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The FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE to 1 OCTOBER 1943

(*Short Title: AAFRH—9*)

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M A P S

The Fourteenth Air Force to 1 October 1943

Chapter I

BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE

The activation of the Fourteenth United States Air Force under Brig. Gen. Claire L. Chennault on 10 March 1943 was another unusual action in an unusual theater of operations. The creation of an air force to support China was not of itself an extraordinary act; the timing of the activation and the motive for this timing make it unique. The United States was committed to aid China even before 7 December 1941 and had never swerved from that policy. The declared mission of the Tenth Air Force when it appeared in India was to support the Chinese; lend-lease goods had flowed regularly over the Burma Road until this land supply artery was cut by the Japanese occupation of Burma; and upon the severance of the land supply line an aerial supply line had been established. For approximately a year this had been the only channel through which the hard-pressed Nationalist government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had received supplies from the outside world--supplies which after the loss of the industrial cities in northern China were vital to the prosecution of a defensive war against the invading armies of Japan.[1]

The establishment of an air force in a region already so greatly dependent upon an aerial supply line appeared unwise and, from the Chinese point of view, undesirable, as this force would have to be supplied by the air cargo service and would obviously require a

substantial portion of the tonnage being hauled over the awesome "hump" by the Air Transport Command and by China National Airways Corporation (CNAC) pilots. Yet it was largely because of requests from the Chinese government that the activation was accomplished at this apparently inopportune time.[2]

The story of the Fourteenth Air Force does not begin with 10 March 1943, but goes back much farther; it is inextricably interwoven with the story of its commander, General Chennault. After his retirement from the United States Army in 1936 he went to China to aid the Chinese flyers in their unequal fight against the superior Japanese air force. There he supervised the building of a fine system of airdromes in southern China, and laid the plans for an air warning net which later became a marvel of effectiveness. He won the respect of the Chinese pilots, who, under his guidance, performed creditably as long as they had enough planes with which to fight. When battle attrition so decimated this force that it was unable to do more than carry out sporadic defensive missions, General Chennault conceived the idea of an international air force to aid the Chinese. The first contingent of this force was the First American Volunteer Group which arrived in Burma during the summer of 1941.[3]

Before the AVG had completed training on the outmoded P-40's with which it was equipped, the United States was plunged into the war. Almost immediately this mere handful of American pilots began a series of aerial exploits which in China have become legendary. During the next six months General Chennault and his "Flying Tigers" furnished the American reading public a much-needed tonic--news of American victories over the Japanese.[4]

After a stubbornly fought aerial campaign the AVG was forced back from Burmese bases to Kunming. The Burma Road was lost. The import of this catastrophe was appalling to well-informed Chinese, yet they had nothing but praise for the American fighters. The masses in unoccupied China knew only that since the coming of the foreign warriors their cities were bomb free, and they were grateful. The personal prestige of General Chennault was enhanced to an extent rarely, if ever, equaled by a foreigner in China.

Meanwhile, in February 1942, Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell had arrived at Chungking to command all American troops in the China-Burma-India theater and to act as Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff. The disastrous Burma campaign followed immediately and while General Stilwell was not blamed for the debacle, his prestige in China never thereafter approximated that of General Chennault.[5]

By the summer of 1942 the P-40's of the AVG were deteriorating under constant use without adequate maintenance. Some had been cannibalized to keep others flying; not a few had been lost in combat. Pilots were war weary. Since the AVG was a quasi-commercial venture, it was discontinued and a part of the Tenth Air Force was sent to China to take its place. On 4 July 1942, at the dissolution of the volunteer group, the China Air Task Force (CATF) was activated under the command of General Chennault, recently recalled to active duty and promoted to brigadier general. A few AVG pilots elected to accept induction into the Army, remaining in China as a valuable leaven for the inexperienced unit which absorbed them. Without interruption the aerial battles over southern China continued.

The Japanese soon learned that the CATF pilots could fight with the same daring precision and general effectiveness so well demonstrated by their predecessors. The fighter pilots of the 23d Fighter Group under Col. Robert L. Scott and the medium bomber crews of the 11th Bombardment Squadron under Col. Caleb V. Haynes rapidly absorbed the vast fund of battle lore which General Chennault had acquired during his long contest with Japanese airmen. They harassed the Japs and protected the eastern terminus of the aerial ferry but had to be content with fighting a largely defensive battle. They made offensive forays with their bombers and caused more than a little damage, but were always pinched by lack of equipment and supplies. Wholly dependent upon supply by air, they were forced to make the most of their scanty stores. Only by destroying enemy aircraft in almost incredible numbers were they able to prevent defeat by mere attrition.

Accustomed to a free hand in China, General Chennault soon began to feel that his actions were unnecessarily restricted by a command setup which made him subject to orders from an air force commander based in India, as well as those of the theater commander. To him, China was the most important part of the theater--the one place in the Far East from which the enemy could be struck a crippling blow. With his puny force he could not interfere with Japanese ships moving undisturbed along the China coast and up the Yangtze River. Consequently he desired tactical freedom and sufficient reinforcements to allow an aerial offensive against enemy installations and shipping to the north and east.

Chiang Kai-shek was disappointed that a more powerful American air unit had not been sent to China, and that the tonnage flown over the

hump had reached only a small fraction of the volume which had been received over the Burma Road. He also desired to resurrect the moribund Chinese Air Force, which at that time had a number of trained pilots but no aircraft. American military leaders, however, were not willing to provide combat planes for the Chinese unless they were to be used under American direction. Reluctantly Chiang consented to this arrangement, but only on the condition that General Chennault be the commander under whom the Chinese Air Force would operate.

Desirous also that General Chennault be given tactical independence of the Tenth Air Force, the Generalissimo exerted pressure at the highest level for the establishment of an independent American air force in China. Because of the complicated chain of command in American forces of the CBI, and the desirability of giving a free hand to a combat leader who had enjoyed outstanding success against the Nipponese, the principle of establishing a separate air force for China was accepted by the War Department. In January 1943 it was decided that this force would be created, but tactical and logistical conditions dictated that consummation of the plans be postponed indefinitely. The limited offensive in northern Burma to which the CATF was giving aerial assistance would have to be completed successfully, and the hump tonnage would have to be increased to a figure theretofore considered impossible before any action should be taken.

Meanwhile the Generalissimo became insistent and let it be known that Chinese resistance was on the verge of total collapse. He warned that if the hump tonnage were not immediately swelled and the air forces in China materially reinforced, the situation there would be hopeless.

This argument, of course, had a direct bearing on American strategic plans in the Far East, which had been predicated on the availability of air bases in China from which Japan would eventually be bombed.

The China crisis was discussed at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, and a decision was reached to rush reinforcements to the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command (ICWATC). Following the conference General Arnold toured the CBI theater, conferring with British, American, and Chinese military leaders but making no commitment as to the date of activation of the new air force. Upon his return to Washington, General Arnold gave his recommendation and the Fourteenth Air Force was activated, to operate in China under the command of General Chennault.

The conclusion that the establishment of the Fourteenth Air Force was a political expedient to encourage the Chinese to continue resistance is inescapable. The barriers which prevented the activation in January had not been removed--the offensive in northern Burma was still in progress and the hump tonnage had not been lifted to a point which was then considered necessary for operation of an expanded air force in China. Nor were aircraft and personnel for another air force then available. From a purely military point of view the activation was patently premature, and represented little beyond a change in nomenclature--General Chennault's CATF, not formally assigned to the Fourteenth until 24 April, merely became an independent command with its operational sphere extended to include the area north of the Yangtze River. Responsibility for supply remained with the Tenth Air Force in India. The Chinese, on the other hand, gained several advantages. They obtained

definite commitments for increase of the hump tonnage, aircraft for the Chinese Air Force pilots, and succeeded in having American units in their country separated from the Tenth Air Force and placed under complete operational control of a leader whose primary interests were in China.

The Fourteenth Air Force was unique among American air forces. It was the first to be created for political reasons; it was the first to be entirely dependent upon an aerial supply line; it operated in an area where Americans had carried on the longest continuous aerial operations against the Japanese; it was, in effect, a force fashioned for a particular leader, and which, because of logistical difficulties, required a minimum rather than a maximum of American personnel.

While it is not to be denied that the Fourteenth faced certain handicaps which no other air force encountered, it also enjoyed peculiar advantages. First was the experience and leadership of General Chennault, who was thoroughly versed in enemy tactics, entirely familiar with the locale of operations, and aware of the capabilities and limitations of his aircraft and his men. Second was the rich inheritance of prestige, tradition, and experience from two previous American forces whose records of accomplishment were outstanding. So important was this factor that the Fourteenth adopted the flying tiger insigne, already passed on from the AVG to the CATF. Some of the personnel had been in China since AVG days and the entire organization at activation had extensive theater experience. No disruption took place because of the necessity of moving, and no period of orientation was necessary. They merely continued to operate in their usual fashion, but under

another name. Third was the system of airfields, ready for use and situated on inner lines over which shifting of units from field to field was feasible and comparatively safe. Fourth was the ready-made air warning net which had proved its value in past months. Last was the advantage of operating over territory which, although nominally held by the enemy, was in reality peopled by friendly natives, glad to give assistance to bailed-out airmen and eager to give information concerning enemy installations, movements, and dispositions. Probably in no other theater did so many pilots and crewmen escape after being forced down in enemy-occupied country.

The personnel of the Fourteenth Air Force was far different from the inexperienced men who had taken up the fight in China at the expiration of the AVG. Veterans of many missions and winners of many victories over a numerically superior foe, they were thoroughly familiar with the difficult terrain over which they were fighting and fully comprehended the serious handicaps under which they had to operate. They knew their equipment, its shortcomings and its superior qualities, and had learned to use it to the best advantage. They had studied the stratagems of their skillful and treacherous opponent until they could outguess him at almost every turn. They were cocky but wary, for the unwary among them had already died. Their morale was excellent.[6]

Probably no other single factor contributed more to the success of the small American force in China than the quality of its leaders, from commanding general down through squadron and flight leaders. They did not direct activities from bases far from the battle areas, for in China the battle area included the very headquarters from which they operated.

They were combat leaders rather than administrators and personally led their men in battle. Indeed, under General Chennault, the prime requirement for group and squadron commanders was accomplishment in battle.

The 23d Fighter Group was first commanded by Colonel Scott who amassed a long string of victories over the Japanese before he was returned to the United States. His successor, Lt. Col. Bruce K. Holloway became the leading fighter pilot of the entire theater in the number of enemy planes destroyed. The squadron commanders had no less impressive records. The 74th Squadron was first commanded by Maj. Frank Schiel who had shot down seven Japanese aircraft while serving with the AVG. Upon his death in battle on 5 December 1942, he was succeeded by Capt. A. J. (Ajax) Baumler, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War in which he had shot down several German and Italian planes. En route to join the AVG, Baumler was caught at Wake Island when the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor; after a narrow escape he finally reached China via the Atlantic route. His combat experience was invaluable. After his first victory in China he was reputed to be the first American pilot to shoot down German, Italian, and Japanese planes. A victim of recurrent malaria he was returned to the United States early in 1943, being succeeded by Capt. John D. Lombard, already noted for his combat exploits.[7]

The 75th Squadron was commanded from 4 July to 5 December by Maj. David L. (Tex) Hill, who as an AVG squadron leader received credit for shooting down 12 Jap planes. His successor, Maj. John R. Alison, had already received the DSC and was soon to leave China to take part in the First Air Commando Group operation which also included in its personnel Capt. Grant Mahoney and Captain Baumler. The 76th Squadron

was commanded by the third of the ex-AVG men who took over USAAF squadrons on 4 July 1942--Maj. Edward F. Rector. Credited with destroying six Japanese planes while flying with the volunteers, he continued his excellent work with the CATF until ordered to the United States on 31 December 1942. His successor, Captain Mahoney, had participated in the Philippine and Java campaigns where he had won the DSC.

The 16th Fighter Squadron, detached from the 51st Fighter Group for duty in China, was commanded in turn by Maj. George W. Hazlett and Maj. Harry M. Pike, both of whom had enviable combat records.

The original bomber wing of the CATF was commanded by Colonel Haynes whose distinguished record requires no comment. Lt. Col. Herbert (Butch) Morgan, who succeeded Colonel Haynes, proved his courage and leadership and received numerous decorations. The 11th Bombardment Squadron (M), detached from the composite bombardment group in India, was the only bomber squadron of the CATF. It was commanded by Maj. William Bayse, veteran of the Java campaign until January 1943 when Capt. Everett W. Holstrom, pilot on the Doolittle Tokyo raid, took over.

With these men, veterans of the AVG, the Spanish Civil War, Philippines, Java, and the Doolittle raid, as well as campaigns in India, Burma, and China, General Chennault had built up a fighting force of the highest type. It was his good fortune to retain many of them as a nucleus for the Fourteenth Air Force.

Experience and fighting ability could not, however, completely overcome the many complexities which necessarily hampered operations in China. Low priority of CBI, difficulties of transportation to and within the theater, and the dependence upon natives for maintenance work all

tended to prevent anything more than relatively minor air operations over China in the succeeding months.

Chapter II

EARLY PLANS

The complete dependence of the Fourteenth Air Force upon expansion of the aerial ferry made all plans contingent upon the success or failure of the ICWATC. It was indeed a case of being forced to put all the eggs in one basket. As months passed the hump tonnage lagged, causing operations of combat squadrons already in China to be greatly circumscribed. Hence it was impracticable to carry out the plans for increasing the striking power of General Chennault's force. Nevertheless, the plans in themselves are significant.

In January 1943 when the advisability of separating the CATF from the Tenth Air Force was first discussed, General Arnold felt that the initial reinforcement should consist of an additional squadron of medium bombers, the only augmentation of the CATF immediately contemplated.[1] The China crisis, which had led to the hasty decision to send heavy reinforcements to the ICW and to activate the Fourteenth Air Force, also brought about an upward revision of the projected strength of General Chennault's command. The 308th Bombardment Group (H), equipped with B-24's, was presently ordered to CBI to operate in China. General Chennault had expressed a preference for medium bombers because of the strain which support of heavies would put on the hump flight, but this objection was removed by a plan to make the

308th Group self-supporting, the B-24's doubling as transports and hauling into China the bombs and aviation fuel needed for their combat operations.

The 308th Group arrived in China during March, and with the four fighter squadrons, one medium squadron, and a small photo-reconnaissance detachment which had comprised the CATF since its activation, represented the entire strength of the Fourteenth Air Force until late in the summer of 1943.

For a long time General Chennault had given careful consideration to the problem of increasing Allied strength in China, and his over-all plan presented to General Arnold in February provided not only for a substantial increase in the size of the American force but also for the incorporation of Chinese airmen into American units. After long and searching discussion this carefully worked out plan was adopted without major change. It provided for a bomber command composed of one heavy group and one medium group, a fighter command of two groups, and an air service command, plus Chinese-American combat units which would eventually be added. Shortly after General Arnold returned to Washington from the theater, General Chennault forwarded a complete blueprint of his projected force to AAF Headquarters. To avoid delay he recommended that the bomber and fighter commands be authorized immediately and activated later. Need for the air service command was not yet urgent, he said, and its authorization could wait. Moreover, he recommended that the medium squadron and two fighter squadrons, which were to be added, be activated in China with cadres from the 11th Bombardment Squadron (M) and the 23d Fighter Group, the fillers to come

from the United States.[2] In this way he would be assured of battle-tried officers and men in key positions of the new combat squadrons.

In a letter which accompanied the plan for the Fourteenth, General Chennault said that Japanese aerial activity had been quickened, making prompt reinforcements urgent. He listed as immediate needs: two additional fighter squadrons, one medium bombardment squadron, a fighter group headquarters, and a medium group headquarters. This, he said, would give him two fighter groups of three squadrons each, one medium bombardment group of two squadrons, and one heavy group of four squadrons[3]--except for the three command headquarters, bomber, fighter, and air service, the full projected strength of his air force.

His plan for use of Chinese pilots called for the immediate formation of one fighter squadron, to be expanded to a group as soon as pilots and planes were available, and immediate formation of one light or medium bombardment squadron, also to be expanded to a full group as soon as planes and pilots were ready. It was hoped that by 1 November 1943 these two Chinese groups would be ready to operate under direction of the Fourteenth.[4]

In his tentative plan to equip the American units of his air force General Chennault asked for a minimum of 150 fighters, or 75 for each group, 32 medium bombers for the 2 medium squadrons, 35 heavy bombers, and 8 photo-reconnaissance planes.[5] At that time (1 March 1943) his aircraft strength was 86 P-40's of various models, 7 P-43's, and 12 B-25's, with 35 B-24's of the 308th Group en route.[6] He was asking, then, that the number of fighter and photo-reconnaissance planes be raised from 93 to 158, and that the medium bombers be increased from

12 to 32. Ordinarily this would have involved the shipment of only 85 aircraft, but the condition of many of the planes already in China was such that they would have to be replaced. The seven P-43's, not considered suitable for ordinary combat duty, had been used sparingly, usually for reconnaissance. Some of the P-40's had been in CBI since July 1941, seeing hard usage with the AVG and CATF. These, as well as many later models, were almost completely worn out.[7] The B-25's were likewise of older short-range model and needed complete overhauling if not outright replacement. Yet, had it been necessary to replace all the planes then in China, General Chennault's aircraft requirements still could be considered quite modest.

Fourteenth Air Force personnel requirements were equally moderate. Aside from the 308th Group which was already on the way, General Chennault asked for only 168 officers and 763 enlisted men, in addition to the CATF personnel already present.[8] But in organizing the Chinese units he was particularly desirous for the return of certain officers formerly with the AVG and CATF and currently on duty in the United States. Majors Hill, Rector, and Baumler, Col. Merian C. Cooper and Maj. Charles Bond were specifically requested.[9]

Modest as were these requirements, and sympathetic with General Chennault's needs as was General Arnold, it was still necessary that the build-up of the Fourteenth be held in abeyance. General Chennault was told that no combat units were to be activated in the theater, and that all immediate reinforcement needs could be met by the transfer of units from the Tenth Air Force.[10] This was within the power of General Stilwell, who was reminded that a balancing of strength between the

Tenth and Fourteenth would be necessary until other units could arrive.[11] A plan for equalization was suggested: upon the arrival of the 80th Fighter Group in India the remaining squadrons of the 51st Group could be sent to China and rejoined with the 16th Squadron; when the 311th Bombardment Group (L or M) was available to the Tenth Air Force, the squadrons of the 341st Bombardment Group which were then operating in India would join the 11th Squadron in the Fourteenth Air Force.[12] The advantages of this suggestion to the Fourteenth were immediately obvious, for it would not only respect the integrity of the long-divided groups but would result in the transfer of experienced units to China while leaving newer organizations in India. This plan, too, had it been feasible to execute immediately, would bring the Fourteenth to full combat strength as recommended by General Chennault. The two groups earmarked for India, however, were greatly delayed, and as a consequence the 51st and 341st Groups were retained in India while the Fourteenth continued its unequal struggle without reinforcement.

The only part of General Chennault's recommendation which was immediately approved and implemented was the request for additional personnel for Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force. Key personnel arrived in China in a short time. It was not possible, however, to comply with the request for former AVG and CATF personnel. In reply to General Chennault's letter of 4 March, General Arnold on 2 April said that Colonel Cooper was not available for assignment and that Majors Hill, Rector, and Bond would be considered for reassignment to China after a thorough rest in the Zone of the Interior. Major Baumler was still hospitalized.[13]

General Arnold doubtless understood General Chennault's desire for

the return of these men who had made outstanding contributions to the success of both the AVG and CATF. He knew that they would be especially valuable when the Chinese-American composite groups were formed, and had agreed to return as many such men as was possible. Nevertheless he was convinced that high-caliber administrative personnel were presently more necessary to the new air force than were experienced combat men. Consequently a careful selection of key personnel was made and the following list submitted to General Chennault with suggested assignments:[14]

Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, Chief of Staff

Brig. Gen. Julian B. Haddon, Commander, ASC

Col. Donald R. Lyon, A-3

Col. George V. McPike, A-4

Lt. Col. Sydney D. Grubbs, Jr., Assistant A-3

Others being sent out at the same time but without suggested assignments were:

Lt. Col. Morris F. Taber

Lt. Col. Samuel B. Knowles, Jr.

Lt. Col. Edward O. Hunter

Maj. Henry J. Amen

Capt. Roy Garfield Hoffman (formerly with AVG)

Capt. Arthur W. Grafton

Capt. Robert O. Denny

Cpl. Joseph Lapierre

In concluding his letter General Arnold expressed regret that he was unable to send the officers requested and congratulated General Chennault upon his recent promotion to major general.

Meanwhile the small air force in China was fighting a battle of survival. Since December 1942 the few medium bombers had almost ceased operations because of a fuel shortage. Fighter squadrons had to be pulled out of advanced eastward posts such as Kweilin, Lingling, and Hengyang for aircraft maintenance and repair, and to rest pilots, leaving those outlying bases practically without defense. So many fighters were required at Kunming and Yunnanyi to protect the aerial supply route and its terminals that aerial assistance could no longer be given the ground troops in Yunnan and north Burma. Offensive action other than intermittent reconnaissance and strafing sorties by small flights was impossible.[15]

Sheared of their meager aerial aid, the Chinese ground forces in western Yunnan began to suffer, and as a result Chiang Kai-shek promptly echoed General Chennault's appeal for augmentation of his air force. In Washington on 17 March Dr. T. V. Soong presented to General Marshall a message from the Generalissimo asking for an increase in the number of fighter squadrons for the Fourteenth Air Force so that strafing missions could be flown and at the same time leave an effective guard for the ferry line and the air bases.[16] The following day General Marshall asked Chief of Air Staff Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer whether the transfer of fighter squadrons from the Tenth to the Fourteenth could be considered if General Chennault were provided adequate airfields and a sufficient supply of gasoline to operate them.[17] General Stratemeyer replied that none of the combat units in CBI as yet had been permanently assigned to the Fourteenth, but he assumed that General Stilwell would permit the former CATF units to continue operations in China unless in-

tensification of Japanese operations in northern Burma should necessitate recalling to India the 16th Fighter Squadron. As of 17 March, he said, only 90 aircraft were available to the 4 fighter squadrons in China while 2 fighter squadrons and 146 fighter aircraft were in India. Sixty-seven more fighter planes were en route to the theater by boat. Without committing himself General Stratemeyer concluded that allocation of fighter squadrons between the two air forces in the CBI would remain subject to General Stilwell's discretion.[18]

Had not conditions in the air units of China been so critical the situation might be called ludicrous, since the planners were confronted with the problem of reinforcing an organization which apparently consisted of a commanding general only. It appeared that instead of receiving reinforcements the small force in China was in danger of losing one of its attached fighter squadrons; the request for aid had merely focused attention on the necessity of making definite assignments of units which were already operating under the name of the Fourteenth Air Force.

On 23 March General Arnold told General Marshall that to put more fighters in China until other bases were available would be to invite destruction from the Japanese. General Chennault, he said, had not indicated as yet that such bases were ready.[19] The same day Col. T. S. Timberman of OPD informed Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, that he had visited Dr. Soong during the morning and that Soong was obviously eager to be able to give the Generalissimo definite commitment on additional fighter squadrons for China. Colonel Timberman added: "It was further emphasized to Soong that the whole Tenth Air

Force in India was to support China; that such units as could be supported in China would be moved there by Stilwell."[20] This restatement of the mission of the Tenth Air Force under ordinary circumstances might have been reassuring to the Chinese, but during the current critical period its effect was of little consequence.

On 26 March General Stratemeyer wrote a memorandum to General Marshall recommending that all units then in China be assigned to the Fourteenth Air Force in order to give General Chennault complete control, listing the following as those which would be affected:

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fourteenth Air Force

23d Fighter Group

16th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group

11th Bombardment Squadron (M), 341st Bombardment Group

308th Bombardment Group

He concluded: "It is believed that relations with China will be vastly improved by our ability to announce that General Chennault has complete control of the Fourteenth Air Force and will thus be enabled to perform effectively strategic missions against Japanese shipping and industry."[21] It is again difficult to see what could be gained by such a declaration since Chiang Kai-shek already had been told that General Chennault was in complete control of the air units in China. Moreover, the announced mission of the Fourteenth at its activation included attacks on Japanese shipping and industry. What General Chennault so badly needed, and had repeatedly asked for, was not permission to carry out such missions, but enough squadrons to mount them. Furthermore General Chennault already had more bases than he was able to defend, and indeed had already

urged that more fighters be sent to China, clearly indicating that he had enough bases to accommodate them.

On 31 March President Roosevelt concluded the matter by cabling Chiang Kai-shek that the United States was prepared to place additional air units in China when General Chennault indicated that ground facilities were ready to receive them,[22] evidently using the incident to prod the Chinese into speedier construction of additional bases for future use by the Fourteenth.

Two weeks after the President's message to the Generalissimo Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, in a memorandum to General Marshall said that General Arnold had directed General Chennault to select airdrome sites immediately because the Chinese would not begin work until all the locations were definitely determined upon. Moreover, he said that Soong had promised that the airdromes would be completed by the end of June. Also, in order to promote better cooperation between Chinese and Americans Brig. Gen. O. A. Anderson had been designated by General Arnold to coordinate with Chinese officials in Washington all matters concerning Chinese and American air forces. As an immediate means of building up air strength he said that General Chennault had been instructed to add Chinese pilots to his force, and that 36 had already been assigned.[23] Additional pilots of doubtful training and efficiency had thus been obtained and promises of more bases in China had been received, but the fighter squadrons so badly needed by General Chennault continued to operate with the Tenth Air Force. Meanwhile General Chennault became aware that at least for the time being there would be no reinforcements for the Fourteenth, and

prepared to carry on as he had for the past several years, with little equipment and too few pilots.

On 24 April, the day on which clearing China skies brought the initiation of a determined enemy aerial campaign to knock out Fourteenth Air Force bases, a memorandum from AAF Headquarters to the Adjutant General in Washington stated that in compliance with direction of the Secretary of War the assignment of the following units to the Fourteenth, effective 10 March, should be announced:[24]

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Fourteenth Air Force
Headquarters, 23d Fighter Group
23d Fighter Control Squadron
74th Fighter Squadron
75th Fighter Squadron
76th Fighter Squadron
16th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group
Headquarters, 308th Bombardment Group (H)
373d Bombardment Squadron (H)
374th Bombardment Squadron (H)
375th Bombardment Squadron (H)
11th Bombardment Squadron (M), 341st Bombardment Group (M)
54th Service Squadron

This delayed assignment of all CATF units and the 308th Group to the Fourteenth was the source of certain organizational difficulties. Two squadrons, the 16th Fighter and the 11th Bombardment (M), were assigned to the Fourteenth, while their parent groups, the 51st Fighter and 341st Bombardment (M), belonged to the Tenth. The source of the trouble, of course, lay in the fact that while in name there were two air forces in the theater there were not sufficient air units present for one, and in order to give squadrons of various types to each force, divisions of groups were necessary. At the time of the assignment of the units to the Fourteenth the entire list of units in the Tenth and Fourteenth was:[25]

7th Bombardment Group (H)

9th Squadron (Tenth)
436th Squadron (Tenth)
492d Squadron (Tenth)
493d Squadron (Tenth)

303th Bombardment Group (H)

373d Squadron (Fourteenth)
374th Squadron (Fourteenth)
375th Squadron (Fourteenth)

341st Bombardment Group (M)

11th Squadron (Fourteenth)
22d Squadron (Tenth)
490th Squadron (Tenth)
491st Squadron (Tenth)

51st Fighter Group

16th Squadron (Fourteenth)
25th Squadron (Tenth)
26th Squadron (Tenth)

23d Fighter Group

74th Squadron (Fourteenth)
75th Squadron (Fourteenth)
76th Squadron (Fourteenth)

9th Photo Squadron (Tenth and Fourteenth)

The Tenth thus had nine combat squadrons and the Fourteenth eight, apparently an equitable distribution of strength, but a contrast of the number of planes available to the two forces gives a different picture. As of 1 April the Tenth had 50 heavy bombers while the Fourteenth had 34; 44 mediums were available to the Tenth and 12 to the Fourteenth; for the 4 fighter squadrons in China there were 90 planes, while for the 2 squadrons in India there were 200.[26] Yet until an improvement was effected in the supply situation, little could be done to alleviate the confused organizational setup and maintain the integrity of groups, or to balance the aircraft strength.

The outlook of the Fourteenth, however, was not altogether dark, for serious consideration was again being given to the problems of reinforcement. In April Chiang Kai-shek informed President Roosevelt that he had been working with General Chennault on a plan for an aerial offensive over China and suggested that General Chennault be called to

Washington for discussions with War Department officials. The proposal was not unacceptable to the American Chiefs of Staff, but at the same time it presented a delicate problem. To call in General Chennault alone might leave the impression that General Stilwell had been circumvented. Moreover, it had already been decided to bring General Stilwell to Washington for an early conference on theater problems. There was some risk that the Generalissimo might interpret the theater commander's appearance at the conference as designed to interfere with fulfillment of General Chennault's mission, but the suggestion that General Bissell be added to the list offered little if any assurance on this point. Accordingly, Generals Stilwell and Chennault reached Washington for conference late in April.[27]

Meanwhile it had been planned that Prime Minister Churchill should come to Washington with high-ranking officers from India. Prior to the joint British-American conference (Trident) American officials discussed at length the problems to be dealt with, among them many perplexing ones concerning action in CBI. General Chennault discussed his offensive plan with the President and other high officials.

It was soon apparent that Generals Stilwell and Chennault did not see eye to eye on the strategic needs in China, and differed widely on their proposals to improve the Allied position in the theater.[28] General Chennault believed that every effort should be put forth to improve the aerial supply line so that the Fourteenth Air Force could be strengthened to a point which would enable it to make extensive inroads into Japanese merchant shipping, and at the same time do great damage to land supply lines, aerial installations, and troop concentrations. He

thought that improvement of the air bases in Assam should have the highest priority, even if such action slowed down work on the Ledo Road. He did not believe that the Japanese would be able to penetrate Yunnan or threaten Kunming since they had never made deep penetrations without the aid of river transport. River transport, he felt, was vulnerable to the point that small air units could so cripple lines of communication that enemy ground troops would be unable to operate effectively that far into the interior. The retaking of Burma would be a long drawn-out campaign which would be costly in both time and materiel, and in no way relieving China until the close of the campaign. He feared that if China did not get more immediate aid there was a danger of collapse before the land supply route could be opened. This assistance, he felt, could be furnished only by air.

General Stilwell, on the other hand, thought that the aerial ferry would never be able to haul to China the volume of freight necessary to arm and support the ground troops required for any all-out aerial attack on Japan from bases in China. Admittedly an aerial offensive would be a "shot in the arm" to the Chinese, but would not be decisive. It was his firm belief that such an offensive would only provoke the Japanese to send strong ground forces against American bases in China--bases which could not presently be defended. He thought it entirely possible that the Japanese could move from French Indo-China and take Kunming, thus destroying the cargo route entirely, and making future operations in China an impossibility. A land supply route, to him, was the best possible solution. He thought that the Ledo Road project should be given a high priority, and that before China could be relieved Burma would have to be retaken. Moreover, General Stilwell was entirely opposed to

the postponement or serious modification of the plans laid at Casablanca for the reconquest of Burma. In these plans the Chinese Yunnan army was the key. He believed that a large portion of the air freight into China should go to this organization so that there could be no chance of its failing to carry out its assigned mission in the proposed campaign.

The ultimate objectives of the two American leaders were not so divergent as their views concerning the accomplishment. General Stilwell's plan was a long-range one, and if carried to a successful conclusion would result in rearming a Chinese ground army capable of defending the bases from which great numbers of Allied planes could operate against Japan. General Chennault's plan looked equally as far into the future but along different lines. He felt that the most crippling blow that could be struck against the Japs would be destruction of merchant shipping, and if his proposed campaign were successful, the way might be opened for invasion of China from the east, furnishing a port from which the Chinese could be more successfully supplied than by the exiguous Ledo-Burma Road. Both men expected eventual aerial operations of gigantic proportions against the Japanese archipelago from bases in China; their ideas of how the bases were to be made secure constituted their difference in opinion.

The views of Chiang Kai-shek were represented at the conference by Dr. T. V. Soong. The Chinese government considered the plan for the reconquest of Burma, shaped by British and American military leaders in consultation with the Chinese at Calcutta following the Casablanca Conference, a definite commitment. It was felt that China had lived up to its commitments with reference to this plan. General Chen Cheng, General Stilwell's choice, had recently been placed in command of the

Yunnan army, and China would be fully prepared to fulfill her assigned role in the campaign which had been scheduled for the end of the monsoon season late in 1943. In addition, the Chinese regarded reinforcement of General Chennault as a matter of prime importance, and viewed with disappointment the lack of progress shown in the hump tonnage. They did not attach the same importance to the Ledo Road project as did General Stilwell, emphasizing the logistical problems involved and the superior lines of communication in Burma enjoyed by the Japanese. It was held that only a coordinated attack from several points could be successful.

