the Chief of Signal Affairs.

IDENTIFICATION SERVICES

1. Use will only be made of identification ammunition if antiaircraft artillery batteries have commenced firing or if they are expected to open fire because of local weather conditions. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ A general practice of firing identification signals while crossing the front lines must be avoided in order not to prematurely disclose to the enemy the identification signals used.

At high altitudes identification rounds will be fired diagonally downwards, at low altitudes sideways.

2. Within the Army zone of operations aircraft returning from missions which have not yet reached the ordered safety altitude of between 660 and 1,050 feet will fly very gradual curves at intervals of about two minutes in order to facilitate identification of the aircraft model and the German markings by friendly antiaircraft artillery units.

The descent to the prescribed safety altitude must be so carried out that, seen from the ground, the impression is not given of a slope or dive attack (descent at not more than six meters per second).

The same rules apply to aircraft crossing the zone of interior for some reason or other not at the prescribed

safety altitudes.

5. Ant aircraft artillery units will be offered an opportunity in exercises to familiarize themselves with

- a. the firing of identification signals;
- b. the gradual curves to be flown for identification

4. The identification service between Air Force and Army units is regulated by Bulletin "Genst. 3.Abt. 3443/38 Geh.
v. n 15. 9. 1938."

EXPLANATORY AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES ACCORDING TO DI-
Appendix
RECTIVE No. 5 of 7 DECEMBER 1939--ANNEX No. 5, Below.

1. The Forces Distribution Table in Appendix 5 has been compiled from Annex 1 "Anlage 1 zu Ob. d. L., Fuehrungstab Ia Nr. 5/30/39 i.Kdes., 5. Abr. Chefsache vom 7. 12. 1939." This Annex No. 1 is marked Revised version of 15 December 1939 (Neufassung vom 15. 12. 1939). It has not been possible to check whether the Annex No. 1, which is only available in a copied form, is absolutely correct.

2. All bomber units available at the time, early December, are included in the survey. However, not all bomber wings had as yet received their third group. An actual overall strength evolves of 13 wings (wing headquarters staffs) containing 31 bomber groups, since the 2d, 3d, 28th, 30th, 51st, 54th, 70th Wings on 1 December 1939 had only two groups each (See Part One, Chapter Four, Appendix 5, above).

3. The Fighter wings had three groups each. Exceptions either way are noted by mention of the actual number of groups controlled in parentheses, for example, 27th Fighter Group (5).

4. The organization of the 7th Division at the time is

not given in Annex 1 and it has not been possible to reconstruct it. It will follow later.

5. The AAA corps were organized as follows:

I AAA Corps

101st AAA Regiment

102d " "

104th " "

9th Battery, III Heavy Battalion, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
III Battalion, Goering Regiment

II AAA Corps

201st AAA Regiment

103d " "

33d Battery, III Heavy Battalion

(The ultimate organization of the II AAA Corps can be seen in (1) Part One, Chapter Five, Appendix 3, above
(2) Part Three, Chapter Ten, ~~ANNEX~~, below).

6. The Air District Commands had the following fighter strengths:

Third Air Fleet Zone.

VII Air District Command: 54th Fighter Wing (2 groups)

XII " " " 52d " " (3.5 ")

Second Air Fleet Zone.

VI Air District Command: 26th Fighter Wing

XI " " " 1st " " (3 1/3 groups)

(Explanations concerning figures in parentheses as in Item 3).

7. The names given, without ranks, are those of the commanding generals. These assignments remained unchanged until the opening of the campaign and to its end.

Appendix 5 contains one error, insofar as General der Flieger at that time was still in command of the Second Air Fleet, while General der Flieger Kesselring was only appointed to that post in January 1940.

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--Continued
Annex 8

COPY

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DIRECTIVE No. 5 FOR THE BATTLE OF DEFENSE

1. General Situation. Violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality ~~KIEM~~ by the Western Powers might make it compulsory to assume the offensive in the West.

2. Intelligence. After retiring to the fortifications of the French northeast front, the allied France-British Army with strong mobile forces is holding the line Diedenhofen-Dunkirk ready for the advance across the France-Belgian frontier. According to reports hitherto received the British Army in this disposition is on the left flank in the area between Douai and Calais. Back of this entire area strong operational reserves are in the far rear of the northern territories of France.

