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ORIGINS
OF THE
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
PLANS, ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINES

SCANNED BY ISA

Prepared by _____
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
INTELLIGENCE
HISTORICAL DIVISION

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REFERENCE HISTORY

ORIGINS OF THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE
 PLANS, ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINES
 TO 17 AUGUST 1942
 (Short Title: AAFPH-2)

Prepared by
 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
 Historical Division
 October 1944

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P R E F A C E

For reasons of convenience these chapters are published as a separate study. Actually they are intended as Part I of a first narrative History of the Eighth Air Force, dealing with the period prior to 17 August 1942. Even for that period the story is far from complete. The training of the Eighth in this country, the movement overseas, preparations for reception and supply and maintenance, and the final training for combat—these important topics are studiously avoided. This study deals only with policies, plans, and doctrines.

In part this choice of topics has been guided by the desire to effect some logical division of labor between this office and the historical officers in the field. Whereas many subjects can be treated more adequately in England, it has been supposed that matters involving decisions at the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff level, or activities of the Air Staff, might more easily be covered in Washington.

But the choice has not been wholly one of expediency. If the definitive history of the Army Air Forces now contemplated is to serve any justifiable pragmatic function, it should be to furnish materials for a post-war appraisal of air power in general and in particular of the role of the Army Air Forces in national defense. Because of the nature of its mission, and because of the scale, the longevity, and the severity of its operations, the history of the Eighth Air Force will

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provide the richest body of evidence for an appreciation of air power in its purest form—strategic bombardment. This study has been written on the assumption that a full understanding of the significance of the Eighth demands some knowledge of those subjects which are discussed in the following chapters.

First, an effort has been made to explain the mission of the Eighth in terms of broad strategic plans, some of which were made months before that organization was born and which were continually changed by exigencies in other theaters. Second, the matter of command and organization has been treated in some detail both because of its intrinsic importance in the history of the Eighth Air Force and for its wider significance. The relation of that air force to American ground and naval forces and the theater commander has an obvious bearing on current and future discussions of a unified command in the armed forces of the United States, and the relation of the Eighth to the RAF and to the Supreme Commander will be equally important in any evaluation of the success of operations involving the several arms of the several United Nations. Finally, some attempt has been made to analyze the bombardment doctrines which guided the early operations of the Eighth. For in a sense the history of that air force may be interpreted as the trial by ordeal of battle of a doctrine held by faith but unproven in combat.

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In fine, what is attempted in this study is to show what the task of the Eighth Air Force was, who was to direct that task, and by what means it was proposed that the task be done. Other studies will tell how the task was accomplished.


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Origins of the Eighth Air Force: Plans, Organization, Doctrines
to
17 August 1942

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Chapter I

STRATEGIC POLICIES AND PLANS

Air strategy is the method by which a nation expresses its will through the employment of air forces. . . . There is greater likelihood that poor strategy will cause the overthrow of nations than poor tactics.

Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold and Col. Ira G. Baker, Winged Warfare, 1941.

1. To Pearl Harbor

ABC-1. When it became increasingly obvious in 1941 that the United States might be drawn into the European War, American and British military authorities turned to the formulation of a set of basic agreements regarding the military cooperation of the two nations. A delegation representing the British Chiefs of Staff met with a U. S. Staff Committee in a series of conferences at Washington which lasted from 29 January to 27 March 1941. The report which was submitted on the latter date, United States-British Staff Conversations [ABC-1] became the fundamental document of Anglo-American military relations; it was modified in detail but its underlying policies determined the most important spheres of our own and British effort and in so doing provided the strategic background for the activities of the Eighth Air Force.

The declared purposes of the staff conversations were: to determine the best methods whereby the United States and the United Kingdom might defeat Germany and her allies; to coordinate on broad lines plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers;

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and to reach agreements concerning military cooperation, including the delineation of areas of responsibility, military strategy, and command arrangements.¹ All plans were based on the assumption that if the United States became involved in war with Germany, it would be involved certainly with Italy and perhaps with Japan.² In either event the United States would continue Lend-Lease but would retain any material required for fulfilling her strategic responsibilities as defined.³ Defensive and offensive strategy was to be predicated on the assumption that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers, and that since her defeat was the cardinal objective, the Atlantic and European areas were to be considered the most effective theater of operations. Hence the principal American (and British) efforts should be directed toward that theater and operations elsewhere should be planned so as to facilitate those efforts.⁴ Specific defense assignments made the United States responsible for the Western Hemisphere, England for the British Isles, with the protection of sea communications a mutual task. If Japan entered the war, operations in the Pacific were to be limited to a strategic defense until the defeat of Germany.⁵ Offensive measures against Germany were to include: economic pressure by blockade and other measures; a sustained air offensive against the German homeland and all territories under her control; raids and minor offensives; support of all power resisting the Axis; and the build-up of joint forces for an eventual land offensive against Germany itself.⁶ General principles for command relationships were laid down, and provisions were made for the exchange of military missions and for close liaison in intelligence

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matters.⁷ A more detailed treatment of some of these agreements was included in a series of annexes, of which the most interesting is that outlining a Joint Basic War Plan.⁸

In the Atlantic-European theater the United States was to be prepared to occupy the Azores and/or the Cape Verde Islands, and on entering the war was to deploy specified ground forces for the relief of the British garrison in Iceland, for a "token" force in the United Kingdom, and for ground and antiaircraft defense of American bases in the British Isles. The air mission was to include: aid in defending the British Isles against invasion; cooperation with the United States Navy and the British in protecting shipping (in both cases attack on enemy bases was to be utilized); and cooperation with the RAF in a sustained air offensive against German military power in all areas within range of the United Kingdom. For accomplishing this mission it was estimated that the United States could furnish 32 squadrons in 1941 and additional units when they became available. One squadron each of bombardment and pursuit was to aid in the defense of Iceland. It was understood that American pursuit units in the British Isles were to be used primarily for the defense of those areas in which United States naval and air bases were located, and that bombardment units were to be used primarily against objectives in Germany, although operations to defeat an invasion or the blockade of the United Kingdom would be conducted as circumstance demanded. All United States Army forces, ground and air, were to be under the administrative control of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Great Britain,



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but under the strategic direction of the British government.

ABC-2. Because of the great importance assigned to air power in the united effort--and this was especially true of the European theater--a subcommittee was appointed to study the problems of aircraft requirements and allocation as between the air services of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the several dominions of the British Commonwealth. A report, United States-British Staff Conferences, Air Collaboration [ABC-2], was submitted simultaneously with ABC-1.

The American Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and the British Military Mission in Washington were to advise on the allocation of aircraft to the various services concerned. Both powers were to accelerate production programs, the British striving especially to build up offensive air strength. The United States was to accomplish as its First Aviation Objective a program calling for 54 combat groups with the aim of operating "a substantial proportion of these forces from advanced bases in the British Isles in the event of U. S. intervention in the war."⁹ It was calculated that if the British Isles were no longer available as a base, 100 combat groups would be the minimum force required for safety and hence the United States should initiate as a Second Aviation Objective a program to provide such an air force.¹⁰ Since deliveries of aircraft were to be contingent upon the ability of the several services to utilize the equipment effectively, it was agreed that until the United States should enter the war the Army Air Forces should defer the full realization of the 54 Group Program, provided the aircraft thus made available could be used to further the air offensive as defined in ABC-1.¹¹

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RAINBOW NO. 5. These two reports, ABC-1 and ABC-2, though accepted by the several chiefs of staff, apparently never were sanctioned at the governmental level. Even without this final approval, they constituted a broad framework for cooperation, which was elastic enough to survive modification in detail; but more specific plans were necessary for effecting the broad policies envisaged, and in the United States that need was satisfied by the plan known as RAINBOW NO. 5.¹² Based on the strategic assumptions enumerated in ABC-1, RAINBOW NO. 5 provided for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and for implementing the policy of strategic defense in the Pacific against Japan either as a potential or an actual enemy. In the primary Atlantic-European theater the initial efforts of the United States were to be predominantly maritime and aerial, with the Navy assisting the British in guarding the sea lanes, the Army ground and air forces protecting the naval bases, and the air forces conducting "offensive air operations from bases in the British Isles . . . against German military power at its source."¹³

Offensive operations might necessitate the seizure of bases in areas other than the United Kingdom, but since the build-up of forces for invasion of the continent was the most important long-range objective, only such tasks as would not interfere with this design were to be undertaken. Specific Army missions which were to be initiated on M Day (which might precede any declaration of war) were:

(1) "In collaboration with the RAF conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion

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or blockade as demanded by the situation." (2) Provide ground defense of naval and air bases occupied by U. S. forces in the United Kingdom and "air defense of those general areas in which bases used primarily by U. S. naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed on." (3) Provide a ground "token force" toward defense of the British Isles. (4) Relieve the British in Iceland and with the Navy defend that island.¹⁴ A strategic reserve (20 M Force) was to be prepared to aid the U. S. Marines in seizing additional bases in the Azores, Canary, or Cape Verde Islands, in Dakar or Free-town, but the immediate contributions of the Army were to be limited to the task forces necessary for those missions stipulated above. The precise forces contemplated and their logistical requirements were listed in RAINBOW NO. 5, Concentration Plan.¹⁵ Command arrangements in the British Isles were to be those designated in ABC-1.

When war came RAINBOW NO. 5 with minor revisions still constituted our basic plan for operations. It was not carried out according to schedule, yet it formed the matrix of all succeeding operational plans. The fulfillment of the air missions designated for the United Kingdom became the function of the Eighth Air Force and the mission of the strategic reserve (20 M Force) was twice to affect that force, for the Eighth was originally organized for a mission against Casablanca, and subsequently the early operations of the Eighth were vitiated by serious diversions to aid in the invasion of North Africa.

General Strategy: Review by the British Staff. While ABC-1 and ABC-2 had traced in bold outline the broader war policies and RAINBOW NO. 5 was specific enough in respect to American commitments on M Day,

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these documents had spoken only in general terms of the long-range plans for operations against Germany. Fuller consideration of problems inherent in these operations was initiated in the summer of 1941, and although the American and British staffs professed agreement in respect to the means by which Germany was eventually to be defeated, differences of opinion evidently existed. These differences involved judgments concerning the relative merits, from the point of view of allied potentialities, of the air war and the land war against Germany, and concerning the nature of the air war. From the formal documents available, it is not possible to say how far the dissident views followed service lines of thought, how much they reflected national policies and outlooks; nor does the tempered wording of the documents make it easy to define a difference of opinion which is often a matter of emphasis or of timing rather than of diametrically opposed views. But in general the impression is gained that the British favored postponement of a land invasion in favor of a long bomber offensive, the Americans a quicker preparation for the invasion; and these differences were to be resolved only partially by the BOLERO plan under which the Eighth Air Force began its operations.

At the first of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings, the Atlantic Conference, held on HMS Prince of Wales on 11 August 1941, a paper entitled "General Strategy: Review by the British Staff" [Review] was presented for discussion by the military authorities, and on request the U. S. delegation agreed to submit detailed comments.¹⁶ The Review analyzed the present strategical situation (Part I) and described present and future strategy (Part II). All policies were based on

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the premise that Germany was too powerful to be attacked without undermining the foundations of its war machine and morale by blockade, by bombing, and by subversive activities and propaganda. To be effective the bombardment by air must be on the heaviest scale possible, limited only by operational difficulties imposed by the size of the base area. Hence after insuring the security of the bases, first priority in production should be given to heavy bombardment aircraft. Currently British policy was to concentrate on targets affecting German transportation and civilian morale, thus exploiting weaknesses created by the blockade. Some effects were already visible, but intensified efforts should bring cumulative results. It was believed possible that by these means alone Germany could be forced to sue for peace, but preparations should be made to invade the continent, not with large infantry armies but chiefly through the use of armored divisions aided by local patriots of occupied nations who should be secretly armed by the British. The British were unwilling to say this task was impossible of accomplishment without the aid of the United States but "the American bomber effort would increasingly swell the air offensive against Germany and in the final phase American armored forces would participate."¹⁷

On 25 September the U. S. Joint Planning Committee presented to the British Joint Board a letter embodying American staff reaction to the Review and the letter was dispatched to the Special Observers in London for transmittal to the British Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸ In general the Americans felt that the picture of offensive operations presented

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in the Review was less sharp and clear than it should have been; that the offensive policies laid down in ABC-1, paragraph 12, were sound and should be modified only on considered judgment. Two specific criticisms were voiced. First, it was the opinion of the Joint Board that the Review overstressed "the probability of success solely through the employment of bombing offensives," which was difficult to reconcile with English experience in the Battle of Britain. And the Committee objected to bombardment aimed merely at the destruction of civilian morale, holding that bombing should be "directed against specific objectives which have an immediate relation to German military power; in the end, success in this field should be more destructive of German morale than air offensives against civil populations."¹⁹ Second, it was felt that the Review did not envisage the use of ground forces on a scale sufficient for the defeat of Germany. As for any immediate effective aid from the United States, that was out of the question; the Navy could give some help but ground and air forces were still undeveloped.²⁰

An answer to these criticisms was presented at a meeting of the British Joint Planning Staff and the United States Special Observers in London on 21 November.²¹ The British indicated a desire to discuss more fully American ideas concerning operations on the continent, but since a successful invasion was considered impossible in the face of current German strength, they believed the bomber offensive to be of greatest immediate importance. As to bombing techniques, some misunderstanding must have resulted from the brevity of the Review. Present bombing policies were the result of careful consideration of



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air forces at the disposal of Britain, of tactical limitations and of strategical possibilities within Germany. "Civilian morale" was not an apt expression for bombing objectives of the RAF. What was attempted was really a dislocation of industrial and social life by destruction of homes and public utilities and the facilities of civilian existence, and the choice of this type of objective had resulted from a careful analysis of British experience and from an interpretation of German character. With improved armaments and techniques and with increased reliance on heavy bombers the weight and frequency of bombing attacks could be increased, and eventually the RAF might be able to resort to daylight bombing. But regardless of bombing objectives or techniques, the British staff found it "impossible to overemphasize the importance of the bomber offensive as a part of our offensive strategy."²²

The Special Observers were authorized to transmit these views to Washington, and the reports of the period from the Army and from the Naval Observers indicate a difference of opinion between our own services as profound as that which existed between the joint staffs of the two powers.²³ To summarize, views at the eve of American entry to the war stood somewhat in this fashion: both English and American staffs agreed on the need of concentrating their efforts against Germany, on the impossibility of attacking Germany by land without previous softening-up processes, and on the need of a bomber offensive; unresolved differences existed in respect to the nature, the size and the time of the ground offensive, and as to the objectives and techniques of the air attack. But both American and British concepts of the air offensive contemplated the employment of air power on a level

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beyond the capacity of existing production and training schedules.

ABC-2 had advocated accelerating the tempo of production and had set immediate goals, but a bomber offensive so intensive as that described in the strategic plans would require a more ambitious program.

ANPD/A. On 9 July 1941 the President requested the Secretary of War to have prepared a paper on the over-all production requirements necessary for the defeat of our enemies, on the basis of which OPM could relate our needs to production realities.²⁴ Shortly thereafter, Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold was asked to have drawn up that part of the plan pertinent to air needs and it was decided that ANPD, acting as a staff agency rather than as a subordinate of WPDGS, should prepare the study. The report, known usually by its short title ANPD/1, was completed on 12 August and sent to the Chief of Staff.²⁵ The actual requirement in aircraft, a total of some 60,000 was summarized briefly,²⁶ and specific needs in planes, personnel, bases, training, and equipment were stipulated in a series of tabs. The study, however, went beyond a literal fulfillment of the directive which initiated it; it contained a strategic plan for the deployment and operation of air units far more detailed than that in RAINBOW NO. 5.

Fundamental strategic considerations were summarized in a "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies,"²⁷ a schematic presentation of the salient features of ABC-1 and RAINBOW NO. 5 which like those plans was dedicated to the policy of concentrating first on Germany, then carrying the offense to Japan, if necessary. The German war was divided into three phases: (1) To

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M Day. Measures "short of war" were to be continued and immediate expansion of trained forces and of production begun. (2) M Day until preparations completed. The United States was to maintain a strategic defensive while completing the expansion program, meanwhile destroying "Axis communications, production facilities, and air forces by cooperation of U. S. air units with the RAF" and carrying out in the European theater the other commitments of ABC-1. (3) The final phase was to begin with an intensification of air operations to secure the air superiority prerequisite to the landing operations, and both close support and strategic bombing were to continue until the defeat of Germany.

On the assumption then that a ground force invasion was impossible before 1944 and might never be necessary, the chief immediate concern of the air planners was for the bomber offensive. The technique differed from that advocated in the British Review:²⁶

The basic conception on which this plan is based lies in the application of air power for the breakdown of the industrial and economic structure of Germany . . . involving selection of objectives vital to continued German war effort and . . . tenaciously concentrating all bombing toward destruction of these objectives, at least initially. As German morale begins to crack, area bombing of civil concentrations may be effective."

The main systems of target objectives for precision bombing were to be the electric power network, the transportation system, the oil and petroleum industries, and only finally the targets which would affect civilian morale. As an intermediate objective prerequisite to the success of this mission, it might be necessary to neutralize the GAF

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by attacking air bases, aircraft factories and aluminum installations; and to maintain bases in the British Isles further diversions against submarine bases, surface craft and "invasion coast" bases might be demanded.²⁹ But it should be noted, in view of later plans and actual operations, that these last-named objectives were considered as purely auxiliary to the main strategic purpose.

To calculate the force required to accomplish these missions an estimate was made as to the number of targets which must be destroyed to disrupt each of the target systems enumerated; of the bomb weight required for the destruction of each; of the total bomb lift in view of computed coefficients of aiming errors under combat conditions; and of the number of planes required to deliver that total bomb load within a given time. The estimated requirements of tactical forces in groups were: medium bombers (B-25, B-26 "or better")—10; heavy bombers (B-17, B-24, "or better")—20; heavy bombers (B-29 or B-32)—24; heavy bombers, VLR (4,000 mile radius type)—44; in all, a total of 6,834 aircraft.³⁰ It was expected that these planes, other than the 4,000 mile radius type, would operate from bases in the United Kingdom and the Near East, and that since the VLR bombers would not be available before 1944, an interim program utilizing duplicate bombardment crews could be initiated in 1943. For protection of the bases 10 pursuit groups were to be located in the United Kingdom, six in the Near East.³¹

The success of the whole program depended on the ability of American bombers to conduct daylight missions far into Europe. In

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spite of earlier German and English experience, it was concluded "that by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude" it would be feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany in daylight.³² To provide protection, however, against expected improvements in German fighter defense, experiments should be initiated for the development of a heavily armed and armored escort fighter with speed slightly superior, and range equal, to that of the heavy bombers.³³

It was expected that all-out operations would not be possible until the period April-September 1944. If the bomber offensive alone did not crush the German will to fight, strategic bombardment was to continue while support units worked in close cooperation with the ground forces.³⁴

In conclusion, it was believed that if production of aircraft could be accomplished, air crews and ground personnel for operating and maintaining the planes could be trained.³⁵

The President had asked not for a detailed report but for theoretical requirements stated in general terms, and although ANPD/1 went into great detail, it was based on an ideal conception of the application of air power rather than on current strength or production schedules immediately realizable. The study, after being circulated through the various interested offices, was included by WPDGS in the joint Army-Navy estimate which the President had desired³⁶ and when American and British authorities defined the over-all "Victory Requirements" for carrying out the strategic concepts of ABC-1, ANPD/1 with some changes was taken as the goal for American air strength.³⁷ The

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Secretary of War had implied his approval as a practicable plan only if the nation should be at war, but the Chief of Staff, in accepting the report, had directed all AAF agencies to initiate plans for the implementation of ANPD/1.³⁸ The early outbreak of war prevented the orderly progress of these "splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force"—so the report of the Army Ground Forces had called them³⁹—but the strategic doctrines they describe were not forgotten when the Eighth Air Force began its operations.

2. From Pearl Harbor to BOLERO

At the eve of America's entrance into the war the Associated Powers had formulated a set of strategic principles and the mutual contributions by which they might be effected (ABC-1), and a long-range production plan (Victory Program); the United States had an operational plan which was precise in respect to immediate tasks (RAINBOW NO. 5) and a plan for the application of air power conceived on an almost Seversky-like scale. It is dubious that any of those plans had been framed with the thought that the United States would be engaged so soon in an open, all-out war, and certainly the planners had not foreseen the tragic swiftness of events in the Pacific. Nowhere is the truly global nature of the war better exemplified than in the rapid flux in plans which came in the early days of American participation. The guiding principles of ABC-1 were adhered to, but the details of deployment provided in RAINBOW NO. 5 were modified; the war in the Pacific and in North Africa affected directly and adversely the task forces

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which had been designated for the United Kingdom and postponed the time at which American air operations could be initiated there. When Army Air Forces did go to the European theater they went as part of a task force which had not been named in RAINBOW NO. 5. The fluctuation in strategic plans between December 1941 and August 1942 must be appreciated for any clear understanding of the early operations of the Eighth Air Force.

AWPD/A. With the outbreak of war RAINBOW NO. 5, as previously modified, was put into effect—with respect to Japan on 7 December, with respect to Germany and Italy on 11 December—but it was directed that task forces were to be designated, organized, and dispatched only in accordance with subsequent War Department instructions.⁴⁰ In short, the Japanese in bombing Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field had played havoc as well with designs for M Day. The immediate reaction in Washington was to deploy all available air forces for defense of the Western Hemisphere and, if possible, of Hawaii and the Philippines,⁴¹ but within a short time decisions of a more offensive nature were made. Something of the temper of advocates of air power can be seen in a study made at the time by the air planners—AWPD/4, 15 December. This paper called for the defense of sources of production and bases in the Western Hemisphere and the United Kingdom, the creation of a tremendous air force of 90,000 planes and 3,000,000 men by "giving NATIONAL FIRST PRIORITY TO THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT,"⁴² a decisive offensive against Germany by aerial bombardment followed if necessary by a ground invasion, and a holding action against Japan until a German defeat should allow an all-out attack in the Pacific. This, obviously, was

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ANPD/1 inflated by the urgency of actual war, but a more pressing need was for decisions of an immediate and practicable nature.

The Arcadia Conference. Between 23 December and 14 January a series of conversations, known as the Arcadia Conference, was held in Washington between the heads of government and the several chiefs of staff of the two nations. The agenda suggested by the British mission while en route for America included: (1) a re-declaration of the fundamental bases of joint strategy; (2) the interpretation of this strategy into terms of immediate military measures, including a re-distribution of forces; (3) the allocation of joint forces; (4) the drafting of a long-term program with plans for providing the necessary forces; and (5) the establishment of joint machinery.⁴³ The British presented a general view of strategy which, in spite of the new and serious outlook in the Pacific, reiterated the principles of ABC-1, and with minor modifications the paper was accepted by the American leaders as a workable guide.⁴⁴ Briefly summarized, these principles called for the defense of production areas in North America and in the British Isles so that the Victory Program could be realized, the maintenance of sea communications, the forging of a ring about Germany, an air offensive, and preparations for a land invasion of Europe while the Japanese were being contained by minimum forces. In defining the forces to be deployed in the Atlantic-European theater, the staffs did not disregard the details of ABC-1, but it was necessary to establish a set of priorities which faced the realities of available ground, air, and naval forces, of production and shipping. A list of projects for

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the immediate future was reported on 27 December and officially accepted on 13 January 1942.⁴⁵ The relief of British troops in Iceland and North Ireland should proceed as expeditiously as possible. The movement of an American air force to the United Kingdom should begin as soon as shipping and air units became available so that the weight of air attack on Germany might be increased. The joint occupation of French North Africa and French Northwest Africa was considered of prime strategic importance (for defense of sea communications and "ringing" Germany), but it was believed that forces and shipping were not currently available for this task. Since each of these three projects--the Northwest African, the North Irish, and the British--was intimately connected with the early history of the Eighth Air Force, it became expedient to treat two of the projects briefly, the other in some detail.