In the discussion of General Chennault's plan, the British supported the view that development of air bases should have precedence over the Ledo Road project, and agreed that the best way to help China was to increase the volume of airborne supplies and to enlarge General Chennault's air force. Influenced by the greater weight of their interest in long-range plans involving Bangkok, Malaya, and Singapore, the British were inclined to favor delay of the operation against Burma. The Americans insisted, however, that the immediate problem was to keep China in the war--an aim which would in no way be furthered by operations in the south. In the end a compromise was reached. The plan for moving on Burma was curtailed, but the campaign was not to be delayed. The development of the air cargo route facilities was given highest priority, but the Ledo Road project and northern Burma campaign were to be continued. The attacks via Ledo, Imphal, and from Yunnan were to be undertaken at the end of the monsoon of 1943. Amphibious operations, however, were to be limited to the recapture of Akyab and Ramree Island, which

if successful, would endanger Japan's position both at Mandalay and Rangoon.

In an annex to the final paper on the Trident Conference the projected strength of the Fourteenth Air Force was set forth--exactly as General Chennault had presented it. It was to be composed of one heavy bombardment group, one medium squadron--to be increased to a full group when the goal of 10,000 tons per month over the hump was reached--and two fighter groups. In addition, the Chinese were to be provided with 80 fighters and 40 medium bombers for their operations under General Chennault.[29]

Apparently General Chennault had not only put across his ideas to American military authorities but had convinced the British of the importance of aerial operations in China. In any case, the British appeared to agree with General Chennault's views while at the same time opposing General Stilwell's. The British view, however, was doubtless colored by the fact that they were not prepared for large-scale operations in Burma and were not primarily interested in aid to China; they probably agreed with General Chennault because his plan would call for less immediate exertion of force by the British than would that of General Stilwell, and because Burma was of less strategic importance to them than were Malaya and Singapore.

Chapter III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AERIAL FERRY

Chief among the drawbacks of the Fourteenth was, of course, supply. Shortage of shipping space, length of the supply line, and the low priority of the theater made it inevitable that the entire CBI should receive a mere trickle of supplies in comparison with the quantities being pipelined to other theaters. Of the total tonnage which arrived at Indian ports only a small portion was earmarked for delivery to China. Transportation was of such a difficult nature that delivery of even this insignificant volume presented an unprecedented obstacle; not only did it have to move over the notoriously poor and inefficient Indian railroad and river boat lines, but it had to be flown from Assam into Kunming over the towering peaks of the Himalaya range, under the very worst of flying conditions.

When the port of Calcutta was reopened in the summer of 1942, after the withdrawal of the heavy units of the Japanese fleet from the Indian Ocean, the trans-India transportation burden was lessened, but the critical lines from Calcutta into Assam were still overburdened. The British had developed the railroad system with an eye to defense of northwest India; consequently only a scanty system of narrow-gauge lines was built to serve Assam. When used in conjunction with the river traffic on the Brahmaputra these small inefficient railways were able to handle normal peacetime tonnage. In the strategic situation which



accompanied the loss of Burma, however, the importance of Assam skyrocketed almost overnight. It became the western terminal of the India-China air ferry operations as well as the base for the protective fighter aircraft. Since automobile roads and bridges were almost non-existent in that part of India the major part of the heavy hauling fell on the rail lines, and they were quickly swamped under the deluge of freight. Transportation from Calcutta to Dinjan and Chabua became synonymous with inefficiency and delay.

Improvements were made, but as late as June 1943 a minimum of two weeks was required for the transfer of goods from Calcutta to Chabua. The slowness was largely due to extra handlings made necessary by variations of rail gauges and the use of river ferries instead of bridges. The most commonly used route required one unloading and re-loading process at Santahar where the wide-gauge line ended and the meter gauge began. At three other points similar handlings were necessary at river ferries. These four transfers were made by slow, and physically weak, native laborers.[1]

The water route, by canal from Calcutta to the Brahmaputra, and upstream to Dibrugarh, was even slower. Not enough tugs or barges were available to obtain maximum benefits from this mode of transportation and it was used merely to complement the rail supply line.[2] This bottleneck was further accentuated by the necessity of supplying British troops operating in the Manipur area and Americans working on the Ledo Road.[3] Both British and Americans endeavored to improve the transportation in eastern India but it was destined to remain a major obstacle to operations in Assam and China.

The air freight line from Assam to Kunming perhaps required the greatest attention of American planners for CBI in 1943. Ground transportation was nothing new, but establishing an air supply line of the proportions projected for the India-China Wing and operating it under such disadvantageous flying conditions was new even in the annals of air operations.

Soon after the announcement to Chiang Kai-shek in January 1943 that the ICWATC would be immediately reinforced, General Arnold, while in CBI, gave the Generalissimo and General Stilwell more detailed information regarding the plans. In a letter to General Stilwell written from Kunming on 7 February he gave a general outline of the projected reinforcement. He said that the 62 transport planes of the ICW would be increased to 137 by 15 March, and of the 137 planes, 124 would be devoted exclusively to the hump flight. He believed that by the end of March the ground and air personnel should be well enough oriented to keep a minimum of 90 aircraft operational at all times, and estimated that each operational craft would be able to make 20 round trips over the hump every month.[4] As 12 of the new planes were to be four-engine C-87's he felt that by April the wing would be able to deliver 4,000 tons per month into China, 1,500 tons of which were to go to the Fourteenth Air Force.[5] It was believed that by July General Chennault's share of the hump tonnage alone would amount to 4,790 tons, and that this could be increased to 7,128 tons by September.[6]

Soon thereafter, at the recommendation of Col. E. H. Alexander, General Arnold issued an order that all C-47's on the hump flight should be replaced by the more capacious C-46's.[7] The schedule of departure of these

newer-type transports from the United States was 30 by 1 April, 10 more by 1 May and an additional 10 by 1 June, making a total of 50 of this type to be available some time in June.[8]

Had it been possible to implement this plan fully the history of the Fourteenth Air Force during the succeeding months doubtless would have been radically different. But the story of the hump flight during the spring and summer of 1943, at least from the point of view of the plans made, was one of failure and disappointment. In the number of aircraft assigned and delivered to the ICWATC the plan was closely adhered to, yet the tonnage of freight actually lifted into China never even approximated the projected figure. On 23 March there were 120 transports assigned to the India-China run,[9] and on 27 March there were 133 either on hand in the theater or en route.[10] By 8 June a total of 46 of the 50 C-46 transports scheduled to leave the United States by 1 June had been received.[11] Delivery of aircraft, therefore, was over 90 per cent of the total number projected.

A most discouraging record, however, is that of actual tonnage figures, which were so low as to dishearten all but the most confirmed optimists. In June, with more than 140 transports on hand, including 12 C-87's and 46 C-46's, the tonnage was slightly more than 2,200,[12] while the plans had foreseen more than twice that figure. In July, when General Chennault's share alone was to have been 4,790 tons, only about 4,500 tons were delivered by ATC.[13] In September, when the Fourteenth was to have received 7,128 tons, the ICWATC had been able to move no more than 5,000 tons for all purposes.[14]

Meanwhile the number of transport aircraft on the flight had been

greatly increased. On 14 September the ICW had 230 transports on hand. Of these, 43 were C-87's, 105 were C-46's, and 82 were C-47's and C-53's.[15] Thus, with 230 planes available, and more than half of them newer types with greater capacity than the Douglas transports formerly used exclusively on the run, they moved only 5,000 tons per month, while the original plans called for 124 planes, nearly all Douglas models, to carry 4,000 tons.[16]

In view of the failure of the hump project it might be concluded that the plan was unsound or that the planners were too optimistic. Careful study of the basic considerations and the steps proposed for implementation of the plan indicates, however, that it was entirely logical and sound. The execution of any plan depends somewhat on flexibility, but the plan on which General Arnold based his hopes for increasing the air lift into China could not be flexible, and no alternate plan was possible. Success depended upon four major considerations, any one of which might so affect the outcome as to determine the success or failure of the entire project. Many intangible factors were involved--factors whose effects could not reasonably be foreseen. There were doubtless many misgivings among the men who set the machinery for the operation into motion, and some of them probably suspected that the full requirements could not be met.

The first major consideration was the adding of a sufficient number of transport aircraft to those already in the theater to carry the projected tonnage. The number believed to be necessary was based on the operations of cargo planes over the hump during the past months--the only empirical data available.[17] In delivery of aircraft the schedule

was followed so closely that this factor cannot be cited as a reason for the lack of success.

Second was the moving of sufficient supplies to Assam to support the operation. This proved to be so painfully slow that it doubtless contributed, at least indirectly, to the disappointing outcome. Nevertheless, rarely did the personnel in Assam experience any acute shortage of supplies, nor was there ever any paucity of freight on hand to be moved into China. The third major consideration--sufficient personnel and equipment for processing and loading materials--was not fully implemented, and this was due in part to the transportation difficulties between Calcutta and Assam. Certainly the lack of motor transport and loading equipment proved to be a serious handicap, and to this consideration might be assessed a fair share of the failure.[18]

The fourth, in all probability, was the greatest single factor which doomed the program to failure. This consisted of provision of airdromes to bear the assigned aircraft. In China there was no difficulty, as commodious airdromes were already available.[19] In Assam, however, the picture was entirely different. The British had assumed the responsibility of having five forward and three rearward fields ready by May, and three additional fields by the first of October.[20] Rainfall, excessive even for Assam, notorious for its rains, greatly impeded construction; native laborers, panicked by Japanese bombings, fled the region in droves; construction equipment failed to arrive on time.[21] On the eve of the date when completion of eight fields was scheduled there were only two serviceable airdromes with 14 hard standings available to ATC in all Assam.[22] Of these two, Chabua and Jorhat,

the latter could not be used by the heavy four-engine planes because its taxiways were not paved. This meant that all the B-24's of the 308th Group, which was then hauling its own supplies to China, and 80 odd other planes were using Chabua.[23] So crowded was this field that Colonel Alexander had been forced to park more than 50 Douglas transports, C-87's, and B-24's on the airdrome in daylight hours, with 147 enemy aircraft based within two and one-half to three hours' flight.[24] Two other fields, Mohanbari and Sookerating, were unpaved and were not usable because of the very heavy rains. The airdrome at Dinjan was occupied by CNAC and the fighters which protected the area.[25]

The British continued their work, handicapped as they were, and obtained the services of 4,500 additional laborers.[26] They asked, however, that three American engineer battalions with full equipment be sent to Assam to help in maintenance of completed fields and to assist in construction of the remaining ones. It was believed that the addition of American troops would help morale in case Japanese air attacks were repeated, and would also give a much higher proportion of skilled labor. They also requested that delivery of machinery and vehicles which had long been on order be expedited.[27]

A report by General Davidson on 22 June indicated that the situation was slowly improving, but said that the Chabua runway which was of light construction was going to pieces under the heavy four-engine planes, and in the future would be restricted to C-46's and Douglas transports. Dinjan, which could not stand up under heavier transports, was still being used by fighters and CNAC; Sookerating was completed and had a good concrete runway suitable to all types of aircraft;

Mohanbari was still under construction but would be ready for use by 1 July; Jorhat had a good runway suitable for heavy aircraft but was being used jointly with the RAF.[28] On 13 July Colonel Alexander reported that 59 hard standings with connecting taxiways were available, largely at Chabua, Sookerating, and Jorhat, with none yet completed at Tezpur or Mohanbari.[29]

Up to this point it is obvious that lack of airdrome facilities was the chief handicap, and that this condition was due in a great part to events which could not be foreseen--defection of labor under enemy attack, and unexpectedly heavy rainfall. Apparently the airdrome situation had improved to the extent that a material increase in the hump tonnage could reasonably be expected. In August and September, however, the figures were still far below expectations.

Since tonnage failure could no longer be attributed altogether to lack of airdromes it becomes necessary to examine some less tangible factors, particularly in view of the fact that CNAC, flying under the same conditions, was lifting a much greater tonnage per plane available than was ATC. For instance, in a four-week period in June, ATC with 12 C-87's, 46 C-46's, and 88 C-47's and C-53's assigned, delivered 2,219 tons to Kunming, yet CNAC with only 20 Douglas transports moved 761 tons to the same destination. During a month when CNAC moved approximately 38 tons per plane, then, ATC transported only about 15 tons per plane. In the four weeks ending 28 September ATC hauled 5,198 tons with more than 225 planes on hand, while CNAC carried 1,134 tons with only 23 planes. At that time ATC had 43 four-engine C-87's and more than a hundred C-46's, both models having a larger capacity than

the types being flown by CNAC, in addition to 82 craft of the same models as those of CNAC. Yet CNAC was lifting 49 tons per plane over the hump while ATC was moving only 23 tons per plane.[30]

Bald figures in this case are somewhat misleading, for there were extenuating circumstances in the case of ATC. CNAC was an efficient and well-organized commercial line, manned by personnel of long experience in the theater, and their planes were in some cases equipped with flying instruments which were not available to ATC. Many of the ATC personnel, on the other hand, were relatively inexperienced men who had arrived but recently in CBI. Another deterrent factor was that the C-46's which were heavily depended upon, developed serious "bugs" on the hazardous flight and eventually had to be grounded for modifications. Some of them, however, could be used on the trans-India flights where high-altitude flying was not necessary.[31]

The extra maintenance and repair problem occasioned by the defects in the C-46 aircraft was aggravated when overhauls made at depots in India proved unsatisfactory.[32] Maintenance and repair personnel in Assam were consequently overwhelmed. During August an average of more than 100 planes of the IC:ATC were grounded per day for various reasons.[33]

Trans-India flying and food-dropping missions gave rise to diversions of planes from the hump flight, but had all C-46's been grounded throughout September and 20 other planes been devoted entirely to food-dropping and trans-India flights, the ATC tonnage per ship still would hardly have equaled that of CNAC. Search for the cause of the inability of ATC to operate more efficiently leads back to the early days of the CBI theater. The IC:ATC was a relict of the 1st Ferrying Group which

arrived in the theater in the spring of 1942 and which, over the protests of Brig. Gen. Robert Olds, had been assigned to the Tenth Air Force. Supplies and equipment which were directed to the ferrying unit were placed in a theater pool, and frequently were issued to other organizations; personnel and aircraft were regularly given assignments which had no connection with ordinary ferrying activities. Meanwhile, in Assam, ferry personnel were attempting to develop the aerial cargo route "on a shoestring." Living conditions were bad, mail service was outrageous, supplies were scarce, promotions were slow, and replacements all too few. Morale, high at the outset, gradually deteriorated, and in the autumn of 1942, reached a dangerous point.[34]

In order to increase the efficiency of the operation the organization was removed from theater control in December 1942 and placed directly under ATC Headquarters in Washington. General Stilwell retained control of priorities, but operational control of ICW, which absorbed the ferry organization, was vested in Col. E. H. Alexander. Under Colonel Alexander morale improved, but the sources of discontent were not removed. Relations between the Tenth Air Force and ATC became bitter, with each calling the other "robber."[35]

After a visit to the theater in May 1943 General Stratemeyer reported that the morale of ATC units was bad and that newly arrived and inexperienced troop carrier outfits were already carrying on more efficient operations over the hump than the experienced ATC units. He said that the ICW leaders frankly admitted that the troop carrier units were far more efficient.[36] In a reply to General Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. Harold L. George on 14 June reviewed the entire story of the hump operation,

saying that the difference in the way the two organizations had been handled was responsible for the difference in efficiency and morale. He said that troop carrier materiel sent to the theater was inviolable while ATC supplies were still being appropriated by other units in the theater.[37] On 1 July Maj. Gen. Barney M. Giles informed General Stratemeyer that specific action had been taken to improve conditions in the ICW, expressing confidence that Colonel Alexander would be able to bring his organization up to the standard being set by troop carrier squadrons.[38]

In August Capt. E. V. Rickenbacker submitted to the Secretary of War a report on his visit to the CBI which had coincided with that of General Stratemeyer. He said that morale of ATC personnel "was nothing to be proud of," adding that both CNAC and troop carrier squadrons were far superior to ICW in their operations. As a possible solution, he recommended that the ICW again be placed under command of the theater commander,[39] a view which was shared by Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell commanding the Tenth Air Force.[40]

The Rickenbacker report gave other reasons for the failure of hump operations to come up to expectations. He listed in order:

1. Lack of capable and efficient management at the top
2. Limited number of airports
3. Need of expert communications personnel
4. Need of expert weather personnel
5. Need of more radio aids and direction finders
6. Need of more qualified engineering officers and maintenance men
7. Inexperience of pilots
8. Vast difference in pay of the Army and CNAC

He further stated that from 1 January to 1 June, 26 ICW transports had been damaged beyond repair. Some had collided with aircraft parked on landing strips for want of dispersal areas, and others had been lost by poor take-offs and landings.[41]

Another factor which possibly affected morale of pilots and crews on the hump run was the vulnerability of their aircraft to enemy fighters. American fighters based at Dinjan protected ATC installations as well as they were able with their limited warning net, and patrolled the route on the hump flight when possible. It was impossible, however, to give the cargo planes any degree of positive protection in flight. As the summer of 1943 wore on planes began to disappear on routine trips over the hump. It was believed that they were being destroyed by enemy fighters, but there was no definite proof. A few had been attacked, escaping only by diving into clouds.[42] Eventually crew members of lost planes began to walk out of Burma, telling stories of being shot down by Japanese fighters. Doubtless this did affect morale, but it must be remembered that CNAC and troop carrier personnel were subjected to the same hazards.

It is obvious that divided responsibility was at the root of much of the trouble with the development of the aerial supply service. This division was further complicated because it cut across lines of nationality. For instance, the construction of fields in Assam was planned by Americans and built by Indian labor under British direction, using materials supplied by the British. Later, American engineer battalions were called in to aid in the construction and share the maintenance duties. Flying of cargo ships into China was done by ICWATC, troop

carrier units, and CNAC, American military and Chinese-American civilian organizations, but the responsibility for moving the freight into Assam was British. The fields in Assam were used by American, British, and Chinese aircraft. Guarding of equipment on the fields in Assam was done by Ghurkas, and at Kunming by Chinese, while antiaircraft defenses were largely American.

Functions which were strictly American also suffered from separation of responsibility and authority. The Air Transport Command did not control loading and unloading of aircraft, a function of SOS and theater troops.[43] ICW policies were determined in Washington, but priorities were controlled by a theater board which sat in New Delhi, hundreds of miles from Assam. General Chennault's force whose very existence depended upon the aerial supply line had no representative on the priorities board.[44] Aerial protection for the terminal bases was divided between the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces.

A great part of the confusion which grew out of the command arrangement was unavoidable, but a part, at least, seemed to have arisen from a lack of singleness of purpose on the part of some individuals who were involved.[45] After their visits to CBI in May 1943 General Stratemeyer and Captain Rickenbacker both indicated that some strong central authority was necessary before best results could be obtained. Rickenbacker agreed with General Bissell that the entire operation should be under theater supervision. Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson who was in the theater at about the same time said that maximum efficiency could be attained only if the whole operation were the responsibility of one man.

In an effort to improve conditions the Assam American Air Base Command was activated on 16 June 1943 with Brig. Gen. Caleb V. Haynes in command.[46] The selection of General Haynes as coordinator of all American air activities in Assam indicated the importance of the move. He had been in the theater for more than a year and his three previous assignments there had given him a broad experience and brought him recognition as one of the ablest men in the theater. From his position as head of the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command he had moved into China to command the bomber wing of the CATF. Later he had returned to India to command the India Air Task Force which included all Tenth Air Force combat units stationed in India.

On 27 June General Chennault said in a letter to General Giles: "The appointment of C. V. Haynes as commander of the Assam area should do a great deal to increase tonnage if he is given sufficient support and freedom of action in managing things there."[47] On 30 July Madame Chiang Kai-shek, in a letter to President Roosevelt, said that the hump tonnage was not up to expectation because work on airfields in Assam was not being pushed, and because there was no central control of the airfields.[48] Obviously it would take some weeks before the many activities could be coordinated to the extent of visibly affecting hump tonnage figures.

Chapter IV

EARLY OPERATIONS

Operating over interior lines from a string of strategically located bases at Yunnanyi, Kunming, Lingling, Kweilin, and Hengyang, ringing the inner rim of occupied China, the Americans for more than two years had caused considerable consternation among the enemy air units. Shuttling squadrons from base to base and taking advantage of favorable meteorological conditions, they left the Japanese guessing where the next blow would fall. When enemy planes were brought into an area in anticipation of a prolonged attack, the Americans would pull out and strike undefended areas from which the enemy aircraft had been drawn. Upon occasion, however, when circumstances seemed propitious they would challenge their opponents directly by returning to the target which had been reinforced. These tactics thus pinned down a large portion of the Japanese air force which otherwise could have been used advantageously in other theaters.[1]

In addition to the immobilization of a material part of the enemy's air force the Americans had wrought considerable destruction, both in the air and on the ground. From 20 December 1941 to 5 February 1943 the AVG and CATF, always with considerably less than 100 operational aircraft, had destroyed 521 enemy planes. From 4 July to 5 February the 11th Bombardment Squadron (H) of the CATF in 62 missions totaling

1,048 hours of combat time had bombed such objectives as shipping, dock installations, depots, and troop concentrations in a semicircle from Hankow through the Canton-Hong Kong area to Haiphong in Indo-China and as far west as Shwebo in central China. Concurrently the 74th, 75th, and 76th Squadrons of the 23d Fighter Group with the 16th Figher Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group attached, was accumulating 5,836 hours of combat time in 1,448 missions including escort of daylight bombing missions, reconnaissance, strafing, defense of the ferry, and dive bombing.[2]

This remarkable record was made possible largely by the effective system of tactics and air defense formulated over the years by General Chennault. Despite the difficulties posed by the uneven terrain over which the air bases were located, the vagaries of Chinese weather, the lack of ground forces, and the logistical necessity of operating with the minimum of personnel he had, General Chennault undoubtedly merited his promotion to command a full-fledged air force.[3] The Fourteenth Air Force, however, began operations under conditions something less than favorable. Because of insufficient supplies of gasoline, as well as the longstanding need for the complete overhauling of combat aircraft, General Chennault had withdrawn his squadrons from the eastern bases and brought them back to the comparative safety of Kunming and Yunnanyi.

With the 74th Squadron at Yunnanyi to maintain offensive reconnaissance over the Burma Road and the terminals of the ferry, and other squadrons drawn into the vicinity of Kunming, he now scheduled and carried out in March a series of small raids on the rich phosphate mines near Laokay in French Indo-China. Information of vigorous Japanese expansion and

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

TARGETS OF THE 14TH AIR FORCE IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

development leaked through to Intelligence. According to fairly reliable reports the enemy had been shipping an estimated 1,000 tons of ore per day from Cam Duong. With deposits from other mines this vitally needed mineral was collected at Laokay on the French Indo-China border and shipped by rail to Haiphong or by boat to Hanoi. From rail cars and river boats it was transferred to ocean freighters and carried to Japan where it was manufactured into explosives and incendiaries. In five raids on 16, 19, 21, 22, and 23 March, executed chiefly by bomb-carrying P-40's but including also a raid by 12 medium bombers, the Americans seriously crippled the mines and transportation lines leading from them. Only as reports from the Chinese net began to trickle in did the Fourteenth realize the extent of the damage they had inflicted. For example, three days after the 21 March raid, fires were still burning furiously in the mines.[4] At Thainien, near Laokay, a phosphorous warehouse valued at 25,000 piastres lay in charred ruins, while at Laukiang, dormitories, offices, barracks, and construction materials of the Japanese Phosphorous Company had been gutted by fire. In addition supplies for the building of a mineral ore-loading wharf, the chain track of a suspended carriage line, and freight depots of the South Seas Colonization Company sustained considerable damage. Strafing raids, interspersed with the level and dive-bombing attacks, blew up locomotives, wrecked freight cars, snarled transportation and snapped telephone, telegraph, and cable lines serving the area.[5]

Furthermore the effect of the assaults went far beyond the physical damage to the installations. In desperate fear of future raids the enemy hastily dug an extensive system of trenches in the vicinity, set

up antiaircraft batteries, and generally strengthened defenses. Yet even this added protection did not appear reassuring enough for the coolie laborers who worked the mines. They began to desert in hordes. Those who remained behind refused to work at their old rate and, surprisingly enough, received an increase in wages. If the reports can be believed, few were tempted even by the wage increase.[6] For months the mines languished in expensive and enforced idleness.

The Japanese air force, however, did not remain inactive long. On 1 April they retaliated by mounting a nine-plane attack on Lingling where, by this time, the 75th Fighter Squadron was based. In the opinion of American interceptor pilots the Japanese displayed little aggressive spirit and no imagination. Scouting parties who scoured the environs of the field for wrecks after the battle uncovered a total of seven tangled Japanese Ol-type army planes. The warning net and tactics had evidently worked exceedingly well, for of the nine attackers only two escaped while the American lost only one plane.

From that day until the last week in April there was little aerial activity on either side. Rainy weather, combined with a critical shortage of gasoline, grounded all bombers and with one exception kept most of the fighters out of the air also. A break in the weather on 8 April found the 16th Fighter Squadron, recently arrived at Kweilin, still able to squeeze out enough gasoline for a 10-plane P-40 attack on Ft. Bayard, located in the former French-leased territory of Kwangchowan, and occupied by the Japanese since February 1943. The expenditure of 9,100 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition accounted for the destruction of six planes cached in an underground storage shelter, as well as the customs

compound, a residence for Japanese officers. An estimated 400 Japanese officers and men were killed and wounded during the attack.[7]

Other than this raid, combat operations were confined to offensive reconnaissance from Lungling to Lashio. In this section several P-40's of the 74th Squadron, flying from Yunnanyi every few days, strafed horse-drawn wagons, motor trucks, pack trains, and any other target caught moving along the Salween Gorge or the Burma Road. By 24 April the weather had cleared sufficiently for the bombers and fighters to take off again. From Kunming nine mediums, accompanied by 11 P-40's bombed the Namtu mines in Burma. Because of ground haze, however, observers could not determine the extent of the damage. But reconnaissance the next day showed a direct hit on the reduction plant, two hits on another building, and a few hits on the storage sheds.

The clearing of the weather on 24 April also gave the enemy a chance to move against American bases. Shortly before 1400, 13 P-40's, warned and waiting in the sun over Lingling, watched a lone twin-engine plane swoop low over the field to drop pamphlets. High above, meanwhile, 24 other enemy planes waited to close in. The pamphlet was a challenge to the Americans:[8]

> Our respects to your men who have taken great pains to come to China. We take pride to say, in fact, we are the strongest and best in the world. We express our desire as <u>sportsmen</u> to hold a decisive air battle with you in a fair and honorable manner. We then can best prove to you the spirit and ability of our Air Force.

Although the Domei News Agency later claimed that the Americans refused to take up the challenge because of tactical reasons,[9] in the battle which actually took place the P-40's brought down five planes including the one which dropped the pamphlets, with six more listed as probables.

After the others fled it was found that one P-40 had sustained negligible damage.

With this battle the Japanese initiated a series of hard-hitting raids which in several instances severly punished the American air bases. Showing more imagination the Japanese in another raid on 26 April used a clever ruse to spring a complete surprise on the Yunnanyi base, occupied by the 16th Fighter Squadron. For several days prior to the attack Japanese planes had circled over and around the Mekong and Salween rivers, alerting the warning net without actually attacking, yet forcing the Americans to waste precious gas on abortive alerts. On the day of the raid the spotters flashed the warning that enemy planes passing southwest of the Salween were headed for Yunnanyi. Pilots immediately went on the alert, but a few minutes later relaxed without taking off when information was received indicating that the enemy flight had turned back. Then the unexpected happened. Those stations along the Mekong River which previously had been reliable failed to report the approach of the same planes from another direction.[10] The Japs struck without warning, bombing and strafing the field. Catching 20 P-40's on the ground the raiders destroyed five, severely damaged seven, and slightly damaged the remaining eight. In spite of the disastrous results the squadron commander was not felt to be at fault. He had made his decision to keep the planes on the ground to conserve gasoline only after being reasonably assured that the enemy had turned back.[11]

Encouraged by this success the Japanese two days later confused the net near Kunming with the same tactics. Slipping through the warning posts 21 bombers and an equal number of fighters hit the north end of the

field inflicting casualties on Americans and Chinese who were caught without warning. Two of the casualties were recently arrived American officers: Colonel Lyon was killed instantly and General Glenn slightly wounded. The string of bombs, possibly because of the high wind, fell flightly to one side of a group of hangars and shops, and the damage was slight, a few B-25's parked near the runway suffering inconsequential hits from bomb fragments.

Unlike the Yunnanyi raid two days before, two P-40's were in the air when the bombers came over, and their presence possibly caused the slight miscalculation in the bomb run. As the enemy flew away to the southwest another eight fighters from the 75th Squadron, recently returned to Kunming from Lingling in anticipation of such an attack, overhauled the raiders about 100 miles southwest of the field. Without loss to themselves they destroyed 10 Japanese fighters and damaged five, with three more listed as probables.

During the raid observers had noted a new and unusual feature in the Jap tactics. High above the bomber formation a single observation plane had circled slowly during the approach and bomb run, advising its colleagues when to attack or retire, depending on the number of planes the Americans succeeded in getting into the air to counter the assault.[12]

While the 75th Squadron was still at Kunming the Japanese on 29 April took advantage of their absence to bomb their field at Lingling. None of the Japanese bombers, which were escorted by 14 fighters, scored hits on the head of the runway. On 2 May they returned to Lingling with a force of 35 fighters but this time the 75th was there to meet them. As the enemy fled northward 17 P-40's shot down 7 enemy planes, with another

7 claimed as probables. During the encounter the Americans lost one plane and one pilot, Capt. John F. Hampshire. Captain Hampshire, currently the "hottest" pilot of the squadron, destroyed two planes in the fight to run his score to 14 before receiving a freak shot in the stomach, possibly a ricochet. He radioed his position just before making a forced landing on an island in the Hsiang River. After swimming the stream he was picked up by Chinese guerillas who set out with him for a hospital in Changsha, 60 kilometers away. The exertion of swimming the river and the long rough trip proved too much and he died en route.[13]

While General Chennault was in Washington Col. Eugene Beebe prepared to test the long-range offensive arm of the B-24's of the 308th Group. On 4 May the heavy group made its combat debut. In a combined mission with 12 B-25's and 24 P-40's, 18 Liberators took off from bases at Chengkung, Yangkai, and Kunming at 0830 on the biggest bombing mission yet flown in China. The mission gained additional significance from the fact that Chinese pilots who had recently joined the Fourteenth were used as co-pilots in the medium bombers.[14] After taking off, the entire force proceeded along the direct route to Laokay, at which point they followed the Red River southward to Hanoi. The pilots deliberately tried to draw enemy fighters into the air, but none appeared. Apparently the Japanese had been taken completely by surprise, for even the ack-ack was light and inaccurate. At Hanoi the flight separated. The B-25's and P-40's went on to bomb port installations at Haiphong, while the B-24's flew over the Gulf of Tonkin in a southeastwardly course to the southern tip of Hainan Island where their target was Samah Bay. At Haiphong cloud conditions not only prevented the mediums from spotting their primary target, the

cement works, but also made it impossible for them to observe accurately their strikes at the harbor installations which they chose as an alternate target. What little could be seen through the fog seemed to indicate hits on ammunition dumps as well as warehouses. Meanwhile the Liberators over Samah Bay were hitting the airdrome, a coal yard, dock installations, an oil refinery, and a fuel dump. Subsequently the Chinese learned that the dump had burned for three days. During the bomb run no aircraft had been observed on the ground, but an agent, claiming to have been an eyewitness of the raid, later told the intelligence officers that six fighters and 15 bombers had been destroyed in the hangars which burned that day.[15] Estimates of Japanese and Chinese puppet-troop casualties were placed at 600.[16] Considering the size and distance of the mission, not to mention the inexperience of the Liberator crews, the American success was satisfactory and losses relatively light. One B-24 which had been forced to feather a prop landed at the emergency field at Nanning. Tragedy struck another plane. The crew abandoned a Liberator near Laokay, one crew member being killed; the others made their way back to Kunming in seven days.

