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**SPECIAL OPERATIONS: AAF
TO
EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT**

1943 - 1945

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
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS: AAF AID
TO
EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

1943 - 1945

(Short Title: AAFRH-21)

The original of this monograph and the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, Arch Branch, Bldg. 914, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

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Air Historical Office
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
June 1947

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FOREWORD

This monograph, written by Maj. Harris G. Warren, is unique among the combat studies produced by the Air Historical Office. Rather than the usual account of strategic bombardment or tactical combat, this history recounts the part played by American airmen in support of the Partisan resistance movements in occupied European countries.

The study describes special operations of the AAF in both the European and Mediterranean theaters, giving the background of the resistance movements; the establishment of Allied agencies and air units to aid the Underground; the planning and execution of the missions; supply operations to western Europe, the Balkans, Italy, and Poland; infiltration and evacuation of personnel; and propaganda-leaflet missions from the United Kingdom and Italy. Twenty-three appendixes contain detailed analyses, while a number of maps and charts illustrate the problems encountered in these special operations.

Like other Air Historical Office studies, this monograph is subject to revision as more information becomes available.

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
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Special Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance Movements
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Chapter I

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND ALLIED POLICIES

The clandestine struggle of patriots in occupied countries of Europe against their Nazi and Fascist conquerors was one of the heroic achievements in World War II. Overwhelmed by the enemy's military power, oppressed by economic and political tyranny, and all but crushed by the most brutal treatment ever inflicted upon defeated nations, still the victims of Axis aggression found the courage and the means to strike back. Resistance movements, encouraged by the Allies, came into being almost as soon as organized military resistance ceased.

At first the small and disorganized underground forces were compelled to confine their opposition to individual acts of sabotage, terrorism, and espionage. They were hampered by lack of arms and explosives with which to attack the enemy until Great Britain and the United States undertook to supply the deficiency. They were, likewise, weakened by dissension within their own ranks. National governments in exile, set up in London and Cairo, attempted with varying degrees of success to direct and to give cohesion to these underground movements, and to unify their efforts. Internal political rivalries were significant in long-range policies adopted by the three great powers, for, although their principal objective was to win the war, it was clear that they possessed the power to determine in large measure which of the conflicting groups would emerge dominant at the end of hostilities. In all of the occupied countries except Greece these internal rivalries had been practically settled before the enemy

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surrendered. The Allies, through their ability to grant or to withhold supplies, exercised a strong influence upon the success or failure of any patriot movement.

Decisions to grant material aid to the patriots and the extent of that aid were important to the United States Army Air Forces. American and British planes and crews were called upon to deliver thousands of tons of supplies to the patriots, to infiltrate espionage agents and other personnel, to undertake hazardous landing missions far behind enemy lines, and to drop billions of leaflets over Europe. These special operations, carried out both by armed and unarmed planes, were in addition to the tremendous combat air effort; nor did they interfere with the normal combat role of the AAF. Supply missions to patriots were rarely spectacular; they cannot be compared in dramatic interest with air attacks upon Schweinfurt, Berlin, or Ploesti; and because of their highly secret nature, the press gave them little space. But special operations, in which the AAF played such a prominent part, contributed greatly to final victory.

Resistance Movements in Occupied Europe

Axis forces overran the Balkans and Western Europe between 1939 and 1941. Mussolini's Fascists conquered Albania in April 1939, five months before World War II got under way in full force. Poland fell in the following September, and then came the deceptive Sitzkrieg during which Germany prepared to expand her conquests. Denmark and Norway succumbed in April 1940, and in the next month the Netherlands and Belgium were conquered. France capitulated on 21 June 1940, to give the Axis control

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over all of western Europe except for the neutral countries of Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, and Spain. By November 1940, the Balkan states of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were allied with the Axis. Yugoslavia and Greece both fell easy victims to German troops in April 1941.¹

Patriotism was not dead within these occupied countries. There were the Quislings and the Laval, the collaborationists and outright traitors, who succumbed into a cringing subserviency before the Nazis; but there were, also, thousands upon thousands of people "who wore at their hearts the fire's centre."² These were the people who refused to be conquered and whose efforts, at first so pitifully small, grew to ominous proportions with the aid of supplies dropped by Allied aircraft or hurriedly unloaded from planes that came down on crude landing fields. Oppressive measures adopted by the Germans served only to increase resentment and generate resistance in the occupied countries.³

Underground movements began in France even before the country capitulated. Former army officers joined with civilians in attempts to defeat the aims of German occupation. They constructed strong-points in the mountains, published secret newspapers, sent agents throughout the country to train and organize for sabotage and assassination, became experts in damaging military equipment, and delivered information to the Allies. As the movement grew stronger, small communities of Maquis appeared in Savoy, the Cevennes, the Pyrenees, and the Massif Central swearing allegiance to the Cross of Lorraine.⁴ The Allies counted upon these patriots to aid in operations when OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of France, should be launched, and anticipated that the French Forces of

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the Interior would number at least 160,000 on D-day. Aided by "Jedburgh" teams of specially trained organizers, the Maquis by the fall of 1943 were carrying out attacks upon communications, enemy headquarters, and small groups of German forces. The extent to which they could participate in open hostilities would depend upon the extent to which the Allies could get supplies to them before and after the invasion.⁵

Savage though they were, underground activities in Poland attained neither the proportions nor the achievements credited to the Maquis; nor did the Allies deliver very large quantities of supplies to the country. Somewhat the same conclusions are applicable to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. In these densely populated countries, the resistance movement had to depend largely upon individual acts of terrorism and sabotage. The scope of such activities was curtailed by lack of supplies, although in Denmark there were so many of these acts that the Nazis were compelled to maintain more occupation troops per capita than in any other European country.⁶ Norwegian resistance groups, led by such men as Christian Hauge and "Grenade" Larsen,⁷ carried on with comparatively little aid from the Allies, although the quantity of supplies delivered increased toward the end of the war. By January 1945, it was estimated that 30,000 Norwegian patriots were in the movement and that 20,000 more would aid in "counter-scorch" activities--protection of vital installations from German destruction--when the Allies should enter the country.⁸

In Yugoslavia, as in Greece and Albania, there were rival organizations which engaged in civil war, much to Germany's advantage. The first of these groups to come into prominence was led by Gen. Draja Mihailovich

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(or Mihajlovic), Minister of War in the Royal Yugoslav Government, which supported him upon its re-formation in Cairo.⁹ The Cetniks, as Mihailovich's followers were called, were strong in Serbia and operated sporadically against the Germans; but the Partisans charged that the Cetniks offered no serious opposition to the enemy for any length of time and actually collaborated with them.¹⁰

The Partisans, led by a Russian-trained Communist named Josip Broz, were successful rivals of the Cetniks.¹¹ For a time in 1941 there was an attempt at cooperation, but the two rivals were irreconcilable. Cetnik leadership was conservative and royalist, Partisan leadership was Communist and antiroyalist. Josip Broz, known as Marshal Tito, began open resistance to the Germans in Serbia in June 1941. His troops captured Uzice, a city of some 7,000 inhabitants 73 miles southwest of Belgrade, held it for several weeks, and then were driven out by a combination of German and Cetnik attacks. Upon their retreat into eastern Bosnia, the Partisans acquired numerous adherents from the Cetniks. Thereafter there was open civil war between Cetniks and Partisans.¹² When proof of Cetnik collaboration reached the Allies, full support went to the Partisans. With the aid of Allied supplies, most of which were delivered by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), Tito soon built up a formidable force. By February 1944, his National Army of Liberation had 10 army corps with a strength estimated at more than 220,000 men.¹³ Terrain and the nature of the German occupation aided the formation and activities of this loosely organized army. When the Germans had launched their attacks, the Yugoslav Army had split up

*Exact title: National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

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into small groups in the mountainous country, and these groups retained their light arms. As in Albania and Greece, the people were not totally disarmed.¹⁴ Tito's Partisans, the best organized and most effective resistance movement in the Balkans, were to receive most of the supplies delivered by the Allies to that area.

Underground resistance in Albania was on a much smaller scale than in Yugoslavia. There were two major politico-military parties. The Communist Provisional Peoples Government (LNC), led by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha, was anti-Axis and opposed to the monarchy. This group, concentrated in southern Albania, included some 20,000 adherents by June 1944. The Zoggists, led by Maj. Abas Kupi, were loyal to the king. They were poorly armed and loosely organized, and numbered about 5,000 in 1944. Although politically it was desirable for the Allies to support King Zog, his followers had little military significance in the war against Germany and, if supplied with arms, they were likely to begin a civil war. When all attempts to reconcile the two parties failed, Major Kupi fled and left the field to the LNC. This group was able to keep from three to four German divisions pinned down in Albania.¹⁵

Conflicting political ideologies likewise hampered the Greek resistance movement and nearly destroyed it. Greeks were so engaged in fighting among themselves that they had little time or effort to expend against the common enemy.¹⁶ "As soon as a guerrilla band was raised and gained strength they measured their importance by the prospect of political power rather than military achievement . . ."¹⁷ As in Yugoslavia and Albania, Communists were the strongest party. Their Greek Peoples

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Army of Liberation (ELAS/EAM) held about 25,000 guerrillas, or some two-thirds of all the patriot troops. Their principal opponent was the Greek Democratic National League (EDES), a pro-British organization of about 5,000 followers. General Headquarters Middle East (GHQ ME) constantly endeavored to bring these parties into agreement but never did achieve real unity.¹⁸

Resistance movements in the other Balkan countries were insignificant. In Bulgaria, the Otechestven Front (OF) carried out brigand-type attacks against key officials; but there were no German troops to attack.¹⁹ The results of attempts to initiate opposition in Hungary were discouraging²⁰ and in Rumania King Michael held matters well under control for the Nazis. In all of these countries the Allies were compelled to depend upon strategic bombing to undermine morale and to destroy industries.

The resistance movement in Italy became organized rather late, although there had been anti-Fascist elements in the northern cities for some time and they formed the nucleus of a partisan movement. These elements organized in October 1943 a Committee of National Liberation which included representatives of various small groups.²¹ Partisan armed bands were small and isolated, poorly equipped and unable to engage in large-scale operations. An accurate estimate of their number is impossible, but by January 1944 Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) reported some 25,000 to 40,000 in the Piedmont. There was also a small group in Lombardy, and both they and other elements cooperated with the Yugoslav

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Partisans in northeastern Italy.²² Six months later only 15,000 armed Partisans were reported in northern Italy, two-thirds of whom were in the Piedmont. The rapid advance of the Fifth and Eighth Armies, together with increased supply drops, resulted in a considerable growth of Partisan strength. By September there were some 85,000 in the mountains, four-fifths of whom were armed in some fashion, and about 60,000 more in the towns, two-fifths of whom were armed.²³ Activities of these groups became increasingly important to the Allies as the war entered its last months.

Functions and Needs of Resistance Groups

Resistance movements held great possibilities for aiding the war effort. Their activities necessarily were determined by conditions prevailing in any given region. As clandestine saboteurs in densely populated areas or as armed guerrillas in open country, they constituted a source of grave danger to the Axis. Continuity of patriot activity depended upon the enemy's determination to destroy resistance groups, "which in turn depends upon the amount of supplies dropped to the patriots, which in turn depends upon the military advantage gained by making the enemy employ his forces against the patriots . . ."²⁴

Prior to an Allied invasion, patriots had two principal functions: to require the enemy to maintain large numbers of troops as an occupation force, thus preventing their employment on the main fronts, and to sabotage the enemy war effort. The first of these functions was achieved by open warfare and by attacks on enemy lines of communication, which

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necessitated the maintenance of strong guards. The second function was discharged by acts of terrorism which included assassination, demolition, work stoppage, damage to materiel, the spread of resistance sentiment, and maintenance of morale among subjugated peoples. At the time of invasion, as in France, patriots could and did render valuable aid by engaging troops behind the lines and interfering with their movements. Among the less publicized functions may be mentioned the assistance in evasion and escape of Allied aircrews brought down over enemy territory and the delivery of military information to the Allies.

Aside from special Allied agents and missions to organize and coordinate patriot activities, partisans needed supplies. The list is long: arms, ranging from pistols and Sten guns to light artillery; munitions, explosives, demolition equipment, incendiaries, and sabotage devices; medical supplies, including bandages, ligatures, drugs, and instruments; signals equipment, principally small radio sets; food and clothing, especially in the Balkans, the Pyrenees, and Savoy; money, and even mules.²⁵ Small quantities of these items were delivered by surface craft to the Dalmatian, French, and Norwegian coasts; but, since Germans generally held the coast lines, the main highways, and cities, delivery had to be made for the most part by air.

Allied Policy of Support for Resistance Movements

Political and military leaders among the Allies were fully aware of the possibilities inherent in the resistance movements and of the need to provide patriots with means to operate against the enemy. Early in

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the war, planes of the FAF carried out limited missions from the United Kingdom to western Continental Europe and from the Middle East to the Balkans.²⁶ Although these efforts increased through 1942 and 1943, the volume of supplies that reached the resistance groups did not meet requirements.

Plans were made in the fall of 1943 to increase the quantity of supplies delivered to the patriots in western Europe. The object was to build up stocks of equipment necessary for organized resistance and guerrilla warfare and to transport the personnel of Jedburgh teams--two officers and an enlisted radio operator--into enemy territory. A directive of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff charged the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) with the conduct of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (CG ETOUSA) approved the plan on 26 August 1943, and three days later directed OSS to work out details with G-2 and G-3, ETOUSA.²⁷

These plans apparently were designed primarily to supply resistance groups in France, Holland, Belgium, and Norway. The Polish liaison officer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), Col. L. Z. Mitkiewicz, raised the question of assigning additional aircraft to supply operations in order to augment the British effort to Poland. Specifically, he wanted 20 B-24's, flown by Polish crews, to fly some 200 sorties in the period September 1943 to April 1944.²⁸ Upon receipt of a query from the CCS, Lt.Gen. Ira C. Eaker replied that it was impossible to provide the planes without interfering with strategic bombing by the Eighth Air Force;

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however, he proposed to provide, for supply operations, one and eventually two squadrons of B-24's and B-17's which were not operational for full combat and which would be manned by crews who had completed their combat tours. The initial squadron would be trained with British units already engaged in dropping supplies and personnel, and additional crews should be trained for use in similar work elsewhere.²⁹ The CCS approved this recommendation with the proviso that such operations were to be coordinated closely with the RAF Bomber Command.³⁰ Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers (CG ETOUSA) approved the project on 19 October 1943 and directed General Eaker to implement the plan.³¹ By February 1944, an American squadron was delivering supplies to western Europe; but little effort was directed to Poland. Further efforts by the Polish liaison officer to gain a definite commitment from the CCS failed, and the Poles were told that apportionment of sorties to various countries was a matter for officials in the United Kingdom to decide.³² Thus, although the Poles were not fully satisfied, the Chiefs of Staff and American commanding generals in ETOUSA were committed to increased aid for the resistance movements of western Europe and Poland.

The decision to increase the flow of supplies to Balkan patriots was likewise made in the fall of 1943. Early in October a meeting of the Joint Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Middle East Forces discussed the matter; and at a second meeting, on 18 October 1943, the committee agreed to establish in southern Italy an operating base for squadrons engaged in supply missions to the Balkans. Control over these operations would be under the British, with American agencies cooperating.³³ At about the

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same time the CCS became impressed with the need for giving all possible aid to Balkan guerrillas, which were estimated to number some 230,000 in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, and who were containing some 17 German and eight Bulgarian divisions. Increased aid to these guerrillas would, it was hoped, divert more German forces from the Soviet and Italian fronts. The CCS recommended that General Eisenhower consult with the proper persons to develop seaborne transport to the Dalmatian coast, to transport equipment to patriot-held landing grounds in order to conserve the supply of parachutes, and to arrange with the London Munitions Assignment Board for the release of more Italian equipment for eventual delivery to the guerrillas.³⁴ General Eisenhower was able to reply that steps had been taken to augment aid to the patriots, that port facilities in the heel of Italy were provided for surface operations, that an airfield in the heel was being allotted for the work, and that a request for assignment of captured Italian equipment had been made.³⁵ Various headquarters, therefore, were in agreement on the need to supply patriot groups in the Balkans and western Europe with larger quantities of supplies.

Aside from long-range political considerations, the civil war between Cetniks and Partisans in Yugoslavia had a direct bearing upon supply operations. Yugoslavians could best promote the war by fighting the Germans, and for this immediate purpose it mattered little who received supplies so long as they were used against the enemy. GHQ ME had sent special parties to Mihailovich in 1941 "to arrange for the infiltration of supplies"; but Mihailovich was, to put it mildly, a disappointment, and arrangements were then made to support Tito.³⁶ After 1 January 1944, Mihailovich received

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no more Allied supplies, and in February 1944, the British Foreign Office notified the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile at Cairo that the British mission was to be withdrawn from Mihailovich.³⁷ This mission, which amounted to some 120 persons, was evacuated from Franjani on 28 and 29 May 1944.³⁸ Prime Minister Churchill announced in the House of Commons on 24 May, "We have proclaimed ourselves supporters of Marshal Tito because of his heroic and massive struggle against the German armies. We are sending and planning to send the largest possible supplies of weapons to him and to make the closest contact with him."³⁹

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Chapter II

ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED AGENCIES AND AIR UNITS
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Activities undertaken by the Allies to aid resistance groups and for espionage in enemy-occupied areas required an extensive organization. There were intelligence agencies, both British and American, which carried on secret work. These agencies were represented by personnel in enemy territory who cooperated with the underground groups. Allied air forces provided the planes and crews to transport agents, to deliver supplies, to drop propaganda leaflets, and to evacuate personnel. The closest liaison existed between the secret agencies and the air forces, and the success of the entire program of special operations depended upon full cooperation. Special agencies determined policies, laid the plans, made complete arrangements for their execution, and then depended upon the air forces to bring them to fruition.

Definition and Origin of Special Operations

In its broadest interpretation, the term "special operations" covers all military activities within or behind the enemy lines. These activities may be carried out by Allied troops trained for subversive work or for commando-type raids against limited objectives; or they may be on a broader scale by resistance groups which progress from small units or cells of saboteurs into loosely organized guerrilla bands. These, in turn, may develop into armies, such as the French Forces of the Interior and the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation.¹

French saboteurs arrived in England soon after the British evacuation at Dunkerque (29 May-2 June 1940) in search of aid for the Underground. The British recognized "the military advantages to be gained by systematic sabotage" and organized the Special Operations Executive (SOE) under the Minister of Economic Warfare. Known in the War Office as MO 1 (Sp), SOE was charged with carrying on special operations through sabotage, raiding parties, subversive activities, and encouragement of patriot resistance.² The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the American counterpart of SOE, was established by an Executive Order on 13 June 1942 as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).³ Special operations were among its many functions. Although a full description of the organization of these agencies is not germane to the present study, a general account of how they functioned is necessary background for an understanding of the role of air power in their operations. For this purpose the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, where the AAF played such an important role in supply deliveries, has been selected.

Special Operations Agencies in the Mediterranean Theater

When the North African invasion occurred in November 1942, special operations were in a nebulous state. SOE was represented there by the Inter-Service Signals Unit-6 (ISSU-6), and OSS had an agency called Experimental Detachment G-3 (Prov) which soon became the 2677th Headquarters Company Experimental (Prov). These SOE and OSS agencies fell loosely under the G-3 division of AFHQ, their operations being coordinated by an OSS officer, Col. Kenneth D. Mann. The organization was more

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extensive in the Middle East, where Force 133 was the SOE agency charged with special operations in the Balkans.⁴

After the Teheran Conference, which closed on 2 December 1943, there was an extensive reorganization in the Anglo-American command. GHQ ME came under AFHQ, now commanded by Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as successor to General Eisenhower. This brought Force 133 under AFHQ, and the over-all directive of 5 December 1943 made that headquarters responsible for special operations throughout the Mediterranean area.⁵ By this time Force 133 was establishing an advance headquarters (Advance Force 133) at Bari to control the flow of supplies and the infiltration of personnel to the Balkans. Other agencies, such as the Inter-Service Liaison Detachment (ISLD), the OSS, and the British Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE), were also setting up in Italy. Advance Force 133 coordinated with naval and air commands concerning all operations to the Balkans; ISSU-6/OSS SO directed operations to southern France; and support of Italian resistance groups fell to No. 1 Special Force and the 2677th Headquarters Company (OSS) under Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF). For purposes of allotting transport facilities to drop leaflets over the Balkans, PWE coordinated with Advance Force 133.⁶ (See App. L)⁷

The scale of operations to the Balkans, and especially to Yugoslavia and Albania, increased so rapidly in the first months of 1944 that a G-3 Special Operations Section was set up in AFHQ in February;⁷ but a still closer integration was necessary. Advance Force 133, operating under Force 133 at Cairo, needed a more direct channel to AFHQ. General Wilson, therefore, established a new headquarters called Special Operations,

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Mediterranean Theater of Operations (SOMTO) under the command of Maj. Gen. W. A. Stawell. Advance Force 133 became Force 266, was divorced from Force 133 at Cairo, and was given direction of special operations to Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Dalmatian islands.⁸ (See App. 2.)

The last reorganization of major consequence occurred when the Balkan Air Force (BAF) was organized on 4 June 1944. Force 266 was abolished and all special raiding forces, other than OSS/SOE men, were united under Land Forces Adriatic. SOE units formed Force 399 and came under the Balkan Air Force. Delivery of supplies to Yugoslavia and Albania remained the principal task of Force 399, and, since most of the aircraft engaged in this work were also controlled by BAF, coordination of effort was relatively easy. Force 399, an entirely British unit, had attached to it liaison personnel from Company B, 2677th Regiment (Prov) and Fifteenth Air Force representatives who were aiding in the rescue of Allied aircrews.⁹ (See App. 3.)

Allied Missions with the Yugoslav Partisans

Agents of the Allies operated in all of occupied Europe. These agents in western Europe generally were members of special teams; but in Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent in Greece, there were formal Allied missions. The most important of these missions was headed by Brig. F. H. Maclean, who led his party to Tito's headquarters in September 1943. At the same time another British brigadier went to Mihailovich in a vain attempt to gain Cetnik cooperation against the Nazis.¹⁰

The Maclean Mission's principal functions were to coordinate Partisan resistance activity and to arrange for the large-scale delivery of

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supplies by air.¹¹ American liaison officers were with Maclean and with subdivisions of Tito's army, but the mission remained strictly British and Maclean was General Wilson's only official link with Tito.¹² After the BAF was organized, Maclean dealt directly with its commander in recommending various types of aid to the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation by means of the SOE signals system; in political matters, Maclean dealt with the Bari representative of the British Resident Minister at AFHQ.¹³ Maclean's headquarters, which remained with Marshal Tito, maintained contact with Tito's corps and divisions through British liaison officers (BLO's). These officers passed on Partisan requests for supplies, organized reception parties for air drops and landings, reported requests for offensive air assistance, obtained intelligence information, and reported on the progress and success of offensive and supply operations.¹⁴ A small Russian mission went in to join Tito on 23 February 1944,¹⁵ but its operations appear to have been primarily political.

Representatives of various Allied agencies also carried on highly specialized tasks in the Balkans. Among them were the British Inter-Service Liaison Detachment (ISLD), an intelligence agency; "A" Force, a branch of MI 9 in the United Kingdom, which aided in escape and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and aircrews; and Company B, 2677th Regiment (Prov), formerly Special Balkan Services of OSS, which was concerned primarily with intelligence.¹⁶ In order to provide meteorological data, the 19th Weather Squadron had seven weather detachments in the Balkans in May 1944.¹⁷ American, British, and Yugoslav personnel were used in organizing landing ground parties under the direction of BATS (Balkan Air Terminal Service).¹⁸

Air Units in Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater

More nations were represented in military activities in the Mediterranean theater than in any other combat area. This heterogeneity existed in special operations in which one finds British, American, Polish, South African, Italian, and Russian units flying missions to supply resistance groups. An account of these units centers on the development of the 334 Wing (RAF) which eventually exercised operational control over nearly all special duty aircraft in the theater.

Evolution of the 334 (SD) Wing (RAF). A trickle of airborne supplies began to reach the Balkans in May 1942, when 108 Squadron (RAF) in the Middle East made a flight of four Liberators available for special operations. The demand for supplies in this early period far exceeded the capabilities of the air forces to deliver them, but the situation improved in March 1943 when 14 Halifaxes were assigned to the work. These planes, together with the Liberators of 108 Squadron, were brought together to form 148 Squadron (RAF), which was based at Tocra, Libya.¹⁹

The experience of RAF squadrons in the United Kingdom convinced military authorities that supply operations to resistance groups in the Mediterranean area should be carried on primarily from the Mediterranean theater. Consequently, 1575 Flight (RAF) was sent to Blida, near Algiers, in June 1943. This flight, which consisted of four Halifaxes, supplied resistance groups in Corsica. In the following September, 1575 Flight was absorbed into 624 Squadron (RAF), which sent six of its ^{ten} Halifaxes to Tocra in ~~Libya~~ for Balkan operations.²⁰ The 122d Liaison Squadron (AAF), a remnant of the 68th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, moved to Massicault,

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
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Tunisia, in November with three B-17's and seven B-25's for test flights.²¹

A fourth unit, 1586 Polish Flight, with four Halifaxes and two Liberators, arrived in Tunisia later in the month, primarily for missions to Poland.²²

Since an over-all headquarters was needed to coordinate the efforts of these units, the British established 334 Wing in November 1943 to assume control over all special duty aircraft.²³


At this time the 334 Wing, commanded by Group Comdr. W. E. Rankin, was organized as follows:



Soon after 334 Wing was established, units engaged in special operations were moved to southeastern Italy in order to place them closer to their targets. The Polish Flight and 624 Squadron moved to Brindisi early in December 1943, although a detachment of four aircraft of the latter remained at Blida to supply southern France; the 122d Liaison Squadron moved its B-25's to Manduria at the end of November 1943; the 8th Troop Carrier Squadron (AAF) arrived at Gioia del Colle late in November and 148 Squadron went to Brindisi in January 1944.²⁴ The 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons, 62d Troop Carrier Group (AAF) arrived at Brindisi in February, and a few days later, on 18 February, 624 Squadron left for Blida. Likewise in February, two squadrons of the Italian Air Force, based at Lecce, were assigned to 334 Wing for special operations.²⁵ Thus in February 1944, 334 Wing had the following units assigned or attached:

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
Several changes occurred during the next few months. In March 1944, part of 267 Squadron (RAF), Transport Command came under 334 Wing temporarily,²⁶ and in July a Soviet air group of 12 C-47's was added.²⁷ The 122d Liaison Squadron was transformed into a heavy bomb squadron in April 1944 and continued operations from Blida until September, when it moved to Brindisi.²⁸ In September, also, 624 Squadron was disbanded.²⁹ In January 1945, 267 Squadron ceased supply operations, but its place was taken by 44 Squadron (SAAF).³⁰ Other changes involved a rotation of AAF troop carrier units assigned to special operations.

Upon its organization, 334 Wing was assigned to RAF Middle East; then, effective on 25 January 1944, it was transferred to HQ MAAF. Operational control remained divided between RAF Middle East and MAAF³¹ until 14 February 1944, when 334 Wing and all other Allied aircraft, either permanently or temporarily employed in special duties, were placed under the direct operational control of HQ MAAF.³² The final administrative change of importance took place in June 1944, when 334 Wing became a part

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of the newly organized Balkan Air Force.³³

In September 1944 special duty aircraft were assigned or attached to the Balkan Air Force as follows:



Evolution of the 2641st Special Group (Prov) (AAF). An increase in the delivery of supplies to resistance groups was among the matters which attracted the attention of Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker when he assumed command of MAAF in January 1944. As commander of the Eighth Air Force, he had been instrumental in organizing two AAF squadrons for special operations to the western Continent. The subject, therefore, was by no means new to him when he arrived in North Africa. General Eaker, as well as Generals Wilson and Devers, was convinced that supply operations were well worth the effort; moreover, he wanted Americans to "get some credit in delivering knives, guns, and explosives to the Balkan patriots with which to kill Germans."³⁴

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The 122d Liaison Squadron was the only AAF unit, other than the 8th Troop Carrier Squadron, engaged in special operations in the Mediterranean theater until February 1944. This squadron, with three B-17's and seven B-25's, had "no authorization and no table of organization" suitable for such work and was not operating efficiently.³⁵ Demands of OSS and SOE for missions to the Balkans reflected the increasing importance of supply work; but, General Eaker insisted, these demands could not be met with the aircraft then being employed.³⁶ His solution to the immediate problem was to ask authority to reorganize the 122d Liaison Squadron as a heavy bombardment squadron with 15 aircraft³⁷ which, so far as practicable, would not be fully operational for normal combat duty.³⁸

The War Department partially approved the proposal when, on 14 February 1944, it authorized conversion of the 122d Liaison Squadron into a unit to operate for OSS; aircraft and personnel, however, must come from sources already available.³⁹ General Devers, Deputy Commander in MTO, in assuring General Marshall that there would be no difficulty in setting up the new squadron, emphasized the importance of letting the French and Balkan patriots know that the British were not the sole source of the aid they were receiving.⁴⁰ By this time two squadrons of AAF C-47's were operating out of Brindisi under the 334 Wing, but General Eaker pressed for organization of the 122d Bomb Squadron, since heavy-bomber night sorties were required to reach the more distant targets.⁴¹ Apparently the 14 February authorization did not satisfy General Eaker,

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for on 6 March he asked Maj. Gen. B. M. Giles, Chief of Air Staff, AAF to push the matter through.⁴² General Arnold then informed General Eaker that authorization had been granted, and on 15 March formal War Department approval was sent.⁴³

General Eaker proceeded at once to set up the squadron. Letter instructions issued by MAAF on 18 March 1944 directed organization of the 122d Bomb Squadron (H) at Blida, with personnel to be drawn from various sources.⁴⁴ Each of the heavy bomb groups was called upon to provide a graduate crew on detached service in order that experienced personnel might be obtained,⁴⁵ a practice that continued for the life of the squadron. On 10 April 1944 the squadron was activated under command of Col. Monro MacCloskey and attached to Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force for administration, supply, and maintenance.⁴⁶

The remnant of the 122d Liaison Squadron, operating seven B-25's at Manduria, moved to Blida on 12 April 1944.⁴⁷ At this time the 122d Bomb Squadron had three B-17's and eight B-24's.⁴⁸ General Eaker, reporting that the new squadron was to receive 15 crews and planes, stated that its formation has "permitted the American Air Forces to play a definite part and a very big part in the Partisan lift . . . the percentage of successful sorties by the Americans is practically the same as with the Halifaxes."⁴⁹ Employment of the 122d Bomb Squadron would make it possible, General Eaker believed, for the air forces in April to make up the deficit in deliveries which had been caused by bad weather in previous months. Personnel of the squadron were enthusiastic about their work,⁵⁰

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and by the end of April had flown 22 successful sorties to southern France.⁵¹ On 15 June 1944, the squadron was redesignated as the 885th Bomb Squadron (H) (Sp), but it continued under administration of the Fifteenth Air Force and under the operational control of MAAF.⁵² The 885th Bomb Squadron moved to Maison Blanche, just outside of Algiers, toward the end of August and early in September began to fly missions to northern Italy.

This change in targets was caused by the success of Seventh Army operations in southern France. The Maquis in that area no longer needed airborne supplies from the Mediterranean, a development which caused MAAF to disband 624 Squadron (RAF) and to move the 885th Bomb Squadron to Brindisi for missions to northern Italy and the Balkans. This move took place between 23 September and 2 October 1944.⁵³ At about the same time the 492d Bomb Group of the Eighth Air Force temporarily suspended its supply missions to western Europe. The 859th Bomb Squadron of this group flew to Brindisi about the middle of December 1944 to join in special operations in the Mediterranean theater.⁵⁴ The Fifteenth Air Force now had two B-24 squadrons flying supply missions. To provide a headquarters for these units, the Fifteenth Special Group (Prov) was activated on 20 January 1945 under command of Colonel MacCloskey.⁵⁵ Since many of the group's missions required staging through Rosignano, about 15 miles south-east of Leghorn, HQ MAAF decided to move it to that area and place it under Mediterranean/^{Allied}Tactical Air Force (MATAF). On 17 March 1945, the unit was redesignated as the 2641st Special Group (Prov) and came under operational control of the Twelfth Air Force.⁵⁶ The move to Rosignano

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was completed by 20 March,⁵⁷ and there the 2641st Special Group remained until the end of the war.

Twelfth Air Force Troop Carrier Units in Special Operations. Troop carrier squadrons of the Twelfth Air Force carried most of the burden for the AAF in special operations in the Mediterranean theater. The 51st Troop Carrier Wing was represented in this work from December 1943 until after the surrender of Axis troops in northern Italy. Incomplete records prevent an accurate description of the first troop carrier efforts, but it appears that the 8th Troop Carrier Squadron, 62d Troop Carrier Group initiated AAF C-47 missions behind the enemy lines in Italy for the purpose of infiltrating personnel or dropping supplies to isolated British troops. The air echelon of this squadron moved from Ponte Olivo, Sicily, to Gioia del Colle in southeastern Italy late in November 1943, and flew its first supply mission on the night of 8-9 December.⁵⁸ The 8th Troop Carrier Squadron completed very few sorties over enemy-occupied territory from December 1943 to February 1944, partly because of very bad weather. Its principal mission, however, seems to have been to give parachute training to British Special Air Service troops destined for operations behind the enemy lines.⁵⁹

Special operations by AAF C-47's began in earnest in February 1944. On the 9th, Brig. Gen. G. H. Beverley, commander of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, attended a conference at HQ MAAF which decided that one group headquarters and two troop carrier squadrons were to be sent to Brindisi by 12 February for missions to the Balkans. The group would

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operate under the British 334 Wing.⁶⁰ The 7th and 11st Troop Carrier Squadrons at Ponte Olivo were alerted on 9 February and moved, with 62d Troop Carrier Group headquarters, to Brindisi on the 12th.⁶¹ The 8th Troop Carrier Squadron practically ceased operations at Gioia del Colle by the end of February, but the 7th and 11st carried on to the end of March and then returned to Sicily.⁶² (See App. 5.)

The 60th Troop Carrier Group, commanded by Col. Clarence J. Galligan, moved in to replace the 62d Group's squadrons and remained until October 1944.⁶³ The 7th and 11st squadrons then began a second tour on special operations, the 7th at Brindisi and the 11st at Foggia and Brindisi. These two squadrons formed the Balkan Detachment of the 62d Troop Carrier Group.⁶⁴ The 7th ceased Balkan operations on 4 December when it moved to Tarquinia, about 48 miles northwest of Rome, from which point it flew missions to northern Italy until 9 January 1945.⁶⁵ The 4th and 8th Troop Carrier Squadrons at Siena-Malignano flew supply missions to north Italy for about six weeks ending on 8 January 1945, then moved to Tarquinia, where they were joined on 26 March 1945 by the 11st Troop Carrier Squadron from Brindisi. Early in January 1945, the 64th Troop Carrier Group, under Col. John Gerry, moved to Rosignano, relieving the 62d Group. The 64th flew supply missions to northern Italy until the end of the war,⁶⁶ although its 10th Squadron replaced the 11st at Brindisi on 29 March. While operating from Brindisi, troop carrier units were under operational control of 354 Wing and, after June 1944, of the BAF. Missions flown from Rosignano, Malignano, and Tarquinia were under control of 'MILAN' through the Twelfth Air Force.

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The Balkan Air Force. Operations of various types to the Balkans had increased to such proportions by late spring 1944 that an inter-service headquarters, the Balkan Air Force (BAF) was formed on 4 June to coordinate them.⁶⁷ Commanded by Air Vice Marshal M. Elliot with headquarters at Bari, the BAF began operations on 1 July with fighter, fighter-bomber, and medium bomber squadrons drawn principally from the Desert Air Force and the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force^(MACAF). The British USA Wing, controlling special operations to the Balkans, received additional strength and came under BAF.⁶⁸

Air Vice Marshal Elliot was responsible for coordinating all "combined amphibious operations and raids by Allied air, sea and land forces on the islands and eastern shores of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas." Through the Maclean Mission, now reorganized as No. 37 Military Mission, Elliot was to "afford the greatest possible means of support" to the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation; through the commander of Force 399, he exercised operational control over special operations in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania. BAF came under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to whom Elliot was directly responsible for air operations. Although not in control of special operations in Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, Elliot was "responsible for the operation of Special Duties aircraft employed in those areas." Special operations in Greece remained the responsibility of CEAF, through Force 133; in Rumania and Bulgaria, special operations fell under AFHQ, through Force 133; and CEAF Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) controlled special operations to northern Italy. As chairman of a Special Operations Committee, the

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ACG SAAF was to coordinate "special air operations over the various territories and advise AFHQ on the allocation of effort." Through liaison with the Bari headquarters of AFHQ's Psychological Warfare Branch, Elliot was directed "to ensure that best use is made of . . . operations for the dissemination of leaflets and other propaganda."⁶⁹

The Balkan Air Force expanded rapidly. By December 1944 it controlled 21 fighter squadrons, eight medium bomber squadrons, and two heavy bomber squadrons in addition to the special operations aircraft operating under 354 Wing.⁷⁰ The development of this air force was significant in supply operations not only because it made fighter escort available for daylight missions, but also because it provided the Partisans of Yugoslavia with an effective air arm. Greater quantities of supplies could be delivered through landing operations by C-47's while SAAF planes cooperated with partisan troops in protecting and holding landing grounds. With a dependable air force on call, Partisans could undertake more sustained operations which would, of course, require an increase in the delivery of supplies and in the evacuation of their wounded.

The Russian Air Group at Bari. The first Soviet ^{planes} to take part in special operations in the Mediterranean theater were two C-47's which brought a Russian mission, headed by Andrei Vishinsky, to Italy on 5 February, 1944.⁷¹ The two C-47's remained at Brindisi and flew two sorties to Yugoslavia in March and three in April. Yugoslav representatives made high claims for their role in delivering supplies, but the fact is that their sorties were for the purpose of supplying the Vishinsky mission, and on one occasion they did that by transferring material from British stocks that had been earmarked for the Partisans.⁷²

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The Russians, probably more interested in ultimate political advantages than in immediate military gains, approached General Wilson in March 1944 on the matter of basing planes in Italy to supply the Partisans. General Wilson insisted, should the proposal be approved, that operational control over routing, timing, and coordination of flights would have to be vested in the Allied Commander-in-Chief.⁷³ The British Chiefs of Staff agreed late in April to basing at Bari a small Russian air unit and directed that General Wilson was to coordinate all operations by Soviet aircraft from Italian bases.⁷⁴ Details to receive Russian transports and fighters at Bari were worked out at AFHQ in June and included an agreement that Soviet planes might land in Italy on shuttle missions.⁷⁵ The Russians wanted permission to operate not less than 12 transports and 12 fighters from Italy, but General Wilson refused this indefinite commitment and fixed the number of planes at one squadron of 12 C-47's and one of 12 fighters. When the Russians arrived late in July, they brought four light communications craft to give to Tito and also wanted to give him two C-47's which had been obtained from the United States on lend-lease. This proposed gift of transports was referred to the American Chiefs of Staff for disposal.⁷⁶

At Bari the Russians operated under control of the BAF through 334 Wing, but the "control was more nominal than real, the Russians throughout taking an extremely independent line."⁷⁷ They were, likewise, somewhat less than diplomatic on occasions. When an RAF vehicle slightly damaged one of their planes in a collision, the Russians called it deliberate sabotage.⁷⁸ Another incident occurred in which the Soviet

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air officer at Bari, one Colonel Socolov, deliberately violated both the letter and the spirit of the agreement governing Russian operations from Bari. On 23 July Colonel Socolov asked the BAF commander for permission to fly a training mission to a point off Corfu. Permission was readily granted, with the specification that there was to be no landing or dropping in Greece. The flight occurred during the night of 25/26 July without incident, except that the plane delivered nine or 10 Russian envoys to ELAS headquarters without the knowledge of Allied authorities in Cairo, Bari, Algiers, Greece, or anywhere else. This incident strengthened the belief that the U.S.S.R. intended to further her aims in Greece in complete disregard of British and American desires.⁷⁹

Some conflict also occurred in the matter of bringing in supplies for the Russians, who wanted two or three small merchant ships given to them for moving materials from the Persian Gulf to Bari. General Wilson objected on the grounds that there were no craft to spare, that stores destined for Tito would be largely of American origin, and that the Russians apparently were attempting to bolster their prestige with the Partisans. There were plenty of supplies in Italy for resistance groups, and only the shortage of aircraft, parachutes, containers, and small surface craft impeded their delivery.⁸⁰ The CCS decided in September that the Russians should bring through the Persian Gulf only those supplies not already available in the Mediterranean theater, and special types of supplies for Partisans should be restricted to those definitely needed. No surface craft were to be transferred to Russia to carry supplies to Bari.⁸¹

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Relations between the Russians and other groups at Bari were, nevertheless, relatively harmonious. On 22 August 1944, 10 Soviet C-47's flew a shuttle mission from Russia to Bari with medical personnel for kits and supplies for the air group. The transports returned to Russia on the night of 23/24 August, carrying 150 Yugoslav air trainees. Three days later, a squadron of 12 Yak fighters arrived direct from Russia to serve as escorts for C-47's on daylight missions.⁸³ Fighters and transports remained at Bari until the Russian advance overran Belgrade and opened the Zemun airfield. The Yaks and eight of the C-47's left for Zemun on 23 November, and the remaining four C-47's left Bari early in December.⁸⁵

Evolution of the 492d Bombardment Group in the United Kingdom

Special operations from the United Kingdom involved British and American aircraft almost exclusively. The British, as in the Mediterranean theater, initiated the work of supply dropping and were joined by American planes early in 1944. Prior to this time, the 492d Bomb Squadron (USAAF) had been engaged in dropping propaganda leaflets over occupied Europe (see Chap. VII), and, until organization of the COMBATANT (supply-dropping) project, this was the only American unit in the United Kingdom assigned to special operations. The British, by early 1945, had two bomb squadrons, Nos. 158 and 161, operating out of Tempsford on supply missions to resistance groups in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Poland. Most of their effort was directed to France, where the Underground was putting airborne supplies to good use.⁸⁴ The 608

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decided to increase the volume of supplies being delivered to resistance groups from the United Kingdom, and in October 1943, upon being assured that there would be no serious diversion from strategic bombing, directed General Devers to implement the decision (see Chap. I).

At this time General Sabe, commanding the Eighth Air Force, had available the 4th and 23d Antisubmarine Squadrons of the 479th Antisubmarine Group, which had been operating B-24D's from Dunkeswell, Devonshire, for about three months. The Antisubmarine Command was disbanded in August 1943, leaving highly trained personnel free for further assignment. Representatives from the 4th and 23d Squadrons met with OSS, SOE, and other personnel at Bovington on 24 October, at which time they were informed of their assignment to the CARPENTER project. Selected crews were then sent to Tempsford, where they trained with the RAF supply droppers from 25 October to 30 December 1943. While this training was in progress, the CARPENTER organization took shape. The ground echelons of the two squadrons moved from Dunkeswell to Alconbury late in October and early in November. On 4 December 1943 the Eighth Air Force published orders, dated 11 November, activating the 96th and 406th Bomb Squadrons, commanded by Maj. Robert J. Fish and Lt. Col. Clifford J. Heflin, respectively. The two squadrons formed the Special Project subgroup under the 482d Bomb Group (Pathfinder) at Alconbury and began operations to Europe on the night of 4/5 January 1944.⁸⁵

Several changes, both in station and in organization, took place in February and March 1944. The two squadrons moved to Watton, a few miles

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from Alconbury, between 7 and 17 February. Ten days after completing this move, they were relieved from the 462d Bomb Group and assigned to the VIII Air Force Composite Command, with the 328th Service Group as administrative headquarters.⁸⁶ In response to the Composite Command's request that a separate headquarters be set up to control the CARPETBAGGER squadrons, the Eighth Air Force established the 801st Bomb Group (L) (Prov) on 28 March 1944 and placed it under the command of Colonel Heflin.⁸⁷ In the meantime Colonel Heflin had made a survey of sites suitable for CARPETBAGGER activities and recommended the RAF station at Harrington, 12 miles northeast of Northampton, which had the necessary combination of concrete runways, supply facilities, lighting system, and living quarters.⁸⁸ Arrangements were made with the RAF to vacate the field, and the 801st Bomb Group moved in at the end of March⁸⁹ without interrupting supply operations.

General Hefner's desire to increase CARPETBAGGER effort was not realized until May 1944. Until then the British had been putting up the larger share of effort. At the end of February 1944, for example, the 36th and 406th Squadrons (AAF) had 12 B-24's engaged in CARPETBAGGER missions, although plans were being completed to raise each squadron to a strength of 10 planes; the RAF had 66 planes assigned to similar tasks.⁹⁰ RAF effort varied from time to time, depending upon assignment of aircraft at Prime Minister Churchill's request. An Eighth Air Force order of 10 May transferred the 788th Bomb Squadron, 407th Bomb Group and the 850th Bomb Squadron, 430th Bomb Group to the 801st Bomb Group. Crews of these two units went to Cheddington for training. By the end of May,

the CARPETBAGGER group had more than 40 B-24's assigned. This increase in strength was made largely in anticipation of greater effort in support of OVERLORD.⁹¹ The 788th and 850th Squadrons moved to Harrington on 27 May and flew their first CARPETBAGGER missions at the end of the month.⁹²

An extensive shifting of unit designations took place in accordance with an order of 6 August 1944. The Special Leaflet Squadron (see Chap. VII) and the four CARPETBAGGER squadrons all underwent a change in numerical designation. These changes were the result of shifts designed to eliminate three-squadron groups in the Eighth Air Force 2d and 3d Bomb Divisions and to regularize units of the VIII Air Force Composite Command. The 492d Bomb Group and its four squadrons were transferred with a cadre of one officer and one enlisted man to Harrington to become the CARPETBAGGER group; similar cadres of the former CARPETBAGGER squadrons went to other stations. The reorganized 56th Bomb Squadron was sent to Cheddington for radio countermeasure (RCM) work; the Special Leaflet Squadron, formerly designated as the 406th, now received the designation 858th Bomb Squadron.⁹³ Changes in designation of CARPETBAGGER units, 5 August 1944, were as follows:

<u>Old Designation</u>	<u>New Designation</u>
801st Bomb Gr. (H) (Prov)	492d Bomb Gr. (H)
36th Bomb Sq. (H)	856th Bomb Sq. (H)
406th Bomb Sq. (H)	858th Bomb Sq. (H)
788th Bomb Sq. (H)	859th Bomb Sq. (H)
850th Bomb Sq. (H)	857th Bomb Sq. (H)

Progress of the invasion in France practically ended full-scale CARPETBAGGER activity by the 492d Group. The project may be considered as having been concluded on 16 September 1944,⁹⁴ after which the group

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was used on operation TRUCKING to carry aviation gasoline to France. This last activity was still in progress when, on 5 October 1944, operational control of the 492d Bomb Group passed to Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, retroactive to 1 October, with administrative control in the VIII Fighter Command.⁹⁵ There was some uncertainty as to future employment of the group, but General Doolittle followed a recommendation from higher headquarters that it be reassigned to strategic bombing. This change took place on 23 October, when the group, now commanded by Lt. Col. Robert W. Fish, was assigned to USSRAF, 1st Bomb Division; however, the 856th Bomb Squadron remained on CARPMBAGGUR work.⁹⁶ At about the end of October, reconversion of the three remaining squadrons was delayed pending completion of the project to evacuate from southern France Allied aircrews who had been interned in Switzerland.⁹⁷ CARPMBAGGUR missions by the Eighth Air Force from the United Kingdom were negligible from 16 September 1944 to February 1945; but in March and April 1945, the number of sorties once more reached the level of 100; and June 1944. (See App. 7)

25 The 859th Bomb Squadron went to Italy on 15 December 1944 and joined the 885th Bomb Squadron in January to form the Fifteenth Special Group.⁹⁸

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Chapter III

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MISSIONS TO RESISTANCE GROUPS

Supply missions in the Mediterranean theater and from the United Kingdom were sufficiently alike in planning and execution to warrant their being treated together. Certain differences, however, did exist. Operations with C-47's were highly important in the Mediterranean area, but there were practically no C-47 missions from the United Kingdom to the principal resistance groups. Heavy bombers from North Africa flew long overwater sorties to reach drop zones in southern France; but CARPETBAGGER aircraft in the United Kingdom, except for their relatively few missions to Norway, had merely to cross the English Channel to reach enemy territory. In Italy, both C-47's and bombers flew many missions that involved no overwater flights, and, except for missions to Poland, supply aircraft rarely flew over strongly defended areas. There were comparatively few daylight operations from the United Kingdom until after D-day for OVERLORD, and very few landings behind the enemy lines; both daylight missions and landings were common in the Mediterranean theater. These and other differences, which will be developed in later chapters, were primarily operational in character. For the most part the technique of planning, loading, dropping, and landing varied only in details.