The bulk of the Belgian Army forces are holding the Liege-Antwerp line, with lesser forces ^{farther forward} at the Meuse-Schelde Canal the frontier.

Of the Dutch Army only relatively small forces are south of the Waal River allotted in security missions.

For air situation and estimate of enemy potential see

in detail see "I c l Nr. 7212/39 . Kiss. Chefseche van
3. 11. 1919."

3. The German Army of the West, with very strong air support, will launch its offensive on a front between the North Sea and the Moselle River, driving through the Belgium-Luxemburg area to defeat as large parts of the French Army and its allies on Belgian and northern French soil, at the same time occupying Holland, primarily as far as XXXXXX the Grebbe-Meuse River line and as much ground as possible in Belgium and Northern France as a base area for the continued conduct of the war against Britain and France.

4. Army Group B (on the north) of the attack) has the mission to destroy the enemy forces north of the Seine River and drive through to the Channel coast. After breaking through the frontier fortifications, it will attack in a westward drive, passing Liege on both sides.

The northern group, Sixth Army, initially will be dispatched in a drive to the Brussels area, the southern attack group, the Fourth Army, will advance on both sides of Namur against the XXXXXXX Nivelles-Chinay line. In the zones of both attack groups mobile forces will be sent forward as early as possible in the direction of Ghent-Tuin.

The fortresses of Liege and Antwerp are to be invested.

Plans also provide for a smaller force (X Army Corps with the assigned 1st Cavalry Division), to occupy the rest of Holland with the exception of the part known as the Fortress of Holland (Fortress Holland).

5. For Army Group B Order of Battle see Annex 2.

6. Adjacent Forces.

a. Third Air Fleet will commit the bulk of its bomber units to attack the French air forces in their assembly bases and prevent their participation in ground operations. As the attack develops the air fleet will prevent movements of the French armies from their assembly areas towards areas generally northwest.

The Third Air Fleet will also employ its northern forces (I Air Corps) in action coordinated with Army Group B.

b. X Air Corps, directly under the Air Force High Command, will cooperate closely with the Navy and the Naval Air Command in action primarily against British naval forces at sea, in ports and in docks. It is likely that action will have to be taken against the south coast of England and in the Channel, from bases in the area northwest of Oldenburg, to combat troop transport ships. Accordingly, the X Air Corps will conduct air reconnaissance over the

entire North Sea and the English Channel consistent with developments in the Naval situation, this whole area will be its reconnaissance and combat zone.

7. The Second Air Fleet will commit the bulk of its air forces and the 7th Air Division (plus the assigned 22d Infantry Division) to support the attack by the Sixth Army. In particular, the air fleet will prevent the approach of enemy reinforcements to the front by attacks against troop concentrations, marching columns, and possible troop landing operations at the Belgium-Holland coast. It will prevent action by the Franco-British, Belgian, and so far as the situation requires, Dutch air forces against the north flank of Army Group B. By means of all-out attacks it will prevent the Anglo-French air forces from gaining a foothold in the areas of Belgium and Holland.

With strong concentrations of fighter and anti-aircraft artillery forces the air fleet will protect the troops in combat in the areas of main effort on the ground, as well as their reserves and rear communications, against air attack.

In Home Air Defense, main emphasis is on protection for the Air Force ground organization and vital industries.

8. For details on the forces allocated, the distribution and their first area of commitment see Annex 1.

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9. Reconnaissance.

a. The Air Force High Command will conduct reconnaissance west of a line through Le Havre-Orleans, Bourges, Lyon-Geneva.

b. Second Air Fleet, employing the 122d Reconnaissance Group, will be responsible for reconnaissance northwest and west of the line through the West Frisian Islands, Amsterdam-Antwerp, Brussels-Nivelles (islands and localities included).

The Reconnaissance Mission.

aa. To ascertain the disposition of the enemy air forces in the Northern France-Belgium areas.

bb. To maintain observation over the assembly areas of the British Army, and to detect as early as possible any troop and transportation movements from these areas into Belgium in the direction of Brussels-Ghent.

cc. To detect possible landing operations at the coast.

c. The IV and VIII Air Corps will employ their headquarters reconnaissance squadrons for the early detection of enemy troop movements to insure immediate combat action against such movements.

In the combat action planned against the enemy air forces on the ground, tactical reconnaissance prior to the initial attack is prohibited.

