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ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES: No. 64

[redacted]

Classification changed to [redacted]
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22 SEP 1953 Samuel K. Smith Capt

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

TRAINING OF FOREIGN NATIONALS BY THE AAF

1939—1945

[redacted] the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, Archives Branch, [redacted], Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

[redacted]

The original of this monograph and the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, Archives Branch, Bldg. 914, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

[redacted]

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Training of Foreign Nationals by the AAF, 1939-1945

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

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Air Historical Office
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
August 1947

[redacted]

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[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

C O N T E N T S .

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[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

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FOREWORD

The present study, written by Dr. Gerald T. White, is one of a series of training monographs prepared by the Air Historical Office, but it differs from the others considerably in that it deals with a unique problem that faced the War Department--the training of foreign students in the techniques of Air Corps flying. The monograph discusses the purposes behind this training, the administrative problems involved, and the difficulties encountered in conducting the training of nationals from 31 foreign countries, training from which 20,500 foreign air personnel were graduated, from 1941 to 1945, 14,600 as pilots. Detailed appendixes list the courses of training.

Additional information, interpretations, and constructive criticism will be welcomed.

Chapter I

LEGAL BASIS AND PURPOSES OF FOREIGN TRAINING

The training of foreign nationals by the air establishment of the United States Army became a major phase of American military activity in the period immediately prior to and throughout World War II. This training represented no new departure for the Army's air arm. Throughout its existence it had occasionally trained representatives of foreign air forces. Such early training, however, had tended to be minor and incidental; and the number trained had totaled probably no more than a few hundred, mostly Latin Americans. During the period of World War II the number was expanded manyfold.

Training of the air personnel of other nations in the air establishment of the United States Army had been considered since its inception to be mutually beneficial both to the participating nations and to the United States. The foreign nation profited by having certain of its nationals become familiar with U. S. training processes, airplanes, equipment, and tactical doctrine, while the United States hoped to profit from the feeling of familiarity with and friendship for the United States developed in the foreign officers trained. These general benefits to both parties became much more apparent with the approach of war.

The great expansion after 1938 in the number of foreign trainees and in the extent and types of training was facilitated by new enabling

legislation broadly designed to advance the national interest. The intent of the legislation, insofar as it affected the training of foreign air personnel, was not alone to create good will for the United States through a training job well done, but also to increase United States security both by seeking to eliminate all trace of Axis influence in the air establishment of Latin America and by strengthening air forces of the opponents of fascism throughout the world.

Two major pieces of legislation, plus an Executive order and a new interpretation of the war powers of the President under the Constitution, provided the legal basis for the expansion of foreign training. The first of these measures, the so-called "Goodwill Act," which became law on 24 June 1938 and which was supplemented by Executive order on 29 August 1938, was intended to extend the influence of the United States in Latin America. It made available to limited numbers of Latin Americans "professional educational institutions and schools maintained and administered by the Government of the United States or by departments or agencies thereof," subject to such restrictions and terms as the President might direct.[1]

By Executive order the President required each executive department maintaining and administering educational institutions to draw up regulations to govern foreign training. He also ordered each department to submit a statement indicating the number of foreign students who could be accommodated in each school without curtailing the attendance of U. S. students, together with statements of qualifications required of students and of provisions for safeguarding information vital to the defense of the United States. According to the Executive order, applications to

receive instruction under the act of 24 June 1938 were to be made formally to the Secretary of State by the interested nation. He in turn would determine the feasibility of granting the request through consultation with the executive department concerned.[2]

A clear and concise statement of the goals of training under this legislation, insofar as it affected the Army, is to be found in a letter of The Adjutant General addressed early in 1939 to the chiefs of the various Arms and Services:[3]

> From the viewpoint of military cooperation, it is the purpose of this instruction to bring the United States Army into a contact with those of the other American Republics which will encourage mutual confidence, respect and understanding, will develop a common doctrine and method in the solution of similar problems, and will permit the forces of these Republics to benefit from familiarity with the organization, training, tactics and materiel of our Army.
>
> An equally important objective to be realized as a result of the program and the contacts established thereby is the displacement of the influence of European and Asiatic powers in the military establishments of the American Republics by that of the United States.
>
> Successful accomplishment of the Army's part of this program also will have definite political as well as military significance. It is to be expected that among the carefully selected trainees enrolled in our schools will be found future Army and Government leaders whose influence will be important in determining their country's policy toward the United States.

Particular stress was placed on the importance of the trainees' becoming "sincere friends of the United States and advocates of American military methods." This objective was stated to be "of more importance to the attainment of the general purposes of the program than is the development of technically proficient individuals, although the two will usually go together."

This legislation of 1938 provided the basis for much of the training accorded Latin Americans during the war period. Under its authorization the Army air arm trained substantial numbers of them. At the close of the war it remained the major means for providing training to the nationals of the Latin American countries. [redacted]

Of much greater importance in facilitating foreign training during the war period than the geographically limited and limiting legislation just described was the Lend-Lease Act, which became law on 11 March 1941. This measure was designed to make the United States the "arsenal of democracy" through the supply of materiel to those nations actively engaged in fighting the Axis. The law provided, however, not alone for the transfer of "defense articles" from the United States to other nations in the national interest, but also for the communication of "any defense information" necessary to the use of the defense articles.[4] By far the largest proportion of the foreign training of air personnel conducted during the period of the war was carried on under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. The provisions of this act, moreover, were used to supplement the act of 24 June 1938 in the conduct of much of the training in the two most important Latin American programs. These were the training programs undertaken for Brazil and for Mexico.

In approving the legality of the largest of the foreign training programs—the British 4,000-pilot training program of 1941-1942—Attorney General Robert H. Jackson stated as his opinion that training of foreign personnel in the use of airplanes and other air equipment made available to foreign nations under the Lend-Lease Act was a legal exercise of authority as conveyed by that act. In this opinion, however, he suggested another and broader basis for the conduct of such training. This was the President's power as Commander in Chief as defined in the Constitution. Attorney General Jackson stated:[5]

> Under the circumstances now existing the authority of the President to direct members of the Air Corps to instruct British students in the art of aviation would seem to fall directly within the President's power of Commander-in-Chief as traditionally

> exercised. . . . I have no doubt of the President's lawful authority to utilize forces under his command to instruct others in matters of defense which are vital to the security of the United States.

During the period between May 1941 and the close of the year 1945 air personnel of 31 different nations totaling upward of 18,000 students[6] were graduated from flying training schools and an additional 2,000 students from technical training schools in the United States. Of this large number more than half were British. Substantial training programs were also conducted for France, China, Netherlands East Indies, Brazil, and Mexico. Programs of still lesser size, though notable, were conducted for Turkey, for Yugoslavia, and for several of the other Latin American countries.[7] By participating in these programs the AAF helped both to increase the esteem and good will with which the United States was regarded by other nations and to render more effective the attack of many of the Allied nations against common enemies.

Chapter II

THE MAJOR TRAINING PROGRAMS

In order to establish a process for training which would be as efficient as possible, capitalize upon experience, and limit transportation costs, each of the major programs for the individual training of foreign nationals tended to operate at its own set of airfields and to fall under the jurisdiction of one particular training command. This was especially true of flying training. Thus, through most of the war period nearly all Chinese training was concentrated in the Western Flying Training Command (previously the West Coast Training Center), nearly all Latin American nationals were trained in the Central Flying Training Command (previously the Gulf Coast Training Center), and nearly all French training was concentrated in the Eastern Flying Training Command (previously the Southeast Training Center). A similar concentration is also evident in most of the other flying training programs for foreign nationals. The tendency to divide by nationality the much smaller number of technical trainees among the subordinate technical training commands is less noticeable. In this instance, however, particular types of training for foreign nationals tended to be given repetitively at the same fields.

Most training given foreign nationals by the AAF was designed to build up individual proficiency rather than to provide advanced tactical

or operational training (combat crew). Combat crew training was given, in general, only when a particular nation was actively engaged in hostilities against our common enemies and could not itself provide this training. Thus, although once planned, no combat crew training was provided for the British because of our own great need for facilities and for equipment. Since most of the Latin American nations were not active military participants in the war, combat crew training tended also to be withheld from them. Tactical training, on the other hand, was provided for the Chinese, French, and Netherlanders, for a fighter squadron each from Brazil and Mexico, and for a Yugoslav heavy-bomber flight. Some tactical training was provided for the Turks also, who were considered potential antagonists of the Axis.

United States crew members received their combat crew training in the continental air forces. Because of the continuing pressure of U. S. personnel on training capacity in the continental air forces over a long period of time and because, secondarily, the Training Command had acquired substantial experience with foreign nationals in supervising the individual phase of training, combat crew training for foreigners tended to be given in the Training Command until early 1944. Thereafter, as excess capacity began to develop in the replacement training units of the continental air forces, an ever increasing proportion of combat crew training was conducted by the continental air forces. Thus, most of the Chinese and all of the Netherlands operational training occurring before early 1944 was given in the Training Command. Operational training for French combat crews, on the other hand, did not begin until early 1944, and in consequence was given in the continental air forces. Chinese operational training for

medium- and heavy-bombardment crews was also subsequently transferred to the continental air forces.

Foreign training was given normally within the basic structure of the AAF program governing the particular type of training, and was given under AAF direction and supervision. The sole major exceptions were a portion of the British pilot training program and of the Netherlands East Indies pilot training program. In the former case, the British conducted a large part of their pilot training program throughout the war period under their own direction and supervision at civilian contract schools operated with Lend-Lease funds. In the case of Netherlands East Indies training, too, most of the training was conducted under the direction and supervision of Netherlands authorities, although at AAF fields. AAF personnel was assigned to both these programs, however, to perform housekeeping functions. Both programs will be described in greater detail within this chapter.

British Training

According to a summary written in April 1941 by the British Air Attaché at Washington, the British air training program in the United States came into being as a result of a report made to President Roosevelt by Harry Hopkins following a trip of inspection to Great Britain early in 1941.[1] One aspect of his report stressed Britain's critical need for greater facilities for the training of air personnel. Since Great Britain was then an active combat theater, the potential target of invasion, and the subject of frequent and heavy German aerial attacks, that nation could conduct training of additional air personnel only under great difficulties. Airdromes, for example, were required by fighter units

who were on the alert to repel attack. The use of many of these same airdromes by trainer airplanes reduced the possibility of their efficient use by fighter aircraft. Moreover, England had a poor climate in which to try to conduct rapid training, and the numbers of trainer aircraft and instructors were hardly adequate to the great needs of the training program.

Sympathy for the plight of Britain, which grew out of his belief that the cause of Britain in this instance was also America's cause, led President Roosevelt to issue a directive to the War Department to consider the possibility of assisting Great Britain in meeting its critical training need.[2] Already the Air Corps was assisting Britain in the conduct of the training of air personnel in a minor degree. In mid-October 1940, Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, had secured approval from the Secretary of War for a plan to enable limited numbers of U. S. volunteers for British service to obtain refresher training at civil flying schools which were under contract to the Air Corps.[3] For a period of two months beginning in January 1941, moreover, a team from the 19th Bombardment Group had instructed British pilots and crews at the Sacramento Air Depot, Calif., in flying the B-17. These pilots and crews in turn later gave B-17 transition instruction to other British air personnel.[4]

As a result of President Roosevelt's directive to the War Department, plans for one, and ultimately for two, large pilot training programs were tendered to the British. On 7 March 1941, four days before the President signed the Lend-Lease Act, General Arnold, at a meeting with the British Air Attaché, offered Great Britain 260 primary and 285 basic and/or

advanced trainer airplanes. It was his intent that these airplanes be used for training British pilots in the United States. At General Arnold's request, the operators of six civil flying schools which were under contract to the Air Corps were also present at the meeting. These men, General Arnold felt, were suitably qualified to conduct British training in this country. According to plan, each operator was to establish one new civil school for the conduct of British training exclusively.[5] The plan, as it evolved, provided for entering 50 British students in each school at 5-week intervals for the 20-week course. Such a flow of students, it was believed, would provide 3,000 graduate pilots per year. In consequence the program became known as the 3,000-pilot, or British Flying Training School, program.[6]

Authority for determining and administering the content of training was lodged exclusively in the RAF. Air Corps activity was to be limited to assistance in selecting the sites for the schools and in supervising construction. In addition, once the schools were in operation, the Flying Training Command was to assist the RAF by handling all matters pertaining to supply and maintenance and by dealing with certain auxiliary problems, such as medical care.[7]

Because the contractors were not able to finish the construction of the new schools by 7 June 1941, the date set for training to begin, the first two hundred British students were entered on that date as an overload in four of the schools already being operated by the contractors for the Air Corps. By the time of the arrival of the third class on 23 August, however, five of the six new schools were in operation. These were located at Lancaster, Calif.; Mesa, Ariz.; Terrell, Texas; Miami,

Okla.; and Clewiston, Fla. The sixth school was opened shortly thereafter at Ponca City, Okla.[8] A seventh, at Sweetwater, Texas, was in operation briefly in the summer of 1942.[9]

On 7 June 1941 the second and larger British pilot training program, the 4,000-pilot program, also got under way. This program arose out of a proposal agreed upon in the War Department and carried to London by General Arnold early in April 1941. At a meeting held on 13 April 1941 with ranking officials of the British Air Ministry headed by Air Marshal A.G.R. Garrod, General Arnold explained that because of the shortage of operational aircraft then current in the United States, the U. S. Army air arm would not be able to use effectively the potential full pilot output of its training plant for some time. He stated, therefore, that the United States was willing to divert temporarily one-third of the pilot training capacity of its military air establishment in order to assist Great Britain still further in meeting its pressing pilot training needs. This proposal was accepted gratefully by the British.[10]

The 4,000-pilot program or "Arnold plan," as it was also called, differed in several ways from the 3,000-pilot program already described. In contrast to the latter program, in which the RAF operated its own schools in the United States after its own training pattern, the former was operated within the AAF training structure. British students accepted under the 4,000-pilot program were trained in the same schools as U. S. cadets and were subject to the same program and standards as those governing their U. S. fellow trainees. As the plan evolved, it provided for entering the initial group of 550 British students in AAF civil contract primary schools on 7 June 1941, to be followed by a second group of 550

on 19 July. Additional groups of the same size were to be entered in civilian contract primary schools thereafter at regular five-week intervals for the standard 30-week air cadet course.[11] The first group of British students arrived at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 29 May, and succeeding groups arrived according to schedule.[12] By September 1941 a preflight phase had been added to British training in the endeavor to bring about a more stable entrance rate and to parallel more perfectly the U. S. program.[13]

British training under the 4,000 program also differed from that under the 3,000 program in involving the use of specialized schools for each phase of training. Whereas the British trainee in the 3,000 program took his complete pilot course at a single school, the British trainee in the 4,000 program changed schools at the completion of each phase of training. In order to minimize travel, therefore, all British training under the 4,000 program was concentrated in schools of the Southeast Training Center. This Training Center was also the one closest to England. The first class of British students was enrolled in civil contract primary schools at Tuscaloosa, Ala.; Arcadia, Fla.; Lakeland, Fla.; Albany, Ga.; Americus, Ga.; and Camden, S. C. Basic training for the 4,000 program was conducted originally at Cochran Field, Ga., and Gunter Field, Ala., whereas advanced single-engine training was conducted at Maxwell, Craig, and Napier fields in Alabama and at Turner Field, Ga.[14]

A third, though smaller, program was also established for training British aerial navigators. During the early part of 1941 the British were offered a quota of 10 students per class in the civil contract navigation school operated for the Air Corps by Pan American Airways at

Coral Gables, Fla. As a result of the intervention of Headquarters, AAF, this quota was increased to 150 per class by agreement with Pan American Airways. Beginning 7 July 1941 and thereafter, each class was to consist of 50 U. S. and 150 British students. Such a quota was intended to supply the British with an additional thousand navigators annually.[15]

These three programs, plus an additional small amount of refresher training for U. S. instructors who had been hired to teach in the civil schools of the British 3,000-pilot program,[16] continued throughout the balance of the year 1941 and through the first six months of 1942. They were, however, subject to minor changes. In mid-February 1942 the length of time for each phase of training under the 4,000-pilot program was reduced from 10 to nine weeks. In consequence, new classes began to enter a four-and-one-half-week preflight course at four-and-one-half-week instead of five-week intervals. At approximately the same time the duration of training for British students under the 3,000-pilot program was increased from 20 to 28 weeks. New classes entered training thereafter under that program at seven-week intervals instead of every five weeks as formerly.[17]

During the early months of 1942 plans were drawn up to provide operational training in operational training units(OTU's) for the British graduates who were beginning to pour forth in considerable numbers from pilot schools in the United States. As a result of a conference between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal, it was agreed that 11 OTU's for British students would be established and operated with Lend-Lease funds. Ten of these were to be constructed within the United States and the eleventh at Nassau in the Bahamas. Although all these fields

were constructed, only that at Nassau was released to the British. The increasing requirements of the AAF for training facilities and the reduced allocations of U. S. aircraft to the British because of U. S. needs caused drastic modification of the original plans.[18] Consequently, OTU training for British graduates of pilot training in the United States was given either in England or in schools located elsewhere in the British Empire.