After a rest of four days Colonel Beebe, instigator of the Hainan raid, readied his men for their second mission into Japanese-held territory. Enough gas remained in their reserve stocks to warrant a trip to the Tien Ho airdrome at Canton on 8 May. As planned in the briefing room, the 10 mediums were to take the airdrome while the 16 Liberators hit the barracks and storage area. Col. Clinton D. Vincent's 24 P-40's were to fly escort from Kweilin. The bombardiers on the B-24's calculated their bomb run in such a manner that any bombs which overshot the mark

would land on the field. One major mishap marred the flight to the target. Just as one of the B-25's opened its bomb bay doors the plane exploded. Hurtling to the ground with the crew inside it crashed into a four-story warehouse. Shortly after the run on the airfield a swarm of Zeros swept into the bombers. Although it was generally thought that the enemy had only five minutes warning it apparently was enough time for them to send 20 fighters into the air. Colonel Vincent's P-40's countered their effort by bringing down 13, while the Liberator gunners brought down three. In order to save face with the Cantonese, the Japanese explained away the high combat losses by telling them that the Japanese planes had been manned by Germans and Italians.

Bombing damage on the target was widespread. Twenty-one buildings in the depot area, four in the operational section, as well as the main hangar housing nine aircraft, were completely wiped out.[17] Smoke from large quantities of gas and oil filled the air.[18] As a matter of fact, the whole target was so thoroughly covered with smoke two days later that a photo plane was unable to take pictures of the damage.[19] The Liberator crews were genuinely elated over the success of their first two combat missions and extremely sorry to have to return to the routine business of ferrying bombs and gasoline over the hump for future operations.

As yet the lack of forward fields which could accommodate heavy bombers and which could be adequately protected against enemy attacks had kept the squadrons of the 308th Group to their original bases in the Kunming area--Yangkai, Chengkung, and Kunming itself. Early in May, however, the fighter squadrons made one of their characteristic shifts,

which while serving to permit aircraft maintenance and rest for the crews, also kept the enemy confused. After six weeks at advanced bases, Kweilin and Lingling, the 16th and 75th Squadrons were stationed rearward at Yunnanyi and Kunming. At the same time the 74th moved from Yunnanyi to take the place of the 16th at Kweilin, and the 76th moved from Kunming to replace the 75th at Lingling. The 11th Bombardment Squadron (M), still somewhat handicapped by shortage of gas, remained in the comparative safety of Kunming.

Because of the great distances which separated the bases used by the Fourteenth, the regular moves were time-consuming. The forward bases, Kweilin, Lingling, and Hengyang, near enough together for mutual protection, were far from the other bases. For instance, the aerial distance from Kunming to Kweilin is almost 500 miles, and from Kunming to Hengyang more than 600 miles. Movement of the 16th Squadron from Kweilin to Yunnanyi, or the 74th from Yunnanyi to Kweilin, required that the squadrons travel almost 700 miles. The forward bases, however, were constantly exposed to enemy attacks with very little warning, and their maintenance facilities were of necessity quite limited. A few weeks at Kweilin, Hengyang, or Lingling generally left fighter pilots exhausted and their aircraft badly in need of repairs. Yunnanyi and Kunming, also near enough together for mutual protection, were not exactly safety zones themselves, but they had a more adequate warning system and far better maintenance and repair facilities. Hence the necessity of changes of station at regular intervals.

With the heavy bombers again resuming ferrying duties the fighters had to be relied upon to carry out the aerial offensive when weather

permitted. A description of the raid of 10 May, the last of any importance until the end of the month, serves well to demonstrate what a handful of P-40's can accomplish on offensive reconnaissance. On that day eight "Sharks" were dispatched from Kunming to northern French Indo-China. Striking at targets of opportunity they destroyed an alcohol plant at Nam Dinh, four locomotives, three river boats, two tank cars, one flat car filled with troops and equipment, and five or six troop-filled trucks. For the remaining time, the usual bad weather during this season and the fuel shortage kept the planes close to their fields, earmarked for emergency defense only.

In the interim from 2 to 14 May, during which the squadrons were being shifted, and the bombers and fighters were hammering Hainan Island, Canton, Haiphong, and the above-mentioned targets of opportunity in Indo-China, the Japanese had not chanced a single attack on a major American base. This did not mean, however, that their air force was entirely inactive. Quite to the contrary, they were busy every day confusing the Chinese warning net and alerting American air fields. Employing exactly the same circling tactics they had used against Yunnanyi and Kunming late in April, their flights each day approached within 60 to 100 miles of Kunming and then retired. Each time the pattern remained the same, even to the observation plane which hovered above the formation. Anxiously the Americans watched for them to make a break for the Kunming airdromes. Finally, on 15 May, they struck with the heaviest assault yet made on an American base in the Asiatic theater. In all, they sent 30 twin-engine bombers and approximately 40 Zeros. The net had given ample warning, probably 40 minutes. Four

P-40's were in the air waiting for the bombers. Although they did not prevent the enemy from dropping their bombs the Sharks did interfere with the bomb run. As the planes left the target, even before they had time to close their bomb bay doors, 22 more P-40's had established contact. Handicapped by inability to reach the altitude of the top-cover Zeros, the P-40's conducted a running battle as the enemy withdrew on a course of 230 degrees. Before they had gone beyond the range of the American fighter planes the Japanese had lost 13 fighters and 2 bombers, with an additional 8 fighters and 2 bombers probably knocked out.

As the personnel of the Kunming airdrome picked themselves up out of their bomb-spattered slit trenches and fox holes, they found that only three planes had been destroyed on the field--a B-24 which had taxied up five minutes before the bombs landed, a B-25 being cannibalized for spare parts, and an old Chinese trainer. Subsequent investigation of the field disclosed nearly 200 bomb pits in a pattern which would have blanketed the entire field if the bombs had not fallen short. The original four P-40's had done their work well. The day following the raid the American pilots listened with expressed amusement to a Tokyo radio claim that Japanese pilots had destroyed 20 American planes in the air and on the ground.[20] Actually not a single plane had been lost in the air during the melee. Moreover, according to one tabulation, this Japanese claim was almost three times as great as the number of planes the Fourteenth Air Force had lost in the air for the past month and a half. In the six times they had engaged the enemy since 1 April the Americans had lost only two pilots and seven planes. In the same period they had scored 60 confirmed kills plus an additional 38 probables. The Japanese were winning victories in the air--but by radio rather than combat.

Chapter V

RICE BOWL CAMPAIGN

During the early operations of the infant air force, and while General Chennault was in Washington attending the Trident Conference, logistical plans and problems of repair and maintenance of aircraft had been thoroughly threshed out. In order to make maximum use of Chinese ground men and keep American personnel in China to a minimum General Chennault had recommended that all fourth-echelon responsibilities be retained in India and that no separate air service command be created for the Fourteenth Air Force. Furthermore, he suggested that the single service command serving the Tenth and Fourteenth be placed under control of the theater commander. By this arrangement, he believed, facilities could be pooled and many difficulties which would accompany the setting up of a second air service command in the theater could be avoided.[1] He realized that when substantial increase was made in the air force in China another service command would be necessary, but felt that the activation of certain other units at that time were more important.

It was the opinion of the air staff, however, that the efficacy of the policy of providing each air force with an air service command had been proved, and also that it would be unwise to withdraw the X Air Service Command from the Tenth Air Force and place it under the theater commander.[2] Any air force commander, said Brig. Gen. L. G. Saunders,

Deputy Chief of Air Staff, is seriously handicapped if the air service command is removed from his command control. He proposed that an air service command for China be tailored to meet the specific requirements of General Chennault and that fourth-echelon repair continue as a function of the Tenth. Moreover, he concluded that General Stilwell should direct the Tenth Air Force to furnish the Fourteenth the necessary fourth-echelon logistical support, priorities to be established and conflicting requirements to be resolved by the theater commander.[3]

During the Trident Conference final approval was given not only to the material enlargement of the Fourteenth but also to the rebuilding of the Chinese Air Force. Since it was agreed that the Fourteenth would assume responsibility for the supply of the rejuvenated Chinese Air Force, General Chennault was convinced of the immediate necessity of an air service command for China. While still in Washington he drew up a tentative manning table for the Fourteenth Air Force Air Service Command Headquarters and made known what units would be needed. He said that no attempt would be made to set up a parallel organization which would overlap or duplicate the service command of the Tenth Air Force but that to save personnel every effort would be made to streamline the service command of the Fourteenth and make it an integral part of the air force.[4] Steps were taken immediately to provide additional personnel for the projected organization, and on 19 May 1943 the XIV Air Service Command was activated, with Brig. Gen. Julian B. Haddon, already in China, as commanding general.[5]

Meanwhile the enemy in China was executing a vigorous counter-air force plan. The intensification of assaults on American bases late in

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

TUNG-TING LAKE REGION

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April, coinciding almost to the day with General Chennault's departure, soon took shape as an integral part of a ground offensive launched in the Tungting Lake region early in May. Presumably the Japanese hoped to insure successful execution of their land operations by removing as far as possible the threat of American air power. Apparently the enemy reinforced the Tungting area at the expense of the Hanoi-Haiphong region, probably hoping that bad weather conditions would provide sufficient protection from the American bombers. At any rate, on 24 April Chungking reported that 190 enemy planes had arrived in the Canton area.[6] Later combat and reconnaissance missions revealed that there were practically no aircraft in northern Indo-China, and few in the vicinity of Canton. It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that the aircraft which arrived at Canton were en route to the Tungting Lake rice bowl from Indo-China. This also seems to be borne out by the pattern of enemy air attacks on American airdromes. Yunnanyi and Kunming were accessible to Burma-based planes, and more than once were heavily attacked from that direction. Hengyang, Lingling, Kienow, Kanchow, Suichwan, Liangshan, Enshih, and other American and Chinese airfields to the north and east were bombed repeatedly, but Kweilin, easily reached either from Canton or Indo-China, was not attacked.

Despite Japanese avowal of their intention to capture Chungking, their exact objective is not clear. Chinese intelligence, however, thought that the advance had three major aims:[7]

1. To protect river traffic from Hankow to Ichang.
2. To obtain control of the rice-producing regions around Tungting Lake.

3. To draw Chinese troops northward for the purpose of depleting strength in the southern regions, making them more vulnerable to attack

Past experience with similar offensives substantiate the suppositions of the Chinese. In March, a fortnight campaign into the rice area had seriously interrupted the planting season and destroyed a large part of the valuable stores in the Chinese trading centers. With the approach of the harvest season the Japanese now determined to supplement their earlier work by reaping or destroying the portion of the rice crops escaping devastation as seedlings in the earlier spring drive. Such a move, moreover, would bring with it the added advantage of opening the way to Changsha, Chinese "rice bin."[8] The loss of Changsha would be seriously felt by the American air units, for it served well as the eyes and ears of the squadrons of the Fourteenth stationed at Hengyang and Lingling.

The aerial activity which followed the initiation of the land and air offensive in the Tungting Lake vicinity followed no definite plan, but on both sides apparently consisted of a day-to-day selection of targets largely determined by the vicissitudes of the daily battles. The Japanese were trying strenuously to gain air ascendancy by the destruction of all American-used bases in range of the land operations. Time after time they were successful in knocking out fields temporarily, and thereby they cramped American aerial activity. Delayed-action bombs were troublesome but tenacious Chinese laborers rebuilt landing strips so rapidly that while operations were deterred they were never stopped.

The Americans, strengthened by arrival of 50-odd P-40K's and

P-40M's during May,[9] attempted by their aerial efforts to stop the Japanese push toward Chungking and Changsha, but were forced to take counter-air force action to prevent being driven from their precariously held forward bases. Consequently they bombed and strafed enemy ground positions, fought off enemy raiders when possible, and attacked every enemy airdrome within their range.

In considerable part Japanese plans for the entire operation revolved about the key city of Yochow located on the northeast corner of TungtingLake. As a railhead and river port, Yochow served as a collection and distribution point for the armed forces of the Japanese in the whole region. Furthermore it stood as a guardian over rail, river, and lake traffic between Hankow and Ichang. Consequently when the Jap land offensive continued to make headway, the American fighter-bombers of the 23d Group gave it top billing on its bombing priority list. An attempt to dive-bomb the city was made by the 74th Squadron on 21 May but the effort was thwarted when three Zeros intercepted the flight of four P-40's 4,000 feet above the lake. Jettisoning their bombs the Sharks scrambled with the Japanese fighters, damaging two and possibly destroying a third, without damage to themselves.

On the 28th the 74th Fighter Squadron gained a measure of revenge for the rough handling they had recently received at Yunnanyi when the Japs had attacked while all the American planes were on the ground. At 1100 hours 12 P-40's dive-bombed Yochow without opposition. At 1630 another 12 P-40's carried out an even heavier dive-bombing attack on the same target, again without molestation by enemy fighters. In this double blow at the key point of the Japanese ground offensive they destroyed one

locomotive at the station, a train south of the station, Japanese headquarters near the lake, and also a puppet headquarters. In all, about 200 Japanese were killed, including a lieutenant general arriving by train from Hankow to direct the offensive in the Yochow region. The results were indeed gratifying, especially to the Chinese who lost no time in expressing their usual appreciation for the attack.[10] According to General Glenn, the Chinese officers claimed that the raid had greatly boosted the morale of the Chinese troops in that area.[11]

Chinese ground resistance stiffened on the TungtingLake front with this raid, but the Japanese drive to the north in the Ichang and Itu regions of the Yangtze valley had gained enough strength and momentum by this time to pose a serious threat to Chungking, provisional capital and symbol of resistance in China. By the last week in May, five Japanese divisions had pushed up to the mountain gorges which form the gateway to the city.[12] The situation had grown so acute that the Generalissimo sent an urgent request to the Fourteenth for air-ground cooperation.[13] Although this did not appear to be a proper project for heavy bombers the 308th Group soon demonstrated that General Chennault was not talking idly at Trident when he said that enemy penetrations along rivers could be stopped by air power. On the 27th and 28th six B-24's from the 374th Squadron with three others from the 425th Squadron, attached for the special operation, moved to Hsinching field in the Chengtu area. Five transports accompanied them to carry essential equipment, supplies, and ground personnel. Taking only one day to complete preparations the nine heavies struck the city of Ichang the next day with 36,000 pounds of bombs. In the absence of American fighters, Chinese fighters under two

American officers gave excellent cover for the operation. About 70 per cent of the bombs landed in the target area, damaging military and supply installations so seriously, and interrupting communications along the Yangtze so completely, that a Chinese counteroffensive begun the following day pocketed a substantial part of the Japanese ground troops and forced the remnant to retire in disorder.

Following up their advantage the next seven B-24's dropped 42 x 500-pound bombs on "invisible artillery positions" located for them by the Chinese. None of the bomber crews could observe the results, but the Chinese subsequently reported that this mission was likewise successful.[14] Japanese reaction to the raid seemed to corroborate Chinese claims, for they made a bold bid to regain the air initiative on the 31st when the B-24's from Chengtu came over to bomb the Kingmen airdrome, approximately 50 miles northeast of Ichang. Since the bombardiers were unable to spot the airdrome because of dense fog they flew to Ichang where 40 Zeros intercepted the flight. In a running battle which developed during and after the bomb run, the B-24's knocked down one after another of the attacking fighters. According to squadron reports 20 Zeros were confirmed, with five more counted as probables. Later reports from Chinese Army men indicated that most if not all of the probables had also been destroyed.[15] This action marked a new record for fighter aircraft shot down by heavy bombers in the China theater.[16]

With their air and ground offensive blunted, the Japanese began to withdraw. Telegrams of congratulation, more laudatory than accurate, poured in to Fourteenth Air Force Headquarters. The following one is typical:[17]

> During the recent great campaign in West Hupeh and North Hunan Province, you have gained majestic prestige by many admirable feats and you have dealt hammering blows to our enemy. The crushing onslaught of aggression has been dammed up and final victory for the United Nations thus assured. Ravished by your grand success, we are hereby sending you our grateful congratulations.

Exaggeration, it should be remembered, seems to be inherent in the polite expressions of the Chinese. Consequently such telegrams, indeed even Chinese military claims, while often flattering and usually interesting, should always be read with caution. Antithetically, it is quite possible that the Japanese had intended to withdraw as they had always done in the past. It is true, however, that by these missions the Americans robbed the enemy of the air power needed by them to strafe and bomb Chinese troops, supply dumps, and communications. With air ascendancy in the hands of the Americans it was the Japanese rather than the Chinese who received severe punishment. If the enemy had planned to push on to Chungking as they originally claimed, the loss of air ascendancy was sufficient cause for them to alter their plans. Whatever the reason, by the first week in June shortly after General Chennault returned to China, the threat, real or imagined, to Chungking and Changsha was disappearing, and for the time being, at least, the enemy was in retreat. Radio Tokyo claimed on 2 June:[13]

> The offensive operations carried out between the western sector of TungtingLake and the Ichang Mountain areas that began early in May were completed with full attainment of their objectives and each unit has returned to its former regiment.

To the exclusion of all other combat aerial activity during the first week of June, the fighter-bombers and the mediums which had moved eastward on 28 May exploited to the full extent of their available

strength the land and air advantage they had wrested from the Japanese. With commendable persistence the American flyers harassed the enemy troops as they lumbered back with their impedimenta from the front lines. The dive-bombing Sharks temporarily disrupted train service between Kuchang and Yochow by severing railroad bridges in the Yanglowtung region. They sank some of the motor launches and barges crammed with troops trying to escape across Tungting Lake to the safety of more stable lines to the north. Troop columns winding along the road near Changyang and at Paiyang were machine-gunned. At Pailiuchi the level-bombing Mitchells, operating temporarily out of Kweilin and Hengyang, tore up installations and the landing field. Fighter planes fired a headquarters building at Yanglowtung as well as a barracks at Tangyang. Ammunition dumps, motor pools, and oil storage depots were destroyed wherever they could be found. But on 8 June attention was turned briefly to another sector of the theater.

On that day information revealing the presence of 15 freighters in the harbor at Haiphong offered the Fourteenth Air Force a rich enough target to warrant the temporary suspension of combat flights in the Tungting Lake area. In a combined operation 17 B-24's of the 425th, 373d, and 375th Squadrons, six B-25's of the 11th Squadron, and 17 P-40's of the 74th and 75th Squadrons were dispatched for the French Indo-China coast and Haiphong. Before reaching the objective, however, the formation encountered heavy overcast and thunderstorms which forced them to abandon their primary targets and to seek out instead the secondary targets of Hanoi and Hongay. Only the sinking of a 7,000-ton freighter, later confirmed,[19] made the mission worth the heavy consumption of

precious gasoline required for the operation. Although the unpredictable vagaries of the weather had cheated the men of their prize, they still clung avidly to the hope of catching the freighters the next day. Again the Haiphong mission was scheduled but again inclement weather intervened and it had to be canceled. In 24 hours, six inches of rain had transformed the Kunming airfield into a lake, miring the heavy bombers. As it turned out, the monsoons which in southern China begin in June, washed out all B-24 combat missions for the rest of the month. Dampened in spirits at the gloomy prospect the 308th again took on the laborious, uninspiring, but vitally necessary chore of hauling freight over the hump. On these cargo flights the Liberators were protected by the 16th Fighter Squadron from Yunnanyi, which in addition to its daily ferry patrol carried out from 9 to 14 June a series of strafing and bombing raids on Kunlong, Lungling, Lameng, Wanling, Tengchung, and other targets along the Salween Gorge and the Burma Road.

In the meantime at Kweilin, Lingling, and Hengyang, in the face of adverse elements, the fighters of the 74th and 76th Squadrons resumed their raids on objectives north of Changsha. From 9 June to the end of the month, fighting the weather more often than the enemy, the squadrons performed with moderate success five missions comprising 24 sorties against targets of opportunity at Itu, Yochow, Shasi, Puchi, and Kienli. But during the period the enemy frequently dealt in kind. On 10 June they hit the important base at Hengyang. Eight I-97 (Sally) twin-engine bombers succeeded in making their bomb run at 5,000 feet with a top cover of 16 fighters 1,000 feet above, but were immediately contacted by 11 P-40's. While the ensuing engagement was continuing, a second flight

of 15 Zeros sneaked in at 1,000 feet but were immediately engaged by seven other P-40's which had taken off during and following the first attack. When the final score was checked it was found that one bomber was destroyed and three fighters and another bomber probably destroyed. Later the Chinese confirmed the destruction of three of the probables. The bombing had not been accurate, the field escaping with little damage when all the bombs fell to the east. Nine fighters took off from Ling-ling to lend assistance but were never able to make an interception.

On the same day (10 June) nine enemy bombers escorted by 17 fighters attacked the outlying field at Kienow. Meeting with no fighter opposition they aimed their missiles deliberately and with a high degree of accuracy. Seventy bombs rained on the field, 20 of them striking the runway. Six hours after the attack 40 of the bombs had not exploded.

The following day the Japanese attacked at will installations at Siang Siang and Changsha, but three days later 8 P-40's exacted a large toll when they caught 19 bombers with a 20-plane escort flying along leisurely 25 miles southwest of Nanchang. They were apparently heading toward Kanchow and Suichwan, American-used fields known to be undefended by fighter planes, but alert spotters warned Kweilin in time for pilots from that field to establish an advantageous contact with the raiders. This cost the enemy eight fighters, with two probables and one damaged, while only one American plane sustained damage. Undoubtedly the Americans themselves had provoked this enemy raid for on the preceding day they had made a low-level attack on Nanchang with 11 Mitchells and 14 P-40's. From 150 feet they had dropped 132 x 100-pound bombs. With 85 per cent of the release in the target area, the bombardiers hit--repeatedly in

several instances--runways, revetments, and hangars, destroying 10 trucks, 4 aircraft, 2 gasoline dumps, and killing an estimated 40 Japanese soldiers and a number of Chinese laborers.

During the remainder of the month the mediums of the 11th Squadron mounted three attacks, all at the request of Chinese ground officers. The 11th Squadron, transferred to Kweilin temporarily late in May, finally moved into that base on a permanent basis. They were able, however, to use Hengyang for some of their operations, giving them a much greater range to the north. On 15 June this squadron achieved excellent results in the bombing of Ouchihkou, situated on the Yangtze 36 miles south of Shasi; the second raid, six days later, against enemy positions near Shihshow, was likewise a success. But the third, in the afternoon of the same day, turned out to be one of those fateful ironies of war that sometimes plague the best military plans and intentions. Owing perhaps to the similarity of terrain and the inaccuracy of maps, a flight of eight B-25's mistakenly attacked the Chinese town of Nanhsien instead of the Japanese stronghold of Hwajung.[20] As a result of the error two Chinese officers, three soldiers, and 50 civilians were killed.[21] Shortly after this bombing accident the weather blanked out the remaining operations scheduled for the month.

Statistically June did not measure up to the sortie and bomb expenditure record of May. During May the Fourteenth had dropped 121 tons of bombs in 936 sorties, while in June inclement weather, gasoline shortage, and the necessity of keeping close defense on air bases cut the number of sorties to 748 and the bomb tonnage to 67.[22] Yet, strategically, June could be considered quite a successful month. The squadrons at

advanced bases had continued to slug it out with the enemy while at the same time dealing punishment to the enemy air force and their bases. They definitely established the fact, frequently questioned by some military strategists, that, isolated as they were, they could absorb all the punishment the enemy was capable of handing out and yet continue their own operations. There was no longer any question of their having to retreat to the Kunming region as they had done earlier in the year. With the Japanese offensive on the wane and the enemy unable to oust the Americans from the advanced bases, the Fourteenth could, in July, devote its attention to strategic targets, particularly shipping.

Chapter VI

JULY OPERATIONS -- SEA SEARCHES

When General Chennault first suggested that the American air units in China be separated from the Tenth, strengthened, and made a separate air force, he stated that such an arrangement would have the advantage of permitting operations north of the Yangtze and attacks on Japanese shipping along the coast. The Tungting Lake campaign of May-June had already ushered in American aerial activity north of the Yangtze; July was to mark the initiation of offensive action against enemy coastal shipping by heavy bombers.

It had been recognized at the time of the Trident Conference that if the destruction of enemy vessels became a serious threat to Japanese north-south lines of communication, retaliation could be expected in the form of enemy land offensives against advanced American bases as well as serious counter-air force action. The older P-40B's and P-40E's in the fighter squadrons were slowly being replaced by later model P-40K's and P-40M's,[1] and when the Chungking-Changsha drive and the accompanying counter-air force action was safely weathered, General Chennault believed the Fourteenth strong enough to risk retaliation by turning attention toward the coastal areas of China and French Indo-China.

During the months of May and June General Davison had been conducting an investigation in China "to determine the practicability of operating

against Japanese commerical shipping." His careful analysis of the theater situation uncovered certain underlying factors basic to a consideration of the problem. To him, the ground armies in China seemed to be stalemated for the present at least, with the enemy in possession of northern China, the Yangtze valley up to Ichang, and a number of ports such as Amoy, Hong Kong, Foochow, Swatow, and Canton. In some of these places he found that Japanese holdings were extremely precarious, especially along rivers and railways, and sporadic forays by Chinese guerillas and American flyers occasionally disrupted these communications. Beyond this threat to communications, however, the lack of equipment in the regular Chinese Army forestalled any determined Chinese land offensive in the theater aimed at recovering their lost territory.[2]

Only in the air did the Allies have the power to prosecute a vigorous offensive against the enemy. By directing its aerial strength against one of the most vulnerable parts of the Japanese war machine, the river and ocean merchant marine, General Davidson, like General Chennault, believed that the Fourteenth Air Force could help immeasurably in weakening Japan's tenuous hold on its wartime empire. Much of the shipping, particularly for the war effort in China, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies, passed along the China coast within easy reach of long-range planes operating from existing bases in China. American submarines were already reported to have been sinking ships off the China coast at a rate greater than the replacement capacity of the enemy. By hitting the merchant marine the Fourteenth would not only contribute to an increased attrition rate through the actual sinking of ships but would also aid the efforts of American submarines by forcing enemy ships out beyond the protection

of the coastal shelf and into the deep water where United States underseas craft could get at them. On the lakes and rivers of central China the fighter-bombers of the 23d Fighter Group had already begun the process of whittling down Japanese inland merchant marine through dive bombing and strafing. General Davidson's proposal seemed to contain fruitful possibilities for the future employment of Fourteenth Air Force power.[3]

Toward the immediate translation of this promising suggestion into rewarding action, General Chennault forthwith advised the heavy bomber group and the medium bomber squadron that shipping and harbor installations would have first priority on the target docket for the month of July. With the torrential rains and heavy overcast of June still holding the China coast and American bases in its grip, the bombers were compelled to postpone the inauguration of the new program until the second week of the month when the cloud bank gave promise of lifting. Capitalizing on this and every subsequent break in the overcast during the month the bombers struck again and again at their assigned targets. After a bombing attack of uncertain results on Pailiuchi on 6 July the 11th Squadron, recently moved to Kweilin, opened the new campaign of sea searches with an attack on the harbor at Canton. Although the intention was to hit shipping at the Whampoa Docks with nine B-25's and 24 P-40's, two fighters and two bombers aborted before reaching the target. The remainder, bombing through 9/10 broken clouds at 17,500 feet, concentrated their 42 x 500-pound explosives on three large motor vessels ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 tons. With observation obscured by overhanging clouds the bombardiers could not determine the extent of

the damage. Later intelligence, however, lifted the veil of uncertainty and credited to the 11th Squadron the sinking of an 8,000-ton cargo transport, the Tahatiho Maru, together with her brood of 10 lighters. In repulsing the interceptors, who tried not too aggressively to crack the formation, the American fighters added two more planes to their confirmed column, with four more listed as probables.[4]

With this raid the USAAF, operating in China for almost one year, brought the total number of Japanese aircraft destroyed to 342--242 in aerial combat and 100 on the ground. Meanwhile the Americans had lost only 30 planes in the air and 13 on the ground--a ratio of better than 8 to 1.[5]

In the Thampoa raid the enemy had been given only a warning of the destructive capabilities of the heavy bombers. Loaded with 66,000 pounds of explosives 22 B-24's departed from Chengkung at 1000 on 8 July to bomb shipping, docks, cement works, and other installations at Haiphong. En route they picked up an escort of 13 P-40's from Kweilin. Bombs from six of the planes gutted an 8,000-ton freighter in the stream off the docks. The remaining planes placed 60 per cent of their missiles on the cement works, demolishing two warehouses.

An unusual incident of the mission earned for the pilot and gunner of the B-24 Mudfish an oak leaf cluster to the DFC, and the soldier's medal, respectively. Just as their plane had lifted itself from the end of the runway on the take-off it clipped a steamroller, shattering the nose-wheel gear of the plane and leaving the wheel dangling loosely in the air. The pilot, however, elected to continue on the mission. The dangling wheel, he knew, would tag the Liberator as a cripple and

openly invite the constant attention of all enemy fighters. So from Chengkung to the vicinity of Hanoi the gunner tried in vain to disengage the telltale evidence of distress. Finally, in desperation, he lowered himself without a parachute through the gaping hole, and hanging with both hands jumped on the wheel until it broke loose. Then came the bomb run, the trip back home, and the problem of making a landing without a nose wheel. Three quarters of an hour out of Chengkung the pilot ordered all movable equipment piled in the rear of the plane in order to make the nose as light as possible. After making sure that all crew members had wrapped themselves in heavy flying togs to cushion the crash landing the pilot slowly nosed in. With gas gone and engines cut, the Mudfish responded beautifully to the deft hand of the pilot, settling down on her tail and dragging to a stop--a perfect landing.[6]

Continuing their sea searches 14 B-24's left Chengkung on the gray morning of 10 July to seek out shipping targets of opportunity in the Haiphong-Hongay area. Expending a total of 62 x 500-pound and 10 x 1000-pound bombs with 6 incendiary clusters mixed in, the Liberators smashed dock installations, including a dry dock, warehouses, a cement plant at Haiphong, a smelter at Quangyen, northeast of the city, and a railroad yard near Hongay. One plane in the second flight salvoed its bombs on a large freighter roughly estimated at 7,000 tons, lying in the stream opposite the cement plant. "Two hits were observed, one fore and one after the ship, with a great enough distance between to allow the presumption that the two bombs not observed striking the water struck the ship."[7] With this evidence and in the light of later reports there is reason to assume that the ship was actually sunk.

Results the next day of a six-plane mission over the Haiphong-Dalong Bay area were less doubtful. The first flight scored eight near misses on a 300-foot tanker in the bay south of Haiphong. Thinking this insufficient to sink the vessel two of the planes peeled off almost like P-38's, and in an unfamiliar maneuver for heavy bombers, strafed the ship at a level of 25 to 75 feet. Machine-gun pellets spattered across the deck as each plane swept in below mast-height. Reconnaissance pictures later showed the ship to be submerged with only a part of its superstructure protruding above the surface. The second wave flying over Campha-Port at 7,000 feet spotted a 200-foot mine-layer and a 280-foot cargo vessel tied up at the docks. Fanning out for individual attacks they directed a total of 8 x 1,000-pound bombs at these ships; one exploded on the stern of the mine-layer, three landed in the water, and two on the dock; the others were not observed. Since both of these ships were later discovered by guerillas and photo reconnaissance to be in a damaged condition the near misses evidently had been effective.[8] As the planes pulled away one of the Liberator pilots sighted a 7,000-ton cargo vessel creeping cautiously along in open water 12 miles south of Campha-Port. With its last remaining thousand-pounder the heavy made its bomb run over the ship. The missile plummeted into the water 100 feet to the right of the freighter, and the ship, apparently none the worse for the bombing, pushed out from under the bomb spray and continued on its course.

Meanwhile, the same day, four other planes of the 308th bombed Kunlong ferry on the Salween River in response to a request by the Chinese Army. Their intelligence had reported large concentrations of

Japanese troops fording the river preparatory to an offensive in that area. Although the flyers were unable to detect any activity around the ferry they nevertheless loosed their bombs on the area, aiming carefully at the barracks, and then flew back to their base, disappointed at the absence of the Japanese and convinced that they had been deceived by the exaggerated fears of the Chinese. Several weeks later, however, the Kunlong raiders learned from eyewitness accounts which filtered back through the warning net that they had been credited with killing 300 Japanese and destroying one rice depot, one oil dump, and several boats on the raid.[9]

On the final raid of the week, 12 July, seven B-24's blew up a freighter in Dalong Bay, and left another, about 250 feet in length, burning. A secondary explosion occurring shortly after the crew had abandoned the ship probably doomed the stricken vessel. The second flight, with equal good fortune, caught a 300-foot freighter docked at Campha-Port with one direct hit and several near misses. When the planes swooped low to strafe the ship 10 minutes later it was already sinking with one side completely under water. The Liberators spread the rest of their bombs and shells over railroad yards, shops, dock installations, locomotives, and a lighthouse. Five direct hits on the power plant cut off for an indefinite period the principal source of electrical power for the docks, transportation facilities, and coal mines of Hongay and Campha-Port.[10]

During the week of 7 to 13 July clearing skies had enabled the heavy and medium bombers to underwrite in combat the findings and conclusions of the Davidson report on sea searches from Chinese bases. In substan-

tiation thereof they had sunk in the Canton and Haiphong-Hongay areas five ships approximating 25,000 tons, in addition to an 8,000-ton freighter gutted and another 7,000-ton vessel presumably sunk. In the same waters five other vessels had sustained damage, with two of them totaling 15,000 tons probably out of service for a long time.