Special Duty Aircraft and Training of Crews

Planes used in special operations were called special duty (SD) aircraft. The British employed Wellingtons, Stirlings, Liberators, Albemarle,

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Dakotas, and Lysanders for most of their work, while the AAF used B-17's, B-24's, C-47's, and a few B-25's. The Russian Air Group at Bari had C-47's exclusively, the Italians at Lecce flew Cant-1007 Z's and SM-82's, and the Polish Flight was equipped with Halifaxes and Liberators. Except when bomb squadrons were diverted from their normal combat role to execute special missions, SD aircraft were not used for tactical or strategic bombing. Combat aircraft, however, did take a regular part in special operations by dropping propaganda leaflets, or "nickels," while on tactical and strategic missions.

Some modifications were necessary to equip bombers and transports for special operations. The nose of the C-47 was enlarged slightly to provide greater room in the pilot's compartment, and occasionally special floors and bracing were installed to take care of certain types of cargo.¹ Few other changes were required in C-47's beyond fitting them with racks to hold containers and the installation of "Rebecca" equipment. The Rebecca set is a radar directional air-ground device which records radar impulses on a grid and directs the navigator toward the ground operator. By varying the intensity or frequency of the "blips," the ground operator, whose set is called "Eureka," can transmit signal letters to the aircraft.² Rebecca's cathode ray tube display unit gives the distance of the aircraft from the sending set and the aircraft's heading in relation to it. The sending set, Eureka, is a light-weight responder beacon operated on batteries and fitted with a detonator which can destroy it if circumstances require.³ Shortage of Rebecca/Eureka sets limited the use of this equipment in the Mediterranean theater, but by December 1944,

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practically all SD aircraft had Rebeccas.⁴ CARPETBAGGER planes in the United Kingdom were likewise handicapped for a time by lack of enough Rebeccas to meet requirements. The "Sugarphone," or S-phone, another piece of special equipment used by SD aircraft, was an ultra-high frequency short-range radio that provided a two-way contact with a ground phone. This instrument was valuable for receiving landing or dropping instructions from the ground, and for transmitting intelligence information to crews for delivery to headquarters. On several occasions in Yugoslavia, an officer wearing S-phone equipment parachuted to inspect emergency strips and to advise the pilot on their suitability for landing. In nearly every case the pilot landed.⁵

Heavy bombers underwent far more radical changes than the C-47's. The 885th Bomb Squadron in North Africa replaced the ball turret on B-17's and B-24's with a cargo hatch through which packages were dropped.⁶ The Carpetbaggers called their cargo hatch the "Joe-hole," which was made by placing a metal shroud inside the opening. This shroud varied in diameter from 38 to 48 inches and formed a short chute through which "Joes" or "Janes"—personnel to be parachuted over enemy territory—were dropped. The most satisfactory dimensions proved to be a hole with a 44-inch opening in the fuselage floor and a 48-inch opening at the exit. A plywood door covered the hole and could be folded back under the control cables. Jump lights, hand rails, and jump panels were installed at the Joe-hole. Other modifications included the removal of surplus equipment needed only in bombing; installation of a plywood covering to protect the floor, a monorail and roller-mounted safety belt in the rear fuselage,

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a plywood cover over the rear bomb bay, blackout curtains for waist-gun windows, blisters for the pilot's and co-pilot's windows to provide greater visibility, modification of bomb bays to fit British containers, and separate compartments for the bombardier and the navigator. All special navigational equipment was rearranged to provide greater ease of operation, the waist and nose guns were removed, and the planes were painted a shiny black.⁷

Crews of troop-carrier aircraft required little special training other than to become familiar with the use of Rebecca/Eureka and practice flights to develop accuracy in dropping at low altitudes and low speeds. In general, the heavy bomber crews went through the same training. Until June 1944, when the CARPETBAGGER group set up its own training unit, a few crews trained with the British at Tempsford. The course in the CARPETBAGGER training unit reviewed old subjects and introduced new ones. Included in the curriculum were lectures on security, flying control, standard operating procedures, ditching, air-sea rescue, flak intelligence, escape and evasion, and planning supply missions. Crews spent some time in familiarizing themselves with the modified B-24, trained on the use of Rebecca/Eureka, and reviewed dead-reckoning navigation and the use of navigational aids. Radio operators and navigators received intensive training in their specialties. Both day and night practice missions were flown, and dispatchers of "Joes" were required to make jumps themselves. Pilots learned to handle the heavy bombers at near stalling speeds. Pilots, co-pilots, navigators, and dispatchers went along on regular missions as observers before starting their own work.⁸

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Indoctrination appears to have been thorough, since almost no violations of security were reported; even the writers of records were so security-conscious that the historian encounters the greatest difficulty in uncovering facts essential to a full account of supply operations. There were occasions when figures prominent in resistance movements spoke words of appreciation to assembled crews and ground personnel; there were messages of thanks from Partisans in the field and a steady stream of reports on sabotage successfully completed; there were truly heroic episodes, like the career of Johnny Mead with the Maquis (see App. 23), which soon became embellished legends. Whether flying from the United Kingdom or in the Mediterranean theater, AAF personnel were enthusiastic about the part they were playing in defeating the Nazis. Their morale was high.⁹

Planning Supply Missions in the Mediterranean Theater

In the Mediterranean theater, planning procedures involved several agencies as well as the squadrons which eventually flew the missions. Although changes occurred from time to time, the procedures followed in March 1944 may be taken as fairly typical.

The SOE/OSS agencies involved in special operations prepared monthly statements of the estimated number of sorties required to deliver the desired tonnage. These estimates were based on the load-carrying capacity of Halifax aircraft, and were submitted by each agency to the Special Operations Section, G-3 at AFHQ by the 10th of each month. This section reviewed, screened, and consolidated the requests, then submitted

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to MAAF a statement of the net sorties required. This headquarters reported back to G-3 the number of sorties that could be flown with available aircraft. If this estimate fell under the number originally requested, G-3 of AFHQ submitted the matter to the Special Operations Committee, which included representatives of the special agencies, MAAF, the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-2 and G-3 of AFHQ, the American State Department, and the British Foreign Office. This committee took political, tactical, strategic, and economic conditions under consideration in preparing a final allocation of sorties. On the basis of this allocation, MAAF issued the necessary directives to the air units involved.¹⁰

This over-all allocation was further broken down by lower echelons. While operating from Blida and Maison Blanche, special duty squadrons received allocations from the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), a liaison section that determined priority of targets. The squadron commanders, after consulting with meteorological officers, selected the area for a night's operations. SPOC then set up priorities within that area, with alternates to provide a weather spread. When targets were selected SPOC made radio contact with field agents, who prepared reception parties.¹¹

The 334 Wing coordinated activities in Italy. Upon receiving the MAAF directive allocating sorties, targets, and tonnages, 334 Wing prepared flexible daily target lists with stated priorities within each list. An attempt was made to spread the work through the month, taking into consideration long-range weather forecasts. Squadron or group

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commanders and operations officers attended a daily target meeting at 0900 hours at 334 Wing headquarters and selected targets for their squadrons from the list for the day. An operations schedule was then prepared for the scheduled sorties, and headquarters of the special agencies alerted their field agents.¹² The number of targets selected for each mission and the number of aircraft dispatched were determined by weather and availability of planes. The number of C-47's sent out on night missions averaged about 35 from April through October 1944. Occasionally as few as four or as many as 50 were airborne. The number of targets likewise varied widely, the average being about 15 for a C-47 mission, although on one occasion drops were made to 22 targets. Generally, not more than one to three aircraft dropped on the same target. The relative tactical importance of a target, the weight of stores required, and the hours of darkness available determined the number of planes that dropped on any one target.¹³

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For a description of planning procedures at lower echelons, the 60th Troop Carrier Group may be used as an example. A staff meeting early in the morning discussed the night's operations, and squadron operations officers assigned missions to crews and aircraft. Throughout the day the loading section, senior operations officer, and intelligence officers maintained close liaison. Crews, alerted and briefed two or three hours before take-off, arrived at the final briefing with target indication sheets previously prepared by the group intelligence officer and distributed by squadron S-2's. At the final briefing, the group intelligence officer gave a résumé of the enemy situation, the location

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of friendly convoys, targets to be attacked by friendly bombers, and other special instructions. The group operations officer instructed pilots as to direction of take-off, special corridors and routes to be followed on return to base, beacon characteristics in friendly territory, alternate landing fields, and, of course, the time tick. The group weather officer summarized meteorological information and gave a forecast for the operational period. The air liaison officer from the packing unit informed each pilot about his cargo, personnel, and methods of dispatching, and recommended dropping heights for various cargo components.¹⁴

Planning CARPETBAGGER Missions

Planning of CARPETBAGGER missions from the United Kingdom was somewhat less involved than the practice followed for supply operations in the Mediterranean theater. Requests for missions originated either with field agents or at various "Country Sections" in London headquarters of OSS. There was a section for each country involved. The Chief of Special Operations, OSS and his counterpart in SOE determined priority of missions. Targets were pinpointed by the Air Operations Section of OSS and then forwarded to the Eighth Air Force to determine their suitability. Terrain of the target areas and strength of enemy defenses in their vicinity were governing factors in this decision. The Air Operations Section of OSS was then notified of approved targets and in turn informed the proper Country Section and the British Air Ministry, which could cancel proposed sorties that might interfere with other operations.

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
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After targets were approved and supplies were ready, an operational order was made out by the Air Operations Section and placed in a pool of approved missions. The Country Section then notified its field agents of the code phrase that would designate the particular operation that had been requested.¹⁵

Daily at 1700 hours, the Air Operations Section forwarded the list of approved targets to the CARPETBAGGER group's S-2 via scrambler telephone. The S-2 then plotted the pinpoints on an operational map (scale 1:500,000) and indicated each with a colored tab. He also plotted SOE targets for the same night. The next morning, at about 0900 hours, the weather officer at Harrington reported on meteorological conditions to be expected in the target areas, and the group commander or his deputy decided whether the proposed sorties were practicable. The group commander then selected the targets for the night's operations, and the S-2 telephoned the information to London, where changes might be suggested.¹⁶ When the target list was agreed upon, the appropriate Country Section notified its field agents to stand by and to listen for the "crack signal" broadcast by the BBC. This signal was the pre-arranged code phrase which told the field agent how many planes to expect and when they would arrive at specified targets.¹⁷

Squadron commanders were called into conference at about 1100 hours and shown the map with its pinpointed targets. They selected targets for their squadrons, with the group commander deciding any disagreements that might arise. The group navigator distributed target lists to

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Map No. 1
Representative Distribution
of Drop Zones: Chaumont-Nancy
Area, France

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squadron navigators, who in turn passed each crew's targets to the crew navigator. The latter then worked out his flight plan. Take-off schedules were prepared by the group navigator in his capacity as an assistant S-3. Briefing of crews by the S-2 of each squadron took place at about 1500 hours, then a general final briefing was held at 1630 hours.¹⁸ (For further details, see App. 6.)

Loading Supply Droppers

Supplies carried to the Balkans consisted principally of guns, ammunition, dynamite, food, clothing, medical supplies, and specialized equipment; but gasoline, oil, jeeps, mail, and even mules were included in the cargo when landing operations increased. The weight of stores carried by a C-47 ranged from 3,000 to 4,500 lbs. net, although the average seems to have been less than 4,000 lbs. In addition, each C-47 usually carried 150 lbs of "nickels" to be dropped over specified areas.¹⁹ Stores at Brindisi were kept in warehouses, collectively known as Paradise Camp, where Partisans--generally evacuees who had come to Italy for medical care--packed the supplies under British supervision. A large stock of "standard packs" of frequently demanded items was kept on hand. This stock normally held about 8,000 bomb-rack containers and 25,000 fuselage packages, which were stored in warehouses by categories. The largest stocks were of food, clothing, arms, and ammunition; but wireless equipment, medical supplies, gasoline, and lubricants were also prepared in advance of calls from the field. Special requests were met by packing and storing the supplies separately to await a sortie to the originating Partisan

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group. A special area of Paradise Camp held high explosives, bombs, mines, and grenades. A post office processed all personal and official mail for men in the field.²⁰

Each morning the Air Loads Section at Paradise Camp received a statement of the day's program of missions. Using data provided by the Country Sections at OSS/SOE headquarters at Bari, the Air Loads Section prepared a maximum load for each aircraft destined for the specified targets. A checker driving a truck then took the list to the various warehouses, where Partisans loaded the containers and packages specified. The checker stopped at the post office for mail and at the parachute shed, then drove to the airfield with a complete load for one aircraft. There the checker reported to the Loads Control Hut, where a warrant officer commanded several teams of Partisan workers, picked up a loading team, and was directed to the plane assigned for that particular cargo. A British checker in charge of the team inspected the load and supervised the transfer of containers and packages from truck to plane. When mules formed part of the cargo on a landing mission, a tarpaulin was spread on the floor and covered with planks. Stalls for four animals were made with sturdy poles, and the mules were tied securely by lines running from the pack saddle to strong-points in the cabin and to cross supports.²¹

Whereas C-47's were loaded under British supervision by Partisans, the 885th Bomb Squadron was supplied from an OSS dump located adjacent to the dispersal area and operated by squadron personnel. Special devices enabled a B-17 to carry 14 American containers weighing about 300 lbs. each, while the B-24 carried 16 containers in the bomb bay. In addition

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packages, containers, and personnel could be carried in the waist. A normal gross cargo of 6,000 lbs. was considered a good load for a heavy bomber, and each plane usually carried 250 to 300 lbs. of leaflets, which were thrown out of the waist windows. Bomb bay containers were toggled by the bombardier, and cargo carried in the waist was pushed out through the cargo hatch.²²

The loading process at Harrington resembled the practices at Brindisi and in North Africa. Upon receipt of the day's target list, the OSS liaison officer with the Carpetbaggers arranged for containers and packages to be delivered to the airdrome from the station near Holme. Packages, leaflets, and parachutes were stored in Nissen huts on the "Farm" near the airdrome perimeter; containers of arms and munitions and other supplies were stored at the bomb dump. The group Armament Section loaded packages, leaflets, and "Joes" on the aircraft, while containers were fitted with chutes and loaded by the Ordnance Section. The OSS liaison officer and his assistants checked each aircraft to be certain that the proper load was in place. Leaflets were delivered to the field under direction of the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (PWD SHAHF) from the OWI/PWE warehouse at Cheddington. Six to 10 bundles, each containing 4,000 leaflets, were usually carried by each CARPETBAGGER B-24. These "nickels" were dropped some 30 to 50 miles from the target for security reasons. Personnel to be parachuted, escorted by OSS agents, were fitted with jumping equipment by the Armament Section. The dispatcher supervised their jump, or drop, through the "Joe-hole."²³

Difficulties Encountered En Route to Targets

The targets of C-47's on supply missions were generally within 300 miles of base, a distance well under the maximum action radius. An extra time allowance was thus provided in order to anticipate such difficulties as bad weather, inability to locate the drop zone (DZ) or landing ground at once, delays occasioned by ground factors, and navigational errors. Moreover, the course followed to a target generally was not a direct line, since flak concentrations had to be avoided and changes in course aided in confusing the enemy's radar. The normal limit of C-47 flights, however, brought within range all of Albania, nearly all of Greece, western Bulgaria, and nearly all of Yugoslavia except the area north of Zagreb. On occasions when B-24's were not available for the more distant missions, C-47's flew to targets as much as 450 miles from base.²⁴ Flights varied in time from four to more than eight hours, with the average well under five hours.²⁵ Danger from enemy action over western Europe prevented the use of C-47's in that area until after the enemy had been pushed back into eastern France. Bombers used in supply operations had a greater range than C-47's, although many of the CARPETBAGGER targets were less than 300 miles from Harrington. The situation was considerably different in North Africa and Italy, where supply bombers often flew to targets lying 600 to 700 miles or more from their bases.²⁶

Navigation in the Mediterranean theater was somewhat more difficult than over western Europe, since fewer navigational aids were available. Sorties from North Africa required overwater flying for 400 to 500 miles, then inland for 100 to 200 miles to the pinpoint. Nearly the entire flight, including take-off, was made on instruments, and when the pinpoint

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was located the pilot might be guided in by Eureka.²⁷ Some areas, especially Belgrade, held enemy radio stations which helped pilots to "home" on their targets; but in almost all cases pilotage and dead-reckoning were used to reach the pinpoint after the planes crossed the Balkan coast.²⁸

Routes to be followed by special duty aircraft were selected in an effort to avoid areas frequented by enemy night fighters or which held heavy antiaircraft defenses. This consideration applied particularly to the unarmed and unarmored C-47's, which were protected only by darkness and the pilot's ability to take evasive action. Although some transports returned to base badly riddled by flak and some were shot down, damage from enemy antiaircraft fire and fighters was relatively light.²⁹ Nevertheless, the danger from night fighters and flak was always present on night missions. On the night of 8/9 August 1944, for example, 2d Lt. Sam O. Painter, 12th Troop Carrier Squadron, met a night fighter while on his third approach to the DZ. He completed the mission, then turned his C-47 directly into the enemy fighter to force the pilot to alter his course. The maneuver succeeded, and Painter escaped in the darkness. Another pilot ran into heavy and accurate flak over a DZ supposedly held by Partisans. Evasive action saved the plane, which flew on to an alternate DZ.³⁰ Bombers on supply sorties were less vulnerable than C-47's, but the rule to avoid combat governed their operations as well. If possible, routes were laid out that would subject B-24's to nothing more than light flak. Night flights seldom exceeded 7,000 feet in altitude, and planes dropped to 2,000 feet when past danger areas. This low altitude

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aided in evading radar detection and made terrain identification possible during moon periods.³¹

Bad weather was a more serious obstacle to operations than enemy action. This factor stood high as a cause for incomplete and "scrubbed" (canceled) sorties. Approximately 55 per cent of the unsuccessful troop carrier sorties from Italy during the period 12 February through December 1944 failed because of weather.³² Heavy bombers experienced a similar difficulty. In December 1944 the 885th Bomb Squadron was forced to use alternate fields in order to get through storm belts to reach targets in northern Italy. Even after flights through heavy fronts, pilots often found their targets completely closed in.³³ Weather at the base could not, of course, be expected to prevail over the target. On the night of 29/30 January 1945, five B-24's of the 856th Bomb Squadron were scheduled for Norway. A snow storm set in after two bombers had taken off from Harrington and the mission was scrubbed; but the airborne planes went on, made successful drops, and returned more than eight hours later to find every field in England socked in.³⁴ In view of difficulties imposed by weather, lack of navigational aids, and enemy action, the success of crews in reaching their targets was noteworthy in all AAF units engaged in delivering supplies to resistance groups.

Techniques of Supply Dropping

All of the effort put forth to drop supplies to resistance groups would fail in attaining the ultimate goal unless nearly perfect coordination existed between the aircraft and reception committees. Drop zones

must be ready, identification signals must be exchanged, and dispatchers must time the drops so that packages and containers could be recovered. There was the ever-present danger that supplies might fall into enemy hands; even when this danger was at the minimum, a poorly executed drop would destroy supplies or scatter them so widely that recovery was virtually impossible. Successful drops therefore depended upon the skill of crews and the completeness of preparations by reception committees.

The reception committee played an important and often dangerous role in supply operations. This was the group which prepared the drop zone, lighted the signal fires or laid out the panels, maintained contact with the resistance leaders, and arranged for recovery and removal of the supplies. In Yugoslavia, each DZ was staffed by an Allied liaison officer, a small party of troops, and numerous Partisans.³⁵ In France, reception committees varied in size according to the quantity of supplies expected and the anticipated enemy opposition. The standard committee usually had 25 men for each 15 containers, which was the normal load of one aircraft.³⁶ The committee went to great pains to protect the DZ from enemy interference. It could not afford defense against air attack, but every possible measure was taken to keep the dropping ground's location secret and to prevent its capture by enemy troops. The technique used by the Maquis was more or less typical of that developed by resistance groups elsewhere. Maquis guards took up their positions around the DZ, roads leading to the area were blocked off, and a watch was kept for enemy patrols. These patrols generally had four or five Germans or French militiamen, but might be much larger. On those rather rare occasions

when a strong patrol surprised a committee at work, the two groups would fight it out, or the patrol would call up reinforcements. By the time these could arrive, the Underground would have recovered the supplies and disappeared. Detection of a drop zone would make it unusable for a time, but the patriots kept a constant watch and reported when enemy vigilance had relaxed.³⁷

One of the principal factors in supply operations was identification of the DZ. Pilots were guided to the pinpoint by Sugarphone contact and by Rebecca/Eureka where this equipment was available, although there were not enough Eureka's to meet the need.³⁸ The Maquis of Ain, for example, had only three sets in July 1944.³⁹ Reception committees lighted signal fires for night missions and laid panels for daylight missions. The fires, in prearranged patterns of crosses, triangles, and letters, were lighted when the aircraft's approach was detected. Generally the fires were burning before the plane reached the DZ and served as an invaluable navigation aid. Many times, however, the DZ was either surrounded by the enemy or was in danger of being detected. On such occasions the fires were not lighted until identification signals had been exchanged. The aircraft, whether the fires were lighted or not, circled over the pinpoint flashing the letter of the day. Upon receiving the proper response by Aldis lamp or flashlight, the crew prepared for the drop. This identification procedure saved large quantities of supplies from falling into German hands, since enemy troops, especially in the Balkans, often discovered the drop zones just before or after fires were lighted.

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Then, even though the fires were burning, the aircraft would not drop because the ground-to-air signal was not given.⁴⁰

Drop zones were located wherever possible in areas least susceptible to enemy discovery. In heavily populated regions, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, the DZ's were very difficult to conceal. In the mountainous areas of Norway, southern France, northern Italy, and the Balkans, detection was much less to be feared. The reception committee was primarily concerned with security, not with accessibility. Consequently, terrain obstacles or difficulties of approach were minor considerations in laying out a drop zone. In the Balkans, dropping grounds were nearly always in rugged mountain country, where "danger lurked in . . . dark uncharted valleys."⁴¹ The danger was primarily that of terrain and poor visibility. Pilots had to fly at about 600 feet over the drop zone, which often was three to five thousand feet below the surrounding peaks and ridges. Accidents were few, but occasionally not even the most skillful pilot could avoid disaster. On the night of 20/21 June 1944, Capt. Robert H. Snyder, Operations Officer of the 28th Troop Carrier Squadron, crashed when his C-47 stalled in a tight turn while attempting to avoid a cliff. The entire crew perished.⁴²

A plane arriving over a target in the Balkans was allowed not more than an hour for "stooging": pinpointing the DZ, waiting for fires to be lighted, exchanging identification signals, and making the drop runs. If a drop was not possible, the pilot went on to an alternate target.⁴³ During the drop runs, the pilot of a C-47 let down to 700 feet or lower

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and flew at about 110 miles per hour. The crew chief, aided by the radio operator and a Partisan dispatcher, unloaded the cargo. Upon receiving the pilot's signal to drop, he released containers in braces of two and pushed packages through the door until a bell signaled the end of the run. Occasionally a container chute opened prematurely, requiring immediate release of the container to prevent disaster.⁴⁴ Both free and parachute drops were made, although few supplies other than clothing or mail could be dropped free without serious damage. The 28-foot parachutes were equipped with a fuze that released the pilot chute, which in turn pulled out the main chute. This device proved to be unsatisfactory, so SOMTO designed a new one in December 1944. The improved mechanism had a streamlined weight attached to the parachute release gear by a length of cord. When the weight struck the ground, it tripped the release gear and pulled out the pilot chute.⁴⁵

A steady stream of reports from the field provided a check on the degree of success achieved by the supply droppers. These reports were frank and unequivocal, praising good drops and complaining of bad ones.⁴⁶ They also revealed some of the reasons for unsuccessful sorties: occupation of the grounds by German patrols, betrayal to the Gestapo, bad weather on the ground, dropping far from the pinpoint, failure of the Underground to call out the reception committee, and so on.⁴⁷ Most of the reports told of successful drops but some revealed the chagrin of reception committees whose work had been nullified by errors on the part of the aircrews. On one occasion in France the plane was guided to the pinpoint by Eureka, then went off and dropped its load in the main street

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of a German-occupied village.⁴⁸ Fortunately, such mistakes were comparatively rare, and only a small percentage of the supplies dropped failed to reach the patriots. An almost infallible method of delivery was developed through landing operations in which the uncertainties of dropping were eliminated.

Landing Missions and Landing Grounds

There were two types of landing operations behind the enemy lines. Fully clandestine missions were flown to small, secret strips which were always in danger of being overrun by the enemy. Missions of this sort went primarily to southern France, northern Italy, and Poland. More frequently landing operations were carried out to Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries where there were a number of semipermanent and well-organized strips under Partisan control for considerable periods of time.⁴⁹

Landing missions to the Balkans by the AAF began on the night of 2/3 April 1944, when two C-47's of the 60th Troop Carrier Group came down on a rough strip near Tito's headquarters at Drvar. This mission was made possible by an increase in Partisan strength, which resulted in part from supply drops. The stronger patriot forces were able to set up definite lines of resistance. Within the areas so held, there were fairly flat stretches of land that could be made into crude landing grounds.⁵⁰ Three strips were available near Drvar at various times in April,⁵¹ by July there were 16, and by May 1945 some 36 strips had been used in Yugoslavia alone.⁵²

The Balkan Air Terminal Service (BATS) was organized by MAAF to locate and to operate suitable landing grounds in Yugoslavia after the

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Partisans had prepared the first strips. This service came under the Balkan Air Force in June 1944, but by that time BATS had been operating for several weeks. Nine BATS landing ground parties, also known as British Air Terminal Sections, were organized but only five became operational.⁵³ Each section was composed of an officer and five or six men. Their equipment was light, to permit the highest mobility: a Very pistol, paraffin oil, a portable radio, Aldis lamps, S-phones, a Eureka set, and a Jeep and trailer.⁵⁴ The landing ground party aided in selecting and preparing strips, guided planes to the grounds, prepared cargo and personnel for evacuation, and organized Partisans to unload and load C-47's.⁵⁵

The success of BATS parties is indicated in part by the number of successful landings carried out by special duty aircraft. From April 1944 to May 1945, the 51st Troop Carrier Wing completed 846 landing missions in Yugoslavia out of 1,058 attempts; and Russian, British, and South African C-47's completed 618 missions out of 707 attempts. (see App. 15A). These parties operated under many difficulties and often had to suspend activities to evade the enemy. No. 1 BATS party arrived at Medeno Polje (see Map 4) on 15 May 1944. Its operations attracted enemy attention, and 10 days later a German bombing attack forced the party to abandon the landing ground. After failing to set up a strip at Ticevo the group put one in operation at Preodac, which soon suffered the fate of the Medeno Polje strip. On 9 June No. 1 BATS party was evacuated from Ticevo, where it had finally succeeded in getting a landing ground into operation, and it remained in Italy until 27 June. On

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10 July, shortly after resuming operations at Ticevo, the party was again driven out by enemy action. This time the Germans parked tanks on the field. By 18 July, Ubdina strip was in operation; but the Germans persisted and compelled the party to move again on 9 August.⁵⁶ Other parties had similar experiences. No. 3 BATS party went to Berane at the end of May 1944, where Partisans were so efficiently organized that they were able to load and unload an aircraft in 10 minutes. After a short period of operation, Berane was closed by enemy action. Better luck awaited the party at Grabnovica, where it landed on 2/3 September. The party's leader directed improvement of the strip and kept it in operation until heavy rains set in.⁵⁷ No. 5 BATS party arrived at Gajevi from Bari on 19 July. Four days later the Germans bombed the landing ground and on 26 July carried out two severe attacks. Treachery must have played a part in this strike, since the bombers followed the party in its moves. The Gajevi strip had to be given up early in August, but the same party kept a strip open at Slina until rains closed it late in October.⁵⁸ No. 7 BATS party landed at Nocin on 14 July, was attacked by ground troops six days later, and then bombed intermittently for a month. Tito's troops were able to protect the field until heavy rains caused it to be abandoned in December.⁵⁹ These experiences were typical in BATS operations.

The best efforts of BATS parties could not remove the two greatest hazards to aircraft using the fields at night. In addition to the danger from enemy night-fighters, the terrain factor caused constant tension among aircrews. Most of the fields were so located that only one approach was possible. Failure on that one attempt meant a wrecked

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plane and death or injury for its occupants. No night-flying facilities existed, except for fires to mark the rude runways or an occasional electric flare-path.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, night landings steadily increased in number.

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Chapter IV

SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO WESTERN EUROPE AND POLAND

CARPETBAGGER operations from the United Kingdom fell into two periods. Beginning in January 1944, the AAF delivered supplies to resistance groups in France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Holland. Most of the sorties were flown to support patriots in northern France. The Maquis of Haute-Savoie and other mountainous areas were supplied from the Mediterranean theater until after the Normandy invasion; then large numbers of Eighth Air Force bombers were diverted from strategic missions to make a series of mass drops. Bombers on shuttle missions that terminated at Russian bases also dropped a small quantity of supplies to the defenders of Warsaw, but most of the missions to Poland were carried out by RAF and Polish planes. The first period of CARPETBAGGER missions ended in September 1944, after which there was a lull of three months, followed by small-scale activity until the last two months of the war in Europe. This second period was characterized by an increase in the percentage of sorties flown to Denmark and Norway, two countries which had received only a small quantity of supplies in comparison with those delivered to France.

CARPETBAGGER Activities from January to September 1944

While the 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons were completing their training, the RAF Bomber Command bore the entire burden of supply operations from the United Kingdom. In December 1943 AAF participation in supply

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missions was confined to training flights with British crews, and no American planes dropped to Partisans during the month.¹ The CARPETBAGGER squadrons, with six B-24D's operational out of the 12 assigned,² flew their first missions to France from Tempsford on the night of 4/5 January 1944.³ At the same time, the British had 25 aircraft regularly assigned to special operations.⁴ By 22 January, the 36th and 406th Bomb Squadrons had 18 B-24's on hand, of which 12 were operational.⁵

The first month's operations by the Carpetbaggers were largely in the nature of trial runs. Headquarters and the two squadrons attempted 17 sorties, of which eight were completed. In February, the effort increased to 56 sorties which contributed 21 completions. (See App. 7). A comparison of AAF sorties with the RAF effort reveals that the Eighth Air Force was playing a small role in supply operations during this period. The RAF and the AAF together flew 234 successful sorties out of 547 attempts from 1 December 1943 to 1 March 1944, and all but 29 of the completed missions were by the RAF⁶ since the Carpetbaggers did not start until January 1944. In the next three months, Carpetbaggers increased their effort and also improved the percentage of completions: 213 were successful out of 368 attempts.⁷ Nearly all of these missions were flown to groups in France north of a line through Metz, Troyes, and Orleans and west along the Loire River.⁸ (See Map 2.) The RAF also flew most of its sorties to this area.⁹

The disparity between AAF and RAF accomplishments in special operations aroused concern in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a cable to General Eisenhower in April 1944, reporting that the British

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seemed to be receiving credit for all that was being done in supplying resistance groups, and that the United States was suspected of being opposed to the arming of patriots. To correct this error, the JCS directed General Eisenhower to equalize the effort between the AAF and the RAF insofar as it was consistent with the requirements of military operations.¹⁰ Eisenhower replied that SOE/SO headquarters in London was responsible for arming resistance groups in SHAERF's area and controlled delivery of supplies to France from both the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean theater. The Carpetbaggers had 32 aircraft available for SOE/SO, while the RAF had 22 regularly assigned. RAF sorties were greater than those of the Carpetbaggers because, in accordance with an agreement between Churchill and General De Gaulle, the British were making another 65 planes available monthly for supplying the French. The Eighth Air Force had planned to increase the permanent assignment of B-24 Carpetbaggers by 25. In the matter of supplies, General Eisenhower reported that the SOE/SO stockpile was principally British, that many British items already were in patriot hands, but that American resources were being drawn upon more heavily.¹¹ A later message explained that to the end of April, OSS had secured less than 22 tons of supplies from the United States and the British had provided 1,282 tons. The British, of course, had received some of these supplies through lend-lease. OSS followed the practice of getting from the United States only those items which were superior to British manufacture or which were in short supply. In addition to these supplies, SOE delivered up to 240 tons monthly to the OSS packing station. However, OSS was increasing its requests for

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American items.¹²

Addition of the 788th and 850th Bomb Squadrons to the CARPETBAGGER 801st Bomb Group in May permitted a sharp increase in successful sorties for the next three and one-half months. In July, when the Carpetbaggers reached the peak of operations, the four squadrons dropped at least 4,680 containers, 2,909 packages, 1,378 bundles of leaflets, and 62 "Joes." The total of 397 successful sorties was the highest achieved in a single month during the life of the project.¹³ (See App. 7 and 9.) To achieve these results, the Carpetbaggers flew missions on 28 nights to set a new record. Standard operating procedure was violated in that aircraft went out in non-moon periods and in unfavorable weather.¹⁴

Demands for supplies in the area visited by the Carpetbaggers decreased somewhat in August, while the requirements of southern France were met by special mass drops. Nevertheless, the 492d Bomb Group flew at least 337 successful sorties in August, again concentrating on France.¹⁵ Occupation of most of France and Belgium in September 1944 brought full-scale Carpetbagger operations to an end with the sorties flown on the night of 16/17 September.¹⁶ By that time the 492d Group had completed 268 sorties.¹⁷

When CARPETBAGGER missions came to an end temporarily, the 492d Bomb Group then modified its planes for ferrying gasoline to France, an operation which was completed in October. Verbal orders were received on 20 October to prepare three squadrons for medium-altitude night-bombing missions. The 856th Squadron, however, remained on CARPETBAGGER work and received the group's four C-47's for evacuation of aircrews

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from Annecy to the United Kingdom. Col. Hudson H. Upham became commanding officer of the Carpetbaggers in November, but his control over the 856th Squadron was purely nominal. This unit operated practically as an independent squadron under OSS direction. Seven crews of the squadron were sent on detached service to the 406th Bomb Squadron at Cheddington for leaflet dropping; four of these crews returned to Harrington in the middle of December, and the others remained at Cheddington for about a month more.¹⁸

Although the 856th Squadron flew two sorties to the Netherlands from 10 November to 8 December, its CARPETBAGGER missions were not resumed to any extent until 31 December. Then one B-24 dropped supplies and personnel over Norway, and two flew to Denmark. By 5 March, the 856th Squadron had completed 41 sorties to these countries, the effort being about equally divided between them. At the same time, RAF supply droppers completed 402 sorties to Denmark and Norway.¹⁹ The 856th Bomb Squadron returned to the control of the 492d Bomb Group on 14 March, and thereafter all three squadrons were to be available for both special operations and bombing.²⁰ The 859th Bomb Squadron, as stated in Chapter II, had moved to Italy in December 1944.

CARPETBAGGER activities were interrupted again when personnel of the 856th and 858th Squadrons were sent to Dijon, France to drop agents into Germany. This project continued from 19 March to 26 April, and resulted in 54 successful sorties.²¹ The crews remaining at Harrington during this period continued to concentrate their efforts on Norway and Denmark.²² Many of the missions to Norway were for the purpose of dropping small

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parties of Norwegian-speaking paratroopers on the Swedish border.²³

The Carpetbaggers were not alone in flying missions to Norway. In November 1944 the "Norwegian Project" was instituted at the request of the Norwegian Government-in-Exile to transport police troops, supplies, and a field hospital from northern Sweden to Kirkenes. The project was organized by the U. S. military attaché to Sweden, Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Kessler, Jr., and was commanded by Col. Bernt Balchen. Ten C-47's and crews from USSTAF were based at Kallax airfield near Lulea, Sweden and began operations on 12 January 1945. Most of the police outfit and the field hospital were transferred to Kirkenes by 18 January, but the C-47's remained in operation until 31 July. By that time they had flown 572 sorties and landed 1,418 men and more than 1,181 tons of supplies at Bodo, Kautokeino, Kirkenes, and Banak. In addition, the C-47's dropped 41.3 tons of supplies to patriot groups.²⁴ These C-47 missions, except for a few from fields in liberated France, were practically the only special operations from the United Kingdom in which unarmed and unarmored AAF aircraft participated.

A statistical summary of the CARPETBAGGER project cannot reveal its intensely dramatic character, for much of that drama came from encounters with night fighters, from planes shot down by concealed antiaircraft batteries, and from the exploits of crews in escaping capture or in fighting alongside the Maquis. Far greater interest centers upon the reception committees waiting tensely for the sound of a B-24's motors; upon German patrols attempting to break up the Underground organization; and upon the acts of sabotage made possible by airborne supplies. The

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Carpetbaggers alone are credited with having delivered 20,495 containers and 11,174 packages of supplies to the patriots of western and north-western Europe. More than 1,000 "Joes" parachuted from the B-24's into enemy territory. To accomplish these results, the Carpetbaggers completed 1,860 sorties out of 2,857 attempts. From January 1944 to the end of April 1945, 25 B-24's were lost--an average of one to every 74.4 successful sorties--and eight were so badly damaged by enemy action that they were no longer fit for combat and were written off. Personnel losses totaled 208 missing and killed and one slightly wounded. (See App. 9.) Many of those listed as missing were helped by the Underground and later returned to Harrington after escaping from enemy territory.

North African Supply of the Maquis in Southern France

Resistance groups in southern France received their supplies from bases in North Africa and the United Kingdom. Until June 1944, RAF and AAF bombers based near Algiers supplied southern France, while the Carpetbaggers at Harrington and RAF bombers at Tempsford supplied the northern area. Apart from any question arising from theater boundaries, several reasons may be advanced for supplying southern France from North Africa. Distance was one of the principal factors, since Marseille is more than 700 miles from Harrington but less than 500 miles from Algiers. To reach an area equidistant from Harrington and Algiers, aircraft from the United Kingdom would be compelled to fly over numerous antiaircraft defenses; but aircraft from Algiers could serve the same area with much less exposure to enemy action. Other factors to be considered were

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the congestion of air traffic from the United Kingdom over occupied Europe, the availability of suitable airdromes in England, the desirability of dispersing supply dumps, and the advantages to be gained from variations in weather. Among these factors, that of distance was probably the most important, since Eighth Air Force strategic bombers carried out mass drops to south central France and to the Vosges from June to September 1944.

Operations to southern France were on a very limited scale until after the fall of Corsica in September 1943. Then the British left a small detachment of 624 Squadron at Blida near Algiers to institute regular missions to that area.²⁵ By this time SOE/OSS agents were operating among the Maquis and sending in requests for supply drops. The small British detachment at Blida failed to achieve much success in meeting these requests because weather conditions were unfavorable. During the period from 1 October to 31 December 1943, there were only seven successful sorties from Blida to southern France.²⁶ In order to take advantage of Maquis potentialities, the Allied leaders decided to increase the delivery of supplies. In February 1944, 624 Squadron concentrated its entire strength at Blida, and steps were begun to activate the 122d Bomb Squadron²⁷ in order that the AAF might have a part in the work. By May 1944 this newly formed squadron was in full operation and RAF-AAF activities were being coordinated by the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC).²⁸

The 122d Bomb Squadron fully lived up to General Baker's expectations. During May the squadron put up 72 sorties, of which 45 succeeded.

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Weather and poor navigation caused some failures, but inability to contact reception committees was the principal reason for incomplete missions.²⁹ Navigational errors were reduced by providing reception committees with more Eureka's; lack of reception was remedied by designating "dumping grounds" as alternate targets. In areas selected for dumping there were few Germans, and the Maquis could recover the supplies when field agents were informed by radio of the pinpoints where the supplies had been dumped. This practice ended in August when German withdrawal gave the Maquis greater freedom of movement.³⁰ The 885th (formerly 122d) and No. 624 Squadrons at Blida were aided in July by No. 36 Wellington Squadron, which was relieved from its antisubmarine patrol. With this increase in strength the number of successful missions rose perceptibly at a critical time for Allied operations in France.³¹

Since missions to the Maquis differed little except in details, one experience of the 885th Bomb Squadron may be taken as typical. On the night of 12/13 August, less than three days before the Seventh Army invasion, the squadron was assigned the task of delivering last-minute supplies to the Maquis and of dropping leaflets over French cities to alert the patriots of the lower Rhone Valley and along the coast. Eleven aircraft took off from Blida in a moonless night, flew individually to their assigned pinpoints, and dropped 67,000 lbs. of ammunition and supplies, 18 "Joes," and 225,000 leaflets. The squadron received the Presidential Unit Citation for this achievement.³²

As was true with the Carpetbaggers from England, Allied successes

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in France reduced the number of sorties from Africa to the Maquis after the middle of September. The 885th Bomb Squadron, in its operations from 5 June to 13 September 1944, completed 484 sorties out of 607 attempts, dropped 193 "Joes," and delivered 2,514,800 lbs. of arms and ammunition.³³ Subsequent missions from Italy raised these totals considerably. The combined RAF-AAF effort resulted in a total of 1,129 successful sorties from 1,714 attempts, which dropped 578 "Joes" and a gross weight of 1,978 tons.³⁴ In all of these operations from North Africa in 1944, the RAF suffered eight aircraft lost ^{and} while the 885th Bomb Squadron lost one B-24.³⁵

Definite results of supply drops to southern France are difficult to list categorically. Some indication of Maquis importance is revealed by two facts: when the Allies were breaking out of the Cherbourg peninsula, Maquis in the Vercors engaged the full attention of the 9th Panzer Division; and the 11th Panzer Division was held south of Limoges because the main railroads around Toulouse, Cahors, Brive, and Limoges were blown and all of the main highways had been mined.³⁶ In other areas, French patriots created widespread confusion among enemy units.

Mass Drops by the 3d Air Division to Southern France

The Eighth Air Force greatly increased the quantities of supplies delivered to the Maquis by flying more than 750 successful sorties in the period from 25 June to 9 September 1944. These critical weeks in the invasion of France found the Maquis fighting with ever-increasing

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
strength to divert enemy attention and committing numerous acts of sabotage to hinder German troop movements toward the battle areas. In the fight for St. Lô, which ended on 18 July, French Forces of the Interior (FFI) prevented large numbers of German troops from reinforcing hard-pressed units; in the Seventh Army's drive northward toward Lyon, the FFI protected its right flank. Supplies delivered by special duty aircraft from North Africa and the United Kingdom were insufficient to support such activities; but by diverting B-17's from strategic bombing, the Eighth Air Force was able to deliver the additional quantities required by the Maquis.

Shortly after the Normandy invasion, Special Force Headquarters (SEHQ) on 13 June advised SHAEF that the Maquis lacked only supplies to enable them to play an important role in the battle for France.³⁷ The Underground already controlled four departments, and fighting was in progress in several others.³⁸ A conservative estimate placed the number of armed Maquis at 16,000 and the number awaiting arms at 31,800. Potential recruits would raise the total to more than 100,000.³⁹ By extending the range of their missions to Chateauroux and the Cantal area southeast of Limoges, the Carpetbaggers could maintain about 13,500 Maquis in south central France; but by diverting B-17's to the extent of 340 sorties monthly, an additional 34,000 could be maintained in that area. SEHQ pointed out that before 13 June the FFI had made cuts on practically every important railway in southern France and had blocked many highways. Virtual control of all southern France seemed possible;

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Map No. 3
Areas Served by Mass
Propaganda in
France - September 1944

Map No. 3



Scale 1:500,000

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even partial control would threaten all enemy communications in the area, endanger the Franco-Italian border, pose a Bordeaux beachhead, divert German effort from Normandy, and provide an "airhead" on the Continent for the reception of airborne troops.⁴⁰

These arguments convinced SHAEF that the effort should be made. On 15 June, the Eighth Air Force designated 75 B-17's for supply work, but three days later General Doolittle was ready to provide a minimum of 180 B-17's. The 3d Air Division, which accepted the task, assigned five wings of 36 aircraft each to the first operation. Crews received hasty training in CARPETBAGGER methods, while SFHQ transported loaded containers to airdromes, made arrangements with the Maquis, and selected the targets most in need of supplies. Each of the five wings could arm 1,000 to 1,200 men with rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, ammunition, grenades, and side arms.⁴¹

Five target areas were selected for Operation ZEBRA, the first mass drop by B-17's to the Maquis. In the Cantal area west of the Rhone, heavy fighting had been going on since 3 June. Supplies were exhausted, and units from North Africa could not replenish them quickly. Southeast of Limoges (Target 1, Map 3), an uprising by the Maquis had stopped rail traffic on D-day, but subsequent fighting had exhausted patriot supplies. In the Vercors (Target 4, Map 3) the entire population was in revolt. Southeast of Dijon (Target 2, Map 3), the Maquis were unusually active in disrupting traffic. The mountainous Ain area (Target 3, Map 3) west of Geneva was practically liberated by 14 June, but a German drive forced the Maquis back into more inaccessible ground; the department of Haute-

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Savoie south of Geneva was almost entirely under FFI control by 18 June. Fighting in these five regions had reduced Maquis supplies to a dangerously low level.⁴²

Originally scheduled for 22 June, Operation ZEBRA was postponed three days by unfavorable weather. Then, with fighter escort provided by the VIII Fighter Command, 180 B-17's took off at about 0400 on 25 June in clear weather. One plane was lost to flak, another was shot down by an enemy fighter, and two others failed to complete the mission. However, all but three of the B-17's made successful drops and delivered 2,077 containers to four targets (Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, Map 3).⁴³

Operation CADILLAC, the second mass drop by B-17's of the 3d Air Division, took place on 14 July. At this time, with the battle for St. Lô approaching its climax, the Maquis could give valuable assistance by continuing to disrupt enemy troop movements and by engaging the maximum number of German forces. Fighting was heavy in the Vercors, where the Nazis were making a strong effort to eliminate the threat to their communications northward in the Rhone and Saône valleys, southwest of Châlons-sur-Saône, and in the area south of Limoges. Operation CADILLAC was planned to deliver supplies to seven points in these three regions. Nine wings of 36 B-17's each were assigned to CADILLAC, and each wing prepared six spares to ensure a maximum drop.⁴⁴ The B-17's took off at about 0400 from nine airdromes, picked up a fighter escort of 524 P-51's and P-47's, and flew to their targets. The only enemy opposition was that offered by some 15 Me-109's which attacked southwest of Paris.⁴⁵ Together the bombers and fighters claimed nine of the Me-109's shot down.

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two probables, and three damaged.⁴⁶ Two of the B-17's landed on the Normandy beachhead, and only one other suffered major damage.⁴⁷ Seventy-two B-17's of two wings dropped 860 containers on the Vercors plateau (Target 4, Map 3), and one wing dropped 429 containers southwest of Châlon-sur-Saône (Target 5, Map 3). The remaining 214 B-17's dropped 2,491 containers on five targets (Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, and 9, Map 3) in the Limoges-Brive area.⁴⁸ Practically all of these 3,780 containers, representing nearly 500 tons of supplies, were recovered by reception committees. This outstanding achievement brought commendations from General Eisenhower and from General Spaatz.⁴⁹

A third mass drop, Operation BUICK, occurred on 1 August 1944. The 3d Air Division assigned five wings of 39 B-17's each to drop on four targets. One wing went to the Châlon-sur-Saône area (Target 5, Map 3), where the FFI had won control over the department of Saône et Loire by using munitions delivered on 14 July; another wing dropped 451 containers west of Geneva (Target 3, Map 3). In Savoie in the Alps, 5,000 Maquis had fought an eight-day battle with an equal number of the enemy in January 1944. The patriots were forced to dissolve their organization because their supplies were exhausted; but they reorganized in May and had 5,500 waiting for arms. To this group, 39 B-17's dropped 463 containers (Target 10, Map 3), and 75 B-17's delivered 899 containers to Haute-Savoie (Target 11, Map 3). In all, 192 B-17's made successful sorties to drop 2,281 containers at a cost of six planes slightly damaged.⁵⁰ Important though they were, these mass drops represented only part of the effort directed to southern France. Sorties by the

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RAF from England and by the squadrons based in North Africa resulted in the delivery of 4,333 tons of arms and ammunition to the FFI from 6 June to 1 August 1944.⁵¹

One other Eighth Air Force operation which supplemented the regular supply dropping is worthy of note. This took place on 9 September to a drop zone 25 miles south of Besançon (Target 12, Map 3). By this time the FFI controlled a score of departments and were growing stronger. The rapidly moving Seventh Army had overrun many of the regular drop zones; but the Besançon area, on the route to Belfort and Colmar, was not yet cleared of the Germans. To this drop zone, six groups of 12 B-17's each dropped 810 containers.⁵²

The claim has been made that these large-scale daylight operations by the Eighth Air Force proved that such missions were "not only possible but were more economical and practical than night-time operations conducted for the same purpose."⁵³ This contention implies a sweeping indictment of night missions flown by the Carpetbaggers and by other aircraft regularly employed on special operations, an indictment that fails to consider several important factors. A principal objective of SOE/OSS operations was that of keeping small resistance groups active over a wide area. These groups would form the nuclei of large forces when the time came for a general uprising in support of an Allied invasion. The RAF and AAF from the United Kingdom and North Africa were able to deliver sufficient supplies and agents to achieve this objective before the Normandy invasion. Then, when mass drops were necessary to support the general uprising, the Eighth Air Force was called in, and by then the

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diversion from strategic bombing was not serious. The success of mass drops, therefore, actually emphasizes the fact that small-scale night missions over many months had kept the resistance movement alive in France.