Major changes also took place in the extent of British training during the midsummer of 1942. By that time, as a result of readjustment and expansion of its training facilities, Great Britain found that it no longer required much of the training assistance being provided by the AAF.[19] The desire of the British to train their pilots in accordance with their own training standards may well also have entered into their willingness to relinquish their quotas in the U. S. schools.[20] At approximately the same time, the AAF became increasingly pressed for adequate training facilities as a result of its own great expansion. Consequently, Headquarters, AAF informed the Flying Training Command early in July 1942 that "No British students will enter elementary schools in the Southeast Training Center in the September 8th class, nor in subsequent classes." At the same time the Flying Training Command was also informed that the quota of 150 formerly reserved for the British in the contract Pan American Airways Navigation School was to be filled by U. S. students in the class beginning 28 August 1942 and in all succeeding classes.[21]

Both the British 4,000-pilot program and the aerial navigator program were thus marked for a speedy termination. The last class enrolling British students under the 4,000-pilot program graduated from the advanced schools of the Southeast Training Center on 17 March 1943.

With the addition of these final graduates, a total of 4,370 British pilots out of 7,860 entrants had graduated from schools of the AAF in the period following 7 June 1941.[22] The last class of aerial navigators was graduated from the contract Pan American Airways Navigation School at Coral Gables on 17 October 1942. Of 1,225 British entrants in this program since the enrollment of the first 10 students on 24 March 1941, 1,177 had completed training.[23]

The British Flying Training School program also was subject to readjustment during the summer of 1942. On 7 August, by order of Headquarters, AAF, all British students were withdrawn from the civil contract school at Sweetwater, Texas, and the school was made immediately available to U. S. cadets. At the same time provision was made for the transfer to the AAF of the contract school at Lancaster, Calif. As of 7 August no new British students were entered at that school, although those already in training were permitted to finish training there. Thereafter the school at Lancaster, like that at Sweetwater, became an integral part of the contract school system of the AAF.[24]

Despite this reduction in the number of schools, the British more than offset their loss in schools by an increase in the number of students enrolled per school. In the fall of 1942 the number of students per school was raised to 100. Of these, however, 17 were U. S. cadets in the class beginning 11 November, and thereafter each British school trained a small quota of U. S. cadets in the endeavor to alleviate, though slightly, the backlog of cadets in the AAF Classification Centers.[25] The joint training of British students and U. S. cadets continued until entrance of the class of 11 February 1944, after which time no additional U. S.

cadets were enrolled in the British Flying Training Schools. The last group of Americans graduated from the British schools on 18 June 1944.

Although yet another of the contract schools was lost to the British when the contractor closed his school at Ponca City on 18 June 1944,[26] substantial classes continued to graduate from the four remaining British schools. After April 1943, for example, no class graduated fewer than 300 British pilots, whereas prior to that time only one graduating class had been as large. Despite the loss of the 4,000-pilot program, the British thus continued to receive sizeable increments to their pilot strength from the pilot program which they still operated in the United States. In all, 6,921 British pilots were graduated from the British Flying Training Schools by the date of termination of this program on 11 September 1945. In addition, 558 U. S. pilots also were graduated.[27]

From time to time a few British graduated from technical training courses given at AAF schools. The 65 thus trained between 1 July 1943 and 2 September 1945 were of slight importance, however, in comparison with the far larger total trained as pilots and navigators.[28]

Latin American Training

The training of nationals of the various Latin American countries in the military air establishment of the United States was based on several motives, all of which had in common a definite and direct relationship to U. S. national interest. Chief among these was the desire to further a major aim of United States foreign policy toward Latin America, that of promoting good will. At the conclusion of the war this motive remained dominant. Out of it seemed to be arising, too, the idea of a possible pan-American air force to promote the future peace of the

Western Hemisphere.[29] More immediate to the war itself were certain other goals. These included the elimination of all Axis influence from the commercial airlines and military air forces of the hemisphere through supplying trained air personnel to Latin America, and the building of a stronger air force in certain strategic nations, particularly Brazil, in order to promote hemisphere defense.

Both the large number of Latin American nations and the fact that almost none of these nations were active belligerents affected the extent of training afforded them in the military air establishment of the United States. While intended to be large enough to achieve the goals of United States national interest, the programs allowed most Latin American nations were small. Statistics of graduates of AAF flying and technical schools for the period from May 1941 to September 1945 indicate that only nine of these countries had 10 or more graduates. These were as follows:[30]

Country	No. of Graduates
Argentina	24
Bolivia	46
Brazil	814
Chile	50
Cuba	36
Ecuador	16
Mexico	447
Peru	51
Uruguay	11

Only Brazil and Mexico were thus accorded flying training for substantial numbers of their nationals.

There was one other program which, if not as large as those of Brazil or Mexico, was yet of great importance and interest. This program, unique in the history of the AAF, involved training Latin American civilians at the behest of the Department of State to replace civilians

of Axis nations in the operation of Latin American airlines. These Axis nationals were numerous. The Acting Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs stated in a report made in 1943 that "Prior to the outbreak of war approximately 27,000 miles of airline transportation in South America were under the control of Axis nations utilizing their own personnel."[31] Certain of these airlines were in the area of the Panama Canal and constituted a definite threat to American security.

In the period of 1940-1941 a series of meetings was held under the chairmanship of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, designed to discover means "for the elimination of Axis influence in Latin American air transportation."[32] The War Department was represented at these meetings, as were also the Civil Aeronautics Board, Civil Aeronautics Authority, the Department of State, and representatives of federal loan agencies. The plan, as finally evolved, provided for training Latin American civilians to commercial proficiency as co-pilots on scholarships offered by the United States Government. The Civil Aeronautics Authority planned to train 200 of these students. The Office of Chief of the Air Corps also agreed to train 100, beginning in January 1942, as its contribution to the success of the project.[33] Only 78 were actually enrolled by the Air Corps, however, for higher priority activities following the declaration of hostilities in December 1941 precluded the carrying through of the Latin American civilian pilot student program as planned.[34] Those trained received most of their training at Texas flying fields in the Gulf Coast Training Center. Primary training was given mainly at Uvalde, Texas, while basic training was given at Randolph Field and advanced training

at Kelly Field. In conducting this training the Air Corps not only assisted in the larger problem of hemisphere defense but also derived valuable experience for its continued training of Latin American military personnel.

The most important of the Latin American programs from the point of view of numbers trained and also for the length of its duration, that of Brazil, actually consisted of three programs--the "130 pilot program," the "first 300 pilot program," and the "second 300 pilot program." These programs, entered into consecutively by the United States at the request of Brazil, were designed to build up a strong air force friendly to the United States in one of the two most important Latin American countries. They were also intended as a token of gratitude to Brazil for permitting the AAF to use its airfields for the South Atlantic ferry route at a time when the Nazis were threatening to overrun the whole of North Africa.[35]

The 130-pilot program was granted to Brazil in October 1942, following a searching discussion between the Department of State and the War Department and its subordinate organizations as to the feasibility of offering additional training to foreign nationals at a time when the military air training establishment of the United States was taxed to the utmost.[36] The training was approved, however, as a diplomatic necessity, and provision was made to receive the 130 students in nine classes spaced at four-and-one-half-week intervals. The first class began on 11 October 1942. Perhaps because of the difficulty in finding Brazilian students sufficiently qualified to meet the physical and language standards required by the AAF, the class quotas were rarely filled. A total of only 27 students was enrolled under this program.[37]

Despite the failure of Brazil to meet its quotas under the 130-pilot program, Dr. Salgado Filho, Brazilian Minister for Air, approached General Arnold at the time of his visit to that country early in 1943 to request his assistance in securing a training program which would permit Brazil to enter 300 of its nationals over a three-month period for pilot training in AAF flying schools.[38] The resulting plan, forwarded by General Arnold to Dr. Salgado Filho provided for the acceptance of 100 students each on 22 March, 24 April, and 26 May.[39] Although this time schedule was not kept, ultimately 291 students were entered under this program.

The second 300-pilot program, agreed to in January 1944, arose because the high rate of elimination incident to the preceding program had prevented the Brazilian Air Force from obtaining the full number of pilots for which it had hoped.[40] The new program provided for the entrance of Brazilian students into preflight school in six groups of 50 each. The first group was scheduled to begin its training on 7 April 1944, to be followed by succeeding classes at four-and-one-half-week intervals. In the establishment of requirements for admission to training, special emphasis was placed on the necessity for a good working knowledge of English, lack of which had been a major factor in the high elimination rate in the preceding programs.[41]

As in the case of the earlier programs, flying training under the second 300-pilot program was given primarily at Texas airfields of the Central Flying Training Command (Gulf Coast Training Center). Preflight training for these programs was conducted at the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center. Flying training was given at the following Texas airfields: primary training at Corsicana Army Air Field, basic training at Waco Army

Air Field, advanced single-engine training at Eagle Pass Army Air Field, and advanced twin-engine training at Blackland Army Air Field. During the fall of 1944 Brazilian flying training was transferred to other fields, all of which were in Texas. Primary training was given thereafter at Garner Field, Uvalde; basic training was moved to Perrin Field at Sherman; while advanced single-engine training was transferred to Moore Field at Mission; and advanced twin-engine training to Pampa Army Air Field.[42]

The Brazilian training program also shared with the Mexican training program the distinction that each provided a fighter squadron for service in an overseas theater. These projects were in line with the near-continuous search by the War Department, in conjunction with the Department of State, for means of dramatizing the war in Latin America and thereby bringing the hemisphere into closer unity.[43] The Brazilian fighter squadron was given operational training during the early months of the year 1944, first at Aguadulce, Panama, under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Air Force and thereafter at Suffolk Army Air Field, N. Y., under First Air Force jurisdiction.[44] It finished its P-47 operational training and departed for service in the Mediterranean theater in mid-August 1944.

The 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron, which was the other Latin American unit to serve overseas, arrived at Randolph Field, Texas, on 25 July 1944.[45] The pilot members of this organization first received advanced flying training at Foster Field, Texas, under the jurisdiction of the Training Command. They were then transferred for P-47 operational training to the Second Air Force at Pocatello Army Air Field, Idaho and at Majors Field, Texas. This unit was sent overseas to the Southwest Pacific in mid-January 1945.[46]

In addition to flying training, the AAF also provided technical training to substantial numbers of the personnel of Latin American air forces. In fact, nationals of a specific Latin American country who were given technical training in most instances outnumbered such nationals who were given flying training. The importance of technical training in the Latin American programs conducted within the United States by the AAF is perhaps to be attributed to the fact that because of insufficient facilities of their own the Latin American countries were accustomed to depend to a large extent on the United States for industrial and technical assistance. The high elimination rate among Latin Americans taking pilot training, moreover, influenced the number given technical training, for it was the policy of the AAF to give eliminees training in one or another of the technical specialties when possible. Technical training was given most commonly in the specialties of aircraft mechanic, armorer, or radio operator.

A total of at least 1,600 Latin American air personnel from 17 different countries was graduated from schools of the AAF in the period between the passage of the act of 24 June 1938[47] and the end of the year 1945. Perhaps half of this number were Brazilians and another quarter were Mexicans. Well over 600 of the 1,600 were trained as pilots.[48]

Latin American training is one type of foreign training certain to continue in the postwar period. Although all provisions for training foreign air personnel under Lend-Lease were terminated as of 30 November 1945, the act of 24 June 1938 was permanent legislation. Under the terms of this act, a plan was drawn up in mid-December 1945 providing for entering 648 Latin American military air personnel in schools of the AAF in

the period prior to 30 August 1946. Of this number 160 were to be pilots, 132 ground officers, 10 medical officers, and 346 enlisted technicians.[49] If quotas of such size are maintained, the numbers of Latin Americans trained per year in the postwar period will be even larger than during the period of World War II.

Chinese Training

Chinese training conducted by the AAF from the fall of 1941 throughout the period of the war sprang both from an emotional sympathy with China's plight in its long and unequal struggle with Japan and from the more positive desire to build up a strong air force in a nation that shared our cause. The beginnings of this training, as in the case of British training, antedate direct United States participation in the war. Unlike the British program, however, which waned as the war progressed, Chinese training increased as the strain on the U. S. training establishment lessened, thus permitting heavier foreign commitments. Great Britain, a modern, industrialized nation with long experience in the use of air power, required less aid from the United States as its period of crisis passed. China, on the other hand, required continuous and increasing aid if it were to have a strong air force; it could not provide one for itself. At the close of the war the United States still stood committed to the training of a large number of Chinese air personnel.

The first program for Chinese training, like the British programs initiated in 1941, was made possible by the passage of the Lend-Lease Act. On 29 March 1941, shortly after the passage of this important measure, Brig. Gen. H. B. Claggett was dispatched to China as the head of a three-man Army-Navy air mission to investigate the status of the

Chinese Air Force and its needs. The mission was in China from 17 May to 6 June 1941. It reported that in addition to supplying aircraft, the training of Chinese air personnel on a large scale by the United States was necessary if an effective Chinese Air Force was to be created and maintained.[50]

The nature of the report was in fact anticipated by earlier messages and statements from members of the mission. These, combined with Chinese requests for assistance in training[51] and with conversations between President Roosevelt and the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Dr. T. V. Soong, resulted in a program submitted by Gen. George C. Marshall to Dr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, on 15 July 1941.[52] The program provided for training by the AAF of a total of 500 single-engine pilots, 25 armament mechanics, 25 radio mechanics, and 20 heavy-bomber pilots and crews. Single-engine training and the armament and radio mechanic programs were scheduled to begin on 1 October 1941. Further provision was made for the entrance of pilot trainees into training in increments of 50 every five weeks, but no arrangement was included at this time for their tactical training after graduation from the flying school system. The heavy-bombardment pilot and crew program was scheduled to begin only on 1 April 1942. It was hoped that heavy-bombardment squadrons in the United States would have sufficient aircraft by that date to undertake the bombardment pilot and crew training phase of the program. As a matter of fact, however, because of the great shortage in aircraft and facilities, no heavy-bombardment air training was conducted for the Chinese until early 1944.[53]

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Difficulties as to the selection of properly qualified personnel by a nation desperately at war and as to transportation, particularly after Pearl Harbor, caused considerable irregularity in carrying out the program. The first group of Chinese students, for example, did not arrive in San Francisco until 20 October 1941 and was unable to begin training until early November.[54] Only one other group was able to make the trip eastward across the Pacific; thereafter, the Pacific war made necessary the long and arduous journey via India to the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.

The Chinese training program, so modestly begun, was held close to its original limits throughout 1942 and 1943. During that time, although amendments were made, the AAF resisted vigorously any changes which would result in a greater diversion of facilities to foreign training. Thus, when in April 1942 Dr. Lauchlin Currie, at the instance of the Chinese Government, requested that the Chinese program be expanded to include the training of 200 bombardier-navigators, General Arnold successfully protested that this additional training could be accomplished only at the expense of "serious interference with existing plans for the formation of American crews."[55] Again in July 1942, when Maj. Gen. T. H. Shen requested refresher training for 100 Chinese pilots in addition to the training of the 500 Chinese already agreed upon, the AAF yielded only on condition that "the additional Chinese students are merely an extension of our present commitment for training 500."[56] The same condition was attached to approval of the request made by the Chinese early in 1943 for training still another 500 pilots.

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After December 1943, however, as the training load passed its peak and excess capacity and equipment seemed potentially available, amendments to the training program were both frequent and of greater consequence. During that month the AAF agreed to train 960 B-25 nonpilot crew members.[57] Pilots for the resulting B-25 crews were to be furnished from the graduates of the pilot training program. By November 1944 further commitments had been made so that by that time the AAF had been directed to train a total of 1,500 pilots, 42 B-24 crews, 100 technicians in third and fourth echelon maintenance, 960 B-25 nonpilot crew members, 27 photo reconnaissance crews, and 30 celestial navigator-bombardiers.[58] In addition it was also obligated to carry on in the United States training which had been given at Karachi, India, prior to the dissolution of the CBI Training Command in September 1944. As a result of this assignment, the AAF acquired the further responsibility of training the Chinese 2d Medium Bombardment Group to combat proficiency and of giving refresher training to an additional 110 (subsequently 140) Chinese fighter pilots.[59]

During 1945 the AAF received still more directives for Chinese training. By late April 1945, although there had been no change in the goal for fighter training, certain other goals had been markedly increased. It was now planned to train 100 heavy-bombardment crews. The B-25 nonpilot crew member program, moreover, was increased to a 114 medium-bombardment crew program. The goal for photo reconnaissance crews was also raised at the same time from 27 to 39.[60] Technician training goals had been increased by 700,[61] and an additional increase of 104 technicians was approved prior to V-J Day.[62]

Training of Chinese pilot personnel was in the first instance made a responsibility of the West Coast Training Center. This delegation of

responsibility was a logical one. At the time of the arrival of the first group of Chinese students in October 1941, the Southeast Training Center was already engaged in the conduct of British training, while some Latin American training was being conducted in the Gulf Coast Training Center. The West Coast Training Center alone was engaged in the conduct of no foreign program; moreover, it was the Training Center in closest proximity to China. The advantage of proximity, it is true, was lost after the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States; for thereafter Chinese students had to come the long way round to the Atlantic seaboard. Nevertheless by that time facilities for Chinese training as well as personnel experienced in the instruction of Chinese were established and available in the West Coast Training Center.