Particular attention is drawn to the use of intruder planes.

d. The II MAA Corps will have the II Reconnaissance Squadron available for the battle reconnaissance necessary in the execution of its assigned missions.

e. Air Reconnaissance Boundaries.

On Right: North Sea Coastline
tip

On Left: Southeast corner of the Maastricht corner -Liege-Charleroi-Valenciennes-Amiens-Dieppe (localities included).

f. Border crossing by reconnaissance units on D-Day authorized only from H-Hour plus five minutes on.

10. Mission of VIII Air Corps. On the first day of attack, the VIII Corps will commit units to support an airborne operation by the 7th Air Division (see Special Orders).

In action closely coordinated with the Sixth Army (area of main effort at and west of Maastricht) the corps will support the ground forces in the advance across the fortified outpost lines and watercourses in the catchment area of the Meuse River and will annihilate the Belgian Army west of that area. In these operations an order to be strictly observed is that ~~XXXXXX~~ attacks against localities are only authorized if it is definitely established that they

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are occupied by troops.

The corps will commit its fighter forces in action to establish air superiority over the attack zone of the Sixth Army.

11. IV Air Corps, on the first day of attack will support the airborne operation by the 7th ^{Air} Division by annihilating the Dutch and Belgian air forces and attacking the ground defenses within the area in which the 7th Air Division will operate. Adequately strong forces will be dispatched in a concentrated surprise attack against the air bases probably used by fighter forces, for example at Eindhoven, Gilze, Deurne, Evèrè, Nivelles, and Vliessingen. With the bulk of its bomber forces the corps in continuous day and night operations will attack enemy troop concentrations and the bridge transports and march movements expected in the area around Lille-Armentières-Bethune-Arras-Valenciennes and/or towards the Brussels-Ghent line from midday on D-Day on.

As alternate targets the units will select interdiction points, such as narrow sections, entrances to and exits from built up areas, and important road intersections.

For combat action against the Dutch air forces and their ground service installations, as well as against possible landing attempts in Holland, the 26th Bomber Group will be tactically assigned to the IV Air Corps for the first day

of the attack.

12. The 7th Air Division, reinforced by the 22d Infantry Division or parts of the division, will be used to execute an airborne operation according to a special order.

13. The II Air Corps (two regiments) initially will protect the concentration movements of the Sixth Army. With this army it will open the attack and support the army forces in crossing the Juliana Canal and the Meuse River line, as well as in battle for the bunkers. As the attack progresses the corps units will keep pace with the advance and will be committed simultaneously with motorized and tank divisions in the foremost line ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ in action against air and ground targets ~~XXXXXXXX~~ closely coordinated with the local commands of the Army. Brisk operations exploiting the great mobility and flexibility and high fire power of its units enable the AAA corps to make a major contribution to the success of the drive to the Belgian and north French coastlines.

14. The VI Air District Command with the bulk of its forces will protect the Ruhr region, the Air Force ground organization, and the rear communication lines of the Army (main emphasis on Rhine River bridges).

After occupation of Belgian and Dutch territories, the

VI Air District Command will assume responsibility for protection of the ground installations in use and of the rear communication lines of the Army. For these purposes it will commit

In the Dutch territories: The AAA Training Regiment (6th Battalion), and the 51st Fighter Wing (two fighter groups)

In Belgian territories: The VI AAA Brigade.

Linkin with the XI Air District Command approximately at a line through Maastricht-Aachen-Eindhoven, the VI Air District Command will develop an air defense outpost area.

The 26th Fighter Wing will remain committed with the mission of direct defense of the Ruhr region. Its zone of operations is bounded on the west by the German frontier, even if the front moves farther westwards. This applies also to pursuit operations. On D-Day the 26th Fighter Division must count on having to release two of its groups for one day to the IV Air Corps.

15. The XI Air District Command will prevent enemy penetrations over the North Sea coastline and, with main emphasis on the North Sea ports and the service installations of the ground organization in use at occupied airfields will protect its areas against air attack.

With occupation of Holland, the air district command will assume responsibility within the occupied territories

for

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4
Annex 3--Continued

for protection of the Air Force ground organization and of the rear communication lines of the Army and, linking with the VI Air District Command at a line approximately through Aeldeern-Messel-Groningen will develop an air defense outpost area. It will commit elements to support army forces in occupying the West Frisian Islands, namely fighters and light AAA units for protection against air attack. An early aircraft warning line will be established by placing air observers on the islands.