Supply Missions to Poland

Supply of the Underground in Poland was carried out principally by RAF and Polish aircraft from the United Kingdom, North Africa, and Italy. Deliveries from the Mediterranean theater began on a very small scale in January 1944, apparently by No. 1586 Polish Flight, which had arrived at Blida in November 1943. The effort gradually increased with RAF aid until in May 1944, 76 successful sorties out of 122 attempts dropped 82.5 tons of supplies.⁵⁴

During this period the RAF was also flying supply missions to Poland from the United Kingdom. In February 1944, the British proposed to make 62 aircraft available to help the Polish Partisans and asked that the United States match this assignment; but General Spaatz was opposed to the diversion of any more planes from strategic bombing.⁵⁵

The situation changed considerably in August 1944 when Russian armies reached the vicinity of Warsaw. Again the Poles requested an increase in aid when the Underground in Warsaw rose in open warfare against the Germans. General Baker, after studying the possibility of daylight drops by the Fifteenth Air Force, concluded that the danger was too great. No fighter cover could be provided for the target areas, which were 770 miles from Fifteenth Air Force bases and beyond the range

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of heavy bombers unless equipped with bomb-bay tanks. All he could promise was to use the night efforts of special operations to the maximum.⁵⁶ General Spaatz suggested that a supply drop might be combined with the next shuttle mission from the United Kingdom to Russia,⁵⁷ but the principal effort in August seems to have come from MAAF. All available aircraft were assigned to the work. Two squadrons of the 205 Bomb Group (RAF) and 148 Squadron (RAF) supplemented the activity of 1586 Polish Flight. These units succeeded in completing 84 of 170 attempted sorties; but delivery of 100 net British tons (2,200 lbs.) resulted in the loss of 30 aircraft.⁵⁸ In September the entire 205 Group participated in supplying Warsaw, but the effort was small. Less than 23 tons were delivered by 19 successful sorties in 47 attempts. Of the 10 aircraft lost,⁵⁹ 8 were by 1586 Polish Flight.

The Eighth Air Force made one mass drop to Warsaw. On 18 September three groups of 110 B-17's were dispatched, of which 107 dropped 1,284 containers, with the loss of two planes. The B-17's, protected by one of the three groups of escorting P-51's, continued on to Russian bases and then returned to the United Kingdom via Italy.⁶⁰ This drop was reported as having achieved a high degree of success,⁶¹ but the Russians claimed that at least 50 per cent of all supplies dropped by the RAF and AAF fell into German hands.⁶² The mission of 18 September had afforded some relief, and the Russians had delivered a few tons of supplies, mostly food, from 13 to 18 September; but General Spaatz reported that further drops were urgently needed.⁶³ General Arnold did not favor a continuation of the Polish missions because they detracted from our offensive effort and subjected the AAF to possible heavy losses.

Any further assistance, he believed, should be dependent upon the date of relief of Warsaw.⁵⁴ At the end of September General Marshall believed that at least one more mission should be made to relieve the desperate situation in Warsaw,⁵⁵ but it was too late for a trickle of supplies to be of much assistance to the city.

Small deliveries of supplies continued to reach the Polish Underground from Italy. The Polish Flight completed three sorties in 21 attempts during October, and 34 Squadron (SAAF) lost two Liberators in completing one sortie in six attempts.⁵⁶ Only 301 Polish Squadron (formerly 1586 Polish Flight) flew to Poland in November. In completing four of 15 sorties, the squadron dropped less than six net British tons.⁶⁷ After December 1944, when nine of 25 sorties were completed,⁶⁸ the allotment of supplies to Poland ended.

The AAF played only a small part in special operations to Poland; although the mass drop of 18 September was a spectacular demonstration, its effects probably were largely nullified by conditions which made further attempts inadvisable. While a proper assessment of political factors lies beyond the range of this study, there is no doubt of their significance.

Enemy Countermeasures

The quantity of war materials reaching the patriots aroused considerable anxiety among the Nazis and caused them to adopt every possible means of suppression. The Gestapo tried, often with success, to ferret out the Underground leaders, to introduce its own agents among

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the Partisans, and to make reprisals against civilians in areas where sabotage had been especially prevalent.⁶⁹

To prevent supply droppers from reaching their destinations, the enemy had to depend upon his antiaircraft defenses and night fighters. The latter were not especially effective against the Carpetbaggers, which still were capable of self-protection even though much of their armament had been removed. One of the few B-24's lost to night fighters occurred over England on the night of 27/28 June 1944 when the crew was on a training mission.⁷⁰ Night fighters are also credited with having shot down a B-24 over Norway on 7 April 1945.⁷¹ Antiaircraft defenses were more to be feared, although routes to and from targets were selected so as to avoid concentrations of flak whenever possible. Sometimes the Germans were able to spring surprises. For example, news of a successful drop to a Belgian target on the night of 28/29 May 1944 caused the Germans to occupy the DZ and adjacent areas. They moved mobile flak units into the region, alerted night fighters, and then waited. Belgian patriots were unable to warn London in time to cancel a second mission scheduled to that area for the night of 29/30 May. A B-24 of the 858th Bomb Squadron took off from Harrington at 2300 hours; at 0100 the pilot was circling over the target looking for identification signals. "Then . . . all hell broke loose from a flak battery . . . The aircraft was hit, and as it veered away from the area it was attacked by a waiting JU-38, which raked it with 20mm. cannon fire. The stricken airplane became enveloped in flames." The crew and a check-out navigator parachuted safely, then spent several weeks in attempting to evade capture.⁷²

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A few days after this incident, on the night of 4/5 July, the 857th Bomb Squadron lost a plane to flak over France.⁷³ Among the 25 CARPETBAGGER B-24's lost and eight seriously damaged, one collided with a Halifax over the DZ,⁷⁴ another struck a tree when coming in too low,⁷⁵ and nearly all of the others were victims of flak.

Far greater success met the German effort to capture supplies. Broadcasting on the Vichy radio, Philippe Henriot, Minister of Information and Propaganda, asserted that on the night of 4 February 1944, 14 oxes of arms and explosives had been dropped in the Dordogne Department; on 9 February, a wireless set had arrived; on 11 February, 18 boxes containing 85 submachine guns, 3,400 rounds of ammunition, 25 pistols, and quantities of explosives were parachuted at Lacelle; on 11 February, also, 124 submachine guns with ammunition, 570 grenades, 2,000 packets of dynamite, 20 Colts, and 32 Mausers had been dropped in Var Department; on 13 February, 41 containers were captured in Allier Department, and the next night more than 300 submachine guns and ammunition fell in the same area.⁷⁶ These supplies had been captured. Similar broadcasts could have been made with monotonous regularity, since about 40 per cent of the supplies dropped to French patriots during the earlier periods of operations may have fallen into Nazi hands. Sometimes the reception committees were seized with the goods in their possession, at times the enemy captured DZ's before the parachutes had completed their descent, and the Germans made a practice of searching known drop zones.⁷⁷ It is possible that the actual loss was less than 40 per cent, since late in 1944 it was estimated that 60 per cent of the supplies were recovered

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by the FFI, 20 per cent by the Germans, and the balance by persons hostile to the Nazis but not members of the Underground.⁷⁸ In the Netherlands and Denmark, possibly more than one-half of the supplies were captured,⁷⁹ although a member of the Danish Underground asserted in August 1944 that about one-third of the total was an accurate estimate of losses by capture.⁸⁰ A German officer, Gen. Walter Warlimont, asserted that the Nazis achieved considerable success in capturing supplies by listening to broadcasts and thus determining when supply droppers were due.⁸¹

Persistent efforts to track down leaders of the resistance and Allied agents, to capture supplies, and to crush the Maquis did not prevent French patriots from rendering valuable assistance in the liberation of their country. Captured German generals admitted that sabotage caused heavy damage in Belgium and northern France, in the Rhone Valley, and in the Cantal.⁸² After the Normandy invasion, military activities of the FFI were an important factor in creating confusion among the retreating Nazis.⁸³ German countermeasures were inadequate to cope with activities made possible by airborne supplies.

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Chapter V

SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO THE BALKANS AND ITALY

In all of occupied Europe, the Balkans held the greatest possibilities for special operations to succeed. Terrain, the will to resist, strong resistance movements, Allied air supremacy, and Germany's inability to garrison the region adequately combined to make the Balkans a fertile area for Partisan activities. Far more sorties were flown to Yugoslavia than to any other country in Europe, and far greater quantities of material were delivered. After the Nazi conquest of Greece, Partisan forces were the only ground troops in the Balkans that could carry on persistent operations against the enemy. In Yugoslavia, and to a lesser degree in Albania and Greece, the Partisans were, in effect, Allied forces. The policy governing the delivery of supplies to these groups was complicated by political quarrels and even civil war, but there was not the added complication, as in France, of keeping resistance alive until it could make a concerted effort in conjunction with an invasion. The problem was one of supporting constant and increasingly effective military operations in an area not destined for large-scale Allied invasion. Supply missions to the Balkans provided quartermaster and ordnance services for the Partisan groups, while their offensive air arm consisted of Allied units based in Italy.

Allied Aid for Yugoslav Partisans to the End of 1943

Yugoslavia had considerable strategic and economic importance in the Axis plans. Its railways provided lines of communication to the

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Mediterranean, its airfields could base Luftwaffe units to protect the southern flank from attack, its minerals were needed by German industries, and its people might provide satellite troops for garrison duty. The Partisans were able to nullify these advantages to a considerable degree. Their resistance forced the Germans to give up any idea of occupying the entire country, their attacks on railways and highways required a large number of garrison troops for protection, and their centers of resistance made them the objective of several offensives.¹ These achievements harmonized well with Allied plans. Partisan efforts to contain and destroy enemy troops aided in preventing a flow of reinforcements into France or Italy and required the Germans to keep 17 or more divisions in the Balkans.² The active resistance movement in Yugoslavia and Albania likewise aided in protecting the Adriatic flank of Allied armies in Italy.

Marshal Tito, chief of the Partisans, obtained his supplies from various sources to the end of 1943. A considerable quantity of arms remained in private possession when the Yugoslav Army disintegrated in 1941; some supplies were captured from Axis troops and from the Cetniks; and large quantities fell into Partisan hands when the Italians capitulated in September 1943.³ The British, flying from African bases, brought a trickle of airborne supplies to Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia, but their deliveries were far too small to meet the demand.⁴ In November 1943, SOE/OSS sent in some 3,000 tons of supplies by surface craft to the Dalmatian coast⁵ and planned to increase that form of aid.⁶ The supply situation became serious in December when the Germans launched

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another of their offensives to regain control of Bosnia and the Dalmatian coast. Fighting was inconclusive in Bosnia, and Partisans were successful in the area south of Zagreb; but the Germans captured Livno, some 40 miles northeast of Split, and took the Peljesac peninsula and the islands of Korcula and Mljet. The offensive continued in central Bosnia, and the Partisans gave up Jajce, which they had held since August 1943.⁷ The Desert Air Force (DAF) and the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force (MACAF) sent fighters, fighter-bombers, and medium bombers to attack enemy troop concentrations and other targets,⁸ but Tito's Partisans needed still greater assistance. Their stocks of supplies were being exhausted by prolonged operations at the close of 1943, and RAF sorties were insufficient to answer the calls for help. The 334 Wing was spreading its efforts over north Italy, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia.⁹ although in the period from 1 December 1943 to 1 March 1944 the RAF completed 306 of 533 sorties from Brindisi to Yugoslavia to drop 524 tons of supplies.¹⁰ The need for greater deliveries was met by assigning AAF C-47's to special operations.

AAF Supply Missions to Yugoslavia and Albania

Supply missions by the AAF from Italy may be divided conveniently into three periods. The first extended from 12 February to the end of March 1944, when two squadrons of the 62d Troop Carrier Group, Twelfth Air Force operated with the 334 Wing at Brindisi; the second period, from April to about 10 October 1944, found the 60th Troop Carrier Group in action; the final period, extending to the end of the war, was one


in which the 62d Troop Carrier Group and the 2641st Special Group carried the burden for the AAF.

62d Troop Carrier Group Operations, February-March 1944. Assignment of C-47's to supply operations helped to solve a critical situation. The Partisan army in Yugoslavia, which numbered about 200,000 in September 1943, had been growing rapidly. To combat these resistance forces, the Germans in March 1944 had 14 Reichswehr divisions and about an equal number of Bulgar and collaborationist troops, ^{but} Brigadier Maclean was enthusiastic about Partisan prospects and predicted that the Germans were not likely to renew large-scale attempts to liquidate Tito.¹¹ This prospect did not lessen the pressure for supplies, since the Partisans were engaging in extensive sabotage and their attacks could not continue unless fresh stores were received.¹² General Wilson was determined that every effort would be made to get the largest possible volume of supplies into Yugoslavia,¹³ but the number of special duty aircraft available in the Mediterranean theater could not be expected to answer all calls. Regardless of nationality, the special duty squadrons were asked to meet a variety of demands: supply drops to resistance groups, escaped prisoners of war, and evaders; nickeling missions to all of the Balkans; infiltration of SOE/OSS agents; and, eventually, evacuation of large numbers of Partisans.¹⁴

The 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons arrived at Brindisi from Sicily on 12 February 1944, but unfavorable weather conditions held them to 11 sorties, of which seven were successful, during February. Their missions were scheduled to Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and Albania

primarily, although a few sorties went to drop zones 40 to 45 miles west of Sofia, Bulgaria. Most of the targets in Yugoslavia were in the vicinity of Belgrade, Ticevo, Medeno Polje, Vlasenica, Ribnica, and Jajce; in Albania, the Kiber, Tirana, and Shepr areas received drops.¹⁵ (See Map 4.) As many as 20 C-47's were scheduled to fly on some nights; but the average was much lower, and an effort was made to prevent more than four planes from dropping at the same target (See App. 10). During this tour at Brindisi, the two squadrons successfully completed 82 sorties. The 51st Squadron failed to complete 52 sorties, and the 7th failed on 51 attempts.¹⁶ The 51st Squadron completed 20 of 55 missions to Yugoslavia and Albania, while the 7th Squadron completed 23 of 57 sorties to the same countries.¹⁷ Thus, of the 82 successful sorties flown by the two squadrons during the period, 43 went to Yugoslavia and Albania, while 112 of 186 sorties flown were scheduled for those areas.¹⁸ A gross weight of 374,900 lbs. of supplies, leaflets, and personnel was dropped to all targets.¹⁹

Weather was the greatest obstacle faced by the troop carriers in their first tour at Brindisi. The 7th Squadron had 97 of 229 scheduled sorties scrubbed before take-off, and bad weather caused 30 of the squadron's 51 failures.²⁰ The 51st Squadron attributed 32 of its failures to weather. Lack of reception caused 25 failures for the two squadrons, and incorrect signals accounted for 16 and mechanical trouble for three incomplete sorties.²¹ Pilots made every attempt to deliver their loads, even at the risk of inviting enemy action. On the night of 1/2 March, for example, two C-47's of the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron took off for target SLENDER I, a DZ seven miles north of Tirana, Albania. The first



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pilot to arrive located the pinpoint, flashed the signal, but received an incorrect reply. He "stooged" for nearly 90 minutes waiting for a correct signal, then returned to base with the load. The other pilot located signal fires some distance away from the pinpoint, but during his runs on the target the reception committee moved the fires to a new location. These two experiences were eloquent testimony of German vigilance in the area and indicated Partisan audacity in defying enemy patrols.²²

50th Troop Carrier Group Operations, April-October 1944. The second period of AAF C-47 operations at Brindisi covered about six months, during which supply operations reached their peak. It was a period marked by greatly increased aid to the Partisans, a larger percentage of successful sorties, desperate German counteroffensives to keep their communications open, the organization of the Balkan Air Force, escorted daylight missions to landing grounds, and the Russian invasion of the Balkans which caused the enemy to begin a withdrawal from Greece, Albania, and southern Yugoslavia. At the end of this period, special duty aircraft of the AAF were assigned to supply the Italian Partisans on an increasingly large scale, although at least one squadron remained at Brindisi until a short time before the war's end.

By the end of March 1944, Marshal Tito's Partisans numbered about 300,000 troops.²³ The extent of their contribution to victory would depend in large measure upon Allied success in delivering supplies and evacuating Partisan wounded. Allied commanders in the Mediterranean theater agreed that 334 Wing should be strengthened in order to meet

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the growing demands for supply and evacuation.²⁴ The 60th Troop Carrier Group's four squadrons, accordingly, were attached to 334 Wing at Brindisi and replaced the 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons between 16 March and 5 April 1944. The number of aircraft was increased further in May by assigning 267 Squadron (RAF) to 334 Wing (see App. 4), and steps were taken to conserve and to increase the supply of parachutes used in dropping.²⁵ Although these efforts were not expected to make the Partisans strong enough to carry out full-scale military operations against the Germans, Tito's 11 loosely organized corps could be expected to inflict heavy casualties upon the enemy.²⁶

The 60th Troop Carrier Group flew its first missions from Brindisi on the night of 27/28 March to drop leaflets over Italy and the Balkans. Supply sorties began the following night²⁷ and initiated a period of more than six months in which the troop carriers were to deliver more than 5,000 short tons of supplies to the Balkans. (See App. 12.) Because a satisfactory breakdown of statistics is not available, it is impossible to distinguish accurately between sorties flown to Yugoslavia and to the rest of the Balkans; however, two months of operations by two of the squadrons may be taken as typical of the 60th Troop Carrier Group for the period. In April the 10th Troop Carrier Squadron flew 74 sorties, of which 43 were successful. Fifty-six of the total sorties and 33 of those completed went to Yugoslavia. Supplies dropped on each sortie averaged about 3,000 lbs. net.²⁸ In June 1944, the 11th Troop Carrier Squadron flew 142 of its 170 successful sorties to Yugoslavia to deliver more than 246 short tons of supplies (See App. 11).

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A majority of the AAF missions from April through June went to DZ's in central Yugoslavia in the Bihac, Tuzla, Jajce, Sarajevo, and Banjaluka areas.²⁹

The principal German offensives in Yugoslavia in May and June were directed against Vlasenica, the area south of Bihac, Ribnica, and Tito's headquarters at Drvar.³⁰ When these efforts in Slovenia and Bosnia failed, strong forces attacked Partisans in southern Yugoslavia in the Andrijevisa, Berane, and Kolasin areas of Montenegro. This July offensive left the enemy with his positions only slightly improved.³¹ In July, also, the BAF began operations and was able to give considerable tactical aid to the Partisans, to inflict serious damage on the enemy's road and rail transport,³² and to provide fighter escort for daylight landing missions on a scale hitherto impossible. Most of the 1,200 sorties flown by the BAF in July were against communications targets, but numerous Spitfire attacks struck Podgorica and Niksic in Montenegro in support of Partisan operations.³³ This activity in Montenegro called for many supply missions by C-47's and a great increase in landing operations which took out more than 5,000 persons, most of whom were wounded Partisans and women and children. (See App. 12.) In August the Germans renewed their drive to clear communications routes in southern Yugoslavia. Troops assembled in the Pec-Nitrovica areas advanced west to capture Andrijevisa, Bijelo, Berane, and Kolasin. In spite of heavy assistance from the BAF, Partisans were losing ground rapidly. What had become a critical situation changed quickly between 23 August and

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5 September when Rumania and Bulgaria capitulated before the swiftly advancing Russians.³⁴ The Germans were compelled to revise their strategic plan and directed full attention to extricating their exposed forces from the Balkans.

The August offensive came at a time when considerable effort was being made to aid the Polish uprising in Warsaw, and the 334 Wing diverted three squadrons for that purpose.³⁵ Nevertheless, special duty aircraft--exclusive of the Russian Air Group--flew 635 successful sorties to Yugoslavia to deliver more than 873 net long tons of supplies. The 60th Troop Carrier Group delivered more than 65 per cent of this total, which represented about 75 per cent of its effort to the Balkans. The Italian squadrons at Lecce took in 203.47 long tons.³⁶ The Russian Air Group completed 194 of 324 sorties to Yugoslavia and delivered 321 net long tons; 43 of its sorties were landing operations that evacuated 751 personnel and infiltrated 146.³⁷ Practically all of the 60th Troop Carrier Group's 145 successful landings during August were made in Yugoslavia, and more than 2,000 persons were evacuated to Italy.³⁸ An unusual feature of these landing missions was the delivery of 24 mules and 12 75-mm. guns to Montenegro. These deliveries were made on two very difficult landing grounds and in exceptionally bad weather which required flying on instruments between two jagged peaks at the destination.³⁹

During September, the last full month of the 60th Troop Carrier Group's tour at Brindisi, the Allies endeavored to take advantage of

the changed strategic situation. With Russians on the Yugoslav-Rumanian border, Germany's plight in the Balkans was serious. Communications were in a chaotic condition because of Partisan and BAF attacks; columns of enemy troops withdrawing from Greece and southern Yugoslavia to protect Belgrade and to reinforce the German line east of that city would be subjected to constant Partisan attacks. Tito's divisions in Montenegro and Serbia began to drive northeast to link up with the Russians advancing on Belgrade from western Rumania.⁴⁰ The Balkan Air Force opened Operation RATTWEEK on 1 September to cooperate with Tito by attacking enemy communications and transport.⁴¹ During the month the BAF flew more than 3,500 sorties and inflicted heavy damage on motor and rail transport.⁴² Partisan successes were also notable. Practically all of the main rail routes through Yugoslavia were cut by 10 September, and considerable territorial gains were made.⁴³ The Germans deployed large numbers of troops along the Belgrade-Skoplje railway in an effort to keep it open, while a screening force on the Dalmatian coast served as a guard against an expected invasion from that quarter.⁴⁴

Partisans of Yugoslavia and Albania received a somewhat smaller tonnage of airborne supplies in September than in August. Of the 930 net long tons dropped and landed, more than one-half was taken in by the 60th Troop Carrier Group. (See App. 13 for a comparison of effort.) Approximately three-fourths of theAAF C-47 effort was directed to these two countries. Practically all of the 128 successful landings were on Yugoslav grounds, from which about 1,500 persons were evacuated. (See

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App. 12.) The 11th, 13th, and 26th Troop Carrier Squadrons were withdrawn from Partisan supply missions on 8 and 10 October to take part in Operation MARINA, the British occupation of southern Greece, leaving only the 10th Troop Carrier Squadron, which carried on until 25 October. The 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons of the 62d Group arrived at Brindisi on 22 and 27 October for another tour of duty with 334 Wing. (See App. 5.) These changes account in part for the delivery of only 67 net long tons to Yugoslavia and Albania by the 51st Troop Carrier Wing in October, a month in which the majority of the sorties and tonnage went to Greece.⁴⁵

A review of the 60th Troop Carrier Group operations for the period April to 17 October 1944 reveals the cumulative importance of supply missions. More than 5,000 net short tons of supplies were delivered to the Balkans, of which approximately three-fourths went to Yugoslavia and Albania. Some of these supplies were to maintain Allied missions and agents, but diversion for that purpose represented a comparatively small percentage of the total. Landing operations began on a small scale in April with 13 successful attempts, then increased rapidly: 50 in May, 125 in June, a peak of 194 in July, 145 in August, and 128 in September. Again, a large majority of these landings were in Yugoslavia, and many of them were at night. In view of the hazards encountered, the loss of 10 C-47's and 38 men was very low.⁴⁶ This average of one C-47 lost for each 458 sorties was a remarkable record that testified to the pilots' skill in evading enemy flak, night

fighters, and mountain peaks and was a tribute to the faithful performance of ground crews. Of about 1,280 incomplete sorties, only 58 were attributed to mechanical failure, 661 were caused by bad weather, and 486 by reception failures. (See App. 12.) In commending the group for this performance, General Eaker stated:

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We in this Theater Headquarters have noted with admiration the volume of your day-to-day operations. We are also conscious of the tremendous import your operations have had in the depreciation of the German influence and effort in the Balkans and the growing strength of the Partisan effort which is demoralizing German troops in that area. . . . I know of no organization in this theater which has done better. Their difficult operations, conducted with great skill, resource and courage, have contributed materially to the success of the overall air effort in the Mediterranean theater.

The Final Period, October 1944-May 1945. During the last period of supply operations to the Balkans, the AAF assigned both transports and heavy bombers to the work. The 885th Bomb Squadron completed its move from North Africa to Italy early in October; its primary mission was to supply distant targets in northern Italy and Yugoslavia. The 7th Troop Carrier Squadron completed its special assignment to Greece and started operations from Brindisi on 22 October, to be followed five days later by the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron. The 7th left Brindisi early in December, but the arrival of the 859th Bomb Squadron partially compensated for this loss. (See App. 5.) Replacing the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron at the end of March 1945, the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron continued supply dropping until the end of the war. Three AAF squadrons, there-fore, were available for missions to Yugoslavia through March; there-after, the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron was the only AAF unit thus engaged.

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(See Apps. 5 and 14.) Thus desiring to achieve maximum results in Yugoslavia before winter set in and to prevent the enemy there from sending reinforcements to Italy, General Wilson had given priority to supplying Tito and made the 205 Bomb Group (BAF) available to supplement regular drops.⁴⁹

General Wilson's actions were caused by a desire to take advantage of the enemy's deteriorating position in the Balkans. British troops were in Greece by the middle of October 1944; the Nazis evacuated Split, gave up the Peljesac peninsula and several outlying islands, and continued their efforts to extricate their extended troops from actual and potential Partisan traps over much of Yugoslavia.⁵⁰ The Russians invaded Slovakia late in October and advanced to the suburbs of Budapest in November. Wherever the Germans "advanced to the rear," they were threatened by Partisans and Russians. In southwestern Yugoslavia, in the Podgorica-Kotor-Scutari area, the German 21st Mountain Corps of Army Group E managed to extricate itself from a dangerous trap and by the end of December was retreating through Sarajevo; and by this time, also, most of Army Group E was back of the Drava-Danube and Sava rivers.⁵¹

These troop movements provided the BAF with excellent opportunities. Roads were blocked with landslides that resulted from bombing; motor vehicles were strafed and rail traffic became virtually impossible. In December alone the Germans lost at least 1,000 vehicles on the road between Podgorica and Kolasin from these BAF attacks.⁵² The Tactical, Desert, and Strategic Air Forces of MAAF all participated in striking enemy targets in hundreds of sorties.⁵³

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Squadrons flying supplies to the Balkans encountered a period of bad weather which canceled many missions during the third week of October, and in November less than one-half of the days were operational. Out of 35 days of possible operations between 22 October and 30 November, 16 were completely lost because of bad weather.⁵⁴ In spite of this handicap, the two C-47 squadrons succeeded in putting up 312 sorties during the period ending 30 November, of which more than 75 per cent succeeded. Approximately 772,000 lbs. of supplies were landed or dropped.⁵⁵ The 7th Squadron alone flew some 256 persons into Yugoslavia and Albania and evacuated 178 agents and wounded Partisans.⁵⁶ Drop zones were widely scattered: Vocin, Grabovica, Bristoje, Pavna Gora, Clina, Milinovic, Korca, Ubdina, and many others. (See Map 4.) Among the more notable landings were those at the Zemun airfield on the edge of Belgrade on 22/23 November and later.⁵⁷ Zemun was rough but not as bad as a ground near Siroplje, where on one occasion 20 oxen were required to pull a C-47 out of bomb craters.⁵⁸

Withdrawal of the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron early in December resulted in greatly reducing operations of AIF C-47's to the Balkans. The 51st Troop Carrier Squadron flew 44 landing sorties to SWIFTER, a ground some 15 miles north of Argyrokastron, Albania. This field alone received more than one-half of the squadron's sorties for the month and somewhat less than 60 per cent of the tonnage delivered. About four-fifths of the squadron's deliveries for December, representing about 101 net long tons, went to Albania, with Korca, Scutari, Libason, Valona, and

Argyrokastron each receiving supplies.⁵⁹ Yugoslavia's needs were met by other units for the most part. (See App. 14.)

While the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron was concentrating upon these close targets in Albania, the 885th Bomb Squadron was reaching the more distant Yugoslav drop zones. This squadron began its Balkan operations on 18 October and completed 94 sorties to drop more than 330,000 lbs. of supplies. More than one-half of the total went to Albania and less than four tons to Yugoslavia.⁶⁰ Most of the squadron's 129 successful Balkan sorties in November were directed to the area southeast of Zagreb and north of the Sava River, and in the area northeast and southeast of Sarajevo.⁶¹ Bad weather in December caused many abortive sorties for all special duty aircraft and prevented delivery of one-third of the supplies scheduled for all areas. The 885th Bomb Squadron completed 33 of 59 Balkan sorties, principally to south central Yugoslavia.⁶² The 889th Bomb Squadron arrived from the United Kingdom in time to drop a few tons to the Yugoslav Partisans. A pocket of Germans in the Podgorica area, under sporadic attack by Partisans during November, was being rescued by a convoy of some 1,600 motor transport sent down from the north. Partisans north of Podgorica were too weak to risk a pitched battle, but it was imperative that they receive supplies to harass the withdrawal. The 885th Bomb Squadron sent out 13 aircraft on 3 December to make a daylight drop to these units; a few days later the DZ's on the Lim and Zeta rivers north of Podgorica had been overrun, but the Partisans had their supplies.⁶³

The first quarter of 1945 found the supply droppers facing rapidly changing conditions. German withdrawals from southern Yugoslavia were still underway, but the Russian offensive had bogged down temporarily at Virovitica, which the Nazis recaptured as part of their drive to keep escape routes open. This determination led to the maintenance of a strong enemy force at Zagreb as the hub of future operations, with outlying garrisons reaching out as far south as Mostar. Partisan difficulties were increased by civil wars with the Cetniks and the Croat collaborators, the Ustachi.⁶⁴ In order to make the Sarajevo-Brod rail and highway routes more secure, the Germans attacked and captured Travnik late in January 1945. In the Mostar area south of Travnik, however, Partisans emerged from a series of attacks with the balance in their favor. While the fighting was in process, the BAF was hammering constantly at enemy targets, and with considerable success. Temporary enemy successes, such as the recapture of Virovitica, could not change the direction of events. The battle for Budapest ended in victory for the Russians on 13 February 1945. The enemy made one last attack to protect his "national redoubt" area by an offensive in western Hungary which opened on 6 March. This offensive failed quickly, leaving Army Group E in a precarious position in Yugoslavia. The newly constituted Fourth Yugoslav Army, with aid from the BAF, opened a drive on 20 March from Gospic which overran Uzdina, Korenica, and Bihac in about a week. Enemy losses were severe.⁶⁵ The BAF gave aid to Partisan attacks wherever they appeared, and were strongly reinforced by other components of IIAAF.⁶⁶

Division of responsibility among the supply droppers had been more carefully drawn early in January 1945, in time to meet the critical situations which developed in the Balkans in connection with the German withdrawal. The 51st Troop Carrier Wing, assigned to MATAF, was to meet demands in the 15th Army Group's area in Italy. The Fifteenth Special Group (Prov), under MASAF until the middle of March, would operate both in Italy and the Balkans: Italy was the first priority for the 885th Bomb Squadron and the Balkans for the 859th Bomb Squadron. The 334 Wing continued to devote its principal attention to the Balkans, with second priority to Italy. No. 305 Group, nominally a part of MASAF, was to be available to BAF for special operations.⁶⁷

Supply missions to the Balkans reflected the military situation even more clearly than before. From January through March the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron alone delivered more than 723 net short tons of supplies, landed or dropped 719 persons, and evacuated nearly 2,600. All but 11 of the 51st Squadron's⁶² sorties in January were landing missions, many of them at Zemun airdrome and in the Niksic area.⁶⁸ Improved weather in February permitted the squadron to succeed in 140 of 175 sorties, of which 12 were nickaling missions that dropped 49,000 lbs. of propaganda. The supply missions delivered a total of nearly 196 net long tons.⁶⁹ Of the 80 dropping sorties, only nine were flown at night; of the 48 landings, only one was at night.⁷⁰ All but 10 of the landings were at Zemun airdrome; the others were mainly at Skoplje, Sanski Most, and Tirana. Dropping missions concentrated on the Berane-Rijelo Polje area during the first two weeks, then changed to the Tuzla area about 55

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miles west of Belgrade.⁷¹ The March record of the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron was still more impressive: 197 successful sorties in 235 attempts. Many of these sorties were to Zemun, which had become a non-combat run. The outstanding operations of the month took place on 25 and 26 March when the squadron, based temporarily at Zara, evacuated some 2,000 persons from a sport field about midway between Zagreb and Fiume. Dropping missions, as in February, went primarily to the Tuzla area.⁷²

The first quarter of 1945 brought Balkan operations of the 2641st Special Group to an end. During the three months, the 859th and 885th Bomb Squadrons had flown about 350 sorties to Yugoslavia to drop more than 690 net long tons.⁷³ A considerable tonnage went to the Vlasenica (TOFFEE) DZ south of Tuzla and the Ticevo area west of Travnik, but far more was dropped on grounds west, south, and east of Zagreb.⁷⁴ Most of these Zagreb drops were to support attacks on the German withdrawal route from Brod to Zagreb up the Sava River valley. The 16th Troop Carrier Squadron served these same drop zones around Zagreb when it relieved the 51st Squadron at the end of March. The 2641st Special Group was concentrating its effort to north Italy after 20 March, when it moved to Designano to join three squadrons of the 64th Troop Carrier Group.⁷⁵

The campaign in Yugoslavia was drawing to a close in April 1945. The Fourth Yugoslav Army was driving northward along the coast from Gospic toward Fiume; other Partisans were spreading their control west of the Danube and south of the Drava rivers; and farther to the south, Sarajevo

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fell to the Partisans on 6 April. These were but three of the noteworthy Partisan victories, but they were indicative of the rapid deterioration of the enemy's situation. At the end of April the Germans had some 10 divisions east of the Karlovac-Zagreb-Vrazdin line in addition to police regiments and garrison battalions. This was the principal enemy-held area left in Yugoslavia and it, too, was broken up by 9 May. The drive northward from Gospic had reached Klagenfurt by 7 May; had by-passed enemy pockets at Fiume on 8 May, and Ljubljana fell the same day; and Zagreb was in Partisan hands on the 9th. There was no more organized resistance in Yugoslavia.⁷⁶

Again, the BAF had played a prominent role in harassing the retreat of the 21st Mountain Corps. Its 4,668 sorties in April and May took a heavy toll on rail and highway transport, and many missions were flown to provide air assistance for Partisan attacks.⁷⁷ The 16th Troop Carrier Squadron provided supplies for Partisans in both the Sarajevo and Zagreb areas, and nearly all of its 12 landing sorties were at Sarajevo. The record of 183 successful missions in 196 attempts in April set a new high in troop carrier performance over the Balkans. During the first seven days of May, the squadron delivered about 150,000 lbs. of supplies to the Vocin and Grabovica areas in 42 sorties and on 11 May ended its special operations with three sorties to Zemun and five to Grabovica.⁷⁸

Evaluation. Receipt of supplies from southern Italy was an important factor in Partisan successes in Yugoslavia and Albania. Partisans captured large quantities from the enemy, and significant amounts were received by surface craft; but special duty aircraft delivered the

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supplies that made the difference between defeat and victory. More than 16,500 long tons (gross) of supplies were flown to Yugoslavia and more than 1,200 tons to Albania. To accomplish this, Allied supply planes flew 9,211 successful sorties in 12,305 attempts.⁷⁹ Eighteen aircraft were lost in Yugoslav operations and seven on Albanian missions.⁸⁰ At least 10 AAF C-47's and two B-24's are included in this total.⁸¹ The 51st Troop Carrier Wing and the 2641st Special Group delivered somewhat less than one-half of the total tonnage to Yugoslavia, while the C-47's dropped or landed 65 per cent of the supplies taken to Albania. (See App. 15.) Bad weather was the principal cause of incomplete sorties, while lack of reception accounted for a large portion of the other failures. Mechanical trouble, enemy action, and navigational errors caused a low percentage of incomplete missions. In the period from April through December 1944, the C-47's failed to complete 1,539 sorties to all countries; of this number, 850 were attributed to weather, 527 to lack of reception, 62 to mechanical failures, and 36 to navigational errors. Enemy action caused 34 failures.⁸²

The Germans were unsuccessful in the countermeasures adopted to decrease the flow of airborne supplies to the Partisans. Their difficulty may be understood when one recalls that there were at least 322 drop zones and landing grounds in Yugoslavia alone.⁸³ These grounds were by no means secret--the Germans knew the location of most if not all of them. Armored columns, as well as large patrols, were sent out to capture drop zones and landing grounds;⁸⁴ bombers cratered the strips and fighters strafed planes and personnel. These measures achieved

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
some success, but there were too many Partisans and too many inaccessible places where supplies could be dropped. Occasionally the Germans set up dummy landing strips near the real ones, but there is no record of an Allied plane having been lured into such a trap.⁸⁵ The quantity of supplies reaching Tito's men became so large that on 5 July 1944 the 21st Mountain Corps commander announced a "coordinated drive against guerrilla air supplies" in accordance with a directive received from higher headquarters. This drive, known as Operation CASANOVA,⁸⁶ accomplished little. Night fighters flying over southern Yugoslavia were rewarded at times. On the night of 14/15 July, a Nazi fighter strafed a landing ground in Montenegro while a mission was in progress. Although some of the C-47's were damaged, seven of 11 scheduled for the field landed safely.⁸⁷ Again on 18 and 19 July the Germans attempted to disrupt supply deliveries by sending 20 to 30 planes to bomb the landing ground at Berane and drop zones at Andrijevica,⁸⁸ and on the night of 21/22 July a fighter shot down one of two C-47's in northern Yugoslavia while a landing was in progress.⁸⁹ There were, also, several cases of bombing of landing grounds simply to make them unusable.⁹⁰ Der Fuehrer himself unintentionally admitted the failure of countermeasures and complimented the supply droppers when he complained:⁹¹

To call a man like Tito a Marshal is absolutely correct. A man who has practically no materiel at his disposal, who keeps a full enemy force constantly on the alert, and who always recuperates from our blows deserves this title much more so than some of our own Colonel Generals and Field Marshals who could not operate skillfully with the finest machine the world has ever known.

Missions to Greece and Other Balkan Areas

Political squabbles within Greece and the lack of a strong resistance movement in other Balkan countries restricted special operations to those areas. The British had flown a few sorties to Greece from the Middle East late in 1942, but even then internal strife was a serious handicap to patriot activity against the common enemy. In March 1943, when No. 148 Squadron was formed, a more or less regular flow of supplies went in to resistance groups organized by SOE agents.⁹² Beginning in February 1944 American and Polish units were also available, but the British 148 Squadron flew nearly as many supply missions to Greece as all other units combined. (See App. 15B.)

The 62d Troop Carrier Group's C-47's at Brindisi began their missions to Greece with two sorties in February,⁹³ and in the first three weeks of March its 51st Squadron added 39 successful sorties. (See App. 10.) The Edessa-Zborcko, Anavra-Mavranaioi, and Triklinos areas were all visited by the supply droppers.⁹⁴ (See Map 5.) On the night of 7/8 March, 11 C-47's of the 51st Squadron attempted to drop on target SUCKRAM near Paraskevi; two were turned back by bad weather and the remaining nine could get no response from the drop zones to their signals. Four of the nine dropped on an alternate target; five carried their loads back to Brindisi.⁹⁵ On the same night, the 7th Squadron sent eight aircraft with more than 25,000 lbs. of clothing, food, guns, and ammunition to a drop zone some 70 miles northwest of Athens in the Pentaloi area. In spite of rough weather en route, ceiling and visibility were unlimited--except by darkness--over the target. Circling down from



Map No. 5

SKETCH MAP OF GREECE

- + Typical Drop Zones
- Principal Highways
- Principal Railroads

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9,000 feet, each C-47 in turn flashed the letter "S" and each received "A" in reply. The reception committee then lighted nine fires in a "V" and waited for the drop which proved to be unusually successful. Crewmen of the last plane to leave could see Partisans loading supplies in a truck.⁹⁶ The 51st Squadron dropped more than 16,000 lbs. from five C-47's in this same area on the night of 18/19 March.⁹⁷ Of about 70 successful sorties by the two squadrons in March, 37 went to Greece, 22 to Yugoslavia, eight to Albania, and three to north Italy. One explanation for this emphasis upon Greece is that the Allies were attempting to implement the NOAH'S ARK plan to unify the guerrillas and to get them busy at sabotage instead of mutual assassination.⁹⁸

The 60th Troop Carrier Group apparently devoted a considerably smaller proportion of its sorties to Greece than to Yugoslavia.⁹⁹ In May 1944 the four squadrons completed 83 of 92 sorties to Greece and dropped or landed more than 100 net long tons; but this total was only some 13 per cent of the entire tonnage delivered. Forty of these sorties flew to RENOVATION target near Yannina in west central Greece.¹⁰⁰ In June more than 20 targets were visited by 60 successful sorties, and Yannina was the destination of about one-fourth of the total.¹⁰¹ Supply deliveries to Greece by the 60th Troop Carrier Group seem to have fallen off considerably in July,¹⁰² but they increased significantly in the next three months. The 885th Bomb Squadron devoted about one-fourth of its October sorties to Greece and dropped more than 69 net long tons.¹⁰³ In the period August through November 1944, American units delivered about 329 net long tons to Greece, or 53 per cent of the total for all special duty aircraft to that country.¹⁰⁴

September and October were critical months for the Partisan movement in Greece. The Germans were carrying out their withdrawal. British troops were entering Greece, and the Partisans were preparing for a struggle in which the Communist ELAS/EAM group would make bid for supremacy. The Allies, in planning to take advantage of German disintegration in Greece, were conscious of the necessity of occupying the country before Soviet troops could forestall British control.¹⁰⁵ As a prelude to a British invasion, MAAF carried out heavy attacks on the enemy airfields in the Athens area. By 24 September the fields were heavily damaged, although Nazi transport aircraft continued air evacuation.¹⁰⁶ Increased tonnage delivered by supply droppers along the withdrawal routes, especially in Macedonia, enabled Partisans to cut all roads and railways in that area.¹⁰⁷ A squadron of British Special Boat Service troops dropped on the Peloponnesus on 23 September to secure and to repair Araxos airdrome¹⁰⁸ in preparation for Operation MANNA.

While not strictly within the category of special operations, MANNA was so closely connected with Partisan activities that some account of its execution is not wholly out of place. Plans for this airborne invasion of Greece had been formulated well ahead of the German withdrawal and were being held until the proper time for their execution. Lt. Gen. E. Mack. Scoobie, G.O.C., Allied Military Liaison Force, commanded the British and Greek units assigned to the operation.¹⁰⁹ British and Greek troops landed on Poros on 1 October.¹¹⁰ Megara airfield was captured by 10 October, and convoys with reinforcements put out from Italy and the Middle East on the next day. On 11 October, likewise, seven C-47's

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of the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron began operations from San Pancrazio. These planes were part of a formation that landed on Araxos airfield to deliver 123,000 lbs. of mortar shells, explosives, parachute equipment, and food.¹¹¹ During the next week, C-47's of the 60th and 62d Troop Carrier Groups, operating from Brindisi, Manduria, and San Pancrazio, flew 246 sorties, landed or dropped 2,000 personnel and 327 tons of equipment in the Araxos-Athens areas, and completed the series without loss. Araxos, Megara, and Kalamaki airbases were the principal sites for drop, glider, and landing missions.¹¹²

Upon completion of Operation MANNA, the 60th Troop Carrier Group ended its supply missions and the 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons of the 62d Group took over. These two units continued to supply Partisans in central Greece by both landing and dropping missions through November.¹¹³ The 51st Troop Carrier Squadron, for example, sent two C-47's to a landing ground near Ardea on 20 November. These aircraft delivered nearly 9,000 lbs. of supplies and picked up 34 passengers and 960 lbs. of parachutes.¹¹⁴ The 51st Squadron flew 25 sorties to Greece from 4 to 9 December, taking in British troops and equipment and evacuating Italian prisoners of war.¹¹⁵ RAF units provided service for British troops engaged in fighting ELAS forces in December 1944 and January 1945. (See App. 15B.)

Disregarding the effort put forth in Operation MANNA, the 51st Troop Carrier Wing and the 885th Bomb Squadron together delivered 821 net long tons of supplies to Greece on 402 successful sorties. These figures represented about 40 per cent of the total sorties and about one-third of the tonnage.

Special operations to Bulgaria, Rumania, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were on a minor scale. From the Mediterranean theater, a total of 408 sorties were attempted to these countries and only 207 were completed. (See App. No. 15I.) Bulgarian targets received 107 of the successful sorties. Allied agents parachuted into Bulgaria to organize and to lead small Partisan groups, and other agents crossed over from Yugoslavia.¹¹⁶ The 51st Troop Carrier Wing flew 68 of the 107 successful sorties to Bulgaria and lost one plane in dropping 57 per cent of the 218 long tons (gross).¹¹⁷ Rumania was a barren field for special operations: 148 Squadron (RAF) succeeded on four of nine sorties and dropped two tons of supplies which were for the six agents parachuted into the country.¹¹⁸ Hungary offered little chance for an underground movement and, as in the case of Rumania, special operations were confined to the dropping of agents and their supplies. No. 148 Squadron and No. 301 Polish Squadron together completed 14 of 28 sorties and lost one plane in the process of dropping 16 tons of supplies for 14 agents.¹¹⁹ Halifaxes of 148 Squadron from Brindisi flew the first special operations sorties to Austria in June 1944 to drop agents and their supplies, but the real effort came in March 1945 when the 2641st Special Group flew 19 successful sorties from Rosignano. Three more sorties in April completed the group's missions to Austria. This effort, which was one-half of the completed missions, delivered three-fourths of the supplies dropped in that country, and resulted in the loss of one B-24.¹²⁰ Only British and Polish aircraft were employed on missions to

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Czechoslovakia until April 1945. Then the 2641st Special Group succeeded in completing 12 sorties in 56 attempts.¹²¹

Missions to North Italy

Poorly organized and scantily supplied, the Italian resistance movement was far less important to the Allies than its counterpart in Yugoslavia. Italy was a major battleground with well-defined combat lines manned by regular troops. These conditions, so different from those that prevailed in the Balkans, severely restricted Partisan activities except in limited areas. Nevertheless, bands of anti-Fascist guerrillas harassed the enemy's rear areas, perfected their organization, harbored Allied agents, transmitted information to the Allies, and aided flyers in escape and evasion.