Not one American plane was lost in all these missions. Indeed, only once, on 7 July, did the American planes encounter any fighter opposition, and in that instance the enemy challenge was numerically small and aggressively weak. Feeling reasonably secure against enemy fighter attacks the 308th had made an unusual departure from the customary Chennault procedure during the week by flying all its sea searches except its initial raid on 8 July entirely unescorted. In part this change may have been occasioned by the knowledge of how the Japanese warning net around the Haiphong-Hanoi area worked. Supposedly this district received warnings of approaching aircraft from five to 30 minutes before they appeared over the target. According to Chinese information, however, it was more frequently only five to 10 minutes.[11] Limited photo reconnaissance permitted by clearing weather had also failed to reveal more than a very small number of fighter aircraft in northern Indo-China. Regardless of the reason, no escort was used and no interdiction attempted except as stated.

For the next five days the Chinese weather in one of its most sullen moods displayed such a wholly uncooperative attitude toward the "bomber boys" that the crews wisely decided to restrict their activities to repairing and reconditioning their planes, replenishing their dwindling supplies, and most important of all, resting. Meanwhile the

fighters from Yunnanyi, Kweilin, Kunming and Lingling had braved the weather to keep constant lookout for enemy activity. They ranged over Burma, the TungtingLake area, toward Canton, and toward Haiphong, bombing and strafing various targets when they were able to distinguish them through the soupy fog.

On 18 July the weather lifted its heavy hand and permitted the resumption of the Haiphong-Hongay shipping flights. Employing seven planes with 42 x 500-pound bombs the 308th scored several hits that day on a floating dry dock, on a warehouse, and on the building adjacent. All the bombs aimed at a large vessel, the primary objective, missed their mark. One plane, however, managed to toggle its bombs into a concentration of barges huddled together in the harbor of Hongay. As the thoroughly battered barges slipped beneath the surface the oil slicks which bubbled up and stained the water over a wide area revealed their contents. In this raid there was no interception and very little flak, and all planes returned to base without damage.

The next day only four B-24's appeared over Haiphong for a second chance at the ship which had escaped destruction the day before. Inaccuracy had saved it then, and now dense clouds and a harbor fog had thrown a protective blanket over the area. Forced to abandon the quest for their shipping prize they selected instead the Haiphong cement works. Bombing through overcast the bombardiers could not be certain that they had hit the factory. Their fear of failure, however, was allayed one month later when a U.S. naval liaison officer received information from a "most reliable source" indicating that the Japanese had "advised firms, usually depending on the cement output of the Haiphong plant, to place

their orders early and elsewhere, as the Haiphong plant . . . [had] met with an accident and was no longer operating on a production basis."[12] The Japanese explanation of the bottleneck was apparently not without a touch of understatement.

Since the initiation of the Fourteenth Air Force program against the Japanese merchant marine early in July only sea-going vessels had felt the pinch of attrition. This perforce had been handled almost wholly by heavy bombers. As a complement to their work the Hengyang fighters of the 76th Squadron on 21 July applied pressure on inland shipping with a sweep against river vessels plying the Hankow-Yochow waterways. Shooting 8,500 rounds of small ammunition the strafers exploded boilers in a 60-foot tug and a 150-foot steamer at Senti. Fire immediately enveloped both of the boats. Near Puchi a locomotive and and two 30,000-gallon water tanks were riddled and destroyed. Perhaps these river raids would have continued if it had not been for the uneasy feeling, probably inspired by Chinese rumors, that after such a long layoff the enemy was probably ready to launch another series of attacks on American advanced bases. Extensive reconnaissance, however, failed to locate any concentration of enemy aircraft. On 19 July American aircraft ranged as far as Shanghai, reporting excellent targets, which, however, were out of range of the mediums, and the heavies could not use existing bases near enough to that objective. On 22 July the airdromes at Tangyang, Ichang, Shasi, Kingmen, Pailiuchi, and Yochow were reconnoitered but no aircraft were found on any of them.

On the following day, however, the Japanese suddenly forsook their defensive policy and struck from bases which obviously had been recon-

noitered. In a supreme effort to wipe out the bases in eastern China they delivered attacks and attempted attacks almost continuously over a three-day period from bases to the east and northeast of Tungting Lake. Spreading their well-coordinated assaults over most of the American bases along the Hankow-Haiphong railway line the Japanese hoped to divide and weaken American interceptor strength, thereby preventing any concentrated opposition to their raids by the two fighter squadrons available for the defense of the area. At 0710 on the 23d seven enemy planes swooped in at the undefended and rarely used base at Kienow and churned up the runway with huge bomb bursts. Ten minutes later the first of two waves of enemy aircraft consisting of 20 bombers and a cover of 25 fighters barreled into Hengyang where the few P-40's were caught on the ground by the sudden onslaught. At 0830 a second wave of 18 bombers continued the cascade of bombs on Hengyang. With a display of accuracy heretofore not too much in evidence the Japanese showered 12 bombs on the runway, smashed the alert shack with a direct hit, and severed all communications with other bases. Forty miles north of Hengyang the P-40's of the 76th made contact with the second enemy formation. Meanwhile 9 other P-40's from Lingling plus 6 sent from Kweilin intercepted a flight of 18 enemy bombers and 40 fighters about 30 miles south of Lingling, the Japanese apparently expecting all the fighters to be drawn northward to defend Hengyang. Unexpectedly confronted by the American force the would-be raiders jettisoned their bombs, winged over, and fled. As a result of these contacts 9 Zeros and 5 bombers were destroyed, 12 Zeros and 7 bombers probably destroyed, and 6 Zeros and 3 bombers damaged. The Americans lost three fighters in crash land-

ings and one by bombing, while one was shot up so as to require local repair. General Chennault attributed the inability to defend Hengyang to a lack of fighter units, the 76th Squadron alone being inadequate to defend both Lingling and Hengyang against determined enemy attacks. Moreover he expressed fear after the raid that if enemy bombings persisted in such strength the results at Lingling and Kweilin might duplicate those at Hengyang where the field had been rendered unusable for a week.

The following morning the Japanese pattern of attack continued to unfold. Feinting at Kweilin with a diversionary action the enemy assaulted Lingling and Hengyang in force. These tactics prevented the consolidation of American forces by alerting and clearing all the fields. The 21 bombers and 20 to 30 fighters over Lingling approached the field on a south-north run at an altitude of 22,000 feet with the escorting fighters stacked up at heights ranging from 23,000 feet to 30,000 feet. Composed of seven elements of three planes each the bombers flew a tightly formed "V of V's." The lead element with its two wing elements occupied a position slightly ahead of the other planes creating an almost line-abreast formation. Over the target the escorting Zeros broke into a "bee-hive" on the sunward side of the bombers, giving the planes close support by "weaving, diving, zooming, crossing and recrossing" the formation. To counter this the P-40's made long, shallow dives, veering toward the unprotected side of the bombers, then pulling up sharply and attacking the bombers from the bottom rear.[13] Japanese tail gunners opened fire at too long range for the stinger to have much effect on the P-40's. With this method of interception the Sharks accounted for seven Zeros at Kweilin as well as three

Zeros and three bombers at Lingling, with one bomber probably destroyed and several damaged. The Americans lost only one P-40 and one P-38* but 11 other P-40's were damaged by enemy fire. The fighters, however, had not prevented the enemy bombers from damaging the field although it remained partially usable. Later in the day seven B-25's attempted to catch Japanese raiders returning to their fields around Canton but were forced to turn back from their targets by heavy thunder storms. Reconnaissance to the north and east now revealed more than 75 enemy aircraft on the airdromes at Hankow and Wuchang.

On 25 July, with Hengyang unusable and Lingling partially knocked out, the Japanese shifted their hammering blows from the fields along the Hankow-Haiphong railway to Shaoyang and Chihkiang just west and slightly north of Hengyang. Since neither of the fields maintained a fighter defense the 52 Japanese planes enjoyed uninterrupted approaches, bomb runs, and withdrawals. Notwithstanding this complete freedom of action the field at Shaoyang suffered only inconsequential damage, but at Chihkiang 15 direct hits on the air strip with an additional 10 scattered alongside damaged the field to such an extent that considerable time would be taken to restore it to service.

The Americans, however, did not allow this strike to go completely unchallenged. Taking off at Hengyang where coolies had worked feverishly after the raid of the 23d to make the landing strip usable, 9 B-25's, 2 P-38's, and 15 P-40's dropped 26 clusters of frags and 36 x 230-kilogram general-purpose bombs on the dispersal areas and shops at Hankow, presumably the base from which the Japanese attack had been mounted earlier that day. This raid was followed by another the next day in

* Six of the 25 P-38's from North Africa arrived in China during July 1943, the remainder arriving in mid-August. See pp. 90-91.

which 4 B-25's accompanied by 12 P-40's again struck the revetments and hangars at Hankow. Unlike the raid on the day before when no fighters appeared to oppose them, the formation was jumped by 30 to 50 Zeros. For 115 miles the enemy continued to bore into the B-25's and P-40's. It almost seemed as if the Japanese pilots were anxious to test in combat a new set of tactics they had recently adopted. Employing a six-plane concerted attack the Zeros maneuvered into a position approaching from dead ahead to an altitude ranging from 1,500 to 2,000 feet higher than the B-25's. When even with the bombers the Zeros executed a roll at intervals of two to three seconds and dived vertically on the bombers, leveling off at approximately 1,000 feet below the quarry. From this point they pulled up and delivered attacks from 5 and 7 o'clock.[14]

They maintained this alternating attack for the entire 115 miles. By that time the squadron leaders apparently felt the tactics had been tested sufficiently to judge their effectiveness. If the Japanese military weighed the results honestly only one reading was possible. On one side were 14 Japanese planes destroyed with an additional 17 accounted as probables. To counterbalance this the Americans had lost only one P-40, with three B-25's victims of only minor battle damage. Meanwhile on this day as on the preceding day (25 and 26 July), the Japanese pilots singled out the undefended base at Kienow as their target, but after flying 46 uncontested sorties and scoring many hits on the runway 200 meters of the field still remained usable.

It had now been a little more than a week since the last sea-search mission of the 308th had been flown. As noted above, American activity during that time had been confined mainly to defense of air-

dromes. On the 27th, however, the 308th was once again ready to take the air. Fifteen of the heavies were assigned shipping targets in the Samah Bay region of Hainan Island. An account of the mission showed five near misses and a direct hit on the stern of a 3,500-ton ship which was observed listing and smoking; a direct hit on the deck of a 5,000-ton ship, and also five near misses; two near misses on a ship 250 feet long; and four hits on the warehouse and dock area. Ten minutes after the bomb run 25 to 30 black-painted enemy fighters, several of which were identified by pilots as the Messerschmitt type, attacked the bombers.[15] Thirteen of them were destroyed in an intense battle. Those crew members who had participated in the Chengtu operations over Ichang in May reported that these enemy pilots were better flyers and better gunners. Results indicated as much; every one of the Liberators had suffered some damage, yet in no case was the damage serious enough to prevent a return to home base. One plane having lost one engine over the target succeeded in limping back to Kunming on three engines. Over the field the pilot shouted to the bombardier to get out of the nose of the plane as he was going to crash-land. Misunderstanding the order as being one to abandon the plane the bombardier jumped from an altitude of 500 feet, landing only a few hundred yards from his barracks. Although already wounded in the calf of the leg as a result of the air battle he suffered no further injuries from his low-level jump.[16]

While the Liberators were attacking Samah Bay on 27 July, six B-25's and 14 P-40's were trying to bomb a 500-foot ship in the Hong Kong harbor, but with little success, as all the bombs fell short of their mark. Another raid the following day brought no better results. On the 29th

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18 B-24's with an escort and top cover of 12 P-40's and 3 P-38's tried their aim on the same objective. They made one direct hit on a 203-foot vessel in the Royal Navy Dry Dock; three direct hits on the docks 230 feet west of that dock; three direct hits on jetties 1,200 feet west of the Royal Navy Dock; a hit on a building south of the dry dock; six bursts on the Taiko dock area; and destroyed barges and buildings at Kowloon. Strangely enough only two Zeros attempted to defend the harbor. There are two plausible explanations for the presence of such an insignificant force over so important a target. The Zeros may have been away on a routine patrol at the time of the strike, or the two which were airborne may have been spotters aiding the ack-ack gunners in gauging the altitude, using the same air-ground cooperation employed frequently by the Germans in the Middle East in defense of airdromes and harbors. One Zero and one P-40 were shot down in the skirmish over the target and one B-24 was lost when it crashed in a rice paddy just a few minutes flying time out of Kunming--the first Liberator lost on a combat mission since the 308th Group had started operations in China.

This concluded American offensive operations for July. The Japanese for their part ended their aerial offensive of the month against American air bases with attacks on Kienow and Hengyang the same and following day. On 29 July they scored 13 hits on Kienow. In their attack against Hengyang at the same time the Japanese introduced a new approach. Realizing that Hengyang, unlike Kienow, would be hotly contested by fighters, the enemy sent 25 bombers southward toward the field. Some miles north of the airdrome the flight turned back. In coordination with this maneuver a second flight of 23 bombers and 30 Zeros slipped in and attacked the

field. Four P-40's intercepted, destroying one enemy plane and probably destroying three more, but did not prevent the bombers from dropping their explosives on the field. With similar tactics the next day the enemy sent in a flight of 30 Zeros as a decoy. Two waves of bombers followed a few minutes later. Forty-five miles north of the field the first wave of bombers turned back. In the meantime a second wave composed of 24 bombers flew a parallel course 60 miles east of the railroad, swinging into Hengyang from the east at 0919 hours. Alertness on the part of American pilots caused the elaborate ruse to fail completely. At 20,000 feet over the base 7 P-40's cut into a flight of Zeros while 9 other fighters pursued the 24 bombers north of the field. In all, the Americans destroyed 3 bombers and 14 fighters, with an additional bomber and 6 Zeros probably shot down. The Americans lost one P-40 on the ground and one in combat. Two others were damaged by gunfire, one quite seriously.

During the month the Fourteenth had carried out 1,016 sorties compared with the 748 of the preceding month, and had dropped 191 tons of bombs (more than 2 4/5 times the weight dropped in June). Forty-one thousand tons of shipping were sunk and 35,000 tons damaged. The counter-air force record of the American units in China from 4 July 1942 to 4 August 1943 now stood at:

Enemy losses in air	312
Enemy losses on ground	139
Total destroyed	451
Probably destroyed	166
American losses in air	36
American losses on ground	15
Total American losses	51

Chapter VII

REINFORCEMENT PLANS -- AUGUST OPERATIONS

At the Trident Conference in May, the middle of July had been named as the date by which the Fourteenth Air Force would be reinforced by one medium bombardment squadron and two fighter squadrons. At the end of July none of the new squadrons had arrived. Instead of bringing substantial reinforcements July had witnessed a gradual whittling away of the already meager aircraft strength in China, especially fighter planes. Although 98 fighter aircraft, many of them P-40K's and P-40M's, had been added to the Fourteenth during May, June, and July, the number on hand on 1 August was exactly the same as the number present on 1 May, for exactly 98 planes had been lost during the three months--some worn out, some destroyed in combat, some on the ground, and others in accidents on routine flights. Of the 92 fighters on hand for the four fighter squadrons, however, only 64 were serviceable, an average of 16 per squadron.[1] Only by a near miracle had they been able to carry out their several missions--protecting the eastern end of the aerial supply line, flying escort to bombers, strafing and bombing enemy targets, and preventing Japanese air attacks from rendering their major bases untenable. As yet the ostensible interest in improvement of the military situation in the Asiatic theater shown by both British and American leaders at Casablanca and Trident had not brought succor to the Fourteenth.

Despite the superlative performance of the American airmen daily operational losses inexorably ate away at the small reserve of American planes. By the end of July attrition had reduced the number of fighter aircraft in serviceable condition to a dangerous low of 64, distributed as follows: Yunnanyi 13, Kunming 18, Kweilin 15, Lingling 9, and Hengyang 9. It was apparent that only the arrival of replacements or more fighter squadrons could prevent the ignominy of another withdrawal from the all-important bases at Hengyang, Lingling, and Kweilin.

Deplorable as the conditions of the air units were, they were comprehensible. The discussions at the conferences had not been purely academic, but it was clearly understood that the Asiatic theater would receive only so much military personnel and materiel as was necessary to maintain the status quo, plus whatever residue remained after commitments to other higher-priority theaters, especially the European Theater, had been met. Full-scale military operations in the CBI was a consideration for the indefinite future when the denouement of the war with Germany should come, and when something more than an infinitesimal part of the war potential of Britain and America could be directed, on the Asiatic continent, at the lesser of the two great Axis powers. Obviously it was greatly to the advantage of the Allied nations to keep China in the war, and it was the call for assistance from that beleaguered country which had largely determined the plans for augmenting the Fourteenth Air Force. It was fully as obvious to those in the inner military circles that promises made to Chiang Kai-shek and General Chennault for the purpose of raising Chinese morale and bolstering them in their determination to continue the war on the invader, would probably not be fulfilled on schedule. It is entirely possible that General Chennault himself knew in advance that all the immediate plans for his air force could not be implemented fully at the appointed date.

Fully cognizant of the hump difficulties, General Chennault knew that the extra medium squadron could not yet be supplied, but

he did consider it possible to supply the two additional fighter squadrons, and he was particularly desirous that they be sent to China immediately. Because of its economical operation the fighter aircraft in China had been developed into a multi-purpose plane without which the Fourteenth would have been practically impotent. Only through the efforts of the fighter squadrons could the Americans cling to the advanced bases which would be indispensable for the major operations of which General Chennault dreamed.

Since his return to China from Trident the commander of the Fourteenth had emphasized the necessity of augmenting the fighter strength in that area. After the devastating Japanese raids of late July the need was more obvious. On 25 July he informed General Arnold that Chiang was dissatisfied because of the lack of progress of the program for air reinforcement to China and was considering sending a message of protest to President Roosevelt.[2] Then on 13 August he reported an acute need for replacement combat crews. The 15 per cent replacements allocated for delivery each month had never been received and as a result many pilots and crew members had flown combat missions, without relief, for a period of from 10 to 14 months. Large numbers were approaching the war-weary stage simultaneously and an early shipment of replacements was necessary to correct the critical situation.[3] General Arnold immediately asked General Stratemeyer, then in India, to investigate the possibility of adjustment of fighter pilots between the Tenth and Fourteenth.[4]

In mid-August the arrival of a fighter squadron equipped with P-38's somewhat relieved the critical situation, for by sending the

new squadron to Lingling and shifting all the 76th to Hengyang, General Chennault for the first time was able to station a fighter squadron at each of the eastward bases. This belated arrival of higher-altitude fighters was the culmination of strenuous efforts and long negotiations.

On numerous occasions requests had been made by the Tenth and Fourteenth for fighter aircraft to deal with Japanese reconnaissance planes whose superior ceiling enabled them to operate undisturbed by the slow-climbing, low-altitude P-40's, but each appeal had evoked the reply that no aircraft of the type desired were available for allocation to CBI. Finally Japanese fighters and bombers began to attack American bases from altitudes above P-40 ceiling. The inadequacy of the P-40 to protect those installations so vital to the aerial supply line was at last recognized, and General Stratemeyer upon his return to Washington from his May visit to CBI recommended that 25 P-38's immediately be diverted from the 12th Air Force in North Africa and sent to India and China, with another 25 to follow in a few weeks.[5]

The recommendation was approved and orders issued, and once more the problem of balancing the air strength of India and China arose.[6] It was evident that ATC installations at both ends of the line required protection and that P-38's were needed both in Assam and Kunming. At first it was decided that because of the concentration of the installations in Assam, the Tenth should have 16 of the first 25 P-38's and the Fourteenth the remaining nine. These nine P-38's with two flights of 16 P-40's were to be activated as a fourth squadron of the 51st Fighter Group and sent immediately to China. The Tenth's 16 P-38's with one

flight of P-40's would form a squadron which would be activated as the fourth squadron of the 80th Fighter Group then en route to the theater.[7] The second 25 P-38's from North Africa would be divided 16 for China and nine for India, thus giving each air force one full squadron of high-altitude fighters. It was also anticipated that when the 80th Group was prepared to take over defense of Assam the entire 51st Group would be assigned to the Fourteenth and moved to China.[8]

On 7 July General Stilwell agreed to the activation of fourth squadrons for both the 51st and 80th Groups and the eventual assignment of the 51st to the Fourteenth, but requested that all of the first 25 P-38's be sent to China as a fourth squadron of the 51st and that the second shipment of 25 P-38's be kept in India as the fourth squadron of the 80th.[9] Two days later he was informed by General Arnold that he would be authorized to activate a fourth squadron for the 51st, to be equipped with the first 25 P-38's to arrive, and that this squadron should be immediately assigned to the Fourteenth. When the second movement of P-38's was concluded General Stilwell would be authorized to form them into a fourth squadron for the 80th Group to serve with the Tenth in India.[10]

By the time the first P-38 squadron arrived in the theater the entire picture had changed. Thus far, the Japanese had made no concerted effort to destroy ATC installations in either Assam or Kunming, but were concentrating on knocking out the forward bases of the Fourteenth, particularly those at Lingling and Hengyang. Upon the arrival of the newly activated 449th Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, it was therefore placed at Lingling, rather than at Kunming or Yunnanyi as

first planned.

The arrival of a P-38 squadron, while encouraging, was by no means a final solution. The gasoline consumption of the new planes was higher than that of the P-40's, and the introduction of a second fighter type presented another maintenance problem. The P-40K's and P-40M's which were gradually taking the place of the old P-40B's and P-40E's were rugged and possessed great fire power, but they were heavier than the earlier models and were therefore slow climbers of limited ceilings. Meanwhile new model Japanese fighters were appearing in increasing numbers--planes which could dive with the P-40 and almost equal its level-flight speed. Thus the advantages the American fighters had formerly enjoyed were largely removed. About the only superior quality of the P-40 was its ability to absorb tremendous punishment and still return to base.

With outclassed but durable fighters and beset with the usual disadvantages of the China theater, the Fourteenth prepared to continue operations as soon as the monsoon lifted sufficiently. For the first 12 days of August aerial activity was at a complete standstill because of the heavy rains and low-hanging clouds. By the 13th, however, the Yunnanyi-based 16th Fighter Squadron, reinforced by replacement and filler pilots, once again resumed offensive patrols over western China and Burma with some degree of regularity. Now and again the P-40's dropped bombs on Mangshih, Lungling, Tengchung, and other likely targets appearing through the occasional breaks in the almost solid overcast. With 90 per cent of these patrols flown above 20,000 feet, experience in high-altitude piloting was requisite. Few of the recently arrived

pilots had received sufficient altitude testing at OTU. Many developed ear and sinus infections which disabled them for this type of operation and necessitated their transfer to transport and low-altitude flying. Believing this wastage to be a correctable situation worthy of immediate attention the commander of the 16th Squadron recommended that henceforth more high-altitude training be included in the OTU curriculum.[11]

Meanwhile over eastern China the fighter pilots were also having trouble with an altitude problem of a different type. In preparation for intensive bombing attacks on American air bases in that section the Japanese had, like the 16th Squadron, taken advantage of the improved weather to initiate a series of fighter raids on the fields, apparently hoping to smooth the way for forthcoming bomber attacks by engaging and crippling the American fighter strength. On 16 August a lone observation plane followed by two waves of 20 enemy aircraft each entered the warning net and headed for Hengyang. Warned by their reconnaissance plane that the Americans had 11 P-38's and 22 P-40's airborne at 26,000 feet, the enemy flights turned tail 30 kilometers north of Hengyang and dropped their bombs on Siangyin, just north of Changsha. The high altitude of the Japanese planes combined with poor visibility made it futile for the Americans to try to make contact.[12]

The following morning at 0930 nine Japanese bombers appeared over outlying Kienow and scored three hits on the runway, but left 400 meters of the field in usable condition. Bombing of this totally defenseless and almost entirely unused airfield had become a routine procedure, probably to prevent its use by photo-reconnaissance planes;

yet Chinese coolies in this instance carried on a peculiar but effective attrition contest with the bombers. Day after day they filled bomb craters and tamped and smoothed the runway, so that it was a rare occasion when the field was entirely unusable. They were pitting their only weapon, patient and persistent manual labor, against Japanese air power, and forcing the enemy to expend thousands of gallons of aviation fuel and many tons of explosives.

On the same day, 17 August, the heavy bombardment arm of the Fourteenth flew its first combat mission since the 29 July attack on Samah Bay in which it had suffered its first plane loss in actual combat. Twenty-two B-24's of the 425th, 374th, and 375th Squadrons took off from the Kunming area, and unescorted bore to the southeast. Twelve of the planes turned back because of bad weather and another because of engine trouble, but the remaining nine pressed on to their objective--a Japanese encampment at Cau Lo, south of Haiphong. Light ack-ack over the target left the craft unscathed, and no enemy fighters offered opposition. Many hits were scored on a motorized artillery pool and storage area, and first-phase photographs revealed additional bomb craters among near-by buildings. All nine bombers returned to Kunming without mishap.

Following this raid the monsoons again grounded the planes on both sides. On 20 August, however, the enemy broke the lull by flying 39 fighter-plane sorties over Kweilin and Hengyang, bases of P-40 squadrons. Significantly, Lingling, base of the P-38 squadron,was avoided. Using those tactics which the Americans under General Chennault had employed so successfully against them since the days of the AVG the Japanese tried

to pit the best features of their new fighter planes against the weakest features of the P-40's. During the three raids which took place during the morning the enemy planes maintained an altitude of 30,000 feet--well above operational ceiling of the P-40. Diving from that level singly or in pairs the Japanese made one pass at the P-40's below, then climbed back to the safety of their altitude. Not once during the raids were the Americans able to establish an advantageous and direct contact with them. Whatever satisfaction the P-40 pilots may have gained from this imitation of their tactics certainly did not soften or alter the results. Accustomed to exacting a far heavier toll of enemy planes than their own losses, they shot down only two Zeros while losing three P-40's. The squadrons in the forward areas knew that more and better planes were urgently needed if the Americans were to maintain their air ascendancy.

That same afternoon (20 August) eight B-25's and 11 P-40's from Kweilin struck back at the enemy, attacking Tien Ho airdrome at Canton. Engine trouble forced two bombers and one fighter to turn back, but the others loosed 48 x 120-kilo frags at 200-foot intervals, and 24 x 160-kilo general-purpose bombs at 75-foot intervals on the revetment area and hangars. Before they could make a complete observation of the damage done by the bombs dropped from 16,500 feet, 20 Zeros intercepted. In the battle which ensued further evidence of improvement in the performance of the Zeros was noted. They could not only dive at over 400 miles per hour but exhibited greatly increased level-flight speed at medium altitude.[13] The results in enemy plane losses were more satisfactory than they had been in the morning engagements, the P-40's shooting down four Zeros with two probables and the B-25 gunners

accounting for one confirmed and one probable. One P-40 crashed and burned 10 miles south of Kweilin, another crashed at Hengyang, and one was listed as missing. For the day the score was six P-40's lost against six Zeros shot down by American fighters. Outnumbered at 5 to 1 the American fighters obviously could not continue to operate with that attrition ratio.

With the knowledge that the enemy fighter raids on Hengyang and Kweilin had been launched from Hankow as well as Canton, the Americans planned an operation against Hankow similar to the attack on Tien Ho, but on a larger scale. On 21 August, 14 B-24's, 7 each from the 374th and 375th Squadrons, took off from Chengkung with the intention of making a rendezvous with 7 B-25's and 11 P-40's at Hengyang. Meanwhile, however, the warning net reported 33 Japanese fighters winging their way toward Hengyang. Immediately the P-40's including those alerted for escort duty on the day's mission, took off to meet the oncoming formation. Uncertain of the enemy's exact destination Col. Bruce K. Holloway, commander of the 23d Fighter Group, ordered 12 of the P-40's to climb as high as possible at a point midway between Hengyang and Lingling. From this vantage point the Sharks could shift either way according to the development of the engagement. Gathering the remaining P-40's together Colonel Holloway led the formation to an altitude of 23,000 feet and waited over the field at Hengyang. When the enemy fighters failed to appear Colonel Holloway assumed that the formation had turned back or selected another target, and anxious to get everything in shape for the rendezvous with the bombers, he and his wingman began to descend. As he reached 15,000 feet a heated radio conversation between the P-40's remaining upstairs

revealed that they were being attacked by Jap fighters diving on them from far above. Apparently the enemy had doubled back at a very high altitude and were using the same tactics employed the day before at Kweilin. Colonel Holloway climbed as rapidly as possible but when he reached 22,000 feet the fight was over. The attackers had left or were out of sight above. In the melee four Zeros had been destroyed and two claimed as probables, while one P-40 was shot down, the pilot bailing out successfully.

Colonel Holloway then collected some of the milling P-40's into a formation and led them northward in hope of catching an unwary enemy flying home at lower altitude. Two were eventually spotted at 5,000 feet, and before the Jap pilots sighted their pursuers, bullets were pouring into them from directly astern. In flames almost immediately the Zeros nosed straight for the ground. Almost simultaneously 9 P-38's alerted from Lingling contacted 12 Zeros at 29,000 feet over Changsha, claiming 3 probables without loss to themselves.

With nothing more in the offing the P-40's turned back, taxiing into Hengyang at 1110. Ground crews scurried out to service them for their escort job, and by 1130 six of the planes had their belly tanks attached and were ready to join the bombers. The Liberators from Kunming, however, had meanwhile traveled a little west of their course, missing Hengyang completely, and proceeded unescorted to the target. The fighter pilots stood by until 1200 when the Hankow-bound B-25's arrived from Kweilin. The even-dozen P-40's, which had by that time been serviced with auxiliary tanks, took off, joined the B-25's, and headed northward.

Soon the Liberators, well ahead of the B-25's and P-40's, approached the target and executed their bomb run. Expending 71 x 500-pound bombs the bombardiers laid a perfect pattern along the entire length of the dock area. Before any assessment of the damage of the bombing could be made the B-24's were attacked by 60 to 100 Zeros. Concentrating on the lead planes, three to six fighters pressed home simultaneous attacks. The plane of the squadron leader, Maj. Bruce Beat, went down immediately. At 15,000 feet some of the crew bailed out, but when the plane exploded at 4,000 feet only three or four parachutes had opened. Jap fighters strafed the parachutists repeatedly. So successful were the enemy tactics in the first onslaught that in addition to shooting down the first plane they wounded the pilots in each of the lead planes.

For 27 minutes the enemy pressed the attack. Zeros from 9 and 3 o'clock attacked simultaneously, flying directly toward the bombers, apparently with a view to disconcerting the waist gunners. The approach varied but the Zeros always made concerted attacks. As the battle developed another noteworthy method of attack was observed. Zeros from a high frontal position made one diving pass at the nose of the Liberators, passed underneath, pulled up, and attacked the tail of the plane from 5 and 7 o'clock--tactics similar to those recently used against the medium bombers. In other instances two Zeros coming in at various clock points directed their fire at the position of a single gunner--more than once the gunner was able to shoot down both interceptors, so close were the attacks pressed, but several gunners were killed or wounded.

Fifteen minutes after the first onslaught a second B-24 was forced out of the formation and crash-landed, with three of the crew dead and two seriously wounded. Finally the interceptors turned back. A third B-24, so badly shot up that it could not make its way to Kweilin, came down on the field at Lingling; the others reached Kweilin without further mishap. Of the 14 bombers participating in the attack 2 were lost and 10 were badly shot up. Of the planes which had survived the ordeal 1 tail gunner was killed while 3 pilots and 1 co-pilot were wounded.

An exact assessment of the losses inflicted on the attacking fighters could never be obtained, but after all surviving members of crews on planes shot down were questioned it was found that 57 were claimed as shot down, with 13 others claimed as probables, and another 2 damaged. If this tabulation is accurate the bombers had set a new combat record for the theater, but the price they paid was high.

Shortly after the B-24's had shaken the Jap fighters loose, the 7 B-25's and 11 P-40's (one had aborted) moved in to attack the Hankow airdrome. Coming in at low level the Mitchells covered the field effectively with 84 x 120-kilo frag clusters, catching on the ground some of the fighters just returned from the battle with the Liberators. Perhaps the fighters had spent their gas and ammunition on the B-24's, for in contrast to the mauling they had given the B-24's only one Japanese fighter challenged the later formation and was immediately driven off by the Sharks.[14]

This 21 August attack on Hankow has been the subject of some speculation but the answers to many of the questions raised are as yet obscure. For instance, did the Japanese have advance information on the mission and

send the fighters to Hengyang to delay the escort so that their fighters over Hankow would have a better chance to destroy the B-24's? While this is possible it should be pointed out that the Liberators missed Hengyang by an accident which could not be foreseen by the enemy, and this accident contributed largely to the failure of the escort to join the heavies. The B-24's, accustomed to flying unescorted missions to the Haiphong area, obviously felt able to take care of themselves, with or without the P-40's. Did the Japanese purposely concentrate their fighters on the Liberators while deliberately allowing the mediums and fighters to attack the airdrome--or did the upset in the American schedule also upset enemy defensive strategy? If one accepts the thesis that the enemy had advance information on the mission, knowing that Mitchells and P-40's were to participate in the raid, they must have set out to destroy the B-24's at whatever the cost. This seems plausible in view of the destruction already caused by the heavy bombers on targets which were out of reach of the other American planes.