16. Boundary Lines:

a. Between Second and Third Air Fleets for combat operations: southeast tip of the Maastricht corner-Liege-Nivelles-Valenciennes-Aixens-Dieppe (localities to Second Air Fleet).

b. Between IV and VIII Air Corps: On D-Day: Venlo-Weert-Diest-Richemont-Natur (localities to VIII Air Corps)

From D-Day plus one until further notice: Venlo-Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi (Deurne and Ryvere air bases to IV Air Corps).

As the attack by the Sixth Army gains ground the boundary will be advanced westwards.

c. Between VI and XI Air District Commands: during operations against Holland: Quakenbrueck (including air base to VI Air District Command)-Messen-Sceverden-southern tip of

Yssel Zee.

17. From 1200 noon on the day prior to the attack I shall be at Second Air Fleet Command Post in Kaarst near Mense.

S/ Pelag
General der Flieger

Distribution:

EXPLANATORY MATERIAL TO THE SECOND AIR FLEET

ORDER OF BATTLE
(Appendix 9)

1. Appendix 9; "Second Air Fleet Order of Battle (Truppen-
gliederung der Verbände der Luftflotte 2)," has been compiled
from the appropriate annex to Directive No. 5 for the Battle
of Defense, Appendix 9 to the present chapter.

2. Only the flying units of the Second Air Fleet have
been included, together with the fighter units of the air
district commands under the Second Air Fleet.

The flying forces of the X Air Corps are not included,
since they were not tactically assigned to the Second Air
Fleet, with the exception of the 26th Bomber Wing, assigned
only for one day, on D-Day.

3. The tactical symbols for the individual arms and
services are those in use at the time.

4. In the case of the aircarried ground forces of the
7th Air Division and the 22^d Infantry Division, all units
smaller than battalion size, for example the antitank, re-
connaissance, and medical units, have been omitted to avoid
confusion.

For security reasons the localities for action were
omitted in the original and also do not appear here.

5. The tables of organization for the antiaircraft artillery have not been included. The strengths were as follows: The II AAA Corps, with headquarters at Meerssen-Gladbach, according to the original Order of Battle, had the 103d, 201st, 202d AAA regiments, each with four battalions of each three heavy and one light batteries; corps troops were approximately as given in Part One, Chapter Five of the present study.

The antiaircraft artillery units allocated for home defense in the VI and XI Air District Command zones also are not included.

In the case of the II AAA Corps the fact must also be noted that the 202d AAA Regiment was tactically assigned to the I Air Corps (Third Air Fleet).

6. Within the zone of the VI Air District Command, the 12th, 14, and 16th Special Air District Commands had been organized for commitment in the German advance.

7. Within the zone of the VI Air District Command fighter units were also concentrated (51st Fighter Wing Headquarters with two groups) which, together with the AAA Training Regiment also held available for the purpose, were to assume responsibility for protection of the ground installations used by the German Air Force in Holland and Belgium after

Belgium and Holland after KRAKE countries had been occupied and to protect the rear communications of the Army.

The VI AAA Brigade was to take over the same responsibilities in Belgium.

All of these units were under command by the VI Air District Command.

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 11CopyLUFTVLOTTEKOLMANNO 2
Führungsbteilung

Headquarters, 12 December 1939

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS No 1 to

Directive No. 5 for Combat and Reconnaissance

(Revised)

A. Beaver Units.

1. Each corps and the 7th Air Division will receive special orders concerning the possible forms of the initial action.

From these special orders any changes which might become necessary in the command assignments of the various units for tactical purposes will evolve.

2. Principles for the Conduct of Combat Operations.a. Attitude towards Belgium and Holland:

It is to be assumed that the Government and the population in Belgium will resist invasion as energetically and with the use of all means available as was the case in 1914. In Holland this is not quite as definitely the case. The attitude of the Dutch Army cannot be predicted.

The occupation of these countries rendered necessary by the attitude of the Western enemies initially necessitates that the greatest possible consideration be shown for the

countries and the population so far as military requirements permit. These must be implemented with all energy, and all measures allowed by international law must be used to break resistance. Where no resistance is encountered the ^{invasion} ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~ is to be given the characteristics of a peaceful occupation.


b. In attacks against moving columns and troop concentrations the following points must be borne in mind:

Attacks against permanent type targets, such as railroads, roads, bridges, and built-up areas, produce only direct and delaying results but no annihilating effects, unless they strike enemy troops at such narrow points.

c. Attacks to destroy bridges in Belgium are authorized only in agreement with the Sixth Army.