Organization and supply of these Partisan groups were functions of No. 1 Special Force (SOF) and the OSS. The AAF made flights for these organizations and also for various other agencies.¹²² Until after the Salerno invasion in September 1943, the only special-operation flights to Italy were for the purposes of dropping agents or to deliver supplies to escaped prisoners of war. During the period June to November 1943, No. 624 Squadron (RAF) completed 29 of 42 attempted sorties to Italy from Blida. Dropping and reception techniques used in connection with these flights were so faulty that many agents were captured and supplies often fell into the enemy's hands. Improper location and identification of DZ's continued throughout the war as a factor in causing unsuccessful missions, but the situation improved considerably when several well-

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trained officers were dropped to the Partisans.¹²³

The AAF played a minor role in supplying Italian Partisans until September 1944. Prior to that time No. 148 and No. 267 Squadrons (RAF) and the Polish Flight bore most of the burden.¹²⁴ Squadrons of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing at Brindisi had completed 11 sorties to Italian targets by the end of May 1944 and flew another 19 sorties in June.¹²⁵ The Italians were putting these supplies to good use. On 19 June 1944, Marshal Kesselring announced that guerrilla warfare was endangering the German supply routes and the armaments industry and urged that the guerrillas be suppressed with utmost vigor. Hundreds of the Partisans were killed or captured in the resulting drive, but the resistance movement was far from crushed.¹²⁶ Allied armies were making such rapid gains in Italy during the summer of 1944 that there was little point in attempting to utilize Italian Partisan effort to any great extent. This rapid advance, that carried to the Arno River, occurred when resistance groups in France were exerting maximum pressure on the enemy and when Tito's Yugoslav Partisans were engaged in critical battles. Northern Italy was of necessity neglected because of demands elsewhere for airborne supplies. The situation changed rapidly with the liberation of southern France, since the 885th Bomb Squadron was available thereafter for other assignments. The squadron moved from Blida to Maison Blanche, just outside Algiers, and flew its first mission to north Italy on the night of 9/10 September 1944. In less than two weeks it had completed 36 sorties which dropped nearly 59 tons of supplies in the Po Valley.¹²⁷ During

the last week of September, while operating from Brindisi, the squadron completed nine more sorties to the same area.¹²⁸ Although transferred to Brindisi, primarily to be closer to its Italian targets, the 885th Bomb Squadron carried out many daylight Balkan missions.¹²⁹ Weather seriously interfered with night flying to north Italy and caused October deliveries to fall off drastically. (See App. 16.) Unfortunately for the Partisans, this period of bad weather coincided with determined German attempts to crush guerrilla activity in the Udine area in north-eastern Italy and in the Ossola Valley in the northwest. The 885th Bomb Squadron tried 85 sorties on the seven operational nights; only 33 were successful, and two B-24's were lost in efforts to relieve the Partisans.¹³⁰

Delivery of supplies to north Italy increased sharply in November 1944 and remained on a high level to the end of the war. This result was achieved by assigning the 62d and then the 64th Troop Carrier Group to these operations, and by the arrival of the 859th Bomb Squadron from England in December. The 205 Bomb Group (RAF), the 301 Polish Squadron, and 148 Squadron (RAF) all contributed to the total; but AAF units delivered practically all of the airborne supplies that reached Italian Partisans after November 1944. (See App. 16.) Deliveries to Yugoslavia continued to be far greater than those to Italy, but the discrepancy became progressively less as the war drew to a close.¹³¹ The C-47's, flying from Tarquinia, Malignano, and Rosignano, confined their attention largely to the area south of Turin and Piacenza, west of Modena, and north of Pisa, Lucca, and Pistoia. (See Map 6.) It was estimated that

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the Partisans in this area were keeping some 40,000 second- and third-rate enemy troops on police duty.¹³² The Ligurian and Maritime Alps in the region, as well as more distant targets, were visited by the supply bombers in November and December.¹³³

The 62d Troop Carrier Group, stationed at Malignano and Tarquinia, loaded all of its planes at Malignano, where a packing station was operating. The group began its missions to north Italy on 22 November when six C-47's of the 4th Squadron, with an escort of two P-47's, flew to a DZ near Massa behind the German lines. The 8th Squadron joined the 4th in these missions on 28 November, and the 7th followed suit on 10 December.¹³⁴ The three squadrons completed their daylight missions to northern Italy by 9 January, having delivered more than 494 short tons of supplies.¹³⁵ Most of the group's sorties had been to DZ's in the mountains 20 to 100 miles northwest of Pistoia, although some flights went west of Turin. Target LIFTON, about 25 miles north of La Spezia, received particular attention. The 7th Troop Carrier Squadron sent out 38 sorties from 11 to 20 December in vain attempts to supply this target but finally succeeded in dropping more than 16 tons of supplies.¹³⁶ Bad weather, as usual, was the principal cause of incomplete missions, while enemy interference and improper reception accounted for about one-tenth of failures to drop after the planes had reached the DZ's. An escort of four P-47's or Spitfires, which generally met the C-47's over Marina di Pisa, provided protection from hostile aircraft, but no opposition was met other than occasional bursts of flak.¹³⁷

Italian Partisans, supplied on a scale never before attempted in Italy, increased their activities materially in December 1944. Guerrilla tactics created confusion in German lines of supply and communication and forced the enemy to strengthen his garrisons of Wehrmacht and Italian Fascist Black Brigades. In the last week of December, these units killed 200 and captured 700 Partisans in the Acqui-Asti-Alessandria area south-east of Turin. This activity marked the opening of a German drive to clear their lines of communication, especially around Piacenza where two Partisan divisions, the Giustizia e Liberta and Garibaldi, had organized and armed some 7,000 men. The offensive scattered the Partisans and opened the roads temporarily; but while bands were reassembling north-west of La Spezia, activity increased in such distant areas as Udine and Vittorio Veneto.¹³⁸

The 64th Troop Carrier Group, operating under MATAF at Rosignano, began its supply operations on 11 January 1945. When its missions ended on 7 May, the group had completed more than 1,000 sorties which dropped more than 1,800 net short tons of supplies.¹³⁹ During this same period the 2641st Special Group, formed by joining the 859th and 885th Bomb Squadrons, dropped nearly 1,260 tons.¹⁴⁰ Most of the missions continued to be flown during daylight hours and, as before, weather and reception difficulties accounted for most of the failures. The January experience of the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron was typical: of 24 sorties, 12 failed to receive the correct signals.¹⁴¹ Weather caused 50 of 142 failures for the 64th Group in February.¹⁴² Enemy opposition, on the

other hand, was insignificant, and but one C-47 was lost.¹⁴³

Swift disintegration of German positions in April provided the Partisans with splendid opportunities to aid the Allied advance. Guerrillas captured large quantities of enemy material, but far to the north there were more or less isolated groups that had to depend upon airborne supplies which the 2641st Special Group dropped. New targets were opened for this group in the Alps, where Partisans were disrupting traffic toward the Brenner Pass, and in the Po Valley. Other Partisan groups were attacking the Verona-Udine-Villach withdrawal route from strongholds in the Adige and Piave valleys.¹⁴⁴ Even after hostilities had ceased, on 2 May 1945, the supply droppers continued to receive calls from units that had been cut off from other sources; but special operations may be considered as having ended in Italy by 7 May. During the period of hostilities, Allied special duty aircraft had completed 2,646 of 4,268 attempted sorties to Italian targets and had dropped more than 5,900 long tons (gross) of supplies. The AAF flew 70 per cent of the completed sorties and dropped 68 per cent of the tonnage.¹⁴⁵

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Chapter VI

INFILTRATION AND EVACUATION

Infiltration of personnel by parachute drops or by landing missions was a principal phase of special operations. Success of the entire program depended upon establishing liaison and channels of information between SOE/OSS and resistance movements and upon coordination of Partisan activities with Allied strategy. Native and foreign agents, dropped or landed in enemy-held areas, gave direction to resistance movements or served in less prominent but still important roles. The reverse process, evacuation of personnel from enemy-occupied countries, provided opportunities for firsthand reports, further training of agents, and refinement of plans through consultation with experienced personnel. Closely connected with such "exfiltration" was the evacuation of wounded Partisans, women and children, and Allied flyers who had been forced down while on combat missions. Infiltration and evacuation must be considered jointly, since so many of the landing missions, especially in Yugoslavia, served both purposes. It was not unusual for a C-47 to parachute agents at one pinpoint, land at an emergency ground some distance away to discharge supplies, and then return to Italy with a load of wounded Partisans, American airmen, and salvaged supply parachutes.

General Infiltration Missions

The air forces during the course of hostilities were called upon to deliver personnel for various types of missions in enemy territory.

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Agents bent on sabotage or espionage, organizers of resistance movements, "Jedburgh" teams, operational groups, weather observers, radio operators, aircrew rescue units, and formal military missions made up most of the "bodies" transported.

Infiltration of special agents by air began in 1940 when the RAF dropped operatives of the British Special Intelligence Service over France.¹ In the following year, Lysanders and other light aircraft landed occasionally on secret fields to take in some agents and to evacuate others. From these early efforts, the infiltration of personnel into hostile areas grew rapidly as Allied intelligence agencies expanded and as the preliminary work of Partisan organizers began to bear fruit. The presence of "Joes" and "Janes" in C-47's, B-17's, and B-24's became common. Carpetbaggers from England dropped 617 "Joes" from January to September 1944, and by April 1945 had raised the total to 1,043.² Units of the MAAF dropped or landed 4,683 Allied agents and Partisans in various European countries from 1943 to 1945.³ The 60th Troop Carrier Group alone dropped or landed 837 persons in the Balkans from 1 April to 30 September 1944. (See App. 12.)

Except on a few occasions, special duty aircraft carried not more than three or four Joes on any one sortie. Jedburgh teams, which made up a large part of the personnel infiltrated by Carpetbaggers after September 1943, consisted of two or three officers and one enlisted radio operator. These teams were developed primarily to work with the Maquis, and by midsummer 1944 there were some 100 of them in France alone.

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Every team included an officer who was a native of the country in which the men were to operate.⁴ Team GILES, which may be taken as typical of the Jedburghs, dropped in France on the night of 8/9 July 1944. Its personnel consisted of Capt. B.M.W. Knox (American), Capt. Paul Lebel (French), and Sgt. Gordon H. Tack (British). The men organized successful receptions at 13 DZ's in addition to providing leadership for Maquis groups.⁵

Most of the infiltration sorties were routine work for the air forces, however dramatic the experience might be for the Joes, but the 492d Bomb Group participated in a few missions in 1945 that departed from its ordinary cycle. The 856th Bomb Squadron, operating from an advanced base at Lyon, dropped parachutists in Germany on 21 January, and with the 858th Bomb Squadron, flew out of Dijon from 19 March to 26 April. During this period the two squadrons dropped 82 agents, equipped with radios, at key locations in Germany. The DOCTOR team, made up of a Belgian radio operator and a Belgian observer, dropped on the Austro-Bavarian border on the night of 23/24 March to check on traffic through the Brenner Pass and to observe events in the Berchtesgaden area. Another interesting variation was the "Red Stocking" series in which pilots flew Mosquito aircraft from Dijon. These planes, equipped with recording devices, were flown at high altitudes over designated pinpoints to pick up and record messages transmitted by agents on the ground.⁶

Special Infiltration Missions

Supply droppers in Italy were called upon at times to execute special

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infiltration missions, among which were Operations ORATION, BUNGHOLE, and MANHOLE, that varied considerably from their usual work.

Operation ORATION, infiltration of the Maclean military mission to Yugoslavia by parachute, took place about the middle of January 1944. Glamoc landing ground was originally designated as the pinpoint, but because of enemy action the DZ was moved to a location some 10 miles north of Ticevo. Two DC-3's of No. 267 Squadron at Bari carried 16 personnel and 2,400 lbs. of equipment; six SM-82's from Lecce dropped 30,000 lbs. of boots and clothing; two squadrons of P-40's from DAF provided the escort; and another squadron attacked the Mostar airfield as a diversion.⁷

Operation MANHOLE, infiltration of the Russian military mission, took place on 23 February 1944 after many annoying delays. The CCS informed Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson in January that he was to facilitate the movement of the Russian mission to Tito's headquarters. This mission was to arrive in Italy via Cairo in two C-47's, one of which would remain in Italy at the mission's disposal and was to be maintained by MAAF.⁸ Advance Force 133, accordingly, made plans to facilitate the mission's journey and requested that MATAF provide another Dakota (C-47) and six SM-82's for a daylight operation to land at the Medeno Polje ground, about 30 miles southeast of Bihac, on 3 February. The Dakotas would carry wounded Partisans on the return trip, and the SM-82's would carry in supplies for the Russians. The Desert Air Force was requested to provide fighter escort from 249 Wing.⁹ On 1 February, when the Russians were due in Tunis, a staff meeting at the MAAF advanced CF considered these plans. Brig. Gen. Lauris Norstad believed that the landing ground was

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beyond the reach of C-47's, and General Baker suggested that the mission drop by parachute; but none of the Russians had been trained in parachute jumping. The problem was turned over to 334 Wing,¹⁰ which went ahead with plans to use the C-47's.

The Russians arrived at Bari on 3 February, and Advance Force 133 at once requested permission to carry out the Medeno Polje landing and supply drop on 5 February.¹¹ The operation order, issued by 249 Wing on 4 February, called for 1 Dakota of 267 Squadron, the 2 Soviet C-47's, 6 Italian SM-82's, and an escort of 18 P-40's from 250 Squadron, DAF. The SM-82's from Lecce were to arrive over Bari at 1055, there to be joined by the C-47's. Proceeding to Cutella, some 130 miles up the coast from Bari, the formation was to pick up 12 fighters and go on to Medeno Polje and the DZ designated as the target for the SM-82's.¹² MAAF approved the plan on 5 February,¹³ but bad weather delayed execution. The Russians complained at once that there was not enough fighter protection,¹⁴ so MAAF ordered an additional 12 P-47's from MASAF to give top cover over the Adriatic.¹⁵ In the meantime snow began to cover the selected landing ground, and the plans were discarded.¹⁶ MAAF thereupon proposed that the Tactical Air Force carry out the operation with gliders and fighter escort.¹⁷ MATAF gave the assignment to the 62d Troop Carrier Group, which was to provide three C-47's, each towing a Waco (CG-4A) glider. Twenty-four P-40's from DAF and 12 Fifteenth Air Force P-47's were to provide the escort.¹⁸ Three C-47's of the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron took off from Bari at 0945 on 23 February. Twenty-three Russian

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and six British officers were in the gliders, and the transports carried a gross load of 10,500 lbs. of supplies to be dropped. The mission was successful, although visibility was practically zero over the target.¹⁹

Operation BUNGHOLE, the infiltration of American meteorologists into Yugoslavia, had been assigned to 267 Squadron (RAF) for execution on 19 February. The Fifteenth Air Force was to put up an escort of 24 P-47's, and nine SM-82's were to drop supplies at the DZ north of Ticevo.²⁰ The mission was transferred to the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron, which sent two C-47's, piloted by Maj. Paul A. Jones and Capt. John A. Walker, to Bari on 23 February. Four days later, loaded with Joes, equipment, and supplies, the C-47's took off. Picking up their escort over the Adriatic, they crossed the Yugoslav coast south of Sibenik and ran into a heavy snowstorm. Although visibility was poor, Major Jones found the target and made four runs to drop his load. The SM-82's "were seen dropping their loads in various and sundry spots in the vicinity." Captain Walker, unable to locate the signal fires, returned to Bari with his cargo.²¹

Landings in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece increased in number as the war drew to a close, and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing in effect operated an air transport service at Brindisi. Outgoing traffic consisted primarily of Allied agents and supplies; incoming traffic was largely made up of Balkan nationals and Allied airmen.

Air Evacuation of Allied Agents

Flying agents into enemy territory was an easy task in comparison

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with getting them out again--if they survived. The return trip was especially difficult from western Europe and Poland, although there were a few quite successful air evacuations, or "pick-ups." The first pick-up operation during the war occurred on the night of 20 October 1940 when a British Lysander landed in France. The demand for pick-ups increased after the North African invasion, and the Air Ministry was asked to send a Lysander flight to Italy for these operations. By February 1944 there were four Lysanders attached to 148 Squadron (RAF) at Brindisi. Most of their sorties went to southern France and northern Italy, primarily to bring out agents, documents, and other intelligence material. These planes were not used as a source of supply for Partisans, nor were they used to any extent on regular missions to Partisan-held landing grounds. The Lysander Flight, from February 1944 to May 1945, attempted 73 pick-ups and succeeded in 44; in all, 133 agents were carried, 63 taken in and 70 brought out. The only loss occurred in November 1944 when an Allied fighter shot down a Lysander over Italy.²²

Transports made a few pick-ups, as distinguished from landings on well-established Partisan strips. No. 267 Squadron succeeded in landing 13 agents and in picking up 21 from southern France on the night of 10/11 August 1944.²³ A Dakota of the same squadron, on a mission to a field north of Tarnow in Poland during April 1944, landed two agents and picked up a Polish delegation that later went on to England from Brindisi.²⁴

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These pick-up missions were even more clandestine in nature than evacuations from semipermanent landing grounds. The number of agents who escaped from enemy territory by this means was far less than the number brought out of the Balkans on regular SO sorties. In May 1944, for example, special duty aircraft of MAAF evacuated only 61 personnel of Force 266, two RAF officers, an OSS officer, and 32 miscellaneous personnel.²⁵

Routine Evacuation from the Balkans

The principal reason for evacuation of Partisans from the Balkans was the inability of guerrilla forces to care properly for their wounded and to protect women and children threatened with extermination by German and Ustachi forces. Hospital facilities were not available in the mountainous and sparsely inhabited areas under Partisan control, nor did the loosely organized patriots have the means to establish such facilities. Partisans who fell into German hands almost invariably suffered torture and death for their "treasonable" acts in fighting the invaders. Allied airmen, forced to abandon their planes over the Balkans, also made their way to Partisan and Cetnik headquarters, thus creating another problem which demanded solution.²⁶

Although more or less regular evacuation missions did not begin until April 1944, Advance Force 133 attempted to organize them earlier. On 2 February this agency reported that Partisans near Berane urgently needed about four tons of arms and ammunition, and that there were four British liaison officers (BLO's) and 60 wounded Partisans who should be

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evacuated. Force 133 suggested that two DC-3's of 267 Squadron (RAF) should land at Berane about 5 February, with an escort from 242 Group (RAF).²⁷ But the commander of 242 Group insisted that Berane was beyond escort range and he did not have resources to accept the commitment.²⁸ Thereupon, MAAF announced that at present transport aircraft could not be used for evacuating wounded Partisans and that fighters could not be spared to escort daylight missions.²⁹

Apparently the RAF, and the two Russian C-47's that brought the Vishinsky Mission to Italy, began Partisan evacuation in March 1944. During the week of 22-28 March, the Russians flew two sorties to Yugoslavia to land supplies. An RAF officer who landed near Berane in the same week offered to carry out some wounded Partisans, but the Yugoslavs preferred to be evacuated by Russians, who would treat them better!³⁰ Apparently, too, the landing ground at Medeno Polje had been in use since about the middle of February and other strips had been prepared as early as January.³¹

The practice of evacuating wounded Partisans and other personnel was well established by the end of April. Capts. Karl Y. Benson and Floyd L. Turner, of the 60th Troop Carrier Group, are credited with having initiated operations to Medeno Polje on the night of 2/3 April 1944. The two planes took out 36 evacuees, most of them wounded Partisans.³² By the end of the month 15 transports had landed and evacuated 168 personnel, among whom were members of the Maclean Mission and a Yugoslav delegation to MAAF. These operations, known as PLAINDEALER,

were so successful that MAAF sent a flying control and unloading party--forerunner of the BATS--to operate the Medeno Polje field for more frequent service.³³

Successful transport landings in Yugoslavia increased by 400 per cent in May as compared with April. There were 60 completed sorties which evacuated 1,098 persons, 777 of whom were wounded Partisans.³⁴ All but 37 of the evacuees were brought out by the 60th Troop Carrier Group. (See App. 12.) Although statistics are incomplete, the total number of persons evacuated from the Balkans in the period 1 April 1944 to 30 April 1945 was about 19,000.³⁵ Of this number, almost 9,300 were evacuated by the 60th Troop Carrier Group between 1 April and 30 September 1944.³⁶ Most of the Balkan evacuation sorties after October 1944 were flown by the RAF, since after that date the major effort of AAF C-47's was directed to north Italy. The importance of evacuation to Tito is indicated by the record for August and September 1944. In these two months, in 532 attempts by all units, there were 418 successful landings, which evacuated 4,102 wounded Partisans.³⁷ Enemy attempts to interfere with this work had reduced the August landings to about two-thirds of those in July.³⁸ The total number of persons evacuated from the Balkans and Italy fell off considerably during the winter of 1944-45 but increased in the spring.³⁹

Landing sorties were far more interesting and dangerous than routine supply drops. Capt. Homer L. Moore, 28th Troop Carrier Squadron, won the DFC for his exploit on the night of 3/4 June 1944. His target

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was a crude strip in the bottom of a narrow valley surrounded by 300-foot hills. Captain Moore let down successfully through a thick overcast, delivered his supplies, and carried 22 wounded Partisans to Italy.⁴⁰ A few nights later, on 8/9 June, Capt. Howard A. Colliver, 11th Troop Carrier Squadron, landed on a soft field in Croatia. A team of oxen was required to free the plane from the mud and dawn was approaching when the C-47 was again on firm ground, but Captain Colliver camouflaged the plane. During the day he hid in the hills with his crew. That night, with 31 Partisans aboard, he took off successfully.⁴¹ Partisans at a field in Montenegro guided Maj. Joseph T. Wimsatt, 12th Troop Carrier Squadron, into a bomb crater. Unable to take off with a bent propeller and a damaged wing tip, Major Wimsatt flew back to Italy in another C-47, returned the next night with a new propeller, and flew his plane back to base.⁴² On the night of 7/8 July, 2d Lt. Robert H. Cook, 10th Troop Carrier Squadron, lost an engine at 10,000 feet when he was flying 22 wounded Partisans to Italy. Lieutenant Cook set course for the island of Vis, and, his fuel almost exhausted, crash-landed without injuring his passengers.⁴³ Lt. Harold E. Donohue, 28th Troop Carrier Squadron, set some sort of a record on 3 July when he carried 66 Yugoslav orphans and three adults to Italy in his C-47.⁴⁴

Large-Scale Evacuations Requested by Marshal Tito

On at least three occasions special duty aircraft responded to urgent calls from Marshal Tito for mass evacuations. The first of these occurred in connection with the so-called seventh German offensive in

Yugoslavia, a drive which nearly succeeded in its attempt to capture Tito and his staff.

This offensive opened on 25 May 1944 with drives from Bihac through Petrovac, south from Jajce and from Banjaluka, and north from Livno.⁴⁵

(See Map 7.) For several weeks the enemy had been massing troops at strategic locations and had carried out local attacks in preparation for what was intended to be the final stroke against Tito in western Bosnia.⁴⁶ Tito's headquarters were located in a ravine north of the

mountain village of Drvar. The Russian mission was bivouacked about a mile to the northwest, the British mission was in a ravine about two miles to the south, and an American weather detachment was just west of the town.⁴⁷ Drvar was a splendid prize for the Germans who were,


probably, well informed about the concentration of Allied and Partisan leaders in the area.⁴⁸ Intensive enemy air reconnaissance on 24 May aroused Tito's suspicions, and he moved a part of his headquarters back into the mountains.⁴⁹ At about 0430 on 25 May the Germans hit Drvar with a dive-bombing attack, then dropped paratroopers and landed gliders. About two battalions of enemy troops and 100 planes were involved, against which the Partisans could marshal less than 1,000 men. Tito and the foreign missions fled to the hills, so successfully that only one American officer and a cameraman were reported missing. Tito's men held out on the 25th and reported the attack liquidated on the morning of 26 May; but that afternoon a German armored column from Petrovac and additional infantry joined the attack. Partisans in

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surrounding areas could give no aid to Drvar, nor did Allied fighters appear on the critical days.⁵⁰ In their flight from Drvar the Partisans had been unable to take their supplies with them, but this shortage was remedied in part on the night of 25/26 May when C-47's dropped supplies at Drvar, and three nights later when an additional 60 tons were dropped.⁵¹ In response to Tito's plea for aid, MAAF flew nearly 1,000 bomber and fighter sorties to attack enemy concentrations, shipping, dumps, and transport from 25 to 31 May.⁵² This activity, while not directed against Drvar itself where battle lines were confused, made a strong impression on the Partisans, enabled them to collect supplies that had been dropped, and raised Anglo-American prestige almost as high as that of the Russians.⁵³ While the Germans were pressing their search for Tito, some 4,000 Allied and Partisan troops raided the island of Brac to create a diversion⁵⁴ and 334 Wing hurriedly prepared to evacuate Tito and the foreign missions.

By 1 June Tito's party was loosely encircled in the Prekaja Mountains, but the main group escaped to Kupresko Polje about dusk on 3 June. No. 2 BATS party had prepared an emergency strip and C-47's were on their way even before Tito's party had assembled. A Russian transport from Bari landed at 2200, took on Tito and other important officers, delivered them safely at Bari, and returned for another load. Three C-47's of the 60th Troop Carrier Group took out 74 persons on the same night. On the following night seven more C-47's took out the rest of Tito's staff, and on the night of 5/6 June, six AAF C-47's evacuated 118 recently wounded Partisans. The Germans captured the



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strip a few hours after this last evacuation,⁵⁵ but by that time the crisis was over. American and Russian C-47's attached to 334 Wing had saved Tito and the foreign missions from almost certain capture.

The German offensive in the Drvar area failed to achieve its objective, and Partisan counterattacks recovered much of the lost ground. Nazi interest then shifted to Montenegro, where the Prinz^{Eugen} and 21st Mountain Divisions launched an attack against the Partisan 2d Corps headquarters in July. The patriots lost Andrijevic, Kolasin, and Nerane, reverses which enabled the Nazis to begin occupation of the liberated area west of the Plevlja-Niksic road. Heavy casualties among the Partisans caused British liaison officers to request preparation of a landing ground for evacuation of the wounded. Casualties assembled while a BATS party prepared the strip for operations; but enemy artillery fire fell on the landing ground before it could be used. The wounded, now numbering more than 800, were sent on a four-day march to Brezna, 10 miles north of Niksic. Enemy planes bombed and strafed the party, but losses were slight. At Brezna the patriots cleared cornfields to make an emergency landing ground, which was ready on 21 August. By this time the enemy was closing in rapidly, and Partisan leaders feared that they could not hold the area for more than two days. On the edge of this strip were shells of houses where women and children had been burned to death in 1943 and the graves where they were buried, reminders to the hundreds of wounded and exhausted Partisans of what lay ahead for any patriots captured by the Nazis.⁵⁶

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Liaison officers at Brezna sent urgent radio messages to the BAF on 21 August requesting immediate aid in supplies and evacuation of the wounded. At first, pleading prior commitments, BAF refused to send aid before 23 August. This decision fortunately was changed, and on the morning of 22 August, Dakotas of 267 Squadron (RAF) flew to Brezna with an escort of 18 Mustangs and Spitfires and evacuated 219 of the seriously wounded. The transports were on the ground 20 minutes, a time that could have been reduced had it not been for cowardly behavior by Italians of the Garibaldi Division, who had to be forced from the planes. Then two Spitfires circled over the strip dropping messages with the information that 24 more C-47's were on their way.⁵⁷ These planes were from the 60th Troop Carrier Group, each squadron of which sent out six C-47's. The first squadron landed early in the afternoon, and by night the 24 C-47's had taken out 705 wounded Partisans and 16 Allied flyers. Each of the flights was escorted by Mustangs and Spitfires.⁵⁸ The experience of the 20th Troop Carrier Squadron was typical of the group's work. Led by the squadron commander, Capt. Harry W. Husman, six C-47's took off from Brindisi in two elements of three planes each at 1607 and landed on the Brezna field at 1740. After discharging a British surgeon and a ton of food, they loaded 191 wounded and took off at 1755, proceeded to Bari to deliver their passengers, and were back at Brindisi by 2105.⁵⁹ The RAF and AAF together evacuated 940 persons during the day. The Russian Air Group, on the night of 22/23 August, brought out 138 wounded Partisans from Brezna, raising the


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
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total number of evacuees to 1,078, and of this number all but 19 were wounded Partisans. This was the largest operation of its kind undertaken in the Balkans until March 1945. The Partisan commander, relieved of his burden of casualties and resupplied with arms, ammunition, and food, was able to resume the offensive. Having failed to achieve their objective, the enemy withdrew from the area within a fortnight.⁶⁰

The next large-scale evacuation, known as Operation DUNN, took place on 25-26 March 1945. Marshal Tito requested on 21 March that about 2,000 refugees, in danger of annihilation by the retreating Germans, be evacuated from an area northeast of Fiume. At this time the only AAF unit at Brindisi was the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron, commanded by Maj. Bruce C. Dunn. The BAF plan was for the 51st Squadron to base 13 C-47's (one a supply plane) at Zemonico airdrome, Zara, and fly shuttle missions to the landing strip (PICCADILLY HOPE "A") which was located about midway between Fiume and Zagreb. (See Map 8.)⁶¹ When the landing strip was ready on 24 March, Partisan troops were fighting at a river only three miles away. The first C-47's arrived on the PICCADILLY strip at 0950 on 25 March. Two missions of 24 sorties evacuated 788 adults and children during the day and landed nearly 95,000 lbs. of supplies. An enemy bombing attack that night failed to damage the field. On the next day, while weather became progressively worse, three missions were flown from Zara, 1,253 persons were taken out, and 142,000 lbs. of supplies delivered. Eight Spitfires based at Zemonico escorted all missions. A German bombing attack on the night of 26/27



MAP No. 8
 OPERATION DE'NN
 25-27 MARCH 1945



March damaged the field so severely that further operations were impossible.⁶² Again the Partisans had been relieved of burdensome refugees. Operation DUNN completed a 12-month period in which AAF, RAF, Dominion, and Russian airmen had rescued well over 11,000 Yugoslav refugees and casualties.⁶³

Evacuation of Allied Aircrews

One of the principal problems facing MAAF was the evacuation of Allied aircrews from the Balkans. These men were survivors who had parachuted or crashed while over enemy territory on combat missions. The problem was especially acute through most of 1944, when heavy air strikes were made on such targets as Ploesti, Klagenfurt, Sofia, and other objectives in or near the Balkans. Cetniks and Partisans aided aircrews who escaped capture--fed them and tended to their wounds as well as possible, and frequently gave them assistance in reaching the Adriatic coast, where they could be rescued by small surface craft or make their way in fishing boats to the Italian coast above Bari or to the island of Vis.

Very little could be done to rescue airmen until after the air forces had moved to Italy. Then, from September to December 1943 the Fifteenth Air Force processed 108 evaders who had made their way back to base. During the next five months more than 300 evaders were brought back, most of them in April and May.⁶⁴ This great increase in the spring of 1944 was a direct result of landing operations by special duty aircraft.

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Until June 1944 escape and evasion had been the responsibility of A-2 subsections in the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces, but actual rescue work was left mainly to clandestine organizations behind the enemy lines. Chief of these was "A" Force, a British agency formed in 1940 to rescue troops from Greece. This unit later became a permanent Middle East organization and expanded its operations to Sicily, Italy, and the Balkans. Other Allied agencies in the Balkans, particularly Force 266 and the Anglo-American Military Mission to the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation (AAMM, also Maclean Mission) took an active part in aiding escapers.⁶⁵ The Maclean Mission, with its sub-missions to various Partisan units, gathered all the information possible about escapers and sent aid and guides to lead them to assembly points for evacuation. In March 1944 aircrews could be taken out from three landing grounds which had been used by C-47's, and at least 21 flyers were on their way overland to one of these fields at the end of March, while 35 more flyers had been located. The AAMM had spotted other fields and used liaison aircraft to maintain communications among them.⁶⁶ American personnel of Company B, 2677th Regiment (Prov) of OSS, were attached to Force 266 (later Force 399) and were stationed with Mihailovich and Tito to aid in aircrew evacuation. Requests for evacuation sorties originated with Force 266 or the OSS company, were cleared through Air Operations SOM and the BAF, and then assigned to British or American special duty squadrons.⁶⁷

None of these Allied agencies in the Mediterranean theater was concerned solely with the recovery of aircrews. Recognizing the need

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Nathan F. for such a unit, Maj. Gen. Twining on 19 June 1944 recommended the creation of an Aircrew Rescue Unit (ACRU) whose function would be to rescue aircrews from Yugoslavia. General Eaker approved the idea on 13 July and recommended to General Wilson that a unit of 12 to 20 officers and men, including medical personnel, be organized. Wilson approved in principle, with the proviso that ACRU would coordinate with BAF, SOMTO, Force 399, and the Maclean Mission. General Eaker, on 24 July, directed the Fifteenth Air Force to establish ACRU No. 1, and General Norstad's directive of 31 July outlined its general organization and methods of operation. ACRU, with headquarters at Bari, would call upon the 60th Troop Carrier Group at Brindisi to land on Yugoslav strips to evacuate assembled aircrews. Two ACRU field parties, of six men each, were to be dispatched, one to Mihailovich and one to Tito. ACRU No. 1, headed by Col. George Kraigher, was activated at the end of July and went to work immediately.⁶⁸

The first ACRU field party was dropped on the night of 2/3 August in Cetnik territory about 55 miles south and slightly west of Belgrade.⁶⁹ About 100 American flyers, with various Russian, French, and British fugitives, had assembled there in July. One of the Americans, Lt. T. K. Oliver, had sent a message to Bari on 25 July:⁷⁰

150 Yanks are in Yugo, some sick shoot us work horses, ask British about job. Our challenge first letter by bombardier name of Bob of (Banana Nose Genig Scarf) your verification first letter of Ghief Mug's name, color of fist on club wall, must refer to Shark Squadron 459 Bomb Group for decoding. TKO callsign. 025888 Flat Rate Five. Lug order.

This apparent gibberish, in reality an ingenious code, caused ACRU to send its party in to prepare a strip for evacuation. On the night of

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9/10 August, four C-47's landed on the 1,700-foot strip, left supplies, and took out 48 of the personnel most urgently in need of aid. On the following morning, 12 C-47's of the 10th and 12th Troop Carrier Squadrons, escorted by 45 P-51's, evacuated 220 men. Apparently all but 42 of the evacuees were Allied flyers.⁷¹

Special duty aircraft continued to evacuate Allied aircrews for the duration of the war, but most of the work was in conjunction with regular supply missions. Most of the sorties were at night, although some were flown by day with fighter escort. An example of the latter occurred on 17 September 1944 when two C-47's, 28th Troop Carrier Squadron, flew to a 1,200-foot strip a few miles south of Belgrade and evacuated 20 flyers and six ground personnel.⁷² On another occasion, 5 January 1945, three C-47's of the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron flew about 350 miles to Sanski Most in northern Yugoslavia with an escort of nine Mustangs. They took out 66 flyers, all but one of whom were Americans, from a snow-covered field.⁷³

The following summaries, while perhaps not entirely accurate, indicate the cumulative importance of aircrew evacuations and afford a comparison among three classes of personnel evacuated by special duty aircraft from the Balkans.

EVACUATIONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE, AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1944^a

Month	No. of landings		No. of persons evacuated			
	Attempted	Successful	Allied aircrew	Wounded partisans	Others	Totals
August	261	215	479	2,321	626	3,426
September	309	253	153	1,812	1,044	3,009
October ^b	248	230	165	200	668	1,033
November	135	135	59	102	234	395
TOTALS	953	833	856	4,435	2,572	7,863

a. Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 5-8, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

b. Includes landings in Greece in connection with the British occupation.

EVACUATIONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA, JANUARY-APRIL 1945^a

Month	No. of landings		No. of persons evacuated			
	Attempted	Successful	Allied aircrew	Wounded partisans	Others	Totals
January	87	85	106	174	98	378
February	117	110	116	40	730	886
March	136	100	57	215	783	1,055
April	114	112	31	1,266	22	1,319
TOTALS	454	407	310	1,695	1,633	3,638

a. Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 10-13, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

Aircrew evacuation by all agencies in the Mediterranean theater reached a peak in September 1944, although August was the heaviest month for special duty aircraft. In September alone, 1,135 Americans were evacuated from Rumania by B-17's in Operation REUNION. All but 74 of these were Fifteenth Air Force flyers who had been lost over Rumania during the Ploesti attacks. Likewise in September, nearly 300 Allied flyers were rescued from Bulgaria by B-17's.⁷⁴ By 1 October 1944, 2,694 Allied flyers had been rescued from the Balkans. Of this number, 1,088 came from Yugoslavia, 46 from Greece, and 11 from Albania in special

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duty aircraft. Cetnik territory in Yugoslavia yielded 356 flyers, and Partisan territory gave up 732.⁷⁵ Evacuation by air from northern Italy was on a minor scale. The Escape and Evaders Section of the Twelfth Air Force dropped supplies from a B-25 during the period December 1944 to May 1945 and flew out 35 airmen from secret landing strips.⁷⁶

Infiltration and evacuation sorties were phases of special operations that had almost equal importance for the Allies and the resistance movements. The availability of special duty aircraft to execute these secret missions guaranteed constant liaison between Allied agencies and patriots in many countries. Evacuation sorties to the German-occupied countries of western Europe had little significance until after the enemy had been driven back toward the Rhine; but in the Balkans such missions figured prominently in Partisan success. Mass evacuations of wounded Partisans from Yugoslavia, and the spectacular rescue of their leader from a German trap, saved the followers of Marshal Tito from what threatened to be a major disaster. Aid to the Yugoslav Partisans and the maintenance of friendly relations with Mihailovich were small prices to pay for the return of hundreds of Allied flyers who were forced to abandon their planes over the Balkans.

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Chapter VII

LEAFLET OPERATIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ITALY

Dropping propaganda leaflets by aircraft was one of the more effective means of waging psychological warfare during World War II. This method of delivering messages, information, and propaganda to friend and foe in enemy-occupied areas was used in every theater with considerable success; but western Europe, with its many large centers of population and its concentrations of Axis troops, promised the greatest returns from this activity. Allied leaflet operations were initiated by the British early in the war. British artillery fired special leaflet shells into enemy positions, and British aircraft dropped the propaganda in the course of regular missions. In every area of the European theater, from North Africa to northern Norway, from the Channel Islands to eastern Germany, from Pantelleria to Yugoslavia, Allied aircraft flew thousands of sorties to drop billions of leaflets. The British, skilled in the coinage of military slang, called these leaflets "nickels," and the process of delivering them by aircraft became known as "nickeling."

Production and Types of Propaganda Leaflets

Civilian agencies were responsible for leaflet production in England before the Normandy invasion. Two American agencies, the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), cooperated with the British Political Intelligence Department

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(PID) in this work. After D-day, when tactical and strategic factors were even more important than political considerations, most of the leaflets were produced by the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (PWD SHAEF), which was a special section of General Eisenhower's staff commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure. Civilian agencies acted in an advisory capacity to PWD SHAEF and a PID-OSS editorial team continued to produce the German-language newspaper Nachrichten. The Leaflet Section of PWD had its own writing team, controlled the operations of the Special Leaflet Squadron, and had a packing and trucking unit to service Britain-based aircraft with packages of leaflets and packed leaflet bombs. (See Chart 1 on following page.)¹

Many types of nickels were used in psychological warfare. Classified according to general purpose, there were strategic and tactical leaflets. Strategic leaflets dropped before D-day were intended to weaken the will of the German people to resist, and to raise morale in conquered nations. After D-day, this type of leaflet was used to deliver the Supreme Commander's communications to civilian populations, to provide accurate and contemporary news of the campaign, and to guide widely spread subversive activities behind the enemy's lines. Before D-day, 43 per cent of the strategic leaflets went to France, 7 per cent to the Low Countries, and most of the remainder to Germany; after D-day, 90 per cent of the strategic leaflets were dropped over Germany, and the remainder fell to the French, Belgians, and Dutch.²

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Newspapers, generally of two or four printed pages, made up a large part of the strategic leaflets. The Dutch regularly received copies of De Vliegende Hollander, edited in London by J. de Jong; German civilians and troops were showered with copies of Nachrichten für die Truppe, a single sheet of two pages which developed into a four-page publication. Distribution of Nachrichten began on 25 April 1944 and continued until the enemy capitulated. This paper, designed originally as a tactical sheet to undermine the German soldier's faith in his leaders and to convince him that defeat was inevitable, served a long-range strategic purpose as well.³ The pamphlet-magazine Accord, an illustrated monthly review in French, received wide distribution over France. Excellently illustrated, this clearly printed magazine carried articles and pictures describing the progress of the war, inspirational messages to the Underground, accounts of Partisan activities in other countries, and human-interest stories.⁴ A four-page leaflet, bearing the royal seal in crimson and gold, was issued by the Norwegian High Command to instruct Norwegians on what to do in the coming liberation.⁵

Many of the strategic leaflets were small single sheets which bore brief but pointed messages. One, bearing the title "Die Amerikaner haben sich nicht geändert" (The Americans have not changed), warned German civilians that the Americans would expect quiet and order and would root out war criminals, fanatics, and Nazi swindlers. Another asked "Hat der Führer das gewollt?" (Has the Führer willed wholesale death, destruction, and misery?) The implication that, if he had not so willed, there was



Sherman-tanks van het Amerikaanse 7e Leger in het herencoude terrein bij Weversheim (Elzas) tijdens een kanonnade.

Een nieuwe aanklacht der artsen

Open Brief aan den Rijkscommissaris Dr. Arthur Scyss-Inquart

Opnieuw hebben de Nederlandsche artsen hun stem verheven in protest tegen de onwettige plundering, uithongering en deportatie waaraan het Nederlandsche volk wordt onderworpen door den Duitschen bezetter. Op 6 Januari 1945 hebben Nederlandersche artsen een Open Brief gericht tot den Rijkscommissaris, Dr. Arthur Scyss-Inquart, waarin opnieuw wordt geconstateerd dat Duitschland en Duitschland-alleen de schuldige is aan het nameloos leed dat in de afgelopen maanden over ons volk is uitgestort. Wij geven hier de voornaamste passages uit den brief der artsen weer, welke niet heeft nagelaten, grooten indruk te maken op de openbare meening der vrijen volken.

De uithongering

De Nederlandsche artsen stellen de Rijkscommissaris verantwoordelijk voor het inwendig leed aan de Nederlandse bevolking. De nood van het Nederlandsche volk in het dichtsbewoonde deel van het bezette gebied groeit met den dag. De door de distributie verstekte ranspotten van een volwassen hebben de levensvoeding van 1940 tot 1944 in een mate van 60 tot 70 procent van het rustend menschenmood heeft om te blijven leven en het is minder dan een derde van wat een werkend menschen hiertoe behoeft. Aan dezen toestand is de bezetter schuld.

Ten eerste, doordat hij met overreding de inernationale wet in de grote reservevoorraden die in 1940 aanwezig waren naar Duitschland draagt en in de jaren na 1940 nog een groot deel van het vee en van het in ons land geproduceerde voedsel weuveerde. Ten tweede, doordat hij nu in 1944 het Nederlandse volk het niet nog aanwezige voedsel zoo goed mogelijk over ons land te verdeelen en doordat hij bijna alle verzovermiddelen in bezlag heeft genomen en heeft weuveerde.

Roof van transportmiddelen

De pogingen om de schuld af te wenden op de Nederlandsche instanties moeten worden afgewezen. Maatregelen ter verbetering van de voedselvoorziening worden door de bezettende macht tegenovergesteld. De voedselvoorziening worden door de bezettende macht tegenovergesteld. De voedselvoorziening worden door de bezettende macht tegenovergesteld.



Een lange rij Russische tanks, opgesteld voor een... (The rest of the caption is illegible due to blurring)

en koeien... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

De deportaties

Als gevolg van de uithongering en weuveerde... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Beestachtige toejanden

Hierin... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Arbeiders in de frontlijn

... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

In Arnhem... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Richtsverkrachting

Maar... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Conclusie

De... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

7 Dagen

Vrijdag 19 Jan.—Duitschers uit Frankrijk... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Zaterdag 20 Jan.—Aanval van Fransche leger bij Mulhouse... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Zondag 21 Jan.—Voortgang Britsche leger bij Roermond... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Maandag 22 Jan.—Amerikanen veroveren Wetzlar... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Dinsdag 23 Jan.—Amerikanen in Noord-Engeland... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Woensdag 24 Jan.—Britsche leger in Noord-Engeland... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

Donnerdag 25 Jan.—Duitsche leger in Noord-Engeland... (The rest of the text is illegible due to blurring)

CONFIDENTIAL

NACHRICHTEN FÜR DIE DEUTSCHE BEVÖLKERUNG

Nr 363, Montag, 16 April 1945

USA-Panzer in Halle, Chemnitz und Dessau

Westkeil zerreißt Nord-Süd-Verbindung

USA-PANZER sind in Chemnitz, Dessau und Halle eingedrungen, haben den Stadtrand von Leipzig erreicht und westlich Leipzig Leuna mitsamt den Treibstoffwerken und den anderen chemischen Anlagen der IG-Farben besetzt.

Mit dem Durchbruch nach Chemnitz haben die Alliierten die letzten Nord-Süd-Verbindungen im unbesetzten Reichsgebiet unterbrochen. Die beiden Hälften des Reichs im Norden und Süden hängen jetzt nur noch durch Umwege über das Protektorat zusammen.

Auch diese Verbindungen sind jetzt bedroht. Amerikanische Panzer spitzen dringen bereits beiderseits Chemnitz weiter in Richtung Dresden vor, das letzte Bindeglied zwischen der Reichshauptstadt und Prag.

Der Westkeil der Alliierten durch Sachsen, der die deutschen Truppen in der Ost- und Westfront bedroht, ist nun ernstlich gespalten. Westlich der Elbe führen noch vereinzelte Wehrmachtseinheiten, darunter die Panzerdivision, die die Reichshauptstadt...



Ob. West in zwei gespalten

Der Führer hat den Oberbefehl im Westen selbst in die Hand genommen. Die Alliierten sind in zwei Hauptgruppen getrennt. Die eine Gruppe ist in Richtung Köln und Bonn vorgerückt, die andere in Richtung Mannheim und Karlsruhe.

In Paris sind die Alliierten in zwei Hauptgruppen getrennt. Die eine Gruppe ist in Richtung Köln und Bonn vorgerückt, die andere in Richtung Mannheim und Karlsruhe.

Auch Parteileitung

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Doppelte Bedrohung

Während der Durchbruch der Amerikaner in Sachsen den Rest des unbesetzten Reichs abtrennen, ist es in zwei Hauptgruppen getrennt. Die eine Gruppe ist in Richtung Köln und Bonn vorgerückt, die andere in Richtung Mannheim und Karlsruhe.

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(Fortsetzung Seite 4)

Oderfront: Sowjets führen erste Schläge

Die ersten Einbrüche der Sowjets in die Abwehrfront ostwärts Berlin werden aus dem Abschnitt Frankfurt-Küstrin gemeldet, wo die Sowjets seit 36 Stunden angreifen.

Panzertruppen unterstützen überall die sowjetischen Schutztruppen und durchstoßen die Minenfelder. Pioniere räumen die Hindernisse fort und bahnen Sturmangänge für den allgemeinen Angriff.

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51 Grosstädte sind überrannt

Von den 73 Grosstädten des Reichs sind bereits 51 erobert.

Von den restlichen 22 Grosstädten sind 19 unmittelfroh bedroht. Mit diesem Fall muss in den nächsten Tagen gerechnet werden.

Nur 9 deutsche Grosstädte sind übrig geblieben, die nicht nicht direkt gefährdet sind, und zwar München, Kiel, Graz, Augsburg, Lübeck, Tinz, Rostock, Wesermünde und Leibniz im Breisgau.

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less reason to go on fighting was a subtle way to undermine morale. Other strategic leaflets appealed to the workers to give up the useless struggle and urged inhabitants of the Ruhr and Rhine cities to impede the progress of a lost war.⁶

Tactical leaflets also took the form of newspapers and small handbills. Frontpost, a weekly semitactical newspaper produced by Twelfth Army Group, was disseminated by fighter-bombers and mediums from continental bases. An abridged version, Feldpost, was delivered by artillery shells. Frontbrief, a Seventh Army weekly newspaper, was also fired by artillery to fill in the propaganda gap when the Special Leaflet Squadron could not service the southern French front. These newspapers may be classified as general tactical leaflets, since they were used with good effect in static situations, emphasized the surrender theme, and documented Allied successes. Other general tactical leaflets exploited specific achievements in mobile situations: the Normandy invasion, assault on the West Wall, failure of Von Rundstedt's counteroffensive, and crossing the Rhine. Local tactical leaflets, designed to serve a temporary situation, were disseminated largely by artillery and fighter-bombers; but heavy bombers occasionally were called on to do the job when enemy units were widely scattered and difficult to pinpoint, or when fighter-bombers were not available.⁷

There were three basic tactical leaflets. Most important was the "Passierschein" (Safe conduct), which was introduced early in July 1944. Effective from the beginning, this passport to a prisoner-of-war cage

18. Dezember 1944
 Nummer 38 - 12 AG

Frontpost

„Der Starke braucht die Wahrheit nicht zu sehen.“
 Ernst Moritz Arndt

NACHRICHTEN FÜR DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN. HERAUSGEBER: DIE AMERIKANISCHEN TRUPPEN IN WESTEUROPA

Durchbruch zum Rhein

PARIS. — Die amerikanische Siebente Armee hat bei Haguenau die deutschen Linien durchbrochen und die Ortschaft Seltz, 2 km vor dem Rhein, erreicht. Die amerikanische Erste Armee steht 2 km vor Düren. Verzweifelte deutsche Gegenangriffe gegen die amerikanischen Brückenköpfe östlich der Saar wurden zurückgewiesen. Die Deutschen erlitten starke Verluste.