The Northwest African Project. For some months before Pearl Harbor the U. S. staffs had been studying the problems incident to the occupation of some base in French Northwest Africa for the protection of South America and the South Atlantic, and for possible operations against the European continent. Operational plans had been drawn up for a landing at Dakar (operation BLACK)⁴⁶ and at Casablanca (operation GYMAST). The British meanwhile had considered the possibilities of a landing at some port in French North Africa, and at the Arcadia Conference an attempt was made to weld these two plans into a single combined operation. A project calling for a simultaneous assault on Tunisia and Casablanca was presented by the Joint [Combined] Planners on 28 December but was not accepted at that time.⁴⁷ The

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project was not abandoned, but under varying forms (SUPER-GYMNAST, MODIFIED GYMNAST) continued to interest the Joint Planners during and after the Arcadia meetings. As the first major offensive operation of the Associated Powers, SUPER-GYMNAST would have a political and psychological significance perhaps as great as its military importance, and there was little inclination to assume risks of failure. All plans were contingent upon the cooperation of the French and the prospects of dealing with Vichy were some too promising. It was thought that enough ground troops would be available, but a number of puzzling problems confronted the planners—German counter-attack, Spanish reactions, shipping for troops and supplies, and the difficulty of finding air support without denuding defense areas or weakening previously designated task forces. It was the effort to provide air support that gave birth to the Eighth Air Force.

In the discussion of the expediency of this mission it had been the opinion of the air planners that the venture offered certain advantages toward the air offensive in Europe, but that it should not be undertaken without an air force sufficient to guarantee success.⁴⁸ Action for providing such a force in case the mission should be undertaken was initiated by General Arnold in a directive of 2 January 1942. The Fifth Air Force was to be organized and prepared for immediate action. Comprised of an air force headquarters, a bomber command, an interceptor command, an air service command, and appropriate arms and services, the new organization was to be commanded by Col. Asa H. Duncan.⁴⁹ To avoid confusion with the Far East Air Force, the

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designation was immediately changed from the Fifth to the Eighth Air Force.⁵⁰ The task of organizing and training the force was to be under direction of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, and he was furnished a full list of the units required, with the names of those tactical units already assigned, and directed to designate by name all other organizations which were to comprise the force; such units as were not available were to be activated at once.⁵¹ An area for concentration and training was to be arranged for and the units were to move in about the first of February.⁵² Pursuant to orders of 19 January, the Commanding General, AFCC constituted the several headquarters units designated, and declared them activated, effective on the following dates:⁵³

Unit	Date Effective	Station of Activation
8th AF, Hq & Hq Sq	28 Jan. 1942	Savannah, Ga.
8th AF Base Command, Hq & Hq Sq	28 Jan. 1942	Savannah, Ga.
8th Bomber Command, Hq & Hq Sq	1 Feb. 1942	Langley Field, Va.
8th Interceptor Command, Hq & Hq Sq	1 Feb. 1942	Salfridge Field, Va.

The substantial force which the air planners had desired had of necessity been scaled down to fit current realities, but the commander of the new air force felt that the five combat groups assigned were inadequate for the mission. With the concurrence of General Fredendall, commander of the Mobile Reserve Corps to which the Eighth was assigned, Colonel Duncan recommended the reinforcement of his force by 3 groups of heavy and 1 of medium bombers and 3 pursuit groups.⁵⁴ His request was referred to AWPB and that agency agreed with Colonel Duncan's conviction in the necessity of an augmented air force. But realizing that the additional groups would probably have to be diverted from

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those allocated for service in England (3 groups heavy bombardment, 2 pursuit groups) and North Ireland (1 group medium bombardment, 1 pursuit group), both projects with higher priorities than the Northwest African venture, ANPD recommended that GYMAST be scratched and the Eighth Air Force as presently constituted be reserved for a lesser mission such as VICTOR or BLACK. If GYMAST were to be mounted, the reinforcements should be found.⁵⁵

The progress of events in the Pacific, however, and the tightness of shipping made it obvious that not only was it impossible to augment the air force for GYMAST, but that the whole project was at present impracticable. The reasoning that underlay that judgment will be analyzed later;⁵⁶ here it is sufficient to note that the Combined Staff Planners on 3 March recommended that SUPER-GYMAST be continued as an "academic study" only, and that no shipping, ground, or air forces be reserved for its accomplishment.⁵⁷ The adoption of that recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff left the Eighth Air Force momentarily without a mission, but it was soon to be absorbed by a larger project, the striking force designed for the United Kingdom. But unhappily for the Eighth, GYMAST proved to be too robust a growth to be throttled even by so degrading a designation as "academic study." Within a few months and actually before the Eighth was committed to combat, the Northwest African project under the new name of TORCH was to be revived and to prove a serious competitor in requests for combat units.

The Relief of North Ireland. RAINBOW NO. 5, in fulfillment of the agreements of ANC-1, had allocated two groups of pursuit to North

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Ireland, one to Scotland, to be used primarily for the defense of American bases.⁵⁸ When the various projects involving the overseas deployment of U. S. forces were reviewed at the Arcadia Conference and the North Ireland mission was given a high priority, a new operations plan under the code name of MAGNET was drawn up and was accepted by the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff on 11 January 1942.⁵⁹

In the new plan, air forces were to play a more important role. The AAF mission, when tactical forces should be made available, would be "to provide air defense for all ground elements and installations within the present boundaries of the Sub-Theater, and support the training and operations of ground forces in land and contiguous sea areas."⁶⁰ Support of a protective movement into Eire was considered a probable need. At first the AAF was to be under tactical control of the RAF, but after assumption of command by an American sub-theater commander the air forces were to be under his tactical and administrative command, with an air commander to carry out his policies.⁶¹ The air forces were to consist of an air support command and an interceptor command.⁶²

In January the organization of the air task force was begun. Known both as the Fifth Air Support Command and Ninth Air Force, it included two pursuit groups, one group each of medium and light bombardment and an observation group.⁶³ The movement of the first MAGNET contingent began in January, but the air units were given low priorities, with the advanced headquarters echelons scheduled to sail on 1 May, the pursuit groups on 1 June, and the other tactical units on 1 July.⁶⁴

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These groups were concentrated in Louisiana for training prior to departure, but before the overseas movement began, strategic plans for the British Isles had been materially changed by the adoption of project BOLERO. The air task force was broken up and the combat groups scattered from Alaska to Cairo,⁶⁵ and by the time the first tactical units reached North Ireland their mission was conceived in a fashion entirely different from that described in RAINBOW NO. 5 or MAGNET.

A further change from the earlier agreements was made in Scotland when the U. S. Navy released to the Admiralty its claim to bases; their defense no longer devolved upon the AAF and the fighter group allocated to that mission could be used elsewhere.⁶⁶

A Bomber Force for the United Kingdom. There can be no doubt that the most important task contemplated for the AAF in pre-war planning was the bomber offensive against Germany, carried out in conjunction with the RAF. Plans had been made on two widely separated levels as analyses in earlier pages have shown: the long-range ideal program of ANPD/1 and the more sober and immediate commitments of RAINBOW NO. 5. Toward the realization of these latter agreements a great deal of preliminary work had been done in the United Kingdom by the Special Military Observers group (SPOBS), set up in May 1941 as a result of ABC-1. It is indicative of the importance of air power in projected operations that the group was headed by an airman, Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, who had vigorously attacked the problems incident to the establishment of repair facilities for aircraft, to the preparation of airdromes for operational groups, to command

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arrangements, and to close liaison with the RAF in intelligence, training and operations.⁶⁷ The exact commitments in terms of tactical groups to be deployed immediately that RAINBOW NO. 5 should go into effect, however, had been changed on several occasions,⁶⁸ and indeed the conflict between requirements for national defense, the expansion programs, and the RAINBOW NO. 5 time schedule figured on an M+ basis had made difficult any clear-cut idea of what would be done at the outset of hostilities if they occurred before the expansion programs had progressed materially.

At an informal meeting at the White House at the opening of the Arcadia Conference it was tentatively agreed between the President and the British Prime Minister that U. S. heavy bombardment units should be sent to England.⁶⁹ The agreement was given a formal status by the recommendation of the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff on 13 January 1942, that heavy bomber groups should be dispatched as soon as they and shipping became available.⁷⁰ The size of the force and the probable date of dispatch were not stipulated. ANPD did not consider the troop basis designated in RAINBOW NO. 5 adequate, and recommended that no decision be made until a revised recommendation could be obtained from SPOBS;⁷¹ but General Arnold indicated to Sir Charles Portal that it should be possible to send two heavy groups soon, perhaps by March, and that strength and that possible date were accepted as a basis for further planning.⁷² It was estimated that out of the 115 Group Program, 16 heavy bombardment and 5 pursuit groups would be available during 1942; most of these would be ready only late in the year, but within the air agencies a high priority was given to

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the initial force of 2 bombardment groups and accompanying pursuit units, and a tentative assignment of tactical units was made.⁷³ This suggested arrangement was adopted in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when they recommended that the first 2 heavy groups ready for combat should be sent to the United Kingdom; the Combined Staff Planners were instructed to prepare plans for the movement of these initial units and decision respecting the other 14 bomber and the 5 pursuit groups was postponed.⁷⁴

By direction of General Arnold, ANPD had already prepared plans for this force, and now in compliance with orders of the Combined Staff Planners those plans were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration.⁷⁵ The force was to consist of a bomber command, 2 groups of heavy bombers, 3 reconnaissance squadrons, 2 air base and 1 air depot groups—a total of 8,599 men and 100 aircraft. Estimated time of movement was now set at 15 May. The British were to provide air and ground protection and the necessary airdromes; supply was to be by the United States Army. Provisions for two fighter groups for bomber escort were also considered.⁷⁶ It was estimated that shipping would be available in May if the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave to the project a high enough priority.

In the early stages of planning this project was referred to merely as "Task Force BR," but General Arnold recommended to the Chief of Staff that an organization be created with the designation American Air Forces in Britain (AAFIB), under the United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) and with subordinate commands—bomber, interceptor, and air base.⁷⁷ This recommendation was accepted

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in principle; it was intended that Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz should command the air force, and Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker was selected as bomber commander and ordered to proceed to England at once to prepare for the reception of his forces.⁷⁸ Orders were issued for the activation of headquarters units for the several commands, to remain under control of the Air Force Combat Command for the present.⁷⁹

While detailed arrangements for the task force were being made, however, serious questions were raised at the highest policy level which threatened to postpone the inauguration of the bomber offensive against Germany and to vitiate American efforts toward that mission. Task Force BR, having had to compete against demands in such American spheres of responsibility as the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific, and Northwest Africa was now to be subjected to demands for aircraft to bolster the defense of British areas, but eventually the new review of strategy that was inaugurated by these requests enlarged, while modifying, the plans under which the movement of the air force to England took place.

In January Sir Charles Portal had requested of General Arnold the allocation of a group of heavy bombers to Egypt, realizing at the time that this reinforcement could be made only by diversion from Task Force BR.⁸⁰ General Arnold declined to weaken the force designated for England, promising to furnish a heavy group for Task Force CAIRO at a future date,⁸¹ but a month later the British Chiefs of Staff submitted a proposed Policy for Disposition of U. S. and British Air Forces that extended the scope of the suggested diversions.⁸² Designed to provide an effective and economical employment of the total

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disposable air forces, the paper sought to establish once again agreements concerning the broad spheres of interest and responsibility of the two powers and the allocation of air units to the several theaters. The United States was to contribute toward the main bomber offensive against Germany, "at the earliest dates practicable," but was asked to accept responsibility for providing additional air strength in the Pacific, conduct bombardment operations against Japan from China, assist the British with heavy bombers in the Burma-Indian Ocean theater, and if necessary in the Middle East. It was understood that forces for these last-named missions could be found only by diverting the two heavy bomber groups scheduled for early departure to the United Kingdom, and in return the British were to be wholly responsible for the defense of the United Kingdom and for sole immediate support of the bomber offensive against Germany.

The diversions recommended in this memorandum had strong support in a cable from the Prime Minister to the President in which Mr. Churchill gravely, almost pessimistically, reviewed the current strategic situation.⁸³ Faced with the spectacular advance of the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific and Burma and with the threat of an Axis pincers movement in the Middle East, the Prime Minister seems to have lost the confident tone of the Arcadia Conference and to have become momentarily more concerned with air operations against the Japanese than against the German homeland; to gain additional AAF support for the Far and Middle East he was willing to postpone MAGNET and GYMNAST and the build-up of an American bomber force in England.

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When the President submitted Mr. Churchill's proposals to a White House conference on 6 March, General Arnold outlined a counter-proposal much more in harmony with earlier agreements. He favored deploying in the Southwest Pacific and India minimum air forces for the support of the ground elements, and concentrating both ground and air strength in England. American air forces should be held there until strong enough to be decisive and then thrown in as an integral unit.⁸⁴ A more elaborate statement was drawn up by the air staff and was incorporated into the President's reply. The United States could contribute to the reinforcement of India and the Middle East only by curtailing forces previously earmarked for the British Isles and it was considered preferable to concentrate on the bomber offensive against Germany. By holding to bare defensive needs in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas and by utilizing air forces previously set up for MAGNET and GYMNAST, a considerable force could be built up in England by the end of the year, and that was considered essential if any concerted effort was to be made against German military strength and resources in 1942.⁸⁵

Without fuller access to sources of information on highest policy levels it is impossible to follow in detail the attitudes and decisions of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff during March of 1942. The reply to Mr. Churchill's cable evinces an objection to the dispersal of striking power in a variety of localities, and the desire to build up a decisive offensive force in the United Kingdom. Elsewhere it is indicated that the striking force was conceived of not merely in terms of air power but of an invasion force for use at a time not too distantly removed, and that it was believed that the English were not yet

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willing to commit themselves to such a venture.⁸⁶ General Chaney was directed to begin preparation for a larger ground contingent than that previously intended as a "Token Force" and for an air force of enlarged but unspecified dimensions,⁸⁷ but before any action could be taken a definite plan for operations had to be prepared and the British convinced of its soundness.

On 27 March WPD submitted a "Plan for Operations in Northwest Europe"; three days later ANPD prepared the accompanying plan for air support and presented it to the Chief of Staff.⁸⁸ The project called for an invasion of the continent in force either in autumn of 1942 or spring of 1943. Air activity was to be in four phases—preparation and training, a preliminary strategic bombing offensive, close support of ground forces during the landing, and a return to the exploitation of strategic targets. The Combined Planners, who examined the project, were of the opinion that the degree of air superiority required would not be available in September but could be provided by the following spring.⁸⁹

The plan was given the general approval of the President and early in April General Marshall went to London to present it to the British Chiefs of Staff. In the first meeting he pointed out the need of arriving at an early decision as to the objectives, the place, and the time of the main Anglo-American effort. He considered Western Europe the theater offering the best opportunities, and to aid Russia and to gain experience for American troops he advocated an early air invasion as was practicable. The United States could not build up much of a force in the United Kingdom before autumn but would be

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willing to work on plans for September or the following April.⁹⁰ The British stated that they had been thinking along similar lines, and after reading and discussing General Marshall's plans agreed in principle that short of measures needed to hold Japan, all efforts should be concentrated against Germany.⁹¹ The build-up of forces for an invasion in 1943 should begin at once, and preparations should be made so that in the event either of Russian collapse or a Russian victory over Germany an emergency landing could be made with such forces as were available in 1942.⁹² The Prime Minister cabled his approval to the President on 17 April of these plans for a crescendo of activities against the enemy "starting with an ever-increasing air-offensive both by night and by day";⁹³ that message may be taken as the official launching of the newly declared strategy.

In Washington the project had been called BOLEHO and that name continued to designate the build-up of forces rather than the operations projected. The Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate plans for the movement, reception, and maintenance of an expeditionary force with these missions: (1) the conduct in cooperation with the RAF of an air offensive against Western Europe in 1942; (2) the initiation in the spring of 1943, in coordination with British forces, of a major invasion of the continent (called ROUND-UP by the British); or the conduct in 1942 of an invasion operation in support of British forces should it be deemed expedient (called SLEDGEHAMMER).⁹⁴

The part then that air power would play, and especially the role of the AAF, would depend largely on the progress on the eastern front.

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If a landing were made in September, there would be little opportunity for extensive American contributions to the bomber offensive and at best the AAF could get into operation only shortly before the time for close ground support came. If the preferred alternative of a major offensive in the spring of 1943 were followed, the AAF could contribute solidly to the previous softening-up process. But in neither case were the long delay (until spring 1944) or the tremendous air force advocated in ANPD/1 to be considered; that this earlier plan was to prove closer to actualities than that adopted at London at this time was the result of still another major shift in strategy.

3. From BOLERO to TORCH

The decision made at London in April that an operation against the continent in 1942 or 1943 should constitute the main offensive activity of the Associated Powers seemed final. Yet while preparations for BOLERO were being rushed in the United States and in Great Britain, the development of a large AAF for the task was threatened by other demands and the whole question of the practicability of the project was under constant re-examination. A definitive settlement was made in respect to the allocation of air forces that seemed to provide adequately for BOLERO, but in a sudden reversal of policy the plans for an early invasion of the continent were scrapped in favor of a North African expedition in such fashion that the development of an American air striking force in England was set back for almost a year.

The Arnold-Towers-Portal Agreement. Lend-Lease policy before American entrance into the war, and Anglo-American agreements thereafter.

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had, in the absence of trained AAF crews, made generous allotments of tactical aircraft to the British. The situation had been changed by the expanding training program which made possible, subject to the achievement of predicted production goals, the plans for the large striking force for the AAFBI. The schedule of tactical units promised to that force was not immune from attempted diversions however, and it became expedient to re-define policies guiding the allotment of aircraft and the deployment of air units. Just after the London conference had launched BOLERO there was some consideration in Washington of sending to General MacArthur air reinforcements of such proportions that BOLERO might well have been rendered impotent, but both General Arnold and General Marshall, in this "Pacific Theater versus 'Bolero'" competition, favored the continuation of the London plans and the President wrote on 6 May: "I do not want 'Bolero' slowed down."⁹⁵ At the same time the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff at Washington attempted to secure a revision of current allocations in order that the RAF might accumulate a reserve of fighters for contemplated assaults on the continent,⁹⁶ which again might have affected adversely the AAFBI. No action was taken on this request at the time, but during the following weeks the whole policy of allocation was reviewed and a new statement was made of the air forces to be deployed in the several theaters.

The Arnold-Towers-Portal Agreement⁹⁷ was based on the principle that in order to create powerful American air forces every appropriate aircraft built in the United States should be fought by an American

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crew. Revisions of allotments were, therefore, made, but in such fashion that combined strength in no theater would be weakened. It was agreed that American combat units assigned to theaters of British responsibility (of which the United Kingdom was one) would be organized in "homogeneous formations" under strategic control of the appropriate British commander-in-chief. Specific American contributions to such theaters were enumerated. In the United Kingdom the United States was to have, by 1 April 1943 (the earliest date set for ROUND-UP), the following combat groups: heavy bombers, 17 (575 planes); medium bombers, 10 (570); light bombers, 6 (342); observation, 7 (399); pursuit, 12 (960); transport, 8 (416).⁹⁸

This agreement was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff⁹⁹ and eventually by the heads of the two governments. It provided a sound basis for the air offensive against Germany, both in its preparatory phase and in the close support of ground action; that it was not realized was due to changes in offensive plans.

TORCH. In spite of the seeming finality of decisions reached in London in April, the British Prime Minister and members of his staffs were in Washington on 18 June, prepared to discuss the coordination and "possible reorientation" of combined policy.¹⁰⁰ Although alternative plans had been made to fit the several predistable contingencies on the eastern front, the current German showing against the Russians was a matter of grave concern. A thorough review of the strategic situation was made, and particularly the question was raised as to whether, in view of the apparent probability of serious Russian

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reverses, some project other than BOLERO should be attempted. The opinion was voiced in an informal meeting,¹⁰¹ however, and incorporated into a paper of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,¹⁰² that the reasons which had led to the adoption of BOLERO were still sound. It was recommended that BOLERO should still be pushed and that since any other large-scale operation would inevitably have a deterring effect, none should be undertaken except in an emergency. Specifically, GYMNAST should not be mounted, though plans should be completed for that and any other operation that might become necessary. These recommendations were accepted by the President and the Prime Minister, and it was decided that planning for GYMNAST should proceed in Washington while the British examined the possibilities of expeditions against the Iberian Peninsula, Norway, and the French coast.¹⁰³

By 8 July the Prime Minister had decided that SLEDGEHAMMER could not be undertaken in 1942 and suggested that the United States go on with plans for GYMNAST, apparently with prospects of reduced aid from the British.¹⁰⁴ What factor, other than German successes in Russia, had caused this new decision is not clear. The opinion was expressed in a U. S. staff meeting that the British had never been enthusiastic about SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUND-UP, and that without their whole-hearted support neither project could succeed. It was even suggested to the President that unless that cooperation could be assured, America might more profitably turn to the Pacific for a show-down with the Japanese.¹⁰⁵ No such drastic steps were taken, however, and on 24 July the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff presented to the British a new set of proposals.¹⁰⁶ BOLERO should continue as our main effort so long as ROUND-UP seemed

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feasible, and limited preparations should be made for SLEDGEHAMMER. If by 15 September the Russian situation made ROUND-UP appear impracticable for 1943, the decision should be adopted to launch a combined operation against North and Northwest Africa. Realistically, it was to be understood that commitment to this plan would make ROUND-UP impossible in 1943, and that the Associated Powers would thereby have accepted for another year a defensive encircling position in respect to Europe.

The British, who seemed nothing loath to postpone the risks of a large-scale invasion of the continent, were nonetheless concerned for the bomber offensive which they had already inaugurated, and Sir Charles Portal asked specifically if American air support required for the African project would have to be withdrawn from those forces allocated to BOLERO.¹⁰⁷ This question, from one who knew the U. S. aircraft situation as Sir Charles did, seems rhetorical; from what other sources could the necessary forces have come? The US JCS had intended that heavy and medium bomber units in the United Kingdom should be made available for the new project,¹⁰⁸ and Sir Charles was so informed. But, as General Marshall pointed out, it was American opinion that the AAF should operate against Germany from any suitable base, and, that because of weather, North Africa in winter might even be preferable to England as a base.¹⁰⁹ A more complete loss to BOLERO was to be found in the recommendations contained in the same report that 15 combat groups, including 3 heavy and 2 medium bombardment units, be diverted to the Pacific.¹¹⁰

These proposals were adopted, with minor amendments, by the COS and detailed work on command arrangements, logistics, and tactical

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plans was begun. Within a week or so--on what exact day it is difficult to say--the definite decision at the governmental level to mount TORCH, as the new project was called, had been made.¹¹¹ Which government took the lead in this strategic volte-face it is difficult to tell. Mr. Sumner Wells has said that the President was responsible for the invasion of North Africa,¹¹² Certainly he had been interested in the venture since 1940, but from the incomplete evidence available it is not certain that it was he who deliberately postponed BOLERO.¹¹³ In any event, with that decision the corollaries had perforce been accepted--no "second front" in Europe for a year and an uncoordinated bomber offensive by the AAFBI until such time as victory in TORCH would release the diverted combat units.