Attacks against sizable towns, including military depots they might contain, are subject to express approval by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Excepted are attacks against troop concentrations at the entrances to and exits from such towns. A list of "sizable towns" will follow.

d. Attacks to destroy the lock installations of the Albert Canal will only be undertaken on orders from the Second Air Fleet. Requests from Army commands for such attacks will be forwarded to Second Air Fleet Headquarters.



e. Attacks against Dutch anti-aircraft artillery forces, and air forces--particularly fighters, on their ground service installations will be restricted to the absolute minimum necessitated in the execution of assigned missions. Attacks are authorized only if they participate in combat operations or if French, British, or Belgian air units are unmistakably identified on the airfields. In combat action against such French, British, or Belgian units, no consideration can be shown for Dutch units.

3. Concerning the weapons to be used in the battle of defense attention is drawn to letter "Hrl. Kdo. 2, Fuehrungsabt. Ia Nr. 2911/39 vom 5. 12. 1939."

Selection of the appropriate weapons for attack must be considered as of incisive importance, and must go hand in hand with a purposeful and economic use.

4. The initial border crossing by air units at H-Hour will take place above the cloud level; if there are no clouds the units will fly at various altitudes and with throttled engines.

5. Attention is drawn to the airfields specially equipped for night landing operations, namely:

Koeln-Batzweiler,	Koeln-Catharin,	Duesseldorf,
Bortmund,	Plantlueppe,	Maeterloh
Handerf,	Wesendorf,	Belsenkerst.

Under special circumstances use can also be made of Third Air Fleet air bases and tactical airfields. There, the following airfields in the border areas are specially equipped for night landings: Bonn-Hangelar, Wahn, and Gleesen.

6. Code Words:

a. The following code words will be given to initiate the assembly and the commencement of combat operations:

a. "Displacement Exercise (with date) (Vorlesungsbuch...
...26."

This will mean that the air units in accordance with Directive No. 5, Annex 1, must complete their displacement by thirty minutes before dark on the date specified.

b. "Freedom(Date)....(Time) (Freiheit...Tag... Uhrzeit)!" The date given will be D-Day and the time given will be H-Hour. At the time given, bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance units are authorized to cross the borders in accordance with the requirements of Directive No. 5.

Existing instructions are supplemented as follows:

The air corps, the II AAA Corps, and the air district commands will insure that the operations planned for the morning of D-Day can still be halted if orders to halt them reach the corps and air district command headquarters by 0200 hours on D-Day.

By that time at latest one or the other of the following two codewords will be transmitted by secret teletype channels:

Rhein--meaning that the attack is to commence
Elbe---meaning that the attack will not commence.

By 20 December 1939 the above corps and air district command headquarters will report to Headquarters, Second Air Fleet, Operations Branch, that measures have been taken insuring that the code words will be received in time by all agencies concerned.

7. Key Times. To avoid misunderstandings, the various key times for the Battle of Defense are stated as follows:

First day of the Battle of Defense--D-Day (in German A-Tag)

Deadline for first border crossing by air units and commencement of the attack by Army forces --H-Hour (in German X-Zeit)

Deadline for takeoff by first echelons of 7th Air Division --u-Hour

Deadline for take-off by first echelons of 22d Infantry Division --y-Hour

Deadline for commencement of radio deception by 7th Air Division --t-Hour

Only independently acting unit commanders down to wing or regiment level will be oriented on the meaning of these codewords, and they only so far as necessary.

8. The dates and time will be transmitted in code according to Annex 1.

9. The airfields immediately south of the boundary

with Third Air Fleet near Arians (Targets 1054 and 1052) will be attacked by units of the Third Air Fleet.

B. Reconnaissance.

1. In view of the way in which the reconnaissance zones of the Operational Air Arm and those of the Army overlap, a speedy exchange of reconnaissance results and a mutual orientation as reconnaissance plans is of especial importance.

The VIII Air Corps and the Sixth Army will make appropriate mutual arrangements. Second Air Fleet (with command post Falke--Intelligence section) will exchange reports and information with Army Group B and the Third Air Fleet.