The fields used in the multifarious aspects of Chinese training were numerous. They were clustered in greatest number in Arizona, thus minimizing the problems of transportation of graduates between fields and of supervision of the program. Throughout the period of the war primary flying was conducted at Thunderbird Field, Glendale, Ariz.; and, with the exception of the first two classes, basic flying training was conducted at Marana Army Air Field, Ariz. Throughout the war Luke Field, Ariz., was the site of single-engine advanced flying training for the Chinese students. It also became the location for P-40 operational training following the failure of the original plan during the summer of 1942 for operational training of Chinese students in U. S. tactical units. Advanced twin-engine training, which was first given to Chinese students in January 1943 at Williams Army Air Field, Ariz., was transferred to Douglas Army Air Field, Ariz., in November of that year. It was subsequently again transferred from Douglas to Marfa Army Air Field,

Texas. B-25 operational training was begun at Roswell Army Air Field, N. Mex., in March 1943. In mid-April 1943 this phase of the Chinese training program was transferred to La Junta Army Air Field, Colo., where it remained until its transfer to Columbia Army Air Base, S. C., and to the jurisdiction of the First Air Force in August 1945. B-24 transition training for Chinese students was begun at Kirtland Field, N. Mex., in the spring of 1944. It was followed by OTU training in the Second Air Force at Pueblo Army Air Base, Colo.

Preflight training was begun in July 1942 at Williams Army Air Field, Ariz., with the third class of Chinese. In December 1943 it was transferred to Santa Ana Army Air Base, Calif., which was the preflight school for U. S. cadets in the Western Flying Training Command. The move to Santa Ana was undoubtedly prompted by a belief that maintenance of Chinese preflight training in close relation to that given U. S. cadets would assure them more adequate training than would be possible in an independent establishment. In January 1945, following the consolidation of all preflight training at San Antonio, Texas, Chinese preflight was transferred to the new location. When the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Personnel Distribution Command, Chinese training was moved to Minter Field, Calif., for a brief interval. It was eventually transferred to Maxwell Field, Ala., the final location of the consolidated preflight school.

Other training, which was of far less importance numerically, was given at more widely separated flying and technical fields. Navigator training, for example, was given primarily at San Marcos Army Air Field, Texas, and bombardier training at Kirtland and Carlsbad Fields in N. Mexico. Flexible gunnery training was given first at Kingman Army Air Field, Ariz., and was transferred subsequently to Yuma Army Air Field, [redacted]

Radio operators were trained at Scott Field, Ill., and airplane mechanics at Keesler Field, Miss.[63]

Because of the fact that the AAF trained pursuit, medium-bombardment, and heavy-bombardment personnel for the Chinese, the Chinese program contained a greater range of types than did any other foreign program. In the period prior to the end of the year 1945, the following numbers of combat crew personnel were graduated: 889 pilots, 235 bombardiers, 83 navigators, 176 radio operators, 195 airplane and engine mechanics, 188 armorers, and 126 career gunners. In addition, the following numbers of ground technicians were graduated: 139 in airplane and engine mechanics, 115 in armament, 20 in communications, 24 in photography, 4 in Link trainer, and 6 in maintenance engineering. Only the British and French training programs graduated more personnel than the 2,238 Chinese who completed their training prior to the end of 1945.[64] It was planned that ultimately the Chinese program would surpass the French in the number of graduates, for it alone of the non-Latin American programs continued in effect after 1945.

Netherlands East Indies

Training of Dutch air personnel from the Netherlands East Indies was added suddenly early in 1942 to the several foreign programs already being conducted in the United States. Unlike the other programs already described, it was one neither anticipated nor long planned; rather, it arose out of the immediate needs of the Netherlanders for facilities to carry on air training for personnel who had escaped from the overrun Netherlands colonial empire.

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The original intent of the Netherlanders was to carry on training in Australia, to which they had fled, and which was also in close proximity to the Netherlands colonial empire. A conference of the Netherlands authorities with the Australian Prime Minister and with Australian and United States military authorities in early March 1942, however, proved any such plan impractical.[65] The heavy demands on Australian facilities made by Allied combat units, in addition to Australian training, made impracticable further burdens on the air facilities of that area. In consequence, the sole recourse for Netherlands East Indies training seemed to be the United States.

The request made by the Netherlands Legation at Washington to the War Department was more modest than most requests for foreign training. It envisioned the delegation by the AAF to the Netherlanders of a training airfield in the southern United States. Training at this airfield was to be carried on primarily by Netherlands instructors and in Netherlands-owned aircraft. In addition, they intended to pay the costs of training in cash. Despite the relatively modest character of the request, it was almost refused[66] and was finally accepted with reluctance. The desire to aid an ally was almost offset by the great need for training facilities by the United States itself.

Within the month following the granting of permission to train in the United States, the NEI Air Force detachment sailed from Melbourne, Australia, on 14 April 1942. A rather curious colony of air personnel and their families, it included 155 officers, 232 noncommissioned officers, 188 soldiers and marines, 60 women, and 57 children. The air personnel consisted of approximately 430 students, 60 instructors, and 85 administrative officers and men.[67] The detachment arrived at San Francisco on 4 May

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and proceeded immediately to Jackson Army Air Base, Miss., where the Netherlanders were to conduct training. The base was under the jurisdiction of the Southeast Training Center.

The Netherlands training program centered particularly on pilot training. Most of the air personnel considered potentially capable of pilot training were entered in that program.[68] Only the best, however, were permitted to complete the various training stages, and the eliminees were made available for training in other aircrew specialties. The number of pilots desired, which was originally placed at 125 fighter and 125 bomber pilots, was later increased to 135 fighter and 125 bomber pilots.[69] To gain this number of pilots the Netherlanders planned to enter 225 students in primary training and 205 students in basic training during May 1942. They planned to enter another 100 men in primary training in July 1942.

In order to take care of this training load, the Netherlanders requested that they be permitted to use Sherman Field at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., for primary training. This request was granted in mid-May 1942.[70] As a result, all primary training was carried on at Sherman Field by the Netherlanders until that field was closed to them at the end of September 1942. Thereafter primary training for a few stragglers was given either at various primary civil contract schools of the AAF or at the Jackson Army Air Base.

Jackson Army Air Base was used for basic and advanced flying training and, after February 1943, for operational training as well.[71] During that month B-25 training was instituted for the Netherlands bombardment pilots and crews. During May 1943 P-40 training was also instituted for Netherlands pursuit pilots. This base continued under Netherlands control and

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operation until the termination of the NEI training program on 15 February 1944.[72]

Other types of training, in contrast to pilot training, were conducted at AAF schools in conformity with the standard AAF pattern. Netherlands student bombardiers, for example, were enrolled in the bombardier school at Midland Army Air Field, Texas. Netherlands navigators received their training at Hondo Army Air Field, Texas; observers, at Brooks Field, Texas; and flexible gunners, at Tyndall Field, Fla. Radio operators received training in the Technical Training Command either at Scott Field, Ill., or at Sioux Falls, S. Dak.

As a result of U. S. cooperation in meeting their training need, the Netherlanders were able to create a well-trained, though small, air force by early 1944. During the interval between May 1942 and February 1944 they were able to graduate a total of 233 pilots from advanced flying training and 178 pilots from operational training at Jackson Army Air Base.[73] In addition a total of 10 pilots, 64 navigators, 97 bombardiers, 26 observers, 292 flexible gunners, and 77 radio operators were trained in AAF schools.[74]

French Training

The invasion of North Africa in November 1942 had as one of its notable achievements the establishment of contact between the Allies and the sizeable French population in Morocco, in Algiers, and subsequently in Tunis. Through this contact the Allies met with numerous former French air personnel, grounded since the fall of France, who were anxious for the opportunity to fight again against the Nazi and the Fascist. To

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their number were added still others who fled to North Africa from France itself to join the forces of the Allies. The advantages of a revived French Air Force were clearly apparent. Chief among these was the political and psychological value of a restored French Air Force "in raising the morale of the French people and at the same time lowering the morale of the German and Italian people."[75] This improvement in French morale seemed also potentially valuable in increasing French cooperation with the Allies, a cooperation which was the more important because many of the French were particularly well acquainted with the terrain of North Africa. Moreover, a revived French Air Force would add still more to the total weight of the Allied offensive.

According to a cable received at the end of December 1942 from Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz in North Africa, the French had approximately 1,400 pilots available for transition training on various types of U.S. fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft. He thought these pilots and associated air personnel were sufficient to operate a force ofabout 300 fighter, 400 medium-bombardment, and 100 transport aircraft. In order to provide replacements, General Spaatz wished to send 500 student pilots to the United States about 15 February 1943 for training. He also desired to send three later contingents of 500, each to be comprised of 270 student pilots, 75 student bombardiers, 55 student flexible gunners, and 100 student operators.[76]

Because of the heavy training load to which the AAF training establishment was then subject, the training program validated by Headquarters, AAF was considerably more modest than that requested by General Spaatz. As approved at the end of February 1943, it provided for entrance of a

first group of 100 French pilot trainees into schools of the Flying Training Command on 28 June 1943. A second group of 100 were to be entered in July 1943, and 50 each month thereafter.[77] No class smaller than 100 was ever entered, however, and the size of the classes was in fact increased. In mid-October 1943 the number of French students entering per class was raised to 132, and in mid-May 1944 was still further raised to 150.[78] Sixty per cent of those students who survived the more elementary flying training were given single-engine training, and the other 40 per cent were given twin-engine training. Following graduation from advanced flying training, these student pilots received either P-40 or B-26 transition training within the Training Command and were then sent either to the First or the Third Air Force for training as replacements (RTU training). The intent of the program was to supply 13 B-26 and 47 P-47 crews per month.[79]

The requirements for technical training in the over-all French program were met in part by a special commitment, which was announced early in July 1943.[80] This commitment provided for training 200 French students (who were not pilot eliminees) in airplane mechanic and engine mechanic courses. Plans for training a second group of the same size were announced at the end of December 1943.[81] The purpose of these programs was to try to supply the French with a sizeable number of trained personnel for B-25 and P-47 maintenance. Additional technical personnel were also furnished the French by training pilot eliminees in a technical specialty whenever possible and by requiring each flexible gunnery graduate to be also a technical specialist.[82] Each flexible gunnery graduate was required to enroll in one of three technical courses

as trainee armorer, trainee airplane mechanic, or trainee radio operator mechanic. After November 1943 it was provided that 13 flexible gunnery graduates should be entered monthly in each of these courses.[83]

Most French training was concentrated in the southeastern area of the United States.[84] Flying training was delegated primarily to the Eastern Flying Training Command which, if its general supervision of Netherlands East Indies training at Jackson Army Air Base be excluded, had been engaged in no major foreign training project since the termination of the British 4,000-pilot program in the spring of 1943. The desire to eliminate as much travel as possible for graduates of each stage of flying training in their movement to new fields and proximity to Europe were as valid reasons in locating most of the French training in the Eastern Flying Training Command as they had been in locating the earlier British 4,000-pilot program in the same Command.

Since the French pilot training program was smaller than the British, each stage and type of training was concentrated at one field. All primary training was thus given at the civil contract school at Tuscaloosa, Ala., until 11 September 1944, at which time this training was transferred to the civil contract school at Orangeburg, S. C. Gunter Field, Ala., was the principal site for basic training, and Craig Field, Ala., for all single-engine and P-40 transition training. During the summer and fall of 1944 three classes of students designated for twin-engine training were given an unusual twin-engine basic course at Shaw Field, S. C., in place of training on the normal single-engine basic trainer; but the experiment seems not to have been sufficiently successful to warrant its permanent inclusion in the program.

More specialized flying training was conducted at three airfields of the Central Flying Training Command, and technical training was given at various of the technical airfields. B-26 transition training was received by French twin-engine students at Dodge City Army Air Field, Kans. The French navigators were trained at Selman Field, La., and French bombardiers at Big Spring Army Air Field, Texas. French radio personnel seem to have been trained primarily at Scott Field, Ill. Mechanic training was conducted at Sheppard Field, Texas, Keesler Field, Miss., Lincoln Army Air Field, Nebr., and Lowry Field, Colo., and in many instances was also supplemented by training at various aircraft and airplane engine factories.

As in the case of the Chinese, the French program also provided for unit tactical training. Because of the unfortunate attempt to give tactical training in the continental air forces to the Chinese in 1942 at a time when those air forces were severely taxed with problems incident to the training of U. S. pilots and crews, nearly all Chinese tactical training thereafter was administered within the Training Command. All French RTU training, on the other hand, was administered directly by the continental air forces on the same basis as that for U. S. pilots and crews. This contrast between French and Chinese training was probably due to the fact that French RTU training did not begin until the spring of 1944, by which time the peak of the tactical training load in the continental air forces was past.

French pilots began to receive P-47 RTU training at Dale Mabry Field, Fla., under the jurisdiction of the Third Air Force early in January 1944. Shortly thereafter this training was transferred briefly to Richmond Army

Air Base, Va., and Norfolk Army Air Base, Va. In mid-July1944 all French P-47 RTU training was concentrated at the First Air Force field at Oscoda, Mich., and subsequently at Selfridge Field, Mich. French B-26 RTU training, which was originally conductedat the Third Air Force station at Barksdale Field, La., was transferred to Selfridge Field in the First Air Force in March 1945.

The total number of French trained in the period between April 1943 and the end of December 1945 is impressive. Although the program was late in getting under way, a total of 1,351 pilots, 253 bombardiers, 74 navigators, and 955 flexible gunners had been graduated from flying schools of the Training Command. In addition, the technical schools of the Training Command graduated 600 French aircraft maintenance personnel, 421 armament specialists, 422 radiomen, and 32 photographers. A sufficient number of this personnel were enrolled in RTU training to permit graduation of 397 P-49 and 165 B-26 crews prior to the end of 1945.[85] This undoubtedly comprised a substantial fraction of the existing French Air Force.

French government officials were exceedingly desirous of continuing to use the training facilities of the AAF for training French air personnel in the postwar period. The War Department, however, saw no direct military benefit accruing to the United States from the continuance of French training, particularly since there was no plan to use French air power in the Pacific following the conclusion of the European phase of the war. On 25 May 1945, therefore, the Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2, informed the head of the French Air Mission in Washington that in the absence of any other agreement beyond the informal arrangement to train monthly specific

numbers of P-47 and B-26 crews, the War Department would accept no new French personnel for training. Training of French personnel already in the United States would, however, be carried to completion.[86]

The position of the War Department with respect to French training was modified further following V-J Day. On 1 November 1945 Headquarters, AAF announced that all French training under Lend-Lease would terminate as of 30 November 1945.[87] As a result of French protest, President Truman agreed that training of French air personnel in the United States would be carried to completion, subject to two provisions. These were that all French training be concluded by 1 March 1946 and that the French Government pay the costs of training after 30 November 1945.[88] The inability of the French to supply the necessary funds under this arrangement resulted in the termination of all French training as of 18 January 1946.[89]

Miscellaneous Training

In addition to the foreign training programs already mentioned, the AAF also occasionally trained air personnel of other foreign countries. In most of these instances, however, the agreement provided for the training of only one or a few individuals. Frequently, moreover, the training given required merely a brief period of time.

These instances of training included such AAF activities as giving two weeks of B-25 transition training in September 1941 to a small group of Russian officers at Fort George Wright, Wash. These officers, 26 in number, had been sent to the United States to prepare to fly five B-25's to their homeland.[90] On at least one occasion a Norwegian medical officer was enrolled in the School of Aviation Medicine at Randolph

Field, Texas.[91] A total of 12 Polish officers received training in the United States during the war years. Eight of these men received some phase of pilot training, and four of them were given technical training. In addition to the men who received courses of instruction, a number of other Polish nationals were allowed visits, tours, and temporary assignments for the purpose of familiarization with U.S. methods and procedures.[92] Small numbers of Canadians and Australians also enrolled in various courses given by the AAF. At the conclusion of the war the AAF was just beginning a substantial training program designed to revive and enlarge the Philippine Army Air Force.[93]

Two of these minor programs were of somewhat greater consequence both because of the numbers involved and the duration of training. These were the Yugoslav and Turkish training programs.