The decision to send air reinforcements to the Pacific may have been made necessary by factors not evident in May when the President had refused to weaken BOLERO for that purpose. General Arnold opposed the diversion on the sound ground that constant changes in allocation of planes to BOLERO made "our course seem vacillating,"¹¹⁴ but his efforts to maintain the integrity of the striking force for the United Kingdom were not wholly successful. From the over-all point of view, the strengthening of the Pacific and the decision to undertake TORCH may have been wise; time only will tell. But from the narrower perspective of the Eighth Air Force the loss to other theaters of tactical units was lamentable. It was not merely that the Eighth was to suffer "paper" losses of planes allocated but not yet delivered, and actual losses of some groups already engaged in operations so that the build-up of an adequate striking force was to be delayed for a

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few months. The diversions meant more--that our air power would be fed in piecemeal instead of in the considerable force that General Arnold had advocated, and that our equipment and techniques would be exhibited to the Germans without adequate returns. The results were not as disastrous as in the premature introduction of the tank in World War I, but there is a certain parallel between the two cases. For the delay gave to the GAF and the German aircraft industry a golden opportunity to prepare a defense for the final launching of a full-scale bomber offensive. These strategic and tactical implications were realized in advance by air commanders, both American¹¹⁵ and British;¹¹⁶ their efforts to restore the Eighth to its original paper strength will figure prominently in another section of this study, but they were successful only after much of the damage to earlier plans had been done.

This account of the strategic background of the Eighth Air Force may appear inordinately long and involved and not always strictly pertinent to the history of that force, narrowly conceived. Yet it is only when viewed against this background that the mission of the Eighth and the limited success of its early months of operation can be correctly appreciated. The delay in inaugurating a powerful bomber offensive was not due to a lack of air planning; ANPD/1 bore a more than superficial resemblance to the plans under which in 1943 the concentrated air attack on Germany was begun, and an effort had been made to provide a force adequate to the mission. But in a real sense the history of the Eighth Air Force was predetermined in Washington by strategic decisions beyond which the AAF could not appeal.

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Chapter II

COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

In reading the various arguments, I find certain terms not susceptible of standard interpretation by our own people, with the general result of a somewhat cloudy issue. I keep struggling with "strategical direction," "operational control," and "administrative command." . . . I want to assure you that I am not trying to start an argument, but I am trying to call attention to the need for evolving a practical and efficient command system under circumstances for which I know no precedent.

Letter, Brig. Gen. H. J. Maloney to
Maj. Gen. J. E. Chaney, 10 September 1942

Broad principles to guide the United States Army in formulating its command arrangements in the United Kingdom had been enunciated in ABC-1 and RAINBOW NO. 5, but the very latitude of those principles made difficult the establishment of a practical system. Months of planning and discussion elapsed before an acceptable system was adopted and during that period several alternative proposals were projected and modified or rejected. The problems of command relationships and of the organizational framework were for the Eighth Air Force on three separate but related levels. At the top there was the question of a suitable over-all command for the combined forces of the United Nations within the European theater. This was a matter of highest policy to be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their respective governments, and here the AAF could exert its influence only through General Arnold in his capacity as member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. Two lessons from World War I colored much of the thinking in respect

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to the over-all command. From the beginning of their collaboration, both American and British leaders professed a belief in the absolute necessity of a unified command in each theater. The experiences of the British in the Near East had not been too happy in this respect; they had showed that mere cooperation between services was not sufficient,¹ and while the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were not always content with the means by which the British proposed to effect the unity they affected to desire, the differences of opinion between the Chiefs of Staff of the two nations were resolvable. And the Americans, remembering also the struggles of General Pershing with the allied command, were, in general, insistent on maintaining their forces in any theater as an integral whole. In the early days of our collaboration with the RAF, the latter's overwhelming numerical superiority in aircraft and the nature of their doctrine made this principle of especial importance to the Eighth Air Force, and it was vigorously asserted by General Arnold.

At the second level were problems incident to the establishment of command arrangements within the U. S. forces. To a large degree these problems were internal to the War Department, though the presence of U. S. naval forces in the theater raised some inter-service issues. The period under consideration was characterized by important changes in the organization of the War Department itself, and the successive plans proposed for the establishment of an air force in the United Kingdom show an evolution comparable to that which gave to the AAF the status of a quasi-independent arm. In addition to the influence of this development at Washington, which was shared by air forces in

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other theaters, the Eighth Air Force was subject to conditions which were peculiar to the European theater, and the difficulties inherent in establishing a new organization under war conditions were complicated by those fluctuations in strategic policies which were described in Chapter I, and by the personalities involved at the command level.

Finally, there was the internal organization of the AAF in Great Britain and of its constituent commands. This was not, as it might seem, a matter of interest for the AAF alone, for the intimate relations between U. S. air forces, ground, service, and naval forces, and the RAF made the command echelons of the air forces a matter of common concern.

Acceptable arrangements at these several levels were reached at different times, but in each case only after months of planning and discussion. In June of 1942 the position of the U. S. theater commander vis-a-vis the British government was announced by the President, but the discussions relative to the unified command for operations against the European Axis powers were continued into a period beyond the scope of this study. The relation of the air force to the theater commander and the number and nature of the subordinate air commands were not finally settled until well after the early contingents were settled in England. And at the lowest level, there was still in early summer of 1942 a wide disparity in the degree to which the several subordinate commands had solved their problems of organization.

1. The Army Air Forces in the British Isles.

To no small degree the delay in arriving at an acceptable organizational scheme for the AAFBI was due to a difference of opinion

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between General Arnold and General Chaney, and to the command channels through which they communicated. ABC-1 had provided that all armed forces within the area of the United Kingdom and British home waters (including Iceland) should be under the strategic direction of the appropriate British commander-in-chief, but that all U. S. forces should be subject to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Great Britain.² RAINBOW NO. 5 repeated these principles and further stipulated that the Commanding General would be responsible for evolving a detailed plan of cooperation, having "authority to arrange with the Air Ministry and the War Office concerning the organization and location of our task forces and operational control."³ Obviously there would be no commanding general until RAINBOW NO. 5 became operative, but provisions had been made to set up a Military Mission to maintain liaison between the War Office and the U. S. Army Headquarters in London, and until the United States entered the war its functions devolved upon the Special Army Observers Group (SPOBS).⁴ That group was established under command of Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney in May 1941. Just when it was first decided that General Chaney should command the USAFBI, once American forces were sent to the theater, is not apparent; it was assumed by the British War Office in September that the Special Observers would form the nucleus of the U. S. Army Headquarters in London,⁵ and that assumption was shared by SPOBS.⁶ Certainly the decision to give the command to General Chaney had been reached by early November⁷ and it was first as commander of SPOBS (really the Military Mission in an innocuous guise), then as presumptive and finally as actual commander of USAFBI that he was concerned with the formulation of an organizational scheme for the AAF in the British Isles.

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General Chaney had begun his study of the problems incident to the organization of the USAFBI soon after his arrival in London and on 20 September he submitted to the Chief of Staff his first report on the subject.⁸ After describing a plan based on his interpretation of RAINBOW NO. 5, General Chaney stated that he was "proceeding on the basis indicated above insofar as command arrangements and relationships are concerned," and recommended the adoption of the plan. A month later he was in Washington and there on 7 November he discussed with General Arnold the problems relating to the establishment of the air force for the British Isles. Members of the air staff described for Chaney a new type of organization for a theater air force,⁹ and on his return to London the following day he carried with him a letter from Arnold in which the new scheme as applied to the United Kingdom was outlined.¹⁰

The scheme had been utilized successfully in the Caribbean by Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews and it paralleled on a lower echelon the forthcoming reorganization of the AAF in the War Department. General Arnold proposed to effect a sharp administrative cleavage between the air and ground forces in the theater and to integrate the former into a "composite air force." There would be an air commander (and staff) directly responsible to Chaney as Commanding General, USAFBI and having subordinate bomber, interceptor, and service commands. There might be, in accordance with current plans, territorial subcommands in North Ireland, Scotland, and Iceland, but the subcommanders should not exercise control over air units based within their respective areas. All air forces were to be integral parts of the theater air force. This

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system would offer several advantages: (1) it would insure real unity of command [of air]; (2) it was capable of expansion to accommodate the vast development contemplated for air forces in the United Kingdom; (3) it would release the Commanding General, USAFBI from administrative and tactical details and allow him to concentrate on relations with the British and the U. S. Navy on the high policy level; and (4) it would insure the integrity of our air forces in the face of any tendency toward absorption into the RAF. General Chaney was urged to consider this plan for adoption.

General Chaney's reply of 5 December from London¹¹ consisted in part of a criticism of Arnold's proposal, in part of a description of his own plan which he had earlier recommended to the Chief of Staff and which he must have outlined to Arnold in their meeting on 7 November. Because General Chaney was to adhere tenaciously to his own scheme for several months in the face of vigorous pressure from AAF Headquarters, his letter may be analyzed in some detail.

General Arnold's suggestion to separate the air and ground arms, Chaney thought, was based on a misconception of the mission of the USAFBI as defined in RAINBOW NO. 5. According to that plan the U. S. Army was to undertake four tasks: (1) to relieve British forces in Iceland; (2) to provide a ground token force in England; (3) to supply ground, antiaircraft, and interceptor defense of areas in which U. S. naval bases were located; and (4) to collaborate with the RAF in a bomber offensive against Germany. The ground forces contemplated were not large; the token force had no relation to the air forces, and ground troops assigned to protect the bases were functionally united

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to the air units—and hence there was no need of a separate commander of ground forces.

The air forces had two tasks: to provide "an air defense, integrated into the air defense of the U. K.," of certain areas; and to conduct, with the RAF Bomber Command, air operations against the enemy. These tasks had no operational connection and their accomplishment needed no common commander other than the Commanding General, USAFBI. American pursuit units in North Ireland would constitute the only interceptor force there, those in Scotland would operate as part of a British group; but the air defense of the United Kingdom was a unified task which could not be subdivided and U. S. pursuit units must function tactically under the RAF Fighter Command. In time the AAF might take over additional British groups, but no higher operational organization. An interceptor commander then would have no tactical decisions to make and no strategical, other than the location of the various pursuit units, and that function would more properly devolve upon the theater commander—and hence no interceptor command should be set up.

The bombardment force, on the contrary, would have a separate task and should, therefore, be constituted as a bomber command, and eventually its size might justify subordinate commands. The determination of its strategic objectives would be the responsibility of the Commanding General, USAFBI, working in collaboration with the Air Ministry and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. When objectives had been chosen, they would be announced to the bomber command in directives. Since this organization would function with the RAF Bomber Command on an equal plane, it should have a commander and staff comparable to their British

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counterparts, but the imposition of an air force commander between this echelon and the Commanding General, USAFBI would unnecessarily complicate operations.

General Chaney agreed that he should divest himself of all administrative details and concern himself only with affairs on the policy level involving relations with the U. S. Navy and the British, but he thought the details could best be delegated to the five subcommanders and that a separate unified administration for all air and another for all ground forces would be an unnecessary duplication. Hence, he advocated local supply and maintenance for air units and no air service command. There should be, however, for requisition and reception of all supplies and personnel a unified communication zone or base for the whole theater, less Iceland, functioning directly under the theater commander and with a subordinate service command for air.

Graphically, Chaney illustrated his scheme by the following simple chart which indicated the major basic subdivisions without further breakdown:¹²

HQ USAF in GB

HQ USAF ICELAND (ICELAND BASE COMMAND)	HQ USA INTERCEPTOR COMMAND N. IRELAND	HQ USA BOMBER COMMAND	HQ 1ST PRO- VISIONAL BRIGADE IN US ("TOKEN FORCE")	HQ USA BASE COMMAND IN UK (COMMUNICATION ZONE USAFBI)
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It should be noted that both Arnold and Chaney agreed that the theater commander should be relieved of administrative details and that the principle of unity of command should be observed; but they

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differed sharply as to the means of achieving these objectives and as to the extent to which U. S. air units should constitute an integral and independent air force. The personal elements which helped mold these divergent views are not apparent in the formal documents in which they appear, but the implications are clear. General Arnold was looking to the future and saw the problem in light both of the imminent reorganization of the War Department which was to give the AAF a more positive status and of the tremendous expansion of air forces contemplated for the British Isles in ANPD/1. General Chaney's views were conceived in terms of a literal interpretation of RAINBOW NO. 5, which was after all the basis for his directive; he was working in collaboration with the British and without the understanding in respect to future trends that he might have had in Washington. At any rate the conflict between the two views was not readily resolved. Chaney had the advantage of an intimate knowledge of local conditions in the United Kingdom, and after the U. S. entered the war he enjoyed a sound position in the chain of command. But the tide of events was swinging in Arnold's direction; to what degree he was responsible for the events may often be sensed from the documents.

The War Department had not acted on Chaney's recommendation of 20 September. At the time of America's entrance into the war General McNarney, who had been working with SPOSS, was en route from London to Washington; included in his list of items for discussion was the matter of command relationships in the USAFBI,¹³ and it seems likely that he may have been the bearer of Chaney's letter of 5 December and that he may have presented Chaney's views orally. At any rate, our

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declaration of war against Germany strengthened Chaney's position. RAINBOW NO. 5 was put into operation, and on 8 January he was designated Commander of the USAFBI and Army member of the U. S. Military Mission in London--to function under the strategic direction of the British government and under direct control of the Commanding General, U. S. Field Forces in the former capacity and immediately under the War Department in the latter.¹⁴ General Chaney also continued as Chief of SPOBS, with new and more extensive duties, and direct communications between AAF Headquarters and that body were authorized; but the Commanding General, Field Forces, exercised his control over USAFBI through General Headquarters, U. S. Army, and all air plans for the United Kingdom had to be cleared through that commander and that office.¹⁵ Hence, it was that General Arnold, in his effort to install the organizational system he advocated for the British Isles, had two avenues of approach. He could attempt to persuade General Chaney--who now enjoyed full authority to establish command arrangements--either through the Commanding General, Field Forces or by direct communication with SPOBS. Or he could approach the War Department through the Chief of Staff in an effort to have General Chaney's directive changed. In the long run--and it was long--the latter avenue proved the more practicable. To add to the difficulties imposed by General Chaney's multiple command, the issue was further complicated by his frequent request for additional officer personnel. These requests had begun long before America's entrance into the war and they increased almost in geometric progression as the duties of SPOBS were extended. The shortage of trained Air Corps personnel and the demands

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of other theaters made it impossible to satisfy those requests, regardless of how reasonable they may have been, and faced with what he considered a serious officer shortage in his own and subordinate headquarters, General Chaney was reluctant to set up additional air force commands.

In January General Arnold submitted to General Headquarters, U. S. Army, a chart portraying in detail the organization he favored for the USAFBI, with an air force and bomber, interceptor, and air base commands; and received on the 21st the tentative approval of General Headquarters, subject to Chaney's acceptance.¹⁶ Then on 26 January General Arnold sent a memo to the Chief of Staff listing the air forces intended for the United Kingdom in 1942 and those which had been listed in ANPD/1 for eventual deployment. Pointing out that air forces of such magnitude would need an adequate organization, he recommended that the Secretary of War direct that the chart in question be approved as a "general guide" and that the AAFBI therein described be activated at once under the Chief of the AAF to pass under Chaney's command on its movement overseas.¹⁷ The recommendation was successful to this degree—that the activation of the subordinate commands was directed on 11 February,¹⁸ but the War Department was not yet fully committed to the whole of Arnold's plan.

Meanwhile, on 24 January General Arnold had cabled General Chaney that he had received the Chief of Staff's approval, in principle and subject to Chaney's final concurrence, of the establishment of an air force in Great Britain with the three subordinate commands in question, the force to be headed by Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz who would

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be directly responsible to General Chaney.¹⁹ General Arnold also indicated that he had conferred with British representatives in Washington concerning the establishment of a definite American area for our air forces, probably in the north half of England, and in order to insure free lines of communication with the Blackpool base area, he suggested that the initial bomber groups be located in RAF 4 Group near York rather than in the Huntingdon region as previously intended. This separate area, it will be noted, would be another factor in securing the integrity and independence of our air force. General Chaney's consideration of these suggestions was requested and a copy of the message was sent to the Commanding General, Field Forces.²⁰

In a message dated 24 January, which must have crossed rather than answered Arnold's cable, Chaney indicated that he had already reached agreement with the Air Ministry in respect to arrangements for command relationships,²¹ and the nature of these arrangements was made apparent in his reply on the 30th to Arnold's suggestions. This latter message²² showed no willingness on Chaney's part to conform either in respect to the location or the organization of the air forces which Arnold had advocated. As to the region to be occupied by the initial units, Chaney, Portal, and the Air Ministry were agreed that the Huntingdon area was preferable to that of York, and in making this decision they had taken full cognizance of lines of communication between air base and general base areas.²³ As for Arnold's scheme for the organization of an air force Chaney thought it might be well adapted to the needs of a virgin American theater, but under existing conditions it would

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be "most undesirable" for the United Kingdom. Pursuit units for the defense of any part of the British Isles should be under control of the RAF Fighter Command and an American interceptor command would only add confusion. The AAF bomber command was necessary and should work in close cooperation and close physical proximity with the RAF Bomber Command, but it would be a mistake to duplicate the whole RAF structure. Experienced air officers might more profitably be used in a bomber command or in Chaney's own headquarters than in superfluous commands. Chaney went on to state that he would change his organization to meet new needs--presumably of a vastly expanded air force--but that since he had been studying this problem for eight months he had no doubts as to the soundness of his plan for present conditions. He had not changed his ideas as outlined in his letter of 5 December and General McNarney would explain his reasons therefor. General Chaney, in short, did not concur.

Seeking a definite conclusion, General Chaney on the following day cabled General Headquarters asking that Generals Marshall, McNair and Gerow be informed of the views he had outlined in the foregoing message and requesting approval thereof "for planning purposes."²⁴ General Headquarters concurred with Chaney's views and recommended on 3 February that the War Department agencies take such steps as were necessary to put those views into effect.²⁵ It is significant that the plans for the establishment of the initial bomber units in the United Kingdom which were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 16 February provided only for a U. S. Bomber Command to be subject

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to Chaney's command through such echelons as he himself should prescribe; there was no provision for an air force or other subordinate commands.²⁶

While General Arnold was attempting, so far with little success, to secure acceptance for his scheme, he was proceeding within the AAF with measures for its implementation at such time as it might be adopted. On 21 January he designated Brig. Gen. Ira G. Baker Bomber Commander for USAFBI and ordered him to proceed to England to help prepare for the reception of the Bomber Command and of headquarters for the AAF in Great Britain. The orders left no doubt as to Baker's status: on the arrival of the air force commander Baker was to pass under that officer's command, which would "be an intermediate headquarters between Bomber Command and the theater commander."²⁷ Baker's own informal notes suggest that in addition to those functions listed in his formal directive he was expected to concern himself with like preparations as well for the Air Base and Interceptor Commands.²⁸ General Arnold then informed Chaney that Baker was en route with detailed plans for the establishment of AAF units in the United Kingdom and that Arnold was holding up action on Chaney's recommendations until Baker had had opportunity to present Arnold's views.²⁹

In respect to one phase of the problem, however, this VLR discussion was reopened before Baker's arrival in London. Chaney, arguing from the purely defensive role assigned to pursuit units in RAINBOW NO. 5, had insisted that all such units be under tactical control of the RAF Fighter Command. Now, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering, and later adopted, the suggestion of the AAF that U. S.

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fighter groups be sent to England as a part of our striking force.³⁰
 This raised an issue not provided for in RAINBOW NO. 5 and Arnold was quick to take advantage of it. On 12 February he sent Chaney by cable a list of the air units scheduled for his command in 1942.³¹ These were to include five pursuit groups, two for the defense of North Ireland, three to be used in operations with the striking force and not for the air defense of England. For these latter groups Chaney's organization would have to provide operational control, and to insure an adequate tactical range it was necessary that they be based in south-east England. Again in a cable of 21 February Arnold hammered home his point: our bombers must operate according to accepted American doctrine. This meant daylight bombing, which required AAF pursuit escorts. If U. S. pursuit units were put under RAF operational control, such support would be impossible. With these facts the RAF must be impressed.³²

Action on the question of the control of fighter units was held up in AAF Headquarters pending Chaney's answer to this cable.³³ General Chaney's reply consisted of a request for bombardment experts for Baker's staff, a recommendation that decisions as to the tactical use of air units assigned to the United Kingdom be left to himself, and a plea that all details be handled in London rather than in Washington—three cables in a single day (24 February) with no clear-cut statement on the specific point at issue.³⁴ Baker had arrived in London on the 20th, however, and after discussing with him the proposed organizational scheme, Chaney on 27 February gave his definitive answer. Addressing his message to Generals Marshall, Arnold, Gerow, and McNair, he said:

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"I do not desire to change the views contained in my [previous messages] as all points of the proposed organization had been considered."³⁵

General Arnold made what provision he could to furnish the officers for Eaker's staff,³⁶ but he was not content to rest on Chaney's flat refusal in respect to command arrangements. In a memo directed to the Chief of Staff Arnold recommended that the Secretary of War direct General Chaney to organize the USAFBI to include a theater commander and separate subordinate commands for air, ground, and service forces.³⁷ The memo requested the previous concurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, and the reply which came from that officer, General Dwight Eisenhower, was not favorable. This was the period, it will be remembered, at which the Chief of Staff was considering the possibility of a large scale invasion of the continent and he was unwilling to risk loss of British cooperation through the imposition in England of an American organizational system totally foreign to the British. Hence, Arnold was informed, "General Chaney's telegram of January 30, on this subject, must be accepted, for the moment, as conclusive," and it was suggested that it be adopted for immediate purposes.³⁸ There was, however, this saving clause: that this action would not preclude later revision of the directive under which Chaney was operating. In reply General Arnold pointed out the obvious fact that the organization he had proposed was not radically different from that of the British services and that it paralleled that of the newly-reorganized War Department, and he voiced the opinion that its early adoption was essential. But the last sentence of the memo from WPD had been promising, and General Arnold was content for the moment to bide his time.³⁹

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The formulation in the War Department during March of those invasion plans which General Marshall took to London the following month, and the uncertainty of their reception by the British, then, made any immediate action to change Chaney's directive ineopportune. General Marshall did write to Chaney directing him to lay plans for the reception of forces, ground and air alike, on a scale larger than those earlier planned for, but no instructions about subordinate commands were given and the letter seems to have recognized tacitly the continuance of an organization based upon the semi-independent task forces of RAINBOW NO. 5.⁴⁰ Even before the adoption of BOLERO, however, modification of the pre-war plans began to make Chaney's scheme obsolescent. General Marshall informed Chaney on 19 March that the "taken force" had been scratched and at about the same time the abandonment by the U. S. Navy of its plans for bases in Scotland released the AAF from the necessity of providing interceptor units for air defense of that area.⁴¹ The MAGNET project had provided for an air commander under the subtheater commander, but the dispatch of air units to North Ireland had been postponed until midsummer and long before their arrival the adoption of the BOLERO project was to modify sharply the status of that air command. With these modifications in RAINBOW NO. 5, Chaney could no longer hold to the details of his organizational plan, and before any action could be taken on his repeated requests for additional trained Air Corps officer personnel for staff positions, it was necessary for AAF Headquarters to have some definite knowledge of the organizational changes he proposed to effect.⁴²

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The existence of new and enlarged offensive plans had been hinted at in General Marshall's letter of 19 March, and the significance of those plans was made explicit in a cable of 30 March.⁴³ Chaney was informed that his command arrangements should be such that they would permit the eventual employment of large forces in offensive operations. Air forces were to include both bombardment and the necessary pursuit aviation. Hence in reference to his letter of 20 September and his cables of 30 January (#495) and 27 February (#667), Chaney was asked to review his organizational plans in light of this new information and to recommend promptly any modification he might desire.