Haguenau genommen

Im Südschnitt der Westfront hat die amerikanische Siebente Armee nach der Eroberung von Haguenau die deutschen Stellungen in der Maginot-Linie durchbrochen, ist 11 km in acht Stunden vorgestoßen und kämpft in Seltz, 2 Kilometer vom Rhein. Der deutsche Widerstand ist am linken Rheinufer auf 40 km breiter Front von Straßburg bis Seltz zusammengebrochen. Die französische Erste Armee nähert sich Kolmar. Bei Kolmar hat die Nazi-Führung Feuerwehrlente und Luftschutzwarden, die noch ihre alten Uniformen trugen, an der Front eingesetzt.

Kämpfe um Dillingen

Am Nord- und Mittelabschnitt der Front schieben sich die alliierten Armeen zusehends näher an die Industriegebiete der Ruhr und Saar heran. Die amerikanische 9. Armee, die bereits die Roer erreicht hat, bombardiert die deutschen Stellungen jenseits des Flusses. Die amerikanische Erste Armee hat sich durch den Hürtgenwald hindurchgekämpft und die Roer an drei Stellen erreicht. Einheiten dieser Armee haben Hoven, Mariaweller und Merken, zwei km vor Düren, erreicht. Die Ortschaften Merode und Schlich wurden von den amerikanischen Streitkräften ein-



genommen, während in Pier Straßenkämpfe im Gange sind.

An der Saarfront fanden die heftigsten Kämpfe bei Dillingen und in den Vorstädten von Saarlautern statt. Wiederholte deutsche Gegenangriffe gegen die amerikanischen Brückenköpfe über der Saar wurden zurückgewiesen und diese erweitert. Bliexbrücken, 10 km östlich von Saargemünd wurde genommen. Der Fluß Bliex wurde überquert. Auch nördlich von

Saargemünd überschritten die amerikanischen Streitkräfte die deutsche Grenze.

Budapest unter Feuer

MOSKAU — Russische Truppen kämpfen in den Vororten von Budapest. Die ungarische Hauptstadt liegt unter ständigem Artilleriebeschuß. Auf einer 600 km breiten Front, vom Dukla Paß bis zur jugoslawischen Grenze rücken die russischen Truppen den fliehenden Deutschen

nach und gegen Österreich vor. Im Norden stehen die Russen 95 km vor Preßburg. Nur noch zwei Straßen stehen den Deutschen offen. Die Haupt-Eisenbahnlinie und die Rollbahn Budapest-Wien wurden durch russische Artillerie durchschnitten. Südlich des Plattensees haben die Russen eine einheitliche Schlachtlinie aufgestellt und bedrohen bereits Nagykanizsa. Die ungarische Marionettenregierung Szalasi ist nach Odenburg geflohen. Gleichzeitig rücken russische und jugoslawische Truppen auf Zagreb vor.

Verhandlung in Athen

LONDON. — Die schweren Unruhen, die in Griechenland jüngst ausgebrochen waren, scheinen eine friedliche Lösung zu finden. Der britische General Skobie empfing heute den Vertreter der EAM und übergab ihm die Bedingungen der Engländer zur Beilegung des Konfliktes.

Frauen werden eingezogen

STOCKHOLM. — Amtlichen Berichten aus Berlin zufolge, wurde in Deutschland die Mobilisierung aller gesunden Frauen angeordnet. Zunächst werden die Frauen im Alter von 18-35 Jahren eingezogen. Sie werden Flak- oder Transporteinheiten zugeteilt und sollen auch im Nachrichten- und Sanitätsdienst eingesetzt werden.

Größter Luftangriff des Krieges

PARIS. — Der größte Luftangriff des Krieges wurde gestern gegen Deutschland geflogen. 1000 Bomber, die von 800 Jägern begleitet waren, griffen das Ruhrgebiet und das Rheinland an. 16 000 fliegendes Personal — zwei Divisionen — waren über Deutschland. Bei ihrem Abflug bildeten die Flugzeuge eine 450 km lange Kette. Alliierte Bombenflieger griffen ein deutsches Truppenlager in Baumholder, nördlich von Saarbrücken, an. In diesem Lager befanden sich 30 000 Mann deutscher Reserven. Eisenbahnanlagen und Benzolwerke in Frankfurt, Giessen, Hanau, Darmstadt, Aschaffenburg und Merseburg wurden angegriffen. Italiengestützte Flugzeuge bombardierten Treibstoffwerke in Wien und Schlessen.

EINE MINUTE

die Dir das Leben retten kann.

Lies die folgenden 6 Punkte gründlich und aufmerksam! Sie können für Dich den Unterschied zwischen Tod und Leben bedeuten.

1. Tapferkeit allein kann in diesen Materialschlachten den Mangel an Panzern, Flugzeugen und Artillerie nicht wettmachen.
2. Mit dem Fehlschlag im Westen und dem Zusammenbruch im Osten ist die Entscheidung gefallen: Deutschland hat den Krieg verloren.
3. Du stehst keinen Barbaren gegenüber, die am Töten etwa Vergnügen finden, sondern Soldaten, die Dein Leben schonen wollen.
4. Wir können aber nur diejenigen schonen, die uns nicht durch nutzlosen Widerstand zwingen, unsere Waffen gegen sie einzusetzen.
5. Es liegt an Dir, uns durch Hochheben der Hände, Schwenken eines Taschentuchs, usw. deutlich Deine Absicht zu verstehen zu geben.
6. Kriegsgefangene werden fair und anständig behandelt, ohne Schikane — wie es Soldaten gebührt, die tapfer gekämpft haben.

Die Entscheidung musst Du selber treffen. Solltest Du aber in eine verzweifelte Lage geraten, so erwäge, was Du gelesen hast.

Basic Tactical Leaflets



SO GING ES EUREN KAMERADEN

Bildbericht über die Behandlung deutscher Soldaten unmittelbar nach ihrer Gefangennahme.



Das kann jedem passieren.

Nach hartem Kampf und schweren Ausfällen übergibt ein deutscher Feldwebel seinen Zug bei St. Malo. Tausende wurden so gefangengenommen — teils weil sie von den schnellen amerikanischen Einheiten abgeschnitten wurden, teils weil im Trommelfeuer ihre schweren Waffen ausgefallen waren und sie der Übermacht daher nicht mehr standhalten konnten.



Erst wird mal kräftig gepennt . . .

Das Artillerie ist nur mehr ein dumpfes Rollen in weiter Ferne. Als Kriegsgefangene warzen diese Kameraden auf Abtransport, rauchen, entspannen die Nerven und ruhen sich aus. Verwundete werden indessen sofort zu den alliierten Verbandplätzen und Lazaretten gebracht, wo sie dieselbe Behandlung genießen, wie die alliierten Truppen selbst.



Die erste Mahlzeit als P.W.

(P.W., Abkürzung für Prisoner-of-War, bedeutet Kriegsgefangener.) Die erste Mahlzeit ist gewöhnlich die amerikanische C-Ration (eiserne Ration), die aus 2 Buchsen besteht: Eine enthält die Fleischspeise, die andere enthält Keks, Kaffeepulver, Zucker, Konfekt und Zigaretten. In den Lagern ist das Essen selbstverständlich bedeutend besser.

Basic Tactical Leaflet

went through three revisions. A second basic leaflet, "One minute which may save your life," was introduced in August 1944 and emphasized the futility of continued resistance. The third of these basic nickels, "This is how your comrades fared," was a series of pictures with simple captions illustrating steps in prisoner-of-war processing and care.⁸

Leaflets dropped by aircraft over Italy and the Balkans were similar to those delivered to western Europe. There was a greater emphasis upon strategic leaflets for the Balkans, where Europe's most effective Partisan force operated in Yugoslavia and where opportunities for tactical leafleting were severely limited. The principal purposes were to inform isolated peoples of the march of events, to counteract enemy propaganda, and to maintain morale.⁹ The Soldaten Nachrichten, distributed in the Mediterranean theater, was similar to the Nachrichten für die Truppe. Among strategic leaflets dropped over Italy after the Salerno invasion were those that urged the preservation of art treasures, informed enemy soldiers of Allied successes on other fronts, and encouraged and directed Italian Partisans in works of sabotage.¹⁰

AAF Units Engaged in Leaflet Dropping

Under ideal conditions, leaflet operations would use various methods for distribution: artillery for pinpointing local tactical leaflets; fighter-bombers for targets beyond artillery range; medium bombers for close-in strategic and semitactical leaflets; and heavy bombers for strategic leaflets far behind the lines.¹¹ Conditions rarely existed where this doctrine could be followed exactly, although there were

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
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periods in Italy while the lines were static, when distribution "by the book" was possible. In dropping leaflets over enemy-occupied areas in which military operations were primarily of a guerrilla nature, as in the Balkans and western Europe before D-day, heavy bombers and planes engaged in supplying partisan groups proved to be the best means of distribution. Medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force were used for a few weeks after D-day, but these operations ceased when the mediums moved to the Continent.¹²

The Special Leaflet Squadron of the Eighth Air Force was the most effective leaflet carrier for PWD SHAEF. This squadron, "the only air force unit which was permanently and directly under the operational control of a psychological warfare organization," enabled PWD to direct leaflets to targets where they were needed most, to address messages to the people of a certain town or area, and to distribute leaflets over the areas for which they were intended.¹³ (See Chart 2.)

The Special Leaflet Squadron entered the European theater in 1942 as the 422d Bomb Squadron (H), 305th Bomb Group and flew its first day-light bombing mission on 22 November of that year from the base at Grafton-Underwood. The squadron moved to Chelveston early in September 1943 and carried on night bombing missions with the RAF from that base. This experience caused the 422d to be earmarked for night leaflet missions, a type of operation which it began on 7/8 October 1943.¹⁴ The 422d Bomb Squadron, commanded by Lt. Col. Earle J. Aber, Jr.,¹⁵ remained at Chelveston until 25 June 1944, when it moved to Cheddington.

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FLOW CHART OF LEAFLET OPERATIONS

Chart No. 2

From PWD SHAEF, "Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater."

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Because of the special operations carried on by the 422d Squadron, the 305th Bomb Group had only three squadrons available for regular bombing missions. An Eighth Air Force reorganization took place in June 1944 which resulted in placing all units engaged in special operations under the VIII Air Force Composite Command. As a part of this reorganization, the 858th Squadron of the 2d Bomb Division was transferred on 13 June, with a few of its personnel as a cadre, to the composite command. The rest of the personnel, as well as planes (B-17's) and equipment, for the 858th Bomb Squadron came in part from the 422d Bomb Squadron.¹⁶ On 24 June, 67 officers and 166 enlisted men were transferred from the 422d to the 858th Squadron, and new crews were assigned to build the 422d up to full strength as a bombing unit.¹⁷ This change took place with no interruption in night leaflet missions. The Special Leaflet Squadron continued to operate as the 858th until 11 August 1944. At this time the 492d Bomb Group was being formed from the CARPETBAGGER and other units, and the Special Leaflet Squadron changed numbers with the 406th Bomb Squadron.¹⁸ Thus, the squadron number 406, which had been borne by one of the two original Carpetbaggers, now became the Special Leaflet Squadron. The change, again, was largely a paper transaction. No further changes in designation occurred, although on 7 October 1944 the 406th was placed under the VIII Fighter Command¹⁹ without a change of station, and then on 30 December 1944 it was relieved from this assignment and placed directly under the 1st Bomb Division.²⁰ A final change in station occurred on 15-16 March 1945, when the 406th moved to Harrington.²¹

Bombers of the Eighth Air Force were regularly used to drop leaflets on their combat missions to supplement the Special Leaflet Squadron's work and to reach the more distant targets. This practice began a few months after the Special Leaflet Squadron entered the theater. A directive of 22 February 1944 placing heavy bombers at the disposal of PWD SHAFF was modified at the end of April to confine daylight leaflet dropping to the 91st, 305th, 306th, 351st, and 397th Bomb Groups of the 1st Air Division. On every mission to Germany, two planes from each of these groups were to be fully loaded with leaflet containers.²² (See Apps. 17 and 18.) The number was reduced to one plane per group on 22 May.²³ Another change occurred in June when USSPAF directed the Eighth Air Force to assign two aircraft in each of six groups to leaflet work.²⁴ In response to this order, General Doolittle directed the following groups, two from each bomb division, to provide the aircraft:

1st Bomb Division:	91st Bomb Group, 1st Combat Wing
	306th Bomb Group, 40th Combat Wing
2d Bomb Division:	445th Bomb Group, 2d Combat Wing
	491st Bomb Group, 95th Combat Wing
3d Bomb Division:	447th Bomb Group, 4th Combat Wing
	487th Bomb Group, 92d Combat Wing

Leaflets were to be dropped on suggested targets, en route to or from the combat targets. All responsibility for delivering and loading packed leaflet bombs and the designation of targets remained with PWD SHAFF.²⁵ The leafleting program was intensified further in November 1944 when the 1st Bomb Division attached seven crews of the 856th Bomb Squadron to the 406th Bomb Squadron for night missions from Cheddington. All but three of these crews were back with their parent unit at the end of the month.²⁶

There was no special leaflet squadron in the Mediterranean theater. Distribution of nickels was assigned to C-47's on supply missions, to bombers on day and night attacks, and to lighter aircraft on tactical missions. The Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE) at first coordinated its requests for leaflet drops with Advance Force 133,²⁷ and then with SOMMO, 334 Wing, and the Strategic Air Force. Each C-47 on a supply mission generally carried 150 lbs. of nickels to be dropped some distance away from the DZ scheduled to receive supplies.²⁸ The heavy bombers, B-17's and B-24's of the 2641st Special Group, normally carried 250 lbs. of leaflets.²⁹ Comparatively few of the C-47 sorties were flown exclusively for nickeling purposes. In November 1944, for example, the 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons flew only 11 sorties exclusively devoted to leaflet distribution. The weight of nickels carried on such sorties was 4,000 to 4,500 lbs.³⁰ The 205 Bomb Group (RAF) also flew several leafleting sorties, both by day and by night.

Techniques of Leaflet Dropping

The earliest method of leaflet distribution, and the one used most extensively in the Mediterranean theater, consisted of throwing broken bundles from windows, doors, or bomb bays. This method was used by B-24's of the 406th Bomb Squadron when it started leaflet operations from the United Kingdom in October 1943. The nickels, picked up by the armful, were dropped through open bomb bays at an altitude of 30,000 feet or more.³¹ RAF bombers released leaflets through flare chutes. Neither method was satisfactory, since the light pieces of paper often

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drifted a considerable distance before reaching the ground.³² In the first leaflet raids on Paris, pilots of B-17's and B-24's threw out leaflets when the planes were 75 miles away from the city, "hoping that the wind would carry them more or less in the direction of the capital. very often the leaflets would go all the way to Italy instead."³³

A slight improvement came when leaflet bundles were placed in crude boxes and released through a trap door attached to a bomb shackle. Each B-24 carried two boxes which contained a total of 100 standard-size leaflet bundles. Some bundles were equipped with an aneroid fuze which was set to break up the package at 6,000 feet, but nearly all of them actually broke within a thousand feet of the plane. Other bundles were tied with cords and failed to break until striking the ground.³⁴

The problem of more efficient distribution of leaflets over a target attracted the attention of Capt. James L. Monroe, Armament Officer of the 422d Bomb Squadron. His experiments resulted in the invention of the "Bomb, Propaganda, T-1," which was first tested on 21 January 1944.³⁵ The new bomb was a cylinder, 60 inches long and 18 inches in diameter, constructed of laminated wax paper and fitted with a barometric nose fuze. This fuze functioned at altitudes of 1,000 to 2,000 feet and ignited a primer cord which destroyed the container (with practically no damage to its contents) and released the leaflets. Each bomb could hold about 80,000 leaflet units which would be scattered over an area of about one square mile.³⁶ The modified bomber used by Special Leaflet Squadron carried 12 of the bombs on its racks, while the regular bomber held 10. On regular bombing missions, when the Eighth Air Force sent

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out 12 B-24's loaded with leaflet bombs, a maximum of 9,600,000 leaflets could be carried.³⁷ The T-1 bomb was in mass production by April 1944

at Melchbourne, where the assembly line turned out 100 cases per day.

The finished bomb cases were loaded with leaflets at Sharnbrook.³⁸

Some time later, apparently in June or July 1944, the T-3 leaflet bomb came into use for fighter-bombers. This was a converted metal flare case, 50 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, which had a streamlined nose and a tail fin. The T-3 operated either with an American clockwork fuze or a British barometric fuze. Each of these smaller bombs held 15,000 leaflet units. Fighter-bombers carried up to nine T-3 bombs, and mediums could carry 20.³⁹

Leaflet operations in the United Kingdom fell into three categories according to the degree of urgency involved. "Routine" missions dropped French, Belgian, Dutch, German, and Norwegian pamphlets and newspapers. These leaflets were delivered to Sharnbrook, loaded into bomb cases, and then distributed to air force stations. "Routine rush" missions dropped the daily newspaper to German troops. Partly loaded bombs for such missions went from Sharnbrook to Ohelveston, where the newspapers were delivered and the loading completed. "Rush" missions called for the delivery of special leaflets over a particular target. Each station likely to participate was supplied with 20 empty containers, which were loaded at the station.⁴⁰

Nickelining Operations from the United Kingdom

In describing leaflet dropping in any theater one is forced by the

very nature of the work to have recourse to statistics: numbers of leaflets, tons of leaflets, numbers of sorties, and so on. The result leads inevitably to the general impression that the Allies dropped a tremendous weight of printed propaganda. Most of the work, especially that part of it which was carried on at night, was routine in nature and relatively devoid of any excitement other than the danger which was characteristic of all missions over enemy territory. Uncertainty was always present, of course; but pilots of planes bearing nickels, like those carrying supplies to the resistance groups, were primarily concerned with delivering their loads and avoiding combat. The planes flew high, avoided concentrations of antiaircraft fire, and were not required to take the risks that accompanied bombers bent on destroying either small or large targets. Losses, therefore, were light. The Special Leaflet Squadron in flying 2,302 credit sorties, that is, sorties that reached enemy territory, lost 3 aircraft in action, suffered severe damage to 5, had 16 or 18 men killed, 11 missing, and 11 or 14 wounded. Three enemy aircraft were destroyed and one was claimed as damaged. The first plane went down in July 1944, the second in October, and the third in January 1945. This record, for 19 months of operations, was little short of miraculous. (See App. 20.)

Nickeling activities from the United Kingdom began with a small RAF mission over Kiel on the night of 3/4 September 1939. The program gathered momentum as the war progressed, until by 6 June 1944, D-day for the Normandy invasion, British planes had dropped a total of

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2,151,000,000 leaflets over the Continent. In August 1943, the Eighth Air Force began to participate in this form of psychological warfare and by 6 June had dropped 599,000,000 leaflets over the Continent. After the invasion of Normandy, Eighth Air Force leaflet operations far surpassed those of the RAF. Heavy bombers on regular daylight missions distributed 1,176,000,000; the Special Leaflet Squadron on night missions dropped 1,577,000,000; and medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force added 82,000,000 to the total. The RAF at the same time was dropping 405,000,000. Thus, AAF units dropped more than 57 per cent of the 5,997,000,000 leaflets which were carried to the Continent throughout the war by Allied aircraft based in the United Kingdom.⁴¹ (See Chart 3, on following page, and App. 21A.) These statistics provide ample evidence of the role played in psychological warfare by Allied aircraft from the United Kingdom.

The Special Leaflet Squadron, the 422d of the 305th Bomb Group, began operations on the night of 7/8 October 1943 with a mission of four aircraft to Paris. Fifteen sorties were flown during the month to drop propaganda on Paris, Rennes, Rouen, and Caen. By the end of December, the squadron had completed 146 sorties and had dropped 44,840,000 leaflets. The missions varied in size from two to eight aircraft, the average being slightly under five. Except for three missions, all of the targets lay in France, Belgium, and Holland. On the night of 30 November/1 December, Krefeld and Opladen in Germany were nicked, and on 2/3 December planes showered more than 1,000,000 nickels on Bremen, Oldenburg, and Hamburg.⁴²




Chart No. 3

From F.W.D. SHAEFF, "Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater."

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During the first quarter of 1944, the Special Leaflet Squadron devoted most of its efforts to France, where Paris, Rouen, Amiens, Reims, Lille, Orleans, and Rennes were especially favored. Sorties went as far south as Toulouse and southeast to Grenoble, and 35 cities were "attacked" with leaflets.⁴³ CARPETBAGGER and regular bomber squadrons were likewise engaged in nickeling and raised the total leaflet tonnage to 583 for the quarter. (See App. 19.)⁴⁴ The 422d Bomb Squadron extended the scope of its operations considerably in April, although the number of completed sorties was smaller than in March. On the night of 18/19 April, B-17's using the T-1 leaflet bomb for the first time, visited Oslo, Drammen, Skien, Trondheim, Stavanger, and Bergen in Norway. The number of cities nickeled per mission also increased until it was common for 15 to 25 to be scheduled as targets for a five-plane mission.⁴⁵ In May, the last full month of operations before D-day, four of the leaflet droppers were attacked by enemy planes. The first attack, on the night of 3/4 May, resulted in no casualties or damage.⁴⁶ Three nights later, an Me-110 and an FW-190 attacked one of the B-17's south of Louvain. Gunners on the B-17 claim to have destroyed the FW-190; their own ship suffered severe damage, but none of the crew was wounded.⁴⁷ Over Denmark on the night of 12/13 May, one of five B-17's was attacked by a Ju-88, which was destroyed; but two of the crew were killed and three were wounded. The last attack was by two Ju-88's on 15/16 May, in which one of the crew was killed and three were wounded. Three of these four attacks were suffered by Dina Mite, piloted by Lt. Albert J. Kantor.⁴⁸ Still, the Special Leaflet Squadron had not

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lost a plane in 537 credit sorties over a period of eight months.

The Special Leaflet Squadron was, in a sense, the spearhead of the Normandy invasion. Led by Colonel Aber, the 422d was the first B-17 unit to fly over the beachheads to Normandy on D-day. Singly and unescorted, the planes dropped warning leaflets to the people of 17 villages and cities.⁴⁹ That night the squadron set a new record when 12 B-17's nicked 34 targets in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.⁵⁰ Missions of eight to ten planes were not uncommon in June, and by the end of the month the Special Leaflet Squadron had set a record of 209.6 tons of leaflets dropped. This tonnage was more than double the May figure and far surpassed the previous high of 146.3 tons delivered in March. Deliveries by CARPETBAGGER planes, amounting to 43.1 tons, also set a new record for the 492d Bomb Group, although the leaflet tonnage dropped by bombers on regular missions was 50 tons less than in May.⁵¹

Invasion of the Continent brought about a change in the propaganda policy. Greater emphasis was placed upon appeals to foreign workers to sabotage Germany's war effort, upon pointing out the futility of continued resistance, and on urging soldiers to surrender.⁵² Consequently, most of the propaganda distributed after D-day was printed in German. (See Chart 4, on following page.) In July the Special Leaflet Squadron again set a record with 133 effective sorties which dropped 216.1 tons of propaganda. The total for all Eighth Air Force units, however, was nearly 14 tons under the June tonnage. For the first time in 10 months of operations, the Special Leaflet Squadron lost a plane, with 10 men reported missing. (See Apps. 19 and 20.)⁵³ CARPETBAGGER




Chart No. 4
From PWD SHAEF, "Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater."

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missions ended in September, thus leaving nickeling operations to the regular bombers and the 406th Bomb Squadron. Still the tonnage for August and September was 662.8. Of the 217,000,000 leaflets dropped by planes based in the United Kingdom in August, 84,000,000 were combat leaflets to the battle areas, 66,000,000 were strategic leaflets directed to the German home front, and 58,000,000 went to the French people. Medium bombers also entered significantly into the propaganda war and greatly increased the volume delivered over the battle areas. The bulk of leaflets dropped in September went to the German home front and to the retreating Nazi armies.⁵⁴ A variation in activities occurred on 3 October when 15 P-51's escorted two B-17's of the 406th Bomb Squadron on a special mission to the Netherlands. From eight to ten bombers went out on operational nights during the month to nickel 30 to 40 targets on each mission.⁵⁵

The campaign to disseminate propaganda to the German people was further intensified in November. The 406th Bomb Squadron was raised in strength to 21 aircraft and 24 operational crews, a change made possible by transferring seven planes and crews from the 492d Bomb Group.⁵⁶ The result was to increase the squadron's tonnage to 315.3 for the month, a record that was not surpassed until March and April 1945. (See App. 20.) It has been estimated that in November, when propaganda distribution was concentrated on the Aachen and Metz sectors and ahead of the First French and Seventh U. S. Armies, more than 300,000,000 leaflets were distributed by all agencies. Medium and

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fighter bombers based in France dropped about 8,000,000, artillery fired 10,000,000, and bombers from England contributed 286,000,000.⁵⁷

Two factors exercised a decided influence on leaflet activities in December, bad weather and the German offensive. The first hampered activities somewhat and the second, the period of the Ardennes breakthrough, made the usual tactical leafletting inopportune. The 406th Bomb Squadron dropped no leaflets at all in the salient but flew four missions to other parts of the front from 16 to 27 December. Then, when the German offensive had been stopped, it delivered 3,250,000 copies of Nachrichten to the enemy's scattered forces. Special leaflets, rushed into print to cover the Allied offensive, were delivered by the RAF and AAF strategic bombers in large quantities.⁵⁸ The use of strategic bombers in a tactical role put bomb space at a premium, however, with the result that on many missions no leaflets were carried.⁵⁹

Both the regular bombers and the 406th Bomb Squadron set new records for leaflet dropping during the last four full months of the war. The all-time high for the AAF came in March, with 654.9 tons; in April the total was 557.3 tons. (See App. 19.) German, French, Dutch, and Belgian targets were visited frequently.⁶⁰ Colonel Aber, the 406th's commander, was killed by friendly flak over England on 4 March 1945 while returning from a mission to the Netherlands, thus ending a brilliant career as leader of a unit to which had been assigned a most difficult and important role in the air war.⁶¹ In spite of this loss and the move from Cheddington to Harrington, the 406th Bomb Squadron dropped 407.9 tons of leaflets in March.⁶² When its combat operations

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ended on 9 May 1945, the Special Leaflet Squadron had flown 2,334 credit sorties to 7,036 targets.⁶³

Nickeling Operations in the Mediterranean Theater

Special duty aircraft flying from Italian bases were much more limited in nickeling opportunities than were planes from the United Kingdom. The nature of the war in Italy and the Balkans, rather than any physical difficulties, is the principal explanation. Bombers on strategic missions and supply planes in the course of their normal operations were able to meet PWB needs without the aid of a special leaflet squadron or the assignment of several bombers to the work. Tactical aircraft, the medium and fighter-bombers in particular, and artillery "shoots" were used extensively to nickel the enemy's front-line positions and rear areas.

The RAF, in the course of activities from the Middle East, dropped both leaflets and supplies over Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece early in the war, but the effort was on a small scale.⁶⁴ Supply droppers from North Africa, both of the RAF and the AAF, carried propaganda to southern France. Whenever possible, each special operations sortie carried 300 lbs. of leaflets, and a number of purely nickeling sorties were flown to that area from the Mediterranean, particularly prior to the Seventh Army invasion in August 1944. In all, special duty aircraft delivered less than 100 tons of nickels to southern France,⁶⁵ a figure surpassed by the Special Leaflet Squadron of the Eighth Air Force in every one of its 18 full months of operations.

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The Strategic Air Force dropped appropriate PWB leaflets on large cities in Italy and the Balkans. Its attacks on Rome were preceded and accompanied by nickeling, and leaflets urging a general strike and sabotage of enemy communications preceded the Salerno invasion.⁶⁶ Most of the nickeling by the Strategic Air Force after Operation AVALANCHE was carried out by the 205 Bomb Group (RAF). From 1 November 1943 to 1 March 1944, this unit flew special nickeling missions over large cities and dropped more than one-half of the 13,500,000 nickels delivered by MASAF. In the first half of November 1943, Wellingtons of the 205 Bomb Group flew eight special nickeling missions over cities and the battle areas. Thereafter, stabilization of the front and other factors curtailed such missions.⁶⁷ During the first quarter of 1945, however, the group dropped about 20,000,000 leaflets on regular bombing missions and special nickeling sorties.⁶⁸ The 422d Bomb Squadron of the Eighth Air Force, by way of comparison, dropped more than 346,000,000 leaflets in the same period.

Leaflet dropping was merely a side issue of supply operations for special duty aircraft based in Italy. Nearly every C-47 of the 60th Troop Carrier Group carried from 150 to 450 lbs. of leaflets to the Balkans or north Italy on supply missions. Written in many languages, they were dropped on Germans, Greeks, Albanians, Yugoslavs, Bulgars, and Italians while the planes were en route to or from their targets.⁶⁹ A sufficient number of nickeling sorties, on each of which some 4,000 to 4,500 lbs. of leaflets were carried, were flown to keep the monthly

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total at 45 to 68 tons. In the period 12 February-31 December 1944, the 51st Troop Carrier Wing dropped 414.4 tons on the Balkans and Italy.⁷⁰

The 51st Troop Carrier Squadron flew its first sortie from Brindisi in February 1944 with a nickeling mission to Patras, on the north shore of the Peloponnesus. Visibility was poor but the pilot dropped 4,500 lbs. of nickels on his assigned targets.⁷¹ The 7th Troop Carrier Squadron also began operations with a two-plane mission on the next night. Lt. Col. Aubrey S. Hurren, commander of the 62d Troop Carrier Group, piloted one of the planes by dead-reckoning to the Peloponnesus and dropped his leaflets on six targets. The second plane, also flying blind in heavy weather, nickeled five targets in southern Yugoslavia.⁷² One of the longest nickeling missions, in time elapsed, was flown by a 7th Troop Carrier Squadron plane on the night of 24/25 February 1944. Taking off at 2205 through an overcast, the pilot made a landfall on the Albanian coast, proceeded to southern Yugoslavia to nickel five targets, and then headed for Brindisi. On the return trip the navigator received an incorrect QDM and, after wandering over Italy until 0730, the plane landed at a bomber base.⁷³ The number of exclusively nickeling sorties flown by the 62d Troop Carrier Group to the end of March 1944 was small, probably not more than three or four.⁷⁴

Nickeling continued to be of secondary importance to supply operations when the 60th Troop Carrier Group took over at Brindisi in April 1944. Seven leaflet sorties were flown in April, one each in May and

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June, and only two in July.⁷⁵ There was a decided increase in "The Nickel Express" in November when the 7th and 51st Squadrons flew 10 nickeling sorties to drop more than 21 tons on Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece.⁷⁶ In December, after the 7th Squadron had left Brindisi, the 51st flew at least seven sorties to drop surrender and other leaflets on the Podgorica pocket and northward along "flak alley," the enemy's escape route through Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ All but five of the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron's sorties in January were landing missions, and no nickels were dropped;⁷⁸ but in February it completed 11 leaflet sorties to drop 22 tons in Yugoslavia, primarily to German troops, and in March the squadron dropped about 10 tons on five sorties.⁷⁹

After the 885th and 859th Bomb Squadrons entered Italy, they also carried nickels for PWB.⁸⁰ In two typical months of operation, the 2641st Special Group flew 209 successful sorties to the Balkans and 152 to northern Italy, during which it dropped a total of 34.6 tons of leaflets.⁸¹ Since the average per sortie was 230 lbs. in January and 172 lbs. in March 1945, it is obvious that many of the sorties carried no leaflets.

In comparing leaflet operations by special duty aircraft in the Mediterranean theater with the effort put forth by the Special Leaflet Squadron in the United Kingdom alone, it is apparent that the latter achieved far greater results. The period from February 1944 to April 1945 offers a fair basis of comparison, since it coincides with the period during which AAF units were engaged in special operations in both theaters. During that time the Special Leaflet Squadron dropped

3,378.5 short tons of leaflets, but all Allied special duty aircraft in the Mediterranean dropped less than one-third of that weight. (See Apps. 20 and 21E.) From August 1944 to April 1945, for which adequate statistics are available for both theaters, the Special Leaflet Squadron dropped 2,463.3 short tons, and all special duty aircraft in MEO dropped 615.37 short tons to all target countries.⁸² In making such comparisons one must bear in mind that the two theaters presented diverse problems. Had a greater weight of leaflets been advisable in the Mediterranean theater, the Allied air forces could have delivered them.

An evaluation of nickeling activities is difficult if not impossible when one goes beyond operational statistics. These may show the extent of such work and reveal the volume of effort devoted to dropping propaganda; but the effect of the entire program, its influence upon civilian and military personnel, cannot be measured except in the most general way. It is unlikely that general officers at SHAEF would have continued their support had they not been convinced that airborne propaganda was justified by the results. One test was afforded by counting the number of prisoners who used the safe-conduct leaflet, or had it in their possession. Anthony Eden stated in the House of Commons that 77 per cent of all Germans captured in France carried surrender leaflets.⁸³ The PWD officer of 21st Army Group reported that 75 per cent of 11,302 prisoners taken at Le Havre carried leaflets of some sort, and the PWD officer of 12th Army Group stated that 80 per cent

of the prisoners captured on the Brest peninsula had leaflets.⁸⁴ Of a sample 200 prisoners captured near Aachen in October 1944, about 50 per cent had leaflets on their persons at the time of capture.⁸⁵ Examples of this sort, which could be multiplied at length, prove definitely that German soldiers saw our leaflets, read them, and kept them for future use. This fact alone is not fully satisfactory evidence that Allied propaganda was effective in undermining enemy morale, but the burden of prisoner-of-war information indicates that such was the case.

Further proof of leaflet effectiveness is seen in attempts by the German High Command and the Goebbels organization to counteract Allied propaganda. The lack of news in German forward areas made enemy soldiers more or less constant readers of Nachrichten and other news sheets. Persons were sentenced to death for picking up and distributing leaflets, and the High Command directed officers to carry out its orders to destroy this propaganda.⁸⁶ As Karl Siegbold, mouthpiece for Goebbels, declared: "There is not a single sentence in these leaflets which does not want to do us harm. . . . They are weapons, and we must be careful with all weapons."⁸⁷ And the National Zeitung of Essen declared: "The text of these leaflets is always so undermining that they must immediately be surrendered to the police."⁸⁸ News leaflets contained material that was reproduced in clandestine sheets published by the Underground, and even these were found to be an effective means of undermining enemy morale.⁸⁹ They were, likewise, important in maintaining civilian morale in occupied countries.⁹⁰

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Nickeling in the Balkans has been credited with serving the same general purposes as in western Europe. News sheets carried information not otherwise available, encouraged resistance, and bolstered morale. The Soldaten Nachrichten gave the German soldier uncolored news and contained accounts which often were confirmed by enemy broadcasts. Each confirmation served to increase the soldier's confidence in the truth of Allied statements. Good Nazis, of course, might not read the leaflets; but they could not avoid hearing discussions among those who had read them.⁹¹ Leaflets also had a nuisance value, since the enemy went to considerable trouble to collect them before they could gain wide distribution, and the Partisans gleefully tacked the annoying pieces of paper in prominent places to increase the enemy's task.⁹²

This sampling of the evidence, while not a basis for qualitative evaluation, does afford reason to conclude that confidence in the leaflet aspect of psychological warfare was not misplaced. The AAF, responsible for delivery of the propaganda though not its content or production, cannot avoid a deep interest in the effects of operations which made significant demands on its materiel and personnel, and which required the diversion of aircraft and crews from more orthodox combat missions.

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G L O S S A R Y

AAMI Anglo-American Military Mission to the Yugoslav
 National Army of Liberation (Maclean Mission)
 AAI Allied Armies in Italy
 A/C Air Commander
 AC/AS Assistant Chief, Air Staff
 AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff
 ACEF Allied Central Mediterranean Force
 ACRU Aircrew Rescue Unit
 AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
 AGO Office of The Adjutant General

 BAF Balkan Air Force
 BATS Balkan Air Terminal Service; British Air Terminal
 Sections; Balkan Air Terminus Section
 BBC British Broadcasting Company
 BLO British Liaison Officer

 CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
 CG Commanding General
 CP Command Post
 C/S Chief of Staff

 DAF Desert Air Force
 DFC Distinguished Flying Cross
 D.S.O. Distinguished Service Order
 DZ drop zone

 EDES Greek Democrat National League
 ELAS/EAL Greek Peoples Army of Liberation
 ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

 FFI French Forces of the Interior

 G F German Air Force
 G HQ ME General Headquarters, Middle East
 GO General Order
 G.O.C. General Officer Commanding

 IAF Italian Air Force
 ISLD Inter-Service Liaison Detachment (Brit.)
 ISSU-6 Inter-Service signals Unit-6 (Brit.)

 JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JICAME Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, Middle East

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LNC Communist Provisional Peoples Government (Albania)
 MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
 MACAF Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force
 MASAF Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force
 MATAF Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force
 MID Military Intelligence Division
 MO 1(Sp) Designation for SOE
 MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations
 NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U. S. Army
 n.p. not paginated
 OF Otechestuen Front
 OSS Office of Strategic Services
 OSS/SO Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Branch
 OWI Office of War Information
 PIC Photo Intelligence
 PID Political Intelligence Department (Brit.)
 PWB Psychological Warfare Branch, AFH
 PWD Psychological Warfare Division
 PWE Psychological Warfare Executive
 RAF Royal Air Force
 RCM radio countermeasure
 SAAF South African Air Force
 SAC Supreme Allied Commander
 SD special duty aircraft
 SFHQ Special Force Headquarters
 SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
 SO Special Operations
 SOE Special Operations Executive (Brit.)
 SOMTO Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
 S-phone "Sugarphone"
 SPOC Special Projects Operations Center
 TAF Tactical Air Force
 TC Troop Carrier
 TF Task Force
 UK United Kingdom
 USAAF United States Army Air Forces
 USSTAF United States Strategic Air Forces
 WD War Department
 WDSS War Department Special Staff

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NOTES

Chapter 1

1. The World at War, 1939-1944 (Washington, 1945), pp. 35-78.
2. Stephen Spender, "I Think Continually of Those Who Were Truly Great," quoted in Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Pocket History of the Second World War (New York, 1945), p. 291.
3. "Even after three years of privations and repression and the ferocity of Nazi reprisals for any act of disobedience, the spirit of independence was still alive. In the mountains of Yugoslavia the patriots continued their struggle against the armed forces of the Axis. Guerilla outbreaks in Greece were on the increase. French resistance found expression not only in sabotage and in attacks on German officers, but also in rioting and resistance to forced labour, and in March the report that all youths from 20 to 23 would be drafted for labour services resulted in the flight of several thousand into the mountains of Savoy where they maintained a brief resistance against the authorities. Norwegian anger at repression and food seizures forced the Nazis to proclaim a state of emergency during the second week in October [1943] as a precaution against outbreaks. Dutch resistance to compulsory labour and the internment of ex-soldiers brought the proclamation of martial law at the beginning of May. . . . In Denmark the first attitude of icy aloofness was replaced by an active campaign of sabotage. . . . By August sabotage had become so widespread that the Germans demanded the handing over of the culprits to German military courts. . . . These were forces for the Allies as well as the Germans to take into account. Within the European Fortress lay enslaved populations who passionately awaited an Allied assault as a signal to turn against their oppressors with all their remaining strength. It was one of the tasks of the United Nations to keep that spirit alive and to provide the weapons and the leadership which would enable the forces of liberation within Europe to co-operate with the coming invasion." Edgar McInnis, The War: Fourth Year (London, 1944), pp. 249-51.
4. Articles by Andre Girard and J. Kessel, quoted in Commager, ed., The Pocket History of the Second World War, pp. 301-08.
5. Ltr., Col. G. S. Vanderblue to CG AFMUSA, "Supply of Resistance Groups," 12 Oct. 43, in 492d Bomb Gr. (H), History of the CARPETBAGGER Project, I (n.p.). [Hereafter cited as CARPETBAGGER History.] in 373.35 Top Secret
6. "Visitor from Denmark," 2 Aug. 44, in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.

7. Walter Taub in Commager, ed., The Rocket History of the Second World War, p. 297.
8. CM-IN-6310 (7-1-45), Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 Jan. 45, #S-73960.
9. AFHQ G-3 Operations Sec., "Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations," Sec. VIII, p. 1, in AGO Analysis files. [Hereafter cited as Special Operations MTO.] 512.6392
10. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7 (April-June 44), p. 75; Military Attaché Report, Baghdad, No. 259, May 44, in A-2 Lib.
11. Broz, a Zagreb metal worker, had been sent back to Yugoslavia in 1937 by the Comintern to lead the illegal Yugoslav Communist Party. Ibid.
12. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 78; Military Attaché Report, Rome, No. R-82-45, 27 Nov. 45, in A-2 Lib.
13. Military Attaché Report, Baghdad, No. 259, May 44; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 76.
14. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "The Story of Resupply Operations to the Balkans and Greece" (n.p.). [Hereafter cited as "Story of Resupply."]
15. Special Operations MTO, Sec. IX, pp. 1-2.
16. AFHQ G-3 Operations Sec., "History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theatre, 1942-1945," p. 30, in AGO Analysis files. [Hereafter cited as Special Operations (Air) MTO.]
17. Special Operations MTO, Sec. X, p. 1.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19. Ibid., Sec. XIV, p. 1.
20. Ibid., Sec. XV, p. 1.
21. Ibid., Sec. IV, p. 1.
22. CM-IN-6681 (1-1-44), Wilson to WD, 10 Jan. 44, #W-9833.
23. Special Operations MTO, Sec. IV, p. 3. Since an extensive treatment of the resistance movements is beyond the scope of this study, no effort has been made to cover the rather voluminous periodical literature and numerous books which have appeared on the subject. The following titles are suggestive of available materials: René Kraus, Europe in Revolt (New York, 1942); Jacob Worm-Mueller, Norway Revolts Against the Nazis (London, 1941); L. de Jong,

Holland Fights the Nazis (London, 1941); Anon., Belgium Unvanquished (London, 1941); Betty Wason, Miracle in Hellas: The Greeks Fight On (New York, 1943); Jan Karski, Story of a Secret State (Boston, 1944). These books are uniformly uncritical, highly laudatory of Underground leaders, emotional, and superficial.

24. Special Operations MTO, Sec. I, p. 3.
25. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 11; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 77; ltr., Col. T. J. Manning to CG Twelfth Air Force, 22 Sep. 44, in Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp.; History, 877th Bomb Sq., p. 2, in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44; ltr., Col. C. S. Vanderblue to CG ETOUSA, "Supply of Resistance Groups," 12 Oct. 43, in CARPETBAGGER History, I.
26. "Notes for Lecture on Mediterranean Operations, May 1943-November 1944," pp. 21-22, in History, MAAF, XXXV; Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 34. The first RAF drop on the night of 7/8 July 1941 consisted of a radio, 2 containers with 16 lbs. of explosives, 4 machine guns, and 12 flashlights. History of Special Operations, ETOUSA, Pt. I, Chap. II, p. 347, in Historical Div., WDSS.
27. Ltr., Col. C. S. Vanderblue to CG ETOUSA, "Supply of Resistance Groups," 12 Oct. 43, in CARPETBAGGER History, I.
28. CM-OUT-2587 (6-9-43), Arnold to Eaker, 6 Sep. 43, #R-2731.
29. CM-IN-7216 (9-9-43), Eaker to Arnold, 9 Sep. 43, #W-4259.
30. CM-OUT-8231 (17-9-43), CCS to Devers, 17 Sep. 43, #R-3223.
31. Ltr., Col. C. S. Vanderblue to CG ETOUSA, "Supply of Resistance Groups," 12 Oct. 43, in CARPETBAGGER History, I.
32. Memo, JCS to Maj. Gen. B. M. Giles, "Use of U. S. Aircraft for Polish Subversive Activities," 29 Nov. 43, and memo for JCS, "Use of U. S. Aircraft for Polish Subversive Activities," 4 Dec. 43, both in AC/AS, Plans.
33. CM-IN-12966 (22-10-43), Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Oct. 43, #W-3081/567; CM-IN-13452 (22-10-43), Royce to Marshall, 22 Oct. 43, #AMSME-8764. This committee consisted of Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces; Vice Admiral Sir Algernon Willis, Commander-in-Chief Levant; Air Marshal Sir John Linnel, Acting Air Officer Commander-in-Chief; and Maj. Gen. C. Gubbins, Director Special Operations Executive.
34. CM-OUT-8309 (19-10-43), CCS to Eisenhower, 19 Oct. 43, #432.

35. CM-IN-12966 (23-10-43), Eisenhower to CCS, 21 Oct. 43, #W-3081/567.
36. Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, p. 1.
37. CM-IN-12755 (18-3-44), CCS to Wilson, 17 Feb. 44, Cosmed 37.
38. Ltr., Twining to Baker, "Evacuation of USAAF Personnel from Serbia," 19 June 44, in History, MAAF, XII; Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During May 1944, Monthly Report No. 2, ibid.
39. PIC Paper No. 53, "A Brief Outline of the Position in Serbia, 10 July 1944," MID Report No. NA-21309, 4 Aug. 44, in A-2 Lib.

Chapter II

1. AFHQ, "Basic Policies for Special Operations," 10 March 44, in Special Operations MTO, Sec. II, Annex A.
2. Ibid., Sec. I, p. 2.
3. Ibid., Sec. I, Annex A.
4. Ibid., Sec. III, p. 1.
5. Directive for Unification of Command in the Mediterranean, 5 Dec. 43, in History, MAAF, II.
6. GHQ ME, Directive No. 197, 26 Nov. 43, in Special Operations MTO, Annex B.
7. A G-3 Special Operations Section, AFHQ, was set up in February 1944, headed by Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Caffey. Its functions were to initiate policies for command approval; recommend priorities of facilities such as special operations aircraft and special naval craft; prepare recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander in respect to the operations of OSS/SOE, and directives to lower echelons on the subject; advise on OSS/SOE matters in general, and in particular on planning the preparation of these services in military operations; coordinate at AFHQ all policy matters and staff actions relating to special operations, with particular emphasis on liaison with State Department and Foreign Office representatives; recommend the approval of the employment of special raiding forces (such as the Bataillon de Choc, #2 SAS Regiment, Operational Groups of OSS, and others) in strategic roles and to coordinate such activities with "A" Force and commanders of lower echelons; advise, as necessary, the staff sections concerned at AFHQ on questions of equipment, supplies, and transportation connected with the activities of special operations agencies; call and preside at special operations meetings to be attended by representatives from OSS, SOE, ISLD, "A" Force, I.S. 9, G-2, PWB, MAAF, and the political advisers. Special Operations MTO, Sec. III, p. 2.
8. CM-IN-8690 (13-3-44), Wilson to Mideast, 11 March 44, Medcos 66; CM-IN-16192 (23-3-44), Wilson to WD, 21 March 44, #67579. General Stawell's functions as CG SOMTO were to advise the SAC MTO on SOE/OSS Special Operations in the theater, to command all SOE/OSS units not assigned to subordinate commands, to coordinate all special operations activities of SOE/OSS units. Ltr., Wilson to Stawell, 17 April 44, in History, MAAF, II.
9. Ltr., Baker to Arnold, 3 Sep. 44, in History, MAAF, XXXVI. Company B, 2677th Regiment (Prov) was formerly the Special Balkan Service Unit.

10. Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, p. 2.
11. Ibid.
12. CM-IN-1916 (3-3-44), CCS to Wilson, 2 March 44, Cosmed 18.
13. AFHQ, directive to Brigadier F. H. Maclean, D.S.O., British Military Mission to Marshal Tito, 22 June 1944, in Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, Annex I. The Maclean Mission is also referred to as 37 Military Mission.
14. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 11.
15. Twelfth Air Force, Troop Carrier Operations 1944, p. 8.
16. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 11.
17. CM-IN-7362 (10-5-44), MAAF to WD, 10 May 44, #M-16858.
18. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 17. BATS may also mean British Air Terminal Sections or Balkan Air Terminus Section.
19. Special Operations MTO, Sec. XVI, p. 1; Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 4.
20. Ibid., pp. 11-12, 41; OSS-IN-4229 (2-3-44), Toulmin to Donovan, 2 March 44, #22494, in European Resistance Groups folder, AG/AS, Plans.
21. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Nov. 43-May 45, p. 1.
22. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 5. This flight was raised to squadron status on 7 Nov. 44 with 18 multiengine aircraft and was redesignated No. 301 Polish Sq. Hq. MAAF, RAF Organization Memo No. 51, 5 Nov. 44, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
23. Special Operations MTO, Sec. XVI, p. 1.
24. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 12; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations 1944," p. 6.
25. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 6.
26. Ibid.
27. Special Operations MTO, Sec. XVI, p. 2.
28. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 12.

29. The order was issued on 5 Sep. 1944, and the squadron flew its last mission four days later. Hq. MAAF, RAF Organization Memo No. 43 and Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During September 1944, Monthly Report No. 6, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
30. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During January 1945, Monthly Report No. 10, *ibid.* From time to time other units were made available for special operations. Chief among these was 205 Group (RAF) with a strength of 120 to 134 Wellingtons and Liberators, which engaged in supply operations from October 1944 to February 1945. See App. 4, this study.
31. Hq. MAAF, RAF Organization Memo No. 4, 15 Jan. 44, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
32. Hq. MAAF, RAF Organization Memo No. 14, 12 March 44, *ibid.*
33. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 87. At this time 334 Wing was under Group Capt. A. E. Woodhall. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Oct. 44, p. 3.
34. Ltr., Baker to E. M. Giles, 6 March 44, in History, MAAF, II.
35. GM-IN-21017 (31-1-44), Baker to Arnold, 31 Jan. 44, #TS-0143.
36. Ltr., Baker to Giles, 31 Jan. 44, in AAG 312.1-0.
37. GM-IN-21017 (31-1-44), Baker to Arnold, 31 Jan. 44, #TS-0143. Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of OSS, informed General Arnold on 3 March 1944: "Only by the assignment of sufficient U. S. planes to bring the total to four squadrons of heavy bombers in the European Theater and at least one full squadron of B-17's in the Mediterranean Theater will our contribution approach the scale of the British effort." Ltr., 3 March 44, in European Resistance Groups folder, AG/AS, Plans.
38. GM-IN-529 (1-2-44), Baker to Arnold, 1 Feb. 44, #TS-002.
39. GM-OUT-5923 (14-2-44), Arnold to Baker, 14 Feb. 44, #9742.
40. GM-IN-14415 (20-2-44), Devers to Marshall, 20 Feb. 44, #EN-114.
41. Ltr., Baker to Arnold, 21 March 44, in History, MAAF, II.
42. Ltr., Baker to Giles, 6 March 44, in AAG 312.1-P, Operations Letters. Air Vice Marshal Sir John C. Slessor informed General Donovan: "Our current allotment of a few B-25's are practically worthless and we really require a squadron of heavy bombers sorely. I am convinced that the way the most can be done to divert forces away from Overlord is to raise Hell in the Balkans and that

- invaluable aid to that end would be accomplished by a squadron of American heavy bombers for the Special Operations Force." OSS-IN-4230 (2-3-44), Slessor to Donovan, 2 March 44, #24214.
43. CM-OUT-3313 (8-3-44), Arnold to Eaker, 7 March 44, #766. Arnold repeated the message in the same form on 15 March. (CM-OUT-6346 (15-3-44), Arnold to Eaker, 15 March 44, #2296.) General Eaker had won his point, but some officers in the War Department were dubious about the project. Maj. Gen. H. A. Craig wrote to General Eaker that "the War Department has been very reluctant to grant this authority, notwithstanding the urgent need for this unit. As a matter of fact, this action has set a precedent, so unless the directive . . . is followed immediately and implicitly, there may be some repercussions." Ltr., Craig to Eaker, 22 March 44, in AAG 312.1-P, Operations Letters, Central Files.
 44. CM-IN-15448 (22-3-44), MAAF to WD, 18 March 44, #EN-6447.
 45. Ltr., Eaker to Arnold, 21 March 44, in History, MAAF, II.
 46. Hq. Fifteenth Air Force, GO 153, 25 March 44; CM-IN-14443 (20-4-44), MAAF to WD, 11 April 44, #R-19.
 47. History, 122d Bomb Sq., April 44.
 48. Ibid.
 49. Ltr., Eaker to Arnold, 7 April 44, in History, MAAF, II.
 50. Teletype conversation, Eaker and Giles, 17 April 44, in AAG 312.1-Q, Operations Letters.
 51. History, 122d Bomb Sq., April 44. The squadron historian, very security conscious, wrote "The operations of this squadron are of a highly secret nature and cannot be divulged."
 52. Hq. Fifteenth Air Force, GO 905, 7 June 44, in History, 885th Bomb Sq., Aug. 44.
 53. Ibid., Sep. 44 and Oct. 44.
 54. Hq. Eighth Air Force, Special Operations Order, 15 Dec. 44, cited in History, Fifteenth Special Gp. (Prov.), Jan. 45, p. 7.
 55. Hq. Fifteenth Air Force, GO 284, 18 Jan. 45, cited in ibid., p. 7. Lt. Col. Leonard M. McManus and Capt. Robert Stone commanded the 859th and 885th Squadrons, respectively.
 56. Hq. Twelfth Air Force, AG/S A-3, "Historical Records," 16 April 45, p. 3, in Administrative History, Twelfth Air Force, Pt. II, Vol. 2.

57. History, 2641st Special Gp., March 45.
58. War Diary, 8th Troop Carrier Sq., Dec. 43; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 6.
59. War diaries and histories, 8th Troop Carrier Sq., Dec. 43-Feb. 44.
60. MATAF to XII Troop Carrier Comd. (R), No. A.85, 10 Feb. 44, in Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944."
61. History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Feb. 44, p. 1. Lt. Col. Aubrey S. Hurren commanded the 62d Troop Carrier Group, Maj. Paul A. Jones had the 7th Troop Carrier Squadron, and Maj. Charles A. Gibson led the 51st Troop Carrier Squadron. Administrative History, Twelfth Air Force, Pt. III, Vol. 1.
62. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," pp. 6, 8.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
64. History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Sep. and Oct. 44.
65. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 35.
66. 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Operations, 1945.
67. Special Operations MTO, Sec. III, p. 3.
68. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 87.
69. AFHQ to Comdr., Balkan Air Force, "Trans-Adriatic Operations," [22 June 44], in Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, Annex J.
70. "Notes for Lecture on Mediterranean Operations, May 1943-November 1944," p. 3, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
71. Hq. Force 133 to MAAF, 3 Feb. 44, #3/475, in History, MAAF, XXXVI. This mission, taken to Tito's headquarters later in the month, seems to have worked to undermine British and American prestige in Yugoslavia.
72. CM-IN-21565 (30-3-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 29 March 44, Medcos 77; Hq. MAAF, memo, Maj. T. K. Wilder to Col. F. G. Allen, "Allied Air Operations into Yugoslavia and Albania in Aid to the Partisans," 16 May 44, in Air Plans III.
73. CM-IN-16680 (23-4-44), Chapin to State Dept., 20 April 44, #1313 SC. The Russian Ambassador to Italy, Bogomolov, had asked Badoglio on 8 March 1944 for facilities for a Russian air force in Italy. Badoglio, refusing to commit himself, suggested that Bogomolov take the matter up with the Americans and British. The Ambassador did

so, neglecting to reveal his previous request to Badoglio. General Wilson, while anticipating trouble with the Russians, felt that the request should be granted since the Allies would also have to supply the Russian Mission to Tito if no Soviet planes were available to do so. The disadvantages of having a Russian air unit in Italy would be outweighed, Wilson believed, by providing the British and Americans with a lever for acquiring the use of Russian base facilities in other theaters. CM-IN-6788 (10-3-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 9 March 44, Medcos 65.

74. CM-IN-21122 (28-4-44), British C's/S to Wilson, 27 April 44, Cosmed 96.
75. Ltr., Eaker to Air Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, 14 June 44, in History, MAAF, II.
76. CM-IN-20290 (24-7-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 23 July 44, Medcos 140.
77. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 12.
78. CM-IN-20290 (24-7-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 23 July 44, Medcos 140.
79. CM-IN-2607 (3-8-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 3 Aug. 44, Medcos 142.
80. CM-IN-5453 (7-7-44), Wilson to WD, 6 July 44, #FX-69255.
81. CM-OUT-25952 (6-9-44), CCS to Wilson, 5 Sep. 44, #Warx-25952.
82. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During August 1944, Monthly Report No. 5, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
83. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During November and December 1944, Monthly Reports Nos. 8 and 9, *ibid.*
84. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 4. In August 1940, No. 1419 Flight was set up at North Weald; by October 1940 it had 3 Lysanders, 2 Whitleys, 2 DC-3's. The flight moved to Stradishall in October 1940. In the fall of 1941, No. 1419 Flight was merged with No. 138 Squadron at Newmarket. No. 161 Squadron became available for special operations in the spring of 1942 and moved, with No. 138 Squadron, to Tempsford in April. However, as of 2 August 1943, SOE had only 22 special duty aircraft available. History of Special Operations, MTOUSA, Pt. I, Chap. II, pp. 396-396d.
85. CARPENTERBAGGER History, I. On 14 December, Heflin became Air Executive, Special Project, 482d Bomb Group; Fish became Operations Officer of the group; Capt. Robert L. Boone succeeded Heflin in command of the 406th Bomb Squadron, and Capt. Rodman A. St. Clair succeeded to command of the 36th Bomb Squadron.

86. Ibid. On 5 February 1944 Heflin became commander of the 328th Service Group. History, Hq. & Hq. Sq., 328th Service Gp.
87. CARPETBAGGER History, I; History, Eighth Air Force, Feb. 44, p. 66; Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 Aug. 42-8 May 45, p. 10. The squadrons were assigned on 4 April 44.
88. History, Eighth Air Force, March 44, p. 64.
89. CARPETBAGGER History, I.
90. RAF planes included 20 Stirlings, No. 3 Group at Laken Heath; 12 Stirlings, 22 Halifaxes, 6 Lysanders, and 3 Hudsons at Tempsford; and the 38 Group at Hurn had put up 60 sorties with Stirlings and Albemarle. OSS CM-IN-4225 (2-3-44), Bruce and Haskell to Donovan, 2 March 44, #26384, in European Resistance Groups folder, AC/AS, Plans.
91. History, Eighth Air Force, May 44, p. 11. The 788th Bomb Squadron had been engaged in strategic bombing. (History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44, n.p.). The 850th Bomb Squadron had arrived in the United Kingdom at the end of April and early in May. Actual assignment of the two squadrons occurred on 22 May. History, 857th Bomb Sq., April 44, p. 13, and May 44, pp. 4, 6, 10.
92. Ibid., May 44, p. 12.
93. Hq. Eighth Air Force, GO 473, 5 Aug. 44. The 788th Bomb Squadron was re-formed into the 2d Bomb Division and the 850th Bomb Squadron was re-formed into the 3d Bomb Division.
94. CARPETBAGGER History, I.
95. Journal of Events, 492d Bomb Gp., Sep.-Nov. 44.
96. History, Eighth Air Force, Oct. 44, pp. 34-35. The order was dated 20 Oct. 44. Journal of Events, 492d Bomb Gp., Sep.-Nov. 44.
97. History, Eighth Air Force, Oct. 44, p. 35.
98. History, Fifteenth Special Gp. (Prov.), Jan. 45, p. 7; Hq. Eighth Air Force, Special Operations Order No. 50, "Movement of Troops," 15 Dec. 44.

Chapter 3

1. History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
2. CARPETBAGGER History, III.
3. Hq. XII Troop Carrier Comd. (Prov.), "A Report of Troop Carrier Command Activities Including the Italian Invasion, 1 August-30 September 1943," II, 93.
4. Special Operations (Air) MTO, pp. 109-10.
5. Ibid., p. 111.
6. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44, pp. 1-2.
7. History, 857th Bomb Sq., May 44, pp. 8-9; "Modification and Maintenance of B-24 Liberators for Carpetbagger Operations," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44; 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions. The shiny paint was expected to reflect 100 per cent of all light beams and would therefore greatly aid in making the planes invisible to persons near the searchlights through whose beams the aircraft might fly. The "invisibility" resulted from the fact that the angle of reflection is equal to the angle of incidence; hence the reflected light would be directed away from the source and not back to it unless, of course, the plane should be caught in a nearly vertical cone by passing directly over a light. Even then there would not be time for antiaircraft fire to be aimed at the plane, which would be traveling at high speed and taking evasive action.
8. CARPETBAGGER History, I.
9. Ibid., I, II. The following quotation is an indication of the state of morale among supply droppers: "This Group has been fighting the Axis in a method heretofore unheard of on so large a scale. They didn't go flying in tight formations over the target, dropping block-busters on German industries, nor did they come buzzing down at tree-top level, guns ablaze, shooting up convoys, troop concentrations, trains, and other exciting things a fighter pilot does. No, the boys of troop carrier had another method of evening their score with the Germans; operating with the Balkan Air Force, they slipped in and out among the ever threatening mountain peaks in the still of the night, dropping supplies and frequently landing right in Jerry's backyard. In their own way, they dropped bombs that were more accurate than those placed by the world's best bombsight, machine-gunned troops and enemy supply lines not from the air, but from behind walls, buildings, mountains and ravines, not in person of course but by

making it possible for the Partisans, fighting under the leadership of Marshal Tito, to do these things. By the combined efforts of every member of the unit, and continuous flying on the part of the aircrews, in the face of danger frequently more dangerous than the enemy (weather), the Partisan forces were supplied with everything from blood plasma to jeeps, when and where needed, on a scale never before possible. Though thousands of miles from the invasion of Normandy, the men of this group like to feel that they had a part in the greater picture, because of the fact that the resupplied Partisans were able to divert several divisions of German forces, and keep them plenty well occupied. Acting as observers, the crews reported all unusual incidents noted on each flight to the proper authority. As a result, fighters or bombers were sent out to neutralize the target, sometimes a motor convoy, and frequently an enemy fighter base." 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."

10. Report by the CG USAAF to the CGS, "Allied Assistance by Air to Resistance Groups in Europe, 2 March 1944," inclosed in "Special Operations Procedure for Air Sorties in Mediterranean," App. A, European Resistance Groups folder, AC/AS, Plans.
11. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44, p. 1.
12. Ibid., Oct. 44, pp. 2-3; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 5.
13. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply"; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 18.
14. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
15. History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44; CARPMBAGGER History, I.
16. On 9 April 1944, Colonel Heflin received full authority to accept or reject missions for the CARPMBAGGER group. No other group officer in the Eighth Air Force had such full control over his operations. History, Eighth Air Force, April 44, pp. 15-16.
17. CARPMBAGGER History, I; History, 857th Bomb Sq., May 44.
18. Ibid.
19. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 18. Each G-47 carried a crew consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, aerial engineer, radio operator, and a British dispatcher. Sometimes an additional assistant aerial engineer helped in discharging the cargo.
20. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."

21. Ibid.; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 19.
22. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44, pp. 1-2.
23. "Armament-Ordnance in CARPETBAGGER Work," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44; History, 857th Bomb Sq., May 44; 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions."
24. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
25. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 14.
26. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44, p. 2.
27. Ibid., pp. 2-3. The following statement by the historian takes in altogether too much territory: "As is true of Navigators in the 885th, the pilots of the Squadron are called upon for a higher degree of technical skill than is to be found in any other American Air Force unit engaged in tactical operations."
28. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 16.
29. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 13.
30. History, 12th Troop Carrier Sq., Aug. 44, p. 3. Givin was killed on a hospital flight on 19 August 1944, when he flew into a thunderhead.
31. CARPETBAGGER History, I.
32. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," pp. 10, 37.
33. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Dec. 44, p. 3. On the night of 9/10 December 1944, the B-24's took off from Brindisi at 1930 hours to escape a severe cold front that threatened to close in the field. They flew up the Adriatic at altitudes ranging from the deck to 24,000 feet, but seven were forced back by severe turbulence, icing, and hail storms. Ibid.
34. History, 856th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44-April 45. The planes landed at Lucers, Scotland. The British supply droppers canceled 121 sorties scheduled for that night.
35. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
36. "A Maquis Chief Visits the Carpetbaggers," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
37. Ibid.

38. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 35.
39. "Marksman Visits the Carpetbaggers," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
40. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 11; Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 2; 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
41. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 2.
42. Ibid., p. 8.
43. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 16.
44. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
45. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During December 1944, Monthly Report No. 9, in History, MAAF, LXXV.
46. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 16.
47. History, 858th Bomb Sq., Book II, Vol. II.
48. "A Maquis Chief Visits the Carpetbaggers," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
49. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 87.
50. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 3.
51. At Drvar, Berane, and Medeno Polje. Berane was abandoned temporarily because of a German advance. "A Plan for the Use of Air Power to Take Advantage of the Situation in Yugoslavia in the Early Summer of 1944," 23 April 44, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
52. "Employment of Air Forces in Tactical Support of Partisan Operations," 18 July 44, ibid.; Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 12. In the latter source, page 88, the figure is given as 38. Perhaps two in Albania were included.
53. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 17.
54. "Employment of Air Forces in Tactical Support of Partisan Operations," in History, MAAF, XXXV.
55. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 12.
56. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
57. Ibid., p. 21.

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58. Ibid., p. 22.

59. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

60. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."

Chapter IV

1. CM-IN-2659 (4-3-44), Castles to Arnold, 4 March 44, #W-12274.
2. 36th and 406th Bomb Sqs., Consolidated Form 34 for the Period 2-8 Jan. 44.
3. 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions.
4. CM-IN-2659 (4-3-44), Castles to Arnold, 4 March 44, #W-12274.
5. 36th and 406th Bomb Sqs., Consolidated Form 34 for the Period 16-22 Jan. 44. This is the last Form 34 which the present writer has been able to locate for any of the CARPETBAGGER squadrons.
6. "Operations Based on United Kingdom," App. A in ltr., Donovan to Arnold, 3 March 44, in European Resistance Groups folder, AC/AS, Plans.
7. CARPETBAGGER History, III.
8. 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions.
9. In February 1944, 93 per cent of the total RAF/AAF sorties were to France, 3 per cent to Belgium, 3 per cent to Norway, and 1 per cent to Denmark. CM-IN-2659 (4-3-44), Castles to Arnold, 4 March 44, #W-12274.
10. CM-OUT-24345 (17-4-44), JCS to Eisenhower, 17 April 44, #War-24345.
11. CM-IN-1120 (5-2-44), Eisenhower to JCS, 1 May 44, #S-51066.
12. CM-IN-4808 (7-5-44), Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 May 44, #S-51396. The increases were for 56,000 carbines instead of 14,000; 16,000 rocket launchers instead of 3,600; and 32,400 chutes instead of 21,600.
13. The totals probably were somewhat greater, since an equally reliable source gives 437 effective sorties, 100 "Joes," 5,103 containers, 1,594 leaflet packages, and 3,122 supply packages. (See App. 9, this study.) Just what unit flew these 40 additional sorties is not clear.
14. History, Eighth Air Force, July 44, p. 27. The stickler for statistical accuracy is stumped at this point. This source refers to more than 400 aircraft dispatched and to 600-odd tons of supplies dropped; but the CARPETBAGGER History says 543 planes were dispatched, and the Eighth Air Force Statistical Summary (see App. 9, this study) has 592 sorties.

15. CARPETBAGGER History, III: see App. 7, this study.
16. History, Eighth Air Force, Nov. 44, p. 39.
17. Ibid., September 1944, gives the number as 285. (Cf. App. 9, this study.) In addition to these supply-dropping missions with B-24's, the CARPETBAGGERS flew a few C-47 landing sorties. The first of these missions took place on 8 July 1944 and the last on 18 August. During this period the group's four C-47's flew 35 sorties to 12 fields in liberated territory, delivered 62 tons of arms and ammunition, and took in 76 "Joes" and evacuated 213. "An Account of C-47 Missions," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
18. History, 856th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44-April 45.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. History, 858th Bomb Sq., March 45; History, 856th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44-April 45.
22. From 15 March to 30 April 1945, the 858th Bomb Squadron completed at least 31 of 42 sorties to Denmark and 11 of 30 to Norway. On the night of 23/24 March, 13 sorties were attempted, but the records fail to give the mission's outcome.
23. History, 858th Bomb Sq., April 45. This squadron lost three aircraft over Norway and Denmark in April.
24. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Kessler, Jr., to Arnold, "Completion of Norwegian Project," 17 Aug. 45, in Norway folder, AC/AS, Plans; CM-CUT-24644 (21-1-45), Arnold to Deane, 21 Jan. 45, #War-24644.
25. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 41. Missions prior to September 1943 were primarily sidelights to the Corsican campaign and consisted for the most part in dropping agents of ISLD and ISSU-6, both agencies of SOE.
26. Ibid.
27. See Chap. II, this study.
28. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 41.
29. War Diary, 122d Bomb Sq., May 44.
30. Special Operations (Air) MTO, pp. 42-43.
31. Ibid., p. 42.

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- 32. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Dec. 44, p. 6; First Citation, 885th Bomb Sq., pp. 1-3.
- 33. First Citation, 885th Bomb Sq., App. A.
- 34. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 45.
- 35. Ibid., p. 43.
- 36. First Citation, 885th Bomb Sq., p. 1.
- 37. 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions.
- 38. GM-IN-11033 (14-6-44), SHAEF to WD, 13 June 44, #S-53795. The departments of Doubs, Jura, Hautes Pyrenees, and Indre were in control of the Maquis; fighting was serious in Vosges, Savoie, Isere, Brittany, Cantal, Haute Loire, and Lozere.
- 39. 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions. A more detailed analysis was given as follows:

Maquis Strength and Supply Requirements in Principal Centers of Activity, June 1944

Area	No. armed	No. un-armed	Initial issue to supply un-armed		Monthly supply requirements	
			Sorties	Tons	Sorties	Tons
Brittany	1,000	7,000	70	88	80	100
Chateauroux-Indre	1,000	3,000	30	38	40	50
Perigieux-Limoges	2,500	2,000	20	25	45	57
Cantal	3,500	7,000	70	88	105	132
Annecy-Chambery	1,000	2,000	20	25	30	38
Châlon-sur-Saône	2,000	2,000	20	25	40	50
St. Die	3,000	4,000	40	50	70	88
Vercors	<u>2,000</u>	<u>4,800</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>85</u>
TOTALS	16,000	31,800	318	399	478	600

- 40. Ibid.
- 41. There were "C" containers which held Bren guns, .303-caliber rifles, Sten guns, and Bazookas and rockets; the "H" containers carried Sten guns, pistols, grenades, high explosives, ammunition, and field dressings. Ibid.

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Hq. Eighth Air Force, Preliminary Report on GAF Reaction to CADILLAC Operation, 14 July 44.
46. History, Eighth Air Force, July 44, p. 60.
47. Memo, "Bomber Attacks," in CADILLAC Plan, 14 July 44, Mission No. 472.
48. 3d Air Div., "Report on Supply Missions."
49. History, Eighth Air Force, July 44, pp. 27-38.
50. 3d Air Div., "Report on Supply Missions." By the first of August the enemy had recaptured nearly all of the Vercors plateau. CM-IN-1471 (2-8-44), SHAEF to WD, 2 Aug. 44, #FWD-12537.
51. CM-IN-11872 (2-8-44), SHAEF to WD, 2 Aug. 44, #FWD-12537.
52. 3d Air Div., "Report on Supply Missions." This drop raised the total for the four operations to 8,948 containers dropped by 758 aircraft. An estimated 349 containers were lost in the drops.
53. Ibid.
54. "Notes for Lecture on Mediterranean Operations, May 1943-November 1944," in History, MAAF, XXXV.
55. CM-OUT-5923 (14-2-44), Arnold to Eaker, 14 Feb. 44, #9742.
56. CM-IN-11847 (13-8-44), Eaker to Arnold, 13 Aug. 44, #M-26962.
57. CM-IN-12325 (14-8-44), Spaatz to Arnold, 13 Aug. 44, #U-66382.
58. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During August 1944, Monthly Report No. 5, in History, MAAF, XXXV. Statistics on supplies delivered by the RAF from the United Kingdom are not available.
59. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During September 1944, Monthly Report No. 6, ibid.
60. History, Eighth Air Force, Sep. 44, p. 28.
61. CM-IN-17857 (19-9-44), Deane to Marshall, 19 Sep. 44, #MX-21018.

62. CM-IN-21086 (22-9-44), Deane to Arnold, 22 Sep. 44, #MX-21070.
63. CM-IN-20686 (22-9-44), Spaatz to Arnold, 22 Sep. 44, #UX-68378.
64. CM-OU-35285 (23-9-44), Arnold to Spaatz, 22 Sep. 44, #Warx-35285.
65. CM-OUT-39143 (30-9-44), Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Sep. 44, #Warx-39143.
66. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During October 1944, Monthly Report No. 7, in History, MAAF, XXXV. The 4 sorties delivered 5.06 long tons (net).
67. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During November 1944, Monthly Report No. 8, ibid.
68. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During December 1944, Monthly Report No. 9, ibid.
69. "Marshman Visits the Carpetbaggers," in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44. Examples of reprisals were numerous; wounded Maquis captured by the Germans invariably were beaten to death; and the Maquis retaliated by killing three German prisoners--when they had them--for every Maquis killed or tortured by the Germans.
70. History, 857th Bomb Sq., June 44.
71. History, 856th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44-April 45. Eight of the crew were killed in this loss.
72. History, 858th Bomb Sq., Book II, Vol. I.
73. History, 857th Bomb Sq., July 44.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., June 44.
76. See unidentified clipping in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.
77. "A Maquis Chief Visits the Carpetbaggers," ibid.
78. 3d Air Div., Report on Supply Missions.
79. Ibid.
80. "Visitor From Denmark," 2 Aug. 44, in History, 859th Bomb Sq., Sep. 43-Sep. 44.

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81. History of Special Operations, MFOUSA, Pt. II, Chap. V, p. 1593, in Historical Div., WDSS.
82. Ibid., p. 1592.
83. Ibid., p. 1594.

Chapter V

1. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, pp. 77-78.
2. CM-IN-9804 (11-10-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 9 Oct. 44, #FX-36455.
3. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 80. The Italian surrender added strength to the Partisan ranks and enabled Tito's men to gain temporary control over large areas of Yugoslavia.
4. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 34.
5. OSS Bari, Report on Situation in Yugoslavia, 9 Dec. 43, in A-2 Lib.
6. CM-IN-16282 (25-1-44), Wilson to Agwar, 24 Jan. 44, #W-984/42478.
7. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 80.
8. The Twelfth Air Force in the Southern Italian Campaign, pp. 36-37; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, pp. 83-86.
9. In the period 11/19 to 22/23 January 1944, for example, the RAF Halifaxes completed nine drops to Yugoslavia, five to Greece, and two to Albania. Incoming cables Nos. 13263 (20-1-44), AAF NATOUSA to WD, 20 Jan. 44, #AF-354; 13776 (21-1-44), AAF NATOUSA to WD, 21 Jan. 44, #AF-357; 15515 (24-1-44), AAF NATOUSA to WD, 23 Jan. 44, #AF-365.
10. Ltr., Donovan to Arnold, 3 March 44, App. A, "Operations from Points in Mediterranean Theater," in European Resistance Groups folder, AC/AS, Plans. There were three C-47 landings in Yugoslavia and four in Greece during the period.
11. Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII.
12. CM-IN-13516 (19-2-44), British C's/S to Wilson, 18 Feb. 44, Cosmed 39.
13. CM-IN-14272 (20-2-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 19 Feb. 44, Medcos 53.
14. History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., March 44, p. 2.
15. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 44; War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44; History, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 44, p. 2; Special Operations Sorties for February 1944, in History, MAAF, XII.
16. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44; War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
17. War Diaries, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. and March 44; War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.

18. In Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 10, it is stated that 190 sorties were flown and 83 $\frac{1}{2}$ were successful. A sortie was counted as one-half successful when it dropped on one-half of its target.
19. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 10.
20. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
21. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 10.
22. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
23. Minutes of Conference, 19 April 44, in Allied Aid to Partisans in Yugoslavia, AC/AS, Plans.
24. Memo, Maj. T. N. Wilder to Col. F. G. Allen, "A Plan for the Use of Air Power to Take Advantage of the Situation in Yugoslavia," 23 April 44, in European Resistance Groups folder.
25. CM-IN-620 (5-1-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 28 April 44, Medcos 102; CM-IN-1944 (5-3-44), British C's/S to Wilson, 2 May 44, Cosmed 100.
26. Memo, Wilder to Allen, "Allied Air Operations into Yugoslavia and Albania," 16 May 44, in European Resistance Groups folder.
27. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2.
28. History, 10th Troop Carrier Sq., Activation to 31 May 44.
29. History, 11th Troop Carrier Sq., June 44.
30. CM-IN-9750 (13-5-44), AFHQ to WD, 13 May 44, #F-44950.
31. CM-OUT-40496 (23-5-44), Bissel to Peabody, 23 May 44, #War-40496; CM-IN-2371 (5-4-44), AFHQ to WD, 3 May 44, #G-59; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8 (July-Sep. 44), p. 104.
32. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, p. 107.
33. JICAME, Report No. 8108-44, 9 Aug. 44, BAF Operations for July 1944, in A-2 Lib.
34. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, pp. 107, 110-11; Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 19.
35. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During August 1944, Monthly Report No. 5, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

36. Comparative figures were, in long tons: Yugoslavia, 571.42; Albania, 118.73; Greece, 48.44; Bulgaria, 15.74; Hungary, 1.39. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Report on Combat Operations for August 1944," in History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Aug. 44.
39. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 6; War Diary, 28th Troop Carrier Sq., Aug. 44, p. 1.
40. BAF Weekly Summary No. 9, week ending 10 Sep. 44, in A-2 Lib.
41. CM-IN-4369 (6-9-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 2 Sep. 44, Medcos 181.
42. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, p. 117.
43. BAF Weekly Summaries Nos. 9-11, Sep. 44, in A-2 Lib.
44. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, p. 110.
45. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During October 1944, Monthly Report No. 7, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
46. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 31.
47. Hq. MAAF, Commendation, 3 Oct. 44, incl. in History, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Oct. 44.
48. History, 16th Troop Carrier Sq., April 45, p. 1.
49. CM-IN-24865 (26-10-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 24 Oct. 44, Medcos 205; Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During October 1944, Monthly Report No. 7, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
50. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, p. 119; No. 9 (Oct.-Dec. 44), pp. 63-64.
51. Ibid., No. 9, pp. 72-77.
52. Ibid., p. 49.
53. Ibid. p.78.
54. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 35; War Diaries, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Oct. and Nov. 44.
55. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Nov. 44.
56. History, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45, incl. No. 2.

57. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Nov. 44; War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Nov. 44.
58. Ibid. This was BETHESDA landing ground.
59. Ibid., Dec. 44; History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Dec. 44, p. 3.
60. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During October 1944, Monthly Report No. 7, in History, MAAF, XXXV. The squadron also dropped 52.96 net long tons to Italy and 62.30 net long tons to Greece.
61. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Nov. 44.
62. Ibid., Dec. 44; Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During December 1944, Monthly Report No. 9, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
63. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Dec. 44, pp. 1-2. The most impressive record was made on 4-5 Nov. 44 when the 205 Bomb Group (RAF) and other units flew 447 sorties to drop 527 net long tons to Yugoslavia. Summary of Special Operations, Dec. 43-Dec. 44, in History, MAAF, XI.
64. History, Fifteenth Special Gp. (Prov.), Jan. 45, pp. 2-3.
65. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10 (Jan.-March 45), pp. 78-83.
66. Ibid., pp. 83-86.
67. Hq. MAAF, Operations Instruction No. 95, 4 Jan. 45, "Employment of Supply Dropping Units of MAAF," in History, MAAF, XXXVIII.
68. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45; History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Jan. 45, p. 5.
69. One can fight with statistics here, as usual, and still not be certain. The War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Squadron, February 1944, page 49, lists 175 sorties, of which 140 were successful; the History, 51st Troop Carrier Squadron, February 1944, agrees with these figures; but the History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, February 1945, admits 133 successful sorties of 168 flown, and Headquarters, MAAF, Monthly Report No. 11, February 1945, states that 174 sorties were attempted, 138 $\frac{1}{2}$ succeeded--then lists 149 successes! The only item on which all sources agree is that there were 12 night nickeling sorties that dropped 48,000 lbs. of propaganda.
70. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 45, p. 491.
71. There were three drops at Glina northeast of Bihac, two at Vocin, and one at Kalinovik between Sarajevo and Mostar. Ibid.
72. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 45.

73. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During January-March 1945, Monthly Reports Nos. 10-12, in History, MAAF, XXXV. Statistics keep on quarreling: The History, 2641st Special Group (Prov), March 1945, states that the 859th Bomb Squadron completed 129 of 143 sorties to Yugoslavia to deliver about 266 long tons (net); the Monthly Report No. 12 has 142 completed, with about 279 long tons (net) delivered.
74. History, Fifteenth Special Gp. (Prov), Jan. 45, p. 34; History, 2641st Special Gp. (Prov), March 45.
75. History, 16th Troop Carrier Sq., April 45.
76. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, pp. 90-96.
77. Ibid., pp. 89, 97.
78. History, 16th Troop Carrier Sq., May 45.
79. Special Operations (Air) MTO, pp. 14-16, 36-37.
80. Ibid., pp. 13, 34.
81. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 31; History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Nov. 44; Histories, 885th Bomb Sq., Nov.-Dec. 44.
82. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 37.
83. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 11.
84. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 3.
85. War Diary, 11th Troop Carrier Sq., May 44.
86. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," Annex D.
87. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 5.
88. JICAME Report No. 8108-44, BAF Operations for July 1944, in A-2 Lib.
89. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 6.
90. JICAME Report No. 8160-44, 15 Aug. 44, in A-2 Lib.
91. Conference at the wolfschanze, 31 July 44, in Himmler's files from Hallein, No. 1, 8 Nov. 45, p. 12.
92. Special Operations (Air) MTO , p. 30.

- 93. Special Operations Sorties for February 1944, in History, MAAF, XII.
- 94. Statistics are extremely poor for these operations. The C-47's averaged about 1.5 short tons (gross) per sortie, so an estimate of about 55 tons delivered is not too far off. The 68th Reconnaissance Group had 7 B-25's at Manduria flying to Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. In March it flew at least 3 sorties to Greece and 7 to north Italy; by 16 April it had completed 10 sorties to Greece, 16 to Yugoslavia, and 5 to north Italy. Special Operations Daily Record, in History, MAAF, XII.
- 95. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
- 96. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
- 97. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 44.
- 98. Special Operations MTO, Sec. X, p. 2.
- 99. In April there were 84 successful sorties to Greece by all units, which delivered 80 long tons (gross). (Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During April 1944, Monthly Report No. 1, in History, MAAF, XII.) A search of war diaries and other sources reveals only five successful C-47 sorties to Greece in April. History, 10th Troop Carrier Sq., Activation to 10 May 1944.
- 100. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During May 1944, Monthly Report No. 2, in History, MAAF, XII. Figures for the squadrons were:

Squadron	Sorties		Net lbs. (Leaflets included)
	Successful	Failed	
10	17	4	54,724
11	35	2	106,161
12	13	1	40,335
28	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>50,127</u>
TOTALS	83	9	251,347

Compiled from squadron Mission Reports, May 44.

- 101. Statistics for June 1944 were:

Squadron	Sorties		Net lbs. (Leaflets included)
	Successful	Failed	
10	13	0	42,673
11	20	3	58,504
12	15	2	45,749
28	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>37,375</u>
TOTALS	60	7	184,301

Compiled from squadron Mission Reports, June 44.

102. Statistics are incomplete. The 10th and 11th Troop Carrier Squadrons together completed 10 of 29 sorties to Greece and delivered 29,002 lbs. (net) of supplies. Combat Mission Reports, 10th and 11th Troop Carrier Sqs., July 44.

103. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During October 1944, Monthly Report No. 7, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

104. Deliveries to Greece, August-November 1944, were as follows:

Month	Net long tons delivered to Greece by all units	Net long tons delivered to Greece by 51 T.C. Wing	Tons delivered to all targets by 51 T.C. Wing	% of 51 T.C. Wing tonnage delivered to Greece
August	50.01	48.44	755.7	6.4
September	124.82	84.36	601.0	14.0
October	397.54	105.21	185.28	57.0
November	<u>29.65</u>	<u>21.68</u>	<u>261.36</u>	<u>8.3</u>
TOTALS	602.02	259.69	1,803.34	14.3

Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Monthly Reports Nos. 5-8, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

105. CM-IN-16352 (18-9-44), AFHQ to WD, 16 Sep. 44, Medcos 190.

106. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 8, p. 113.

107. History, 28th Troop Carrier Sq., Sep. 44.

108. CM-IN-9179 (10-10-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 7 Oct. 44, #FX-35652.

109. Special Operations MTO, Sec. X, p. 2.

110. CM-IN-9179 (10-10-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 7 Oct. ⁴⁴ #FX-35652.

111. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Oct. 44.

112. History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Oct. 44; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," pp. 65-68; War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Oct. 44; History, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Oct. 44; History, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Oct. 44; The Stars and Stripes (Italy), 16 Oct. 44, p.5; History, and War Diary, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Oct. 44; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 9, pp. 55-56.

113. Seventeen successful sorties to Greece are listed in War Diaries, 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons, November 1944.

114. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Nov. 44.
115. Ibid., Dec. 44.
116. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 72.
117. Ibid., p. 73.
118. Ibid., p. 70.
119. Ibid., p. 68.
120. Ibid., pp. 79, 81; History, 2641st Special Cp. (Prov), April 45.
121. Ibid. In addition to supply and infiltration missions, special duty aircraft dropped 42 tons of propaganda leaflets over Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary. See App. 15I, this study.
122. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 63.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. War Diaries, 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Sqs., March 44; History, 10th Troop Carrier Sq., Activation to 1 May 44; Mission Reports, 11th Troop Carrier Sq., May 44; War Diaries, 12th Troop Carrier Sq., May-June 44; Histories, 10th, 11th, 28th Troop Carrier Sqs., June 44. The total weight of supplies dropped by these squadrons from April through June 44 was 61,808 lbs.
126. "The Guerilla Situation in South France and Italy," in History, MAAF, XII.
127. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44.
128. In Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During September 1944, Monthly Report No. 6 (History, MAAF, XXXV), it is stated that the 885th Bomb Squadron dropped 115.32 long tons (net) in north Italy. However, the History, 885th Bomb Squadron, September 1944, states that only 152,863 lbs. were dropped--a net tonnage of 69.9.
129. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Oct. 44.
130. Ibid. The B-24's dropped 128,320 lbs. of supplies, 10,900 lbs. of leaflets, and 3 agents. Of the 52 failures, 38 were caused by weather, 10 by lack of reception, 1 by mechanical failure, and 1 by enemy action.

131. Comparative figures, taken from MAAF Monthly Reports Nos. 5-13 (in net long tons) are:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Yugoslavia</u>	<u>Italy</u>
August 1944	873.88	158.51
September	858.32	199.85
October	471.96	73.37
November	1,309.12	265.65
December	613.55	440.50
January 1945	707.84	261.95
February	1,452.02	718.45
March	1,187.13	689.11
April	<u>974.49</u>	<u>819.46</u>
TOTALS	8,448.31	3,626.85

132. "Special Account of Squadron Activities Over Northern Italy, 22 November 1944-3 January 1945," in History, 4th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.
133. Histories, 885th Bomb Sq., Nov. and Dec. 44.
134. History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Nov. 44, p. 2; Histories, 4th, 7th, and 8th Troop Carrier Sqs., Nov. and Dec. 44. The 51st Troop Carrier Squadron was still at Brindisi.
135. The History, 62d Troop Carrier Group, January 1945, claims only 365 tons delivered, but squadron figures raise the total considerably. The 4th Troop Carrier Squadron completed 106 sorties, dropped 382,741 lbs. (net), and lost 1 C-47 near La Spezia. (History, 4th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.) The 8th Troop Carrier Squadron operated from 28 November 1944 to 3 January 1945, flew 120 successful sorties, dropped 385,270 lbs. (net) and 8 "Joes" without loss. (Hq. 8th Troop Carrier Sq. to CG 62d Troop Carrier Gp., "Narrative Report of Parachute Re-Supply Operations to North Italy for Period 28 November 1944 to 3 January 1945.") The 7th Troop Carrier Squadron from 10 December 1944 to 9 January 1945 sent out 127 sorties, of which 56 failed. War Diaries, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Dec. 44 and Jan. 45.
136. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Dec. 44.
137. History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Jan. 45; History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Jan. 45; War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45; History, 4th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.
138. Hq. MAAF, "Special Air Room Report on Partisan Activity in North Italy," 18 Jan. 45, in History, MAAF, XXXVIII.

139. Histories, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Jan.-May 45. The breakdown by months is:

Month	Sorties	Net lbs.
January 1945	118	413,103
February	184	653,303
March	284	1,009,502
April	398	1,365,197
May	59	176,983
TOTALS	1,043	3,618,088

140. Figures from the 2641st Special Group (Prov) are not available for February 1945. For the other months, the breakdown is:

	January		March		April	
	859th	885th	859th	885th	859th	885th
Sorties attempted	42	75	9	163	159	199
Sorties completed	18	26	2	106	111	132
Net lbs.	85,438	103,953	6,162	463,068	482,297	570,481

Compiled from Histories, Fifteenth Special Gp. (Prov) and 2641st Special Gp. (Prov), Jan., March, and April 45.

141. War Diary, 16th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45. Fifteen of 30 sorties by the 18th Troop Carrier Squadron failed because of incorrect signals or lack of reception. War Diary, 18th Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.
142. Other causes of failures were: wrong signals or no reception, 71; no escort, 10; enemy action, 1; navigational error, 1; mechanical failure, 1; miscellaneous, 8. History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Feb. 45, p. 3.
143. History, 16th Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 45.
144. Histories, 2641st Special Gp. (Prov), March, April 45. The Group lost two B-24's at B&F, a DZ southwest of Livigno on the Swiss border, one by crashing into the mountains, and one to five Italian Fascist fighter planes.
145. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 65.

Chapter VI

1. History of Special Operations, MTOUSA, Pt. I, Chap. II, pp. 345-47.
2. CARPETBAGGER History, III. See App. 9, this study.
3. Special Operations MTO, Sec. XVI, App. A.
4. History of Special Operations, MTOUSA, Pt. I, Chap. II, p. 362. The personnel seem to have varied somewhat. This source states, on page 343, that the OSS assigned 64 U. S. officers and noncommissioned officers to the Jedburgh teams, hardly enough to supply an American officer to each of 100 teams. CARPETBAGGER History, I, states that there were two officers and one enlisted man per team.
5. History of Special Operations, MTOUSA, Pt. II, Chap. II, pp. 858-866. In addition to radio operators of the Jedburgh teams, there were 51 other radio operators functioning in France on D-day. *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Chap. II, p. 365.
6. History, 856th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44-April 45.
7. Directive, Adv. Hq. Force 133 to Hq. TAF, 7 Jan. 44; Directive, Hq. MAAF to A/C Forster, SAS, Hq. Force 133, *et al.*, 12 Jan. 44; Adv. Hq. Force 133 to Hq. TAF, 16 Jan. 44, in MANHOLE-BUNGHOLE folder, AC/AS, Plans.
8. CM-OUT-9774 (17-1-44), CCS to Wilson, 25 Jan. 44, #OZ-291.
9. Teletype, Adv. Hq. Force 133 to Hq. TAF, 30 Jan. 44; Adv. Hq. Force 133 to MAAF, 31 Jan. 44; MAAF to Fwd. DAF, Hq. Force 133, *et al.*, 31 Jan. 44.
10. Minutes of Daily Staff Meeting, 1 Feb. 44, in History, MAAF, II. The proposed landing ground was only about 240 miles from Bari, well within the C-47's range.
11. CM, Hq. Force 133 to MAAF, TAF, DAF, *et al.*, 3 Feb. 44, #3/475, in History, MAAF.
12. CM, 249 Wing (RAF) to 267 Sq. (RAF), 4 Feb. 44, *ibid.*
13. CM, MAAF to MAAF, 5 Feb. 44, #A.284, *ibid.*
14. CM, "Fatima" (Air Division) Bari to MAAF (E), MAAF CP, 6 Feb. 44, #271, *ibid.*
15. CM, MAAF to DAF, 7 Feb. 44, #AC/6; Twining to MAAF, 8 Feb. 44, #8.476, *ibid.*

16. CM, MATAF to Fwd. DAF, 249 Wing, et al., 15 Feb. 44, #AC.54, ibid.
17. CM, Hq. MAAF to MATAF, et al., 15 Feb. 44, #A-433, ibid.
18. Manhole Operational Order No. 2, Hq. MATAF to Hq. DAF, et al., 17 Feb. 44.
19. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 8; History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Feb. 44.
20. CM, Adv. Force 133 to Adv. MAAF et al., 17 Feb. 44, #G.191, in History, MAAF.
21. History, 62d Troop Carrier Gp., Feb. 44; War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 44. A-36's dive-bombed Sibenik to provide diversionary cover.
22. Special Operations (AIE) MTO, pp. 64, 87.
23. Ibid., p. 42.
24. Hq. MAAF, "Special Operations During April 1944," Monthly Report No. 1, in History, MAAF, XII.
25. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During May 1944, Monthly Report No. 2, ibid.
26. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."
27. CM, Adv. Force 133 to MATAF et al., 2 Feb. 44, #2/586, in History, MAAF.
28. CM, 242 Group to MATAF (R), 5 Feb. 44, #A.O.665, ibid.
29. CM, Hq. MAAF to Hq. MATAF et al., 7 Feb. 44, #AS.8, ibid.
30. CM-IN-21565 (30-3-44), Wilson to British G's/S, 29 March 44, Medcos 77, in Superduper file.
31. Memo, Wilder to Allen, 23 April 44.
32. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 3.
33. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During April 1944, Monthly Report No. 1, in History, MAAF, XII.
34. Hq. MAAF, "Special Operations During May 1944," Monthly Report No. 2, ibid.

- 35. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 1-2, 5-13, *ibid.*, XII, XXXV; Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 33. See App. 15I, this study.
- 36. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 33.
- 37. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During August and September, 1944, Monthly Reports Nos. 5 and 6, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
- 38. Full statistics for July are not available, but the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron alone flew 59 landing missions that delivered 243,086 lbs. of supplies and evacuated 653 persons, including 132 children and 6 women. The others were mostly wounded Partisans. (History, 12th Troop Carrier Sq., July 44.) There were 74 successful pick-ups from Greece, which took out 600 persons. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 30; Special Operations MTO, Sec. XVI, App. A.
- 39. The figures as reported in Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 8-13 (History, MAAF, XXXV), are:

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. Evacuated</u>
November 1944	494
December	274
January 1945	378
February	888
March	1,061
April	1,339

- 40. History, 28th Troop Carrier Sq., Sep. 44.
- 41. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 4.
- 42. Ibid.
- 43. History, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., July 44.
- 44. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 6. In April 1942, a C-47 in Burma took off with 74 passengers--and landed with 75. AAF Historical Studies No. 12, The Tenth Air Force 1942, p. 36 and n. 71, p. 142.
- 45. Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, p. 3; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, p. 86.
- 46. CM-IN-5743 (8-5-44), SOMTO to AFHQ, 6 May 44, #G-25, Daily Sitrep No. 22; CM-IN-10670 (14-5-44), SOMTO to AFHQ, 13 May 44, #95, Daily Sitrep No. 29; CM-IN-23085 (30-5-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 29 May 44, Medcos 115.