Yugoslav Training. Yugoslav training by the AAF had become a subject for discussion between the United States and Yugoslav Governments as early as the summer of 1941. At that time both King Peter and Gen. D. T. Simovitch, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, requested that the United States train those of its pilots and student pilots who had escaped to the Middle East.[94] After considerable discussion the AAF agreed to train the Yugoslav pilots, numbering approximately 100, at an airfield of the Gulf Coast Training Center.[95] As a result of the entrance of the United States into the war, however, this Yugoslav training was postponed indefinitely.[96]

The first Yugoslav pilot training, consequently, was not given until the summer of 1942. On 1 June 1942 eight Yugoslav pilots--one first class captain, four second class captains, one lieutenant, and two flight

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sergeants--were entered in the four-engine transition school at Kirtland Field, N. Mex. Six of the group subsequently graduated from the four-engine transition school at Smyrna, Tenn., on 18 July 1942.[97]

Since four-engine pilots in themselves were not useful without crews, a discussion ensued as to the possibility of training additional Yugoslav personnel as aircrew. In part as the result of the interest of President Roosevelt in Yugoslav training and his belief that the Yugoslav crews might be of use to the Office of Strategic Services in affording an avenue of contact with the Yugoslav resistance movements, the AAF offered to train sufficient personnel to establish a Yugoslav flight within the structure of the United States military air establishment.[98] Because of the interest of the Office of Strategic Services in Yugoslav training, the expenses of training were charged to that agency.[99]

In accordance with the agreement reached between AAF officers and officials of the Yugoslav Government early in October 1942, 39 Yugoslav air personnel were dispatched from the Middle East for training in the United States. They arrived at Miami, Fla., in mid-November.[100] On 14 December 1942, after a few weeks of instruction in English, all except the four pilot trainees in the group began to receive flexible gunnery training at Fort Myers, Fla. Subsequently the navigator and bombardier students were entered in the preflight school at Ellington Field, Texas. Thereafter the navigator students were trained at the navigation school at Hondo Army Air Field, Texas, and the bombardier students at Carlsbad Army Air Field, N. Mex.[101] Those Yugoslav pilots who had been graduated from the Training Command four-engine transition schools were given operational training concurrently at Davis-Monthan Field, Ariz., under the

jurisdiction of the Second Air Force. The new pilots meanwhile were trained as B-24 co-pilots in a four-engine transition school.

The Yugoslav training program was completed by early August 1943. Shortly thereafter the four crews which had completed training were made ready for overseas service. They served subsequently both with the Fifteenth and the Twelfth Air Forces in the Mediterranean theater.[102]

Turkish Training. The impetus which resulted in the training of Turks in the United States by the AAF arose from the fact that the Turks could not avail themselves of British training facilities and instruction as in former times. The British, conscious that their homeland was a war theater and deeply concerned with their own training needs, could no longer undertake the conduct of pilot training for foreign nations. Although the British were not able to carry on training for the Turks, they seem to have been sympathetic to the desires of the Turks and to have assisted them in the presentation of their problem to the United States. The common element of interest to the Turks, British, and Americans in late 1942 and early 1943 was the strong possibility that the Nazis might attack Turkey in the endeavor to open up yet another route to the Middle East.[103] Consequently, the Allied powers were willing to attempt to build up the strength of neutral Turkey for its protection against Nazi attack.

The first request from the Turks for training by the AAF was made in mid-December 1942 by the Turkish Air Attache in Washington, Maj. T. Ariburun.[104] Specifically, the AAF was asked to give tactical training to about 10 Turkish officer pilots during 1943 and individual pilot training to approximately 100 Turkish air cadets during 1944. After

discussion by the interested subdivisions of Headquarters, AAF, this request was granted.[105]

Eleven Turkish officers arrived in the United States in July 1943 for tactical training in accordance with the agreement. Since most of them were deficient in their understanding of English, they did not report to the Central Flying Training Command until October 1943.[106] Of the 11, 2 were trained as B-24 pilots, 2 as B-25 pilots, 5 as P-40 pilots, and 2 as P-40 reconnaissance pilots. In general, advanced flying training and transition training to tactical aircraft were given at airfields of the Central Flying Training Command; thereafter, except for the reconnaissance pilots, they received more advanced training at tactical training installations of either the Second or Third Air Force. This program was completed by 1 June 1944.

The first of two increments of 50 Turkish pilot students reported to the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center in mid-April 1944, and were followed by the second increment one month later.[107] Both groups received prolonged preflight training in the endeavor to improve their knowledge of English. Flying training for the first group was begun in August 1944. Primary training was given at the contract school at Uvalde, Texas. Basic training was conducted at Perrin Field, Sherman, Texas, and advanced single-engine training at Moore Field, Mission, Texas. This training program was later extended to include training on tactical aircraft in the following ratios: 50% fighter, 40% bomber, and 10% reconnaissance training.[108] P-47 Turkish pilot training under this program was given primarily at Abilene Army Air Field, Texas, while B-25 training was given at Columbia Army Air Base, S. C.

The "100 Turkish pilot program" proved to be among the least successful of the foreign programs. Of the 92 who entered, 54 were eliminated prior to completion of the individual pilot phases of training in the schools of the Training Command. Of the 38 who did graduate, however, 36 had completed tactical training by the date of termination of all Lend-Lease air training on 30 November 1945.[109] Difficulties of adjustment to an alien environment, language difficulties, and inadequate ability, all seem to have been major factors in the poor record made by the Turks.

Chapter III

ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

Preparation and Processing of Programs

As in the case of many AAF activities during the war, the foreign training program and its administration were less the result of orderly planning than of successive adjustments to meet new situations as they arose. By the close of the war no prescribed routine for the orderly consideration of foreign programs had yet been established, although in practice a fairly standard pattern was being observed.

Several of the earlier programs were in great part the result of the personal interest of President Roosevelt. This was true of most, if not all, of the British programs, of the original Chinese program, and of Yugoslav training. Other programs had less personal genesis. They arose out of diplomatic and military negotiations and calculations, as in the cases of French, Netherlands, the later Chinese, and Turkish training. Frequently the first impetus came from the individual war theaters. In still other instances General Arnold played the major role. This was, for example, particularly true in the case of the first Brazilian 300-pilot program.[1]

Dependent upon the point of origin, the foreign training programs evolved in various ways. Those programs which resulted from the personal interest of President Roosevelt or General Arnold were subjected to

investigation within the AAF to determine the availability of facilities, and a report was rendered either to the White House or to General Arnold. This information was then made known to the prospective foreign country to which training was to be tendered.

Requests by foreign nations for the training of foreign air personnel were submitted through the Foreign Liaison Branch, G-2 in most instances. The function of this office was primarily that of serving as the point of contact for the War Department with military attachés and military missions of foreign governments. Prior to 1944, perhaps in the interest of seeming efficiency, the request for training was channeled by the Foreign Liaison Branch directly to the AAF. In the period before the major reorganization of March 1943 the requested program was circulated for comment among AC/AS, Plans; AC/AS-3; AC/AS-4; and the Directorate of Military Requirements. Within each of these organizations the program was routed to the subordinate sections concerned. In addition, if legal questions were involved, the projected program was submitted to the Air Judge Advocate. In the first few months following the March 1943 reorganization of the AAF, the programs were circulated among AC/AS, Plans; AC/AS, Training; AC/AS, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements; AC/AS, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution; and their interested subsections. After this informal consultation, decisions with respect to the acceptance of the programs were rendered by the Chief of Air Staff.

The War Department General Staff divisions seem to have played little part in these programs for training foreign military air personnel until late in 1944. Except for the channeling of an occasional requested program from the Foreign Liaison Office to Operational Plans Division (OPD)

in an effort to determine the advisability of granting the request, the General Staff seemed primarily concerned with maintenance of security regulations as prescribed by G-2. By late 1944, however, the procedure for considering foreign training was "regularized" as a result of the assertion of General Staff authority over the consideration of foreign training programs.[2] After that time, requests for foreign training were no longer channeled to the AAF but were sent instead to OPD and G-3. Under this arrangement the function of OPD in all instances was to consider the advisability of having the requested training given by the War Department; G-3, on the other hand, was to consider how such training could best be given. These two staff agencies coordinated with their respective counterparts in the AAF--AC/AS, Plans and AC/AS, Training--prior to the announcement of a decision. The decision, if favorable, was issued in the form of a directive from G-3 to AC/AS, Training to conduct the training specified. The foreign government was notified formally of the War Department decision by the Foreign Liaison Office, G-2.

The reasons for this change in procedure are not known definitely. It seems probable, however, that better administrative procedure was achieved through the change, which centralized authority for decisions at the General Staff level instead of delegating it to the Air Staff. In actuality, moreover, the Air Staff suffered no great diminution of power; for in no instance did the General Staff act in opposition to the recommendations of the interested Air Staff divisions.[3]

Criteria used in determining the advisability of giving particular foreign training programs seem never to have been formally expressed in

the period prior to 1943. Implicit in the consideration of any program, however, were the general ideas of both long-range and short-range national and military interests. Only those programs conforming to one or another of those interests were accepted.

The first formalized expression of policies for use in the consideration of Latin American training resulted from the disapproval given by AC/AS, Plans in November 1943 to a request from the Colombian General Staff for advanced combat training for 15 of its pilots. The granting of this training was strongly urged by Hon. Arthur Bliss Lane, U. S. Ambassador to Colombia, as a useful opportunity for building up U. S. prestige in that area.[4] Despite this advocacy, AC/AS, Plans nevertheless registered its disapproval, stating that the policy of the AAF was not to give combat training to the personnel of a nation such as Colombia, which, though technically a belligerent, was not actually engaged in hostilities. The guiding policies were expressed as follows:[5]

> a. To give crew training only when it will not interfere with present United States Army Air Forces programs.
> b. To give training through advanced flying training to students from all Latin American countries when it does not interfere with United States Army Air Forces program.
> c. To give transition training on such aircraft except trainers as are furnished to Latin American countries, when desiredand not interfering with our own program.
> d. To give OTU and RTU combat training only to students from Latin-American countries planning on sending expeditionary air forces to fight in the current war.

At the conclusion of the European war a more general statement emanating from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was issued to govern all foreign training. Under provision of Policy Memorandum No. 21 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operational Plans Division of the General Staff announced on 21 June 1945 that foreign training was to be permitted only in the

following three cases:[6]

Those being trained for the war against Japan.
Those being trained to further United States policy in the Western hemisphere.
Those who come under the provisions of post-war policies as such policies are determined.

Policy with respect to the last provision was to be prepared by the Joint Post-War Committee. The latter two principles continued to obtain following the conclusion of the war against Japan.

Administrative Control

No special organization existed for the administration and control of foreign training until the establishment in March 1942 of a Latin American subsection in the Directorate of Individual Training. Prior to that time the general supervision of foreign training was lodged in the Training and Operations Division of the Office of Chief of the Air Corps. Since the number of foreigners being trained was small, there seemed little reason to create a special administrative organization apart from that which supervised and controlled U. S. cadets and trainees.

The impetus for the establishment of a new agency with authority to control foreign training came as a result of deficiencies revealed in this earlier system of control. During the fall of 1941 several incidents involving Latin American trainees threatened to destroy any possible good will deriving from foreign training in the instances of the particular Latin American nations concerned. On one occasion, five Venezuelan pilots assigned to the 112th Observation Squadron at Fort Bragg, N. C., were recalled by their Government because they had averaged less than 10 flying hours per month in the two months they were attached to the unit.[7] In

another instance 16 officers from eight different Latin American countries had an unfortunate experience both during and after an advanced flying training refresher course at Kelly Field, Texas. While taking this training, they were segregated from the other pilots. Following completion of their training on 1 November 1941, they were grounded and their pay stopped. They were permitted no instruction and were forbidden to enter the hangars. When orders were received on 1 December transferring them to various combat units, each officer found on arrival that the outbreak of war had made him an encumbrance to the organization to which he had been assigned.[8]

Three members of this group, one Mexican and two Chilean officers, expressed their complaints at a meeting held with Nelson Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, on 20 December 1941. In his memorandum, which was later transmitted to the War Department, Mr. Rockefeller reported all three officers as "extremely friendly and understanding." He stated, however, that "they felt that it would be very unfortunate should the present procedure continue to the time of their departure, as all of the men would then go back to their countries in a definitely unfortunate psychological frame of mind, having learned nothing when a great deal will be expected of them by their respective air forces."[9]

The memorandum of this meeting, together with other complaints, resulted during January 1942 in an investigation, requested by General Arnold, of all Latin American training. In general, the report of the investigating officer, 2d Lt. Robert C. Brown, corroborated the statements in the memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller. He found an "almost complete

lack of directives, advance notice and Headquarters planning." He found also that units did not know what publications could be made available to foreign trainees without violating security regulations. In consequence, he recommended, among other things, "that a directive be published explaining the purpose of training foreign officers, what can be shown them, and the degree of priority they are to receive." He also recommended that more effective control be exercised over Latin American training by the War Department, and that in units conducting Latin American training officers be appointed to supervise that training.[10]

In the endeavor to render the administration of foreign training more effective, General Arnold on 10 February 1942 addressed a letter to the Office of Chief of the Air Corps laying down basic improvements in administration.[11] The letter provided that a liaison officer be appointed in the Training Division of the Office of Chief of the Air Corps, "who will be charged with the supervision of the program, training and treatment of all officers from Latin American republics in the United States. This officer should be Spanish speaking and sympathetic to the problems of the Latin American officers. . . ." The letter further stated the underlying goal of Latin American training, beyond the successful training of the individual, to be that of maintaining and increasing "the friendship and cooperation of our Latin American neighbors." It directed that one officer be appointed in each subordinate command training Latin Americans to look after their training and welfare.

As a result of this directive, a Latin American Subsection was established in March 1942 in the Special Training Section of the newly organized Directorate of Individual Training, which was itself a subordinate directorate of the Directorate of Military Requirements.[12] The

personnel for the subsection was selected with care. Its first chief, Maj. A. Frank Katzentine, had had a considerable Latin American legal practice in Florida and spoke Spanish fluently.[13] In May 1942 a more important appointment was made when Capt. George A. Braga, a former sugar company executive, was added to the staff. Like Major Katzentine, he was also thoroughly skilled in the use of Spanish. Captain Braga became chief of the subsection in June 1942 and remained in authority throughout the period of the war until his release from the Army in September 1945.[14]

The other officers added to the staff were also of high caliber. 1st Lt. Alfred Kidder, II joined the office in November 1942 directly from his civilian position as instructor in anthropology and curator of the Peabody Museum at Harvard University. As a result of his field trips to several of the Latin American countries he had acquired not only a thorough knowledge of the Spanish language but also a firsthand acquaintanceship with those countries.[15] 1st Lt. Anne H. Richards became a member of the staff in April 1944, as the number of the foreign training commitments of the AAF continued to increase.[16] In April 1945, Maj. Gwynn H. Robinson became the final addition made to the office during the war period. A bomber pilot with a distinguished record in the European theater, he could contribute from his firsthand experience as pilot, to the solution of many training problems.[17]

The authority of the section, originally limited to Latin American training, was rapidly expanded to include all foreign training. By early April 1942 the section was concerned with Chinese training; by early May 1942 with Netherlands training; and probably as early as either of these dates it was concerned with British training also. Subsequently

the name of the section was changed from Latin American Subsection to Foreign Training Section, so that the name might indicate more clearly its enlarged functions.[18] Following the abolition of the directorates in the major reorganization of the AAF in March 1943, the Foreign Training Section became the Foreign Branch, a unit of the Air Crew Training Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training.[19] By June 1944 the name had been further changed to the Foreign Training Branch of the Individual Training Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training.[20]

Although the name of the office established to administer foreign training was changed from time to time, the nature of its functions remained approximately the same from the period of its origin. In essence, it was to serve as a hub or focal point for the totality of foreign air training. In an international sense, with the approval of the Foreign Liaison Office, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, the office served as a liaison between the AAF and the air attachés and military missions of the foreign governments for which the AAF was conducting training. It supplied information and conferred with these foreign representatives with respect to the operation of their training programs. The office also functioned as a liaison between the AAF and other governmental agencies such as the Department of State, Office of Strategic Services, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Defense Supplies Corporation, and Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, which also were interested in foreign training. Within the War Department it maintained direct contact with the Foreign Liaison Office, Military Intelligence Service, G-2. Within the AAF it supervised the officers in the subordinate training commands appointed to conduct foreign training.[21] As a result

[redacted]

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of the many-sided nature of its activities, it thus tended to unify a series of training ventures which, without its central existence, would undoubtedly have operated far less smoothly.

In accordance with the specific statement in General Arnold's letter of 10 February 1942 requiring that "one officer, Spanish speaking, if possible, be charged, in each command where Latin American officers are assigned, with assisting the accomplishment of their air and ground training, recreation and social activities," the Flying Training Command appointed Lt. Col. Thomas S. Power as liaison officer. When Colonel Power departed from the Training Command in July 1943, his liaison duties were assigned to Col. J. L. Price, Executive Officer of A-3. The Flying Training Command transmitted the directive from General Arnold to its subordinate commands.[22] The Gulf Coast Training Center (Central Flying Training Command), which was the Training Center in which most Latin American flying training was conducted, also appointed a liaison officer. Capt. Frank Graham, the liaison officer during most of the war period, was persistently active in his efforts to secure a high efficiency in all phases of Latin American training.