This was not a directive that Chaney should adopt the command scheme for the air force that Arnold had proposed, but that step seems to be suggested by implication. One would suppose that Chaney replied immediately to this specific request and that he accepted the implied suggestion with whatever grace he could, but the message has not been found and instead of being able to document a sharp reversal of Chaney's policy we are forced to trace that reversal, which did come, through a series of anti-climactical steps. At any rate, General Marshall informed Chaney on 7 April that Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz had been designated to command an air force which was to be organized under Chaney, and that Spaatz would organize his staff and train his force in the United States prior to movement overseas.⁴⁴ This cable indicated a definitive settlement of the most important item in the long controversy; detailed arrangement for the subordinate commands had still to be worked out, but Chaney's long struggle to prevent the establishment of a unified air force and an over-all air commander

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between himself and the subordinate commands had failed.

Meanwhile in the Air Staff plans for the establishment of the AAFBI continued to be based on the assumption that General Arnold's organisational scheme would be adopted in full, and steps were taken to provide the necessary headquarters organisations requisite to its fulfillment. Orders had been issued in mid-February for the activation of the several headquarters units for Task Force BR,^{44a} and though it seems unlikely that the organisation ever got past the paper stage, the units were still in existence a month later.^{44b} When it became evident to General Spaatz that the Air Force Combat Command, of which he was commanding general, was soon to be disbanded, he wished to transfer its Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron intact into the air task force which he was to take to England.^{44c} The main organisational framework, however, was to come from another source. It will be recalled that the Eighth Air Force had been organized as the air contingent for operation GYMAST in Northwest Africa. When at the end of March GYMAST was removed from the active list, all air units except the several command headquarters were released to the Third Air Force.^{44d} General Spaatz suggested that if GYMAST was to be abandoned, the Eighth Air Force organisation should be considered as available for the AAFBI.^{44e} Within a few days that change had been effected and the Eighth had been committed definitely to BOLERO.^{44f} Thus it was that the Eighth Air Force found its true mission, through the back door as it were, and by second thought. The several headquarters continued for a while at Savannah, where they

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had earlier been established, and an Eighth Air Force, Belling Field Echelon was set up, becoming actually the main center of action. A high shipping priority was given to the advance echelon of the several headquarters units in order that the various commands might be in operation before the arrival of combat units.⁴⁵

When General Marshall was conferring with the British Chiefs of Staff in London, Arnold sent him by cable the air plan for HOLBRO, and that plan, which bore the approval of Eisenhower and McNamara, called for the early establishment in the United Kingdom of the air force with its several commands.⁴⁶ The acceptance of this plan was requested by General Arnold⁴⁷ and evidently was granted by the Chief of Staff, for on 28 April he informed Chaney that the shipping priorities which had been designated by Arnold for the several command headquarters were to be followed.⁴⁸ While General Spats was still working on some of the unsolved problems of command relationships,⁴⁹ General Chaney was holding up his request for general officers for his air section "pending clarification of air force organization to be set up in the British Isles."⁵⁰ But this "clarification" must have been in respect to details rather than to general principles for Chaney indicated tacitly on 1 May,⁵¹ and unequivocally on the following day⁵² in response to a direct query of Arnold's, that his current plans assumed the existence of an air force and subordinate commands. Within a short time thereafter General Chaney had made arrangements for the actual installation of the several headquarters:

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the Eighth Air Force and the VIII Air Service Command near London, the VIII Bomber Command at High Wycombe and the VIII Fighter Command nearby.⁵³

This acceptance of General Arnold's plan and the practical measures toward its implementation marked the end of the long struggle. The actual number of the constituent commands was later to be increased, and the internal organization of each still had to be worked out, but basically the structure of the air force had been determined. Thereby several fundamental principles had been established: (1) The integrity of our air forces in the British Isles was assured and their control, at least up to the highest echelon, was to be unified in the hands of a single air commander; (2) the delegation of administrative details by the CG, USAFBI, was to be based on functional service lines rather than on geographic subtheaters; and (3) supply and maintenance for the air forces were to be handled by an Air Service Command under the control of the CG, AAFBI, rather than by an air officer under SOS. Without vitiating the doctrine of a unified command for the theater these principles insured that the operations of the Eighth Air Force would be directed by professional airmen, and with such freedom of action as was consistent with the current organization of the War Department. To complete the picture it becomes necessary to describe, first, arrangements more detailed than those which have been mentioned for determining the status of the commander of the Eighth Air Force in respect to the American theater commander and to the British, and second, the internal organization of the constituent commands of the air force.

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2. The Theater Command

Although the basic structure of the Eighth Air Force had been agreed on by the end of April and its relation to the American theater commander had been defined in a general way, there was still need for a more detailed definition of responsibilities. General Spaatz was still anxious for a final settlement on several matters of policy: which headquarters would have control of strategic, which of tactical, decisions in respect to his air forces; who would have command at the theater level of purely air operations and of ground-air operations; and what control or liaison, if any, would be exercised by the RAF in respect to our strictly air and our air-ground operations.⁵⁴ If this need of clarification was important for the Eighth Air Force, it was even more necessary, in view of BOLEDO and the expected assault on the continent, that over-all command arrangements for the combined forces be formulated in terms more precise than those of ABC-1.

In respect to the Eighth Air Force, General Spaatz took the initiative. Asserting his belief that command relations between his organization, other U. S. forces, and the RAF should be clearly established before he set up his headquarters in England, he presented his own ideas in the form of a memo with an accompanying chart.⁵⁵

Several basic principles guided Spaatz' considerations: (1) that U. S. forces should retain their identity and not be integrated with the British command system; (2) that since U. S. forces in the European theater might eventually exceed those of the British, all command echelons should be kept on an equal plane (e. g., AAF Fighter

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Command-RAF Fighter Command, U. S. Naval Task Force-Royal Naval Task Force, etc.); (3) that the principle of unity of command for all U. S. forces be maintained; and (4) that the organization of the U. S. Army Forces in the theater should resemble that of the War Department, with separate AAF, AGF and SOS commands united by a single theater commander.⁵⁶

In enlarging on these principles and in explanation of his chart, General Spaatz went on to point out that the commander of all U. S. forces in the United Kingdom should be an Army officer. His staff need not be large since the commanders of his various forces were in reality his chief advisers. The staffs of the several U. S. commanders should be on a level with their British counterparts, and because of a sort of caste system prevalent among the British staffs, our officers should be given rank commensurate with their positions. Strategic coordination and administration between the U. S. and British commanders should be exercised through a Combined Military Committee in England, composed of the First Sea Lord, Chief of Imperial Staff, Chief of Combined Operations, U. S. theater commander and the commanders of his ground, air, service, and naval forces. Because the British were responsible for the strategic direction of operations in the theater, this committee would probably have to report to the Prime Minister. A Combined Planning and a Combined Intelligence Committee should be provided.

The existence of a commander of the AAFBI would make it possible for certain matters to be settled "on the spot" between him and the RAF or Air Ministry. It might be possible to conduct combined air

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operations without a combined air commander, but it would be difficult since in the absence of a single RAF head the Commander, AAFBI would have to cooperate with several RAF commanders. Certainly when combined air-sea-land operations should begin, mere cooperation would no longer be sufficient and a Supreme Commander would have to be chosen.

American forces under this leader would operate as task forces detached from the theater commander, though his organization should be continued. The AAFBI and the RAF should retain their respective identities under their own commanders, but with a combined air commander over both. Each should be engaged in the performance of designated tasks, though part of either force might be temporarily attached to the other for specific operations. When operations in support of ground forces were in order, both air forces would function under command arrangements set up by the Supreme Commander.

This memo with the organizational chart and a draft letter recommending its adoption by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were sent to General Arnold. Just before his departure for London (about 22 May) the letter requested that the memo be sent to General Eisenhower for his consideration before it was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was thought that General Arnold might have additional ideas after his conversations with Sir Charles Portal,⁵⁷ but in general these recommendations paralleled the views he had expressed on the subject.

General Eisenhower turned the memo and enclosures over to the proper section of OPD for comment and that office non-concurred in several particulars, recommending: (1) that no OG, Army Ground

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Forces be set up and that the CG, AAFBI should control general but not close air support; (2) that there be no Combined Military Committee; (3) that no matters be decided between the CG, AAFBI and the British air agencies but that all decisions be cleared through the U. S. theater commander; (4) that U. S. and British forces should not be organized into combined task forces, a practice which would violate the principle of unity of command; and (5) that no effort be made to maintain equality of grade between American staff officers and their British counterparts. An organizational chart incorporating these ideas was enclosed and recommended for adoption.⁵⁸

General Spats' chart had included command relationships from the governmental level downward, but his special interest, naturally, had been the position of the Eighth Air Force within the general framework. Before his recommendations or those of QPD reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British representatives in the Combined Chiefs of Staff had initiated on 5 June a discussion of the over-all command for the projected combined operations. Stressing the need for a Supreme Commander for the invasion, they presented in barest outline, with diagrams, three alternative arrangements as a basis of discussion.⁵⁹

In their consideration of these proposals on 9 June, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that of the two problems inherent in the situation—the organization of the task force actually participating in the invasion and the organization on a higher level—only the former and less important had been treated by the British. Further, no one of the alternative plans was acceptable. They agreed that a

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Supreme Commander should be chosen at once and that all U. S. forces should be under the CG, USAFBI as Commander of the European Theater of Operations, but that decisions as to command channels should be delayed until the Supreme Commander was chosen.⁶⁰ A counterproposal in the form of a tentative chart was presented for discussion, and on 15 June the Joint Chiefs also considered, without action, that which had been prepared by OPD.⁶¹ Decision on these several proposals and on the matter of command in general was postponed successively at several meetings of both the Joint and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, partly at least because it was desired that the views of the theater commanders concerned and of the as yet unchosen Supreme Commander should be consulted. This stalemate was not broken until it was proposed to abandon SLEDGEHAMMER in favor of TORCH. For political reasons it was decided to name an American as Supreme Commander, and the choice of General Eisenhower vested him with the dual functions of commander of American forces in the European Theater of Operations and Supreme Commander of the combined task force for TORCH.⁶² The diversion to TORCH and the late date of the final agreements on command channels remove subsequent discussion of this tangled problem beyond both the geographical and chronological limits of this study, but even before the decisions respecting TORCH had been reached in late July and early August, the practical steps for the establishment of U. S. command arrangements in Great Britain had been made.

General Chaney was informed on 3 June that, as CG, USAFBI, he would command all U. S. forces, naval as well as army, in respect to their movement to and their reception and maintenance in Great

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Britain.⁶³ Five days later, on 8 June, the European Theater of Operations was established by direction of the President, and Chaney, as CG, USAFBI was designated commander, ETO. As such he was charged with the strategical, tactical, territorial and administrative duties of a theater commander, subject to limitations necessary for the preservation of British sovereignty. The mission of the new theater commander was "to prepare for and carry on military operations in the European Theater against the Axis powers . . . under the strategical directives of the Combined U. S.-British Chiefs of Staff as communicated to him by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army." He was directed to cooperate with the British in operations, but in so doing "the underlying purpose must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces." Direct communication with the Chief of Staff and with the War Department was authorized.⁶⁴

This directive contained no specific reference to the air forces but that omission was remedied by instructions issued to Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz before they departed for England to assume their respective commands. A chart depicting the command arrangements for the air forces in England as it was currently envisaged by AAF Headquarters was sent by General Arnold to General Eisenhower,⁶⁵ and copies were sent also to the interested commanders in England—to Gen. General Chaney, Maj./^{Gen.} J. G. Lee of the Army SOS, and Maj. Gen. R. P. Hartle of the U. S. Forces in North Ireland.⁶⁶ The organization was essentially that which Spaatz had recommended.

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Then, by direction of General Arnold, letters of instruction were prepared for Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz--the former for General Marshall's signature, the latter for General Arnold's.⁶⁷ Because Spaatz had already received verbal instructions from General Arnold, his directive was brief;⁶⁸ dealing exclusively with channels of communication, the letter authorized direct communication between Spaatz and Arnold, Spaatz and Lord Louis Mountbatten (as Chief of Combined Operations), and between Spaatz' intelligence section and AC/AS, A-2.⁶⁹

The letter of instruction for General Eisenhower, which was dispatched for General Marshall's signature on 20 June, constituted the real directive under which the Eighth was to operate, listing as it did the principles to be observed in the organization and employment of USAF units in the ETO.⁷⁰ All units initially based in the British Isles were to be integrated into the Eighth Air Force. General Spaatz as commander was to have his own headquarters and staff, and subordinate Bomber, Fighter, Air-Ground Support, and Air Service Commands. The basic role of U. S. fighter units was to provide close support for bomber operations and those units "will not be integrated with British fighter units employed in the defense of the United Kingdom, or into the British Fighter Command." General fighter support of AAF bombing missions was to be provided by the RAF either directly or by synchronizing AAF missions with their fighter sweeps. American fighter and bomber units should be contiguously located. Strategic control of operations, which by agreement was to be vested in the British government should "be construed to mean general strategic directives

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as to purposes and broad objectives" but it was not to include designation of targets or tactical control of operations. The broad objective of operations was to gain "air supremacy over Western Continental Europe in preparation for and in support of a combined land, sea, and air movement across the Channel into Continental Europe." For the better accomplishment of this mission General Spaatz should be given authority for direct correspondence and "judicial shortcuts" in dealing with the RAF, Fleet Air Arm, and Combined Operations.

This directive left much to the initiative of the theater commander and his air commander. It did, however, answer in a general way those questions on command relations which had earlier concerned General Spaatz. And the practical application of the principles it enjoined was not long delayed. On 20 June, after more than a year of service in London, General Chaney departed for the United States, leaving General Harte temporarily in command.⁷¹ What Chaney's attitude toward the new set-up was, one can only surmise. General Arnold had, on 10 June, expressed confidence in General Chaney's concurrence in the organizational scheme which he was proposing to General Eisenhower,⁷² but such concurrence could only have resulted from an eleventh-hour conversion. A comparison of the salient features of General Eisenhower's letter of instruction with the issues described in the early portion of this chapter will show that on every important issue General Arnold had been successful, and in many cases against the direct opposition of the Commander of USAFBI. But when General Eisenhower assumed command on ²⁴25 June⁷³ and General Spaatz ^{had assumed command on the 18th} on the following day,⁷⁴ *o.g.a.*

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the prospects for an air policy in the European Theater in line with that advocated by AAF headquarters were excellent.

As for the actual control of bombardment operations in coordination with the RAF, the principles and machinery were described in a "Joint/American/British Directive on Day Bomber Operations Involving Fighter Cooperation," issued on 20 August 1942.⁷⁵ The day bomber offensive was to be conducted in three phases, characterized in each successive stage by an increasing depth of penetration as the arrival of more American fighter units with their longer range planes gradually decreased the dependence of the VIII Bomber Command on RAF close support. During the first phase bombing objectives were to be periodically determined, within the existing strategy, by the CG, Eighth Air Force and the [British] Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Ops). An idea of the complex responsibilities involved in the direction of combat missions during the successive phases may best be conveyed by a direct quotation from the directive itself:

MACHINERY FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN.

7. During Phase 1, it will be the responsibility of the Commanding General of the American Bomber Command to initiate offensive operations, making preliminary arrangements for fighter co-operation with the Commanding General, the American Fighter Command. It will be the responsibility of the latter to ensure full consultation with the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command. When the general plan is settled, it will be the responsibility of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command to nominate the British Fighter Group Commander, who is to draw up the detailed fighter plans, reinforcing the Fighter Group in respect of American pursuit reinforcements. Thereafter, detailed planning and the conduct of the fighter operation will be the responsibility of the Commanding General, American Bomber Command, and the British Fighter Group Commander concerned.

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8. When Phase 3 is reached, it will be the responsibility of the Commanding Generals of the American Bomber and Fighter Commands together to make the general and detailed plans and to conduct the operations under the responsibility of the Commanding General of the American Fighter Command to arrange with the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command for such ground facilities and fighter cooperation as may be required from the British Fighter Command.

9. The Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands and the Commanding Generals of the American Bomber and Fighter Commands will at all times keep each other informed of operational intentions and together make such adjustments to plans as may be necessary to ensure proper co-ordination.

10. At some moment during Phase 2 it will be necessary to change from the co-ordination machinery for Phase 1 to that agreed for Phase 3. The moment of change-over will be decided by the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force and the British Air Ministry (A.C.A.S. (Ops.) jointly, having regard to the available strength of American pursuit forces available which are armed with American type fighters, and the degree of operational experience which they have acquired.

3. The Subordinate Commands

It was indicated above that the three constituent commands which General Arnold had originally designated for the Eighth Air Force were increased in number before combat operations were begun.

Primarily this was because the mission of the Eighth was broadened by the adoption of the BOLERO project with its prospect of an early invasion of the continent. Originally conceived of as a striking force of heavy bombers with pursuit support, the Eighth must henceforth think also in terms of close support of ground operations; in General Arnold's words, the need was now for a "balanced force."⁷⁶

The several subordinate commands developed their respective internal organizations at different times and at different rates of

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speed. Several factors contributed to this uneven progress--the date of establishment of each command, the extent to which each was able to levy on British experience, and the size and complexity of the several organizations. Mid-August, the chronological terminus of this study, found them then at different stages of development; no one was perfect, some were still in an inchoate state. This unevenness is partly responsible for the lack of balance in the following description of these commands, but the disparate nature of available documents is also a causal factor.

Bomber Command was the earliest to achieve a practicable organization just as it had been earliest to receive recognition outside AAF Headquarters. This achievement was due partly to the priority which this command enjoyed, but it was effected only by the vigorous and able work of its commander.

VIII Bomber Command. General Baker arrived in London on 20 February; on the 23d he assumed command of his organization and two days later he and his staff moved into RAF Bomber Command Headquarters to begin their understudy of British methods.⁷⁷ In addition to his original directive from General Arnold, General Baker carried instructions from General Chaney to submit plans for the reception, administration and supply of a force to consist originally of two heavy bombardment groups, but such plans were to be elastic enough to care for the anticipated expansion of this force.⁷⁸ General Baker was not unfamiliar with the RAF, having studied certain of its activities the previous autumn, and he was able after a few weeks to present, on

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20 March, a detailed plan for General Chaney's consideration.⁷⁹ Only such portions of the plan as dealt with organization need be considered here.

The plan was full and specific in respect to provisions to be made for the first contingent of 3 heavy bombardment groups, and more general in respect to the 13 other bomber groups and 3 pursuit groups which General Arnold had promised for 1942.⁸⁰ General Eaker recommended, on advice of the RAF Bomber Command, the choice of High Wycombe for his own headquarters.⁸¹ The site, Wycombe Abbey School for girls, had good buildings capable of expansion and was located conveniently near London and headquarters both of the USAFBI and of RAF Bomber Command.

The initial bombardment units were to be established in the Huntingdon area where the Air Ministry had already made available some eight airdromes: parent fields, Pelebrook, Chalveston, Thurleigh, Molesworth; satellite fields, Grafton Underwood, Podington, Little Staughton, Kimbolton. The British should be asked to provide additional fields but these were sufficient to care for the initial groups.

These eight airdromes constituted the RAF 8 Group establishment, and to fit into the existing communication system it would be necessary to set up an AAF Wing as the nearest equivalent to the British group. The 8 Group Headquarters at Brampton would thus become the 1st Wing Headquarters. This was necessary because the eight dependent airdromes had wire connections with Brampton rather than with RAF Bomber Command, and it would require about nine months to change the system. The British Post Office would install wire communications between High Wycombe and Brampton. Subsequently the other 13 bomber groups could

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be organized into 3 additional wings, the 3 pursuit groups into another. No mention was made of the Interceptor Command which had not yet been accepted by General Chaney, and presumably the pursuit wing was to be under Bomber Command. Similarly there was no recognition of an VIII Air Service Command; supply and maintenance were to be provided by the air depot being established at Warton and the 1st Wing Mobile Air Depot at Molesworth.

Insofar as this plan was concerned with the organization of bombardment tactical units, it was adopted in its essential features. General Baker and his staff set up headquarters at High Wycombe on 15 April.⁸² General Baker had given tentative tables of organization for Bomber Command and wing headquarters and those were forwarded to Washington by General Chaney for implementation, the advance echelons to be set up for early shipment.⁸³ In view of the change in plans whereby it was decided that the initial combat units were to consist of only one heavy bomber and two pursuit groups, General Spaatz considered it unnecessary to have a wing organization in place at the time of their arrival, estimated to be shortly after 15 May, but he did request the immediate activation of two bomber and two pursuit wing headquarters to be moved to England by 1 June. Other wing organizations were to be activated at later intervals to care for the subsequent development of the command.⁸⁴ This decision to delay the shipment of a wing headquarters became known to London by the absence of any reference to it on the shipping priority list⁸⁵ rather than by a definite statement; and General Chaney pointed out again

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that the physical set-up of the communications system made it necessary to have the wing headquarters between Bomber Command and the groups, and that hence the former should be in place prior to the arrival of any combat units.⁸⁶ There was no denial of the soundness of General Chaney's contention, but the wing headquarters was not presently available in the United States and he was advised to provide one from his own organization as an interim measure until this requirement could be met.⁸⁷

The 1st Wing cared adequately for those bombardment groups which were expected in late spring and early summer, but General Eaker continued to negotiate with the British for airdrome accommodations for a vastly expanded Bomber Command, and plans were laid for the creation of five wings.⁸⁸ By the end of summer, the organization had grown to three wings with stations assigned as follows:⁸⁹

VIII Bomber Command

CCRC 11 Bovingdon
 CCRC 11 Cheddington

1st Wing
 Brampton

2nd Wing
 Old Catton

3rd Wing
 Elvedon Hall

CO-Col. H. Longfellow

CO-Col. J. P. Hodges

CO-Col. C. T. Philips

Stations

Stations

Stations

Alconbury
 Bassingbourne
 Chalveston
 Grafton Underwood
 Kimbolton
 Little Staughton
 Molesworth
 Pedington
 Polebrook
 Steple Morden
 Tharleigh

Attlebridge
 Bungay
 Hardwick
 Hethel
 Horham St Faith
 Shipdham
 Tibenham
 Wendling

Horham
 4th Wing Stations
 Temporarily Attached
 to 3rd Wing
 Bury St Edmunds
 Rattlesden

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As for the organization of the combat groups themselves, that was left, within existing regulations, to the group commanders, though, as experience was gained, a suggested scheme was referred to newly arriving groups for their guidance.⁹⁰

VIII Fighter Command. It will be recalled that the VIII Interceptor Command, originally activated on 1 February for GDMAST, was assigned to BOLERO about the first of April, its function no longer conceived in defensive terms but in terms of direct support of bombardment operations.⁹¹ The organization was given on 15 May the more aggressive designation of VIII Fighter Command, and Brig. Gen. F. O'D. Hunter was appointed Commanding General. During the same month the advance echelon of the headquarters moved to England, being established in the general neighborhood of the VIII Bomber Command. On the internal organization of this important command this author has been unable to find any materials. Like the VIII Air Support Command, the VIII Fighter Command was bled white by the demands of TORCH, and its history in late summer and early autumn of 1942 was largely concerned with its aid in organizing the twelfth Air Force.