47. Ltr., Col. George Kraigher to Eaker, "German Airborne Attack on Drvar, 25 and 26 May 1944," 3 June 44, in History, MAAF, XII.
48. An SOE source revealed that before the attack the Yugoslav military attaché in the United States had cabled the location of Tito's headquarters to Mihailovich's representative in Cairo, and after the attack sent news of Tito's location at Sator. CM-IN-10034 (13-6-44), British C's/S to Mideast, 12 June 44, #COS ME 4.
49. CM-IN-22298 (29-5-44), SOMTO to AFHQ, 27 May 44, #G/139, Daily Sitrep No. 42.
50. *Ibid.*; ltr., Kraigher to Eaker, 3 June 44, in History, MAAF, XII; CM-IN-17599 (29-5-44), AMSSO to 30 Military Mission, 28 May 44, #2803, in Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, Annex G; AFHQ CM-IN-17951 (29-5-44), Wilson to Air Ministry, 29 May 44, in Special Operations MTO, Sec. VIII, Annex H.
51. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 19; CM-IN-23085 (30-5-44), Wilson to British C's/S, 29 March 44, Medcos 115; Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 4.
52. Ltr., Eaker to Arnold, 1 June 44, in History, MAAF, II; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 7, pp. 56-86.
53. Msg., Lt. Col. Street to MAAF, 30 May 44, in ltr., Eaker to Arnold, 1 June 44, in History, MAAF, II.
54. RAF Mediterranean Review No. 7, p. 86.
55. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 25; CM-IN-3678 (5-6-44), Force 266 to AFHQ, 4 June 44.
56. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 26; RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, pp. 125-126.
57. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 26. This account has the evacuations occurring on 23-24 August, but other and more reliable sources agree that it was on 22-23 August.
58. History, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Aug. 44, p. 2.
59. History, 28th Troop Carrier Sq., Aug. 44.
60. *Ibid.*; Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 26. The heroine of this action was Alice, an English-speaking Partisan whose untiring efforts resulted in maximum efficiency in handling a most confused situation. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, p. 126.

61. Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 27.
62. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 45; History, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., March 45.
63. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, p. 126.
64. The number of Fifteenth Air Force escapees by months was: January 1944, 1; February, 11; March, 32; April, 86; May, 176. (History, MAAF, III, p. 319.) Another source states that 225 American and two RAF airmen were evacuated from Yugoslavia in May 1944. Hq. MAAF, Special Operations During May 1944, Monthly Report No. 2, in History, MAAF, XII.
65. History, MAAF, III, p. 320.
66. Lt. Col. Linn M. Paris, Senior American Officer, Anglo-American Military Mission, to MAAF Director of Operations, 25 March 44, incl. No. 1 in Norstad to CG Fifteenth Air Force, 15 April 44, in History, MAAF, VIII. The liaison planes, two L5-V's and two RAF Austers, were assigned on 15 April 1944. Hq. MAAF, Operations Instruction No. 24, 15 April 44, ibid.
67. Ltr., Baker to Arnold, 3 Sep. 44, ibid., XXVI; ltr., Kraigher to Baker, 20 July 44, ibid., XXXV. An example of evacuation from Mihailovich's headquarters was the mission of six C-47's on the night of 29/30 May 1944. The planes dropped supplies at various DZ's on the way, then landed at a short strip in western Bosnia, delivered two Yugoslav Quislings caught in Italy, and evacuated 61 men, mostly American flyers. On the next night, another C-47 took out Brigadier Armstrong and six others. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 5.
68. History, MAAF, III, 319-24.
69. At 44°02' N, 20°11' E.
70. History, MAAF, III, p. 325.
71. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 7; History, 10th Troop Carrier Sq., Aug. 44; History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Aug. 44. The last source states that 271 American flyers were evacuated. Another source, the History, 60th Troop Carrier Group, August 1944, gives the figure as 226 Allied flyers evacuated on 10 August 1944.
72. History, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Sep. 44.
73. History, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.
74. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, pp. 95, 113.

75. GM-IN-647 (1-10-44), Baker to Arnold, 1 Oct. 44, #M-32698. Fifteenth and Twelfth Air Force recoveries, by land and by air, were as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>15th Air Force</u>	<u>12th Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Albania	16	0	16
Bulgaria	305	0	305
Czechoslovakia	64	0	64
France	60	15	75
Greece	76	0	76
Northern Italy	241	495	736
Rumania	1,309	0	1,509
Russian-occupied Austria	6	0	6
Russian-occupied Germany	25	0	25
Russian-occupied Hungary	651	0	651
Russian-occupied Poland	215	0	215
Spain	18	3	21
Switzerland	332	14	346
Turkey	50	10	60
Yugoslavia	2,350	12	2,362
TOTALS	5,718	549	6,267

History, MAAF, III, 340a. Figures for the Twelfth Air Force are from November 1942 to April 1945; figures for the Fifteenth Air Force are from November 1943 to April 1945. The Twelfth Air Force had 5,425 missing in action, of which 10 per cent were rescued; the Fifteenth had 22,753 missing in action, of which 25 per cent were rescued. At the war's end, 22 per cent of all missing MAF personnel had been rescued.

76. History, MAAF, III, p. 326, n. 7. Evacuation of Allied flyers from Sweden and Switzerland, while an interesting phase of air operations, lies beyond the scope of this study since they were not strictly special operations. The Air Transport Command carried out evacuation from Sweden; and the Eighth Air Force, using B-17's and B-24's, the latter belonging to the 492d Bomb Group, evacuated the Swiss internees from Annecy.

Chapter VII

1. PWD SHAMF, "Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater," pp. 2-3. [Hereafter cited as Leaflet Operations.]
2. PWD SHAMF, "The Leaflet Propaganda Front," 15 Nov. 44, in History, 1st Bomb Div., Nov. 44. [Hereafter cited as Leaflet Propaganda Front.]
3. Leaflet Operations, pp. 8-9.
4. A sample copy is in History, 850th Bomb Sq., May 44. The sixth number, covering March-16 April 1944, contained 32 pages.
5. A sample copy is in History, 1st Air Division, January 1945.
6. See copies in *ibid.*, Oct. 44.
7. Leaflet Operations, p. 9.
8. Leaflet Propaganda Front, 15 Nov. 44.
9. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Co., Tab 2, p. 3.
10. History, Fifteenth Air Force, II, p. 21.
11. Leaflet Operations, p. 21.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
14. "Let's Set Course," p. 4, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45 (page proof of a pamphlet, intended for orientation, which apparently was not published).
15. Aber became a major on 13 January 1944 and was a lieutenant colonel at the time of his death on 4 March 1945. (War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., Jan. 44.) This remarkable officer, a native of Racine, Wisc., was a graduate in engineering from Purdue University, 1941. Hq. ETOUSA, Release No. 9690, 26 Oct. 44.
16. History, Eighth Air Force, June 44, pp. 26-27.
17. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., June 44.
18. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945, p. 10.

19. "Let's Set Course," p. 4, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45.
20. War Diary, 406th Bomb Sq., Jan. 45. The order for this change was effective on 1 January 1945.
21. Operational Performance Record, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45.
22. Ltr., Hq. 1st Bomb Div., "Dropping of Leaflets," 29 April 44, in History, 1st Bomb Div., April 44.
23. Ltr., Hq. 1st Bomb Div., "Dropping of Leaflets," 22 May 44, *ibid.*, May 44.
24. Ltr., Hq. USSSTAF to CG Eighth Air Force, 21 June 44.
25. Directive, Hq. Eighth Air Force to CG's 1st, 2d, and 3d Bomb Divs., 5 July 44.
26. History, 856th Bomb Sq., Oct.-Nov. 44.
27. GHQ ME, Directive No. 487, 26 Nov. 43, in Special Operations MTO, Annex B.
28. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 18.
29. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Sep. 44.
30. War Diaries, 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Sqs., Nov. 44.
31. "Let's Set Course," p. 5, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45; Report of the 422d Bomb Sq. (H) on Night Operations, p. 12, *ibid.*
32. Leaflet Operations, p. 23.
33. New York Herald-Tribune, 27 Oct. 44.
34. Report of the 422d Bomb Sq. (H) on Night Operations, p. 12, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45.
35. Hq. Eighth Air Force, "Leaflet Bomb," 12 April 44, backslip in History, Eighth Air Force; War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., Jan. 44.
36. Leaflet Operations, p. 24; "Let's Set Course," p. 15, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45.
37. Leaflet Operations, p. 23.
38. Hq. Eighth Air Force, "Leaflet Bomb Procedure," 19 April 44, supporting docs. in History, Eighth Air Force. For illustrations of the leaflet bomb, see History, 856th Bomb Sq., Oct.-Nov. 44.

- 39. Leaflet Operations, pp. 24-25. P-47's carried 9 T-3 bombs, 3 under each wing and 3 in the belly-tank position. B-26's could carry 6 T-1 bombs holding 480,000 leaflets, or 20 T-3 bombs holding 300,000 leaflets.
- 40. Hq. Eighth Air Force, "Leaflet Bomb Procedure," 19 April 44.
- 41. Leaflet Operations, p. 1.
- 42. War Diaries, 1st Bomb Div., Oct.-Dec. 43.
- 43. The following table shows frequency of nickeling sorties by the 422d Bomb Squadron to various cities of western Europe, January-March 1944:

<u>City and Country</u>	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>Total</u>
Paris, France	4	4	7	15
Amiens "	4	5	5	14
Rouen "	4	5	5	14
Reims "	4	4	5	13
Lille "	5	4	3	12
Caen "	4	4	3	11
Rennes "	3	5	3	11
Orleans "	4	4	2	10
Antwerp, Belgium	1	5	3	9
Cambrai, France	4	3	2	9
Chartres "	3	3	3	9
Le Mans "	4	3	2	9
Lorient "	3	3	3	9
Nantes "	4	3	2	9
Tours "	4	3	2	9
Brussels, Belgium	1	3	3	7
Brest, France	3	2	1	6
Chateauroux, France	2	1	1	4
Ghent, Belgium	0	3	1	4
Monceau sur Sambre, Belgium	0	3	1	4
Raismes, France	2	2	0	4
Amsterdam, Netherlands	0	0	3	3
Charleroi, Belgium	0	0	2	2
Grenoble, France	0	1	1	2
The Hague, Netherlands	0	0	2	2
Leeuwarden "	0	0	2	2
Toulouse, France	0	1	1	2
Bremen, Germany	1	0	0	1
Evreux, France	1	0	0	1
Liège, Belgium	0	1	0	1
Limoges, France	0	0	1	1
Lyon, France	0	0	1	1
Rotterdam, Netherlands	0	0	1	1
Utrecht "	0	0	1	1
Vichy, France	0	0	1	1

Compiled from War Diaries, 442d Bomb Sq.

44. The unreliability of statistics is well illustrated by two sources: "The total number of leaflets dropped by the Eighth Air Force during February was somewhat in excess of 32,000,000" (History, Eighth Air Force, Feb. 44, p. 7), but the 422d Bomb Squadron alone dropped 52,640,000.
45. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., April 44; Eighth Air Force, Narrative of Operations, April 1944.
46. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., May 44.
47. Eighth Air Force, Narrative of Operations, May 44.
48. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., May 44. Neither the History, Eighth Air Force, nor the Statistical Summary reproduced in Appendix No. 21 includes the 6/7 May attack.
49. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., June 44; Hq. ETOUSA, Release No. 9680, 26 Oct. 44. The targets were Lisieux, Falaise, Argentan, Pont L'Eveque, Le Mans, Vire, Carentan, Rennes, St. L6, Cherbourg, Laval, Villes Boiage, Bayeux, Thury, Harcourt, Concle sur Nocreau, and Pontanbault.
50. War Diary, 422d Bomb Sq., June 44. The number of targets was surpassed on 17/18 June when 10 B-17's nicked 41 French localities.
51. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945.
52. History, Eighth Air Force, July 44, pp. 25-26.
53. The History, Eighth Air Force, July 1944 is mistaken in stating that "Leaflet-dropping operations of the Eighth Air Force reached an all-time high during July."
54. Leaflet Propaganda Front, 15 Nov. 44.
55. Another plane was lost by the 406th Bomb Squadron in October. (See App. 20, this study.) The History, Eighth Air Force, October 1944, page 53, states that two planes were destroyed by night fighters.
56. History, Eighth Air Force, Nov. 44, pp. 39-40.
57. The 406th Bomb Squadron dropped about 109,000,000 tactical leaflets and about 38,000,000 strategic leaflets; the RAF dropped about 23,000,000 strategic leaflets. Leaflet Propaganda Front, 31 Dec. 44.

58. Ibid., 25 Jan. 45. In December, British-based planes dropped 287,236,000 leaflets; French-based planes and artillery units added from 10,000,000 to 20,000,000; the 406th Bomb Squadron dropped 137,000,000 (but compare App. 20, this study); the Eighth Air Force bombers dropped 112,000,000; and the RAF dropped 38,000,000.
59. History, Eighth Air Force, Dec. 44, pp. 16-17.
60. War Diary, 406th Bomb Sq., Jan. 45; History, 406th Bomb Sq., Feb. 45.
61. History, 406th Bomb Sq., March 45. He was followed in command by Maj. Robert H. Gaddy on 7 March 1945.
62. Of 510,000,000 leaflets delivered in March, the RAF dropped 51,000,000; the 406th Bomb Squadron, 183,000,000; and the regular bombers 276,000,000. Distribution was as follows:

German troops	220,456,000
German civilians	247,640,000
Dutch	25,280,000
Frenchmen in Germany	15,200,000
Norwegians	1,120,000
Danes	<u>304,000</u>
	510,000,000

Leaflet Propaganda Front, 30 April 45.

63. "Let's Set Course," p. 5, in History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 45.
64. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 6, p. 101.
65. One source gives the figure as 87.9 gross tons. (Special Operations (Air) MTO, p. 44.) Another source raises it to 98 tons. Special Operations, MTO, Sec. XVI, App. A.
66. Incoming cables, Eisenhower to WD, 5722 (9-7-43), 7 Aug. 43, #W-4413/8749; 12975 (13-7-43), 18 July 43, #W-5167/1961; 22614 (30-8-43), 29 Aug. 43, #W-8634; 1637 (3-8-43), 3 Aug. 43, #W-6406.
67. History, Fifteenth Air Force, II, p. 21.
68. RAF Mediterranean Review, No. 10, p. 64.
69. Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Gp., Tab 2, p. 3.
70. Monthly tonnages were:

12 Feb.-1 April	9.06	August	57.1
April	68.7	September	45.0
May	56.9	October	16.5
June	67.4	November	23.0

(Contd)

70.(Contd)

July	56.8	December	14.0
		TOTAL	414.46

Twelfth Air Force, Troop Carrier Operations, 1944, pp. 10, 33, 37.
See also App. 12, this study.

- 71. History, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 44.
- 72. War Diary, 7th Troop Carrier Sq., Feb. 44.
- 73. Ibid., April 44.
- 74. A total of 18,131 lbs. were dropped, of which 13,496 were delivered on three sorties from 22-25 February. Twelfth Air Force, Troop Carrier Operations, 1944, p. 10; War Diaries, 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Squadrons, February-March 44.
- 75. Twelfth Air Force, "Troop Carrier Operations, 1944," p. 27.
- 76. War Diaries, 7th and 51st Troop Carrier Sqs., Nov. 44. A total of 23 tons was dropped by the two squadrons during the month. Only one sortie went to Greece.
- 77. War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Dec. 44.

A more or less random sampling of troop carrier nickeling operations gives a fair indication of this phase of special operations. On sorties that dropped 3,500 to 4,000 lbs. of leaflets, no supplies were dropped. The following examples are taken from squadron War Diaries:

<u>1944</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>No. of C-47's on the Mission</u>	<u>Country Nickeled</u>	<u>Nickels Dropped (lbs.)</u>
8/9 April	10	2	Albania	470
	10	2	Greece, Yugo.	800
	10	1	Albania	700
12/13	10	6	Yugoslavia	1,380
	10	1	Italy	300
14/15	10	6	Yugoslavia	1,560
15/16	10	10	Yugoslavia	740
16/17	10	3	Greece	525
	10	3	Yugoslavia	1,225
	10	1	Albania	300
18/19	10	3	Albania	1,350
19/20	10	2	Yugoslavia	330
	10	1	Bulgaria	4,500
	10	1	Yugoslavia	300
25/26	10	3	Yugoslavia	650
	10	1	Greece	230

(Contd)

77. (Contd)

<u>1944</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>No. of C-47's</u> <u>on the mission</u>	<u>Country</u> <u>Nickeled</u>	<u>Nickels</u> <u>Dropped (lbs.)</u>
26/27	10	1	Yugoslavia	150
30 Apr./1 May	10	4	Yugoslavia	800
5/6	10	5	Greece	600
14/15	10	1	Greece	150
21/22	10	5	Greece	600
30 May/1 June	10	3	Italy	1,800
1/2 November	51	1	Yugo., Albania	4,500
6/7	51	1	Yugo., Albania	4,500
7	7	1	Greece	4,500
12/13	7	1	Albania	4,500
16/17	51	1	Yugoslavia	4,000
18/19	51	1	Yugo., Albania	4,000
19/20	7	1	Yugo., Albania	4,500
20/21	7	1	Yugoslavia	4,000
22/23	7	1	Yugoslavia	4,000
23/24	51	1	Yugo., Albania	4,000
4 December	51	1	Yugoslavia	4,000
17	51	1	"	4,000
18/19	51	1	"	4,000
19	51	1	"	4,000
21	51	1	"	4,000
26/27	51	1	"	4,000
27/28	51	1	"	4,000

78. History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Jan. 45; War Diary, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Jan. 45.
79. War Diaries, 51st Troop Carrier Sq., Feb.-March 45. In April the 51st Troop Carrier Wing dropped four tons of leaflets to all targets. History, 51st Troop Carrier Wing, April 45.
80. In October, the 885th Bomb Squadron flew 33 successful sorties to the Balkans and dropped 10,900 lbs. of leaflets, an average of 330 lbs. per sortie. History, 885th Bomb Sq., Oct. 44.
81. History, 2641st Special Gp. (Prov), Jan.-March 45. The breakdown for the two months was:

Month	No. of sorties	Balkans		No. of sorties	Italy	
		Lbs.	Average per sortie		Lbs.	Average per sortie
January	76	15,400	203	44	12,200	230
March	133	25,800	194	108	15,800	172

82. Long tons of leaflets dropped by special duty aircraft in the Mediterranean theater, August 1944-April 1945 were as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sep.</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>Total</u>
Albania	8.21	5.22	3.26	5.09						21.78
Germany- Austria				.13	.13		2.18	6.25	2.40	11.09
Bulgaria	2.01									2.01
Crete			.13	.49						.62
Czechoslo- vakia				.27	.13		2.63	2.68	4.28	9.99
France	25.60	6.60								32.20
Greece	5.53	11.10	9.40	4.02	19.20	9.31				58.56
Hungary		1.69	1.01							2.70
Italy	14.41	10.17	4.68	12.46	9.37	4.95	28.00	7.32	7.33	98.69
Poland			.06							.06
Yugoslavia	<u>42.90</u>	<u>36.96</u>	<u>6.23</u>	<u>49.03</u>	<u>36.42</u>	<u>13.26</u>	<u>63.19</u>	<u>44.23</u>	<u>24.51</u>	<u>321.73</u>
TOTALS	98.66	71.74	24.77	71.49	65.25	32.52	96.00	60.48	38.52	559.43 ^a

a. 559.43 long tons equals 615.37 short tons.

Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 5-13, in History, MAAF, XXXV.

83. New York Herald-Tribune, 27 Oct. 44.

84. PWD MAAF, Leaflet Section, "Latest Reports on Leaflet Reactions," No. 11-T, undated supporting doc., in History, 1st Bomb Div., Oct. 44.

85. Ibid., No. 12, 11 Nov. 44.

86. Ibid., No. 12, 11 Nov. 44; No. 13, 8 Nov. 44; and No. 16, 14 Dec. 44.

87. Ibid., No. 10, 30 Sep. 44.

88. Ibid., No. 11-S, undated.

89. Leaflet Operations, n. 8.

90. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure to CG Eighth Air Force, 2 May 45.

91. 60th Troop Carrier Gp., "Story of Resupply."

92. War Diary, 11th Troop Carrier Sq., April 44.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Materials for this study were difficult to obtain because operations discussed were highly secret in nature and adequate records, if they exist, did not come to light. An unsuccessful attempt, extending over several weeks, was made to obtain materials from the Office of Strategic Services. Perhaps it should be noted that OSS records have been somewhat dispersed during the reorganization of that office.

Unit histories, war diaries, and special reports have been drawn upon heavily. On the higher levels, the two histories of special operations in the Mediterranean theater and the history of the CARPENTER project from the United Kingdom were especially useful. Histories of the Eighth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth Air Forces and the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, while touching but briefly on special operations, were also valuable. Among the hundreds of supporting documents that were filed with the MAAF history are many which relate to special operations. Where not otherwise placed, the sources are to be found in the Archives Section of the Air Historical Office.

One finds considerable difficulty in reconciling statistics, especially when sources often disagree substantially. In such cases the writer has accepted the statistics which, in his judgment, appear to be most reliable. For the Mediterranean theater, this unfortunate situation could have been remedied had all the Special Operations Monthly Reports been available. This series did not begin until April 1944, two months after the AAF began its special operations from Italian bases. The RAF Mediterranean Review was helpful in providing background material on the Partisan situation in the Balkans and Italy.


Although the present study primarily treats of the AAF as a carrier for other agencies, the larger story would be interesting, especially to answer the question: "what, specifically, did the Partisans accomplish with supplies delivered by air?" To answer such a question accurately, one must have not only a detailed account of Partisan movements, but also detailed mission reports for each supply-dropping sortie. Except in a very few cases, such reports have not been found. One would like to know, too, exactly where each drop zone and each landing strip was located. A few have been pinpointed, but the writer sought in vain for target lists complete with geographical coordinates.

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Appendix No. 1

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER
DECEMBER 1943*



* Adapted from chart in Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Section III, Annex A.

Explanation of Abbreviations:


- ACOMF-----Allied Central Mediterranean Forces
- SOI-----Special Operations Executive (British)
- OSS/SO-----Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Branch (U.S.)
- ISSU-6-----Inter-Service Signals Unit-6 (British)
- GHQ ME-----General Headquarters, Middle East
- AFHQ-----Allied Force Headquarters

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Appendix No. 2

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER
APRIL 1944*



————— Operational Control
 - - - - - Co-ordination

* Adapted from chart in Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Section III, Annex B.

Explanation of Abbreviations:


- AFHQ---Allied Force Headquarters
- SOMTO---Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
- AAI---Allied Armies in Italy
- TF 163---Task Force 163
- GHQ ME---General Headquarters, Middle East
- OSS/SO---Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Branch (U. S.)
- ISSU-6---Inter-Service Signals Unit-6 (British)
- SOE---Special Operations Executive

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Appendix No. 3

ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER
JUNE 1944*



* Adapted from chart in Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Section III, Annex G.

Explanation of Abbreviations:

- AFHQ-----Allied Force Headquarters
- GHQ ME-----General Headquarters, Middle East
- TF 163-----Task Force 163
- AAI-----Allied Armies in Italy
- SPOC-----Special Projects Operations Center
- ISSU-6, SOE-----Inter-Service Signals Unit-6, Special Operations Executive
- OSS SO-----Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations

Appendix No. 4

AAF, RAF, AND DOMINION AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, 1902
(Average Strength and Average Serviceability)

Unit and Type of A/C	1944 ^b											
	April	May	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	March	April	
148 Sq. (RAF)	14-9 ^c	14-9	13-6	10-6	14-10	14-11	20-12	19-14	19-8	19-11	18-13	
Halifaxes												
1586 Polish Flight												
Halifaxes, Liberators	15-10	12-8	7-6	6-5	10-7	10-8	14-10	13-10	16-10			
Italian Air Force												
SI-82's, Cant Z-1007's	47-24	36-21	40-12	12-6	12-6	12-6	12-6	11-6	15-13	15-8	15-6	
51st TG Wing (AAF)												
C-47's	60-45	52-42	31-30	35-30	35-30	35-30	35-29	75-70	75-70	70-65	70-65	
68th Recon. Group (AAF)												
B-25's	7-4	7-4										
267 Sq. (RAF) ^d												
Dakotas	1-1	10-8	10-8	10-8	10-5	10-5	35-25	10-8				
674 Sq. (RAF)												
Halifaxes, Stirlings	18-17	17-17	11-6	17-8								
122d/885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)												
B-17's, B-24's	9-4	14-10	15-12	15-13	14-13	15-13	14-12	15-10	16-14	16-8	16-8	
869th Bomb Sq. (AAF)												
B-24's							15-6	15-10	16-13	16-12	16-12	
205 Group (RAF) ^e												
Wellingtons, Liberators												
44 Sq. (SAAF)												
Dakotas									10-8	10-5	10-9	

a. Compiled from Hq. IIAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 1-2, 5-13, in History, IIAAF, XII, XXXV.

b. Statistics for June and July 1944 relating to all units are not available.

c. Read as follows: 14-9 means 14 aircraft average strength, 9 aircraft average number serviceable.

d. The 267 Sq. figures for December 1944 include detachments of No. 216 Sq. (RAF) and of Nos. 44 and 28 Sqs. (SAAF).

e. No. 36 Wellington Sq. (RAF) flew a few sorties in August and December 1944.

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Appendix No. 5

STATIONS OF PRINCIPAL AAF UNITS MESSAGED IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, INTCA

Unit	Brindisi	Rosignano	Stations	Tarquinia	Miscellaneous stations ^b
60th TC Group					
10th TC Sq.	5 Apr-25 Oct 44				
11th TC Sq.	17 Mar-10 Oct 44				
13th TC Sq.	28 Mar-8 Oct 44				
28th TC Sq.	16 Mar-3 Oct 44				
62d TC Group					
4th TC Sq.	12 Feb-29 Mar 44			9 Jan-13 May 45	30 Sep 44-8 Jan 45 (Malignano)
7th TC Sq.	22 Oct-4 Dec 44			4 Dec 44-13 May 45	8 Dec 43-22 Feb 44 (Gloria del Colle)
8th TC Sq.				9 Jan 45-13 May 45	30 Sep 44-8 Jan 45 (Malignano)
51st TC Sq.	12 Feb-3 Apr 44				
	27 Oct 44-23 Mar 45			28 Mar-13 May 45	28 Sep-27 Oct 44 (Toggia)
64th TC Group					
16th TC Sq.	29 Mar-13 May 45			10 Jan-29 Mar 45	
17th TC Sq.				10 Jan-2 May 45	
18th TC Sq.				9 Jan-22 May 45	
35th TC Sq.				9 Jan-22 May 45	
2641st Sp. Gp.					
885th Bomb Sq.	2 Oct 44-20 Mar 45			20 Mar-20 May 45	
859th Bomb Sq.	15 Dec 44-20 Mar 45			20 Mar-20 May 45	

a. Compiled from unit histories, station lists, and war diaries.

b. The 122d Liaison Sq. was at Masicault, Tunisia from about 1 Nov. 43 to 4 Dec. 43, at Manduria from 5 Dec. 43 to 10 April 44. A detachment of 3 B-17's was at Blida from Feb. 44 to April 44.

c. The 122d Bomb Sq. moved from Blida to Liaison Blanche on 25 Aug. 44 and to Brindisi on 2 Oct. 44 as the 885th Bomb Sq.

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Appendix No. 6

OPERATIONAL CYCLE OF "CARPETBAGGER" MISSIONS¹

Following events at Harrington for thirty-six hours provides a good picture of the Carpetbagger operational process.

Targets Received and Plotted. This process begins at 1700 hours, at which time the Conference Room at Air Operations Headquarters, CSS, in London, via the scrambler telephone gives S-2 the list of approved targets for the following night. The targets are designated by names and numbers (e.g., "Meelwright 11," "Lixer 7") which refer to targets kept on file and described in detail on Air Transport Form #6. During the evening, S-2 plots these targets on a large operational map covering a wall of the office of the Deputy Group Commander. The map is in a scale of 1 to 500,000, or about ten miles to the inch. It shows topographical features, such as elevations, rivers and forests. Any areas where "Special Operations" flights are prohibited are clearly indicated on the map.

When a target is plotted, it is indicated by a tab pinned to the map. The comparative priority of the missions is shown by bits of colored paper attached to the pins. British or "Special Operations, Executive" targets proposed for the same night are also plotted with distinctive tabs.

Night's Targets Laid On. At about 0900 hours the following morning, the Station Weather Officer advises the Commanding Officer, or his Deputy, of weather conditions anticipated in the target areas, and at that time it is decided where it will be practicable to send Carpetbagger aircraft. Then the Commanding Officer, or his Deputy, selects the list of targets for the night, considering the priority of requests for material in the field, the reception record of the particular ground, the possibilities of enemy opposition, the distribution of desired missions and the availability of aircraft and crews. The list of selected missions is then telephoned to the London Conference Room by the Intelligence Officer and if London has no practical changes to suggest, the list is in effect for that night's operations.

Targets Assigned to Squadrons. At about 1100 hours, the Squadron Commanders are called in and meet before the map with the tabs pinpointing the targets for the night. Together, the squadron leaders select targets for their crews, balancing the difficult with the comparatively easy, the distant with the near, so that each squadron finally will have about the same work load. Any disagreement arising among the squadron commanders is decided by the toss of a coin; or, the Commanding Officer may be called upon to make the decision.

Navigators Receive Targets. At about 1200 hours, the navigators of the crews receive their targets from their Squadron Navigator, who has

1. History of the 857th Bomb Sq. (H), May 1944.

received his list from the Group Navigator, who has been advised of the targets by S-2.

In the meantime, S-2 officers have been gathering briefing data, and preparing maps and special instructions.

At 1500 hours, each crew navigator turns in a flight plan to his Squadron Navigator, who brings all his squadron flight plans to the Group Navigator. The flight plans and courses are checked by the Group and Squadron Navigators, and if necessary, changes are made. A take-off time schedule is made up by the Group Navigator, who is an assistant S-3. The take-off time schedule is posted and distributed to Squadron S-3's.

S-2 Briefs Crews. Also at about 1500 hours, S-2 officers begin meeting with officer-members of each crew. Crew maps are checked for location of the target (latitude, longitude and terrain features). The S-2 officers use large-scale maps, 1 to 500,000 or 1 to 80,000, to insure accuracy. Each crew is briefed separately by an S-2 Officer and has the opportunity to study the S-2 map and to compare it with their own map. Their maps are called target maps and are on a scale of 1 to 250,000 or about five miles to an inch.

Final Briefing. At 1630 hours, a final briefing session is held for all crew members. A weather officer displays the weather map and gives a complete explanation of conditions for each target area, stressing expectations en route and at the home base on the return flight. Weather predictions cover direction and velocity of winds, cloud conditions, icing conditions, the likelihood of rain, sleet or snow. Then, the Intelligence Officer gives any special information which may affect the crew. Next, the Deputy Commander gives general flying and dropping instructions, and finally the Group Navigator gives instructions on the route to be followed while over England and the point and altitude for crossing the English coast. He ends by giving the men a "time tick," on which all crew watches are synchronized.

During the afternoon, enlisted crew members are briefed as necessary. The crew navigator briefs them on the course, the type of reception signal, the code recognition letters for the target, and terrain features approaching and around the target. The radio operators are handed a radio "flimsy" just before take-off. The "flimsy" details all signal information including the code letters, the ground challenge and reply letter, and the colors of the day for flare signals over England, the navigational radio beacons, direction-finder stations in England, a list of the airdrome signals for England, and other navigational information, including the night's bomber code used in communication between bombers and home stations. If necessary, the Group Communications Officer briefs radio operators on special information.

The crew navigators plot their targets on the maps they will use on their mission, check the presence of flak from S-2 flak maps, select routes and check points en route to the target. The crew navigator does this under the direction of his Squadron Navigator, using the Intelligence Library as needed.

Dispatchers, when the aircraft carries special packages or personnel to be dropped, are briefed by the Group Armament Officer, who is the Chief Dispatcher for the Group.

Preparation for Take-Off. During the day, as they have an opportunity, crews give their aircraft a pre-flight inspection. A half-hour test flight is made with each aircraft scheduled for a mission, in order to test all the equipment.

Crews have a meal approximately two and a half hours before take-off time, and arrive at their crew rooms, located in Squadron Operations, about two hours before the take-off. The navigator then receives up-to-the-minute weather reports on a weather card, and turns in a revised flight plan and estimated time of arrival to the Squadron S-3. The pilot receives and distributes to his crew kits furnished by S-2 and containing rations of candy and chewing gum, flares, purses and emergency packets. The radio operator receives his "flimsy" and the navigator his "GEB" codes. It is now about forty-five minutes before take-off time, and the crew is driven out to where its L-24 is parked.

About three hours before the first scheduled take-off, Group Operations telephones the flight plans of all aircraft to the Movement Liaison Officer of the Aircraft Movement Control Section of the Air Defenses of Great Britain Command. This includes the "RF", which is the squadron letter and the aircraft letter for recognition, the times of crossing the English and enemy coasts, and the proposed landing times.

Loading the Aircraft. As soon as it is ready, the target list goes to the OSS Liaison Officer at Harrington, so that he can draw up a list of required containers and packages for which he arranges delivery to the airdrome. The containers are assigned to the Group Ordnance Officer, whose men deliver the containers, first snapping on the parachutes, to the aircraft where Armament Section men stand ready to load the containers into the aircraft.

The packages are delivered to the Armament Officer of the Group and are taken to the aircraft for loading. The OSS Liaison Officer and his men check each aircraft to insure that the proper load is in place.

Leaflets or "Nicksels" are handled by the Armament Section, who deliver them to the aircraft in bundles of 4,000, as received from the Uheddington warehouse of O.I./P.W.S., operating under the direction of SHARP. Usually, six to ten bundles of leaflets are loaded according to the stock on hand, the length of flight, the time over enemy territory. For new areas, not previously well covered by leaflets, more leaflets will be dispatched if possible. (No leaflets are dropped near targets, for security reasons. After leaving the target thirty to fifty miles behind, the dispatcher drops the leaflets on villages and towns passed over on the homeward flight.)

Personnel to be dropped are received at Harrington by the Armament Officer and are controlled by his section until loaded on the aircraft. Representatives from "Special Operations," London, escort all agents until they are loaded, supervise their dressing and assist in their briefing for the drop.

Take-Off. The aircraft are now ready for the night's missions. The crews warm up their aircraft and take off on schedule, proceeding individually to their targets. As each aircraft takes off, the Flying

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Control Section checks it out and reports the take-off to Group Operations, who telephones the information to the Movement Liaison Officer of the Air Defenses of Great Britain Command at Stanmore.

Interrogation of Crews. When an aircraft has completed its mission and returned to the home base, its crew are driven directly to the Intelligence Library for interrogation by S-2 officers.

The interrogation finds the crew showing the strain of a hard, dangerous mission which has lasted from five to eight hours. Free, frank interchange of information is encouraged. The S-2 officers handle the jumpy crew with a great deal of tact and flexibility. . . .

End of the Mission. After the interrogation, the crew go to the Mess Hall, where under the supervision of a medical officer, each man is given a two-ounce medicinal ration of whiskey. The man signs a receipt for his whiskey, which is issued for operational use only and serves to relax tense nerves.

Then the men get a good breakfast, including fresh eggs, and go to bed. If any man has trouble getting to sleep, he is supposed to ask the Medical Officer for a sedative.

The operational cycle ends as the men return to their billets for a well-deserved rest.

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Appendix No. 8

CARPETBAGGER OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES
 JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1944^a

	<u>France</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>Norway</u>	<u>Denmark</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Sorties attempted	2,297	185	8	24	2,514
Sorties successful	1,657	102	6	9	1,774
Personnel dropped	377	38			415
Containers dropped	19,194	1,192	72	104	20,562
Packages dropped	10,249	480	15		10,744
No. of aircraft lost	13	4		1	18

a. 493d Bomb Group (H), History of the CARPETBAGGER Project, III.

The figures in this table, supplied by the Office of Strategic Services, London, vary considerably from the totals given in Appendix 9, this study. The discrepancy probably lies in the fact that the OSS figures include a few sorties made after 16 September 1944 (the terminal date of CARPETBAGGER) and the 177 completed B-17 sorties flown by 3d Bomb Division, Eighth Air Force, to southern France on 25 June 1944.

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Appendix No. 9

SPECIAL OPERATIONS BY EIGHTH AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
JANUARY 1944-APRIL 1945

Month	Aircraft effort		Number of units delivered			Pigeon bumpers	Total tonnage ^b (approx)	A/C lost		Original		casual MIA
	Total sorties	Credit sorties	Per- sonnel	Con- tainers	Lf pkgs			Suo pkgs	MIA	Cat.	MIA	
1944												
Jan	18	18		96	144	20	19.1					
Feb	56	56		252	262	61	47.5					
Mar	67	63	6	432	485	181	66.4				25	
Apr	176	167	13	1,099	1,053	645	223.1				16	
May	222	210	43	1,503	1,332	814	301.9		2		34	
June	253	244	53	2,057	1,625	906	401.3		1		16	
July	592	575	100	5,103	1,594	3,122	953.2		2		38	
Aug	463	467	272	4,001	1,418	2,295	768.2		1		18	
Sep	453	441	396	3,710	43	2,416	705.0		2		8	
Oct	1	1					2.0					
Nov	1	1	1				.2					
Dec	4	3	2	36		7	1.1					
1945												
Jan	13	13	7	73		22	13.6					
Feb	46	46	13	198		58	32.7					
Mar	191	191	59	960		273	150.7				1	1
Apr	281	268	78	985		294	168.8				41	
TOTALS	2,857	2,764	1,043	20,495	7,956	11,174	3,889.8	25	8		197	11

- a. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945, p. 68.
- b. Short tons.
- c. One Jeep delivered.
- d. Leaflets delivered during this period weighed 210.9 short tons; supplies weighed 3,678.9 short tons.

Explanation of abbreviations: MIA--missing in action; Cat. B--Category B, planes damaged beyond economical repair while on an operational mission; KIA--killed in action; MIA, SER--seriously wounded in action; MIA, SLI--slightly wounded in action.

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Appendix No. 7

"CARPETBAGGER" OPERATIONS, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1944*

Month	801/492 Group Hq.				36/856 Bomb Sq.				850/857 Bomb Sq.				406/858 Bomb Sq.				788/859 Bomb Sq.							
	Sorties C	W/C	Cont	Loads	Sorties C	W/C	Cont	Loads	Sorties C	W/C	Cont	Loads	Sorties C	W/C	Cont	Loads	Sorties C	W/C	Cont	Loads				
Jan	1	1	12	2	2	4	24	8	16	5	9	18	4	48	8	32	19	26	19	324	143	282		
Feb	1	1	12	2	11	16	132	30	75	9	18	90	18	180	18	72	26	34	40	1160	704	303		
March	2	2	24	4	19	11	228	82	157	19	18	240	109	126	4	16	19	26	40	1160	704	303		
April	2	2	24	4	30	16	360	226	378	28	23	324	213	396	19	74	109	14	41	1288	767	601		
May	1	1	19	2	29	14	1137	645	390	55	42	1118	616	392	26	104	26	34	40	1160	704	303		
June	2	2	24	4	79	29	925	463	863	78	33	928	495	823	19	74	26	34	40	1160	704	303		
July	1	1	14	2	41	1059	673	297	492	67	67	771	411	260	50	70	70	23	810	504	13	50		
Aug	3	3	36	6	52	12	687	378	299	29	79	627	291	190	159	426	214	5490	3166	2454	159	303		
Sep	1	1	11	2	15	15	667	419	299	29	79	627	291	190	159	426	214	5490	3166	2454	159	303		
TOTALS	15	15	151	30	177	394	1885	5219	2924	2435	140	313	97	3114	2233	1059	169	426	214	5490	3166	2454	159	303

Monthly Totals

Month	Sorties			Loads		
	C	W/C	Cont	Pack	Nick	Joels
Jan	8	9	84	18	56	6
Feb	21	35	234	49	140	6
March	40	29	492	200	293	6
April	60	39	708	455	790	6
May	113	87	2274	1271	796	40
June	207	97	2465	1216	2222	64
July	397	146	4680	2909	1378	62
Aug	337	101	4026	2271	1573	227
Sep	268	86	3193	2128	13	212
GRAND TOTAL	1451	629	18156	10517	7261	617

Legend:

- C--Completed mission, 1 plane
- N/C--Uncompleted mission, 1 plane
- Cont--Containers dropped
- Pack--Packages dropped
- Nick--Packages of Nickels dropped, 4,000 nickels per package
- Joels--Personnel dropped
- Gross weight of containers, about 330 lbs.
- Net weight of container load, about 220 lbs.

* Compiled from tables in 492d Bomb Group (H), History of the CARPETBAGGER Project, III. Note the discrepancies between these statistics and those given in Appendix No. 9, this study.

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Appendix No. 10

SPECIAL OPERATIONS, 51st TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
FEBRUARY-MARCH 1944^a

Date	Operation	Country	No. of sorties		Poundage		No. of Joes dropped
			Successful	Failed	Net	Gross	
22/23 Feb	Nickelag	Yugoslavia	1		N 4,500 ^b	N 4,500	
23 Feb	Manhole	"	3		23,800	24,990 ^c	
24/25 Feb	Savanna	"		3	N 315	N 315	
2/3 Mar	Bovington	Greece		2			
2/3 Mar	Kinbrace	"		1			
3/4 Mar	Bovington	"	2		6,212	9,042	
3/4 Mar	Kinbrace	"		1			
3/4 Mar	Mortlake	Yugoslavia	1	1	3,084	4,079	
3/4 Mar	Boodle (P)	Greece	4	1	11,865	17,195	
3/4 Mar	Boodle (A)	"	1		2,956	4,231	
3/4 Mar	Sculptor	Albania	2		5,715	8,625	
7/8 Mar	Buckram (A)	Greece	4		12,661	17,416	
7/8 Mar	Buckram (P)	"		7			
7/8 Mar	Sorealis	"		1			
13/14 Mar	Cow	Italy	1/3		2,115	2,490	7
13/14 Mar	Eel	"		1/3			
13/14 Mar	Gardenia	"		1/3			
13/14 Mar	Stables	Albania		1			
13/14 Mar	Ballinclair	Yugoslavia	1	4	3,195	4,480	
13/14 Mar	Paperclip	"		1			
13/14 Mar	Fungus	"	1		1,500	1,995	1
13/14 Mar	A 80	Italy		1			
15/16 Mar	Paperclip	Yugoslavia		1			
15/16 Mar	Monkeywrench	"	2		5,991	8,656	
15/16 Mar	Ballinclair	"		4			
15/16 Mar	A 80	Italy		1/2			
15/16 Mar	A 71	"		1/2			
16/17 Mar	Stables	Albania	1		2,988	4,518	
16/17 Mar	Monkeywrench	Yugoslavia		1			
16/17 Mar	Ballinclair	"		4			
16/17 Mar	Intanglement	"	1		3,026	4,197	
16/17 Mar	Paperclip	"	1		2,787	3,945	
16/17 Mar	Enamel	"		2			
17/18 Mar	Kearney	Greece	2	1/2	6,065	8,625	
17/18 Mar	Pirate	"		1/2			
17/18 Mar	Athenium	"	1		3,131	4,486	
17/18 Mar	Koricani	Yugoslavia		1			
17/18 Mar	Savanna	"		3			
17/18 Mar	Monkeywrench	"	1		2,557	3,972	
18/19 Mar	Kearney	Greece	4-1/2		15,019	19,550	

- a. Adapted from tables annexed to 51st Troop Carrier Sq., War Diary, March 1944.
- b. N--Nickels (propaganda leaflets).
- c. Includes 3 gliders carrying 28 personnel.

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Date	Operation	Country	No. of sorties		Poundage		No. of Joes dropped
			Successful	Failed	Net	Gross	
18/19 Mar	Pirate	Greece		1/2			
19/20 Mar	Swifter	Yugoslavia	2		5,906	8,896	
19/20 Mar	Savanna	"	3		9,610	13,430	
19/20 Mar	Slender	Albania		1			
22/23 Mar	Koricani	Yugoslavia		2			
22/23 Mar	Savanna	"		1			
22/23 Mar	Nickeling	"		1			
24/25 Mar	Savanna	"		4			
28/29 Mar	Nickeling	Bulgaria	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>2,000</u>	
TOTALS			40-	52/	135,598	181,633	8

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Appendix No. 11

SPECIAL OPERATIONS, 11th TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
1-30 JUNE 1944^a

Date	Operation	Country	No. of sorties		Net poundage	No. of Joes dropped/landed	Misc.
			Successful	Failed			
1/2	Renovation	Greece	2		5,837		
	Boodle	"	2		5,766	1	
	Shepshed	"	1		2,964		
	Hymn	Italy	1		2,840		
	Skyscraper	Greece	1		2,552		
2/3	Maple	Italy	1		1,415	8	
	Rowena	Yugoslavia	2	1	6,425		
	Ballinclay	"	2		6,010		
	Homage	"	2		7,697		
3/4	Savanna	"	1		2,970		
	Tingewick	Greece	1		3,265		
	Toffee	Yugoslavia	2	1	6,290		
	Rowena	"	1	2	3,725		
	Picadilly News	"	1		4,067		20 evac.
4/5	Primus	Albania	1		2,873		
	Ballinclay	Yugoslavia		1			
	Savanna	"	3	2	11,200		
	Picadilly Grill	"	2		5,860		53 "
	Ballinclay	"	1		3,480		
5/6	Sculptor	Greece		1			
	Toffee	Yugoslavia	3		8,390		
	Picadilly Grill	"	2		5,860		.55 "
	Picadilly News	"	1		4,079		26 "
	Boodle	Greece	1		3,295		
6/7	Primus	Albania		1			
	Earthenware	Yugoslavia	5	1	15,235		
	Mortlake	Greece	2		6,060		
	Kirkstone	"	1		2,995		
7/8	Earthenware	Yugoslavia	5		15,725		
	Picadilly News	"	1		1,300	16	9 "
	Shore	Italy	1		2,788		
	Soapsud	Yugoslavia	1		3,070		
	Shepshed	Greece	1		3,108		
	Conserve	Yugoslavia		1			
8/9	Fungus	"	3		9,000		
	Rio Van Winkle	"	2		6,060		
	Picadilly Light	"	1		3,570		31 Allie evac.
9/10	Rowena	"	4		14,155		
	Ballinclay	"	2		6,640		
	Fungus	"	1		3,565		

a. History, 11th Troop Carrier Sq., June 1944, Combat Missions.

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Date	Operation	Country	No. of sorties		Net poundage	No. of Joes dropped/ landed	Misc.
			Successful	Failed			
9/10	Vaudeville	Greece	1		2,896		
contd.	Buckram	"		1			
10/11	Ballinclair	Yugoslavia	3		10,725		
	Rowena	"	2		6,932		
	Buckram	Greece		1		1	
	Fungus	Yugoslavia	1		2,295	4	
	Rakeoff	"	1		5,040		
12/13	Rowena	"		6			
	Ballinclair (15)	"	1	1	3,189		
	Shore	Italy	1		2,803		
	Balliol	Albania		1			
13/14	Rowena	Yugoslavia	6		21,465		
	Slender	"	2		6,036		
14/15	Picadilly Mews	"	2		8,127		45 Allies evac.
	Relator	"	2		6,972		
	Ballinclair	"	1		3,095	4	
	Geisna	"		1			
	Icarus	"		1			
15/16	Relator	"	3		10,170		
	Picadilly Lights	"	1		4,073		22 evac.
	Picadilly Mews	"		1			
	Cooperation	Albania		1			
	Icarus	Yugoslavia	1		3,009		
	Burlesque	"		1			
16/17	Picadilly Mews	"	2		8,134	5	47 "
	Relator	"		3			
	Toffee	"	1		3,596		
20/21	Gilgal	"	2		6,311		
	Decima	"		2			
	Ashill	Italy	1		2,880		
	Picadilly Mews	Yugoslavia	1		4,100		25 "
	Savanna	"	1		3,324		
	Sculptor	Albania	1		2,883		
21/22	Relator	Yugoslavia		4			
	Picadilly Mews	"	2		8,179		50 "
	Rakeoff	"	2	1	8,100		
	Geisha	"		2			
22/23	Relator	"	2	1	6,715		
	Rakeoff	"	2		8,132		
	Picadilly Mews	"	1		4,100		
	Gargantuan	"	1		3,631		
	Cloister	Italy	1		3,033		
	Toffee	Yugoslavia		1			
	Sculptor	Greece	1		3,334		
23/24	Renovation	"	5		14,192		
	Picadilly Mews	Yugoslavia	2		8,192		

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App. 11 (Contd)

Date	Operation	Country	No. of sorties		Net poundage	No. of Joes dropped/ landed	Misc.
			Successful	Failed			
25/26	Relator	Yugoslavia	6		20,175		
	Picadilly News	"	1		4,100		22 evac.
	Fettes	"		1			
	Carpenter	Greece	1		1,242	3	
	Brasenose	Yugoslavia	1		3,007		
26/27	Flotsam	"		1			
	Picadilly News	"	4		16,250		75 evac.
	Flotsam	"		2			(50 Allies (25 Ital.
	Gilgal	"	2		7,659		
	Flotsam	"	1	1	1,917	2	
27/28	Fettes	"		1			
	Relator	"	6		22,070		
	Toffee	"	3		9,905		
29/30	Picadilly News	"	3		12,060		
	Toffee	"	6		20,531		
	Gilgal	"	5		18,616		
30/1	Ballinclair	"	1		3,640		
	Relator	"	4		13,299		
	Brasenose	"	2		7,080		
	Gilgal	"	2		8,108		
	Ballinclair	"		2			
	Picadilly Lights	"		2			
Picadilly News	"	1		4,026		16 evac.	
Marshmallow	"	1		4,065		20 "	
TOTALS			170	50	571,544	44	516

SUMMARY

Country	No. of sorties ^a		Net poundage delivered	Personnel infiltrated	Personnel evacuated
	Successful	Failed			
Yugoslavia	142	44	492,523	31	516
Greece	20	3	57,506	5	0
Albania	2	3	5,756	0	0
Italy	6	0	15,759	8	0
TOTALS	170	50	571,544	44	516

a. Although 22.7% of the sorties flown are listed as having failed, nearly every sortie dropped nickels even though supplies often were returned to base. During this period, the 11th Troop Carrier Squadron flew no exclusively nickeling missions; but each plane generally carried at least 150 lbs. of nickels to be dropped over Balkan targets.