Another question raised which only future operations could answer was whether or not the Liberators could continue to operate against well-defended areas without fighter escort. They had been unusually successful in their unescorted missions to the south, but that area was lightly defended, and they had never encountered opposition such as was met at Hankow. General Chennault had never sent out medium bombers without fighter escort. Would he be forced to furnish escorts for the heavy-bomber missions in the future?

While these and many other questions remained unanswered other uncertainties regarding the Hankow mission have been clarified. Later

reports through the Chinese and from aerial photographs revealed the full extent of the damage done by the heavy bombers. They destroyed 1,000 drums of gasoline, a civilian gas depot opposite the post office, and the Japanese naval headquarters in which Japanese and puppet officials were holding a meeting at the time of the raid. Three Japanese generals, four colonels, and one naval commander were killed. Numerous destructive hits were also made on commercial buildings in the vicinity of the docks.[15]

Immediately the 308th prepared for a second raid on Hankow, this time with the airdrome as the objective. While the squadrons which had not participated in the first Hankow mission were making plans for their try at the heavily defended area, the Japanese sent a fleet of 50 bombers and fighters to the provisional capital at Chungking. The Chinese Air Force intercepted, bringing down one bomber and damaging several others but losing four planes and one pilot in the process. On 24 August seven B-24's from the 373d Squadron and seven from the 425th took off from Kunming to meet the six B-25's from Kweilin. This time the flight schedule was followed, and when the B-24's and B-25's met over Hengyang they picked up an escort of 14 P-40's and eight P-38's. Again, however, misfortune impeded the mission. The seven heavy bombers from the 373d had run into bad weather soon after taking off and returned to their base, leaving the seven planes of the 425th to push on to the rendezvous alone.

After the formation left Hengyang all went well until bombs were away. Some of the planes mistook Wuchang airdrome for Hankow and dropped some of their bombs, causing considerable damage. Seeing their mistake

they continued with the flight to Hankow. On the airdrome there the remaining bombs were dropped, also doing major damage. Antiaircraft over the target, directed by enemy planes flying at the same altitude as the bomber formation, was heavy and accurate, and damaged several of the bombers.

Two or three minutes after the formation left the primary target 40 Zeros jumped them, again concentrating on the heavy bombers. For 45 minutes the battle lasted, and one by one the B-24's went down. When the enemy fighters finally turned back, only three of the seven heavies remained. Again the B-25's and fighters came out without loss. The three Liberators, having suffered heavy casualties on board and crippled from shellfire, eventually reached Kweilin. When a check was made on the three planes it was found that one pilot was dead, a co-pilot wounded, one crewman dead, and five others wounded. Tragedy still stalked the squadron, however, for one of the three planes crashed on the return to Kunming the following day, killing 10 and injuring two. Of the 7 planes which had left Kunming, 2 returned; and of the 70 men on the B-24's, 57 were casualties--42 killed or missing, and 15 wounded. (The missing included only those who had not returned to the base six months later.) The Japanese, in effect, had rendered a whole squadron impotent for some time to come.

The contest was not altogether one-sided, however, for the surviving planes and crew members claimed 19 Zeros knocked down by the fighters and bombers combined, with others probably destroyed by the missing planes from which there was no report. Damage had been done to two important airdromes, with possible destruction of aircraft on the

ground. The fact remained, however, that in two successive raids the 308th had lost seven B-24's out of some 35 on hand, as well as having several others so badly damaged as to require major repairs. It now seemed clear that the Japanese pilots at Hankow were of the best, and that their planes were of superior quality. It is true that enemy fighter losses were high, but they could spare them far more readily than the Fourteenth could spare the few heavy bombers then in China. Even the P-38's, flying escort, had not been able to prevent the Jap fighters from almost annihilating a whole flight of American B-24's.

While the 308th was badly crippled the Mitchells and fighters carried on the fight, but with little aerial opposition. On 25 August eight B-25's and six P-40's from Kweilin arrived over Kowloon Docks at 0745. Releasing 45 x 500-pound bombs from 16,000 feet they succeeded in placing 50 per cent of them on the docks, while several hits were observed on a 3,000-ton vessel resting in dry dock. No interception was attempted. In the afternoon of the same day seven B-25's and 12 P-40's returned to the vicinity with the intention of bombing two 400-foot vessels which had been sighted by the crews during the morning raid. Unfortunately the ships had departed so the bombs were unloaded on the Taiko docks. No enemy fighters appeared, and antiaircraft fire though heavy was inaccurate, as it had been during the morning. No damage resulted to the attacking planes.

Again the following day, 26 August, five B-25's and 11 P-40's from Hengyang plastered the runways, hangars, and revetments at the Tien Ho airdrome at Canton. Intercepted 25 miles from the target the Americans destroyed five Zeros with a loss of one P-40. Eight other enemy fighters

were claimed as probables. On the same day the 308th, after its unpleasant experience over Hankow, turned its attention southward. Fifteen heavy bombers picked up an escort, this time predominantly P-38's (10 P-38's and seven P-40's) and bombed Kowloon Docks. Pictures by an F-5 indicated that the mission was highly successful. The dock area was well covered, several direct hits were scored on a power plant, the Baily dockyards, crane tracks, the bow of a 500-foot ship in dry dock, a "turning and fitting" ship, and a 250-foot vessel. Many fires were later observed. Following the bomb run 20 Zeros rolled in for an attack, but they were evidently not of the caliber of the Hankow fighters. Five were shot down while the B-24's escaped without damage. One P-40 was forced to crash-land behind the enemy lines with the fate of the pilot undetermined.

According to a Chungking dispatch a Chinese newsman who had escaped Hong Kong related that the two attacks on the docks had practically wiped out the naval dock yards, the wharf, and the Taiko dock yards.[16]

Shifting to northern targets the Mitchells and fighters began a series of devastating missions against targets in the Tungting Lake area and along the Yangtze. On 27 August fighters swept the Tungting Lake vicinity, setting fire to a 125-foot steamer, a 65-foot steamer, a small gunboat, several small steamboats, and two railroad cars. A few vehicles in a 30-truck convoy spotted on the road near Sitang were likewise destroyed. Five P-40's, dispatched later to this target, accounted for an additional four trucks and damaged 15 others. One P-40 was lost in the operations.

Two days later (29 August) in a continuing action to the north the 11th Squadron sent nine medium bombers, covered by 12 P-40's, to bomb the important enemy airdrome at Kingmen. Six and a half tons of fragmentation clusters fell on the center section of the field covering taxiways, runways, and revetments. Flying over the same general area the next day the Mitchells dropped 132 x 100-pound general-purpose bombs and 24 fragmentation clusters on Ouchihkou and Shihshow, while P-40's from the Hengyang-based 76th and P-38's from the 449th Squadron at Lingling strafed towns and shot up several gunboats and a few nondescript vessels, as well as locomotives, trains, warehouses, and railroad stations. Reaching farther north on the last day of the month nine B-25's struck at Ichang, destroying an oil storage tank and partially destroying the airfield. During the same day six Sharks from the 76th Squadron strafed oil drums and kindled fires in the same section, while four Lightnings from the 449th at Lingling bombed and machine-gunned the railroad yards at Yochow and destroyed a warehouse near Senti.

But the biggest action of the day took place far to the south at the Gia Lam airdrome of Hanoi and the Cobi barracks just east of the field. The 308th, flying its first mission since the attacks of 26 August, sent 16 B-24's from the 373d and 375th Squadrons into an area where opposition in the past had been rather light. The escort, however, was to be strong, with 22 P-40's and two P-38's going along. The blueprint for the mission called for a diversionary attack by nine planes from the 373d on the Cobi barracks, while the seven heavies from the 375th hit the airfield with frag bombs. Immediately after the bomb run was executed the fighter-bombers were to flood the field by smashing the

dikes which surrounded it. For this purpose the P-40's carried 500-pound bombs with 45-second fuzes, and the P-38's bore 1,000-pound eight-second bombs.

Everything worked according to plan, even the breaking of the dikes, but the field was not flooded because the water level at the time was too low. Photographs, however, showed the airdrome to be well pocked with bomb craters, and a French source later reported that the fires begun by the bombing lasted until after midnight. All the B-24's and P-38's returned but eight P-40's became lost on the return trip and gave out of gas. Six pilots bailed out and two made forced landings. All the pilots but one returned to their base but seven P-40's were a total loss.

Despite the fact that the Fourteenth had been kept almost completely idle during the first two weeks of August, more sorties were flown during the month than in July--1,071 for August and 1,016 for July. In bombs dropped, however, the total fell from 191 tons in July to 133 tons in August. For the 308th, so far as aircraft and personnel losses were concerned, it was a rather unsuccessful month, for in five completed missions the 308th had lost six planes. Personnel losses included 14 officers and 13 men killed, 9 officers and 19 men missing, and 18 officers and 6 men wounded. Furthermore 11 other officers and 7 other men who had been shot down in combat were lost to the group while they were working their way back to American bases.[17] On the credit side of the ledger, however, the Liberators had destroyed 76 enemy planes in the air, probably destroyed 24 more, and damaged many others. Their bombing attacks had caused widespread damage to such targets as Hankow, Hanoi, and Kowloon Docks.

The B-25's had caused considerable damage to enemy installations while suffering practically no losses, and the fighter-bombers in their sweeps over enemy territory were only beginning to demonstrate the potentialities of low-level attacks on all sorts of targets.

Chapter VIII

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES -- EARLY SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

In spite of some of the dreary aspects, August had marked significant developments in the history of the China-Burma-India theater, some of which affected the Fourteenth Air Force directly. One which had important implications for the Americans in China was the progress made toward implementing the plan for using Chinese airmen under American leadership. After General Arnold had placed his stamp of approval on General Chennault's plan to incorporate Chinese-American composite wings into the Fourteenth, and acquiesced to the bombing campaign against Japanese shipping recommended by Generals Chennault and Davidson, he assigned General Davidson the task of obtaining equipment and personnel for the composite wings.[1]

General Davidson, with full support of the Air Staff, worked tirelessly for weeks, finding the job particularly difficult because requirements for the composite wings were over and above the accepted AAF program. It was finally decided that Chinese number-designations could be used for the units and that some of the aircraft could be obtained from previous allocations to China Defense Supplies, but men and additional planes had to be scraped together from whatever source they could be spared. Nevertheless, on 5 July General Davidson had reported to General Stratemeyer that satisfactory progress was being made.[2]

As a part of the program General Chennault had proposed that an

operational training unit (OTU) be established in India and operated by the Fourteenth Air Force for the purpose of preparing partially trained Chinese fighter and bomber crews for combat operations. He had also suggested that Chinese Air Force mechanics, under AAF supervision, assemble the aircraft they were to use, and that Chinese combat and maintenance crews train at the OTU with the units to which they would be assigned. Upon completion of the training period the American and Chinese officers who acted as instructors were to become group, squadron, and flight commanders, and would go out with the units to operating stations, thus necessitating a continual flow of officer personnel to the OTU.[3]

After authority was given, General Davidson visited the Flying Training Centers, OTU's of the AAF, and Eglin Field, to obtain officers and men experienced in training and suitable for key positions in tactical units.[4] Malir airdrome at Karachi was selected as the site of the Chinese-American OTU, and assembling of personnel and equipment began.[5] Old-model P-40's and B-25's no longer worthy of tactical employment were sent there for use as trainers. Additional short-range B-25's from the United States and P-40's from North Africa were eventually assigned.[6]

On 1 July General Chennault had reported to General Arnold that American and Chinese personnel were already arriving at Malir and would be ready to open the OTU on 5 August.[7] According to the schedule which had been set up and approved, the training unit by 15 March 1944 would turn out eight fighter squadrons and four medium and light bombardment squadrons, together with three group and one wing headquarters. At

that time it was expected that the OTU would close out its work.[8] In August the training program was begun, and by 1 September was in full swing.

Meanwhile important changes in command and theater organization had been brewing. For some months consideration had been given to the advisability of sending to Asia an air officer, senior to Generals Bissell and Chennault, for coordination of air activities of the entire theater. Chiang Kai-shek, however, was adamantly opposed to the placing of another air officer over General Chennault whom he had recently made chief of staff of the Chinese Air Force. Furthermore the Generalissimo had suggested that someone who could cooperate fully with General Chennault replace General Bissell as commanding general of the Tenth Air Force.[9]

Finally a decision was reached to send to the theater a senior air officer who would be immediately over the Tenth Air Force commander. Upon him would rest responsibility for all training in India, including the Chinese-American OTU recently set up at Kalir, and for coordinating the activities of the Air Transport Command and Air Service Command in the CBI; but he would exercise only advisory control over the Fourteenth through his position as air adviser to General Stilwell. The person selected to act as ambassador, coordinator, mediator, and "cajoler," was Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, then Chief of the Air Staff. It was also deemed expedient to replace General Bissell, the prime requisite for his successor apparently being ability to work in harmony with General Chennault. General Davidson who had recently worked in close cooperation with General Chennault and subsequently asked to be assigned to

the Fourteenth, was appointed to command the Tenth. General Davidson assumed command of the Tenth on 19 August and on the following day General Stratemeyer became Commanding General, American Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, China-Burma-India Theater.[10] When General Stratemeyer took over his new command the air service commands of the Tenth and Fourteenth were inactivated and the China-Burma-India Air Service Command was activated under Brig. Gen. Robert C. Oliver. The new command was divided into areas, the China area command to be taken over by Brig. Gen. Reuben Hood, a veteran of CBI.[11]

Simultaneously with the effecting of the command changes, decisions were reached at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec which were to have far-reaching effects on the entire war effort in Asia. It had been found impossible to carry out Asiatic plans laid at Casablanca and Trident, and because of initial failures some revisions were necessary. The British attempt to take Akyab had resulted in miserable failure; development of Assam bases had lagged far behind target dates for completion; the Calcutta-Assam line of communications continued to be a bottleneck; in fact, although improvements had been made, the entire theater plan was months behind schedule. In part, the condition could be ascribed to the fact that the CBI was still a low-priority theater; on the other hand there was some duplication of effort between the RAF and AAF, and in spite of a cooperative spirit the efficiency of the Allied war effort in India and Burma was not satisfactory.

To eliminate lost motion and to prepare for greater military effort which eventually would come, the Southeast Asia Command was created and Lord Louis Mountbatten appointed Supreme Allied Commander. Encompassing

that part of Asia east of India and south of China exclusive of French Indo-China, and a vast sea area to the south and west, the new theater included such objectives as Myitkyina, Mandalay, Lashio, Akyab, Rangoon, and Moulmein in Burma, as well as Sumatra, Bangkok, Singapore, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands.[12] Under the new organization General Stilwell became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in addition to his positions asCommanding General, United States Army Forces in CBI and chief of staff to the Generalissimo's armies. General Stratemeyer because of the necessity of upholding British prestige in India and Burma, was placed second in the air organization under Air Chief Marshal Peirse.[13]

During the Quadrant Conference the entire war effort in Asia was re-examined. In view of the foundation already laid for increasing hump tonnages, reoccupation of northern Burma and long-range plans to establish land communications to China were given top priority. Pipe lines from Assam to Fort Hertz and eventually from Fort Hertz to Kunming were projected. Further improvement of the line of communications from Calcutta to Assam was recognized as a long-time project which would involve doubling track on single-track railways, increasing the river fleet, and improvement of river ports. Proposals included placing the railways under military supervision, drawing rolling stock from other parts of India while awaiting arrival of shipments from the United States, and increasing the number of trains to the extent of taking risks which would not be warranted under ordinary circumstances. To speed up river shipping, installation of navigation lights to enable night running was proposed. While these slower processes were under way additional stores were to be flown from Calcutta to Assam as more American

transport planes became available.[14]

Many misgivings accompanied the organizational setup, and it was mutually recognized by British and Americans that the plan could be made functional only by efforts of the men in the theater. The British were greatly disturbed by the pyramiding of jobs on the shoulders of General Stilwell, evidently having hoped that the new theater would be completely divorced from China.[15] In this connection General Marshall said: "It must be remembered that politically, all US forces in China, or in the Southeast Asia Command, are regarded as being there for the purpose of supporting China, and therefore a system must be evolved whereby, while retaining this political principle, the maximum support can be obtained for operations into Burma."[16] Americans were not pleased to have General Stratemeyer, recently second in command at AAF Headquarters, and originally scheduled to take over all American air units in Asia, placed in second position in the air organization.[17]

Even more disturbing was the possible effect the shift would have on the attitude of the Generalissimo. On 28 August General Arnold wrote long letters to Generals Stilwell, Stratemeyer, and Chennault, endeavoring to clarify the situation and to void the displeasure of Chiang Kai-shek. To General Stilwell he was apologetic about loading him with a third difficult post, but said that he was the only one who could do the jobs successfully. He explained that General Stratemeyer's relation to the Fourteenth was unchanged and that the new command would take no prerogative from the Generalissimo nor rob him of any of his units. Furthermore it would offer an opportunity for Chiang to employ his forces in a coordinated Allied effort against the Japanese. He added that

command relationships to a great extent would have to be worked out in the field, and that Generals Stilwell and Chennault could be of inestimable value in allaying the fears and suspicions of the Generalissimo.[18]

General Arnold's letters to Generals Stratemeyer and Chennault were quite similar to that sent to General Stilwell. Of General Stratemeyer he asked promotion of harmony with Lord Mountbatten,[19] and to General Chennault he said: "Mountbatten's relationship to the Generalissimo is that of two neighboring commanders engaged in fighting a common enemy. . . . In your association with the Generalissimo you can and I am sure you will of your own volition do everything possible to impress upon him the purpose for which the new command was organized. . . . This command is designed to provide the means for supporting larger forces in China and Southeast Asia in order to hasten the liberation of all China and the defeat of Japan."[20]

In his letter of 28 August General Arnold told General Stratemeyer that a conference with Dr. Soong had revealed that repeated requests had been made of the Tenth Air Force by General Chennault for release of the two medium bombardment squadrons and two fighter squadrons committed to the Fourteenth but still with the Tenth. It was his information, said General Arnold, that the four squadrons were to have been delivered to China when operating facilities were available there, and he requested information as to the status of the squadrons and the ability of the Fourteenth to take care of them.[21] Three days later General Stratemeyer asserted that details of transfer and movement of the 51st Fighter Group to the Fourteenth had been completed, but that actual movement of the unit and the two medium squadrons was held in abeyance pending completion

of a study of new plans which might render logistic support of the organization in China impossible.[22] It was clear that the President's promise to the Generalissimo on 31 March--that as soon as General Chennault indicated that he had airdromes to care for them the additional fighter squadrons would be transferred--had been completely overlooked.[23]

At about the same time Dr. Soong inquired of General Giles, now Chief of the Air Staff, why the four squadrons had not been transferred from the Tenth to the Fourteenth as promised.[24] Answering, General Giles said that the actual transfer had always been contingent on two things: the arrival of the 80th Fighter Group to assume responsibility for the defense of Assam, and the capability of the ATC hump tonnage to support the 51st group in China. He informed Soong of General Stratemeyer's statement with regard to the transfer proceedings and expressed hope that recent improvements in the theater would permit an early movement of all four squadrons to General Chennault's force.[25]

On 13 September General Stratemeyer reported that he had received instructions from General Stilwell to move the remainder of the 51st Fighter Group to China. One squadron was already in the process of moving and the other would move about 15 September if the 80th Fighter Group had by that time taken over in Assam. He said that the movement of the rest of the 341st Bombardment Group (M) to China would be discussed with Generals Chennault and Davidson, recommendations made, and movements accomplished, subject to the approval of General Stilwell.[26]

The transfer of the 25th Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, to China was accomplished during the first week in September, the squadron gradually taking over the duties of the 16th Squadron at Yunnanyi. When the move

was completed the 16th moved to Kweilin, leaving the 25th to aid in the protection of the aerial supply line. In view of the fact that the 25th had formerly served in Assam and was familiar with much of the territory over which it would operate, and also that the 16th had been stationed at Kweilin during April, the arrangement was ideal. With the 11th Bombardment Squadron (M), the 16th Fighter Squadron, and the 74th Fighter squadron based at Kweilin, the 449th Fighter Squadron at Lingling, and the 76th Fighter Squadron at Hengyang, the Fourteenth was in far better position for offensive and defensive work that it had been on 1 August.

With regard to aircraft, however, the situation showed little change, despite the arrival of the 449th Squadron during August. Nineteen fighter planes had arrived in China during the month, but on 1 September only 92 were on hand--six less than at the beginning of August. Despite the loss of 13 heavy bombers for all reasons, the total on hand had risen from 34 to 38.[27] The number of serviceable Mitchells had not materially changed.

During most of August the feinting and thrusting of the enemy at advanced American bases had made it necessary to keep some fighters at the bases at all time. This not only made it impossible to give proper protection to the heavy-bomber missions but also cut down on the strafing and dive bombing at which the fighters were becoming so adept. During the first half of September the Japanese, for reasons unknown, discontinued their attacks on major bases, and made only light attacks on outlying fields such as Luchow and Namyung. As a result the eastern-based fighters, many now equipped so that they could carry belly tanks and bombs at the same time, along with the Mitchells of the 11th Squadron,

ranged over the Tungting Lake and Yangtze area, bombing and strafing almost at will. Particular emphasis was laid on destruction of lake and river boats and of railways and rolling stock. Both land and river communications were seriously snarled by the action, yet for some reason, little opposition was encountered. Possibly the Japanese had given up hope of knocking out the advanced bases and had transferred their aircraft to other areas; possibly their fighter losses had been so serious as to make it necessary to limit their operations; perhaps they were holding their planes back for the time when they could again attack the heavy bombers, a quarry which had thus far shown less ability to survive their onslaughts. For whatever reason, the enemy failed to interfere, and the Americans made the most of their opportunities.

On the first day of the new month small groups of fighters and medium bombers ranged over an extensive area to the north, going all the way to the coast along the Yangtze. Twenty-eight sorties on that day, flown by the 74th, 76th and 449th Fighter Squadrons and the 11th mediums, resulted in the destruction of six vessels from 100 to 250 feet in length, four small boats 25 to 50 feet long, three locomotives, eight railway cars, one transport aircraft, three buildings, and one antiaircraft position. Six of these sorties made by the P-40's of the 76th at Hengyang scored direct hits on a 250-foot vessel, believed to be a tanker. They bombed and strafed another ship at about the same point on the Yangtze. A moment after a bomb struck it, the ship began to sink and when last seen by the pilots the decks were awash. At still another point on the river the bomb-carrying Sharks machine-gunned enemy personnel and horses and strafed two 100-foot boats. Five miles east of Shihhuiyao they set

fire to a 100-foot boat towing two barges up the river. Two tugs about half that size were also strafed. At Shihhuiyao heavy antiaircraft fire from a large gunboat and a destroyer prevented the P-40's from pressing an attack on targets there. The neutralization of these vessels called for heavier aircraft. Consequently seven B-25's with an escort of eight P-40's moved in to attack the warships. Although they missed the ships with their delayed-fuze bombs, 36 of their incendiary clusters landed on the loading dock causing considerable damage.

South of this river port three P-38's and some P-40's were attacking troop concentrations at Yangsin, north of Yochow. Near Wuchang the fighters beached a 100-foot vessel. Twenty-five miles southwest of Puchi the flight disabled an eight-car train, including the locomotive, but only after they had snuffed out an ack-ack gun emplacement covering the railroad. Far to the southeast off the coast at Swatow, P-40's from the 74th at Kweilin were attacking ocean-going shipping. One of the planes carrying a 500-pound bomb hit a 150-foot vessel amidship; later in the day an F-5 reconnaissance pilot found the stricken ship still burning. As the pilots left the harbor and started across the city of Swatow several pilots caught sight of three parked transports on the airdrome. Swooping down they strafed the field and completely destroyed one of the transports.

The effects of the wide sweeps of 1 September must have caused some consternation among the Japanese shippers, but apparently the Japanese aircraft did not mean to offer opposition. On the next day operations officers at Kweilin made plans to strike at Standard Oil installations which reconnaissance planes had recently located near Kowloon, opposite

Hong Kong Island. This objective which intelligence reports had previously described as the Laichikok Tank Farm was attacked on 3 September by 10 Mitchells and 2 fighter-bombers with 5 P-40's as an escort. Fourteen tons of bombs were dropped, all falling in the target area. Seven fuel storage tanks containing aviation gasoline, Diesel and lubricating oil, kerosene, and alcohol exploded so violently that sheets of flame shot 3,000 feet into the air and black smoke billowed up to 13,000 feet. Hours later smoke still stretched for a hundred miles along the coast as the oil dump continued to burn. Not far from the storage area the bombers leveled a camouflaged building said to have contained airplane assembly parts for 50 fighter aircraft. The two fighter-bombers peeled off after the bomb run over the main target and made a low-level attack on Stone Cutters Island where a 200-foot vessel was riding at anchor. Three hours later an F-5 reported the vessel burning heavily in the stern. No interception was attempted by the Japanese over the target, but 20 miles beyond the target five to seven enemy fighters caught up with the formation. One was shot down by a Mitchell gunner and two were probably destroyed by P-40 pilots. None of the American planes received any damage. To complete the days activities four P-40's from the 75th Squadron at Kunming strafed Laokay, Chapa, Pho Lu and Laichau near the Red River in French Indo-China.

On the same day (3 September), the Japanese air force, ominously inactive for some time, opened a two-day attack on American air bases, but failed to attack any place where American squadrons were based. Two waves of 19 aircraft each bombed Kuchow airdrome, southeast of Kweilin, while 38 bombers with a 21-fighter plane cover attacked Namyung, east of

Kweilin. American fighters called in from Kweilin and Lingling were not able to establish contact. The day following (4 September) two waves of enemy planes, 42 and 31 respectively, entered the warning net from Canton. Immediately 10 fighters from Kweilin rose to meet them but failed to contact the raiders. Meanwhile an unknown number of bombers were again attacking the undefended base of Wuchow.

On 3 September American listening posts had intercepted a radio message from the Tien Ho airdrome at Canton revealing the transfer of 31 planes to Hanoi. As a consequence of this intelligence 12 medium bombers accompanied by 7 P-40's of the 74th Squadron bombed the airdrome at Canton. Medium ack-ack and fighter interception were encountered over the target. Out of the 15 Japanese fighters attacking the formation three were definitely destroyed and one other possibly destroyed. Only one American plane sustained any damage; one of the three enemy planes definitely shot down was credited to a Chinese pilot temporarily attached to the squadron. More than a hundred bombs hit in the target area but the extent of the damage done was undetermined.

At 1145 and 1500 the next day (5 September) the 75th Squadron from Kunming returned to Laokay to dive-bomb the railroad marshalling yards situated one mile southeast of the city. Two fires were started by the incendiary clusters. Without breaking the continuous string of missions the fighters shifted their sweeps northward to the Yangtze waterways on 6 September. Swinging around the semicircle formed by Lake Poyang, the Yangtze and Tungting Lake, six P-40's and three P-38's concentrated on targets of opportunity in the vicinity of Shihhuiyao, Nanchang, and Yochow, with the following results:[28]

Six large boats sunk or damaged
Three small boats sunk
Two tugs and two barges sunk
Four locomotives destroyed
One railroad station burned
Two trucks destroyed
One transport plane and crew destroyed
One iron foundry destroyed
Eight gun emplacements destroyed
One hundred Japanese killed

Scorching the same area with gunfire in the next two days the fighters added 12 pillboxes, two trucks, one water tower, one locomotive, and another railroad station to the long list compiled on 6 September.

These few raids show dramatically what a handful of fighter-bomber planes can accomplish when vigorously employed. In themselves these daily multiple missions were achievement enough for a small air force, but when it is realized that approximately 25 per cent of the aircraft at the forward bases were unsuitable for offensive action during this period, their success takes on added significance. Furthermore, unsatisfactory overhaul at rearward depots plus a critical shortage of new Allison engines rendered maintenance and repair of combat planes time-consuming when their need was most urgent.[29] Little wonder that with this exasperating condition and with the new Zeros out-performing the P-40 in every type of maneuver, the theme song of the P-40 squadrons continued to be "Praise the Lord and pass the P-51's."

Another extremely successful day was enjoyed on 9 September. Hengyang started the day's activities by sending a two-plane reconnaissance flight around the northern Hankow-Kiukiang "circuit." In addition to their observation duties the Sharks shot up several river boats, setting one of them on fire. A little later in the day four P-38's and two P-40's from Lingling and Hengyang flew the same route, adding more

prizes. They destroyed one boat, and two locomotives on the Shihluiyao mine railroad. On the main line near Puchi they attacked a box car that turned out to be a camouflaged locomotive which they promptly destroyed. In the meantime 12B-25's and 13 P-40's were dispatched from Kweilin to Canton where the Japanese air force was far more active. Four of the Mitchells and two Sharks aborted but the rest did a "fine job" on the White Cloud airdrome, leveling several buildings. Twenty to 25 fighters jumped the formation as it left the target. Chinese reports claimed that the Japanese had previous information on the raid, and according to their report the Japanese had broadcast the position of the B-25's shortly after their take-off from Kweilin. In attacking the American planes the enemy fighters flew a course parallel to the bombers, turned in, and let the bombers fly through their curtain of fire. One of the bombers lost an engine to this new attack but managed to return home on one engine. In the contest the Japanese lost five planes and probably four more while the Americans lost no planes.[30]

At 1400 on the same day four P-38's, each carrying two 500-pounders, dive-bombed the shop and building area around the Canton docks. As the planes started their power dive from 7,000 feet they discovered a flight of Zeros above them at 13,000 feet already aiming their planes earthward toward the American raiders. The pilots, nosed toward the target, pushed their Lightnings to the limit, and released their bombs. Flying through a hail of building debris which exploded into the air over the target they succeeded in outrunning the Japanese--a not unremarkable feat in view of the improved dive performance of the new Zero. Homeward bound the P-38's sighted a transport plane not far from the target. Two

of the twin-boom raiders rolled over slowly to the left and "polished it off."

Without surcease the pounding of Japanese installations continued on 10 September. Besides the regular shipping attrition raids around Kiukiang a special mission was flown to the Hankow area. Ten mediums and 7 P-40's had the Wuchang cotton mill warehouses as their primary objective. Although they missed this target the mission was not entirely unsuccessful because they downed nine Zeros with four probables before they reached their home stations. One American fighter was destroyed upon landing when it collided with a truck but the pilot was uninjured. Later in the day four P-38's loaded with four tons of bombs and covered by two other P-38's dive-bombed the Whampoa Docks at Canton with great success. As they approached the objective the top cover lured 10 attacking Zeros away from the fighter-bombers, accounting for one. Then, before the enemy could retaliate, they pulled out of range of the interceptors. Following the bombing 17 more interceptors moved in on the P-38's, but with great difficulty the P-38's succeeded in outrunning the Zeros.

Unsuccessful in destroying the cotton mill warehouses on 10 September the 11th Bombardment Squadron with an escort from the 74th and 76th Fighter Squadrons repeated the effort on the following day. Unlike the preceding raid the 10 Mitchells scored several direct hits on the warehouses. One string of bombs fell just short of a 200-foot vessel moored alongside the cotton mills. Intercepted by enemy fighters over the target the B-25's maintained close formation and dived sharply away from the target, spoiling the passes of the Zeros.[31] In the fight which

developed the close formation of the bombers prevented any losses while the gunners picked off two Zeros. The accompanying P-40's accounted for two more without loss to themselves. Meanwhile north of Changsha four P-38's strafed and bombed barracks and buildings at Tayeh, killing an estimated 30 Japanese soldiers.

From day to day the targets in the north varied little. Since the enemy was never sure where the next blow would fall the fighters carried out most of their devastating sweeps without interference, covering the Yangtze valley with clocklike regularity. At Yochow, Shihhuiyao, Kiukiang, and Tayeh on 12 September P-40's and P-38's from the 76th and 449th Squadrons destroyed 12 commercial and naval vessels and made direct hits on barracks in the same area. Targets to the south were varied. On this particular day (12 September) four P-38's with 500-pound bombs and covered by six other P-38's engaged in a skip-bombing mission in Hong Kong harbor. One bomb penetrated a 550-foot ship and exploded. Another hit a ship of about the same size. One P-38 had an engine shot out over the target and when the second failed near Kweilin the plane crashed killing the pilot.