VIII Air Force Service Command. In an earlier part of this chapter it was shown that the VIII Air Force Base Command was activated on 28 January 1942 and was assigned to the BOLERO project about the first of April.⁹² This command had been an essential part of General Arnold's plan and had been one of the chief points at issue between him and General Chaney, but the latter had definitely accepted the proposed set-up by 2 May, if not before.⁹³ During May the advance

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echelon of the command came to London and the headquarters was set up according to plans, adjacent to the Eighth Air Force Headquarters. The organization of the command was to be guided by AAF Regulation 20-9, 14 May 1942, which had, as a matter of fact, been drawn up for the Eighth and had been extended to care for other forces in theaters of operation.⁹⁴ It was in keeping with the new regulation that the new designation, VIII Air Force Service Command, was adopted.

On 6 July Maj. Gen. W. H. Frank assumed command.⁹⁵ On the previous day General Spaatz had written to General Arnold describing for him the plans for the organization of the service command with large permanent depots at Burtonwood, Warton and Langford Lodge.⁹⁶ Work on the implementation of these plans was begun at once by General Frank and his staff.⁹⁷ The story of the development of this organization has been told fully and with critical insight in another study,⁹⁸ and that task need not be repeated here.

VIII Ground Air Support Command. The VIII Ground Air Support Command was established to provide for the training and operations of air forces in direct support of the expected invasion of Europe. Constituted on 24 April, it was activated at Bolling Field on the 28th and assigned to the Eighth Air Force. A month later the headquarters organization was transferred to Savannah. Col. R. C. Candee was named as commander.⁹⁹ In his preparations for the reception of air units for the MAGNET project, General Chaney had arranged with the British for the establishment of Ground Air Support Headquarters in North Ireland,¹⁰⁰ but he was now asked to secure a site adjacent

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to Army Ground Forces Headquarters near London.¹⁰¹ In early June General Spaatz recommended a low priority for the shipment of the headquarters organization of this command,¹⁰² but the development of plans for combined operations training in London made an earlier departure expedient. On 26 June General Eisenhower cabled asking that Colonel Candee with the nucleus of his staff be dispatched at once so that he might complete his organization in England and begin his cooperation with the Army Ground Forces.¹⁰³ Colonel Candee (by then promoted to Brigadier General), departed soon after with a handful of staff officers and during July and August the command was established in England, with headquarters originally at Manbury, and after 19 October at Summinghill Park, Berks.¹⁰⁴ The original organization was set up to include the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, 67th Observation Group and the 3d Photo Group.¹⁰⁵ The substitution of operation TORCH in place of BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER interrupted the normal development of this command as an integral part of the Eighth Air Force and for some time its activities were more intimately concerned with the North African venture than with preparations for those operations for which it had originally been intended. Its designation was changed on 15 September to VIII Air Support Command.¹⁰⁶

VIII Air Force Composite Command. This command had as its chief function the operational training of pilot and air crew replacements in the United Kingdom. As its name indicates, it was to perform this mission for both bombardment and pursuit personnel. The command had not been a part of the organizational plans formulated in Washington; it was a product of RAF experiences and of the air congestion threatened

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by the anticipated expansion of the AAF and RAF in the United Kingdom.

It was obvious that combat crews and units, no matter how well trained in the United States, would need additional training in procedures peculiar to the United Kingdom. General Eaker had studied in March the RAF OTU system and had expected to draw on the British for instructional methods, equipment and airfields. It was his intention that the training be done under direction of the VIII Bomber Command and on 1 April he presented his plan to General Chaney, recommending that the British OTU station at Bovington, Herts (with a satellite field at Oakley, Oxon), be acquired immediately to care for the initial bombardment contingents.¹⁰⁷ When it became apparent that the bomber units would be accompanied by fighter groups, General Eaker also proposed that the VIII Bomber Command should, as an interim measure, provide operational training for them as well.¹⁰⁸ He recommended that another OTU station (later Cheddington was picked) should be acquired for this purpose and put into operation; when the Eighth Air Force and the VIII Fighter Command were set up, the field would be turned over to the latter.¹⁰⁹

These fields would accommodate, however, only the early contingents and on 9 May General Eaker submitted to the CG, Eighth Air Force, a training plan for an air force of some thirty groups. It was expected that organized combat units would by-pass the training centers and get the required orientation at their own stations under their own combat commanders, and hence the training centers were conceived of as CCRG's rather than as OTU's. Eight CCRG's were to be established,

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organized into a training wing under Bomber Command. More wings might be formed later. With the establishment in the United Kingdom of the VIII Fighter Command these stations training fighter pilots would be relinquished to its control. The manning table which was presented with this plan, and the decentralized nature of the organization, were patterned after the RAF's system.¹¹⁰

The institution of eight training centers in England presented several disadvantages. It would add to air congestion and deny the use of conveniently located fields for combat purposes, and the chances for uninterrupted training in England were slight. In view of these facts General Arnold had suggested the study of North Ireland as an alternate area for training stations.¹¹¹ This suggestion probably came from the British who had already turned Bovingdon over to the VIII Bomber Command but who were loath to give up so many fields in England itself as the Americans would require, and of that attitude General Eaker was well aware.¹¹² A report made at General Eaker's suggestion by Maj. G. W. Pardy, Chief of his Operational Training Section, G-3, which increased the anticipated needs to 15 bomber and six fighter training centers, further complicated the situation, and the transfer to North Ireland was favorably received.¹¹³ In early June a survey of North Ireland was made and seven suitable fields and a separate headquarters site were located; it was expected that construction of additional fields could be timed to meet future requirements. General Eaker recommended that the seven fields and headquarters station, with equipment, be obtained from the British. The location of these fields at so great a distance from Bomber Command Headquarters,

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however, made operational control difficult and so it was further recommended that the training wing which had previously been provided for be elevated to form the VIII Air Force Training Command, with headquarters at Kircassock House, North Ireland.¹¹⁴

Essentially this was the scheme which was adopted. At General Spaatz' request the VIII Air Force Composite Command was activated at Bolling Field on 4 July, and Colonel (later Brigadier General) C. G. Chauncey assumed command.¹¹⁵ Until such time as the new command could become operational, General Spaatz expected to use Bevington for bombardment training, Acheson (rather than Cheddington) for fighter, and he cabled a request for personnel to man these fields. During this period training at those fields would be under control of Bomber Command and Fighter Command respectively, and after the Composite Command began to function the two stations would be used as replacement pools for their respective combat commands.¹¹⁶

General Chauncey and his staff moved to North Ireland during August, and headquarters were established first at Long Kesh, one of the fields acquired for the command, and moved to Kircassock House (NYACK) only in November.¹¹⁷ The development of this command along planned lines was, as in the case of Air Support Command, seriously interrupted by the diversion to TORCH.

VIII Troop Carrier Command. The VIII Troop Carrier Command was short-lived, if not actually stillborn. Like the VIII Air Support Command it had its inception in an effort to provide an adequate organization for air units engaged in airborne operations. Apparently

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General Spaatz' original plan had been to operate his transport units in wings attached to the VIII Air Support Command.¹¹⁸ The new plan reflected changes in designation in the Army Air Forces which occurred on 20 June 1942.¹¹⁹ The Air Forces Ferrying Command was redesignated Air Transport Command and the former Air Transport Command was redesignated Troop Carrier Command with its chief mission the transporting of airborne infantry, parachute and glider troops. In a theater of operations, troop carrier wings or smaller units were to be assigned to the air force commander, and such units as were required for any mission were to be furnished to the theater Air Support Command.

In line with this development, the VIII Troop Carrier Command Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron was constituted on 4 July and ordered activated at Stout Field. The orders were amended on 9 July and the unit was assigned to the Eighth Air Force but attached to the I Troop Carrier Command until moved to the Foreign Service Concentration Area.¹²⁰ In England a parallel organization was formed on 29 July in the Provisional Troop Carrier Command under Colonel Dunn. Training was begun and it was expected that training with the Army Ground Forces would be initiated on 10 August. To avoid duplication, an inquiry was dispatched to Washington as to the officers assigned to the staff in the United States, and as to the probable dates of arrival in the United Kingdom of the command wing headquarters.¹²¹

OPD replied that the plan for constituting an VIII Troop Carrier Command had been abandoned to reduce staff overhead and to eliminate an unnecessary link in the chain of command. It was proposed that

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troop carrier wings (of which the 51st would arrive in August) would operate directly under the VIII Ground Air Support Command with occasional assignment of units to the Air Service or other commands for specific missions.¹²² In keeping with this decision the headquarters organization in the United States was disbanded and its personnel absorbed into the I Troop Carrier Command.¹²³ Presumably the provisional organization in England met a similar fate.

VIII Air Force Transport and Ferry Command. The reorganization of 20 June which redesignated the Air Transport Command gave to that command responsibility for ferrying aircraft, the transporting by air of personnel, material and mail, and the control of air-routes outside the United States which had been assigned to the CG, AAF.¹²⁴ Whether General Chaney was aware of this contemplated change is not apparent, but on 19 June, as CG, ETO he assigned to the Eighth Air Force the Detachment Air Force Ferry Command in the theater. This was to be effective 1 July, the date on which ATC was to assume its new duties. The CG, Eighth Air Force was to be responsible for operations, supply and administration of this unit, though priorities on the shipment of personnel and freight were still to remain under control of the theater commander,¹²⁵ to whom that authority had been granted on 21 May.¹²⁶

The control of ferrying operations entailed many difficulties what with the vast distances involved, the several commands involved in the various staging fields, and the necessity of cooperating with the British. It was in an effort to centralize control that General Spaatz organized the Eighth Air Force Transport and Ferry Command for the ETO. In announcing this step on 16 July, General Eisenhower thought

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the command would, in close collaboration with the British system, "act for and represent ATC on this (the English) side in accordance with AAF directives." He requested the assignment of Lt. Col. John D. P. T. Hill as commander,¹²⁷ and wished also to transfer to this command ATC personnel at the reception station at Prestwick, Scotland.¹²⁸ The latter request was not granted; in view of the future expansion of the ferry route it was thought that ATC should have an establishment at Prestwick to control the maintenance and dispatch of aircraft, but the unit would be under General Eisenhower's control for administration and discipline, and the control of priorities was still to be vested in the theater commander.¹²⁹

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Chapter III

DOCTRINES

Our doctrine of aviation, therefore, should be to find out where the hostile air force is, to concentrate on that point with our Pursuit, Attack, and Bombardment Aviation, to obtain a decision over the hostile air force, and then to attack the enemy's armies on land or navies on the water and obtain a decision over them.

William Mitchell, Our Air Force, 1921.

These policies which were formulated during the Anglo-American military conversations of 1941 rested on two basic assumptions: that the main war effort should be first concentrated against Germany, and that an intensive bomber offensive was a necessary preliminary to any large scale ground operations on the continent. These assumptions seem to have been accepted equally by American and British staffs, and to no small degree the importance thus assigned to air power was dictated by the current military weakness of each of the nations. The British considered that their ground forces were inadequate for a continental invasion unless Germany had first been seriously weakened by blockade and economic pressure on neutrals trading with the Axis, by subversive activities and propaganda, by commando raids and minor invasions—and by prolonged aerial bombardment. That attitude was grounded in a realistic view of the present and in a long-standing English tradition. In 1941 the British had not yet recouped the losses in materiel suffered on the continent in 1940. Their manpower was pitifully weak in comparison with the Axis nations and their

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satellites, and imperial policies involved the deployment of troops in three continents. For centuries England had relied, in her numerous continental wars, on the Royal Navy, on a small professional army, and on the larger armies of her allies; in 1914-1918 she had broken with that tradition to the extent of committing large citizen armies in France and Belgium and losses had been appalling. With the memory of that experience and of Dunkirk still fresh, it is small wonder that under the less favorable conditions of early 1941, with no important allies and no footing on the continent, England's leaders were in no need for conducting an invasion in force.

The attack by air against Germany would capitalize on the industrial organization of the United Kingdom and, as the Battle of Britain had shown, could pit quality against quantity until a large bomber force had been developed. The entrance of Russia into the war improved the situation—how greatly of course was then but faintly realized—but that good fortune was looked on rather as giving Britain a better opportunity for employing those means of economic attrition mentioned above than as an encouragement to open the "Second Front." That attitude was epitomized in a remark in Commons attributed to Air Minister Sir Archibald Sinclair to the effect that "Our two mightiest weapons are the Russian army and the RAF."¹ It was in accordance with this point of view that the RAF had begun the attack on Germany on a modest scale in the early part of 1941 and that heavy bombardment planes were given a high priority in the British production program.

Eventually members of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were to

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became impatient over the seeming reluctance of the British to have a go at storming Festung Europa but in the spring of 1941 it was apparent that in the event of early involvement in the war the United States would be unable to deploy in the European area any considerable number of troops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were frank in pointing out that the only immediate contributions that the United States could make in the European theater would consist of naval and air forces, and that the latter would have to be fed in piecemeal.² This situation was reflected in RAINBOW NO. 5, in which the only offensive force assigned to the European theater was a striking force of heavy bombers.

Thus it may be said that the staffs of both nations had agreed on a program of strategic bombardment, which the British had already begun but were to intensify and to which the Americans should contribute when they entered the war. But in spite of this general area of agreement there were some sharp differences of opinion. In either nation there were those who were opposed to any great reliance on strategic bombardment; where the validity of that policy was accepted there were varying estimates as to the extent to which air power could be decisive; and the leaders of the AAF differed from those of the RAF in the methods by which they proposed to apply air power. Inasmuch as the decision of the two governments to initiate a large-scale bomber offensive has been discussed in a previous chapter, it is sufficient here to note briefly some of the dissident voices; the divergent opinions of the AAF and RAF as to the methods to be utilized must be described at greater length. In a general way the fundamental thesis

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of strategic bombing and even of the essential differences of American and British tactics have been made familiar to the public by the press, the radio, and the movies. Because of the extraordinary power eventually made available to the two air forces in the United Kingdom, their respective doctrines assume an especial significance. The European theater has become a laboratory in which the fundamental doctrines of air power have been assayed on a scale as yet unknown elsewhere, and any subsequent judgments as to the effectiveness of an air offensive conceived in strategic terms will find there the richest body of evidence extant. Such judgments must take cognizance of the doctrines of the air leaders, the means at their disposal, and the skill and determination with which they used those means to translate doctrines into actuality. This chapter then constitutes an effort at describing the tactical doctrines by which the Eighth Air Force was guided at the time they began operations and inevitably that description entails a comparison with the doctrines of the RAF Bomber Command. The history of operations in subsequent installments of this history will supply the evidence by which these doctrines may be evaluated.

1. Attitudes toward Strategic Bombing

In recommending the adoption of the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive in April 1943, General Baker wrote: It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this proposal does not visualize the conquest of the enemy by air effort alone. It outlines the preliminary

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air phase which must precede any successful invasion of the Continent."³ This was after a year of battling German defenses, weather, and morale; in 1941 there had been less caution in the utterances of many of the advocates of air power. Few were willing to commit themselves unequivocally to a simple statement that Germany could be forced to sue for peace by aerial bombardment alone, but in many statements by both British and American airmen there was a strong undercurrent of "perhaps."⁴ Others were less optimistic. In the British Joint Staffs there were varying degrees of confidence in the potentialities of air power,⁵ and both in England and the United States there were those who put little faith in the general thesis of strategic bombardment.

Opposition to this cardinal principle of the AAF and RAF Bomber Command came in each country from the other services and was closely connected with the questions of a separate air force and of priorities in production. In England critics of the RAF's policies complained of its failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations, of its stress on high-altitude level bombing to the exclusion of dive bombing, of the preference shown to Bomber Command over Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm.⁶ Public indignation over the escape of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau through the Straits of Dover brought editorial agitation for the reorganization of the RAF and "for reconsideration of the policy of high level bombing." These critics, it is true, were not in the main successful. An air attache on General Chaney's staff who for a year had been a close observer of the military scene in England wrote in April of 1942 that "the British public have an

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erroneous belief, which has been fostered by effective RAF publicity, that the German war machine can be destroyed and the nation defeated by intensive bombing."⁷ The attitude had as its logical fruits the heavy bomber production program and the continuing lack of enthusiasm for an early invasion which have been mentioned before. The skepticism as to the efficacy of the bomber offensive, however, was to continue. At the time the Eighth Air Force was entering into combat operations this antagonism was vocal enough to force Sir Arthur Harris to draw up an apologia for the achievements of Bomber Command⁸ and to brand as "wanton propaganda" English efforts to belittle the effects of its bombing. "We can defeat the enemy," he declared, "if we are not defeated by our friends."⁹

Many of the "friends," one may surmise, must have been in the Royal Navy. Certainly an active center of opposition to any great reliance on strategic bombing was to be found in our Special Naval Observer (SPNAVO) in London. Messages from that office indicate doubts as to the results of the British bomber offensive, a distaste for the production priorities which made that offensive possible,¹⁰ and the corollary desire to increase production of aircraft for British and U. S. carriers, "which can be used effectively now," at the expense of the heavy bomber program.¹¹ Drawing his evidence from one isolated British bomber mission, the Chief of SPNAVO, Vice Adm. R. L. Ghormley, concluded that daylight bombing in force was unsound except at very short range under heavy protection and that night bombing was inaccurate and ineffective in view of the effort expended and the losses sustained. This and other similar attacks on policies fundamental

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to the AAF and RAF alike were obviously calculated to effect a readjustment of production schedules and allocations, and they brought vigorous rejoinders from responsible persons within the War Department and the Air Ministry.¹² The effort to depreciate confidence in the capabilities of the heavy bomber was not at this time successful and it was to be repeated later in connection with our activities in the Pacific. Perhaps in the United Kingdom these attacks may have encouraged, on the part of the Eighth Air Force and the RAF, the sort of public relations policy which was deplored by the air attache in the quotation cited in the preceding paragraph. At any rate, when the United States went to war, there was no longer any question that this nation and Great Britain would produce heavy bombers in great quantities and utilize them for the bombardment of Germany. But whereas the AAF and RAF were agreed on the necessity of strategic bombing there were significant differences in their ideas as to how that bombing should be accomplished.

2. Tactical Doctrines: the AAF Manuals

General Arnold once found occasion to remind General Chancy of current differences between American and British principles of bombardment. British bombing, he pointed out, had been less effective than that of the Germans and Japanese, which was fundamentally akin in theory to our own. Hence not English but "only American doctrines and principles must guide us."¹³ The reference was obviously to a distinction in tactical rather than strategic doctrines, and the

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implications were clear enough to General Chaney who had analyzed British techniques and had himself recommended the use of tactics more commonly associated with the AAF. Yet if one turn to the Air Corps manuals of the day the implied dichotomy in doctrine is not so sharp as might be assumed.¹⁴

These manuals were predicated on the assumption that "the basic [sig] of all air power is the bombardment airplane," but support of ground troops was given equal place with strategic bombing and the descriptions of technique included with noble impartiality bombardment by day and by night, from altitudes high, medium and low, at precision targets and at areas. The responsibility for the system of objectives was vested in the theater or task force commander; the selection of the individual targets—and presumably of the method of attack—was left to the air unit commander and great emphasis was laid on the care needed in this selection of objectives. If these passages are taken out of context and read without the background of stresses and emphasis, with which they were inevitably interpreted in the AAF, they might easily have been used to justify the operational procedure of an RAF commander. Perhaps it was because the manuals were just that—text books—that they described the several types of tactics, any one of which might have to be used. But other less stereotyped documents indicate more clearly the respects in which American tactical doctrines differed from those of the British, and to some extent, the reasons for those differences.

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3. RAF Bombardment Doctrine and Practice

When in 1941 the two air staffs were planning to collaborate in the attack on Germany the RAF was already engaged in a bomber offensive over Europe with a carefully chosen system of objectives and a technique adapted to the means available. There was, as is inevitable, a close relation between tactical doctrine and the performance of British heavy bombers; which factor was more important it is difficult to say, but obviously the development of certain characteristics, particularly that of increased bomb load and range, were the result of tactical theories growing out of experience. A considerable part of Bomber Command's efforts were directed, somewhat grudgingly and at times only through pressure from the government, toward what may be called maritime targets,¹⁵ but the preferred target systems consisted of communication centers and the industrial communities which normally surrounded them. Attacks were delivered with the dual purpose of destroying the material foundations of the German war effort and breaking the morale of German workers. This marked a change from earlier attacks which had centered on the oil industry, and the new choice had been dictated by the concentration of so many profitable targets within easy range in the Ruhr Valley, by the tie-in between the economic blockade and increased strain on inland transportation, and by the small force of bombers currently available. The British professed, on humanitarian and military grounds, an objection to indiscriminate bombing of non-military objectives; but they placed great stress on the effect which bombing had on civilian morale. By this they did not mean that they hoped to

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frighten Germany out of the war, though they did believe that civilian reaction would not be so staunch as it had been in England; they meant rather the disruption of the ordinary channels of civilian life that would eventually ruin German war industry.¹⁶ To attack rail or water transportation centers surrounded by sprawling factory districts, area rather than pinpoint bombing was chosen and such bombs as fell outside these targets were absorbed by the adjacent residential neighborhoods in which the workers lived. Because the targets were large, and more important still, because the German defense was rugged, the attacks were delivered at night from a medium to high altitude. Bomber Command was proving that its Stirlings and Manchesters (and later its Lancasters) could deliver a heavy load of bombs in the general vicinity of an industrial area without prohibitive losses; both in the production of aircraft and in the smaller crews required this system seemed more economical than that of the Americans. The British were willing to admit that eventually they might turn to daylight bombing,¹⁷ but for the present they felt constrained to conduct most of their missions under cover of darkness.

When eventually the conflicting opinions of the RAF and the AAF became the subject of public discussion there was some implication that the British objections to our ideas were opinionated, but in all fairness it should be pointed out that they were not mere prejudice. Whereas American doctrine before Pearl Harbor were still based on study and experiment, the British had been learning in the bitter school of experience. They knew as Americans could not know the effect of area bombing on civilian population. The British knew

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something also of the heavy cost of daylight bombing under European conditions, both from their victory over the Luftwaffe in 1940 and from their own missions over the continent. Even after their large-scale saturation attacks by night had begun the RAF still conducted small day missions against precision targets in Europe, but these were exceptional. And no matter how carefully planned and how skillfully executed, these missions were apt to be expensive. Such a special mission was the low-level raid on Augsburg on 17 April 1942 in which the Lancaster made its debut in Germany; the success in hitting a vital precision target may have justified the loss of seven out of twelve aircraft dispatched but the percentage was too high for routine operations.