2. For the same reasons as given above, the air corps will plan their reconnaissance in close coordination with the Intelligence Section of the Second Air Fleet (Command Post Falke).

3. A forward photo section, ^{from the 122d Reconnaissance Group} is stationed at the Dueseldorf air base to handle simple and urgent photographic work for Second Air Fleet Command Post Falke, and to process speedily all important reconnaissance reports from the 122d Reconnaissance Group. The section is assigned tactically to the Intelligence Section Command Post Falke.

4. Intruder Aircraft. Insofar as they have the necessary forces available and time permits, the air corps will

issue appropriate instructions to insure immediate combat action against any enemy air units detected by intruder aircraft within the Second Air Fleet zone.

In reporting, intruder aircraft will use their wing frequency or the frequency used by the reconnaissance group. Speedy transmission of reported reconnaissance results through intelligence channels is essential, particularly the station reports sent by intruder aircraft.

C. Special Instructions for Reconnaissance Operations by the 1224 Reconnaissance Group. Starting on D-Day, the 1224 Reconnaissance Group will conduct reconnaissance in the areas of Northern France, Belgium, and Holland west of a line through the West Frisian Islands-Amsterdam-Antwerp, Brussels-Charleroi.

To supplement intelligence information already available by that time the important point will be to ascertain:

1. the whereabouts of the Anglo-British air forces (this is of primary importance) particularly in the Lille and Arras areas and the coastal areas of Northern France.
2. the enemy assembly areas opposite the Belgian frontier in the assumed assembly area of Dunkirk-Calais-Cambrai-Valenciennes.
3. the movements of additional enemy forces to Belgium.

- a. From the Calais-Dieppe-Amiens-Cambrai area;
- b. by means of troop landing operations in French

Belgian, and Dutch ports north of Dieppe. (are any lateral troop movements noticeable?) Here again emphasis will be on Boulogne and ports farther south. Smaller landing might also occur between Hook van Holland and Calais.

4. The Dutch air forces and their ground service organization as well as the West Frisian Islands must be kept under observation (main emphasis on the area known as Fortress of Holland--Festung Holland).

For The Air Fleet Command
Chief of Staff
S/ Kanakuber

Distribution:

Annex 1: Key Times Chart [not copied here].

Der Chef der Luftflotte 2
und Befehlshaber Nord

Grenadier, 8 November 1939

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with Annex 2 and Overlays A & B

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Supplementary to the above order, Annex 2 and Overlays
A and B herewith.

For Second Air Fleet

Chief of Staff

By Order S/Rieckhoff

Lieutenant Colonel, GSC

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FAVORABLE INTERDICTION POINTS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST
ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENTS

A. Rail Routes (Map Scale 1:1 000 000)

The road targets favorable for rail interdiction are
consolidated under a western and an eastern zone (See Over-
lays A and B of Annex 2).

In the western zone the following points, among others,
are favorable for railroad destruction:

1. the Hazebrouk-Armentières section
2. east of Merville
3. the Bethune-Fagnareuil section
4. the St Paul rail depot
5. Target Anthulle No. 4209 north of Albert near Miraumont
6. Target Halley No. 4208 northeast of Daullemis near Mondicourt
7. Maroilles, Target 4156, 6 miles southwest of Cambrai

In the Eastern Zone:

8. the open way half way between Bruges and Ghent
9. south of Thorout
10. rail intersection at exit from Courtrai
11. Wervicq, 3 miles southwest of Menin
12. open way halfway between Hemsaux and Avelghem, east of Lettignies
13. west of Teruzzi before reaching crossing to Lille and Courtrai
14. half way from Leuze to Ath
15. at Quiévrain between Valenciennes and Mons.