As a result of the deficiencies existent in the operation of the over-all foreign training program within the Training Command because of the lack of centralization at that level, the Foreign Training Branch at the end of July 1944 directed the Training Command to appoint an officer "to monitor all foreign programs."[23] It was to be the responsibility of this officer to coordinate all matters pertaining to foreign training which arose in such offices as Budget and Fiscal, Personnel,

Quartermaster, Intelligence, Transportation, and the Air Surgeon. The first officer appointed as monitor was Lt. Col. F. C. Carr, who was one of the staff of the Training Command's A-3 Division. This linkage with the A-3 Division, the agency most directly concerned with foreign training, was preserved in the selection of his successors. All three of these, Lt. Col. L. W. Jurden, Maj. Edmund Brown, and Capt. Carl Watson, were also members of the A-3 Division.

Of the foreign training programs other than Latin American, that most closely watched because of the administrative problems involved, was the Chinese. This program, which was carried on primarily within the West Coast Training Center (Western Flying Training Command), was assigned a special Director of Chinese Training. Both Col. C. J. Kanaga, the first Director of Chinese Training, and Maj. Christy Mathewson, his successor, had had extensive experience with Chinese as a result of pre-war assignments in China.[24] Because of their administrative positions with respect to Chinese training, they were able to use this experience in the conduct of what was in many ways the most difficult of the foreign training programs. Colonel Kanaga and Major Mathewson made frequent reports on the progress of Chinese training to the Foreign Training Section of Headquarters, AAF.

In most other instances foreign training programs were conducted in the subordinate commands within the ordinary framework of command. No special directors of British, French, or Turkish training were designated, for example. U. S. personnel who acquired substantial experience in training nationals of a specific foreign country, however, and particularly thosewith special language equipment, were likely to be kept within specific

foreign training programs for long periods of time. In one instance, that of Yugoslav training, a U. S. officer with knowledge of Serbo-Croatian, Capt. John J. Stiglich, was designated to accompany the Yugoslavs throughout the period of their training.[25] He acted in a supervisory capacity with respect to their training and had direct access to the Foreign Training Section at Headquarters, AAF.

Nearly all the foreign groups receiving training under the direction of the AAF had their own liaison officers at the major training fields used in the conduct of their programs. The liaison officer functioned as commanding officer of his national group at that field, but for administrative purposes he delegated his command to the AAF base commander. On the other hand, all orders from the base commander affecting the group of foreign nationals receiving training at that field were transmitted through the foreign liaison officer. Punishment in particular was rarely administered to foreign personnel by the AAF directly, but was administered by the commanding officer of the foreign unit in conformity with the regulations of the foreign army.[26]

If the program was of considerable size, as were the French and Chinese programs, in addition to liaison officers at the fields there were also liaison officers at the headquarters of the particular Training Command subcommand in which training was being received. The foreign officer commanding his nationals at the field reported to the liaison officer at the immediate higher headquarters, who in turn reported to his military mission in Washington. The liaison officer at a specific field was apt to communicate directly with the military attaché of his country in Washington in the case of the smaller programs. As a result

of having foreign officers at these levels responsible for the foreign nationals receiving training, it was possible to secure a smoother coordination between the AAF and the foreign governments in the conduct of training than could otherwise have been achieved. For the major programs it was thus possible to have opportunities for consultation with respect to the problems of the particular foreign training programs at each level from that of the individual base to that of Headquarters, AAF. For the smaller programs, moreover, consultations were nearly always possible at the base level and at that of Headquarters, AAF, if not at the intermediate levels.

Finance

The means of financing the various foreign programs depended upon the basis upon which each was initiated. Training administered to Latin American nationals under terms of the act of 24 June 1938[27] was given free of charge, insofar as the specific expenses of training were concerned. Incidental expenses such as housing, subsistence, medical care, and transportation were not covered by the act of 24 June 1938 and were the responsibility of the government whose nationals were receiving training.[28] In some instances, however, ways were found to take care of these expenses, too, without charge to the Latin American governments. Thus, through the mediation of the Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, the Defense Supplies Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, paid the expenses with respect to transportation, tuition for training in civil contract schools, housing, subsistence, medical care, and burials incurred by those Latin American civilian students being

trained by the AAF early in 1942 to replace Axis nationals on South American airlines. The Defense Supplies Corporation was even authorized to pay $25 per month for spending money to any Latin American civilian student of this program whose homeland was not paying him an allowance.[29] In other instances supplementary Lend-Lease requisitions were drawn to cover expenses not sanctioned by the act of 24 June 1938. This procedure was used in the conduct of the first and second 300-pilot training programs for the Brazilians, in the training of the 1st Brazilian Fighter Squadron, and in the training of the 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron.

Most foreign training, and practically all that given to other than Latin American nationals, was given under general Lend-Lease requisitions. Requests for foreign training under Lend-Lease were first submitted to the Defense Aid Section, which had been set up in July 1941 in the Materiel Division of the Office of Chief of the Air Corps. This section, renamed the International Section on 30 April 1942 and assigned to AC/AS-4 and subsequently AC/AS, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution in the reorganizations of March 1942 and March 1943, passed upon Lend-Lease requests and ascertained that the requisitions were properly drawn.[30] It was redesignated the International Branch on 1 June 1944, at which time it was given enlarged functions. The International Branch became a subordinate office of AC/AS, Materiel and Supply when AC/AS, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution was thus renamed on 19 July 1944.

In contrast to the training of Latin American nationals under the act of 24 June 1938, the basic costs of which were absorbed by the AAF without record, training conducted under Lend-Lease requisitions required a procedure for the assessment and recording of costs. These requisitions

varied among themselves in the items of expense covered and as to whether full cash payment was expected from the participating nation. Items which were always included were expenses for facilities, equipment, supplies, and services. Other items which were usually or frequently included, depending upon the nation concerned, were expenses for transportation to and from the participating country, tuition costs at civil contract schools of the AAF, housing, subsistence, clothing, and interpreters. Expenses incurred for pay, salaries, and allowances for the foreign nationals, administrative costs incurred by the foreign nations, and insurance were not chargeable to Lend-Lease.[31] The determination of the charges to be made for training and other expenses incurred under Lend-Lease requisitions was originally the responsibility of the AAF Budget and Fiscal Office.

Those charges incurred under Lend-Lease were entered on the books of the AAF for transfer to the Lend-Lease accounts of the particular nations concerned. Most of these accounts are yet to be adjusted and paid. The Canadian and the major Netherlands East Indies Lend-Lease requisitions were among the few which provided for full cash payment.

Maintenance of a record of expenses incurred under each of the various Lend-Lease requisitions was the responsibility of the Defense Aid Organization. This agency was set up in the Materiel Division at Wright Field, Ohio, on 28 April 1941. A year later, following the outbreak of war, it was renamed the United Nations Section and subsequently the United Nations Branch. In the various reorganizations of the AAF the United Nations Section was transferred to the Air Service Command and later to the Air Technical Service Command, but throughout the period of the war it

maintained its location at Wright Field. According to authorized procedure, shipping tickets were to be submitted from the field to the United Nations Section itemizing the expenses incurred which were chargeable against specific Lend-Lease requisitions. These shipping tickets were then to be used as the basis for preparing a statement of the costs of the training service rendered by the AAF.[32]

Despite the seeming simplicity of this procedure, the plan did not work. The basic difficulty lay in the fact that too many types of training were being given to nationals of foreign countries at too many fields under too many different Lend-Lease requisitions. The training was given, but the recording of charges lapsed badly. Shipping tickets were sent in for training at some few fields and not for training at many others; moreover, not all the shipping tickets which were sent in were accurate.

In an endeavor to improve administrative procedure, the means for registering charges was radically revised during the fall of 1944. On 1 June 1944 the responsibility of determining charges was transferred to the International Branch from the Budget and Fiscal Office.[33] Following this transfer the International Branch and Budget and Fiscal Office jointly improved upon certain preliminary efforts which had been made previously by the Budget and Fiscal Office in an endeavor to establish standard charges based on over-all cost figures for graduates of each type and each phase of training.[34]

The new procedure was declared operative on 1 December 1944.[35] Thereafter the commands and air forces training foreign personnel were required only to report monthly by nation the number of students graduating from each phase or type of training. Personnel of the United Nations

Branch were then to multiply the per capita cost for the specific phase or type of training by the report of the number of students trained. These per capita cost figures varied by nation according to the terms of the individual Lend-Lease requisitions. The United Nations Branch was to use the figures thus obtained to prepare shipping tickets to be signed by the beneficiary governments. Special shipping tickets were to be prepared by the individual training installation and sent to the United Nations Section only in those instances in which unusual expenses were incurred in theconduct of foreign training.

The total charges for training foreign nationals under Lend-Lease during the war period are being worked out at present (May 1946) by the United Nations Section at Wright Field. Although these statistics will not be available for some months, statistics for the largest of all foreign programs, the British, have been compiled. Between 7 June 1941 and 11 September 1945, the date of termination of all British training, the total charge for British training under Lend-Lease has been figured to be $138,092,050.[36] Since the number of British graduates from courses given in the United States was approximately three-fifths of the total of all foreign graduates from flying and technical courses given under Lend-Lease and the act of 24 June 1938, it is perhaps not too far wrong to estimate the value of all foreign training given by (or with the assistance of) the AAF during the war period to be approximately $250,000,000.[37] Although this figure is obviously a minute fraction of total military expense, it represents nevertheless a valuable contribution toward ultimate victory.

Chapter IV

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN TRAINING

Training administered to foreign nationals at the establishments operated by or for the AAF was approximately the same as that given to U. S. personnel being trained for the same air specialties. Such variations in content as did exist consisted principally in the emphasis placed on instruction in English in various programs. This instruction was given in the endeavor to make training more effective through the establishment of a common language. In some cases, moreover, changes were made in the content of training at the request of ranking officers of foreign military missions in this country. Such requests occurred most frequently in the instances of the Chinese and French training programs.[1] Both of these programs were of considerable size. In flying training they frequently monopolized particular airfields. The smaller programs were in general watched over less closely by foreign officials and, given in conjunction with the training of U. S. air personnel, were subject to less frequent variations.

In two instances, those of the British Pilot Training Schools and of Netherlands pilot training, the variation was more marked. As has already been pointed out, although U. S. equipment and facilities were used and U. S. personnel performed the housekeeping functions at the fields, the training programs as such were determined by the respective foreign governments. These establishments were therefore almost self-governing in matters pertaining to training.

The actual conduct of training was fraught with problems. Some were peculiar to foreign training and were inherent in the linguistic, national, and racial differences existing between other nations and ourselves. Of these, none was more difficult than the persistent and perplexing problem in all cases except the British of finding a common language medium for instruction. Associated with the language problem were differences in background and temperament, which frequently militated against achievement of the highest efficiency in training. Other problems which occasionally arose to harass the officers of the AAF administering foreign training were those of maintaining discipline among foreign nationals, meeting G-2 security regulations, and finding sufficient instructors, airplanes, and equipment for the conduct of training. The latter problems were by no means peculiar to foreign training, for they were at times present in all training of the AAF. These problems in their relation to foreign training did, however, have distinctive characteristics. The success of foreign training as a mission of the AAF depended in large measure on the degree of success achieved in their solution.

Standards

Those foreign students entering training averaged somewhat lower in natural endowment and ability (though not in motivation) than U. S. students. This was to be expected because the foreign students came from less favorable environments and, in major instances, from countries desperately engaged in war. Moreover, with the possible exception of Great Britain, the bases for testing and selecting personnel for training in the various air specialties were far less adequate than our own. In

many of the Latin American countries, too, the elements governing choice of candidates for training may well have included a large political factor.

In all programs which involved the training of air personnel in only a single specialty--for example, pilot training--there was little opportunity to shift personnel between specialties in an endeavor to improve the potential percentage of success in each type of training. The "stanine" system used as the basis for selecting U. S. cadets for particular aircrew specialties was not used in the Chinese program until that program was broadened by the arrival of the first Chinese personnel for heavy-bombardment training in the fall of 1943.[2] A similar system was suggested for the French in April 1944 by Capt. Philip H. DuBois, a U. S. officer who was sent to French North Africa at the request of the Joint Air Commission to assist in "establishing a procedure for selecting French applicants for pilot training."[3] There is reason to believe, however, that if such a system was used thereafter, the standards required were markedly lower than those required of U. S. cadets for admission to the same type of training.

Considerable material exists indicating the generally inferior physical status of foreign students in comparison with U. S. students. Thus, an examination of 31 of the Latin American civilians receiving pilot training early in 1942 reveals that 23 were suffering from physical deficiencies. Nine of these possessed two or more defects. While the defects were primarily in teeth and eyes, one student was suffering from syphilis and another from external hemorrhoids.[4] An investigation in June 1943 of one of the groups of Brazilians who came to the United States

under the first 300-pilot training program was hardly more impressive. Of a group of 64 trainees, 85 per cent needed immediate dental attention. Three of this group were recommended for elimination because of venereal disease, and three others were hospitalized shortly after arrival with light cases of pneumonia.[5]

Chinese students were frequently victims of tuberculosis, syphilis, and intestinal parasites. Because of the high incidence of these diseases, a conference held at the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center in February 1945 recommended that more care be taken in the original selection of students. For those already in the United States, it recommended that "the decontamination of intestinal parasites . . . be an automatic process by treating all personnel reporting for training as ambulatory patients for a period of 48 hours immediately upon arrival." It also recommended that all Chinese suffering from syphilis be given the seven-day hospitalization syphilis treatment instead of being subject to elimination as formerly if they were enlisted men.[6]

The physical status of students from Great Britain and France tended to be better than that of students from either Latin America or China. Even among these students, however, there occurred frequent instances of eye or teeth defects. In addition, occasional French students, who were children in the period of World War I, were so deficient in height as to require their elimination from pilot training.[7]

Proficiency standards for foreign students in training were intended ideally to be the same as for U. S. students. According to a letter issued by The Adjutant General early in May 1939 to explain the purposes of Latin American training, students trained under the act of 24 June 1938 were

to be "judged by the standards of training applicable to our own personnel." The same idea was expressed even more forcefully by the Office of Chief of the Air Corps when, at the beginning of the British 4,000-pilot program, it stated, "It is desired to maintain the standards in these schools at the highest possible level in order to insure their continued usefulness to the Air Corps for the purpose of training Army personnel."[8]

This emphasis on standards was also voiced by the representatives of the foreign nations. Lt. Col. H. Y. Lai, Commanding Officer of the Chinese aviation students, specifically stated his desire that "the standard set for the Chinese training program, both air, ground and character building, must be the same as that for the U. S. cadets and students, with a view of achieving competent and well qualified combat personnel."[9] Similar expressions of opinion from administrative officials of other foreign programs could also be cited.[10]

Despite the intent of maintaining standards for all students equal to those demanded of U. S. students, the actual results tended to be otherwise. Standards for U. S. students themselves varied somewhat from time to time, according to the need of the AAF for trained personnel. In most instances the foreign nations had far greater need for aircrew than did the United States. They therefore wished to graduate as high a percentage in each program as possible and winced at any heavy rate of elimination.[11] U. S. instructors, too, tended to be sympathetic to the hopes of the foreign students, whose very presence in the United States represented a substantial outlay and who were often sorely needed in combat. All evidence seems to point to a greater laxity in the application of standards to foreign students than to U. S. students.[12]

Language

Personnel of the AAF administering foreign training considered an inadequate proficiency in English to be the greatest single cause of failure among foreign students. Without an effective means of language communication, the conduct of training was at best slow and difficult. Usually, and particularly in the earlier war years, it was the common requirement that foreign nationals be proficient in English before they were accepted for shipment to the United States. All too frequently, however, this basis for selection was given lip service, for many of those certified as skilled in English had only rudimentary knowledge of the language or none at all.

The effort to solve the language problem in order to provide a satisfactory medium for instruction took several different forms. Most stressed was the attempt to teach English to foreign students in association with their other training. Instruction in English was made a part of the regular curriculum in the case of nearly all the Latin American programs, as well as in the French, Yugoslav, Turkish, and Chinese programs. By April 1944, however, English instruction for Spanish-speaking students had been suspended, apparently because enough Spanish-speaking instructors were by then available to make further English instruction unnecessary.[13] This suspension did not affect the Portuguese-speaking Brazilians, who continued to be given sustained English instruction.[14]

Probably the most elaborate of these attempts to teach English was carried on in connection with Chinese training. According to the pre-flight program given to the seventh group of Chinese pilot trainees at Williams Field, Ariz., 85 of the 262 hours during the nine-week course

were spent in instruction in English.[15] This amount was increased to 195 in a total of 435 hours given to the heavy-bomber preflight students during a 12-week course given later.[16] Instruction in English was continued as a major feature of ground training in all phases of training through the OTU phase. Thus in the program planned for the OTU phase of B-25 training to be given at La Junta Army Air Field, Colo., late in 1943, 42 of the 288 hours of ground training were to be used for English instruction.[17] In OTU single-engine training at Luke Field, Ariz., 27 of the 172 hours of ground training were devoted to English instruction early in 1944.[18] Less emphasis was spent in developing facility in the use of language than in making certain that the Chinese were familiar with "flying line terms, technical phrases, aviation terminology, and other English expressions which would help Chinese cadets in their studies."[19]

English instruction for French trainees was less important in that training program than in the case of the Chinese. This difference probably existed because the problem of communication was somewhat less difficult in the French program. More U. S. instructors were acquainted with the French language than with the Chinese; moreover, in a larger number of cases French trainees had some knowledge of English. Nevertheless, most French students received at least a small amount of English instruction. In July 1944 all French students except pilots (who were excused from preflight training) received 40 hours in basic English out of a total of 200 hours spent in the preflight phase of training.[20] By October 1944 a 10-hour course in English had been added to the ground school program in advanced twin-engine training. Similar courses may also have been included in other phases of training as well.[21] During the basic phase of training at Gunter Field, Ala., at mid-year 1944, for example, the French trainees were receiving instruction in [redacted] nights per week.