4. The RAF and the "Fortress One"

If the British needed any clinching arguments in support of their methods, they might have found them in their own experiences with American planes operated by the RAF in accord with what they considered American techniques. During the early part of 1941, 20 B-17C's were delivered to the RAF. At first British aviation journals gave the "Fortress One" an enthusiastic reception¹⁸ and RAF leaders regarded it "as a very fine aeroplane."¹⁹ To take advantage of the peculiar virtues of the B-17 it was decided to use it first in high-altitude daylight missions of shallow penetration and against precision targets.²⁰ Such operations demanded modifications on the aircraft and special training of crews, and neither was pushed very rapidly nor accomplished with

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great success. Some indoctrination was given the crews by an Air Corps officer but it was not sufficient. On the maiden mission three Fortresses were dispatched to bomb targets at Wilhelmshaven from 30,000 feet. Engine trouble forced one aircraft to attack a secondary target; the other two failed to get any bombs on the target and when attacked by interceptors were unable to return their fire.²¹ Subsequent missions followed in the pattern of this inauspicious beginning. Between 8 July and 12 September, 22 raids totaling 39 sorties were dispatched; 18 aircraft aborted, 2 bombed secondary targets, so that only half of the planes reached the primary target. Two were shot down and two so badly damaged that they crashed on landing; total combat and operational losses included 8 out of the 20 aircraft. It was doubtful that two out of the 40 x 1,100-pound bombs loaded had hit the assigned targets, and not a single enemy fighter had been destroyed.²² One long ton of bombs delivered at a cost of eight heavy bombers was an expensive mode of warfare.

The effect of these failures was to confirm critical British opinions and to dampen any enthusiasm which some members in the RAF may have had concerning the Fortress. According to one observer, "While the first British reaction was one of confidence in the B-17C because of its ability to withstand gunfire, this original confidence has been dissipated. When this observer left England, four of these B-17C's had been lost because of enemy action,"²³ and there was an unconfirmed rumor that one had been forced down intact in Germany. Most of the bombing had been done at very high altitude (average

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about 31,000 feet) and operational difficulties had been great. Failures in the oxygen and heating systems had lowered crew efficiency. Guns had frozen and windshields had frosted, and since German interceptors had been able to climb above them, the lack of speed to escape and of fire-power and visibility to fight back had apparently given some justification to the derisive term of "Flying Coffins" which Herr Goebbels applied to the B-17's.

Under these conditions, operations fell off and General Arnold, who had had disquieting reports of the manner in which the Fortresses had been handled in England, was rightly concerned over the inactivity of American-built heavy bombers at a time when they were so desperately needed in our own air force. On request, General Royce, air attache in London, confirmed reports which General Arnold had received: (1) that the RAF had been forced by the British government to use the B-17's for political and publicity reasons; (2) that little effort had been made to give specialized training to the crews and that the bombardiers especially were not familiar with the Sperry bombsight; and (3) that maintenance had been slow and inefficient.²⁴ The reception accorded some B-24's delivered to the British in the spring of 1941 had been somewhat similar--good initial publicity,²⁵ then undue delay in modification and a preference as far as the British were concerned for using the Liberator as a transport and sea-search plane rather than as a day bomber.

Undoubtedly there was something to be said on both sides. American observers saw chiefly the negligence in maintenance and the lack of operational skill in handling the B-17. The British saw chiefly the

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mechanical failures, the limited armament and the losses. Fundamentally, the difficulty may have been in the natural lack of interest in a plane which was not their own. Certainly there was no one in the RAF who was pushing the project, no crews who were eager to operate the B-17 in combat. Typical of British opinion were the reports by experienced RAF pilots who were invited to the United States for consultation in the autumn of 1941.²⁶ They thought the B-17 and B-24 might be suitable for service in the Pacific, but that they were too lightly armed for daylight missions over Germany--in fact, they called them both "night bombers"! Because of its heavier bomb load the B-24 was preferred to the B-17, but both were considered inferior to English bombers. The pilots spoke of the ruggedness of the B-17 under fire, but they believed no bomber could stand up against the daylight defense over Europe. In short, neither our planes nor our doctrines were suitable for the European theater.²⁷

The probability that this attitude would develop had been appreciated by our observers in Europe, one of whom had written earlier:²⁸

The success or failure of the initial results of the B-17's bombing operations will have an effect, far in excess of its actual operational importance, on the attitude of the RAF, the British, and American people toward the B-17 as a fighting plane. The excellent qualities of a fighting plane may go unrecognized for months if the plane is not properly introduced.

The plane had not been properly introduced, and it seemed to matter little that the crews had been inadequately trained, that the planes had never been sent out in formations large enough to secure a proper bomb pattern, or that equipment and armament would be improved in

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forthcoming models. British opinion of the B-17 had crystallized and their conviction that we could not penetrate Germany by day even led Air Marshal Freeman to propose that we modify the plane for night missions and use it according to British methods when the AAF should be sent to England.²⁹ That suggestion found little support in the AAF. The attitude of the Air Staff is reflected in a comment on the report of the RAF pilots described above:³⁰ "This must not, through frequent repetition, lead us to favor area bombing against precision bombing which accomplishes the strategic result with fewer airplanes and fewer crews." The RAF had used few enough airplanes in their experiments with the B-17, but they had not accomplished any strategic results. This failure contrasted sharply with their increasing success in the type of bombing they favored, and led inevitably to a distrust in U. S. heavy bombers and bombardment doctrines. That distrust was perhaps more sharply phrased by journalists than by the leaders of the RAF, but it was to be allayed only by the early operations of the Eighth Air Force.

5. Development of AAF Doctrines

The regard for precision bombing which was the basic principle in AAF doctrines went back at least to the days of Billy Mitchell; it may have stemmed in part from a deep-rooted national tradition of marksmanship and it certainly derived in part from American military thought in the period between the two World Wars. Such was the character of our national sentiment in those years that all arguments for military

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preparations were of necessity couched in terms of "national defense," and that defense was conceived literally in terms of preventing an enemy from landing on our continent or our outlying territories. It is beside the point that this thinking was in direct opposition to the common sense principle that it is pleasanter to fight in the enemy's territory than in one's own, and that it ran counter to our experience in the last war. Fundamentally indeed the attitude grew out of the disillusionment after that war and the determination, still strong in 1940, not to fight another "foreign" war. Since this country could be invaded only by means of a navy and transport ships, it was believed by some that the invasion could be foiled by the Navy, assisted by long-range bombers which could seek out and sink the enemy ships before they reached our shores. This attitude was very much in evidence in the hearings before a Congressional Committee on the U. S. Air Services in 1925 and it continued to color much of our thought until the outbreak of the European War. It was for this search-and-sink warfare that the B-17 and the Sperry bombsight were developed, and it was obvious that their effective use against maneuvering ships with heavy antiaircraft armament called for daylight precision bombing from high altitudes.

Before 1940 the Royal Navy and the RAF could be tacitly regarded as insurance policies in the Atlantic and the increasing strain in our relations with Japan made it seem that our western coast was more likely to be attacked than was our eastern. Essentially then, the B-17 and B-24 were developed for operations in the Pacific rather than in

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Europe. When we began to think seriously of the bombardment of Germany from English bases these planes were the only heavy bombers we had in production.. We did not wish to scrap our own planes to concentrate on the production of an English model, nor would we accept British suggestions that we modify the B-17 and B-24, in order to utilize British tactics, a policy which would have been inefficient, sacrificing an excellent day bomber to produce a night bomber inferior to the British in many respects. Hence it was that we were constrained by our aircraft as well as by our military thought to have a try at precision bombing in the face of contrary advice from the British. By the time our operations began in Europe our heavy bombers had proved their sturdiness and their fine flying characteristics in the Pacific war, but they had done little in the way of strategic bombing as understood in Europe.

Yet if the faith of AAF leaders in the soundness of their doctrines was as yet unproved in battle, it was not a blind and stubborn adherence to a dogma derived by a priori methods. Those doctrines were studied and re-studied during the year before our operations in Europe began, and they were still considered essentially sound by those leaders who eventually were to put them in practice. It was indeed significant that so many of the members of the Air Staff in 1941 were to assume commands in the Eighth Air Force later. Their willingness to prove the soundness of their doctrines in combat was no assurance of the correctness of those principles but it did guarantee the sincerity of the preparatory studies. Staff work, like the work of

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the ground crew, is apt to be overlooked by the average citizen who sees only the drama of air battles; and the staff officer, unlike the mechanic and grease monkey, has had no conscious program of face-lifting by the PRO. His work in 1941, however, was of great importance for operations in 1942 and later.

The first systematic statement of the possible applications of our doctrines in the European theater was contained in ANPD/1, the strategic implications of which were described in an earlier chapter.³¹ That study had been initiated in an effort to determine the air forces necessary for defeating Germany, but its authors had described in some detail the methods as well as the means required for the mission. The plan had foreseen the possible necessity of attacking intermediate targets (aircraft factories, aluminum and magnesium plants) and secondary targets (submarine installations, naval and "invasion" bases). But the primary objectives were to be the electric power grid, the transportation system and the oil and petroleum industries. All of these objectives, primary, secondary and intermediate alike, were made up of relatively small targets; only after German civilian morale had begun to crack were we to engage in area bombing of population centers. This meant, then, precision bombing by day, and the opinion was voiced that with the development of the proper armament, armor, and equipment, daylight missions over Germany would be feasible.³²

Much of this section of ANPD/1 was the work of Maj. H. S. Hansell whose study of the European situation had taken him to the United Kingdom to observe the methods of the RAF, and whose personal report

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to General Arnold had advocated these same doctrines which were described above.³³ In general these doctrines had also the support of General Chaney, whose judgments were of peculiar significance because of his intimate connections with, and friendly attitude toward, the RAF.

While ANPD/1 was still under consideration General Chaney submitted a report based on British estimates of bomb damage suffered in 1940.³⁴ His opinion was that the Luftwaffe's failure to crush British industry and morale had been the result of serious errors on their part and in no wise could be counted as conclusive proof of the ineffectiveness of air power. The Germans had never put enough bombers over England nor had they concentrated sufficiently on the proper targets. Conversely, General Chaney believed that a large enough Allied air force could knock Germany out of the war, or at least could make easy the final invasion. A system of targets vital to the German war effort and consonant with the forces available should be chosen and attacks should be concentrated on each objective until it was destroyed. Since most of the targets would be relatively small they could best be attacked by precision bombing and at the present state of our equipment that meant daylight bombing. To hold losses within limits justified by results, equipment and tactics would have to be improved but that could be accomplished. Inevitably, of course, losses would be heavier by day than by night, and could be justified only by a higher percentage of bombs on target, which called for bombing accuracy superior to any yet seen in Europe.

Accuracy indeed was the crux of the problem. American and English

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doctrines could be evaluated by a simple mathematical formula of: Bombs on target, Bombers lost; presumably both factors would be greater by day than by night but in their proportion lay the whole argument for or against the American theory. General Chaney's conclusions had been based on an analysis of German and English bombardment and AAF accuracy was supposed to be superior to that of either the GAF or RAF. But it is obvious that records scored in West Texas where rains and fogs were as scarce as Republican congressmen and where the bombardier was untroubled by flak or interceptors might not hold up in the face of north European weather and German defenses. If "precision bombing" was to be anything more than a shibboleth it must mean bombs on target regardless of adverse factors. Hence, General Chaney's recommendations concerning the development of bombardment "under existing war conditions" brought "vigorous action" from General Arnold.³⁵ That action first took the form of research directed toward the improvement of our equipment and technique and eventually of our training. If the United States was committed by its production program to the B-17 and B-24, and by the nature of those planes to daylight bombing, the AAF could still improve the planes by modification and insure that they were used effectively by proper tactical doctrines.

Since precision bombing was contingent first on getting our planes over the target, a study was initiated to determine whether the B-17 and B-24 could penetrate German defenses consistently enough to accomplish the mission defined in AWP/1. Maj. S. E. Anderson, who made the study,³⁶ pointed out that when operated by the RAF the B-17 had

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shown great endurance under enemy fire but small capacity for inflicting damage in return. He considered that, to avoid heavy losses from flak, bombing would have to be done at maximum altitudes where it would be difficult to maintain defensive formations. Because of the limited range of pursuit escorts, the heavy bomber would have to rely largely upon its own defensive fire power and since the B-17 was weak in that respect it was recommended that a study be made to determine what defensive armament should be used on ensuing models of the B-17.

Such a study was made by ANPD.³⁷ A comparison of the armament on the British Stirling and Manchester and on the "Fortress One" which the RAF had used indicated why they had considered U. S. planes under-gunned. It was recommended that both the B-17 and B-24 be equipped, like the British bombers, with ten machine guns, mounted in turrets where possible, but that .50-caliber rather than .30-caliber guns be used. Better equipment for oxygen and heat should be developed and a board of officers should be appointed to draw up the characteristics of a long-range escort such as had been described in ANPD/1.

The recommendation concerning armament was followed immediately and the B-17A, first to be used in combat by the Eighth Air Force, was more heavily armed than any bomber in the theater. The design for the escort plane was slower in its evolution. In August 1942 a board headed by Brig. Gen. A. L. Lyon submitted a plan³⁸ for modifying the B-17 and B-24 into "destroyer escort planes." The planes were to carry no bombs but were to devote their whole useful load to increased armor, armament and ammunition. With a total range of 1,700 miles, these planes would be able to accompany the bombers to any practicable

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target. They were to be kept as similar in appearance as possible to the bombers and mixed into formation in the ratio of 1 to 3 or 4, and it was expected that their guns, assisted by cross fire from the bombers, could win through any fighter defenses. These suggestions eventually materialized in the XB-40 and XB-41. When later the planes were given a try they were to prove unsuccessful and the conventional fighter with jettisonable tanks was to prove a better solution to the problem. But here it should be noticed that long before the Eighth Air Force began operations it was generally accepted that deep penetration of Germany was contingent upon development of a long-range escort.

In the meanwhile the study of techniques had paralleled research on equipment. A board had been established in July to study bombing accuracy in the AAF, and its functions were extended by a directive of 13 October to include an investigation of "peer bombing results" in the European theater.³⁹ From midsummer until the outbreak of hostilities the board was engaged in studying conditions in the United States and in Great Britain. In neither country were its findings encouraging. Its members still considered it possible to bomb Germany out of the war, but not by methods then being used. RAF bombardment had been a disappointment, its accuracy being limited by certain factors of training, equipment and German defenses. In the AAF there were not enough crews trained for night bombing to be able to follow British practices, and at present daylight bombing could be accomplished economically only under limited conditions. The scope of daylight operations, both at high altitudes by heavy bombers and in low attacks

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at dusk by B-26's, could be extended by the sort of improvements in equipment which had been recommended, and even more by improvements in training. Bombing accuracy in the AAF was far below the capabilities of existing equipment and indeed there was "no bombardment unit of the Air Force ready for combat operations in any theater" without a minimum of three months of additional training. This was a serious condition in an air force already at war. The board recommended that certain remedial steps be taken in regard to training, that no unit be committed to an active theater until it had demonstrated its proficiency by certain specific achievement tests, and that an effort be made to enhance the prestige (and hence the morale and the effectiveness) of the bombardier and the navigator.

The report of this board was submitted to General Arnold with General Chaney's concurrence, though he did not favor holding crews in training too long since in last analysis it was only in actual combat that part of their technique could be learned.⁴⁰ Elsewhere the doctrines recommended by this board were summarized in these general conclusions: (1) strategic bombing to be effective must be precision bombing; (2) greater emphasis should be placed on accuracy and tactics; (3) bombardment should be concentrated and sustained; and (4) there was no substitute for thorough and proper training. The report was favorably received by General Marshall,⁴¹ and on recommendation of ANPD⁴² steps were taken to effect some of the improvements advocated. In a directive of 26 February⁴³ General Arnold established a Bombardment Tactical Committee to consist of five bombardment experts (including two members of the previous board), and specialists on anti-aircraft

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artillery, radar and meteorology. These officers were charged with "preparing the doctrines, tactics, and technique of employment of air forces in the European theater," and with making recommendations for improvements in training and equipment necessary for implementing those doctrines.

While these studies were being prepared by members of the Air Staff a similar task was undertaken by an officer who was to have a most important part in the application of our doctrines. When General Eaker went to England in February 1942 to prepare for the reception of the AAFBI he was directed to study the doctrines and operational procedure of the RAF Bomber Command, and he had been advised by General Spaatz to exhaust fully the possibilities of daylight bombing. The report which General Eaker submitted on 20 March⁴⁴ contained a critique of English doctrines, and while he thought that AAF theories would be modified in light of combat experience, the tactics he recommended were essentially similar to those described above.

The primary mission of the AAFBI Bomber Command, as of the RAF Bomber Command, was the destruction of strategic targets vital to Germany's war effort. In attacking these targets the RAF had, with some justification, usually bombed at night. Their forces had never yet been adequate to the task and had unfortunately been diffused in attacks on nonstrategic targets; hence, they were unable to stand the heavier losses which day missions entailed. There were other practical considerations which helped explain the English reliance on night bombing. Precision bombing would require longer training for the crews. If bombers attacked by day, maintenance must be done largely

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at night, which under existing black-out conditions was difficult.

Some of these factors would affect the Americans as well but there would be certain advantages in daylight operations conducted according to their methods. Above all, it was only by day that precision bombing could be accomplished. Combined with RAF night missions the American daylight operations would relieve air congestion and provide an additional strain on German defenses. Navigation and location of targets would be less difficult and therefore time in the danger zone would be shorter. Operational, as opposed to combat, losses would be reduced. Actually, neither American equipment nor training were adapted to night operations, and without additional training and modification of aircraft night bombing was out of the question for the near future. Eventually the AAFBI might try night and area bombing, but initially at least the destruction of precision targets by small compact formations should be the major feature of our offensive.

For success in this sort of operations there were certain prerequisites: an adequate force of aircraft and crews; a high state of training with special stress on such defensive factors as evasive action, formation flying and gunnery; thorough indoctrination of command and staff; and high morale. Americans could profit by lessons drawn from British errors—their frequent return to a few highly defended targets, their prodigality in expending experienced leaders and their overtasking of combat crews. Americans could learn, too, from British virtues, such as their excellent navigation and their

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highly developed combat intelligence. But with these provisos, which were operational details rather than matters of general principles, General Baker was convinced that his forces could operate by day without prohibitive losses.

Those sections of General Baker's plan which dealt with doctrine, then, answered specifically and affirmatively General Spaatz' query concerning the possibility of precision bombing. Even before the plan reached Washington and was approved,⁴⁵ the adoption of BOLERO with its possibility of an early invasion of the continent made necessary some restudy of the doctrines of close support.⁴⁶ But for the VIII Bomber Command and even for the Eighth Air Force as a whole, the predominant concern continued to focus on the heavy bombardment mission. And though the leaders of the Eighth were to become more aware of the difficulties peculiar to the European theater even before they launched the first mission, the principles which General Baker had enunciated continued in the main to be their guide.

These principles, it may be repeated, differed little from other statements which have been analyzed above, but two of General Baker's points should be emphasized. First, he had not unduly damned English methods. Just as the British had stated that eventually they might be able to turn to daylight bombing, ANPD/1 had anticipated that eventually we might turn to area bombing of population centers for morale purposes.⁴⁷ General Baker, who stressed the factor of variety as a safety measure, expected to use his heavy bombers "both day and night," and efforts were eventually made to provide both the requisite

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training and an efficient flame dispenser for the night missions.⁴⁸

Second, General Baker saw the advantages of two systems of bombardment utilized simultaneously against the same enemy. Thus the coordination of mutually supplementary day and night attacks which was to constitute so important a factor in the Combined Bomber Offensive was implicit in General Baker's plan. The principle was more positively defined in the "Joint/American/British Directive" of 20 August, the command implications of which were discussed in an earlier chapter.⁴⁹

According to this directive, the aim of day bombardment by Allied Air Forces in Great Britain was "to achieve continuity [*italics added*] in the bombing offensive against the Axis." Presumably the reference to "continuity" implied the repeated strikes by day and by night which would exhaust German defenses and lessen air congestion in the United Kingdom. Primarily the responsibility for night bombing would rest with the RAF Bomber Command, that for day bombing with the Eighth Air Force. Methods to be used at night were to be those prescribed by current Air Ministry directives; day bombing was to be directed toward the "destruction and damage of precise targets," and it was the responsibility of the Eighth Air Force to develop those tactics of deep penetration of GAF day fighter defenses which would make that destruction possible. The existing British day bomber forces were to be used in a secondary role to add weight to RAF diversionary fighter sweeps, "and to maintain the attack during the periods unsuitable for the operation of American bombers." Presumably Americans might experiment with night missions, so that neither force was to have an absolute monopoly on day or night operations, but the primary responsibilities

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were clearly delineated.

6. Controversy in the Press

The attitude exhibited in General Baker's report and crystallized in the "Joint Directif" was typical of that which governed relations between the leaders of the Eighth Air Force and of the RAF. Divergent views on bombardment methods, strongly held, were tempered by mutual respect and often by an open mind toward the virtues of the other fellow's techniques. This cooperative spirit is so widely attested that it is difficult to account for contemporary news stories to the contrary. The American public had been somewhat on the defensive in respect to the quality of American planes since the beginning of the European war and there was a natural impatience to see our improved models in action against Germany; this impatience and the common knowledge that the AAF and RAF did not see eye to eye in respect to their doctrines or in their evaluation of their respective planes probably gave rise to rumors of friction. It would seem that some American journalists were unable to understand the real temper of the existing relations between the AAF and RAF; that temper is summed up pretty aptly by General Spaatz in a letter in which he condemned the American tendency:⁵⁰

to belittle the RAF and their bombing effort. This, in spite of the fact that . . . the only force that is pounding hell out of Germany is the RAF. This does not mean that I am an enthusiastic supporter of all they do. They were wrong in their analysis of what could be done with daylight bombing but they have the benefit of a hell of a lot of experience, and when they analyze anything it is with the background of that experience.

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Whatever the cause, something of a press war broke out in the summer of 1942, forming a dramatic background against which the early success of the B-17 stood out boldly.

On 8 August the New York Times published an article by John MacCormac under the lead "British-U. S. Rift on Planes Holding up Air Offensive."⁵¹ The gist of the argument was that American cooperation in the bomber offensive was behind schedule and perhaps permanently impaired because of serious disagreements between the two air forces concerning our heavy bombers and bombardment theories. The article was written more in the fashion of the gossip columnist than of the straight news reporter, and evinced little knowledge of the real situation in the Eighth Air Force where operations were being delayed by problems of logistics and training rather than by quarrels over the tea cups with the RAF. The story paralleled the current Axis propaganda line which was aimed at creating friction between the Allied air forces,⁵² and its appearance in so influential a journal brought prompt and emphatic repudiations by General Spaatz and General Eisenhower.⁵³

A week later, however, an article by Peter Massfield of the London Sunday Times served to heighten the suspicion of journalists in this country that there might be some foundation to rumors of lack of whole-hearted agreement in England. Peter Massfield was England's most influential lay commentator on air power, enjoying there a prestige comparable to that of Severky in America. Generally Massfield had supported the policies of Bomber Command in his column, and not

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unnaturally he had favored British aircraft and British doctrines. In an article on "America's Share in Air Offensive: Pooling Men and Machines,"⁵⁴ Macfield restated arguments familiar enough by then, but his handling of the theme lacked the tact which had governed the official comments of the RAF. "Plain speaking is needed," wrote Mr. Macfield and as usual, "plain speaking" meant unpleasant speaking. Because the article offended by its patronizing air as much as by its conclusions, it is best here to quote some of the passages verbatim.