B. Road Routes (Map 1:500 000) (see Overlay B, Annex 2)

If possible, transportation movements on road routes should be attacked at the following favorable interdiction points:

<u>Road Route</u>	<u>Interdiction Point</u>
1. Dunkirk-Bailleul-Lille	a. Rail and road bridge over canal at northwest exit from Bergues
1a. Dunkirk-Ypres-Menin-Courtrai-Audenarde-Minove-Brussels	b. Road intersection at Cassel, 15 miles south of Dunkirk
	c. Bridge west of Ypres, road intersection Avelghem and Nederbrassel
XXXXXXXX, STONESTY	

- | | |
|---|--|
| 2. Calais, St Omer,
Bethune, Lille | a. Rail-road river bridge north of
Arras, 6 miles southeast of
Calais
b. Rail-road river bridge La
Bassee |
| 3. Boulogne, St Omer | a. Road intersection Colombert, 11
miles east of Boulogne |
| 4. Etaples, Arras,
Cambrai | a. Rail-road crossing Marequiel,
13 miles southeast of Etaples
b. Rail-road crossing Rollocourt,
SE of St Pol
c. Road river bridge 6 miles
northwest of Cambrai |
| 5. Abbeville, Doullens, | a. Road intersection 1.75 miles
NW of Doullens
b. Road bridge over Scarpe River
2 miles NE of Bauai |
| 6. Amiens, Cambrai,
Valenciennes, Mons,
Brussels | a. Road intersection Bapaume
b. Road bridge 600 yards east of
Denain
c. Traine le Coete, 18 miles SW of
Brussels |
| 7. Valenciennes, Ghent | a. Road bridge north exit from
Peruwelz
b. Andenarde |
| 8. Ghislenghien, Ghent | a. Leasines, narrow gage rail-
road-river intersection |
| 9. Ostende, Therouap,
Lichtervelde, Thielt,
Ghent | a. Lichtervelde
b. Road intersection Thielt |
| 10. Lille, Ghent | a. Road intersection 10 miles NE
of Courtrai
b. Road intersection Cruysmuntten |
| 11. Bruges, Ghent | Road-River crossing 12 miles
east of Maldegem |
| Lille, Fournai-Deuze-
Ath-Borghien-Had | Road intersection Ghislenghien
Road intersection Orsies |

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 19

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Der Chef der Luftflotte 3
und Befehlshaber West

23 December 1939

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DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

IN THE BATTLE OF DEFENSE

(Revised 23 December 1939)

1. A Franco-British attack through Belgium-Luxemburg the German Army would repel with support from the Air Force by means of a counterattack.

Army Group B, advancing along a line on both sides of Liège-Nivelles, will drive the enemy back to the Sennel coast. On the army group's left flank, elements of the Fourth Army will invest the Liège fortress from south and west and with the bulk of its forces, spearheaded by armored forces, the army group will initially fight its way across the Meuse River at Huy and Dinant.

Left of the Fourth Army, Army Group A forces will attack in a drive aimed generally towards Laon.

The Twelfth Army, supported by forward motorized units (XIX Army Corps), will advance to and across the Meuse River between Fumay and Meuzen.

The Sixteenth Army will advance to the line Meuzen-Sierck and cover the left flank of the entire Army operation.

Should the enemy advance in a surprise offensive during the German assembly, the German armies will immediately go into action in the current order of battle in a counterattack.

Army Group C will defend the Westwall fortifications from the Moselle River to the Swiss border.

2. For enemy estimate see Order "Verfuehung Lfl. Kdoe. 3 Nr. 1560/39 g.Kdoe. vom 1. XI. 1939" and "Nr. 2582/39 vom 22. XII. 1939."

3. Army Headquarters within the Zone of the Third Air Fleet.

Army Group B	(Godesberg, later Dueren)
Fourth Army	(Cologne, later Schmidtstein)
Army Group A	(Koblenz, later Heilst Gruenenwald, north of Wittlich)
Twelfth Army	(Mayen, later Schloss Malberg)
XIX Army Corps	(Biburg)
Sixteenth Army	(Bertrich, later Welschbillig)
Army Group C	(Frankfurt on Main)
First Army	(Bad Kreuznach)
Seventh Army	(Calw)

Boundary Lines: (Map 1:300 000)

between Sixth and Fourth Armies: Keeln-Ehrenfeld (Sixth Army)-Hespenderf (Sixth)-3300 yards northwest of Dueren (Fourth Army)-Roergen (Fourth)-Eugen (Sixth)-Hiese (Sixth)-Nivelles (Fourth).

between Fourth and Twelfth Armies: Hoenef (Fourth)-Aarweiler (Twelfth)-Aar River line as far as south of Antweiler-Hillesheim (Twelfth)-Fraenn (Twelfth)-Prnsfeld (Twelfth)-

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Laetskaepen (Fourth)-Heuffalize (Fourth)-St Hubert (Twelvth)-Haybes, north of Fussy (Fourth).