The smaller Yugoslav and Turkish programs required persistent efforts at English instruction, since a knowledge of either language was rare indeed in the United States. Shortly after the arrival of the larger group of Yugoslavs in November 1942, two enlisted men were assigned to accompany the Yugoslavs and to teach them English.[23] For a few weeks prior to their entrance into flexible gunnery school, in fact, Yugoslav training was devoted almost exclusively to acquiring a rudimentary knowledge of English. Thereafter English instruction was given in conjunction with other training.[24]

The Turks received concentrated instruction in English during 15 weeks of preflight training. This instruction was not immediately successful, for the Turks proved to be very slow learners.[25] In some instances the parrotlike answers made in class seemed to indicate a greater familiarity with the sound of certain English words than with an understanding of their meaning. Instruction in English was conducted as one phase of ground school work during the subsequent phases of flying training.[26]

Although great stress was placed on the teaching of English, it was never the sole means by which the AAF sought to create the necessary basis of understanding between instructor and student. Associated with instruction in English was the effort to use interpreters as a medium in most of the non-English-speaking training programs. This effort frequently involved the use of individuals skilled both in English and the language of the trainee but without necessarily any extensive technical knowledge of aviation. Thus during 1943 the French primary school at Tuscaloosa, Ala., employed a number of interpreters who translated for the instructor and the student on the ground both preparatory to and after training

flights.[27] This system had the great deficiency of leaving the instructor dependent almost exclusively on hand signals while in flight with his student, when occasionally almost immediate understanding between them was required lest the student get into some irremediable flying difficulty.

Other foreign training programs also made use of skilled interpreters. Native Chinese and Chinese-Americans possessing a knowledge of the Mandarin dialect were used asinterpreters both on the flight line and in the ground school classroom.[28] Rarely, however, was the number of interpreters sufficient to meet the needs of the Chinese program, and the problem of finding a sufficient supply was a chronic one. Turkish and Yugoslav interpreters were also used in the conduct of those programs. The Netherlanders, who conducted their own pilot training, usually sent interpreters with their students when they were enrolled in schools of the AAF for training in aircrew specialties not given at Jackson Army Air Base, Miss.[29]

Interpreters proved of greater value when they not only possessed linguistic knowledge but were able to conduct instruction as well. In many instances, particularly in the Spanish-speaking Latin American and the French programs, these instructor-interpreters were U. S. military and civilian personnel. In other programs linguistically skilled Americans were less numerous. In these programs, however, foreign nationals who had graduated from a training program were frequently used to instruct others of their fellow nationals in the same program. In June 1942, for example, the Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2, requested that Maj. Gen. T. H. Shen, then head of the Chinese Air Mission in the United States, assign six graduates from the first class of Chinese officers to act as advanced

single-engine instructors in the Chinese training program. Although this request was refused,[30] Maj. Gen. P. T. Mow, the successor to General Shen, agreed to the retention of as many as 20 of the third group of single-engine graduates for use as instructors.[31] Further levies for instructors were made on succeeding classes.

A similar use of foreign instructor-interpreters was practiced in several of the other programs. Four Brazilians, for example, proved themselves invaluable in assisting in the primary training of Brazilians under both of the 300-pilot programs at Corsicana, Texas. These instructors not only could communicate with their fellow nationals in Portuguese, but they also nurtured Brazilian morale in that no Brazilian was eliminated from primary training without first having received a check ride from one of the four. Although one was killed, the other three were later assigned to more advanced phases of flying training. One of them, moreover, also assisted at Suffolk Army Air Field, N. Y., in preparing the 1st Brazilian Fighter Squadron for overseas service as a P-47 combat unit.[32]

Other instances of the use of foreign instructor-interpreters occurred in the conduct of French and, in much lesser degree, Turkish training. As a result of an agreement reached at a conference held between French and U. S. authorities at Maxwell Field, Ala., in January 1944, the effort was made to alleviate the serious shortage in French-speaking U. S. instructors by withholding French graduates for service as instructors for periods of six months each.[33] Because of these two sources for instructors, French training became almost bilingual in character. At the end of September 1945, 109 French graduates were instructing their fellow nationals in various phases of the flying training program.[34]

A third means by which the AAF sought to facilitate foreign training was to bring as much material as possible to the foreign students in their native tongues. This included translation of texts and writing of new materials in the foreign languages; frequent examinations and permission to use the foreign languages in the construction of answers; and "dubbing in" of foreign language sound tracks on training films. In various degrees the Spanish-speaking Latin American, Brazilian, French, and Chinese programs made use of all these devices.

Courtesy suggested the advisability of presenting the newly arrived foreign students with orientation pamphlets indicating the nature of Army life and offering other useful bits of information. A guide for Brazilians, for example, gave a brief sketch of the similarities and dissimilarities between Brazil and the United States in addition to including helpful hints with respect to the problems of everyday living.[35] The Brazilian student was informed, among other matters, that in the United States there was no haggling between buyer and seller over prices: "All goods on sale in shops are sold at fixed prices." He was also informed with respect to such customs as those governing the occupancy of upper berths in Pullman cars: ". . . you are expected to dress and undress within your own bed. Little nets are hung near your bed for storing your clothing."

The Chinese were given material somewhat more limited in subject matter.[36] The five pamphlets given to the Chinese arriving at Santa Ana Army Air Base, Calif., for preflight training were concerned primarily with military regulations and courtesies. Material more directly concerned with training was also published in the foreign languages, and dictionaries of aviation terms were compiled. In some instances, as in B-25 combat crew

training at Columbia Army Air Base, the texts translated for use by the Chinese were printed in both English and Chinese.[37]

Training films lost nearly all of their value when presented with an English sound track to non-English-speaking students. Capt. S. K. Liu, a Chinese medical officer, reported after observation and examination at Santa Ana Army Air Base that comprehension of content by the Chinese averaged less than 5 per cent when training films were presented without language translation. He therefore vigorously urged the adaptation of sound tracks in Chinese to those films for use in Chinese training.[38] This procedure had already been begun by the Chief Signal Officer in the case of some training films designed for use among the Chinese.[39] A similar program was also inaugurated to supply French sound tracks for training films to be used among the French students.[40]

Another basic means used in the attempt to surmount language difficulties in training was the simple expedient of increasing the length of training. The Brazilian preflight training phase, for example, was increased in 1943 from the normal 10 weeks to 15 weeks,[41] and Turkish preflight training also was conducted on the basis of a 15-week program when it began in the succeeding year.[42] Additional flying time, moreover, was frequently given to individual students in the actual phases of flying training. In September 1944 the Eastern Flying Training Command issued a blanket order that any French student considered potentially capable of completing a phase of flying training was to receive extra instruction and additional flying time up to a total of 25 hours per phase, if necessary.[43] In other instances whole classes received additional training. Thus the first group of Turkish cadets received five additional hours of flying time during the basic phase of their training.[44] Many similar instances could be cited.[45]

Because of the language problem, it is also probable that greater stress was placed on teaching by demonstration and example rather than by assigned reading and purely verbal explanation.[46] In so doing the language barrier could be minimized.

Temperament

Most foreign students coming to the United States for training in one or another of the aircrew specialties probably looked forward to the venture as a great opportunity. The trip seemed to promise not alone the chance to receive excellent training but also to become acquainted with a nation of which they had heard much in regard to its wealth and pleasures. Air Marshal Garrod phrased the British student attitude as follows:[47]

> "If we go to that US AAF school we are going to get such treatment as we have never gotten." They are all eager to come here because they know what a wonderful time they are going to have. We ask these aviation cadets: "Where would you like to train, UK or overseas?" Eighty per cent say, "Overseas." They want to see new country and they have heard about the standards and the wonderful time and the experience.

Despite the genuine eagerness on the part of most of the foreign students for training in the United States, certain difficult problems could and did arise in the training situation because of the differences in background and temperament between the Americans and the foreign students. Some of the U. S. instructional staff, although undoubtedly a small minority, were prone, in an excess of national pride, to treat foreigners as inferiors. To a greater degree they failed to have a thorough and sympathetic understanding of differences in national temperament and consequently were apt to deal with foreign students in the same bluff, rough, and hearty manner they used in instructing U. S. cadets.

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Probably more often because of ignorance than of intent, a U. S. instructor could offend his foreign student by an emotional explosion which, while within the experience of the U. S. cadet, was received by the foreign student in quite a different manner. The foreign student who had been subjected to sarcasm or "cussed out" was apt to be bewildered and hurt. In one case a Brazilian who had been called a "son of a bitch" by his instructor became involved in a fight because of the epithet. Latin Americans were also justifiably sensitive to disparagements of their homelands and to ill-natured references to themselves as "spics" or "greasers."[48]

The site for Latin American training was an unfortunate choice in at least one respect for, though close to Latin America, it was also in that area in the United States where prejudice against Latin Americans was greatest. The presence of Latin American officers in Texas, where residents of Latin American origin constituted a submerged social class, tended to be resented by some Texans as being conducive to social unrest.[49] This potentially explosive situation fortunately remained quiescent almost until the end of the war, when in April 1945 two incidents in close succession made advisable moving all Mexican pilot training from Foster Field, Texas. The incidents resulted from the refusal of a Victoria, Texas, restaurant to serve a party of Mexican officers, and from difficulties experienced by wives of Mexican officers in finding suitable housing in that community.[50] In consequence, Mexican training was moved to Dothan Field, Ala., in June 1945.[51]

Foreign students, on the other hand, tended at times to be unduly sensitive to manners and attitudes in the United States which differed from

those of their respective homelands. Being young and in an alien environment, without knowledge of English in many cases, moreover, they were likely to suffer from homesickness and to have their abilities at fault-finding increased in power. If older or battle-experienced, others seem to have been vexed by what they regarded as nonsensical aspects of training which slowed the pace of training itself. Both British and French students, for example, had little use for the rigid system of cadet discipline, including military training and the customs of "bracing" and "walking tours."[52]

The French in particular proved extremely sensitive to slights, which were frequently more imagined than real. Perhaps to a greater degree than in the case of any other nation, the French were given to making complaints to the various AAF headquarters with respect to the treatment received by their personnel. On one occasion the French officer commanding all French air personnel training in the United States charged that food served at French training stations was inferior to that served to U. S. cadets.[53] No substantiation could be found for this charge. On other occasions complaints concerned the maintenance of French officer privileges and dignity in situations where French officers and enlisted men were receiving the same training. In one such case the charge was made that French officer dignity had been impaired by requiring officers to march to the flight line as was required of enlisted men, and by the issuance of a further directive that no longer would French officers be permitted to ride to the flight line.[54] Such complaints were usually investigated. Adjustments were made within limits in the endeavor to remove sources of irritation and thereby to render training more effective.

Of greater consequence were differences in temperament which resulted in claims by foreign students that they understood matters explained in training which were in fact not clear to them. This characteristic tended to be shared by eager foreign students of all the nations. It was especially marked among the Chinese, however, to whom assent seemed particularly necessary as a matter of politeness irrespective of any real understanding. Such claims to understanding in a situation of partial or total ignorance were dangerous to equipment, to the foreign trainee, and to the instructor if he were accompanying the student on a training flight. U. S. instructors were repeatedly warned against this hazard. Headquarters, Western Flying Training Command directed its instructors never to ask the Chinese, "Do you understand?" Rather, the instructor was to require the Chinese student to explain in turn what had just been explained to him.[55] Brig. Gen. Julian B. Haddon, Commanding General of the CBI Training Command, in speaking of this problem summed up the requirements for Chinese training by stating, "Repetition and demonstration must be the basis of their instruction, together with patience, perseverance, tolerance and understanding, and more patience, bearing in mind the lack of mechanical background through the ages of Chinese students."[56]

These characteristics of good instruction as expressed by General Haddon were valid not alone for Chinese training but for all foreign training.[57] They suggested, in addition to an understanding of the skill to be imparted, the essentiality of the element of good will toward the student as expressed in a willingness to take pains. This attitude was a necessity if the difficulties arising from differences in both language and temperament were to be surmounted. It became increasingly common among instructors as the AAF acquired greater experience with the problems of foreign training.

Discipline

The requirement of high standards of discipline among foreign nationals was essential to the creation of a basic situation in which training could be most effectively carried out, equipment and life protected, and a military spirit inculcated. It was also essential so that the high standards required of U. S. students be not undermined by permitting standards of greater laxity among foreign nationals training in the same area and frequently at the same fields.

The problem of discipline and its importance was early recognized by the AAF. While the first of the major programs, that of the British, was being planned in May 1941, Maj.Gen. George H. Brett requested that "a commitment be secured from the British Government in writing, guaranteeing that the minimum standard of discipline among British student pilots receiving flight training in the United States shall be equal to the standard of discipline maintained in the Air Corps Flying Schools."[58] Although the British Air Attache at Washington felt unable to accept the commitment as laid down by General Brett, he did promise that "the standard of discipline among British students will equal the discipline maintained in Royal Air Force flying schools in Great Britain." He also made known the British intention of assigning a Royal Air Force Administrative Officer to each school at which British students were being trained, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the "King's Regulations for the Royal Air Force."[59]

As in the case of Great Britain, agreements were made in several of the larger programs which permitted the foreign nation to maintain discipline among its nationals in accordance with its own regulations. In these agreements the United States took the position that under international

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law foreign military personnel on duty in a friendly nation with the latter's consent were not subject to the military and civil courts of that nation but in cases involving alleged misconduct were to be judged by their own commanders and military courts. The United States reserved to itself only the right temporarily to restrain foreign trainees by confining them in the guardhouse pending turning them over to their own commander for trial.[60] This procedure had the advantage of limiting the risk of offending national pride at no great peril to the interest of the United States, for as beneficiaries of training the foreign nations were anxious to maintain good relations with this country.

In general, the problem of discipline caused the AAF minor difficulty. Perhaps the most serious of disciplinary cases occurred in mid-1944 when 10 of the first 50 Turkish officers were recommended for elimination by the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center. They were guilty as individuals of various offenses including attempted suicide, intoxication, breaking restriction, being insubordinate, and being absent without leave.[61] The Turkish Military and Air Attaché at Washington, Major Cemal Aydinalp, visited the school and concurred in the recommendation for elimination. He expressed his regret at what had occurred and stated his conviction of "fairness" in the handling of the cases.[62]

Punishment could be exacted for lesser offenses either through the liaison officer of the foreign government stationed at the field, or, in the case of the smaller programs, by the AAF commander directly. For punishment of severe infractions the mechanism of elimination was always present. To this latter punishment the foreign representatives usually acceded without protest.

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Security

In a nation at war, it was necessary that extraordinary precautions be taken at military posts and airfields to make certain that information of value be kept from the enemy. Because of this need for security, foreign students in the United States were the objects of qualified suspicion and were subject to more serious restrictions than obtained in the case of U. S. military personnel.

The standard procedure in force for the clearance of foreign nationals at the beginning of the war provided that any move of foreign personnel to a new field would require validation by Military Intelligence Service, G-2 before the move could take place.[63] During the war period this procedure, if faithfully observed, would frequently have slowed the pace of foreign training while the individuals being trained awaited the necessary clearance. In consequence, the regulations governing security were ignored in some instances at the same time that an earnest effort was made to amend them in order to facilitate training.

This effort involved the attempt to limit the clearance of foreign military personnel by Military Intelligence Service, G-2 to the time of their entry into the United States. Thereafter the foreign personnel, once cleared, were to be attached to the AAF and be given blanket clearance for all moves necessary to the conduct of their training. This device was first used for the first group of 88 Chinese aircrew personnel who arrived at Santa Ana Preflight School in October 1943 to begin heavy-bomber training.[64] At that time they were attached to the AAF for one year. This procedure was expanded to include French and Chinese trainees when those personnel were attached to the AAF during the summer of 1944 for administration and training.[65]

The requirements of security also conflicted with training in some degree in that foreign students were excluded from instruction on secret and confidential equipment. When the early Latin American students reported for training under the "Goodwill Act" of 24 June 1938, they were barred from training at all fields at which heavy-bomber airplanes were stationed, since that equipment was at the time highly classified. Similarly, no foreign student was eligible for training on the Norden bombsight until that equipment was released as of 9 March 1943.[66] After that date bombardier students from any of the United Nations were eligible for training on the Norden bombsight on the same basis as U. S. bombardier cadets. Restrictions on radar training, however, were more firmly maintained.[67]

As the war progressed, foreign students from ally nations found training progressively less subject to security restrictions. The sense of "common cause" and the desire to tie other nations more closely to the United States resulted not alone in large numbers of foreign students being trained but also in their admission to training in highly classified material. The release of the Norden bombsight is one example.