Both the RAF and American crews wished

to see American Fortress and Liberator bombers thrown into the night offensive. . . . But we English, with our long experience of night offensive, have a duty to ensure, if we can, that the flower of America's regular Army Air Forces is not squandered on a type of operation that experience would judge unwise.

American heavy bombers were

fine flying machines, but not suited for bombing in Europe. Their bombs and bomb-loads are small, their armor and armament are not up to the standard now found necessary and their speeds are low. . . . Unsuitable heavy bombers must not be pushed into the night offensive over strongly defended areas. Still less must valuable crews be allowed to throw themselves away by day.

One might perhaps wonder what could be done with bombers unsuited for either night or day operations. "There is a solution," said Mr. Macfield. Lancasters, Halifaxes and Stirlings had been modified and were being used by Coastal Command. The "inadequate Fortress and Liberator" were good enough for patrol work in the Atlantic, and they could release an equal number of superior English bombers to be used, byAAF as well as RAF crews, in the bombardment of Germany.

If this article relieved Mr. Macfield's conscience of any feeling

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of complicity in possible deaths in the Eighth Air Force, it did so without winning him many friends among the potential victims. Whether there was anything behind the article other than his own need to fill a weekly column is not clear. Later General Eaker voiced the opinion that Macfield was a sort of sounding board for the Ministry of Aircraft Production, reflecting the views of the British aircraft industry rather than of the "operational people."⁵⁵ At any rate, the article was quoted in American papers, and General Arnold promptly requested from General Spaatz the true facts "from your point of view."⁵⁶

It is seldom that a request is so appropriately timed. The cable arrived on 17 August, the day of the first bombardment mission of the B-17's over Europe. General Spaatz could at last speak from experience, even if that experience was as yet very limited. He was cautious in pointing out that a strong fighter protection had been used, and that penetration of German defenses would be gradual. But bombing had been effective, losses nil, and the mission seemed to justify all AAF expectations. As for the planes, "My opinion B-17 suitable as to speed, armament, armor and bombload. I would not exchange it for any British bomber in production."⁵⁷

Within a few days, however, the attack came from a new quarter. After interviewing AAF fighter pilots who had participated in the air battle during the Dieppe raid, the U. S. correspondent, Geoffrey Parsons, Jr., quoted the pilots as being "glad they had Spitfires instead of P-40's and Airacobras."⁵⁸ Parsons thought that our crews were satisfied with the B-17, but preferred British fighters. This story and Macfield's column formed the basis of an article in Time⁵⁹ ("The Best

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Planes") in which a complaint was registered against lack of frankness concerning American pursuit planes which had been repudiated by AAF pilots and B-17's which were being tested "in a welter of polite doubt."

The appearance of the Time article brought a long apology from General Eisenhower to General Marshall that "statements originating with pilots of this theater should have caused embarrassment to you and the War Department."⁶⁰ An explanation of the peculiar situation of the Spitfire pilots was given by General Spaatz, who said, "all combat crews are satisfied with our airplanes and in order to win we want only numbers," and he pleaded that journalists cease sniping until they had a better picture of the situation.⁶¹ As a clinching argument in favor of American planes, General Spaatz forwarded a copy of the London Daily Mail of 1 September containing an article by Colin Bednall which reversed abruptly the whole trend of English public opinion on the B-17.⁶² Bednall believed that

So remarkable has been the success of the new Flying Fortress operated by the U. S. Army Air Force from this country that it is likely to lead to a drastic resorting of basic ideas on air warfare which have stood firm since the infancy of flying.

He then went on to recount the successes of the B-17's and to analyze the tactical lessons which were "now the subject of close study by startled experts on both sides of the English Channel."

Bednall's article set a tone which was followed by other English journalists; even Masfield came to see virtues in our planes and methods, though his conversion was somewhat less spontaneous. In the

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autumn, American magazines were able to sing the praises of U. S. heavy bombers and their missions from the record of experiences rather than from mere hopes. But that, as Kipling would say, is another story.

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G L O S S A R Y

AAFBI)	American Air Forces in Britain
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AFANP	Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans
AFCC	Air Force Combat Command
AFIHI	Historical Division, AG/AS, Intelligence
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ATC	Air Transport Command
AWPD	Air War Plans Division
CCRC	Combat Crew Replacement Center
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
ETO	European Theater of Operations
GAF	German Air Force
OPD	Operations Division
OPM	Office of Production Management
OTU	Officers Training Unit
RAF	Royal Air Force
SOS	Services of Supply
SPENAVO	Special Naval Observer in London
SPOBS	Special Military Observers Group
Task Force BR	Task Force for British Isles
UK	United Kingdom
USAFBI	United States Army Forces in the British Isles
USJCS	United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
VLR	Very long range
WPD	War Plans Division
WPDGS	War Plans Division, General Staff

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NOTES

Chapter I

1. ABC-1, par. 3.
2. Ibid., par. 6.
3. Ibid., par. 9.
4. Ibid., par. 10, 13.
5. Ibid., par. 11.
6. Ibid., par. 12.
7. Ibid., par. 14, 15, 19.
8. Ibid., Annex I Organization of Military Mission, Annex II Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces, Annex III U. S.-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan, Annex IV Communications, Annex V Control and Protection of Shipping.
9. ABC-2, par. 3. The 54 Group Program is given in Tab E.
10. Ibid., par. 3. This called for training 30,000 pilots and 100,000 technicians per year on the basis of a first-line strength of about 8,000 aircraft, including 1,520 heavy bombers.
11. ABC-2, par. 10.
12. The several parts of this plan which are pertinent to this study are: (1) Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, 30 Apr. 1930, approved by the Joint Board, 14 May, and by the Secretary of War, 2 June; (2) War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5, short title WPDWOP-R5, approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 Aug.; (3) War Department Concentration Plan, Rainbow No. 5, approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 Aug.
13. Rainbow No. 5, Operations Plan, IV, 12 a.
14. Ibid., IV, 28.
15. Table 6, Annex II, Concentration Tables, Sec. 1 (Iceland), 2 (England), 3 (Ireland), and 4 (Scotland).

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16. J.B. No. 325 (Serial 729), 25 Sep. 1941 from the Joint Board to The Special Naval Observer, London, The Special Army Observer, London, "Comments on 'General Strategy.' Review by the British Chiefs of Staff." The Review is appended.
17. Review, par. 39.
18. J.B. No. 325 (Serial 729).
19. Ibid., par. 6.
20. This analysis of the two papers gives a one-sided view of their contents. Both the Review and the reply to it involve a discussion of world strategy, whereas only the differences of opinion concerning one area are herein described.
21. AL (A1) 8th Meeting, War Cabinet, American Liaison, 21 Nov. 1941. The minutes give a general discussion, Annex "A" a detailed answer to the two objections detailed above.
22. Ibid., Annex "A", note on Comment "C".
23. For the views of General Chaney and Admiral Ghormley, see below.
24. Ltr., President to S/W, 9 July 1941. A similar letter was directed to the Secretary of the Navy.
25. Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces for the Defeat of Our Potential Enemies, short title ANPD/1; memo for C/S, Munitions Requirements . . . , 12 Aug. 1941.
26. ANPD/1, Tab C.
27. Ibid., Tab E.
28. Ibid., Tab No. 1, par. 3.
29. Ibid., Tab No. 1, par. 3, 4.
30. Ibid., Tab No. 2.
31. Ibid., Tab No. 8.
32. Ibid., Tab No. 1, par. 6.
33. Ibid., Tab 3. This idea had been expressed before and continued to figure in later reports; the TB-40 was the unsuccessful result of these suggestions.
34. Ibid., Tabs Nos. 11, 12.

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35. Idid., Tabs Nos. 16, 17.
36. Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements, 11 Sep. 1941.
37. B-H-41-10. Conference on British-United States Production, Victory Requirements, 17 Sep. 1941. British requirements, 1 October 1941 to 1 July 1943 were given as 49,385 aircraft, of which 30,000 could be manufactured by the British themselves. From the ANPD/1 estimate 10 medium bomber and 12 pursuit groups were to be eliminated for lack of operating space. Deployment of the ultimate strength is described in a "Proposed Disposition of U. S. and British First Line Airplanes, Victory Program" (sans originae, no date).
38. A description of the staff work involved in the preparation of this plan and of the history of its adoption can be found in two documents: memo for C/AS, Preparation of ANPD/1, 18 Nov. 1941; RHR, C/AS to OCAC, Further Expansion of the AAF, 6 Oct. 1941. Colonel George, Lieutenant Colonel Walker, Majors Kuter and Mansell, and the offices of A-2, A-3, A-4 and OCAC participated in the preparation.
39. Joint Board Estimate, App. II, Pt. II, p. 10.
40. Letter of Instruction, No. 1, 7 Dec.; No. 2, 11 Dec., in WF-I-A, Letters of Instruction.
41. Memo for C/S, Air Estimate of the Situation--6:30 AM, Dec. 8, in AFAP files.
42. ANPD/4, Sec. V, 1, d. Tab C gives the breakdown of forces required by theaters and by types. The following comparison with ANPD/1 shows the scope of the recommended forces for use against Germany:

Types	ANPD/1	ANPD/4
MB (B-25, B-26)	10 Gps.	13 Gps.
MB (B-17, B-24)	20	27
MB (B-29, B-32)	24	32
MB, VLR (4000-mile radius)	16	21
Night Fighters		21 Sqd.
Total	114 Gps.	152 Gps., 21 Sqd.
43. CI (unnumbered) from HMS Duke of York, 18 Dec. 1941, in WF-I-General #2.
44. ABC-4, Annex I. Washington War Conference. American British Strategy. Memo by the British Chiefs of Staff devised by U. S. Chiefs of Staff, first presented 24 December, accepted as modified 31 December. To expedite action during the conference a Joint Planning Committee was formed and at its first meeting it was agreed that the file of the conference should bear the code-designation ABC-4/. At the end of the conference plans for

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"Post-Arcadia" conversations eventually crystallized into the permanent organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; the term "combined" was defined as referring to inter-allied, "joint" as referring to interservice matters, and papers were to be designated as CGS-1/, etc.

44a-44f. See p. 123.

45. ABC-4/1, Priorities for US and UK Overseas Expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean, 27 Dec. 1941. Approved by British and US C/S, 29 Dec. ABC-4/6, Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater for the First Half of 1942, 10 Jan. 1942. Approved as amended, 13 Jan.
46. Joint Plan for the Occupation of Dakar, short title, JEP-BLACK, 10 Aug. 1941, based on a directive of 9 May 1941.
47. ABC-4/2, Project GYMAST, 25 Dec. 1941.
48. Memo for Gen. Arnold, Joint American-British Occupation of French North Africa, 1 Jan. 1942, in AFANP files.
49. Memo for CG, AFCC [and others] from C/AAF, Organization of Air Task Force (to be designated the Fifth Air Force) for Mobile Reserve Corps, 2 Jan. 1942, in AFANP files. Tactical units were to include 1 medium and 1 light bomber group, 2 pursuit groups with 1 interceptor squadron, and 1 observation group.
50. R&E, Organization of Air Task Force Hq., A-1 to AWPD, 6 Jan. 1942; AWPD to A-3 and A-4, 17 Jan., in III-B-1-#1 AAF.
51. Arnold to CG, AFCC, Eighth Air Force, 6 Jan. 1942, in III-B-1-#1 AAF. Units already assigned consisted of: 80th and 54th Pursuit (I) Gps., 17th Bomb. (H) and 48th Bomb. (L) Gps., 60th Obs. Gp., and 7th Photo Sq. Commissioned personnel of these units was frozen as of 10 Jan.; Arnold to CG, AFCC, Units to Comprise the 8th Air Force, 10 Jan., in Air AG 320.2, 8th AF.
52. Memo for AG/S, G-3, WDGS from C/AAF, Priority and Organization of Task Forces, 20 Jan. 1942, in WP-1-General.
53. Hq. AFCC, GO No. 19, 23 Jan. 1942, in III-C-, Activations #1.
54. Col. A. N. Duncan to C/AAF, Recommendations on Changes in Composition of the 8th Air Force, 12 Feb. 1942, in III-B-1-#1 AAF.
55. Memo, Col. H. L. George, AG/AS, AWPD to C/AS, Recommendations on Changes in Composition of the 8th Air Force, 25 Feb. 1942, in III-B-1-#1 AAF.
56. Below, pp. 31-37.
57. CGS 5/2, SUPER-GYMAST, 3 Mar. 1942. The development of the GYMAST plans can be followed in these papers: ABC-4/2a, 13 Jan.; OPS 2, 22 Jan.; OPS 2/1, 1 Feb.; JPS 3, 1 Feb.; OPS 2/2, 10 Feb.; OPS 2/2

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(A), 20 Feb.; CFS 2/3, 21 Feb.; COS 3 and COS 5/1. By 5 March COS 5/2 had been adopted in principle by COS, but was not to be submitted to Mr. Roosevelt "for a week"; HBR, Recommendations on Changes in Composition of the 8th Air Force, WD, WPD to G/AAF, 5 Mar., in III-B-1-#1 AAF.

58. RAINBOW NO. 5, Concentration Plan, Annex II, Table 6, Secs. 3 and 4.
59. Operations Plan of North Ireland Sub-Theater, short title GHQ-NIST, Code name MAGNET. Directive, dated 27 Dec., plan submitted, 31 Dec. ABC-4/7, Establishment of U.S. Forces in North Ireland, 10 Jan., approved in JCS's 9, 11 Jan.
60. GHQ-NIST, II, 8, g.
61. Ibid., Annex No. 13, Air Plan.
62. Ibid., II, 8. Tactical units were to consist of 2 groups of pursuit, 2 interceptor squadrons, 1 group each of medium and light bombers, 1 of observation and 5 transport squadrons.
63. AAG to CG, AFCC, Ninth Air Force, 9 Jan. 1942, in O&R files; memo, C/AS to AAG, Priority and Organization of Task Forces, 15 Jan. 1942, in O&R files. Designated groups were: 54th and 31st Pursuit (I), 46th Bomb. (L), 12th Bomb. (M), 67th Obsn.
64. GHQ-NIST, Annex 2, par. 7.
65. Units gathered in the New Orleans-Baton Rouge area were released to the Third Air Force on 17 April. Ltr., AFROM to CG, 9th AF, Task Force Magnet, 17 Apr. 1942; Third Air Force Rq., CG #71, 18 Apr., in O&R files. The 31st Pursuit Group went first to the VIII Fighter Command in England, thence with the Twelfth to Africa; the 54th Group went to the Eleventh Air Force in Alaska; the 12th Bomb. (L) was sent to Egypt; the 67th Obsn. Group went to the Eighth.
66. CM #875, London to AGMAR, 24 Mar. 1942.
67. See below, p. 41.
68. ABC-1: 32 squadrons (undifferentiated by type) if in 1941, more if in 1942; ABC-2: "a substantial proportion" of the 54 Group Program; RAINBOW NO. 5, Concentration Plan: 3 gps. HB, 1 gp. MB for England, 2 gps. Pursuit for Ireland, 1 for Scotland; RAINBOW NO. 5, Basis Plan, Revision No. 1, 19 Nov.; 3 gps. HB, 2 gps. MB, 3 gps. Pursuit for the whole of the British Isles. The most practical solution was to send "those air forces as dictated by circumstance"; memo for AG/S, WPD, Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, 31 Oct. 1942, in III-B-Army and Navy Relations #1.

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69. ABC-4, 24 Dec. 1941. The meeting was held the previous evening. Sir Charles Portal questioned the decision until assured that the allotment of heavy bombers to the RAF would not be cut.
70. ABC-4/6, Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater for the First Half of 1942, 10 Jan., approved as amended in JCCS's 11, 13 Jan.
71. Memo, C/AS to AC/S, WPD, Recommendations of SPOBS Relative to . . . RAINBOW NO. 5, 27 Dec. 1942, in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
72. RAN, Conversation with Portal, Arnold to Spaatz, 1 Jan. 1942; ltr., Arnold to Portal, 2 Jan., in WP III-A-2-GB #1. Arnold calls his estimate of the ready-date at "about March or April" a "shot in the dark."
73. Memo, AC/AS, A-3 to AC/S, WPD, Air Corps Garrison Designated as BR, 5 Jan., in WP III-A-2-GB #1. The 29th and 44th HB Gps. are designated.
74. GPS 9, 1 Feb. 1942.
75. CCS 40, Arrangements for Movement of 2 HB Groups of the USAAF to the UK, 16 Feb. 1942. An earlier draft of this is in a memo for the C/AAF, Plan to Move 2 HB Groups to England in the spring of 1942 (~~DATE MISSING~~, no date), in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
76. Memo to JSP, Arrangements for the Establishment of 2 Fighter Groups in Southeast England, 24 Feb. 1942, in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
77. Memo, Arnold to C/S, USAAF in British Isles, 26 Jan. 1942, in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
78. C/AAF to Brig. Gen. Ira G. Baker, Initial Directive to Bomber Commander in England, 31 Jan. 1942, in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
79. Directive memo, C/AS to A-1, Activation of AAF Unit for British Isles, 13 Feb. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England. Three memos under this title were dispatched directing activation at Bolling Field of a Hq. and Hq. Sq. for respectively, a Bomber Command, Interceptor Command, and Base Command. Later the place of activation was corrected as follows: Interceptor Command, Drew Field, Fla.; Bomber and Base Commands, McDill Field, Fla., Directive No. 1-42, Activation of AAF Units for British Isles, 18 Feb., *ibid.*
80. Ltr., Portal to Arnold, 14 Jan. 1942, in WP III-A-2-GB #1.
81. Ltr., Arnold to Portal, 5 Mar. 1942, *ibid.* This reply had been suggested by ANPD on 28 Jan.

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82. CCS 47, 22 Feb. 1942.
83. CCS 56, Message from Prime Minister on Current Situation, 5 Mar, 1943.
84. Memo, HEP [Artridge] to Col. Craig, Conference, 6 Mar. 1942, in WF-I-General #2. Arnold suggested as minimum striking forces the AVG and HALFND groups for China, one NB and one pursuit group for India.
85. CCS 54/1, 6 Mar. 1942. The anticipated force was to consist of the following groups: 15 NB, 7 MB, 7 LB, 13 Pursuit (for bomber escort and offensive sweeps).
86. Memo, Eisenhower, AG/S to C/AAF, Establishment of USAAF in the UK, 4 Mar. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
87. C/S to CG, USAFBI, US Army Forces in British Isles, 19 Mar. 1942, in AAG 322.3, A-1, Activation.
88. Memo for C/S, Air Support of a Continental Invasion from the British Isles (to accompany WPD Appendix Sec. V of "Plan for Operations in N.W. Europe," 27 Mar. 1942) 30 Mar., in WF-III-A-2-GB #1.
89. CPS 26/1, Offensive Operations in Europe, 9 Apr. 1942.
90. C.O.S. (42) 23rd Meeting (0) War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting with General Marshall, 9 Apr. 1942.
91. C.O.S. (42) 97 (0) Comments on General Marshall's memo, 13 Apr. 1942.
92. C.O.S. (42) 118th Meeting, 14 Apr. 1942. The substance of these agreements is to be found in CM-2400, AMEMBASSY to MILIB, 14 Apr. 1942.
93. CM #70, to President from "Former Naval Person," 17 Apr. 1942.
94. CPS 26/2/D, Directive, Preparation of War Plan Beloro, 28 Apr. 1942.
95. Memo, President to Marshall, 6 May 1942, in WF III-E-1A "Beloro" (an answer to a letter from Marshall of like date re "Pacific Theater versus 'Beloro'"). The force involved consisted of 1,000 planes. Memo, Arnold to ANPD, 9 May 1942; memo, Arnold for Eisenhower, 12 May, in WF-I-General #2.
96. CCS 69, Air Offensive over Western Europe: Requirement of Pursuit Aircraft, 4 May 1942. The United States was asked to increase allotments of P-40's in the Middle East so that the RAF could utilize British aircraft originally intended for that theater.

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97. Memorandum of Agreement between Lt. Gen. Arnold, Rear Adm. Fowers and Air Chief Marshal Portal, 21 June 1942. The original Arnold-Portal Agreement, which had been the basis of earlier allocation, has been examined.
98. Ibid., Annex "B".
99. CCS 61/1, Aircraft Situation in the United Nations, 2 July 1942. CCS 91, Strategic Policy and Deployment of US and British Forces, 7 July, gives a somewhat larger force in heavy bombers.
100. CCS 27th Meeting, 19 June 1942.
101. CCS MFI #14, Minutes of an Informal Meeting between Gen. Marshall and Members of his Staff Representing the US WD and Sir John Dill, Gen. Sir A. Brooks and Maj. Gen. Sir M. Inmy, 19 June 1942.
102. CCS 83, Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943, 21 June 1942.
103. CCS 83/1, 24 June; JCS 22d Meeting, 30 June 1942.
104. JPS 22d Meeting, Memo for Record, 10 July 1942.
105. JCS 24th Meeting, 10 July 1942.
106. CCS 94, Operations in 1942/43, 24 July 1942.
107. CCS 32d Meeting, Minutes, 24 July 1942.
108. CCS 94.
109. CCS 32d Meeting.
110. CCS 94. The groups which were to be diverted consisted of 3 MB, 2 MB, 2 LB, 2 Pursuit, 2 Oban., 4 Transport. The 90th and 307th MB Gps. were sent out in early autumn; whether the others were actually sent has not been determined here.
111. CCS 34th Meeting, 30 July. At this meeting it was reported by Admiral Leahy that the President and Prime Minister "believed" that the decision to mount TORCH had been taken; General Bill was of the same opinion. General Marshall said the decision must be made "soon" if TORCH were to be launched before 1 December. It was agreed that the CCS should, so soon as plans were complete, send a memo to the heads of the two governments recommending agreement on the date for a decision to launch TORCH.
112. Sumner Wells, Time for Decision (N. Y., 1944), 163: "The President Roosevelt himself was due both the conception of, and the decision to undertake, the invasion of North Africa."

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113. U.S.-British Strategy, National Policies--United States vis-a-vis Great Britain, in AFAP, PD 981 (3-25-43). This lucid analysis, though anti-British in tone, shows considerable insight. It says that TORCH was substituted for ROUNDUP "upon British insistence." This certainly fits most of the evidence examined in this study.
114. Memo, Arnold to McHarney, Availability of B-17's for Immediate Departure to SUMAC, 20 July 1942, file 400 Misc., Australia and New Zealand, AAG.
115. MBR, Message from Gen. Spaatz, AFDA to AFACT, 1 Sep. 1942, in WF-III-A-2-GR #2.
116. Memo, Portal to Arnold, 20 Aug. 1942, in AAG 311.2, Misc. Communications by Wire.
- 44a. See Chap. II, n. 79.
- 44b. MBR, Bomber Command, AAF in Britain, AFDMR to AFROM, 13 Mar., in AG 370 Misc., Employment of Troops.
- 44c. MBR, Hq. & Hq. Squadron for a New Task Force, A-3 to ANPD, 27 Feb. 1942; ANPD to A-3, 28 Feb.
- 44d. Director WOM to CG, Eighth Air Force, Operations SUPER-GYMNAST, 31 Mar. 1942.
- 44e. MBR, Items of Interest from General Spaatz' Diary, 31 Mar. 1942, in WF-I, General #2.
- 44f. Just when and by what authority this change was made is not clear, not what became of the Task Force NE organization. A memo, CG AAF to CG's, First, Second, Third, Fourth and Eighth Air Forces, indicates the decision had been made by 4 April, in AG 000-800 Misc., British Isles.