Obviously the dive bombing and strafing activities of such a small number of American aircraft were of minor importance in the contest against the Japanese. They did, however, reveal some of the weaknesses of the enemy situation on the mainland of China. Large formations of American fighters and bombers were generally intercepted, but small flights of the fighter-bombers, striking simultaneously in several areas, made it impossible for the enemy to offer serious opposition. Neither could all the targets be protected by antiaircraft guns. As a result

Japanese communications were seriously crippled and the ground forces were restricted in their action. American liaison officers stationed along the Yangtze River began to report that the fighter-bombers in the air and Chinese guerillas on the ground formed a formidable combination which was giving the Japanese much concern. Of the 25 to 30 vessels damaged at Shihhuiyao, for instance, 13 had drifted to the shore where they were burned by guerillas.[32]

The 449th Squadron with its P-38's had proved its mettle in the theater, and like the P-40's, the Lightnings were used for all kinds of operations. They flew escort for bombers, defended bases, flew strafing missions, performed reconnaissance, and acted as dive bombers and skip bombers. They became excellent dive bombers and because of their speed, could go on such missions unescorted or with a very light escort. The presence of very little torque made it possible for them to strike with great accuracy and then outrun any Zeros which might jump them during their power dive. The absence of drag also made it a good craft for skip bombing, and its great speed again allowed it to go out unescorted. After bombs were away the Lightning could act as its own protection. But the P-38 was still not the answer to the fighter needs of the Fourteenth. The P-40's and P-38's could certainly be used to advantage on many types of missions, but to counteract the new Zero a faster high-altitude plane such as the P-51 was sorely needed.

Chapter IX

LATE SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS -- CONCLUSION

Immediately after his arrival in India to assume command of the air forces in the India-Burma Sector, General Stratemeyer had set to work at his task of coordinating all air activities in the CBI. He soon became aware, however, of some of the disadvantages of being assigned to a low-priority theater where a delicate balance of meager air forces had to be maintained between different sectors. Accustomed to sit in judgment on what could be sent to various air forces, he now found himself caught in the toils of demands from China for reinforcements, the necessity of maintaining the Tenth Air Force at a level which would enable it to carry out its defensive duties as well as its part in the Burma fight, and the inability of the Air Staff to assign air units to the CBI. He quickly realized that his new job would be no bed of roses when one of his first requests was turned down--a request for the activation of a troop carrier squadron for the Fourteenth Air Force.

A small transport detachment had been in China since April 1942 when they were ordered there to evacuate personnel who participated in the Doolittle Tokio raid. They had flown supplies and mail to forward bases of the AVG and CATF through all kinds of weather, but not until March 1943 when the Fourteenth was activated was an organized air transport unit established, and even then it had only four planes. Meanwhile the personnel, laboring under great difficulties, were

apparently forgotten when promotions were being made.[1] As the American forces in China grew and more forward bases were built, the need for a full transport unit or troop carrier squadron became acute, and attention was once more called to the small unit which was already active in that theater. On 14 July General Alexander of IC'ATC had told ATC Headquarters in Washington that General Chennault needed a troop carrier squadron for direct support of contemplated operations, saying that he believed such a squadron should be activated in China.[2] On 18 August, two days before he took formal command in India, General Stratemeyer cabled General Arnold that it was essential that a troop carrier squadron be activated for the Fourteenth Air Force if for no other reason than to make possible promotion of personnel in China. The activation, he said, would require no additional transports or personnel.[3] In a letter of 22 August to General Giles, his successor in Washington, General Stratemeyer explained the situation more fully. He reiterated that personnel and planes were not required but that the activation was necessary to aid morale by giving promotions to boys who had been flying about 150 hours a month, and to enlisted men of long service in the China detachment. He added: "Chennault will not go off half-cocked and take advantage of the vacancies that exist if such a squadron is activated."[4]

On 2 September General Arnold replied that it was absolutely impossible to authorize augmentation of the troop carrier units in CBI because of lack of aircraft and personnel, and that over-all plans precluded diversion of other troop carrier units to that theater.[5] A few days thereafter General Giles, replying to General Stratemeyer's

letter of 22 August, reminded him that he (Stratemeyer) had turned down a similar request previously while he was still Chief of the Air Staff. Furthermore, he said, the 273 Group Program as currently set up would not permit the activation of the squadron. Even replacement personnel and planes to keep the squadron operational simply could not be spared.[6]

While this effort to alleviate the transport situation was being considered the combat units in China continued their harassing of the Japanese. Until the middle of September all operations had been handled by the fighter squadrons and the 11th Bombardment Squadron (H). The heavy bombers, hampered by bad weather, had been making regular hauls over the hump, breaking the monotony of the operations by dumping a few bombs on Tengchung and Myitkyina as they passed over. On 14 and 15 September they ran the only combat missions which they were destined to carry out during the month.

In the first raid 15 B-24's took off to bomb targets in the Haiphong region, but the first wave turned back because of the weather. Those planes reaching the target made one direct hit on a 200-foot ship in dry dock, another on the dock itself, and three more on the dock area on the south shore of the river. As the planes started their down-hill run for home they saw smoke rising 4,000 feet into the air above the target. They encountered heavy and fairly accurate antiaircraft over the area but met no interception. The 11th Squadron which flew a diversionary raid over the Kowloon Docks at Hong Kong dropped no bombs but destroyed four Zeros which attacked the formation. To the north on the same day the 449th's planes sank a 300-foot boat and probably sank a 350-foot boat along the Yangtze River "milk run."

After the successful unescorted operation at Haiphong on the 14th it was decided that five of the B-24's which had turned back because of weather should return the following day. This time, however, the enemy was ready with 50 Zeros airborne over the target. Coming out of the sun from behind thunderheads the aggressive Zeros barreled into the small formation and almost wiped out the entire flight. Concentrating on the lead planes as they had at Hankow, they immediately shot down the first plane. Shortly after leaving the target a second plane went down with one engine burning, no parachutes being sighted. A third plane, hard hit, stayed with the formation a few minutes and then turned north. It was hoped that it would reach friendly territory but was never heard from. Two planes, both crippled, returned to Kunming. One was unable to get in. It crashed a short distance from the field. All on board were killed. Of the five planes taking part in the mission four had been lost with their entire crews. Since only one plane was ever able to report, the result of the bombing was never determined. The returning plane had been forced to jettison its bombs, and it is likely that the mission was a complete failure. The one reporting plane claimed to have destroyed 10 enemy planes with 18 more probables. Possibly the other planes shot down some enemy fighters, but American losses were so high as to indicate the inadvisability of continuing unescorted missions by the B-24's. The 373d Squadron was now almost as badly crippled as the 425th had been after the second Hankow raid.

Far to the north meanwhile, the 11th Bombardment Squadron was having better success bombing the familiar cotton mills at Wuchang. The 7 Mitchells, accompanied by 12 P-40's, scored 28 bomb hits on the target

and then successfully fought off the 12 Zeros which intercepted. One P-40 and one Zero were shot down in the ensuing fight, and four other Zeros were damaged.

For the remainder of the month only small raids were mounted by the Fourteenth Air Force, none of them by heavy bombers. From 16 to 22 September the 11th Squadron with fighter escort concentrated exclusively on the Hankow-Kiukiang circuit. In 24 sorties during the six-day period they blasted ammunition dumps at Yangsin, a foundry at Shihhuiyao, and shipping, docks, and railroad yards at Kiukiang. They flew their last two raids of the month on 27 and 30 September against shipping in Tonkin Bay and off the coast at Fort Bayard. Both raids were unsuccessful.

The long quiescent Japanese bombers finally came out of hiding on 20 September, and instead of continuing their campaign against the forward bases at Hengyang, Kweilin, and Lingling, they struck at Kunming. This shift was logical for at least two reasons. By that time there were four fighter squadrons at Kweilin, Lingling, and Hengyang, close enough together so that if sufficient warning were given, the fighters from any one of the bases could aid in protection of either of the other two. On the other hand, only one squadron was based at Kunming, and the only other squadron which could be of assistance in case of a raid was the 25th at Yunnanyi. The movement of the major fighter strength to the eastern bases had therefore made them more defensible against bombing attack than was Kunming itself. The other probable reason for the attack on Kunming was that it was the area whence the B-24's ran their missions. For several weeks it had appeared that the Japanese were more

interested in destruction of the heavy bombers than in stopping the forays of the mediums or fighter-bombers. Possibly they hoped to destroy the B-24's on the ground at their home bases.

Attacking the main airdrome at Kunming, 27 twin-engine bombers, accompanied by 20 to 30 fighters, strung their bombs across the field, through the compound at the north end, and on toward the northeast. Several bombs hit the runways, three fell in the compound, and most of the others fell in open areas. One C-47 was destroyed on the ground and several others were damaged by bomb fragments. A direct hit on the garage completely destroyed the structure and its contents. Directly after the bomb run 27 P-40's and 3 P-38's from the 16th and 75th Fighter Squadrons intercepted. During the battle the enemy bombers maintained superb formation discipline, planes in flames holding their position until they exploded. As much, however, cannot be said for their escort. Their poor flying enabled the Americans to make their first pass with little opposition. After all reports were in, 15 bombers were claimed as confirmed, along with six fighters, and a still larger number claimed as probables. One P-40 and one P-38 were shot down and several others damaged in the aerial battle, while in addition to the C-47 destroyed on the ground seven others were found to have suffered damage. If it had been the aim of the Japanese to destroy B-24's they had obviously failed; it was also obvious that the enemy fighter pilots were not of the same caliber as those previously met at Hankow, Canton, and Haiphong, although it is possible that they had not been trained in the art of flying escort to their own bombers.

The Kunming raid was the last major effort of the Japanese air force

in September. As American operations in the last few days of the month drew to a close there could be no doubt that the aerial situation in China had greatly improved since the dark days of July. The heavy bombers had suffered serious setbacks in August and September, but the mediums and fighter-bombers had been able to keep the upper hand, even in the face of the new Jap fighter planes. The forward bases seemed more secure than ever, and with these bases comparatively safe from enemy aerial interference, the Americans could be expected to plan numerous and varying missions to confuse the Japanese in the future.

Most of the inherent difficulties of theFourteenth, however, were as yet without solution. A glance at recommendations by commanding officers of tactical units reveals the serious character of the many handicaps under which they were operating in the late summer and early fall of 1943. The chief cause of dissatisfaction among the fighter squadrons was, of course, the inferiority of available American fighter aircraft to the new Japanese Zero. Throughout August Maj. Robert Costello of the 76th Squadron, stationed at Hengyang, recommended that P-51 type fighters be introduced to the theater at once. In describing the new enemy fighter he said that it had an elliptical wing similar to the Spitfire and seemed to be larger than the earlier models. "This ship is able to dive with the P-40 thus leaving us at their mercy." Maj. Robert L. Liles of the 16th Squadron, then stationed at Yunnanyi, reported early in September: "The Japanese have evidently changed their tactics in this area and no longer come in below 20,000 feet. Instead they come in above our P-40's and we are unable to get to their altitude. Our planes indicate only 120 miles per hour at 30,000 feet and will go no

higher. Suggest that P-40's be improved with a super-charger or be replaced by an airplane that will combat Zeros at 30,000 feet and above."[7]

Late in August Lt. Col. Norval C. Bonawitz of the 74th Fighter Squadron at Kweilin said: "Tactics used by the Japs . . . showed definite improvement over previous tactics. By using their superior altitude they remained out of range of the P-40's, dropping down by twos and threes to make one or two passes then zooming for altitude as soon as their advantage was lost. Under such tactics the P-40 will not operate effectively against them. A plane with greater altitude range is needed to combat these tactics." Soon afterward Capt. William R. Crooks, also of the 74th, reported: "Recent operations against the new type Zero have shown that the P-40 has little, if any, advantage in speed--(one of the few advantages we have had up to this time)." At about the same time Maj. Edmund R. Goss of the 75th Squadron at Kunming said: "New airplanes . . . are needed immediately to combat the new improved Japanese fighters which have both speed and altitude advantage over our P-40's." Lt. Col. S. B. Knowles of 23d Group Headquarters explained early in September: "A P-40 must have several thousand feet altitude to be sure of out diving the new type Zero . . . . They are able to dive with the P-40 to speeds in excess of 400 miles per hour. They have several thousand feet altitude advantage. The new Zero at low altitude can easily overtake a P-40 and remain in range for sufficient time to shoot it down."[8]

From these reports it is clear that the Japanese were using the new fighters and improved tactics in every sector of the theater, for every P-40 squadron, regardless of its location, sent in appeals for new-type aircraft. Significantly, the P-38 squadron at Lingling made no such requests.

Aside from the critical need for better fighters many less pressing problems presented themselves with regularity. Aircraft on hand frequently remained out of action for weeks awaiting minor parts, while others had engines so badly worn that they were unfit for anything except defensive duties over the airdromes. New engines were rarely available when needed, and engines arriving from overhauls at the Agra depot in India were found unfit for use until further work was done on them. Replacement crews were critically needed to allow the return to the United States of men who had been in the theater for 18 months or more, some of them already ineffective because of war weariness. The few crews which arrived were frequently inadequately trained, especially in formation, high-altitude, and instrument flying. At the forward bases Post Exchange supplies were not available for periods of months at a time, and at least one squadron was unable to get GI shoes for the ground men. Ammunition was found to be faulty on many occasions, one squadron reporting that only one out of 10 tracers would ignite, and that more than 50 per cent of the armor-piercing ammunition was defective.[9]

Morale undoubtedly suffered, particularly when stories reached the theater of combat crews in other theaters being promptly returned to the Zone of the Interior upon completion of a certain number of missions, or upon completion of a given number of combat hours; yet, withal, morale remained remarkably high. Many of the difficulties were at least partially overcome by "Yankee ingenuity," and despite their "grousing" the combat units never lost their aggressiveness. The "forgotten men" of the AAF, the men of the Fourteenth probably realized

that they were getting about all the help that could be expected under the circumstances. Meanwhile, had they known of them, they might have gained some comfort from the strenuous efforts being made in their behalf at the highest levels.

On 24 September General Stratemeyer asked General Arnold for further instructions as to the transfer of the 341st Bombardment Group (M), then in India, to the Fourteenth. He said that General Chennault needed the additional squadrons to attack innumerable targets in China but that General Davidson was currently using them against urgent targets in north Burma. He believed that another medium group should be assigned to the theater as early as possible and said that the eventual arrival of the Chinese-American medium group in China, scheduled for 1 March 1944, would not eliminate the necessity of assignment of the 341st to the Fourteenth. Awaiting further orders, however, he said that the 341st would remain with the Tenth until an additional medium group arrived in the theater.[10]

On 27 September Dr. Soong passed on to President Roosevelt a message which he had recently received from the Generalissimo, apparently the message to which General Chennault had referred in his message to General Arnold on 25 July. Chiang Kai-shek had reviewed the failure to receive reinforcements which were to enable General Chennault to undertake an ambitious aerial offensive in China, and further, had invited attention to the understrength of the units already in China. As of 5 September, he said, there were in China with the Fourteenth only 85 operational fighter planes plus 20 reparable, and 16 medium bombers, only 9 of which were in commission. Chiang felt that only a presidential directive could

save the original plan for China operations "agreed upon by all concerned." He listed General Chennault's pressing needs as follows:

1. One fighter squadron immediately, exclusive of the two currently on the move, plus 45 fighter aircraft to bring the other squadrons to full strength

2. Replacements of 35 fighters monthly

3. Two more medium bombardment squadrons immediately

4. Exchange of an existing P-40 squadron for one of the P-51 squadrons arriving in India so that General Chennault would have fighters capable of meeting the improved Japanese Zero presently appearing in China.

5. Three more assistants skilled in the knowledge of Chinese terrain and Japanese air tactics, to wit, Majors Hill, Bond, and Rector

The Generalissimo concluded that the shift of aircraft from India could be accomplished at once because there were more than 250 fighters and three medium bombardment squadrons then with the Tenth.[11]

Chiang Kai-shek's information on the number of aircraft in India and China was remarkably accurate, and one sees the hand of General Chennault in the entire message.[12] Every item had already been requested by the Fourteenth's commander, and failure to obtain reinforcements through regular channels evidently had led to an appeal through higher channels to the top command level.

For all the complications in China the most obvious and serious drawback in nourishing the anemic Fourteenth Air Force was the snail-pace rise in the hump tonnage. Difficulties with the C-46, construction problems at projected Assam bases, shortage of ground transportation and loading facilities, and the Calcutta-Assam communications bottleneck all combined to defeat the hump project and thereby to emasculate the aerial

effort over China in 1943. Reinforcements were on the way by 1 October, but too late to carry out the plan so carefully laid by General Chennault.

But disappointment was not limited to the people in the China theater. A memorandum from Dr. Soong to President Roosevelt in mid-October elicited this outburst in a memorandum from the President to General Marshall: "I am still pretty thoroughly disgusted with the India-China matters . . . . Everything seems to go wrong. But the worst thing is that we are falling down on our promises every single time. We have not fulfilled one of them yet."[13] On the same day the President said in another communication to General Marshall: "Almost everything seems to have gone wrong with our program for supporting Chennault. I am sure that Somervell, when he puts his mind to it, can put a real punch behind it."[14] In reply General Marshall called attention of the President to the dependence of the air effort in China upon certain improvements in India, largely a British responsibility.[15] Immediately President Roosevelt sent a message to Prime Minister Churchill saying that he was disturbed about the build-up of air facilities in Assam and the development of the Calcutta-Assam supply line. He said that General Chennault's force was the one specific contribution that could be made in China in the next few months and that the Fourteenth could not operate without more supplies. He concluded: "I wish you would take a personal part in this business because I am a bit apprehensive that with our new project in Burma our air force in China will be forgotten and I think that is a great mistake."[16]

With President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Generalissimo all behind the project, the Fourteenth could reasonably expect some improvements, but it was already too late for General Chennault to

mount the aerial offensive before bad weather set in again. Precious months had already been lost. Only in 1944 could there be any real implementation of the plans laid at Casablanca and Trident.

G L O S S A R Y

AC/AS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff
AC/S	Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg.	Acting
Agwar	Adjutant General, War Department
Ammdel	Hq., Theater Commander, New Delhi (Rear Echelon)
Ammisca	Hq., Theater Commander, Chungking
Aquila	Hq., Tenth Air Force
ASC	Air Service Command
ATC	Air Transport Command
AVG	American Volunteer Group
CATF	China Air Task Force
CBI	China-Burma-India
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CNAC	China National Airways Company
Coguk	Hq., Fourteenth Air Force
C/S	Chief of Staff
DC/AS	Deputy Chief of Air Staff
IBS	India-Burma Sector
IC.ATC	India-China Wing, Air Transport Command
Ltr.	Letter
MA	Military Attaché
Msg.	Message
OC&R	Operations, Commitments, and Requirements
OPD	Operations Division, War Department General Staff
OTU	Operational Training Unit
Sgd.	Signed
SOS	Services of Supply
TAG	The Adjutant General

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

The sources upon which this study has been based are well enough indicated in the notes. They have been drawn largely from message files held in AAF Historical Office, classified files, the Intelligence library, and the files of the several AAF Headquarters' offices.

N O T E S

Chapter I

1. See AAF Historical Studies No. 12, Tenth Air Force, 1942; AAFRH-4.

2. Ibid.

3. For popular accounts of the American Volunteer Group, see: Robert B. Hotz, With General Chennault; Russell Whelan, The Flying Tigers; Olga Greenlaw, The Lady and the Tigers.

4. See n. 3 above.

5. Interview with Constantine Leo Zakhartchenko, Air Adviser to Chinese Government, 19 April 43.

6. See Tenth Air Force, 1942, Chap. III, n. 8.

7. Material for this and succeeding paragraphs was obtained largely from decoration orders, station lists, and popular accounts.

Chapter II

1. See AAFRH-4.

2. Inclosure to ltr., Chennault to Arnold, 4 March 43.

3. Ltr., Chennault to Arnold, 4 March 43.

4. Ltr., Arnold to Stilwell, 7 Feb. 43.

5. See n. 2 above.

6. Figures based on material obtained from Statistical Control.

7. General Chennault asked and received permission to remove them from combat duty. CM-IN-13843, 26 March 43, Stilwell to Arnold, #274. On 1 March there were 12 P-40B's, and 16 P-40E's still on duty with the Fourteenth. Weekly Status and Operations Report (Form 34)

8. See n. 2 above.

9. See n. 3 above.

10. Memo for DC/AS from AC/AS Plans, sgd. by General Anderson, 5 April 43.

11. Ibid.

12. CM-OUT-830, 2 July 1943, Arnold to Stilwell, #2909.

13. Ltr., Arnold to Chennault, 2 April 43.

14. Ibid.

15. All squadrons were based in the immediate vicinity of Kunming except the 74th which was at nearby Yunnanyi. Form 34.

16. Memo for Stratemeyer from Marshall, 18 March 43.

17. Ibid.

18. Memo for Marshall from Stratemeyer, 20 March 43.

19. Memo for Marshall from Arnold, 23 March 43.

20. Memo for General Handy from Col. T. S. Timberman, Chief, India-China Sec., Theater Gp., OPD, 23 March 43.

21. Memo for Marshall from Stratemeyer, 26 March 43.

22. Msg., Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 31 March 43.

23. Memo for Marshall from Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, Actg. AC/S, 14 April 43.

24. Memo for TAG from Hq. AAF, 24 April 43.

25. Station Lists, 10th and 14th Air Forces, 1943.

26. Figures from Statistical Control, based on aircraft status reports.

27. Memos for Roosevelt from Marshall, 10 and 12 April 43; memo for Marshall from Roosevelt, 12 April 43; msg., Marshall to Stilwell, 11 April 43; memo for Marshall from Arnold, 12 April 43, notation by GCM at bottom of page.

28. For the following discussion of opinions held by Generals Stilwell and Chennault, and by other key representatives of the interested governments, reference should be made to the papers of the Trident Conference and to memorandums from Arnold to Marshall, 29 Oct. 43, and from Stilwell to Marshall, 13 May 43.

29. CCS 239/1, Incl. A, 23 May 43.

Chapter III

1. Report of Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson to Gen. Arnold, 22 June 43 /Davidson Report/.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ltr., Arnold to Stilwell, 7 Feb. 43, ATC Operations India to China.
5. Ibid.; CM-OUT-8535, 25 Jan. 43, Stratemeyer and George to Arnold, #1432; memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull Actg. AC/S, 14 April 43.
6. Draft of letter to Chennault prepared by Gen. Kuter, undated; memo for Gen. O. A. Anderson by Lt. Col. George C. Carey, "General Chennault's Talk in G-2," undated.
7. Msg., Arnold to Stratemeyer, 13 March 43, #1124.
8. Memo for Deputy C/AS from AC/AS Plans, sgd. O. A. Anderson, 5 April 43.
9. Memo for Marshall from Arnold, 23 March 43.
10. See above n. 5.
11. Figures obtained from official reports ICWATC to Hq. AAF.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. See above n. 1.
17. Ibid.
18. Ltr., Alexander to Arnold 19 April 43.
19. Davidson Report.
20. Ltr., G. N. Macready, British Joint Staff Mission, to Arnold, 10 May 43.
21. Ibid.

22. See above n. 15.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. See above n. 16.

26. See above n. 17.

27. Ibid.

28. See above n. 16.

29. See above n. 8.

30. Ibid.

31. Cable files throughout the summer of 1943 are filled with reports of defects in the C-46 and the efforts to overcome them in the field.

32. CM-OUT-8568, 21 Aug. 43, Arnold to Stratemeyer, #2600.

33. See above n. 8.

34. R&R, Gen. George to AC/AS OC&R, 14 June 43.

35. Ibid.; CM-OUT-8535, 25 Jan. 43, Stratemeyer and George to Arnold, #1432; Cir. #6, Rear Echelon Hq. USAF CBI, New Delhi, sgd. Brig. Gen. B. G. Ferris, 14 April 43.

36. R&R, Stratemeyer to Giles, 6 June 43.

37. See above n. 31.

38. R&R, Giles to Stratemeyer, 1 July 43.

39. Rickenbacker Report.

40. CM-OUT-8535, 25 Jan. 43, Stratemeyer and George to Arnold, #1432.

41. Rickenbacker Report.

42. Ltr., Alexander to Stratemeyer, 10 July 43.

43. CM-OUT-5851, 14 June 43, Marshall to Wheeler, #2807; Davidson Report.

44. Cir. #6, Rear Echelon Hq. USAF CBI, New Delhi, sgd. Brig. Gen. B. G. Ferris, 14 April 43.

45. CM-OUT-8535, 25 Jan. 43, Stratemeyer and George to Arnold, #1432;
CM-IN-11243, 21 March 43, Bissell to George, # Aquila R 770 XS;
CM-IN-15045, 28 March 43, Bissell to George, # Aquila R 1088 A;
CM-IN-5116, 9 April 43, Bissell to George, # Aquila P 214 XS;
CM-IN-8882, 15 April 43, Bissell to Frank, # Aquila W 195 PXS;
CM-IN-9770, 15 May 43, Ferris to Marshall, # Ammdel AG 506;
CM-OUT-8658, 21 Aug. 43, Arnold to Stratemeyer, #2600.

46. History of Evolution of 5320th Air Defense Wing.

47. Quotation from ltr., Chennault to Arnold 27 June 43, along with draft of letter to Chennault prepared by Gen. Kuter.

48. Ltr., Madame Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, 30 July 43.

Chapter IV

1. Interview with Col. Bruce K. Holloway, 16 Nov. 43. In this study the chief sources for the combat operations have been Weekly Status and Operations Reports, Daily Tactical Reports, Cable Messages, and unit histories. Since these sources are arranged chronologically it was felt unnecessary to make individual citations for all operations. In those instances, however, where an unusual statement has been made, and/or where sources other than those mentioned above have been used, individual footnotes have been appended.

2. Summarization of Operations of China Air Task Force from July 1942 to Feb. 5, 1943, extracted by Analysis and Allocation Unit, Record Sec., Informational Intell. Div., 26 March 43, from Report of Hq. CATF, Office of Operations Officer, Kunming, China, 6 Feb. 43, in A-2 Library, China 9910, 1941-1943. Statistics on AVG from Tenth Air Force 1942. See also Robert Hotz, With General Chennault.

3. Interview with Col. Merian C. Cooper, Chief of Staff, CATF, 16 Jan. 43. See also interview Col. Holloway.

4. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 25 March 43, based on report of the Chinese Air Force.

5. Ibid., 21 April 43, based on report from the U. S. Military Attache in Chungking.

6. Ibid., 28 April 43.

7. Ibid., 14 April, 5 May 43. See also Daily Tactical Report Asiatic Theater, 10 April 1943. One P-40 returned because of engine trouble. Daily Tactical Report, 10 April 43. In addition to this combat operation, two spectacular reconnaissance flights were flown from Kunming. One photo plane, making a round trip of some 1,700 miles, covered Ichang, Hankow, and Changsha. The other flew 2,400 miles to photograph Amoy, Foochow, and northern Formosa. It refueled at one of the advanced bases. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater 12 April 43.

8. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 25 June 43.

9. Ibid.

10. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 4 May 43.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 30 April 43.

13. Davidson Report.

14. History, 308th Bomb Gp. (H). See also Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 5 May 43.

15. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 4 Aug. 43.

16. Ibid., 30 June 43.

17. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 13 May 43.

18. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 17 May 43.

19. Ibid., 16 June 43.

20. Ibid., 22 May 43.

Chapter V

1. CM-IN-11607, 19 April 43, Stilwell to Arnold, # Ammisca 356; memo for Arnold from Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, Actg. AC/S, 20 April 43; CM-IN-5710, 9 May 43, Glenn to Chennault, # Coguk MA 126 W 76.

2. Memo for Brig. Gen. J. E. Hull, Actg. AC/S from Brig. Gen. L. G. Saunders, DC/AS, 9 May 43.

3. Memo for Stilwell from Brig. Gen. L. G. Saunders, DC/AS, 11 May 43.

4. Ltr., Chennault to Stilwell, 30 June 43, bearing indorsements by Generals Stilwell and Ferris, 12 and 23 July 43.

5. General Haddon arrived in China with General Glenn and the other Fourteenth Air Force staff officers.

6. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 26 April 43.

7. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 13 June 43.

8. McInnis, Edgar, The War: Fourth Year, 220.

9. The P-40K's and P-40M's had the disadvantage of being much heavier than the P-40E model.

10. History, 308th Bomb Gp. (H).

11. Ibid.

12. McInnis, Edgar, The War: Fourth Year, 220.

13. History, 308th Bomb Gp.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Daily Tactical Report, 2 June 43.

19. History, 308th Bomb Gp.

20. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 23 June 43.

21. Ibid. American fighter pilots and bomber crewmen made generous contributions to a fund for relief of the Chinese who had suffered as a result of the raid.

22. See App. 3.

Chapter VI

1. By the third week in September the 16th, 74th, 75th, and 76th Squadrons had on hand 35 P-40K's, 15 P-40M's, 6 P-40N's, only 5 P-40E's and no P-40B's. Form 34.
2. Davidson Report.
3. Ibid.
4. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 9 July 43.
5. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 7 July 43.
6. History 308th Bomb Gp.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.; Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 14 July 43.
10. Ibid.
11. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 16 July 43.
12. Ibid., 18 Aug. 43.
13. Ibid., 20 Aug. 43.
14. Daily Intelligence Extract, 4 Aug. 43.
15. 14th AF Intelligence Summaries, 30 July 43.
16. History, 308th Bomb Gp.

Chapter VII

1. Figures from Statistical Control.
2. CM-IN-18320, 25 July 43, Chennault to Arnold, # Coguk W 97 YB.
3. CM-IN-9662, 13 Aug. 43, Chennault to Arnold, # Coguk W 41 AC.
4. CM-OUT-6477, 17 Aug. 43, Arnold to Stratemeyer, #3166.
5. Memo for AC/AS Plans from Stratemeyer, 6 June 43.
6. Memo for AC/AS MM&D from Stratemeyer, undated.
7. Comment #1 on memo for AC/AS OC&R from Gen. Kuter, dated 10 July 43.
8. Memo for Arnold from Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, A/CS, 19 June 43.
9. CM-IN-4873, 7 July 43, Stilwell to Arnold, # Aquila D 427.
10. CM-OUT-3365, 9 July 43, Arnold to Stilwell, #2983.
11. Form 34, 15 to 21 Aug. 43.
12. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 19 Aug. 43.
13. Ibid., 23 Aug. 43.
14. Interview with Col. Holloway.
15. History, 308th Bomb Gp.
16. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 7 Sep. 43.
17. History, 308th Bomb Gp.

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Chapter VIII

1. CM-OUT-3460, 8 July 43, Marshall to Stilwell, #2975; memo for AC/AS Plans from Stratemeyer, 1 July 43; notation, sgd. by Stratemeyer, on memo for Arnold from Davidson, 27 June 43.

2. Memo for AC/AS Plans from Stratemeyer, 1 July 43; memo for Stratemeyer from Davidson, 5 July 43.

3. CM-IN-12097, 20 April 43, Chennault to Arnold, #361; CM-OUT-2150, 5 June 43, Marshall to Stilwell, #2762; memo for Arnold from Davidson, 27 June 43.

4. CM-OUT-1712, 4 July 43, Arnold to Chennault, #156; memo for Arnold from Davidson, 27 June 43.

5. CM-IN-1955, 3 July 43, Chennault to Arnold, # Coguk W 1 UB; CM-OUT-1712, 4 July 43, Arnold to Chennault, #156.

6. CM-OUT-12913, 30 June 43, Arnold to Stilwell, #1860;
CM-OUT-8521, 21 July 43, Arnold to Chennault, #3018;
CM-OUT-13629, 29 Sep. 43, Arnold to Stilwell, #3260;
CM-IN-1511, 13 Oct. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Aquila W 2331.

7. CM-IN-213, 1 July 43, Chennault to Arnold, # Coguk W 277.

8. Memo for Arnold from Davidson, 27 June 43.

9. CM-IN-10715, 20 March 43, Stilwell to Marshall, # Ammisca 249; CM-OUT unnumbered, 16 July 43, Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, # WD 3019; CM-OUT-7186, 17 July 43, Marshall to Stilwell, #3024; CM-OUT-7951, 20 July 43, Marshall to Stilwell, #3034; CM-IN-16520, 23 July 43, Stilwell to Marshall, # Ammdel AG 1026.

10. The orginal designation for the post was Commanding General, Army Air Force Units, India-Burma Theater, and Air Adviser to Asiatic Theater Commander. CM-OUT-8778, 21 June 43, Arnold to Stilwell, #2851; CM-IN-14682, 23 June 43, Stilwell to Arnold, # Ammisca 571; CM-IN-14719, 23 June 43, Stilwell to Arnold, unnumbered; CM-OUT-10613, 25 June 43, Marshall to Stilwell, #2882; CM-IN-16328, 26 June 43, Stilwell to Marshall, #591. Also see History of USAAF, IBS, CBI, and supporting documents.