Another example of potentially even greater consequence was the opening of the School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, Fla., to foreign students from ally countries. During the summer of 1944 arrangements were made to receive some 50 Brazilian officers in groups of approximately 10 each for a five-week course at that school.[68] In addition, these officers were to be taken on a tour of U. S. air installations so that they might study the service and supply methods of the AAF. The A-2 Division at Headquarters, AAF recommended in August 1944, that admission

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to the School of Applied Tactics be extended to include not only members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, but also the Chinese and "Latin American republic personnel who will be engaged with United Nations forces within this hemisphere and those employed in conjunction with United Nations forces in military operations overseas."[69] In the period immediately before V-J Day an eight- to 12-week course was being planned to be given at Orlando for senior staff officers from all Latin American countries.[70] This course was to be even less subject to security restrictions than had been true in the earlier and briefer course offered to Brazilian staff officers.

Instructors, Airplanes, and Equipment

The problems of finding a sufficient number of qualified instructors and a sufficient supply of airplanes and equipment for the conduct of foreign training tended to parallel the similar problems experienced by the AAF in the conduct of training for its own personnel. These problems tended to be most critical during 1942 and 1943 at the time when the strain on the training establishment was the greatest; thereafter, as a result of the expanded training plant, built up energetically during the first two years of the war, and the increased supply of airplanes and associated equipment, the strain of shortages in training was considerably alleviated.

Prior to the outbreak of the war Latin Americans receiving training in the United States were in some instances discriminated against in that instructors and airplane hours were devoted in disproportinate degree to the U. S. personnel who were also being trained by the rapidly expanding AAF. The recognition by Headquarters, AAF toward the end of 1941 of the disastrous effect such behavior might have upon the development of good

will, a prime goal of training, resulted in a directive specifying that foreign training should not be slighted but should in fact be considered on a plane of equality with that of U. S. personnel.[71]

The problem of finding sufficient numbers of instructors was made more complex in some instances, as has already been suggested, by the fact that the instructor needed to be not alone technically qualified but also linguistically competent. In those instances in which there were an insufficient number of foreign trainees who understood English and an insufficient number of instructors proficient in the foreign tongue, the necessary means for carrying on immediate instruction was to use interpreters as intermediaries. Less difficulty was experienced in finding instructors and interpreters for the Spanish-speaking programs or even the Brazilian program. No Spanish-speaking Latin American nation ever had a large number of students engaged in training at one time; also, more U. S. instructors possessed a knowledge of Spanish than of any other foreign tongue. Although a knowledge of Portuguese was more rare among U. S. instructors, little difficulty seems to have been experienced in finding interpreters and Brazilian instructors to bridge the gap in languages when necessary.

The situation with respect to certain of the other programs was more critical. U. S. instructors skilled in Turkish or Mandarin Chinese were rare indeed. Though a larger number knew French, that number was inadequate for the needs of so large a program. Fortunately the Turkish Embassy was able to supply a sufficient number of interpreters and interpreter-instructors to make possible the successful operation of its relatively small program.[72]

Since so few U. S. instructors were competent in Mandarin Chinese, it was necessary to rely in great degree upon Chinese graduates of the various programs who had been withheld to assist in the instruction of other Chinese, and on civilian interpreters. These interpreters were in a few cases Americans, but more frequently they were either Chinese-Americans or native Chinese. As the Chinese programs grew rapidly in size and in the types of training offered, early in 1944 the need for additional qualified interpreters became increasingly pressing. In November 1944 the ratio of interpreters to students was 1 to 13; by January 1945 the ratio had become 1 to 25.[73]

The supply of interpreters was increased only slowly. One source of potential value seemed to exist among the graduates of the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) Mandarin Chinese curriculum at Harvard University. Fifty of these graduates were brought to Santa Ana Army Air Base, Calif., early in September 1944 for an intensive 10-week course in Chinese. It was found in nearly all cases that while these men possessed sufficient knowledge of technical terms they lacked the general Chinese vocabulary necessary to explain and discuss particular subjects adequately. Consequently their usefulness was limited.[74]

More fruitful sources seemed to exist among those to whom Mandarin Chinese was a native tongue. Some Chinese nationals, for example, who had been students in the United States prior to the outbreak of war in 1941 had been drafted into the Army subsequent to that event. The AAF made efforts to have transferred to itself Chinese enlisted men serving in the Army Ground and Army Service Forces, so that they might be used as interpreters in the Chinese training programs.[75] It also sought to

recruit interpreters from Chinese still on student status in the United States and used a list of names supplied by the Department of State for that purpose.[76] The greatest alleviation came not from these sources, however, but as the result of new arrivals of interpreters from China. Fifty additional Chinese interpreters arrived from the China-Burma-India theater during June 1945, after having been declared surplus in that theater.[77] As a result of their arrival, the efficiency of instruction tended to improve during the later months of 1945.

French training also suffered from an instructor-personnel problem made more acute by the language difficulty. A survey conducted in the three subordinate flying training commands in April 1943 disclosed only 35 military and 25 civilian instructors who possessed a knowledge of French.[78] Not all of these, of course, could be made available for the French training program.

As a result of this shortage in instructor personnel who knew French, the French training program was seriously hampered during the initial months. After a personal inspection of the training at Van de Graaff Field, Ala., at the end of July 1943, Maj. George A. Braga stated that in his judgment the high percentage of elimination in primary training was due principally to the "students' lack of knowledge of English and the fact that no instructor-pilots are available who speak French."[79] The great difficulty experienced by the first French pilots to receive B-26 transition training was also attributed to the fact that there were no instructor-pilots at Dodge City Army Air Field who were fluent in French.[80]

In time, however, the number of qualified instructors for the French training program was brought into a better balance with the need therefor; this was done principally by recruiting from outside the Training Command military and civilian personnel who possessed the necessary knowledge of French and also by recruiting French student personnel for instructors.[81] The French were usually graduates of the particular courses in which they were to serve as instructors. Interpreters as distinguished from instructor-interpreters were used less commonly in the French program than in the Chinese program. This was probably due to the fact that more U. S. instructors knew French than Chinese and also that more French had at least a smattering of English.

Training aircraft seem to have been no more short in number in most foreign training programs than in the regular program for U. S. cadets, and in most cases were at least adequate to the necessities of training. In respect to tactical training, however, the situation was somewhat different. New tactical aircraft were always under a first priority for the overseas theaters; and in the continental United States AAF OTU's and RTU's were usually favored over the foreign training programs. P-40's used in the tactical training of the Chinese at Luke Field, Ariz., for example, were generally old aircraft. Consequently, they were frequently out of commission as a result of small mechanical failures and a lack of spare parts. Moreover, particularly in the early period, the maintenance problem was also difficult, because Training Command maintenance personnel had had little experience in the repair of tactical aircraft. In March and April 1943, of 30 P-40's assigned to Luke Field the average number in commission daily was about 3.5.[82] In the case of Chinese B-24 training,

the shortage of B-24 aircraft was so great that the training of heavy-bomber crews, which was originally scheduled to begin in April 1942, did not begin until some 16 months thereafter.[83]

While this situation tended to improve as the production of tactical aircraft increased and as the Training Command personnel gained additional experience in maintenance and the supply of parts, the same complaints continued intermittently from the Chinese and other foreign programs. In the fall of 1943 the Executive Officer at Jackson Army Air Base, Miss., reported that Netherlands B-25 and P-40 training were both behind schedule as a result of the use of old airplanes and lack of spare parts for repairs.[84] A similar report was made even after V-J Day with respect to the B-26 aircraft being used in the French training program at Selfridge Field, Mich.[85]

During the early stages of Netherlands bombardier training, a shortage of aircraft was also reported. At this time, when the Norden bombsight was forbidden to foreign training, Flying Training Command Headquarters reported it had at Midland Field, Texas, only one B-18A equipped with the S-1 bombsight for training 34 Netherlands students. It requested that eight B-34's equipped with the Sperry bombsight be made available at once.[86] Although the first two classes of Netherlands bombardier students were delayed as a result of this shortage, the later classes seem to have been graduated on schedule. No indication has been found that foreign student bombardiers fared any differently than U.S. cadets fared after the Norden bombsight was released to them in March 1943, nor that foreign students competed for other aircrew specialties on any basis besides equality in training.

Effect of Foreign Training on American Training

The principal effect of the foreign training programs on U.S. training was the resulting competition for instructional staff, facilities, airplanes, and associated equipment. This competition, although at times critical, was never considered sufficiently desperate to require a curtailment of foreign training, but it did result in extreme reluctance on the part of Headquarters, AAF to accept additional foreign training commitments during the periods of greatest stress. In some slight degree the competition was alleviated in that one program, the British Pilot Training Program, trained a small number of U. S. cadets in each class for a period of almost two years and that several of the programs assisted somewhat in the supply of instructors. Foreign training may also have had incidental benefits to U. S. training by affording additional sources of ideas for improving the conduct of training. Basically, however, the main reasons for permitting the competition with U. S. training were the advantages of the good will to be derived and the improvement in national defense which could be gained by training the air personnel of nations possessing ideals and interests similar to our own.

The extent of competition of the foreign training programs with U.S. training was never stable, but varied from time to time. During 1939 and 1940, at which time foreign training was predominantly Latin American, the competition could have been severe, less because the foreign students were numerous than because the Army's air arm was being rapidly expanded. Because the training facilities were so seriously strained by the rapid rate of growth in the Army air establishment, the additional burden of Latin American training could have been serious if that training had been

conscientiously administered. As it was, however, the commitments in foreign training were subordinated to the training of U. S. personnel. In some instances the foreign students were given hardly any flying training. This was particularly the case with respect to training on tactical aircraft, of which the Army air units were very short.

During 1941 the U. S. Government made its first large-scale tenders of air force training facilities and personnel to the two most important participants in the conflict against the Axis nations in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters—Great Britain and China. These tenders could be made in strict conformity to the interests of national defense, for they were designed to help keep both Britain and China in the battle against the Axis. They could also be justified on the ground that they created no great interference with U. S. training, for the rate of expansion of the AAF was uneven because of a crucial shortage in tactical aircraft.[87] This shortage existed both because training aircraft were more easily manufactured than tactical aircraft and because the tactical aircraft manufactured were being shipped in substantial numbers to assist the British in their grim stand against Germany. So long as this shortage in fighter and bomber aircraft existed, the Flying Training Command pilot schools could produce many more U. S. graduates than could be entered into tactical training. It therefore was in accord with national interest to use a portion of the capacity of the Flying Training Command schools to give the individual phase of pilot training to the British and the Chinese. While giving tactical training in the United States to British graduates of Flying Training Command schools was not contemplated, tactical training was later planned for much graduates of the smaller Chinese program, since the Chinese could not provide that training for themselves.

Following the outbreak of war the tempo of AAF expansion was at once increased. Although foreign training continued, so great was the pressure for a maximum production of U. S. pilots that serious efforts were made to forestall any increases in the size of the foreign programs and even to remove some of them from the United States. The termination of both the British 4,000-pilot and navigator training programs in the fall of 1942 may well have stemmed as much from the desire of the United States to reclaim its training facilities as from Great Britain's conviction that in the future that country could manage its training under its own direction without U. S. assistance.

During 1942 nearly every attempt to increase the extent of foreign training was resisted by Headquarters, AAF in the endeavor to preserve maximum facilities for the U. S. training effort. When the Netherlands made a request in mid-March 1942 that they be permitted to continue their training in the United States, the immediate response of the War Department, later modified, was that the AAF was already short 1,000 pilot graduates in attaining its own production goals, that it was short in training facilities and aircraft, and that its instructors were operating under the heaviest load in its history. The memorandum concluded: "It is a physical impossibility for the training of NEI flight personnel to be undertaken without reducing the American program by a like number of students. A reduction in the American program will preclude meeting commitments already made."[88]

Although this program was accepted, a later Netherlands request for training 240 navigators and 150 observers was refused on the ground that any Netherlands East Indies students that were trained "would result in a

decrease in American student production by a like number."[89] The increases requested in the Chinese program in 1942, although in the main accepted, were resisted vigorously by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, as was also the Brazilian 130-pilot program. As in the case of the Netherlanders, it was bluntly stated that "For every foreign student who is taken into one of our flying schools it means that one of our own students will have to be deferred until there is room in the school for him."[90]

In the case of Latin American training, the attempt was even made during the spring and early summer of 1942 to dispense entirely with the burden of those programs by transferring all Latin American training to Latin America. In February 1942 Headquarters, Flying Training Command recommended that no new Latin Americans be assigned for training during the period between May and August 1942, since during that period the Flying Training Command would be adjusting from a program designed to produce 37,000 pilots per year to one designed to produce 55,000 pilots per year. It suggested as an alternative that 50 basic training aircraft, 50 advanced training aircraft, and 50 AAF pilots be sent to Latin America, where they "should accomplish the same results as sending Latin American officers to this country."[91]

Although nothing came of this suggestion at the moment, the Latin American Subsection recommended in mid-June 1942 "that the entire Latin American training program be administered in Latin America in the various countries which we are called upon to aid in this regard."[92] A similar memorandum was prepared by the Latin American Subsection early in July for submission to the G-2 Division of the General Staff. The reasons given for

this recommendation included the differences in language, which made training difficult, the fact that the schools of the Flying Training Command were taxed to capacity, and the fact that the problem of finding transportation for Latin American students between Latin America and the United States was a recurrent harassment.[93]

On the other hand, according to the memorandum, there were several advantages to administering the flying training of Latin Americans in Latin America. Latin America had numerous airports and available training planes, and the number of each was being steadily increased. If given training in Latin America, moreover, students would be studying in their own homelands and be among persons using their own language. Consequently, the Latin American Subsection believed that this training could be given more efficiently in the Latin American countries "under the supervision of a minimum number of United States AAF advisers" than in the crowded training establishment in the United States.[94]

This memorandum was never submitted to the G-2 Division. The Executive of the Directorate of Military Requirements, in a note to Brig. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Director of Military Requirements, expressed his belief that not alone would the memorandum not be approved by General Arnold but that also in his opinion the memorandum should not be approved.[95]

> Granting that it handicaps our training program, the advantage of training Latin Americans in this country is worth a considerable amount of effort on our part. The importance of Latin American good will cannot be overestimated.
>
> The best way to stimulate this good will is to bring South Americans to this country where they become acquainted with our people, our methods, and our country first-hand, and carry back with them a sympathetic attitude which will be spread in their own countries. This cannot be done effectively by any other means.

The concurrence of General Fairchild in these opinions stopped the further progress of the memorandum. Never thereafter does there seem to have been a serious effort to transfer Latin American training from the United States.

As the training establishment of the AAF continued to be enlarged and as the number of graduates began to approach requirements, the reluctance of Headquarters, AAF to undertake additional foreign training, so apparent in 1942, gradually disappeared. During 1943 and thereafter commitments were assumed to engage in French and Turkish training and to train still additional numbers of Chinese and Brazilian personnel. Several new but minor Latin American programs were also approved. In determining the acceptance of these programs, the criteria used seem to have been those of availability of facilities, good-will value, and the advantage to the United States of supplying trained air personnel to the United Nations for use against the common enemy.

It was a characteristic of foreign training that usually greater time and effort were required to train a group of foreign students than to train a like-sized group of U. S. students to the same level of efficiency. This greater expenditure of energy was due to a number of factors. Among them was the partial language barrier to understanding in most programs; lower standards of acceptance, both mental and physical, in all programs; lack of mechanical experience among foreign trainees; and problems associated with the difficulties of adjustment to an alien environment. Because of these various factors, there was usually also a higher elimination rate among foreign students than among U. S. students.

Although it is of course impossible to know exactly the relative efficiency of the training programs administered to foreign and U. S. students, certain interesting estimates were made. In one such instance Lt. Col. Lee Q. Lasser, Commanding Officer of the 53th Pursuit Group, estimated that the Chinese would require "double the time and effort needed to train American trainees" in the OTU training phase.[96] It is also of interest that when Chinese OTU training was transferred to the Flying Training Command late in the summer of 1942, the military authorities consistently saw to it that the Chinese received at least 105 flying hours in this phase at the time that their U. S. counterparts were being sent overseas with, in most instances, from 60 to 80 flying hours in the same phase.[97] A similar conclusion was indicated when the First Air Force reported in May 1944 that the facilities at Norfolk Army Air Base, Va., were adequate to train "a maximum of 120 United States trainee pilots or 100 French trainee pilots" in the OTU training phase.[98]

Despite the fact that foreign training tended to result in a less efficient use of facilities and to require a greater expenditure of effort per individual trained, there were certain minor compensations and even benefits achieved by the AAF because of foreign training. Among these probably the most important was the training, already mentioned, which was given to a small number of U. S. cadets by the British Pilot Training Schools.[99] This training, entered into in November 1942 and continued until June 1944, involved the acceptance of 17 U. S. cadets in each class of 100 students at each of the British Pilot Training Schools. The purpose was in part to cut down the backlog of aviation cadets in the various AAF Classification Centers, but perhaps even more it was to make available to

the U. S. cadets the extensive navigation course which was incorporated in the British training program. The U. S. cadets were held to the same standards as the British students and were assigned to the Air Transport Command following graduation. A total of 558 U. S. cadets graduated from these schools in the approximately 18 months that this arrangement continued in existence.[100]

The burden of foreign training was also slightly alleviated by the contributions made by the various foreign programs to the instructional staff necessary to the operation of the schools of the AAF. These contributions were usually limited to small numbers of instructors retained to teach the nationals of the particular country concerned. In at least one instance, however, that of the British, the foreign instructors were used not alone for training British students but also for U. S. cadets.