between Twelvth and Sixteenth Armies: Benderf (Sixteenth)-Ostendung (Sixteenth)-Kaisersesch (Sixteenth)-Eitbur (Twelvth)-Pollendorf (Sixteenth)-Ettelbrueck (Twelvth)-Martelange (Twelvth)-Neufchateau (Twelvth)-Chiny (Sixteenth)-Carigan (Sixteenth).

between Sixteenth and First Armies: Lorch (Sixteenth)-Gemuenden (Sixteenth)-Nennweiler (Sixteenth)-Diesdorf (Sixteenth).

between First and Seventh Armies: Mingsheim (Seventh)-Phillipsburg (First)-Gernersheim (First)-Rhine River line to east of Lauterburg.

4. Third Air Fleet will support the attack by the Fourth, Twelvth, and Sixteenth Armies, concentrating its forces tightly in the areas of main effort. The main requirements in the performance of this mission are:

a. continuous combat action against the Anglo-French air forces, initially in the area of Cambrai-Amiens-Chateau Thierry-Reyes-St Dié-Dieden-Don, to prevent preplanned operations by the Allied air forces over our attacking armies.

b. direct air support for the armies in action to breach the fortification belts and numerous river lines of defense, and action to delay the advance of Anglo-French forces and rearward elements of the Belgian Army.

c. to concentrate strong anti-aircraft artillery and fighter forces at the points of main effort in ground

operations to protect the attack units of the Army and Air Force against air attack, together with their rear communication lines.

5. Boundary Lines for Reconnaissance, ^{combat} hunting, and blind navigation operations (Outline Map Scale 1: 1 000 000, Sheet 3 northwest):

a. between Second and Third Air Fleets (localities to Second Air Fleet): Southeast tip of Maastricht-Cornar-Biege-Hivelles-V. lenciennes-Amiens-Dieppe;

b. Between I and II Air Corps (localities to I Air Corps): Silgeltstein (II Air Corps)-Neckarsulz (II Air Corps)-Speyer (II)-Bitsch (V Air Corps)-Revinny (II)-Villenauxe, 12 miles south of Sézanne (II)-Meret, 6 miles SE of Fontainebleau (V)-Chateau du Loir, 24 miles SSE of Le Mans (II)-Ile d'Yeu (V);

6. Air Corps boundaries for ^{combat} hunting and reconnaissance operations (localities included): Avvéville-Clermont-La Fertés-Jouarre, SW of Chateau Flermy)-Regent s.S. (W of Reilly s.S.)-Montbard (30 miles NW of Dijon)-Dijon-Pligny-Swiss border west of southern tip of Lake Neuenburger See.

7. Boundary between Air Force High Command and Third Air Fleet for reconnaissance operations (localities to Third Air Fleet): Le Havre-Orléans-Bourges-Lyon-Swiss border west of Geneva.

8. Air units still in their base air ports will displace forward to the assembly air ports on D-Day minus 1 on receipt of the code message

"Verlegeteubung.....(Date)"; in which the date will be sent in the code attached as Annex 2.

The various corps headquarters will assign those units which cannot displace forward in time because of weather conditions alternate near front targets for their first mission.

9. The battle will commence with a sudden concentrated blow against the enemy air forces. This initial action will take the form either

a. of a uniformly directed attack all along the line on receipt of the code message "Freiheit.....(Date)nd hour), with the hour given signifying the time at which the air units will cross the borders (time given in code attached as Annex 2), or

b. of attacks carried out on orders given separately ^{immediately} by the various unit commanders (on receipt of the code message "Grenzüberflug west frei (border crossing West authorized)."

In either case the execution and scope of missions will depend on weather conditions at the take-off airfield and over the target area, and the training status of the various

aircraft crews. The various air corps headquarters will take measures to insure that the attack can be halted if an order to do so should reach their headquarters by D-Day 0200 hours.

By that time at the latest, the air fleet headquarters will forward by secret teletype channels to the various air corps headquarters (and for orientation to the I AAA Corps, the 123d Reconnaissance Group, and the XII, VII, and XIII Air District Commands one or the other of the two following coded messages:

Rhein--meaning that the attack is to be executed
or Elbe--meaning that the attack is to be halted.

In accordance with Third Air Fleet Operational Study 39, page 102, measures will be taken to insure that the message is passed on.