11. GO #1 Hq. CBI Air Service Command, 20 Aug. 43.

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12. CCS 308/3 21 Aug. 43.

13. History of USAAF, IBS, CBI.

14. CCS 305, 14 Aug. 43. CCS 312 and CCS 312/1, 6 Aug. 43. CCS 319/5, 24 Aug. 43.

15. CCS 11th Meeting, 18 Aug. 43.

16. Ibid.

17. History of USAAF, IBS, CBI, passim.

18. Ltr., Arnold to Stilwell, 28 Aug. 43.

19. Ltr., Arnold to Stratemeyer, 28 Aug. 43.

20. Ltr., Arnold to Chennault, 28 Aug. 43.

21. CM-OUT-11828, 28 Aug. 43, Arnold to Stratemeyer, #2715.

22. CM-IN-23795, 31 Aug. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Aquila W 1860 AB.

23. Msg., Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, 31 March 43; CM-IN-11063, 29 Aug. 43, Stilwell to Marshall, # Ammisca 70.

24. Ltr., T. V. Soong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Giles, 6 Sep. 43.

25. Ltr., Giles to Soong, 8 Sep. 43.

26. CM-IN-9967, 13 Sep. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Aquila S 28 TE.

27. Figures from Statistical Control.

28. Daily Tactical Report, Asiatic Theater, 8 Sep. 43.

29. Form 34, 5-11 Sep. 43, Hq. 23d Fighter Gp. See also same report for 74th Fighter Sq.

30. Interview with Col. Holloway.

31. Form 34, 11 Sep. 43, 11th Bomb Sq. (M).

32. CM-IN-9072, 11 Sep. 43, Chennault to Arnold.

Chapter IX

1. History of 322d Troop Carrier Sq., April 1942-Dec. 1943.
2. CM-IN-9780, 14 July 43, Alexander to Love, # HW 337.
3. CM-IN-13531, 18 Aug. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Ammdel AG 1407; CM-IN-133, 1 Sep. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Aquila W 1877 AC.
4. Ltr., Stratemeyer to Giles, 22 Aug. 43.
5. CM-OUT-638, 2 Sep. 43, Arnold to Stratemeyer, # 2776.
6. Ltr., Giles to Stratemeyer, 8 Sep. 43.
7. Form 34, 1943, passim.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. CM-IN-17120, 24 Sep. 43, Stratemeyer to Arnold, # Aquila W 2240.
11. Memo for Roosevelt from Soong, 27 Sep. 43.
12. Aircraft status reports from the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces, 1 Sep. 43, show 86 operational fighters in China and 242 fighters in India.
13. Memo for Marshall from Roosevelt, 15 Oct. 43.
14. Ltr., Roosevelt to Marshall, 15 Oct. 43.
15. Memo for Roosevelt from Marshall, 18 Oct. 43.
16. Msg., Roosevelt to Churchill, 18 Oct. 43.

Appendix 1

Summarization of Operations of China Air Task Force
From July 1942 to February 5, 1943.

I. 23d Fighter Group

A. Operations

(1)	Total combat time	5836:15
(2)	Total combat missions	1448:00
(3)	Enemy aircraft destroyed air	122
(4)	Enemy aircraft destroyed ground	31
(5)	US losses from enemy action	21
(6)	US losses noncombat	18
(7)	Enemy trucks destroyed	60
(8)	Enemy trucks damaged	40
(9)	Enemy gunboats destroyed	1
(10)	Enemy barges destroyed	4
(11)	Enemy junks destroyed	2
(12)	Enemy tugs destroyed	2
(13)	Enemy tugs damaged	1

B. Ammunition and pyrotechnics expended

(1)	550 demoliton bombs	24
(2)	550 demoliton bombs	13
(3)	250 demoliton bombs	8
(4)	35 fragmentation bombs	114
(5)	17 kg fragmentation bombs	132
(6)	14 kg fragmentation bombs	12
(7)	30 cal ammunition	193,530 rds
(8)	50 cal ammunition	236,157 rds

II. 11th Bomb Sq (M)

A. Operations

(1)	Enemy aircraft destroyed air-confirmed	9
	-probable	11
	ground-confirmed	82
	-probable	57
(2)	Number of combat missions	62
(3)	Total combat hours	1048:20
(4)	Boats sunk:	8
(5)	Lighters sunk:	100

B. Ammunition and pyrotechnics expended

(1) Number of bombs expended

M5 30 lb	2642
50 Kg Russian	712
100 Kg Russian	218
250 Kg Russian	118
50 Kg Chinese demo	420
50 Kg Chinese incend	120
100 Kg Chinese demo	308
M30 100 lb	408
M43 500 lb	324
Incendiary clusters	63
M31 300 lb	7

(2) Ammunition expended--30 cal 29,800 approx--50 cal 26,100 approx

(3) Av number of planes in commission 8

(4) CATF losses bomb

combat 1 noncombat 2

Appendix 2

Fourteenth Air Force Hump Tonnage
April-October 1943

	Total Tonnage		Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants		Others	
	Allocations	Receipts	Allocations	Receipts	Allocations	Receipts
April	1,270	872	900	680	370	192
May	1,270	1,728	796	1,397	474	331
June	3,360	1,928	2,499	1,706	861	222
July	4,700	3,233	3,408	2,074	1,292	1,159
August	4,700	3,038	3,320	1,992	1,380	1,046
September	4,700	4,576[1]	3,220	3,413	1,480	1,163
October	4,700	4,225	3,211	3,022	1,489	1,203
Total	24,700	19,600	17,354	14,284	7,346	5,316

(1) The original report lists this figure as 4,575 but in view of the figures given in the breakdown, as well as another report made by the same organization, the obvious error has been corrected.

Report prepared by 24th Statistical Control Unit, China.

Appendix 3

Operations and Resources of Fourteenth Air Force
May-October 1943

	RESOURCES			OPERATIONS	
	Personnel of 14th AF	Aircraft on hand	Hump tonnage	Sorties flown	Tons of bombs dropped
May	2,502	158	1,728	936	121
June	2,547	174	1,928	748	67
July	2,618	176	3,233	1,016	191
August	2,827	182	3,038	1,071	133
September	3,365	181	4,576	1,254	161
October	3,794	193	4,226	1,365	318

Figures compiled by 24th Statistical Control Unit, 20 June 1944.

Appendix 4

CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON HUMP TONNAGE
APRIL-OCTOBER 1943

Week ending	ICMATC tons to China	CNAC tons to China	Total tons to China[1]	ICMATC Planes on hand					CNAC Planes on hand
				C-87	C-46	C-47 C-53	C-54	Total	
20 April	720	181	901						
27 April	552	193	745						
4 May	676	146	822	12	28	90		130	20
11 May	535	245	780						
18 May	357	235	592	13	33	91		137	20
25 May	411	187	598	13	35	88		136	20
1 June	557	99	656						
8 June	541	191	732	12	46	88		146	20
15 June	573	221	794	11	47	87		145	20
22 June	662	189	851	11	47	85		143	20
29 June	443	160	603	10	46	84		140	20
6 July	495	185	680	17	48	84		149	20
13 July	662	264	926	19	62	83	1	165	25
20 July	577	272	849	20	70	83	1	174	25
27 July	1,063	261	1,324	22	71	83	1	177	27
3 Aug.	1,237	251	1,488	22	85	83	1	191	27
10 Aug.	852	302	1,154	26	93	83	1	203	27
17 Aug.	1,002	315	1,317	35	96	83	1	215	23
24 Aug.	872	312	1,184						
31 Aug.	1,310	260	1,570	36	101	82		219	23
7 Sep.	1,507	271	1,778						
14 Sep.	1,085	288	1,373	43	105	82		230[2]	23
21 Sep.	1,407	264	1,671	43	102	81		226	23
28 Sep.	1,145	311	1,510	42	101	77		220	23
5 Oct.	1,401	332	1,775	43	100	79		222	23
12 Oct.	1,286	274	1,641	44	98	76		218	23

(1) Totals for 28 September, 5 October, and 12 October include 54, 42, and 81 tons hauled by 2d Troop Carrier Squadron.

(2) During the week ending 14 September, 100 ICMATC were grounded per day, for various reasons.

This table was compiled from reports made by ICMATC to Hq. AAF, Washington.

Appendix 5

Air Forces Personnel in China
July 1942-October 1943

	Fourteenth Air Force			Air Service Command		
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
1942						
July	177	357	534	4	36	40
Aug.	172	383	555	5	36	41
Sep.	184	395	579	5	36	41
Oct.	214	464	678	6	36	42
Nov.	210	569	779	9	33	42
Dec.	200	592	792	16	33	49
1943						
Jan.	193	623	816	8	60	68
Feb.	211	606	817	12	82	94
March	456	1,868	2,324	12	83	95
April	474	1,925	2,399	11	91	103
May	480	1,932	2,412	12	123	135
June	504	1,965	2,469	23	126	149
July	567	2,108	2,675	24	128	152
Aug.	731	2,466	3,197	38	130	168
Sep.	772	2,843	3,615	36	143	179
Oct.	916	3,338	4,253	37	303	340

Report prepared by 24th Statistical Control Unit, China

Appendix 6

Aircraft Strength of Fourteenth Air Force
January-October 1943

	Balance on hand first of month			Balance on hand end of month		
	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers	Fighters	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers	Fighters
January		12	73		12	86
February		12	86		12	93
March		12	93	34	12	90
April	34	12	90	30	12	92
May	30	12	92	29	14	133(1)
June	29	14	133	35	16	98
July	35	16	98	34	25(2)	92(3)
August	34	25	92	38	17	86(4)
September	38	17	86	33	15	109
October	33(6)	15(7)	109	32	13	164(5)

(1) This increase represents the arrival of newer-model P-40's before the older P-40B's and P-40E's were retired.

(2) Newer-model B-25's were arriving and older short-range models were being retired.

(3) This includes the first P-38's of the 449th Squadron.

(4) At this time the last P-43's had been removed from service.

(5) This figure includes 15 P-51's which arrived during October. Fighter models still in service included P-40E's, P-40K's, P-40M's, P-40N's, and P-38's.

(6) All heavy bombers were B-24's.

(7) All medium bombers were B-25's.

This table compiled from information furnished by Statistical Control, Hq. AAF.

Aircraft Strength of Fourteenth Air Force
31 July 1942-31 October 1943

	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers	Fighters	Others	Total
1942					
July		8	56		64
August		10	69		79
September		5	58		63
October		12	69		81
November		13	93		106
December		13	95	3	111
1943					
January		12	96	3	111
February		12	114(1)	3	129
March	34	12	107	9	162
April	30	12	110	6	158
May	33	16	118	7	174
June	35	16	119	6	176
July	35	11	123	13	186
August	34	14	117	15	180
September	36	15	127	15	193
October	35	15	183	14	247

(1) The total number of fighters given in this report is consistently higher than that given on aircraft status reports. Apparently the aircraft status reports included only those planes either already serviceable or repairable in a short time, while the report above obviously includes many aircraft which were not flyable. Most of the fighter aircraft which arrived in China during the summer of 1943 were already worn to the extent of being almost unusable. The P-40's and P-38's from Africa and the P-51's from the United States were all badly worn and required considerable maintenance or repair work before they could be put into combat. Some inconsistencies are attributable to the fact that figures sometimes represented the number of planes on hand at the beginning of the month and sometimes represented figures for the end of the month.

Above report was prepared by 24th Statistical Control Unit, China.

Locations of Combat Squadrons of Fourteenth Air Force--March-October 1943

	Kunming	Chanyi[1]	Chengkung	Yangkai	Yunnanyi	Kweilin	Lingling	Hengyang
20 March	11 Bomb (L) 76 Ftr	16 Ftr 75 Ftr			74 Ftr			
17 April	11 Bomb (L) 76 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	74 Ftr	16 Ftr	75 Ftr[2]	
15 May[3]	11 Bomb (L) 75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)	74 Ftr	374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	16 Ftr		76 Ftr	
19 June	11 Bomb (L) 75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	16 Ftr	74 Ftr	76 Ftr	
17 July	75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	16 Ftr	74 Ftr 11 Bomb(L)	76 Ftr	
21 Aug.	75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	16 Ftr[4]	74 Ftr 11 Bomb(L) 16 Ftr	449 Ftr	76 Ftr
18 Sep.	75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	25 Ftr	74 Ftr 11 Bomb(L)	449 Ftr	76 Ftr
2 Oct.	75 Ftr 425 Bomb(H)		374 Bomb (H) 375 Bomb (H)	373 Bomb (H)	25 Ftr	11 Bomb(L) 74 Ftr	449 Ftr	76 Ftr 16 Ftr

(1) Chanyi was used only in emergencies. The 74th Fighter Squadron was there on 15 May only while en route from Yunnanyi to Kweilin.

(2) The fighter squadrons based at Lingling frequently had flights located at Hengyang.

(3) Some B-24's of 425th and 374th Squadrons were in the Chengtu area during May, carrying out a series of special missions in support of the Chinese ground forces.

(4) Squadrons frequently had detachments in several bases other than the one occupied by headquarters. For example, on 31 August the 16th Fighter Squadron, based at Yunnanyi, had detachments at Kunming, Kweilin, Hengyang, and Nanning. Station list, 14th AF, 31 Aug. 1943, in Units Records Branch.

SECRET

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

I

CHINA AIR TASK FORCE

4 JULY 1942 TO 31 DEC. 1942

II

CHINA AIR TASK FORCE

1 JAN. 1943 TO 10 MAR. 1943

14TH AIR FORCE

10 MAR. 1943 TO 31 DEC. 1943

PREPARED BY:
24TH STATISTICAL
CONTROL UNIT
24 JANUARY 1944

THE FOLLOWING SOURCES HAVE BEEN UTILIZED TO GATHER THIS INFORMATION— DAILY OPERATION REPORTS FROM UNITS, DAILY OPERATION REPORT TO CGAAF, AAF FORM 34, MISSION REPORTS, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, A-2 DIARY OF ACTIVITIES, SPECIAL LETTERS SUBMITTED BY UNITS REGARDING U.S. PLANE LOSSES AND ENEMY LOSSES, HISTORY OF 23RD FIGHTER GROUP.

SECRET

ENEMY AIRCRAFT SUMMARY - DESTROYED - PROBABLE LOSS - DAMAGED

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942

ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES	FIGHTER	BOMBER	OTHER	TOTAL
DESTROYED				
IN AIR	116	15	2 a	133
ON GROUND	12	3	1 b	16
TOTAL	128	18	3	149
PROBABLE LOSS				
IN AIR	51	4	0	55
ON GROUND	20	11	0	31
TOTAL	71	15	0	86
TOTAL ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES & PROBABLE LOSSES				
IN AIR	167	19	2 a	188
ON GROUND	32	14	1 b	47
TOTAL	199	33	3	235
DAMAGED				
IN AIR	12	2	0	14
ON GROUND	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	13	2	0	15

Note: a - 2 Biplanes
b - 1 Transport

PH9-31

ENEMY AIRCRAFT SUMMARY - DESTROYED - PROBABLE LOSS - DAMAGED

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942

ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES		FIGHTER	BOMBER	OTHER	TOTAL
DESTROYED					
	IN AIR	116	15	2 a	133
	ON GROUND	12	3	1 b	16
	TOTAL	128	18	3	149
PROBABLE LOSS					
	IN AIR	51	4	0	55
	ON GROUND	20	11	0	31
	TOTAL	71	15	0	86
TOTAL ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES & PROBABLE LOSSES					
	IN AIR	167	19	2 a	188
	ON GROUND	32	14	1 b	47
	TOTAL	199	33	3	235
DAMAGED					
	IN AIR	12	2	0	14
	ON GROUND	1	0	0	1
	TOTAL	13	2	0	15

Note: a - 2 Biplanes
b - 1 Transport

RH 9-31

FOURTEENTH U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT LOST AND DAMAGED

For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942

CAUSE	FIGHTER	BOMBERS		OTHER	TOTAL
		MEDIUM	HEAVY		
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT					
LOSSES IN AIR	9	1	0	0	10
LOSSES ON GROUND	1	1	0	0	2
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AA AND GROUND FIRE	4	0	0	0	4
TOTAL LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION	14	2	0	0	16
MISSING - NOW CONSIDERED LOST - CAUSE UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0	0
LOSSES - OTHER REASONS	18	1	0	0	19
TOTAL LOSSES	32	3	0	0	35
DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION	8	1	0	0	9

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed Confirmed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 9.3 to 1

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Probably Destroyed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 14.7 to 1

FOURTEENTH U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT LOST AND DAMAGED

For Period 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943

CAUSE	FIGHTER	BOMBERS: MEDIUM	BOMBERS: HEAVY	OTHER	TOTAL
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT					
LOSSES IN AIR	35	5	8	0	48
LOSSES ON GROUND	20	4	1	3 a	28
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AA AND GROUND FIRE	19	0	2	1 b	22
TOTAL LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION	74	9	11	4	98
MISSING - NOW CONSIDERED LOST - CAUSE UNKNOWN	10	1	4	0	15
LOSSES - OTHER REASONS	82	8	15	4 c	109
TOTAL LOSSES	166	18	30	8	222
DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION	45	13	16	2 d	76

Note: a - 2 Transports, 1 Photo
b - 1 Transport
c - 4 Photo
d - 1 Transport, 1 Photo

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed Confirmed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 7.3 to 1

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Probably Destroyed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 10.6 to 1

RH9-28

ENEMY AIRCRAFT SUMMARY - DESTROYED - PROBABLE LOSS - DAMAGED
(TOTAL)

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943

ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES	FIGHTER	BOMBER	OTHER	TOTAL
DESTROYED				
IN AIR	584	67	11 a	662
ON GROUND	92	36	49 b	177
TOTAL	676	123	60	859
PROBABLE LOSS				
IN AIR	124	39	0	163
ON GROUND	37	18	0	55
TOTAL	361	57	0	418
TOTAL ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES & PROBABLE LOSSES				
IN AIR	908	126	11 a	1045
ON GROUND	129	54	49 b	232
TOTAL	1037	180	60	1277
DAMAGED				
IN AIR	138	31	1 c	170
ON GROUND	12	10	1 d	23
TOTAL	150	41	2	193

Note: a - 7 Transports, 2 Photo Ships, 2 Biplanes.
b - 5 Transports, 15 Biplanes, 15 Type unknown, 13 Crated Aircraft type unknown, 1 Seaplane Destroyed on Water.
c - 1 Transport
d - 1 Photo Ship

KH9-27

TOTAL

FOURTEENTH U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT LOST AND DAMAGED

For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943

CAUSE	FIGHTER	BOMBERS		OTHER	TOTAL
		MEDIUM	HEAVY		
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT					
LOSSES IN AIR	44	6	6	0	56
LOSSES ON GROUND	21	5	1	3 a	30
DESTROYED BY ENEMY AA AND GROUND FIRE	23	0	2	1 b	26
TOTAL LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION	88	11	11	4	114
MISSING - NOW CONSIDERED LOST - CAUSE UNKNOWN	10	1	4	0	15
LOSSES - OTHER REASONS	100	9	15	4 c	128
TOTAL LOSSES	198	21	30	8	257
DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION	53	14	16	2 d	85

Note: a - 2 Transports, 1 Photo
b - 1 Transport
c - 4 Photo
d - 1 Transport, 1 Photo

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed Confirmed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 7.5 to 1

Ratio of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed and Probably Destroyed to United States Aircraft Destroyed Due to Enemy Action: 11.2 to 1

RH9-2

S O R T I E S

BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

Type	For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942			
	Number Sorties	Percent of total Sorties	Abortive Sorties	Abortive Percent
Fighter	925	74.3	45	4.8
Medium Bomber	285	22.9	15	5.3
Heavy Bomber	6	.5	1	-
Photo	29	2.3	1	-
TOTAL	1245	100	62	5

Type	For Period 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943			
	Number Sorties	Percent of total Sorties	Abortive Sorties	Abortive Percent
Fighter	7825	62.5	557	7.1
Medium Bomber	934	7.6	113	12
Heavy Bomber	3387	27.	120	3.5
Photo	365	2.9	16	4.4
TOTAL	12,511	100	806	6.4

Type	TOTAL For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943			
	Number Sorties	Percent of total Sorties	Abortive Sorties	Abortive Percent
Fighter	8,750	63.6	602	6.9
Medium Bomber	1,219	8.8	128	10
Heavy Bomber	3,393	24.7	121	3.5
Photo	394	2.9	17	4.4
TOTAL	13,756	100	868	6.3

UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES

BOMBS

Type Aircraft	For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942	For Period 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943	For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943 TOTAL
Fighter	154 tons	101+ tons	116+ tons
Medium Bomber	299+ tons	664 tons	963+ tons
Heavy Bomber	--	896+ tons	896+ tons
TOTAL	314+ tons	1,661+ tons	1,975+ tons

AMMUNITION

Type Aircraft	For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942	For Period 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943	For Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943 TOTAL
Fighter	72,190 Rds	612,356 Rds	684,546 Rds
Medium Bomber	--	71,553 Rds	71,553 Rds
Heavy Bomber	--	198,207 Rds	198,207 Rds
TOTAL	72,190 Rds	1,076,116 Rds	1,150,306 Rds

Note: Expenditures for period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942 are believed to be more than that actually listed as expended, yet available records show these amounts.

ENEMY SHIPPING LOSSES -- (See Appendix)

Period	Sunk	Probably Sunk	Damaged	Total
Period of 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1942	52,000 ton	11,200 ton	11,700 ton	72,900 ton
Period of 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943	164,889 ton	69,850 ton	151,500 ton	386,239 ton
Period of 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943 TOTAL	216,889 ton	81,050 ton	163,200 ton	459,139 ton

Total Tonnage Enemy Shipping Sunk, Probably Sunk and Damaged: 459,139 ton

Note: See Appendix for individual listing of shipping losses and those not included in totals.

RH9-32

This Page Declassified IAW EO12958

TARGETS

STRAFING AND BOMBING MISSIONS - SORTIES
TONNAGE BOMBS DROPPED

Key: M - Missions
S - Sorties
Tons Bombs - Tonnage Bombs Dropped on Target

TARGET	Period 1 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942						Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943						Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943					
	Strafe		Bomb	Tons			Strafe		Bomb	Tons			Strafe		Bomb	Tons		
	M	S	M	S	Bomb		M	S	M	S	Bomb		M	S	M	S	Bomb	
Akyab	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	4	12	10.6		-	-	4	12	10.6	
Amoy	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1	3	2.6		-	-	1	3	2.6	
Anking	-	-	-	-	-		1	1	7	10	7.2		1	1	7	10	7.2	
Anlung	-	-	1	-	-		-	-	1	4	1.		-	-	1	4	1.	
Bac Ninh Bish	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1	4	1.		-	-	1	4	1.	
Bayard Fort	1	2	-	-	-		1	1	10	2	5	4.4	2	3	12	4	9.4	
Bhamo	-	-	-	-	-		5	1	16	5	25	9.9	5	1	16	5	25	9.9
Burma Road	3	14	-	-	-		3	1	32	-	-	-	4	1	46	-	-	-
Canton	-	-	2	7	6.1		2	2	8	1	7	-	2	2	8	1	7	6.1
Cam Lo	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	1	22	8.1	-	-	-	1	22	8.1
Chengtsh	-	-	-	-	-		8	1	57	16	95	52.9	8	1	57	16	95	52.9
Chefang	2	10	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	2	10	-	-	-	-
Chia Tou	-	-	-	-	-		1	1	2	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-

TARGETS - Cont'd

TARGET	Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942					Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 194[illegible]					Period - 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 194[illegible]				
	Strafe		Bomb		Tons	Strafe		Bomb		Tons	Strafe		Bomb		Tons
	M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb
Chihtaoko	-	-	-	-	-	2	8	-	-	-	2	8	-	-	-
Chiengmai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	32	44.5	-	-	4	32	44.5
Chihchow	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	6.	-	-	1	4	6.
Chungtien	*	-	1	3	.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	.1
Cobi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16	23.9	-	-	1	16	23.9
Dalong Bay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	10.7	-	-	1	7	10.7
Dong Cuong	-	-	1	4	.4	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	1	4	.4
Formosa(Sninchiku)	-	-	-	-	-	1	15	1	14	10.1	1	15	1	14	10.1
Gia Lam Airdrome	-	-	3	13	9.8	1	7	4	47	48.8	1	7	7	60	58.8
Hagiang	-	-	-	-	-	3	6	-	-	-	3	6	-	-	-
Haiphong	-	-	1	5	5.3	3	18	11	122	205.1	3	18	12	127	210.4
Hanshow	-	-	-	-	-	3	36	1	5	3.	3	36	1	5	3.
Hangking River	-	-	-	-	-	1	12	-	-	-	1	12	-	-	-
Hankow	-	-	3	11	3.6	1	6	7	61	66.4	1	6	10	72	70.
Hankow Airdrome	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	16	13.1	-	-	2	16	13.1

TARGETS Cont'd

TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1942 to 31 Dec 1942						Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942					
	Strafe		Bomb		Tons Bomb		Strafe		Bomb		Tons Bomb	
	M	S	M	S			M	S	M	S		
Hanoi	3	13	4	29	14.1		3	13	4	29	14.1	
Hoaung Su Phi	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1	8	8.5	
Hofuh	3	53	3	17	6.1		3	53	3	17	6.1	
Hon Gay	-	-	1	6	1.8		-	-	3	20	21.9	
Hongkong	1	3	6	52	53.5		1	3	8	64	65.1	
Heinaw	1	4	-	-	-		1	4	-	-	-	
Heutu	2	16	-	-	-		2	16	-	-	-	
Htawgaw	-	-	2	14	8.4		-	-	2	14	8.4	
Huanglike	-	-	-	-	-		1	2	-	-	-	
Huang Shan Ko	-	-	1	14	1.8		-	-	1	14	1.8	
Hwajung	2	20	3	21	20.2		2	20	3	21	20.2	
Ichang	4	22	4	28	48.3		4	22	4	28	48.3	
Ichang Airdrome	-	-	1	6	4.3		-	-	1	6	4.3	
Kentung	4	22	-	-	-		4	22	-	-	-	
Kentung Airdrome	2	13	-	-	-		2	13	-	-	-	

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M	S	M	S	Bomb		M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb
-	-	-	-	-	Kiangling Airdrome	-	-	1	5	3.4	-	-	1	5	3.4
-	-	-	-	-	Kienli	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Kingmen Airdrome	-	-	1	9	6.1	-	-	1	9	6.1
-	-	-	-	-	Kiungshan Airdrome	-	-	1	2	2.	-	-	1	2	2.
-	-	1	3	2.2	Kiukiang	2	11	7	42	21.3	2	11	8	45	23.5
-	-	1	12	17.2	Kowloon	-	-	5	64	73.9	-	-	6	76	91.1
-	-	-	-	-	Kungan	-	-	1	5	3.6	-	-	1	5	3.6
-	-	-	-	-	Kunling	-	-	1	6	1.	-	-	1	6	1.
-	-	-	-	-	Kunlong	2	11	2	14	12.7	2	11	2	14	12.7
1	2	-	-	-	Kutkai	1	2	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Lai Chi Kok	-	-	1	10	13.6	-	-	1	10	13.6
-	-	-	-	-	Lamang	-	-	3	14	5.8	-	-	3	14	5.8
-	-	-	-	-	Lampang	-	-	1	31	38.8	-	-	1	31	38.8
-	-	-	-	-	Lang Son Coo Bang	1	2	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Lao Kay	3	9	2	44	8.8	3	9	2	44	8.8

TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942 Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb	TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943 Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb	Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943 Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb
2	4	9	58	61.8	Lashio	9	24	1	6	4.9	11	28	10	64	66.7
-	-	-	-	-	Lashio Airdrome	-	-	1	8	.2	-	-	1	8	.2
-	-	1	4	4.3	Lichiangpo	-	-	1	4	1.	-	-	2	8	5.3
-	-	-	-	-	Lichow	3	24	1	5	3.6	3	24	1	5	3.6
-	-	2	14	5.	Linchwan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	14	5.
-	-	-	-	-	Linsiang	-	-	1	8	2.	-	-	1	8	2.
-	-	1	6	8.5	Linsi Mines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	8.5
-	-	-	-	-	Li Tsao Mo	1	8	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Luang Probang	2	12	-	-	-	2	12	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Luchingka	-	-	1	6	1.	-	-	1	6	1.
-	-	-	-	-	Liuchow	1	8	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Lukao	-	-	1	4	1.4	-	-	1	4	1.4
2	7	5	18	15.3	Lungling	5	14	4	25	11.3	7	21	9	43	26.6
-	-	-	-	-	Lushau	-	-	1	3	.8	-	-	1	3	.8
-	-	-	-	-	Man Dinn	1	8	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-

TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942					TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943					Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943				
Strafe		Bomb		Tons		Strafe		Bomb		Tons	Strafe		Bomb		Tons
M	S	M	S	Bomb		M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb
2	6	1	4	4.3	Mangshih	3	11	3	21	10.	5	17	4	25	14.3
1	1	-	-	-	Maymo	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
1	2	3	9	7.1	Mingmao	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	9	7.1
-	-	-	-	-	Mongkoote	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Mongtye	1	2	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	(Not Identified) Mission X-13	-	-	2	12	2.	-	-	2	12	2.
-	-	2	14	14.5	Myitkyina	-	-	9	55	22.3	-	-	11	69	36.8
-	-	-	-	-	Nampong Island	-	-	2	4	5.	-	-	2	4	5.
-	-	-	-	-	Namsang Airdrome	-	-	4	31	38	-	-	4	31	38.
-	-	2	16	3.5	Nanchang	1	2	1	6	.5	1	2	3	22	4.
-	-	-	-	-	Nanchang Airdrome	-	-	1	11	6.6	-	-	1	11	6.6
-	-	-	-	-	Nanhsien	3	24	4	22	20.	3	24	4	22	20.
-	-	-	-	-	Nantu	-	-	1	9	8.5	-	-	1	9	8.5
-	-	-	-	-	Ouchikow	4	17	5	34	22.	4	17	5	34	22.
-	-	-	-	-	Outsun RR Yards	1	8	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-

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TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942					TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943					Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943				
Strafe		Bomb		Tons		Strafe		Bomb		Tons	Strafe		Bomb		Tons
M	S	M	S	Bomb		M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb
-	-	-	-	-	Pailochi	-	-	1	5	3.	-	-	1	5	3.
-	-	-	-	-	Pailochi Airdrome	4	17	1	7	4.2	4	17	1	7	4.2
-	-	-	-	-	Pan Chin	-	-	1	4	.5	-	-	1	4	.5
1	8	-	-	-	Poyang Hu	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Peiyang	1	12	-	-	-	1	12	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Pho Lu	-	-	1	13	2.6	-	-	1	13	2.6
-	-	-	-	-	Phu Tho	-	-	1	8	3.7	-	-	1	8	3.7
-	-	-	-	-	Pingka	-	-	2	12	3.	-	-	2	12	3.
-	-	-	-	-	Puchi	-	-	2	17	4.3	-	-	2	17	4.3
-	-	-	-	-	Pwisang River	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Quangyen	-	-	1	15	31.	-	-	1	15	31.
-	-	-	-	-	Salween River	1	8	1	2	.9	1	8	1	2	.9
-	-	-	-	-	Samah Bay Airdrome	-	-	1	18	24.	-	-	1	18	24.
-	-	1	6	2.0	Sanchan Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	2.
-	-	-	-	-	Santasho	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-

RH9-14

TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942						TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943						Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943					
Strefe		Bomb		Tons Bomb			Strefe		Bomb		Tons Bomb		Strefe		Bomb		Tons Bomb	
M	S	M	S				M	S	M	S			M	S	M	S		
-	-	-	-	-		Taichei	-	-	1	8	.9		-	-	1	8	.9	
-	-	-	-	-		Tai Koo	-	-	2	11	13.5		-	-	2	11	13.5	
-	-	-	-	-		Tangyang	1	5	-	-	-		1	5	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-		Tatung	-	-	1	4	1.		-	-	1	4	1.	
-	-	-	-	-		Teyeh	-	-	3	16	7.6		-	-	3	16	7.6	
-	-	-	-	-		Tehshen	1	8	-	-	-		1	8	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-		Tehei	1	4	-	-	-		1	4	-	-	-	
1	2	6	24	20.5		Tengchung	9	34	9	42	14.1		10	36	15	66	34.6	
-	-	5	22	17.6		Tien Ho Airdrome	-	-	8	71	78.3		-	-	13	93	95.9	
-	-	-	-	-		Tong	1	5	-	-	-		1	5	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-		Tongking Bay	-	-	1	2	1.		-	-	1	2	1.	
						Transport Route (Exact location not defined)	1	8	-	-	-		1	8	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-		Teingshih	1	7	-	-	-		1	7	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-		Tsuyung Mt.	1	4	-	-	-		1	4	-	-	-	

TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942: Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb	TARGET	Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943: Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb	Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943: Strafe M	Strafe S	Bomb M	Bomb S	Tons Bomb
-	-	-	-	-	Tungting Lake	4	51	3	6	2.6	4	51	3	6	2.6
-	-	-	-	-	Tung-wan	-	-	1	2	1.5	-	-	1	2	1.5
-	-	-	-	-	Tzeli	1	12	1	4	2.4	1	12	1	4	2.4
-	-	-	-	-	Vinh Yen	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-
1	2	-	-	-	Wai Chow	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	Wanlaikam	-	-	1	2	.2	-	-	1	2	.2
2	7	5	11	18.6	Wanling	-	-	-	-	-	2	7	5	11	18.6
-	-	-	-	-	Wanming	-	-	1	6	.7	-	-	1	6	.7
-	-	1	10	14.4	Whampoa	-	-	4	22	15.2	-	-	5	32	29.6
-	-	-	-	-	White Cloud Airdrome	-	-	5	42	40.8	-	-	5	42	40.8
1	8	1	8	-	Wuchang	-	-	2	11	13.	1	8	3	19	13.
-	-	-	-	-	Wuchang Airdrome	-	-	5	23	17.1	-	-	5	23	17.1
-	-	-	-	-	Wuchow	-	-	1	10	6.	-	-	1	10	6.
-	-	-	-	-	Yangchi	-	-	1	5	3.8	-	-	1	5	3.8
-	-	-	-	-	Yangtze River	4	22	8	47	15.6	4	22	8	47	15.6

TARGETS - Cont'd

Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1942						Period 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Dec 1943						Period 4 July 1942 to 31 Dec 1943					
Strafe		Bomb		Tons		TARGET	Strafe		Bomb		Tons	Strafe		Bomb		Tons	
M	S	M	S	Bomb			M	S	M	S	Bomb	M	S	M	S	Bomb	
						Yonhy	1	4	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-												
1	-	2	15	6.7		Yochow	14	102	10	79	46.	14	102	12	94	54.7	
-	-	-	-	-	-												
-	-	-	-	-	-	Yunai	-	-	1	12	.7	-	-	1	12	.7	
-	-	-	-	-	-												
-	-	1	6	13.		Seaweeds *	-	-	42	160	175.2	-	-	43	166	188.2	
						Miscellaneous											
						and Unsuccessful											
-	-	-	20	-	-	Sorties **	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	24	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	Practice Bombs	-	-	-	-	16.5	-	-	-	-	16.5	
25	51	68	369	324.5		TOTALS	167	1019	306	2231	1861.	192	1120	374	2652	1975.	