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1. The cables from the U. S. Military Attaches at London (Gen. Lee) and Cairo (Col. Fellers) stress the weakness of the British in this respect. See for example, unnumbered cables from London, 27 September 1941 and from Cairo, 22 September.
2. ABC-1, Annex III, par. 52.
3. RAINBOW NO. 5, Operations Plan, Sec. VII, par. 28 b.
4. ABC-1, Annex I.
5. Ltr., Maj. Gen. A. E. Nye, Dir. of Staff Duties, War Office, to Gen. Chaney, 27 Sep. 1941.
6. Ltr., Brig. Gen. J. T. McNarney to Gen. Nye, no date (reply to ltr. cited in n. 5), *ibid.*
7. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Chaney, 8 Nov. 1941, in AAG 321.9 D1.
8. Ltr., Command Arrangements, U. S. Army Forces in Great Britain, Chaney to C/S, 20 Sep. 1941, in AG, ETO, General Chaney's official 201 file.
9. Ltr., Lt. Col. N. L. George, AWPB to Col. H. L. McClelland, SPOBS, 8 Nov. 1941, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
10. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Chaney, as cited in n. 7 above.
11. Ltr., Gen. Chaney to Gen. Arnold, 5 Dec. 1941, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
12. *Ibid.* Incl. 1, "Graphic Outline of the Basic Organization of U. S. Forces in Great Britain under RAINBOW 5." A more detailed chart is to be found in Appendix 1.
13. Memo for Gen. McNarney, 6 Dec. 1941, in AG, ETO (SPOBS).
14. CM-OUT (unnumbered), AGRAB to SPOBS, 8 Jan. 42, in AG 400.3295.
15. Memo for CO, AFCC, etc. by Gen. Arnold, Channels of Communications with Maj. Gen. J. E. Chaney, 2 Feb. 1942, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
16. The chart is reproduced in Appendix 2 below. The indorsement, "Concur for tentative approval. Chart to be referred to General Chaney for remark," bears General McNair's signature.

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17. Memo for C/S by Gen. Arnold, DC/S for Air, USAAF in British Isles, 26 Jan. 1942, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
18. Directive memo for A-1 by C/AS, "Activation of AAF Units for British Isles," 11 Feb. 1942, in III-O-Activations #1. Separate directives were issued for the air force and for the bomber, interceptor, and air base commands.
19. CM-OUT-399 (24 Jan. 42), Arnold to SPOBS, AF #1/401, 24 Jan. 42.
20. Memo for CG, PF by Chief, AAF, 2 Feb. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
21. CM-465, London to AGWAR, 24 Jan. 42.
22. CM-495, London to AGWAR, 30 Jan. 42.
23. The Huntington area had been suggested by the British in November 1941; B/M 410/7/Q (Ops), Minutes of Meeting Held in Oak Room, 20 Nov. 1941, in Gen. McNarney's notes, file #9.
24. CM-52, Chaney to GHQ, 31 Jan. 42.
25. Ltr., CG, GHQ to AG, Organization of U. S. Army Forces in the U. K., 3 Feb. 1942, in AAG 321.9 G-1, Organization.
26. CCS 40, Arrangements for Movement of 2 HB Groups of the USAAF to the U. K., 16 Feb. 1942.
27. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Baker, Initial Directive to Bomber Commander in England, 31 Jan. 1942, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
28. Details Which Must Be Accomplished by Bomber Command Advance Echelon, no source, no date, but presumably about early February, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
29. CM-OUT-472 (6 Feb. 42), CG, AAF to SPOBS, AF #2/105, 5 Feb. 42.
30. Memo for JSP, Arrangements for the Establishment of Two Fighter Groups in Southeast England, 24 Feb. 1942, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
31. CM-OUT-519 (12 Feb. 42), Arnold to SPOBS, AF #2/207, 12 Feb. 42.
32. CM-OUT-576 (21 Feb. 42), Arnold to SPOBS, AF #2/353, 21 Feb. 42.
33. MBR, Organization of U. S. Army Forces in U. K., Chief, AAF to AWPB, 27 Feb. 1942, in AAG 311.22 B, Cablegrams.
34. CM-634, CM-635, CM-636, all London to AGWAR, attention Arnold and Harmon, 24 Feb. 42.
35. CM-667, London to AGWAR, 27 Feb. 42.

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36. CM-OUT-657 (6 Mar. 42), Arnold to SPOBS, AF #1/97, 6 Mar. 42.
37. Memo for Chief of Staff by Gen. Arnold, USAAF in British Isles, 26 Jan. 42, in WP III-A-2, OS #1.
38. Memo for Chief, AAF by Gen. Eisenhower, Establishment of USAAF in the U. K., 4 Mar. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
39. Memo for AG/W, WPD by Chief, AAF, Establishment of Army Air Forces in the U. K., 11 Mar. 1942, in WP III-A-2, OS #1. This memo is attached to a buck slip, Arnold to ANPD, 6 March. "In view of activities yesterday, I believe this action to be O.K. for the present."
40. Ltr., Gen. Marshall to CG, USAFBI, U. S. Army Forces in British Isles, 19 Mar. 1942, in AAG 322.3 A1, Activation Units.
41. CM-675, London to AGWAR, 24 Mar. 42.
42. RAR, "Items of Interest from General Spaatz' Daily Journal," AFMR to ANPD, 30 Mar. 1942, in WP I, General #2.
43. CM-OUT-150, Marshall to Chaney, 30 Mar. 42.
44. CM-OUT-1181 (8 Apr. 42), Marshall to USFOR, WD #235, 7 Apr. 42.
45. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to CG, 1, 2, . . . 8 Air Forces, Preparation of Air Units for Balero, 4 Apr. 1942, in WP III-E-1A "Balero."
46. CM-OUT-290 (12 Apr. 42), Arnold to Marshall, AAFC 362, 11 Apr. 42.
47. CM-OUT-306 (13 Apr. 42), Arnold to Marshall, AAFC 395, 14 Apr. 42.
48. CM-OUT-520 (28 Apr. 42), Marshall to USFOR, WD 520, 28 Apr. 42.
49. Memo for CG, Interceptor Command, etc. by Brig. Gen. A. N. Duncan, 25 Apr. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
50. CM-1261, Chaney to AGWAR, 24 Apr. 42.
51. CM-1342, Chaney to AGWAR, 1 May 42.
52. CM-IN-0467 (2 May 42), Chaney to AGWAR, #1363, 2 May 42. This answered CM-OUT-518 (30 Apr. 42), Arnold to USFOR, AAFC 999, 30 Apr. 42.
53. CM-IN-2699 (10 May 42), London to AGWAR, #1474, 10 May 42.

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54. Memo for CG, BG, IC, etc., VIII Air Force, by Gen. Duncan, 25 Apr. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
55. Memo for CG, AAF by Gen. Spaatz, Organization of U. S. Forces in the British Isles with Particular Reference to the Relationship of the Eighth Air Force to the RAF, no date, but ca. 20 May 1942, in OPD 320.2, Great Britain.
56. See the chart in Appendix 3.
57. Memo for Gen. Eisenhower by Gen. Harmon, Organization of the U. S. Forces in the British Isles, 25 May 1942, in OPD 320.2, Great Britain.
58. Memo for AG/S, OPD by Col. J. E. Hull, European Sec., Theater Gp., OPD, Organization of U. S. Forces in British Isles, 4 June 1942, ibid.
59. CGS 75, System of Command for Continental Operations in 1943, 5 June 1942.
60. JCS, 19th Meeting, 9 June 1942.
61. JCS, 20th Meeting, 15 June 1942.
62. CGS, 33d Meeting, 24 July 1942.
63. CM-OUT-1490 (3 June 42), Marshall to USFOR, WD #1103, 3 June 42.
64. CM-OUT-1697 (8 June 42), Marshall to USFOR, WD #1120, 8 June 42.
65. Memo for Gen. Eisenhower by Gen. Arnold, 10 June 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
66. Ltrs., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Chaney, Gen. Arnold to Gen. Lee, Gen. Arnold to Gen. Hurtle, all dated 10 June 1942, ibid.
67. R&R, Directive for General Spaatz as CG of 8th Air Force, AFDA3 to AFAEP, 12 June 1942; AFDA3 to AFAEP, 15 June 1942, in Air AG 353.9 D2, Training, General.
68. Busk slip, Gen. Arnold to Gen. Harmon and Gen. Kuter, 13 June 1942; busk slip, Col. Craig to Gen. Kuter, both attached to R&R cited above.
69. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Spaatz, Coordination in Equipping, Manning, Organizing and Training AAF, 20 June 1942, in Air AG 353.9 D2, Training, General.

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70. Gen. Marshall to Gen. Eisenhower, Letter of Instruction, 20 June, *ibid.*
71. CM-IN-6792 (21 June 42), London to ACGAR, #2236, 21 June 42.
72. Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Gen. Chaney, 10 June 1942, in Air AG 320,2, England.
73. ^{CGO No. 7 ETJUCA 24 June 1942} CM-IN-8107 (25 June 42), London to ACGAR, #2311, 25 June 42.
74. ^{CGO No. 4, 42. YAF 18 June 1942} CM-OUT-6743 (26 June 42), ACGAR to London, #1307, 26 June 42.
75. Quoted in Lt. Col. Waldo H. Heinrichs' History of the VIII USAAF Fighter Command, Chap. III, 49-51.
76. Memo, Gen. Arnold to Adm. Stark, 23 Apr. 1942, in WP III-A-2, GB #1.
77. Chronology, VIII Bomber Command, in Manual of Reception Information for incoming units.
78. Directive, CG, USAFBI to Gen. Kaker, 25 Feb. 42, in work cited in n. 79 below.
79. Plan for Bomber Command and Constituent Units to Arrive in the United Kingdom, 1942, in AG/AS Plans, Filled Books, File #5.
80. See above, p. 25.
81. Ltr., Gen. Kaker to CG, USAFBI, Headquarters Site, 5 Mar. 1942, G-4 Annex, Incl. 1.
82. Chronology, VIII Bomber Command.
83. CM-IN-6962 (26 Apr. 42), London to ACGAR, #1310, 28 Apr. 42.
84. Gen. Spaatz to Gen. Kaker, Formation of Wing Headquarters Squadrons, 24 Apr., in Air AG 320,2, England.
85. CM-OUT-1031 (5 May 42), ACGAR to USFOR, WD #583, 2 May 42.
86. CM-IN-2477 (9 May 42), London to ACGAR, #1455, 9 May 42.
87. CM-OUT-3887 (14 May 42), Marshall to USFOR, #703, 14 May 42.
88. First 1100 Bombers Dispatched by Eighth Bomber Command, II, 433.
89. Chart taken from Manual of Reception Information for Incoming Units.
90. Organization of Bombardment Group Stations in the United Kingdom, 11 Nov. 1943.

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91. See above, pp. 20, 21.
- 91a. Eighth Air Force Hq., SO #6/1, 14 May 1942.
92. Above, pp. 20, 21.
93. GM-IN-0487 (2 May 1942), London to ACHAB, #1363, 2 May 42.
94. See preliminary draft and notes, "Activation of 8th Air Force Service Command," in History of Air Service Command in European Theater, Appendix.
95. VIII Air Force Service Command Hq., CO #2, 6 July 1942.
96. Ltr., Gen. Spaatz to Gen. Arnold, 5 July 1942, in VIII AFSC, Plans Section Files.
97. Ltr., Gen. Spaatz to Gen. Arnold, 8 July 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
98. History of Air Service Command in European Theater, Chap. 2, Organization.
99. Progress Report of VIII Air Support Command, 12 May 1943, in WP XII-F-2 N. Africa #1.
100. GM-IN-2973 (11 May 42), Chaney to ACHAB, #1484, 11 May 42.
101. GM, no number, Arnold to Chaney, 11 May 42.
102. Memo, Gen. Spaatz to CGAAF, 2 June 1942, in BOLERO-Orders and Plans.
103. GM-IN-0591 (26 June 42), London to ACHAB, #2351, 26 June 42.
104. Memo, "History of Sunninghill Park," same origin, no date.
105. Historical Summary of VIII Air Support Command, 28 Apr. 1942 to 1 Oct. 1943.
106. Daily Activity Reports, VIII Ground Air Support Command, 15 Sep. 1942; ditto, VIII Air Support Command, 10 Sep. 1942.
107. Ltr., Gen. Baker to CG USAFBI, Operational Training, Bomber Command, 1 Apr. 1942, British Isles, in AAC 000-000 Misc.
108. Ltr., Gen. Baker to Col. M. G. Craig, Plan for Operational Training in the UK, 16 Apr. 1942, *ibid.*
109. Ltr., Gen. Baker to CG USAFBI, "Recommendations on Operational Training of Fighter Units," 29 Apr. 1942, *ibid.*

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- 110. Ltr., Gen. Baker to CG 8th Air Force, "Recommendations for Aircrew Replacement OTH's," 9 May 1942, *ibid.*
- 111. CM-OUT-421 (22 April 42), Arnold to USFOR, AAF PG 712, 22 Apr. 42.
- 112. CM-IN-7493 (28 April 42), London to AGMAR, #1310, 28 Apr. 42.
- 113. Ltr., Maj. G. W. Pardy to Gen. Baker, Report on Program for Operational Training, 26 May 1942, in AAG 400, Misc. British Isles.
- 114. Ltr., Gen. Baker to CG USAFBI through CG 8th Air Force, Irish Stations, Recommendations on CCRG's, 15 June 1942, in AAG 000-800 Misc., British Isles.
- 115. Ltr., Constitution and Activation of Air Force Composite Command, 3 July 1942, AG 320.2 (7-2-42) MR-N-AF; VIII Air Force Composite Command, SO #1, 4 July 1942.
- 116. Ltr., Gen. Spaatz to CG AAF, "Combat Crew Replacements," 13 July 1942, in AAG 321.9-28, Groups.
- 117. History of the VIII Air Force Composite Command Headquarters, 4 July 1942 to 14 Feb. 1944.
- 118. Ltr., Gen. Spaatz to Gen. Kuter, Formation of Wing Headquarters, 24 Apr. 1942, in Air AG 320.2, England.
- 119. AAF Hq. CO #8, 20 June 1942.
- 120. Microfilm of AG cards, reel 5, item 1.
- 121. CM-IN-1296 (4 Aug. 42), London to AGMAR, #867, 4 Aug. 42.
- 122. CM-OUT-2020 (7 Aug. 42), WDOFD to USFOR, #3061, 6 Aug. 42.
- 123. Microfilm as in n. 120 above.
- 124. AAF Hq. CO #8, 20 June 1942.
- 125. ETOHQ, CO #4, 19 June 1942.
- 126. CM-OUT-773 (21 May 42), Marshall to USFOR, WDF/773, 21 May 42.
- 127. CM-IN-5548 (16 July 42), London to AGMAR, #412, 16 July 42.
- 128. CM-IN-5788 (17 July 42), London to AGMAR, #433, 17 July 42.
- 129. CM-OUT-5950 (21 July 42), CG AAF to USFOR, #SEM 2408, 21 July 42.

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Chapter III

1. Quoted in Report [Informal] by Lt. Col. G. de F. Lerner, 28 Apr. 1942.
2. Above, p. 9.
3. Ltr., Gen. Baker to CG ETOUSA, Plan for the Build-up and Employment of the Bomber Offensive, Eighth Air Force, 13 Apr. 1943.
4. For British statements the following are typical: CM (unnumbered), London to WD sgd. Lee, 19 Apr. 41 (outlines General Dill's views as expressed in conversation to General Arnold); JB #325 (Serial 729), General Strategy, 31 July 1941, par. 36; memo by Air Minister Trenchard, 27 Oct. 1941, in WP-1, General (memos of 19 May and 30 Sep. 1941). For American views see: ANPD/1, Tab #1, par. 3, and the report cited in n. 39 below.
5. Memo for Gen. Arnold by Gen. Royce, Digest of British Papers Received August 26 [1941], in II-E-1, RAF Data.
6. Serial #236, Employment by the U. S. Navy of Aircraft Engaged in Operations over the Sea, [British] Naval Attache for Air to SPENAVO, 30 Sep. 1941.
7. Lt. Col. G. de F. Lerner, Report [Informal], 28 Apr. 1942.
8. Note by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris on the Role and Work of Bomber Command, WP(42)374, 24 Aug. 1942, in AG 321.9-38.
9. Ltr., Sir Arthur Harris to Gen. Arnold, 14 Aug. 1942, in AG 312.1 E.
10. Memo for Chief of Naval Operations by Commander Forest Sherman, 18 Aug. 1942, in II-E-1, RAF Data.
11. CR 061, SPENAVO to Chief of Air Corps, 29 Nov. 41; CM #216, London to AG, 6 Dec. 41.
12. Memo for S/W by R. A. Lovett, G-2 Report of Admiral Ghoraley's Estimate of Bombers as Offensive Weapons, 17 Nov. 1941; memo for C/AS by ANPD, Commentary on Attached Memo re: Lessons from British Air Offensive, 18 Nov. 1941, in II-E, Evaluation of Intelligence. These refer to Admiral Ghoraley's memo of 14 November. CM-WW707, Airhit to Raddel, Personal C/AS to Harris, 12 Feb. 42 refers to a statement made by Admiral Ghoraley for Admiral Stark attacking the heavy bomber program.
13. CM-OUT-576 (21 Feb. 42), Arnold to Chaney, AF #2/353, 21 Feb. 42.

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14. Manuals on which these conclusions are based are: FM 1-10, Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack, 20 Nov. 1940; WD Training Circular No. 70, 15 Dec. 1941. The then current FM 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, was in process of revision; it has not been examined here.
15. "By instructions of the Prime Minister but contrary to judgment of RAF commanders, bombing effort is being concentrated in support of the Battle of the Atlantic." CM (unnumbered), Lee to WD, 18 Apr. 41, Cf. WP(42)774, as cited in note 7. In this Air Marshal Harris states that between April 1941 and March 1942 approximately 90 per cent of Bomber Command's operations were against maritime targets.
16. This analysis is from the defense of RAF policies by the British Joint Planning Staff and against American criticism. AL(41)6th Meeting, 21 Nov. 1941. The morale factor was stressed in the names of Sir Arthur Trenchard cited in note 4 above.
17. AL(41), Annex A, comment "G".
18. Aeroplane, 16 May 1941, 1 and 22 Aug. 1941.
19. Ltr., Air Marshal Harris to Gen. Arnold, 2 July 1941, in AAG 360.08, British Isles.
20. Ibid.; cf. CM (unnumbered), Harman to Arnold, 1 May 41.
21. CM #57, Chaney to TAG, 22 July 41.
22. Summary of B-17's (Fortress I) Bombing Operations, 12 Sep. 1941, in U. S. 9570, Airplanes Bomb., B-17.
23. Report of Interview with Maj. E. F. Mochlin, 7 Oct. 1941, ibid.
24. Gen. Arnold to Air Attache, London, Combat Employment of B-17 Airplanes, 1 Oct. 1941; 1st ind., Military Air Attache (Gen. R. Royce) to Gen. Arnold, 16 Oct. 1941, with 6 incls., ibid.
25. Aeroplane, 11 July 1941.
26. CM #664, London to AGWAR, 11 Oct. 41.
27. Memo for C/AS, Notes on a Conference with . . . Two British Bomber Pilots, 26 Nov. 1941, in AG 337 B, Conferences.
28. Summary of B-17's, as cited in note 22 above.
29. CM #303, Chaney to AGWAR, 24 Dec. 41. Freeman raised the point with General Chaney and had wished to refer the question to General Arnold and Sir Charles Portal. It may have been discussed at the Areadia Conference.

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30. Memo for C/AS, Notes on a Conference with British Pilots, 2 Jan. 1942, in AG 337 B, Conferences.
31. Above, pp. 11-15.
32. ANPD/1, Tab #1.
33. Memo for Gen. Arnold by H. S. Hansell through Gen. Chaney, An Air Estimate of the Situation for the Employment of the Air Striking Force in Europe (ABC-1), 11 Aug. 1941, in WF III-A-2, GB #1.
34. Memo for Gen. Lee by Gen. Chaney, Comments on Analysis of Bomb Damage to Key Points, 5 Sep. 1941, in file #48, Gen. McNarney's Notes.
35. OM #70, Arnold to Chaney, 6 Oct. 41.
36. Memo for Col. George by Maj. S. E. Anderson, Research Regarding Bomber-fighter Combats in Europe, 15 Oct. 1941, in II-E-1, RAF Data.
37. Memo for C/AAF by ANPD (HSH), Equipment Necessary for Daylight Penetration, 23 Oct. 1941, in WF-I, General.
38. Requirements for Destroyer Escort Plans, 8 Aug. 1941, Tech Report #239, in Eighth Air Force Strategic Doctrine.
39. Report, Bombing Accuracy Board (F. L. Anderson, H. G. Montgomery, Jr., Edward Flanick) to C/AS, 2 Jan. 1942, in III Q, Minutes, Boards, etc.
40. Gen. J. E. Chaney to AG, Bombing, English and German theaters, 6 Dec. 1941, in file #47, Gen. McNarney's Notes.
41. Memo for C/AS by H. L. George, 20 Jan. 1942, in WF III-A-2, GB #1.
42. Memo for C/AAF by ANPD, Preparing the U. S. Bombardment Force for its Contribution to the Defeat of Germany, 18 Feb. 1942, in WF I General.
43. Memo for C/AS by Gen. Arnold, Creation of Bombardment Tactical Committee, 26 Feb. 1941, in III B-1, #1 AAF. Air Corps officers were Col. H. L. George, Lt. Cols. K. N. Walker, E. E. Partridge, F. L. Anderson, and Edward Flanick. No report on these activities has been located.
44. Plan for Bomber Command, 3, f and G-3 Annex.
45. ANPD Division Digest, 21 Apr. 1941, in III-A-1.

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46. Memo for C/AS, Air Support of a Continental Invasion from the British Isles (to accompany WPD Appendix Sec. V of "Plan for Operations in Northwest Europe, 27 Mar. 1942), in WP III-A-2, OB #1.
47. Above, p. 12.
48. On 27 August the VIII Bomber Command was still "urgently" desiring first priorities be given the development of flame dampeners for B-17's and B-24's; CM-IN-10594 (28 Aug. 42), USAWW to AGWAR, #338 F, 27 Aug. 42.
49. Above, pp. 66, 67.
50. Ltr., Gen. Spaans to Gen. Stratemeyer, 14 Sep. 1942, in AAG 370.2, Bolero.
51. New York Times, 8 Aug. 1942; the dispatch is dated Washington, 7 August.
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53. New York Times, 11 and 16 Aug. 1942.
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Documents consulted in this study consisted of papers of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff; operational plans; letters, memos, and other forms of Army correspondence; recorded interviews; orders; cable and radio messages; and a few unit histories. The documents are cited in the notes according to the repositories in which they are found, and according to the following codes or symbols:

AAF Classified Files, cited AAG with decimals.

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Secretary of Air Staff, classified files, cited Air AG with decimals.

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