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Appendix No. 12

SUPPLY OF BALKAN PARTISANS BY THE 60th TROOP CARRIER GROUP
1 APRIL to 17 OCTOBER 1944^a

	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Sorties flown	445	852	943	819
Sorties successful	256	543	734	598
Sorties incomplete	189	304	209	221
Successful landings	13	50	125	194
Gross tons delivered	592.3	1,220.3	1,612.3	1,311.3
Net tons delivered ^b	380.8	852.5	1,227.2	1,040.5
Tons of nickels	68.7	56.9	67.4	56.8
Persons infiltrated	49	136	117	100
Persons evacuated	98	1,061	1,902	2,408
Freight out (tons)		5.6	2.6	15.8

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>1-17 October</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Sorties flown	770	568	190	4,587
Sorties successful	567	424	180	3,307
Sorties incomplete	203	144	10	1,280
Successful landings	145	128	81	741
Gross tons delivered	1,160.8	884.4	341.5 ^c	7,124.9
Net tons delivered ^b	847.2	676.2	99.2	5,124.2
Tons of nickels	57.1	45.0	9.9	361.8
Persons infiltrated	203	332	1,739	2,576
Persons evacuated	2,193	1,582	78	9,322
Freight out (tons)	8.7	5.9		38.6

Causes of Incomplete Sorties

Weather	661
Wrong signal or no reception	496
Mechanical failure	58
Navigational error	41
Combat losses	7
Enemy action	20
Miscellaneous	7

- a. Compiled from Citation, 60th Troop Carrier Group, Tab E, and Twelfth Air Force Troop Carrier Operations 1944, p. 33. Tons used in this table are short tons (2,000 lbs.).
- b. Figures following "Net tons delivered" refer only to supplies.
- c. The seemingly large difference between gross and net tons delivered in October is accounted for by dropping and landing of British troops in Greece. The weight of these troops is included in gross tons but not in net tons.

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Appendix No. 13

SPECIAL OPERATIONS, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, SEPTEMBER 1944^a

Unit & Sorties Base	A/B SUC		Successful Operations ^b				Yugo- slavia (924)	Bul- garia (12)	France (Max) ^c	Poland (Max) ^c	Hungary (40)	Crete Num's (2)	Czech Num's (4)	Austr Num's (2)	Totals (12374)		
	WA ^d	OSS No. 1	SOE/OSS	ISSU-6 & 6th B	ISLD	FWB											
148 Sq.	80	43 1/2	3	10	13	23	4	14									
Brindisi									36.40							79.56	
1586 Flt.	42	25 1/2	1	4	9	10	6	2	16.36							46.19	
Brindisi																	
IAF	120	79				79										110.62	
Lecce																	
51 TOW	559	415 1/2	3	24		416		8	13	84.36	68.0	440.93	6.59		1.15	601.03	
Brindisi																	
205 Gp.	16	9						9								11.59	
Foggia																	
267 Sq.	134	96	6	9	13	95		6		39.56	3.71	86.69					
Bari																	
Lysander																	
Brindisi	2	0															
524 Sq.	16	15					16									31.40	
Blida																	
885 Sq.	181	129		7	59	69		1		115.32	138.47					253.79	
Blida																	
Russ. Air	144	120															
Gp. Bari	1294	936 1/2	13	54	94	120		31	13	124.82	72.02	160.86	6.59	199.85	169.87	22.89	
TOTALS																	161.76
																	5.50
																	146.13

a. Adapted from Hq. MAAF, Monthly Report No. 6, Special Operations During September 1944, in MAAF History, LXXV.
 b. Under Successful Operations are shown the sorties flown successfully at the request of the agencies thereunder listed.
 c. A maximum tonnage was set for the target; no set figure was given.
 Explanation of abbreviations:
 Numbers in parentheses under names of countries indicate target tonnage in net British tons
 A/B--Sorties attempted; SUC--Sorties successful; WA--RAF Force; SOE--Special Operations Executive;
 OSS--Office of Strategic Services; No. 1--No. 1 Force; 399--Force 399; ISSU-6--Inter-Service Signals Unit-6;
 ISLD--Inter-Service Liaison Detachment; FWB--Psychological Warfare Branch; IAF--Italian Air Force.

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Appendix No. 14

SUPPLY DELIVERIES TO YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA,
OCTOBER 1944-APRIL 1945^a
(In net long tons)

	October		November		December		January	
	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.
51st TG Wing	37.67	39.28	212.39	37.39	24.54	101.57	81.33	11.09
859th Bomb Sq.					11.68		102.52	
855th Bomb Sq.	3.61	75.18	204.86	23.98	63.20		35.59	
No. 148 Sq.	80.89	90.73	146.85	62.96	113.02		141.52	
No. 267 Sq.	27.72		82.42	7.56	16.82		34.36	1.34
205 Bomb Gp.	175.32		503.37		312.47		289.35	
No. 1536 Polish Flt 301 Sq.	10.17	4.30			4.13			
Italian Air Force	19.78	24.97	82.09		60.11		41.67	2.01
Russian Air Group	116.82		75.2		8.35			
TOTALS	471.93	234.46	1,306.98	126.89	614.32	101.57	706.24	14.44

	February		March		April		Totals	
	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.	Yugo.	Alb.
51st TG Wing	193.67	1.85	246.22		309.37		1,104.99	181.18
859th Bomb Sq.	212.37		279.56				606.13	
855th Bomb Sq.	53.83		6.89				367.98	104.06
No. 148 Sq.	332.53		308.36		300.16		1,423.31	153.69
No. 267 Sq.							161.32	8.90
205 Bomb Gp.	368.04		77.03				1,705.58	
No. 44 Sq. (SAAF)	85.66	3.82	111.09		255.65		452.40	3.82
No. 1536 Polish Flt 301 Sq.	48.02						62.32	4.30
Italian Air Force	148.0	6.03	156.91	8.03	109.31	4.62	617.85	45.66
Russian Air Group							200.37	
TOTALS	1,442.12	11.70	1,186.06	8.03	974.49	4.62	6,702.25	501.61

a. Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 7-13, in History, MAAF, XXV.

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Appendix No. 15

A. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO YUGOSLAVIA, 1943-1945
(Weight in long tons--2,200 lbs.)

Unit	Dropping Missions		Landing Missions		Combined gross tonnage
	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	No. of sorties dropped	No. of successful sorties delivered	
51st TG Wing (AAF)	3,249	2,283	1,058	846	6,352
206 Group (RAF)	2,020	1,707	3,054		3,054
148 Squadron (RAF)	1,568	845	2,450		2,450
Italian Air Force	1,098	791	1,007		1,007
Russian Air Group	390	315	630	198	1,026
267 Squadron (RAF)	366	352	504	380	1,064
301 Polish Squadron	251	201	505		505
44 Squadron (SAAF)	237	232	464	140	744
624 Squadron (RAF)	69	34	84		84
Lysander Flight (RAF)	25	5			
TOTALS	9,373	6,665	12,264	1,068	15,186

a. History of Special Operations (Air), in the Mediterranean Theater, pp. 15-16. Statistics given in this table for the 2641 Special Group (AAF) are unreliable and therefore have been omitted here. The 855 Bomb Squadron of this group dropped 806.13 net long tons and the 885 Bomb Squadron dropped 367.98 net long tons over Yugoslavia.

App. 15 (Contd)

3. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO GREECE, 1942-1944
(weight in long tons--2,200 lbs.)

Unit	Dropping Missions			Landing Missions			Combined Gross tonnage
	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage delivered	
148 Squadron (RAF)	591	415	1,245	62	57	114	1,245
51st TG Wing (AAF)	573	310	620			244	734
267 Squadron (RAF)	81	52	104	140	122		348
Italian Air Force	38	34	68				68
885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	36	35	87				87
301 Polish Squadron	12	8	20				20
7 Squadron (RAF)	3	3	C				6
Transfer Flight (RAF)	16	7					
TOTALS	1,150	864	2,150	202	179	358	3,508

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 32. During the so-called Civil War period, when British troops were fighting the MMS Greeks, supply of British troops was carried on by both British and American squadrons. The 205 Group (RAF), No. 267 Squadron, No. 38 Squadron, and No. 14C Squadron flew 722 sorties in December 1944 and January 1945. They delivered 1,700 long tons (gross) of supplies and carried about 3,600 personnel into Greece.

App. 15 (Contd)
 0. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO ALBANIA, 1943-1944
 (Weight in long tons--2,200 lbs.)

Unit	Dropping Missions		Gross tonnage dropped	No. of sorties	Landing Missions		Combined gross tonnage
	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties			No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped	
51st TC Wing (AAF)	378	301	502	87	86	173	774
148 Squadron (RAF)	95	80	230				230
885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	57	56	140				140
Italian Air Force	21	15	20				20
38 Squadron (RAF)	10	10	20				20
Lysander Flight (RAF)	10	8	16				16
267 Squadron (RAF)	8	8	5				5
301 Polish Squadron	2	2	2				2
44 Squadron (SAAF)	1	1		4	4	8	10
TOTALS	582	481	1,035	91	90	180	1,205

2. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, pp. 36-37.
 A total of 134 personnel were parachuted into Albania by No. 148 Squadron (RAF), No. 301 Polish Squadron, and the 835th Bomb Squadron (AAF). Landing operations by the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, Co. 44 Squadron (SAAF), and the Lysander Flight (RAF) delivered 201 persons and evacuated 502.

App. 15 (Contd)

D. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO SOUTHERN FRANCE, 1943-1944
(Weight in long tons--2,300 lbs.)

Unit	Dropping Missions		Gross tonnage dropped	Personnel Statistics		
	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties		Dropped	Landed	Evacuated
624 Squadron (RAF)	926	536	1,410.5	380		
885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	735	568	1,546.7	198		
36 Squadron (RAF)	41	26	20.9			
267 Squadron (RAF)	2	1			13	21
Lysander Flight (RAF)	10	8			18	13
TOTALS	1,714	1,129	2,978.1	578	51	34

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 45.

a. SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO ITALY, 1943-1944
(Weight in long tons--2,300 lbs.)

Unit	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped
51st TG Wing (AAF)	1,933	1,261	2,523
2641st Sq. Co. (AAF)	1,020	599	1,486
148 Squadron (RAF)	497	299	897
501 Polish Squadron	305	173	490
267 Squadron (RAF)	251	129	258
205 Group (RAF)	210	156	250
624 Squadron (RAF)	42	29	4
TOTALS	4,268	2,646	5,907

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 65.
The Lysander Flight flew 12 sorties, of which 8 were successful in bringing out 24 personnel. Aircraft of the 2641st Special Group, Nos. 148 and 624 Squadrons (AAF), and No. 501 Polish Squadron parachuted 538 personnel into enemy-occupied Italy.

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App. 15 (Contd)

F. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO BULGARIA, 1943-1944^a
(Weight in long tons--3,200 lbs.)

Unit	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped	No. of personnel dropped
51st TO Wing (AAF)	128	68	125	
148 Squadron (RAF)	25	17	48	14
267 Squadron (RAF)	19	16	32	
301 Polish Squadron	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>8</u>
TOTALS	183	107	218	22

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 73.

G. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1943-1945^a
(Weight in long tons--3,200 lbs.)

Unit	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped	No. of personnel dropped
148 Squadron (RAF)	37	14	12.5	25
885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	30	3	8.5	
301 Polish Squadron	26	12	9	17
859th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	21	10	23.38	
634 Squadron (RAF)	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>		
TOTALS	118	49	58.38	42

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 77. The April History, 2641st Special Group, states that the 859th and 885th Bomb Squadrons attempted 56 sorties to Czechoslovakia and completed 12.

H. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO AUSTRIA, 1944-1945^a
(Weight in long tons, 2,300 lbs.)

Unit	No. of sorties	No. of successful sorties	Gross tonnage dropped	No. of personnel dropped
148 Squadron (RAF)	31	16	5	32
885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	19	13	17	21
859th Bomb Sq. (AAF)	18	9	14	12
301 Polish Squadron	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTALS	74	43	40.8	76

a. History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theater, p. 81.

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App. 15 (Contd)

I. SUMMARY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER
(Weight in long tons--2,200 lbs.)

Country	Total sorties	Successful sorties	Gross tons delivered	Personnel dropped	Personnel landed	Personnel exfiltrated	PJB Leaflets in tons
Yugoslavia	11,632	8,640	16,469	--	2,500 ^b	19,000	536
Greece	2,064	1,714	4,205	85	300	600	106
Albania	673	572	1,205	134	201	502	74
Corsica	89	79	140	2	--	--	4
S. France	1,715	1,139	2,378	578	31	34	98
Poland	619	389	501	132	12	13	200
Italy	4,280	3,653	5,507	538	--	--	169
Hungary	28	14	16	14	--	--	11
Rumania	9	4	2	6	--	--	10
Bulgaria	183	107	218	22	--	--	--
Czechoslovakia	114	39	53	42	--	--	11
Austria	74	43	40.8	76	--	--	10
Crete	31	20	39	10	--	--	--
TOTALS	21,509	15,302	31,678.8	1,639	3,044	20,149	1,229

a. AHEAD G-3 Operations Sec., Special Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Sec. XVI, App. A.

b. Records are not available to distinguish between personnel dropped and personnel landed in Yugoslavia; it is known, however, that comparatively few were parachuted because of the large number of landing strips in operation.

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Appendix No. 16

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO ITALY, AUGUST 1944-APRIL 1945^a

Month	Units	Sorties		Personnel		Net long tons
		Attempted	Successful	In	Out	
Aug 44	148 Sq. (RAF)					63.22
	1586 Polish Flight					7.69
	267 Sq. (RAF)					<u>87.60</u>
	TOTALS	183	92	65		158.51
Sep 44	148 Sq. (RAF)					36.40
	1586 Polish Flight					16.36
	267 Sq. (RAF)					31.77
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					<u>115.32</u>
TOTALS	186	110	33		199.85	
Oct 44	148 Sq. (RAF)					6.89
	1586 Polish Flight					6.19
	51st FG Wing (AAF)					3.12
	Lysander Flight (RAF)					.22
	205 Group (RAF)					3.97
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					<u>52.98</u>
TOTALS	131	44 $\frac{1}{2}$	13	3	73.37	
Nov 44	148 Sq. (RAF)					40.97
	301 Polish Sq.					58.85
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					34.51
	205 Group (RAF)					127.25
	51st FG Wing (AAF)					<u>24.07</u>
TOTALS	527	225	35	3	265.65	
Dec 44	148 Sq. (RAF)					28.12
	301 Polish Sq.					35.82
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					72.36
	359th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					4.08
	51st FG Wing (AAF)					<u>300.12</u>
TOTALS	501	284	61	1	440.50	
Jan 45	148 Sq. (RAF)					2.34
	301 Polish Sq.					6.16
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					42.55
	359th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					35.23
	51st FG Wing (AAF)					<u>175.62</u>
TOTALS	320	163	21		261.95	

a. Compiled from Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports Nos. 5-13, in History MAAF, XXXV.

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App. 16 (Contd)

Month	Units	sorties		personnel		net long tons
		Attempted	Successful	In	Out	
Feb 45	148 Sq. (RAF)					.24
	301 Polish Sq.					21.59
	859th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					169.28
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					235.61
	51st TG Wing (AAF)					<u>291.73</u>
	TOTALS	676	403 $\frac{1}{2}$	50		718.45
Mar 45	148 Sq. (RAF)					.59
	Lysander Flight					.60
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					200.47
	859th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					2.12
	51st TG Wing (AAF)					<u>485.33</u>
	TOTALS	537	409	154	5	689.11
Apr 45	148 Sq. (RAF)					11.02
	885th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					206.52
	859th Bomb Sq. (AAF)					252.50
	51st TG Wing (AAF)					<u>340.42</u>
	TOTALS	<u>656</u>	<u>468$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>810.46</u>
	GRAND TOTALS	3,517	2,199 $\frac{1}{2}$	662	53	3,617.85

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Appendix No. 17

A WEEK'S LEAFLET-DROPPING ACTIVITIES, EIGHTH AIR FORCE
19-25 FEBRUARY 1945^a

A. DAYLIGHT DISTRIBUTION BY EIGHTH AIR FORCE HEAVY BOMBERS

Target	Dates	No. of leaflet bombs	No. of leaflets dropped
Ansbach	22, 23 Feb	24	480,000
Aschaffenburg	23	19	190,000
Bamberg	23	9	150,000
Bielefeld	24	9	120,000
Bochum	19	10	800,000
Bremen	24	27	780,000
Crailsheim	23	9	220,000
Dortmund	19	10	410,000
Eschwege	23	10	450,000
Gelsenkirchen	19	20	820,000
Gera	23	9	160,000
Giebelstadt	25	5	200,000
Halberstadt	23	10	190,000
Hannburg	24	37	550,000
Hilbersheim	23	10	340,000
Hildburghausen	23	9	120,000
Jugenthal	19	10	450,000
Kaufbeuren	25	7	280,000
Kitzingen	23	7	130,000
Ludwigslust	23	10	300,000
Meschede	19	10	380,000
Misburg	24	10	310,000
Munich	25	35	620,000
Neuburg	25	9	190,000
Northem	23	9	190,000
Nürnberg	20, 21	174	6,200,000
Osnabrück	19, 21	29	1,250,000
Paderborn	23	19	730,000
Plauen	23	8	80,000
Plainfeld	23	9	150,000
Rheims	19	10	450,000
Salzvedel	23	9	210,000
Siegen	19	20	1,200,000
Stendal	23	9	210,000
Swabish Hall	25	5	200,000
Treuchtlingen	23	9	120,000
Ulm	23	4	280,000
Ulzen	22	10	160,000
Wesel	19	8	640,000
TOTALS		657	21,330,000

a. P.O. Chief, "Leaflet Distribution for the Eighth Air Force and 406th Squadron for the Period 19 February through 25 February, 1945," 26 February 1945.

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3. NIGHT DISTRIBUTION BY THE 406th BOMB SQUADRON

Army Sector	No. of leaflet bombs	No. of leaflets dropped
Dutch Interior	60	1,300,000
First Canadian Army	40	1,450,000
Fifth U. S. Army	104	4,310,000
First U. S. Army	134	5,590,000
Third U. S. Army	112	4,760,000
Seventh U. S. Army	<u>63</u>	<u>2,250,000</u>
TOTALS	529	20,040,000
GRAND TOTALS	1,186	41,480,000

Note: The Eighth Air Force daylight operations to 69 targets were accomplished on seven missions; the 406th Bomb Squadron flew four missions of 46 sorties. Approximately 80,000 single leaflets, 10,000 copies of Nachrichten, or 20,000 copies of De Vliegende Hollander could be loaded in each leaflet bomb.

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Appendix No. 18

EXAMPLE OF LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION ON REGULAR BOMBING MISSIONS
LEAFLET DISTRIBUTION, BERLIN, BY EIGHTH AIR FORCE^a

<u>Code No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of bombs</u>	<u>No. of leaflets</u>
USG.47	Sternenbanner	6 Aug 44	5	100,000
XG.17	The Game is Up	"	5	300,000
XG.19	Foreign Workers (French)	"	5	400,000
XG.20	Foreign Workers (Polish)	"	5	400,000
T.170	Nachrichten	6 Oct 44	10	120,000
T.171	Nachrichten	"	10	120,000
WG.9	Message to German Women	"	5	400,000
ZG.66	General Eisenhower's Statement	"	5	400,000
WG.2F	Foreign Workers Booklet (French)	"	5	40,000
WG.6P	Foreign Workers Leaflet (Polish)	"	5	400,000
T.229	Nachrichten	5 Dec 44	5	50,000
T.231	Nachrichten	"	10	100,000
T.232	Nachrichten	"	20	200,000
ZG.66	General Eisenhower's Statement	"	5	400,000
WG.17B	The Lesson of Aachen	"	5	400,000
WG.22I	Voice of SHAEF (Italian)	"	5	400,000
T.291	Nachrichten	3 Feb 45	20	200,000
T.292	Nachrichten	"	20	200,000
ZG.98	The Last Attempt	"	10	800,000
ZG.95	A Last Attempt	"	5	400,000
ZG.75	Ask the Front-Line Soldier	"	4	320,000
ZG.97	What Capitulation Means	"	5	400,000
WG.21	Civilian Safe Conduct	"	5	400,000
WG.27	Volkssturm in Battle	"	5	400,000
WG.28	Eisenhower Against Himmler	"	5	400,000
T.312	Nachrichten	26 Feb 45	19	190,000
T.313	Nachrichten	"	43	430,000
T.314	Nachrichten	"	13	130,000
WG.28	Eisenhower Against Himmler	"	4	320,000
WG.34	Message to Railway Workers	"	5	400,000
WG.35	Roosevelt-Churchill Statement	"	4	160,000
WG.37	Crimea Declaration	"	7	280,000
BG.151	The Bridge	"	4	160,000
T.331	Nachrichten	18 Mar 45	11	110,000
T.333	Nachrichten	"	30	300,000
T.334	Nachrichten	"	32	320,000
T.335	Nachrichten	"	19	190,000
WG.25	Report from Western Germany	"	8	640,000
WG.34	Message to Railway Workers	"	5	400,000
WG.42	The Future of Germany	"	5	200,000
WG.43	Three Tons of Explosives	"	10	800,000
T.341	Nachrichten	28 Mar 45	5	50,000

a. PWD SHAEF, "Leaflet Operations, Western European Theater," Exhibit 8. There were 43 different leaflets.

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<u>Code No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of bombs</u>	<u>No. of leaflets</u>
T.344	Nachrichten	28 Mar 45	5	50,000
T.345	Nachrichten	"	15	150,000
WG.45	Two Questions--One Decision	"	3	120,000
BG.152	The Bridge	"	<u>2</u>	<u>80,000</u>
TOTALS			438	13,230,000

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Appendix No. 19

TONS OF LEAFLETS DROPPED BY ALL EIGHTH AIR FORCE UNITS
BY MONTHS, OCTOBER 1943-MAY 1945 a

Month	Units on bombing missions	422d/406th Bomb Sq. b	Units on CARPETBAGGER missions c	Monthly totals all units
<u>1943</u>				
Oct		24.4		24.4
Nov		100.8		100.8
Dec	3.3	112.1		115.4
<u>1944</u>				
Jan	27.6	118.6	3.8	150.0
Feb	37.4	131.6	6.9	175.9
March	99.1	146.3	12.9	258.3
April	74.8	134.9	27.9	237.6
May	123.5	102.4	35.3	261.2
June	73.1	209.6	43.1	325.8
July	53.6	216.1	42.3	312.0
Aug	87.8	203.1	37.6	328.5
Sep	152.8	180.4	1.1	334.3
Oct	165.8	240.5		406.3
Nov	151.1	315.3		466.4
Dec	138.1	261.6		399.7
<u>1945</u>				
Jan	165.8	182.0		347.8
Feb	196.6	276.3		472.9
March	247.0	407.9		654.9
April	186.8	370.5		557.3
May	<u>102.4</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>102.4</u>
TOTALS	2,086.6	3,734.4	210.9	6,031.9

- a. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945, pp. 18-21.
- b. In May 1945, the 406th Bomb Squadron flew 4 missions of 30 sorties over 56 targets and dropped 354 leaflet bombs, or about 28,320,000 leaflets, on combat missions which ended on 9 May. After V-E Day, the 406th flew 18 noncombat missions of 141 sorties over 96 targets and dropped 1,549 new-type parachute bombs. (History, 406th Bomb Sq., May 1945.)
- c. Statistics for CARPETBAGGER missions were obtained by subtracting the totals of the bombing units and the 406th Bomb Squadron from the monthly totals.

Appendix No. 20

LEAFLET OPERATIONS OF THE SPECIAL LEAFLET SQUADRON, OCTOBER 1943-APRIL 1945^a

Month	No. of night ops.	Total sorties ^b	Aircraft Credit sorties ^c	Effect. sorties ^d	Leaflets dropped		A/C lost			ORIG. casualties		Claims	
					Short tons	Number	MIA	Cat.	KIA	MIA	WIA		SER
1943													
Oct	4	15	15	15	24.4	9,760,000							
Nov	12	63	62	62	100.8	40,320,000					1		
Dec	14	71	70	69	112.1	44,840,000							
1944													
Jan	15	74	73	73	118.6	47,440,000							
Feb	15	82	81	81	131.6	52,640,000							
March	16	90	90	90	146.3	58,520,000							
April	17	84	83	83	134.9	53,960,000					1 ^e	1	
May	16	67	63	63	102.4	40,960,000					3	1	
June	19	134	129	129	209.6	83,840,000						1	
July	23	141	133	133	216.1	86,440,000	1			10			
Aug	21	126	125	125	203.1	81,240,000						1	
Sep	15	128	111	111	180.4	72,160,000							
Oct	17	152	148	148	240.5	96,200,000	1				1		
Nov	17	213	196	194	315.3	126,120,000							
Dec	17	173	161	161	261.6	104,640,000			1				
1945													
Jan	18	127	112	112	182.0	72,800,000	1			12		4	
Feb	17	180	171	170	276.3	110,520,000				1		1	
March	24	267	251	251	407.9	163,160,000			2	1	1	1	
April	22	241	238	228	370.5	148,200,000				1			
TOTALS 319		2,428	2,302	2,298	3,734.4	1,493,760,000	3	5	16	11	1	10	3

- a. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945, p. 70.
- b. Number of aircraft airborne.
- c. Number of aircraft reaching target area or subject to enemy action.
- d. Number of aircraft completing mission assigned.
- e. The 422d Bomb Squadron, War Diary, May 1944, lists 3 KIA and 6 MIA for the month.

Explanation of abbreviations: MIA--missing in action; Cat. E--Category E, planes damaged beyond economical repair while on an operational mission; KIA--killed in action; WIA, SER--seriously wounded in action; WIA, SLI--slightly wounded in action.

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Appendix No. 21

A. TOTAL NUMBER OF LEAFLETS DROPPED THROUGHOUT THE WAR
BY AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM^a

<u>Air Force</u>	<u>3 Sep 39 to 6 June 44</u>	<u>6 June 44 to 7 May 45</u>	<u>Total</u>
Royal Air Force	2,151,000,000	405,000,000	2,556,000,000
Special Squadron	181,000,000	1,577,000,000	1,758,000,000 ^c
Eighth Air Force (Daylight Bombers)	418,000,000	1,176,000,000	1,594,000,000
Allied Expeditionary Air Forces ^b	7,000,000	82,000,000	89,000,000
TOTALS	2,757,000,000	3,240,000,000	5,997,000,000

- a. PWD SHAEF, "Leaflet Operations, western European Theater," Exhibit 9.
- b. The figures for the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces refer only to droppings by that air force during the time it was based in Great Britain.
- c. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, 17 Aug. 1942-8 May 1945, page 70, which does not include May 1945 statistics, credits the 406th Squadron with having dropped 1,493,760,000 leaflets, or 264,240,000 less than the total given above. Still another figure is given in letter, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief, PWD SHAEF to CG, Eighth Air Force, "Commendation for Special Leaflet Squadron," 2 May 1945: "From 4 October 1943 through 21 April 1945, this unit has flown 314 missions totalling 2,332 sorties, and dropped approximately 1,943,520,000 leaflet units on enemy troops in and behind the lines and on civilians in Germany and occupied countries."

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B. TONS OF BOMBMENTS DROPPED THROUGHOUT THE WAR
 BY SPECIAL DUTY AIRCRAFT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
 THEATER TO THE PRINCIPAL TARGET COUNTRIES^a
 (In long tons--2,200 lbs.)

Period	Yugoslavia	Italy	Albania	Greece	Totals
To 31 July 1944	214.27	70.31	51.22	47.44	383.24
August 1944	42.90	14.41	8.21	5.53	71.05
September	36.96	10.17	5.22	11.10	63.45
October	6.23	4.68	3.26	9.40	23.57
November	49.03	12.46	5.09	4.02	70.60
December	36.42	9.37		19.20	64.99
January 1945 ^b	18.26	4.95		9.31	32.52
February	63.19	23.00			91.19
March	44.23	7.32			51.55
April ^c	24.51	7.33			31.84
TOTALS	536.00	169.00	73.00	106.00	884.00

- a. Compiled from History, Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Air) and Hq. MAAF, Special Operations, Monthly Reports, Nos. 5-13, in History, MAAF, XXXV.
- b. The figure given for Italy in January 1945 disagrees with the total in History, Fifteenth Special Group (Prov), p. 34, which is about 5.5 long tons.
- c. Satisfactory statistics for May 1945 are not available, but nickeling by special duty aircraft in that month was insignificant.

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Appendix No. 22

ACCOUNT OF A MISSION TO GREECE
10-11 NOVEMBER 1944¹

Up before daylight for an early breakfast, we pile into a Weapons Carrier to be taken out to the a/c, C-47A #186. While the Engineer, Sgt. Secrest, runs up the engines, and the Radio Operator checks his sets, the Pilot, Lt. Bell, the co-pilot, Lt. Stowe, and the navigator, Lt. Hall, check up the weather, and have a last look at the S-2 maps and photos of their target, a small landing strip, high up in the mountains of Greece. Returning to the plane, pins out, blocks out, a final check by the pilot, we taxi to the end of the runway, and on getting the "green" from the tower, a roar of engines, and a moment later we are airborne.

Cut over the Adriatic towards an island just off the Greek coast, Lt. Hall checks his position and gives the pilot a new course. Over the water the weather is perfect, but approaching the coast high cloud banks, piled up in fantastic shapes, obscure the ground. Further inland, occasionally a glimpse of the ground thru a break in the clouds shows rugged hills and deep valleys. On arrival at the pinpoint of the target, there is no break in the clouds to be seen, and it is necessary to fly some 30 miles further on before encountering a break in the clouds sufficient to let down thru. Under the clouds now, and flying in a valley, the plane rocks and bucks in the wind currents. The target sighted, marked by 4 white parachutes, 2 at each end of the runway, Lt. Bell swings around to look over the strip, and on receiving the proper answer to his signal, starts his run in to the field. There is a vicious cross wind, and the word is passed back to brace yourself, but Lt. Bell "greases" in to an almost perfect landing.

Taxiing to a hard spot at one side of the runway, we are greeted with big smiles by a British Sergeant, his rank denoted by wearing American Sergeant stripes up-side-down, and 25 or 30 ragged Italian soldiers left behind by the Germans when they pulled out. They make quick work of unloading the 4500 lbs. of supplies we brought in to them.

The last cigarettes they had received were dropped to them back in July, and they have been out of food for several weeks, and were living off the land. Out of nowhere a crowd of Greek men, women and children gathered to watch as 3600 lbs. of previously dropped medical supplies were brought to the plane in two donkey drawn carts of ancient vintage, each making many trips. The natives looked well fed, and warmly, if roughly clothed. The women smiled but turned their faces away when we attempted to snap pictures of them, and the men just stood and looked. All the women, even small girls, were knitting, a big fluff of wool on a stick tucked under their arm, out of which they made their thread as they knitted. A Br. Major, and his aide, who was born and raised in Greece, arrived in a German jeep, with a change in orders that would take us to Athens. With plane loaded, and the 2 Br. officers as our passengers, we taxi to the end of the runway, the soft surface dragging the plane so much that it is apparent that it will be hard to get off.

1. 51st Troop Carrier Squadron, War Diary, November 1944, Sheets Nos. 409-411. This account continues to describe experiences in Athens and on the return trip to ~~Brindisi~~.

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with the load we have. A last check, and the run is started; 2/3 the way down the runway, pulling 45 inches, and not getting 60 miles an hour, Lt. Bell shut down and taxied to the end of the strip to try again. As he swung the a/c around, it settled down in the soft ground and mired to the hubs.

As a rain storm was due and no assistance from trucks was available (the nearest truck 45 miles 3 hours away), the a/c was quickly unloaded and the long job of digging it out was started. The first several tries simply dug it in deeper, and finally, 4 hours later, with rock and wood tracks built under the wheels and for 10 feet ahead and twenty men lifting under each wing, Lt. Bell gunned it up the inclined tracks, and kept it going until it sat on fairly solid ground. The workmen cheered as if the home team had won a big game, and we all felt relieved. Rain started coming down a few minutes later. We held a hurried conference and decided to put 2000 lbs. of the load back on, then we took off without any trouble and headed for another landing strip to the East.

This strip turned out to be just a field, but fairly smooth and dry, and we sat down without a jolt. At the time of our arrival the place was deserted, but soon a truck came down the road, and before we were unloaded several hundred children, age 4 to 14, gathered around. Different from Italian, Sicilian, and African kids, they asked for nothing, just looked and smiled, and tried to see inside of the plane. Although the sun had almost deserted us, we tried to get some pictures, and no matter which way you turned, there were kids lined up, smiling and wanting to be in them. Several Greek Patriots, dressed in portions of Br., Am. and Italian uniforms, and armed with Italian and German weapons, came up and after telling us how much they liked Americans, guarded the a/c and would allow no one to put a hand on it. They posed proudly for pictures. None of them could have been over 16 years old.

The passengers we were to pick up turned out to be a special operations unit, American, out of Greek descent, who had been operating behind the enemy lines and living cut off from our forces for five months, coming down out of their base only to harass the enemy by blowing up trains, bridges, etc. We discovered that they were part of the original force that landed on the Island of Vis, and to whom our Squadron dropped supplies last February. There were one Am. Lt., 22 E1, and their 5 attached Italians, all with full kits, and these together with the two Br. officers, gave us a big load. Since we were light on gas and Athens was only 82 miles away, it was decided to take them all. The Americans said that the Italians worked with them, fought with them, and they had orders to take them if they so desired. We made a smooth takeoff and a straight run to Athens, without incident.

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Appendix No. 33

A "CARPETBAGGER" WITH THE FRENCH FORCES OF THE INTERIOR

Lt. John Mead--Guerrilla^a

Lt. John B. Mead, known familiarly as "Johnny" by everyone in the Group who knew him, was a bombardier in the 858th Squadron (then the 406th Squadron). He had been in the Carpetbagger Project from its inception, and was considered one of the most skillful practitioners of Carpetbagger bombardiering. One of his closest friends was Captain Robert D. Sullivan, the Group Intelligence Officer, whom he and his wife, Dorothy, had known back in the States.

For four months, Johnny Mead flew on Carpetbagger missions, contributing his particular bit to the growing success of the Group. And then, on 5 May 1944, it happened. The aircraft, piloted by Lt. [Murry L.] Simon, in which Mead was bombardier, failed to return from a mission to France.

The whole group was saddened by the news. Everyone knew he would miss good-looking Johnny Mead, his friendly smile, his enthusiasm, his drawling speech. Captain Sullivan wrote to Dorothy, offering what consolation he could, telling her not to give up hope. But three weeks went by and no further word was heard. As each day went by it became more difficult to hope.

Then, on 29 May, something happened. An 858th aircraft piloted by Lt. Munn, was engaged on a mission to a point deep within central France, in the vicinity of the town of Roanne. As the aircraft circled the target area, the Radio Operator, T/Sgt. Clarence H. Brown, succeeded in establishing an S-phone contact. He was somewhat surprised to hear a voice speaking in perfectly unbroken English:

"Are you British or American?"

Perhaps because the voice from the ground had a noticeably southern drawl, Brown replied, "Neither. We're Yankees."

"Who's your pilot?" the voice then asked.

"Lt. Munn," Brown replied.

"Well, I'll be damned!" the voice said. "Tell him hello. Tell everybody hello. This is Johnny Mead."

Startled almost to the point of speechlessness, Sgt. Brown managed to ask Lt. Mead how he and the rest of the crew were. The answer came that everyone was perfectly all right. Mead would not give any details over the S-phone regarding the evasion or discovery by the underground.

By this time, Lt. Munn's aircraft was in a position to make its dropping run. Lt. Mead gave detailed instructions from the ground, and a perfect completion was accomplished. When the drop was completed and Lt. Mead had acknowledged that it was a good one, he instructed the Radio Operator tell Colonel Heflin that "The Colonel's doing a good job too."

Nothing more was heard from Mead until 4 July when a wireless telegraph message came over one of the circuits from the French underground, saying that John Mead was in command of a group of Maquis and

a. History of the 858th Bombardment Squadron, Book II, Vol. I.

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an able assistant to the senior commander.

The next day, 5 July, Captain Sullivan was telling this story in the Intelligence office at Harrington. As he talked an orderly brought in an airmail letter from America. Captain Sullivan ripped open the envelope, read it hurriedly and passed it to another officer without a word. It was a brief and heartbreaking note from Johnny Mead's wife, Dorothy, asking for some crumb of information about Johnny. But Dorothy will have to wait and suffer until Johnny returns from working with the Secret Army, or until the war is over, because to tell her anything now would break a stern security rule which protects Johnny and thousands of others-- British and American soldiers and French Guerrillas.

In the meantime, Johnny Mead is running true to form and is a good guerrilla--a soldier in the Secret Army of France.

Journey to Johnny Mead

In the middle of October, after Carpetbagger operations had ceased and while 492nd personnel (including Johnny Mead) were engaged in a special mission in France, the Group Historian flew to the Haute-Savoie to interview Mead. The bombardier turned Maquis was altogether too reticent about his exploits. He was first of all reluctant to describe incidents in which his role could be construed as "heroic." He shuddered at the thought of appearing dramatic or heroic. Moreover, he did not wish to submit for permanent record any facts which his chiefs, the British agents "Geegee," "Victor" and "D'Arien" had included in their official reports, since he considered this a breach of discipline. This account, therefore, is the historian's own recollection of Mead's informal, off-the-record conversation. It must not be interpreted as a definitive report of the activities carried on by the Maquis group of which Mead was a member.

First of all, Mead was able to supply the last word to the story of how his airplane, piloted by Lt. Simon, was brought down. It was on 5 May 1944, at 0032 hours, twenty kilometres North of Cheney le Chatel, altitude 1200 feet, that the airplane was shot down by twelve 20-millimetre flak guns mounted on a troop train. The train, at the time, was blacked out and not in motion. Immediately after the airplane was hit, a German telegraph, tapped by the French Resistance, sent out a message as follows: "Enemy aircraft fired on and damaged to such an extent should fall in near vicinity."

Mead bailed out at 700 feet. It was a good jump and he landed on his feet in a cow pasture. Unhooking his parachute, Mead hid it, his mae west and his harness. Then he lit a cigarette and attempted to get his bearings. At that moment he heard an explosion and looked up to see his airplane blow up and go down in flames. Immediately, Mead took out his escape kit, removed the compass and began walking in a southerly direction.

Daylight found him in a populated area near Vivans. He began to think of getting help and to that end he approached an isolated house. Meeting a farmer near the house, he introduced himself with the aid of his language card. The farmer showed a willingness to help. Mead asked if there were any Germans nearby, and the farmer replied in the negative.

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Then they entered the house, and while Mead was given food and drink, the farmer sent his daughter in search of assistance. In this way, contact was made with the Resistance.

Mead remained in this house until 9 May. Then he was called for by the British agent known in the field as "Victor," and the two men journeyed on bicycles to a secret Maquis headquarters in Roanne. In the course of their conversation, Victor told Mead that he was short handed and would like Mead to remain in France and work with him. Mead expressed a willingness to do so. And so, when they reached Roanne, Victor despatched a coded wire to London requesting that Mead be permitted to remain and help the Resistance in that area.

Mead remained hidden in Roanne until late May, when an answer arrived from London, "Regarding your 0733073 (Mead's Army Serial Number) keep him." And from that time on, until the final liberation of France, Mead stayed and worked in the Resistance as an assistant to the British agents who were chiefs of Resistance forces in that area.

At this time the organization was primarily concerned with sabotage, but it was decided that Mead could work as instructor of American equipment, thereby laying the foundation for beginning an active resistance unit. To this end, quantities of materiel were requested from London and delivered by air, largely by Carpetbagger crews. By a remarkable turn of events, Mead found himself on the ground as leader of a reception committee, instead of in the air pinpointing the dropping grounds.

Receptions were set up in the following manner. Six men, armed with tommy guns and grenades, stood on guard one kilometre away, three more men were stationed a half kilometre away, and at the ground itself were five men. Then, when the airplane was in the target area, the men from the outer ring were called in to assist in the reception. The drops, Mead said, were generally good. Only someone who has been at a reception can appreciate the anticipation with which the French people awaited the loads. Though the danger was extreme, even mothers of families would come, just to see the drop. It was at one of these receptions that Mead spoke over the S-phone to Lt. Munn's crew.

After a drop was completed, and the packages and containers had been collected, Mead and his men would transport the load into Roanne, usually by ox-cart. Once, when a drop had been made quite late, it was beginning to get light. Mead described how he had driven the ox-cart, loaded with containers and parachutes, into Roanne, which was then garrisoned by 2,000 Germans. On his lap was resting a machine-gun. Looking back at this incident, Mead could hardly believe that no evil consequence had befallen this overt indication of resistance, but none had.

The resistance used the abandoned warehouse of a textile factory in Roanne as a warehouse and assembly shop. Here they clandestinely stored the materiel they had received by air, unpacked, cleaned and assembled it. Mead, at the time, was living in the home of a prominent engineer. Every day, dressed in civilian clothes, he would walk to work at the warehouse. The route he chose to walk was past a German barracks, because it had been found that that was one place where no one was ever stopped for questioning. All of Mead's papers were in order, even to a bicycle-tax receipt. He had French pin-up girls in his billfold, and he carried a lunch-basket complete with a bottle of wine (of course, a Sten gun was cradled at the bottom of the basket). If he had been

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stopped, his papers would have identified him as Jean Noel Dumbret, a deaf-mute.

On 26 June, Mead was commissioned to take active charge of a small unit, and he moved out of Roanne into a mountain headquarters, sixteen kilometres Southeast of Roanne. There he formed a unit known as "Maquis Violette." The FFI name for the unit was "Groupe de Fragny." From this time on, Mead operated in his capacity of instructing the men in American field equipment and in basic military tactics. Moreover, sabotage activities were carried out from this headquarters. Johnny Mead was getting to be a dyed-in-the-wool guerrilla.

On 15 July Mead received the following telegram: "Congratulations on your good work and regards from your Colonel and your friends. Signed Heflin."

"Maquis Violette" was attacked in force by German troops and Vichy French Milice on 21 July. The group was forced to withdraw and disband. But in accordance with pre-arranged plans, the men of the group rendezvoused a week later at another position near Fic de Rochefort, thirty kilometres Southwest of Roanne. At this time the Germans, faced with disaster in the North, were intensifying their attacks against the Maquis throughout the rest of France. The Maquis were reorganized into small, compact groups of men who were by now well trained; and Mead was moved with his group to work the area Northwest of Roanne. Here, Mead and his group began intensively to interfere with German communications, and to engage in road, telegraph and railway sabotage.

At Fragny, the group of twenty-eight men led by Mead found themselves on a hill surrounded by German forces. The first information Mead received was that a patrol of thirty Germans was moving up the hill towards him. Instead of retreating in the face of such a small force, Mead decided to defend his position. He gave the order to fire. Unfortunately, the information he had received proved, as usual, to be incorrect, because after four minutes of continuous firing he observed that his position was surrounded by close to six hundred Germans. Mead decided to lead his men in a break-through to safety. Cautiously, the Maquis slipped down the hill as the Germans moved up. At the bottom of the hill was a field and at the edge of the field a road, Highway 82, ran. The Germans had fast cars, armed with machine-guns patrolling the road. Led by Mead, the Maquis group crawled across the field. Mead waited until the cars were at the greatest distance from his position, and then gave the signal. The men leaped across the road. One armored car swung sharply around and opened up with its machine-gun. Mead could hear the bullets whistling about his ears. But his Maquis aide, an Alsatian, stood up and fired his tommy-gun. The German machine-gun was silenced.

Mead's group had suffered casualties, but he had led most of his men to safety. Mead himself, however, was not yet out of danger. He and his staff of four were being hotly pursued by six Milice. Mead and his men headed for the Loire. At his order, the four men split up, two going North and two South. Mead and his Alsatian aide were together. Reaching the Loire, and still pursued, they dove in and swam, under fire from the Milice, the two hundred feet to the opposite shore. They reached safety and later rendezvoused with the rest of the group.

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At Tarare, Mead led a unit of sixty men, part of a force of three hundred and sixty, in an attack against twelve hundred Germans. Displaying a brilliant command of field tactics, Mead disposed his small force so skillfully that they succeeded in demoralizing and routing a large group of Germans, preventing them from retreating, and driving them into the hands of Canadian paratroopers. When Mead entered Tarare he found the bodies of nine Frenchwomen and three Frenchmen. Mead discovered the cause of their death. It seems that they had been driving down a road and had been shot in cold blood by a retreating German officer.

This is only one example of German atrocities to which Mead can personally attest. At St. Yan he saw the bodies of thirty unarmed men who had been slaughtered at the entrance to the town's hotel. And at St. Gingolph there were the 800 people, of all ages, massacred in a church. This is quite beside the instances of individual torture, the mutilated, burned and broken bodies of Mead's own comrades who had fallen into German hands.

Finally, on 20 August, as the Allies advanced in France, the efforts and sacrifices of the Resistance bore its final fruit. Roanne was evacuated by the Germans and all German control in the area ceased. On 23 August Mead received the following wire: "Advise me present work not in line of duty. Suggest you return immediately if possible. Don't take any chances. Signed, Heflin." This wire may seem to cast a dubious light on Mead's stay in France. Actually, USSTAF had issued secret orders that he remain and work with the Resistance. That is why Colonel Heflin's wire was not in the form of a direct order, but was rather a "suggestion" that Mead return "if possible."

At any rate, the Germans were cleared out and the work of the Resistance in that area was at an end. On 24 August, therefore, Mead joined Lt. Peitmeier, who had been the navigator on Lt. Simon's crew . . . in Roanne. They remained there until the roads were cleared, and on 5 September left for Lyon together. From Lyon they went to Amberieu and from there they caught a ride in a B-25 to Salon. From Salon they flew in a C-47 to Caserta, Italy, arriving on 8 September. Mead was interviewed by General Cabel, Headquarters MAAF, who requested that Mead return to France to aid in the work of the Air Force Recovery Unit. On 10 September, Mead received orders from General Spaatz, placing him on detached service with ACRU #2 for an indefinite period. So Peitmeier went on to England, and Mead, after cabling the news of his survival to Dorothy, his wife, returned to France

Johnny Mead returned to England, at last, on 4 November, to find that it was now Captain John B. Mead. Moreover, he had been recommended for a Silver Star "for gallantry in action against an armed and determined enemy, while engaged in a special assignment with the French Forces of the Interior."

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