(* Includes only those sorties and missions where shipping was the only target hit.)
(** Includes bombing missions which were unsuccessful due to weather, etc.; also those where information is lacking as to weight of bombs dropped.)

RH9-10

ENEMY SHIPPING SUNK
Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943

Approximate Location	Exact Location N E	Number	Type	[illegible]
[illegible]siang	29° 52'-116° [illegible]'	[illegible]	Junks	[illegible]
[illegible]i[illegible]ong	26° 50'-106° 50'	1	350' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible]yang [illegible]	29° 20'-116° 20'	7	[illegible], [illegible]	
			[illegible] Barges	[illegible]
[illegible]iang	[illegible]ochow Peninsula	1	Motor [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]kong	22° 1[illegible]'-11[illegible]° 1[illegible]'	1	Tanker	
[illegible] kong	" " "		Tanker	
[illegible]kong	" " " "	1	350' Freighter	
[illegible] Bay	2[illegible]° 59'-107° 05'	1	550' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible]ton	23° [illegible]'-11[illegible]° [illegible]'	1	430' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]° [illegible]'-11[illegible] 32'	1	45[illegible]' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible]	" " "	1	41[illegible]' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible]	24° 1[illegible]'-[illegible]° 18'	1	Barge	[illegible]
[illegible]kai	2[illegible]° [illegible]'-[illegible]° 50'	1	Small Barge	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]° 15'-[illegible]° 1[illegible]'	[illegible]	River Boat	[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	18° 1[illegible]'-10[illegible]° 25'	1	265' [illegible]	
			Ship,[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]1° [illegible]'-10[illegible]° 5[illegible]'	1	Large River Boat	[illegible]
[illegible]	" " "	1	River Boat	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]° [illegible]'-111° [illegible]5'	1	Gunboat	[illegible]
[illegible]chow	[illegible]° [illegible]'-113° [illegible]'	1	Large River Boat	[illegible]
[illegible]	" " "	1	Launch	[illegible]
[illegible]	30° [illegible]'-11[illegible]° 11'	1	Large Motor [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	" " "	1	Landing Barge	[illegible]
[illegible]ong	[illegible]° [illegible]5'-111° [illegible]	Unknown	Barges	[illegible]
[illegible]ong	" " " "	[illegible]	Tugboat	[illegible]
[illegible]ong	[illegible]° 5[illegible]'-10[illegible]° [illegible]'	1	Large Transport	7[illegible]
[illegible]	30° [illegible]'-11[illegible]° 25'	4[illegible]	Barges	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]3° [illegible]'-11[illegible]° 32'	1	[illegible]5[illegible]' Transport	8[illegible]
[illegible]ong	20° 5[illegible]'-10[illegible]° [illegible]5'	1	Small Boat	Unknown
[illegible]ong	" " "	1	430' Transport	7[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	20° 55'-10[illegible]° [illegible]'	1	2[illegible]' [illegible]	1[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	" " "	1	250' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	" " " "	1	300' Freighter	31[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]° 45'-113° [illegible]5'	1	15[illegible]' Steamer	8[illegible]
[illegible]ong	[illegible]° [illegible]'-10[illegible]° 5[illegible]'	9	Barges	[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	18° 1[illegible]'-10[illegible]° [illegible]5'	1	325' Freighter	[illegible]
[illegible] Bay	" " "	1	400' Freighter	58[illegible]
[illegible]	29° [illegible]'-11[illegible]° [illegible]'	1	Small Gunboat	Unknown
[illegible]ong	2[illegible]° 1[illegible]'-114° 1[illegible]'	1	[illegible]00' Freighter	58[illegible]
[illegible]ong	" " " "	1	175' [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]chow	[illegible]° 4[illegible]'-11[illegible] 35'	[illegible]	75' Gunboat	Unknown
[illegible]chow	" " " "	[illegible]	75' Boat	Unknown
[illegible]ong	[illegible]° 1[illegible]'-11[illegible] 1[illegible]'	1	[illegible]50' Merchant Ship	8[illegible]

ENEMY SHIPPING SUNK - Cont'd

RH 9

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
Aug 31, 1943	Hongkong	22° 13'-114° 10'	1	50' launch	Unknown
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	30° 42'-111° 25'	1	250' tanker	2000 ton
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	" " " "	1	100' Vessel	500 "
Sept 1, 1943	Swatow	23° 20'-116° 35'	1	150' Freighter	800 "
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	30° 42'-111° 25'	1	100' Steamer	500 "
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	" " " "	1	125' Tug	500 "
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	" " " "	1	Barge	Unknown
Sept 16, 1943	Shihnweiyao	30° 42'-115° 03'	1	250' Ship	2000 ton
Sept 6, 1943	"	" " " "	3	Small River Boats	Unknown
Sept 6, 1943	"	" " " "	1	150' Steamer	800 ton
Sept 6, 1943	"	" " " "	1	Tug Boat	Unknown
Sept 6, 1943	"	" " " "	2	Large Junks	Unknown
Sept 9, 1943	Kiukiang	29° 52'-116° 15'	1	100' Steamer	500 ton
Sept 9, 1943	Kiukiang	" " " "	1	Tug	Unknown
Sept 9, 1943	Kiukiang	" " " "	1	150' Tug	800 ton
Sept 9, 1943	Kiukiang	" " " "	1	100' Tug	500 "
Sept 14, 1943	Yangtze	29° 52'-116° 00'	1	300' Vessel	3100 "
Sept 27, 1943	Tongking	20° 30'-107° 30'	1	200' Tanker	1200 "
Sept 30, 1943	Tongking	21° 10'-110° 25'	1	150' Gunboat	Unknown
	Ft Bayard				
Oct 3, 1943	Kiukiang	29° 56'-116° 06'	1	Gunboat	Unknown
Oct 7, 1943	Formosa Strait:				
	Amoy Harbor	23° 50'-118° 10'	1	285' Freighter	2500 "
Oct 9, 1943	Formosa Strait:	24° 30'-118° 30'	1	150' Tanker	800 "
Oct 13, 1943	Amoy Harbor	24° 20'-118° 10'	1	75' Sampan	Unknown
Oct 13, 1943	Amoy Harbor	" " " "	2	250' Freighters	4000 "
Oct 25, 1943	Haiphong	20° 50'-106° 50'	3	Small Boats	Unknown
Oct 25, 1943	Gulf of Tong-King	20° 30'-106° 20'	1	150' Tanker	800 tons
Oct 25, 1943	" " "	20° 30'-104° 10'	1	200' Freighter	1200 "
Oct 26, 1943	Kiungshan	20° 05'-110° 05'	1	250' Tanker	2000 "
Oct 26, 1943	"	" " " "	1	200' Transport	3100 "
Oct 26, 1943	"	" " " "	1	150' Freighter	800 "
Oct 26, 1943	"	" " " "	2	200' Freighters	2400 "
Oct 26, 1943	"	" " " "	1	100' Tender	500 "
Oct 28, 1943	Gulf of Tong-King	20° 30'-107° 30'	2	150' Freighters	1600 "
Oct 28, 1943	" " "	" " " "	1	25' Junk	Unknown
Nov 4, 1943	Swatow Harbor	23° 20'-116° 50'	1	400' Cargo Vessel	5800 ton
Nov 4, 1943	" "	23° 20'-116° 53'	2	200' Freighters	2400 "
Nov 7, 1943	Amoy Harbor	24° 19'-118° 25'	1	150' Cargo	800 "
Nov 7, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	200' Freighter	1200 "
Nov 7, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	150' Freighter	800 "
Nov 7, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	125' Tug Boat	500 "
Nov 7, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	200' Cargo	1200 "
Nov 10, 1943	Yangtze	29° 32'-113° 10'	2	50-75' Motor Boats	Unknown
Nov 10, 1943	"	" " " "	11	10 Sampans & Barge	Unknown

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ENEMY SHIPPING SUNK - Cont'd

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
		I	II			
Nov 15, 1943	Saiphong	20° 50'-106° 50'	1	Sampan	Unknown
Nov 16, 1943	Swatow	29° 35'-111° 15'	Several	Sampans	Unknown
Nov 16, 1943	"	" " " "	41	1 Barge & 40 Sampans	Unknown
Nov 16, 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 10'	1	520' Cargo	11500 ton
Nov 16, 1943	St John Island	21° 45'-112° 50'	2	200' Freighters	2400 "
Nov 16, 1943	South China Sea	21° 10'-117° 35'	1	300' Tanker	3100 "
Nov 18, 1943	Chihmen	29° 35'-111° 15'	1	Barge	Unknown
Nov 19, 1943	Pase Two Island	25° 20'-119° 50'	1	175' Freighter	800 ton
Nov 19, 1943	Tungting Gulf	20° 05'-110° 10'	1	300' Freighter	3100 "
Nov 19, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	225' Freighter	1000 "
Nov 19, 1943	South China Sea	21° 20'-119° 50'	1	150' Gunboat	Unknown
Nov 21, 1943	Hong Mi Bay	20° 59'-107° 05'	1	200' Freighter	1200 ton
Nov 21, 1943	Tungting Lake Area	Western	1	Barge	Unknown
Nov 24, 1943	Amoy Harbor	24° 20'-118° 10'	1	370' Freighter	4400 ton
Nov 24 1943	Hankow	29° 00'-111° 55'	4	Sampans	Unknown
Nov 25, 1943	"	" " " "	75	Boats & Sampans	Unknown
Nov 25, 1943	"	" " " "	12	Small Supply Boats	Unknown
Nov 26, 1943	East China Sea	25° 20'-119° 55'	1	200' Freighter	1200 ton
Nov 27, 1943	" China Sea	25° 20'-120° 00'	1	350' Destroyer	Unknown
Nov 28, 1943	Tongking Gulf	20° 05'-110° 10'	1	175' Freighter	800 ton
Nov 29, 1943	Hongkong & Swatow	23° 20'-116° 50'	3	100' Barges	1500 "
Nov 25, 1943	Changteh Area	29° 05'-111° 45'	3	Small Boats	Unknown
Dec 1, 1943	Tsikoo Shipyard	22° 20'-114° 10'	1	320' Merchant Ship	3100 ton
Dec 5, 1943	Changteh Area	29° 05'-111° 45'	3	Sampans	Unknown
Dec 9, 1943	Namchien Area	29° 18'-112° 20'	10	Sampans	Unknown
Dec 15, 1943	Tongking Gulf	21° 05'-108° 30'	1	250' Tug	2000 ton
Dec 16, 1943	N. of Kumsang	23° 10'-117° 20'	1	175' Freighter	800 ton
Dec 18, 1943	Yangtze	29° 32'-113° 45'	10	Sampans	Unknown
Dec 18, 1943	South China Sea	19° 43'-109° 04'	1	350' Freighter	4400 ton
Dec 22, 1943	St John Island	20° 55'-114° 10'	1	450' Freighter	8000 "
Dec 23, 1943	Chung Shan Ko		6	Sampans	Unknown
Dec 23, 1943	Haitan Straight	25° 30'-119° 30'	1	200' Gunboat	Unknown
Dec 25, 1943	Bias Bay	22° 25'-114° 35'	1	300' Passenger	3100 ton
Dec 27, 1943	Near Shoichi A	29° 35'-113° 30'	1	200' Tanker	1200 "
Dec 28, 1943	Yangtze	30° 40'-117° 30'	1	200' Cargo Vessel	1200 "
Dec 28, 1943	"	" " " "	1	175' Cargo Vessel	800 "
Dec 28, 1943	"	30° 25'-117° 10'	1	200' Armed Motor Vessel	1200 "
Dec 29, 1943	"	31° 15'-118° 10'	1	200' Armed Passenger Vessel	1200 "
Dec 29, 1943	"	" " " "	1	150' Cargo Ship	800 "
Dec 30, 1943	Tihang to Hwayun	29° 33'-112° 35'	1	100' Cargo Ship	500 "
Dec 30, 1943	" " "	" " " "	1	175' Cargo Ship	800 "
Dec 30, 1943	" " "	" " " "	1	250' Transport	2600 "

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ENEMY SHIPPING SUNK - Contd

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
Dec 30, 1943	Yihang to Wanyang	29° 33'-112° 35'	1	175' Cargo Ship	800 tons
Dec 30, 1943	" " "	" " " "	1	75' Tug	Unknown

Total Enemy Shipping Sunk for Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943 - 214,889 tons.

Total does not include the following:

4 Gunboats - size unknown
1 75' Gunboat
2 150' Gunboats
1 175' Sub chaser
1 180' Destroyer
5 Junks
12 Motor Launches
56 Barges
212 River boats, sampans and small boats
4 Tugs

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[illegible]
Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943.

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
July 6, 1942	Canton	23° 05'-116° 30'	1	100' River boat	50 ton
Sept 2, 1942	[illegible] Ho Lake			[illegible]boat	Unknown
Oct 25, 1942	Hongkong	22° 13'-114° 10'	1	Freighter	7700 ton
Nov 22, 1942	Port Cay	20° 57'-107° 05'	1	430' Freighter	7000 "
Nov 26, 1942	" "	" " " "	2	River Steamers	Unknown
Jan 9, 1943	Bhamo	24° 15'-97° 10'	4	Barges	Unknown
Feb 11, 1943	"	" " " "	2	Barges	Unknown
[illegible] 1943	[illegible]kiang		1	Gunboat	Unknown
June 10, 1943	Yochow -[illegible]	29° 20'-113° 00'	1	Gunboat	Unknown
June 20, 1943	" "	" " " "	10	Barges	Unknown
July 6, 1943	Yangtze [illegible]	29° 30'-113° 05'	5	Sampans	Unknown
July 6, 1943	" "	" " " "	10	Small barges	Unknown
July 8, 1943	Haiphong	21° 01'-107° [illegible]	1	450' Freighter	8000 ton
July 11, 1943	"	" " "	1	430' Freighter	7000 ton
July 11, 1943	"	" " " "	7	Barges	Unknown
July [illegible], 1943	[illegible]nti	29° 45'-113° [illegible]	1	60' Tug	Unknown
[illegible] [illegible]5, 1943	Kowloon Docks	22° [illegible]'-114° 10'	1	500' Ship	10750 ton
[illegible], 1943	Kowloon	[illegible]	1	250' Ship	2000 "
[illegible] [illegible]7, 1943	Yochow	[illegible]9° 2[illegible]'-113° 00'	1	125' Steamboat	500 "
[illegible] [illegible]7, 1943	"	" " "	1	65' Steamboat	Unknown
[illegible] [illegible]7, 1943	"	" " " "	1	Small steamboat	Unknown
[illegible] 30, 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 15'	1	250' Freighter	2000 ton
[illegible] 1, 1943	[illegible]tan	[illegible] 35'-114° 1[illegible]'	1	100' Steamer	500 "
[illegible], 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 15'	1	250' Tanker	2000 "
[illegible] 6, 1943	[illegible]hweiyao	29° [illegible]5' 111 [illegible]5'	1	200' Steamer	1200 "
[illegible] 6, 1943	"	" " " "	[illegible]	100' Steamer	1000 "
[illegible], 1943	Hongkong	22° 1[illegible]'-114° 1[illegible]'	1	550' Vessel	15000 "
[illegible] 12, 1943	"	" " " "	1	Destroyer	Unknown
[illegible] 14, 1943	Y[illegible]	[illegible]5° 5[illegible]'-115° [illegible]0'	1	[illegible]50' Vessel	[illegible]000
[illegible], 1943	[illegible]kiang	29° 55'-116° [illegible]'	1	[illegible]30' Vessel	1600 "
[illegible] 20, 1943	"	" " " "	1	300' Naval Vessel	Unknown
[illegible], 1943	Yangtze	[illegible]0° 42'-11[illegible]° [illegible]5'	1	300' Gunboat	Unknown
[illegible] 14, 1943	[illegible]oy	[illegible]4° [illegible]0'-118° 13'	1	200' Freighter	1200 ton
[illegible] 1[illegible], 1943	"	" " " "	1	[illegible]0' Freighter	1200 "
Nov [illegible], 1943	[illegible] south along River		[illegible]	100' Tug & 100' Barge	1000 "
Nov [illegible], 1943	[illegible] Harbor	[illegible]3° 20'-116° 50'	1	200' Freighter	1200 "
Nov 11, 1943	[illegible] Tsing[illegible] area	29° [illegible]'-111° [illegible]8'	1	Steamer	Unknown
Nov 1[illegible], 1943	East China Sea	[illegible]° [illegible]5'-116° 50'	1	300' Freighter	3100 ton
Nov [illegible]6, 1943	[illegible]ton Area	29° 5[illegible]'-111° [illegible]5'	1	70' Vessel	Unknown
Nov [illegible]7, 1943	East China Sea	25° 20'-1[illegible]0° 0[illegible]'	1	250' Freighter	2000 ton
Nov [illegible]7, 1943	" " "	" " " "	1	Destroyer	Unknown
[illegible], 1943	[illegible]	29° 1[illegible]'-112° 05'	1	100' [illegible] ship	500 ton
[illegible] 15, 1943	Tongking Gulf	22° 05'-108° 30'	1	25' 3-mast schooner	2000 "

[illegible]

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[illegible] Cont'd

[illegible]ate	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Type	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	–	[illegible] Tanker	1700 tons
[illegible]	[illegible]	19° [illegible]	1	[illegible]	1600 "
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]-117° [illegible]	1	175' Motor Vessel	300 "
[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " "	[illegible]	Barges	Unknown

[illegible] Probably [illegible] for [illegible] 194[illegible] to 31 December [illegible]: 81,050 tons.

[illegible] the following:

[illegible] [illegible]boats – [illegible]
[illegible] – [illegible]
1 [illegible] Gunboat
8 [illegible]
[illegible] Motor [illegible]
[illegible] Barges
61 [illegible] boats, [illegible] small boats
1 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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ENEMY SHIPPING DAMAGED
Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location N E	Numbers	Type	Tonnage
ly 26, 1942	Kiukiang	29° 52'-115° 58'	2	Junks	Unknown
ly 27, 1942	Nanchang & Wuchang	30° 35'-114° 12'	1	150' Freighter	800 ton
pt 2, 1942	Kiukiang	Wuchang Peninsula	4	Junks	Unknown
t 28, 1942	Hongkong	Kowloon Harbor	2	Freighters	1000 ton +
v 22, 1942	Hon Gay	20° 59'-107° 05'	1	300' Freighter	3100 "
v 27, 1942	" "	" " " "	1	375' Freighter	5100 "
v 25, 1942	[illegible]	20° 40'-114° 10'	1	Gunboat	Unknown
v 25, 1942	"	" " " "	1	Merchant Steamer	500 ton +
v 2?, 194?	Hon Gay	20° 50'-107° 05'	1	200' Coal Freighter	1200 "
n 13, 1943	Bhamo	24° 15'-97° 10'	2	Tug boats	Unknown
r 13, 1943	"	" " " "	3	Barges	Unknown
n 15, 1943	"	" " " "	4	Barges	Unknown
n 15, 1943	"	" " " "	1	Small Tug	Unknown
r 11, 1943	"	" " " "	2	Barges	Unknown
13, 1943	"	" " " "	2	River Boats	Unknown
20, 1943	Tengchung	Katha	2	River Steamers	Unknown
20, 1943	"	"	1	Large Barge	Unknown
16, 1943	Laokay	29° 05'-105° 50'	1	Large Barge	Unknown
5, 1943	Tenchung		1	Barge	Unknown
9, 1943	Hanoi	21° 05'-105° 50'	1	Large Barge	Unknown
9, 1943	"	" " " "	2	Barges	Unknown
10, 1943	Nanking		3	River Boats	Unknown
30, 1943	Yochow	29° 20'-113° 00'	1	Freighter	[illegible]
2, 1943	Changyung		5	Landing Barges	Unknown
2, 1943	"		10	Launches -towing troop barges	Unknown
2, 1943	Ichang	30° 42'-111° 25'	1	River Boat	Unknown
6, 1943	Shasi		1	Gunboat	Unknown
6, 1943	"		1	160' Vessel	800 ton
10, 1943	Haiphong	2?° 50'-106° 45'	1	400' Freighter	5800 "
11, 1943	K.long Ferry		Unknown	Small boats	Unknown
11, 1943	Haiphong	20° 50'-106° 45'	1	200' Mine Layer	Unknown
11, 1943	"	" " " "	1	180' Freighter	800 ton
1?, 1943	Haiphong	" " " "	1	Ship	Unknown
27, 1943	Samah Bay	18° 12'-109° [illegible]	1	[illegible] Ship	2600 ton
29, 1943	Haiphong	20° [illegible]-10?° [illegible]	1	[illegible] Freighter	1200 "
29, 1943	"	" " " "	1	250' Ship	2900 "
21, 1943	Hankow	30° 40'-114° 10'	1	[illegible] Motor Vessel	5800 "
25, 1943	Kowloon Docks	22° 20'-11?° 15'	1	[illegible] Ship	10750 "
26, 1943	Kowloon Docks	" " " "	1	350' Ship	4400 "
26, 1943	" "	" " " "	1	Gunboat	Unknown
1, 1943	Shihhweiyao	30° 42'-115° [illegible]	1	175' Vessel	800 ton
1, 1943	Yangtze	31° [illegible]-11?° [illegible]	1	Gunboat, [illegible]	Unknown
1, 1943	"	" " " "	6	[illegible]	2000 ton

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ENEMY SHIPPING DAMAGED - Cont'd

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
Sept 1, 1943	Swatow	23° 20'-116° 50'	1	150' Vessel	800 ton
Sept 1, 1943	Yangtze	31° 15'-113° 05'	1	125' Tug	500 "
Sept 2, 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 15'	2	Fire Barges	Unknown
Sept 2, 1943	Lai Chi Kok		5	Boats	Unknown
Sept 6, 1943	Shihtsuyao	30° 42'-115° 03'	1	250' Freighter	2000 ton
Sept 9, 1943	Yiukiang	30° 05'-116° 15'	1	300' Vessel	3100 "
Sept 9, 1943	"	" " " "	1	250' Vessel	2000 "
Sept 9, 1943	"	" " " "	1	100' Vessel	500 "
Sept 9, 1943	"	" " " "	1	250' Steamer	2000 "
Sept 10, 1943	"	29° 55'-116° 10'	1	175' Vessel	800 "
Sept 10, 1943	"	" " " "	2	Tugs	Unknown
Sept 10, 1943	"	" " " "	1	300' Transport	3100 ton
Sept 12, 1943	Shihhweiyao	30° 42'-115° 25'	1	Tug	Unknown
Sept 12, 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 10'	1	250' Vessel	2000 ton
Sept 12, 1943	Hongkong	22° 15'-114° 10'	1	530' Vessel	13000 "
Sept 12, 1943	"	" " " "	1	485' Merchant Ship	9500 "
Sept 12, 1943	Haipong	20° 50'-106° 50'	1	265' Vessel	2000 "
Sept 12, 1943	"	" " " "	1	250' Freighter	2000 "
Sept 20, 1943	Kiukiang	29° 55'-116° 01'	1	300' Vessel	3100 "
Sept 22, 1943	Shihsuyao	29° 08'-115° 03'	1	300' Cargo Vessel	3100 "
Sept 22, 1943	"	" " " "	1	400' Freighter	5800 "
Sept 22, 1943	Anking	30° 30'-117° 00'	1	Large Freighter	7500 "
Sept 27, 1943	Tungting		3	2 Sampans 1 Life boat	Unknown
Sept 30, 1943	"		1	75' Launch	Unknown
Sept 30, 1943	"		1	150' Freighter	800 ton
Oct 1, 1943	Yangtze	29° 56'-116° 02'	1	300' Vessel	3100 "
Oct 2, 1943	Yangtze	" " " "	8	2 - 40' sailboats	
				4 Sampans, 1 Barge	
				1 50' Steamer	Unknown
Oct 3, 1943	Wenchung		1	100' Freighter	500 ton
Oct 3, 1943	Yangtze	31° 13'-113° 05'	2	300' Freighters	6200 "
Oct 3, 1943	"	" " " "	1	250' Freighter	2000 "
Oct 6, 1943	"	" " " "	2	300' Freighters	6200 "
Oct 8, 1943	Formosa Str. Light		1	140' Patrol Boat	500 "
Oct 11, 1943	Amoy Harbor	24° 30'-118° 10'	1	75' Sampan	Unknown
Oct 25, 1943	Haipong	20° 50'-106° 10'	5	Boats	Unknown
Oct 25, 1943	"	" " " "	1	150' Vessel	800 ton
Oct 26, 1943	Wanchuan	28° 05'-110° 05'	1	200' Gunboat	Unknown
Oct 29, 1943	Kiukiang	29° 50'-115° 58'	1	200' Steamer	1200 ton
Nov 8, 1943	Tungting Gulf		1	250' Freighter	2000 "
Nov 12, 1943	Yangtze	29° 32'-113° 20'	1	50' to 75' Motor Boat	Unknown
Nov 13, 1943	Shantosho		10	Sampans	Unknown
Nov 13, 1943	Tungting Lake		1	Launch	Unknown
Nov 13, 1943	Yueni		3	River Boats	Unknown

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ENEMY SHIPPING [illegible] - Cont'd

Date	Approximate Location	Exact Location	Number	Type	Tonnage
Nov 15, 1943	Haiphong	20° 5[illegible]'-106° 5[illegible]'	1	250' [illegible]	[illegible]00 ton
Nov 15, 19[illegible]	"	" " " "	8	[illegible]	Unknown
Nov 15, 194[illegible]	Fort Bayard	21° 10'-110° [illegible]5'	1	150' Vessel	800 ton
Nov 17, 194[illegible]	[illegible]		1	[illegible]	Unknown
Nov 1[illegible], 194[illegible]	[illegible] Island	23° 1[illegible]'-11[illegible]° [illegible]	1	150' Vessel	8[illegible] ton
Nov 1[illegible], 194[illegible]	Tung ting [illegible]		2	[illegible]	Unknown
Nov 19, 194[illegible]	[illegible] Island	[illegible]° 1[illegible]'-117° 2[illegible]'	1	1[illegible]5' Vessel	500 ton
Nov [illegible], 194[illegible]	[illegible]		5	Small River Boats	Unknown
Nov 21, 194[illegible]	Tung ting Lake	Western Lake	50	Sampans & Boats	Unknown
Nov 21, 194[illegible]	[illegible]	29° [illegible]'-111° [illegible]'	75	Boats	Unknown
Nov 21, 194[illegible]	[illegible]		5[illegible]	Boats	Unknown
Nov 2[illegible], 19[illegible]	[illegible]	29° 05'-111° [illegible]'	5[illegible]	Boats	Unknown
Nov [illegible]3, 194[illegible]	[illegible]	29° [illegible]5'-111° 50'	[illegible]	Barges	Unknown
Nov [illegible]4, 19[illegible]	North of [illegible]		15	Small Boats	Unknown
Nov [illegible], 1943	Near [illegible]		8	Small Boats	Unknown
Nov 26, 194[illegible]	Changteh Area	29° [illegible]5'-111° 45'	10	Sampans	Unknown
Nov 2[illegible], 194[illegible]	N. [illegible] Changteh	29° 10'-111° 50'	10	Boats	Unknown
Nov 29, 19[illegible]	[illegible] Area	29° 1[illegible]'-112° 05'	50	Small Boats	Unknown
Nov [illegible], [illegible]	South [illegible] Tungting Lake	29° 15'-112° 40'	[illegible]	Boats	Unknown
Nov [illegible], 1[illegible]	[illegible]		30	Boats	Unknown
[illegible], 194[illegible]	[illegible] Area [illegible] of [illegible]		[illegible]	Large Boats	Unknown
Nov [illegible], 19[illegible]	" "		10	Boats	Unknown
Nov 27, 1[illegible]	[illegible]		30	Small Boats	Unknown
Dec 1, 1[illegible]	Tungting Lake		15	Boats	Unknown
Dec 1, 194[illegible]	[illegible] Lake	29° 1[illegible]'-11[illegible]° [illegible]'	15	Boats	Unknown
Dec 1, 1[illegible]	[illegible] Shipyard	2[illegible]° [illegible]'-114° 1[illegible]'	1	400' Tanker	9500 ton
Dec 1, 194[illegible]	[illegible] Shipyard	[illegible]° [illegible]'-114 1[illegible]'	1	5[illegible]' Ship	12250 "
Dec [illegible], 194[illegible]	Changteh Area	29° 05'-111° 45'	2	Boats	Unknown
Dec 4, 1943	Tungting Lake	29° 15'-11[illegible]° 40'	[illegible]	Boats	Unknown
Dec [illegible], 194[illegible]	" "	" " "	4	Boats	Unknown
Dec [illegible], 194[illegible]	" "	" " " "	15	Boats	Unknown
Dec 5, 1943	[illegible] Area		[illegible]6	Boats	Unknown
Dec 5, 1943	Changteh Area	29° 05'-111° 45'	3	Boats	Unknown
Dec 1[illegible], 1[illegible]	[illegible] Lake Area		3	Boats	Unknown
Dec 10, 19[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]3° 10'-117° 20'	1	175' Freighter	800 ton
Dec 1[illegible], 1943	[illegible] Lake		45	Sampans	Unknown
Dec 15, 1943	Yangtze River		2	Barges	Unknown
Dec [illegible], 1943	Yangtze River	31° 15'-118° 20'	1	150' Cargo	800 ton
Dec [illegible], 1943	[illegible] to [illegible]		[illegible]	Destroyers	Unknown

Total Enemy Shipping Damaged for Period 4 July 1942 to 31 December 1943: 163,200 ton.

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958

RH9-1

[redacted]

[redacted] - Cont'd

does not include the following:

2	Subchasers - size unknown
1	200' Minelayer
1	Cruiser
1	100' Gunboat
1	200' Gunboat
2	Destroyers
8	Junks
10	Motor Launches
27	Barges
473	River boats, Sampans and small boats.

Estimate Tonnage.

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Source: Army Air Force Form 34, Weekly Status and Operations Report -
Daily Operations Radiograms from Units - Outgoing Operations Radiograms
Prepared by A-3 - Mission Reports - Intelligence Summaries - A-2 Diary.

Prepared by: 24th Statistical Control Unit

Date: 20 January 1944

Location identified by co-ordinates. These co-ordinates compiled by A-2 based on all available information regarding location of ships sunk, probably sunk and damaged.

[redacted]

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