As in the case of each of the other major programs, the first use of British instructors was in training their own nationals. The initial assignment of British graduates as instructors seems to have been made during the month of January 1942.[101] By the end of March 1942, approximately 75 British graduates were being withheld to cooperate with the 465 U. S. instructors then engaged in training British students under the 4,000-pilot program in the schools of the Southeast Training Center.[102] At the end of June their number had been further increased to 177.[103]

Because of the serious shortage in the supply of instructors existing at that time and because of the fact that Great Britain and the United States possessed a common language, Col. James M. Bevans, Director of Personnel, Headquarters, AAF recommended late in April 1942 that British

graduates be retained "both for the training of their own students and our students."[104] This recommendation was approved by General Arnold toward the end of July 1942. The plan as put into operation at that time provided for retention for one year of a substantial number of British graduates from each class. These graduates, following processing at the Central Instructors School, were to be divided equally among the three subordinate flying training commands.

The first 42 British graduates withheld under this plan were followed at intervals by levies on succeeding British classes. By the end of December 1942, 440 British graduates were engaged in instructing British and U. S. students.[105] At the end of April 1943, by which time all British enrolled under the 4,000-pilot program had graduated from the schools of the AAF, 369 British graduates were engaged in training U. S. cadets. Of this number, 241 were instructing in the schools of the Southeast Training Center, while 80 were in the Gulf Coast Training Center and an additional 48 were in the West Coast Training Center.[106] As late as the end of September 1943, the last date for which British instructors are recorded as being assigned to schools of the AAF, 61 were assigned within the Western Flying Training Command (formerly the West Coast Training Center) and 26 within the Central Flying Training Command (formerly the Gulf Coast Training Center).[107] The British instructors were used almost exclusively in the basic and advanced flying schools. As a result of the operation of this plan, a considerable amount of instructional aid in the training of U. S. cadets was achieved during that period when the shortage in instructors was most acute.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

The AAF conducted foreign training prior to and during the war as an operating agency carrying out the policies set forth by the White House and the War Department in conjunction with the State Department. These programs were based on legislative enactments and Executive authority. In every instance the AAF and its interested subdivisions were consulted as to the feasibility of granting foreign training, and in most instances its recommendations were accepted. In certain instances, as in that of the first Brazilian 300-pilot program, the AAF seems to have played an initiating role without reference to higher authority. In its conduct of training, the AAF was implementing foreign policy by the creation of good will. It was implementing national defense by increasing the military strength of those nations with ideals and interests similar to our own.

The extent of the contribution of the AAF to international good will and national defense through its foreign training programs is impressive. A total of 20,500 foreign air personnel graduated from training courses received in the United States in the period from 1941 through 1945. Of this number, 18,500 received flying training and 2,000 received technical training.[1] Of the 18,500, 14,600 were trained as pilots. More than three-fifths of the total trained in all categories were British, and nine-tenths were military air personnel of three of our four major allies: Great

Britain, France, and China. Of our four major allies, only Russia failed to share substantially in the training received from the AAF by foreign nationals.

Foreign training in greater or less degree seems certain to be carried on into the postwar period. Latin American training, for example, is provided for as a permanent policy under the act of 24 June 1938. Once the problem of payment is settled, opportunities for training will probably be accorded to nationals of still other countries. In the spring of 1946, the Chinese were receiving training; and an endeavor was being made to establish some satisfactory means of repayment since Lend-Lease had been terminated.

These training programs, properly carried out, will continue to further national interest. They will be potential agents for the creation of good will, for the promotion of hemisphere defense and pan-American unity, and for the advancement of the interests of the United States in the world at large. They can form a useful adjunct to foreign policy.

Foreign training can also have direct benefits for the AAF as the training agency. For one thing, it should build up a bond of friendship between air personnel of the United States and that of foreign countries to the mutual advantage of both. More important, however, provided satisfactory financial arrangements can be made, foreign training can be used to maintain a somewhat larger training organization than would be necessary for the training of U. S. personnel exclusively. This "extra" training will permit maintenance of additional facilities, additional aircraft, additional equipment, and additional personnel--facilities,

aircraft, equipment, and personnel which could be diverted to more vital uses in case of need. Foreign training would thus supply a means to the more rapid expansion of the AAF than would otherwise be possible.

If foreign training of air personnel is to yield these benefits to the maximum both to the nation and to the AAF, it will be necessary for this training to be more carefully planned and executed than it was during the hectic period of the war. There must be less improvisation and more foresight, less seeking to solve problems after they have arisen and more avoidance of them through careful planning.

One goal of planning, which is in large part outside the power of the AAF, is so to schedule foreign training that there will be no sudden spurts of expansion or contraction but something approaching an even flow. Only thus can proximate stability be assured to the AAF in the conduct of training. If such a goal is to be achieved, auxiliary problems like the financial basis on which training will be given will have to be settled and quotas for training established and adhered to. This would require enabling legislation on the part of Congress which would permit the training of air personnel of all nations. It would also require agreement between the White House, War Department, and Department of State as to what nations would receive foreign training and in what numbers.

If training of foreign air personnel is to yield the greatest dividends with respect to military security and good will, it will also be necessary that the programs be well administered within the AAF. Personnel of unusual ability will be required to carry out the program—personnel who are not only familiar with the intricacies of the operations of training but who possess also a broad and sympathetic understanding of the unusual

problems faced by a foreign student in an alien environment. In an ideal sense, such qualifications would include familiarity with various types of training as well as familiarity with the language and culture of one or more foreign nations. The administrative officers should not be kept to their office at Headquarters, AAF but should be brought close to the actualities of foreign training through frequent field trips. The statement has been made by the officers of the Foreign Section, Headquarters, AAF that during the war years the exactions of administration were so great as to require almost full time in Washington, with little opportunity for a firsthand acquaintanceship with the operation of foreign training in the field.[2] This should be remedied.

The procedure for recording costs of foreign training is dependent in the first instance on the nature of legislation passed by Congress expanding the scope of foreign training. If legislation is passed providing for training of foreign air personnel above and beyond that permitted Latin American countries under the "Goodwill Act" of 1938, effective means should be used to make certain that accurate costs are recorded currently. The per capita system of charges by countries seems sound, provided that the subordinate commands and fields can be depended upon to supply accurate data as to the numbers trained.

The effectiveness of foreign training will undoubtedly be enhanced and certain of the more serious difficulties of the war period removed if entrance standards more closely approximating those of U. S. cadets are required of all foreign students. These include mental, physical, and educational requirements. A better case for such requirements can be made in peacetime than in wartime, for during the peace period there is no longer the great drain on manpower characteristic of war, and foreign nations can be more selective.

Another, and perhaps even more important requirement, judging from the war experience, is that the foreign students have a satisfactory knowledge of English before being accepted for training in one or another of the job specialties of the AAF. No greater and at the same time more unnecessary reason for training failures existed among foreign students during the war period than an inadequate knowledge of English. The wastefulness and costliness of attempting to train in spite of a language barrier should be eliminated. In those instances in which it seems politic to train foreign students who are deficient in understanding of English, instructor-interpreters supplied either by the United States or by the country receiving training should be used. These instructor-interpreters, in contrast to mere interpreters, will possess not alone language facility but also technical knowledge.

Of great consequence also is the necessity of seeing to it that the foreign student is made to feel at home during his period of training. This can and should be accomplished by friendliness and a willingness to take pains on the part of instructors, by acceptance of foreign students on a plane of equality, and by speaking always in terms of respect of the homelands of foreign nations. Particular care should be taken that foreign students are trained in areas free of gross racial or cultural prejudice. It is almost a commonplace to state that the student who feels at home in a foreign country will do better at training than one who suffers from insecurity, a feeling of antagonism, or homesickness.

A parallel to these requirements is, of course, that foreign students be held to standards of performance and discipline equal to those exacted from U. S. students, so that standards for U. S. students be not undermined

by lesser requirements for other students at the same fields. Literal obedience to security regulations should also be required in the cases of all foreign students, although the "red tape" element in security may well be eliminated through attachment of foreign students to the AAF for the duration of the training period after the initial investigation. Security regulations as to the content of training should be tailored to the requirements of sound military policy.

Despite their shortcomings, the foreign training programs conducted by the AAF during the war were markedly successful in most instances in building up a feeling of international good will toward the United States and contributed toward Allied victory. As a result of the experience gained during the war and of the greater opportunities for careful planning during peacetime, it should be possible in the future to make foreign training of air personnel an increasingly effective means for achieving goals in accord with national interest.

TRAINING OF FOREIGN AIR PERSONNEL - 1945

Training of foreign air crew personnel continued to be a significant phase of the activity of the Army Air Forces throughout the year 1945. By 1 February 1946 this training had been markedly reduced, however, for by that date the only non-Latin American program being conducted was that for the Chinese. This heavy reduction was due to the termination of use of Lend-Lease funds for foreign training.

Additional training contracted in 1945 tended to be minor. It consisted in part of a few additions and amendments to Latin American programs. Of greater consequence were the amendments made to the Chinese program. This program was substantially increased during the early months of 1945. By late April 1945 the commitment of the Army Air Forces to train heavy bomber crews had been increased from 42 to 100, and the 960 non-pilot crew program was also expanded into an 114 medium bombardment crew program. The goal for photo reconnaissance crews was increased at the same time from 27 to 39.[1] Technician training goals had been increased by 700, and an additional increase of 104 technicians was approved prior to V-J day.[2]

More important than any of these increases, however, was a general over-all plan for a postwar Chinese Air Force, which was conceived during the summer of 1945 by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General of the CBI theater, and was tentatively approved by the War Department. This plan, the "Palmyra" plan, envisioned the expansion

of the Chinese Air Force from a strength of approximately six and one-half groups at the date of termination of the war to a strength of five wing headquarters, one air service group, one heavy bombardment group, four medium bombardment groups, two photo reconnaissance squadrons, and four transport squadrons. It was estimated that accomplishment of the plan would require training 1,000 pilots, 1,400 aircrew, and 1,000 technicians over and above all past programs.[3]

Following the conclusion of the European war the War Department reconsidered the extent and potential usefulness of its foreign training programs. Under provisions of Policy Memorandum Number 21 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operational Plans Division of the General Staff announced on 21 June 1945 that training for foreign nations was to be undertaken only when their personnel could qualify as:[4]

Those being trained for the war against Japan.
Those being trained to further United States policy in the Western hemisphere.
Those who come under the provisions of post-war policies as such policies are determined.

Even previous to this time the Army Air Forces had moved toward the termination of the two largest foreign programs, those of Great Britain and France. On 10 May 1945, Brigadier General E. M. Powers, International Officer for the Army Air Forces, informed the British that after 1 June 1945 no new British students were to be accepted for training in the four British pilot training schools still operating in the United States.[5] These four schools had been in existence since June 1945. They had been operated by the British in conformity with the British training pattern, but for supplies and for certain services,

such as medical care, they were dependent upon personnel of the Army Air Forces. They were also financed by Lend-Lease funds. At the request of the British, plans for closing the British schools were temporarily postponed in date so as to permit the entrance of a last British class at the end of August 1945 and the completion of its training.[6] Late in August, however, Headquarters, Army Air Forces informed the Training Command that Course 28, which was scheduled to begin on 25 August, would not start, and that all British training would be terminated as of 11 September.[7] On this date a program which had been in being since June 1941 was brought to a successful conclusion. In that period it had supplied the British with a total of 6,921 pilot graduates.[8]

Hardly two weeks after the British had first been informed of the prospective termination of their program, the Foreign Liaison Office, G-2, notified the Chief of the French Air Mission that no new increments of French air personnel would be accepted for training.[9] As in the case of the British, the dominant reason for this decision seems to have been that use of British or French air personnel was not contemplated in the Pacific theater. Even more vigorously than the British, the French protested the proposed termination of their training.[10] Their argument was based particularly on their great need for trained air personnel and the inadequacy of facilities in France for conducting the widespread training they considered necessary. The aid of the Department of State was enlisted by the French in the endeavor to prolong their status as beneficiaries of air training under Lend-Lease.[11]

Despite the intervention of the Department of State, the War Department moved early in November to terminate all training under provisions of Lend-Lease as of 30 November 1945.[12] As a result of continued French protests and the interest of the Department of State, the matter of ending French training was carried ultimately to the White House for a decision. On 5 December 1945 President Truman informed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that the training of French air personnel in the United States would be carried on subject to two provisions. These were that all French training in the United States be concluded by 1 March 1946, and that the French pay the costs of their training ($3,000,000) in the period after 30 November 1945.[13] When the French proved unable to meet the costs of training, all French training was terminated as of 18 January 1946.[14]

The third major training program, that of the Chinese, was likewise scheduled for termination as of 30 November 1945. Because of this decision by the War Department, Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek cabled President Truman in mid-November to request that training of those Chinese air personnel who were in or on their way to the United States on V-J day be completed. He also requested that an additional 1,220 Chinese whom the United States had contracted to train but who had not left China by V-J day be accepted for training. No mention was made of fulfilling the provisions of the "Palmyra" plan.[15]

President Truman agreed to this proposal subject to the establishment of some new arrangement superseding Lend-Lease for payment for all training received by the Chinese in the period after 30 November 1945.[16] This new arrangement has yet to be arrived at. As a result of this

agreement, on 30 November 1945 there were 2,200 Chinese in training in the United States. An additional 1,220 were to arrive thereafter.[17] The Chinese program, following the termination of the British and French programs, thus became the largest of all programs and larger than all Latin American training programs combined.

Other programs affected adversely by War Department action terminating the use of Lend-Lease funds for training purposes as of 30 November were the Turkish program and certain of the Latin American programs. The training of 38 Turks who were in Army Air Force pilot courses ended as of the above date.[18] Latin American training was affected less drastically. After 30 November Latin American training could still be carried on free of charge under provisions of the "Goodwill Act" of 24 June 1938. Thereafter, however, auxiliary costs, such as housing, subsistence, medical care, and transportation, formerly chargeable to Lend-Lease under certain of the Latin American programs (particularly Brazil and Mexico) had to be paid by the specific Latin American country receiving training.[19]

Problems in foreign training during 1945 tended to remain much the same as in earlier years.[20] Chief among them was that of levelling the language barrier so as to permit establishment of an effective medium of communication between instructor and student. This problem was particularly pressing in the case of the French and Chinese training programs. In its solution great reliance was placed on the use of graduates in the French program for the instruction of other French students. As of 3 October 1945, 109 French instructors were being used in the French training program.[21]

At the beginning of the year 1945 the ratio of Mandarin-speaking Chinese interpreters to students was 1 to 25.[22] In the endeavor to increase the number of interpreters, which was markedly inadequate, the Army Air Forces tried several means. It made efforts to have transferred to itself the Chinese nationals who had been drafted into the American Army and who were serving as enlisted men in the Army Ground and Army Service Forces.[23] It also sought to recruit interpreters from Chinese still on student status in the United States and used a list of names supplied by the Department of State for that purpose.[24] The greatest alleviation came not from these sources, however, but as the result of the arrival of additional interpreters from China. Fifty interpreters arrived from the CBI theater early in July 1945, after having been declared surplus in that theater.[25] As a result of their arrival, the efficiency of instruction tended to improve during the latter months of 1945.

Progress toward solution of another problem long present in foreign training was made in June 1945 when Mexican training was transferred from Foster Field, Victoria, Texas, to Dothan Field, Alabama. In apparent disregard of local prejudice, the Army Air Forces had been conducting training of Latin American nationals predominantly in Texas since 1941. During 1944 there had been some minor incidents between Texans and Mexican nationals receiving training which threatened to jeopardize both the effectiveness of training and the further development of international goodwill. During April 1945 two more incidents occurred. In one case a restaurant at Victoria, Texas, refused to serve a party of Mexican officers, and in the other case wives of Mexican

officers experienced difficulty in finding suitable housing in that community.[26] The transfer of Mexican training to Dothan Field, Alabama, was designed to prevent the occurence of any more such incidents.[27]

Although training tended to taper off sharply during the latter months of 1945, the year was nevertheless a major one in foreign training. During March 1945, when foreign training was close to its maximum, a total air personnel of 5,200 from thirteen different countries were receiving training. Of these 2,120 were Chinese, 1,750 French, and 1,100 British.[28] Statistics for the year show a total of 4,754 individuals who graduated from air training courses, 2,940 of whom were trained as pilots. Of the larger number, 1,511 were graduates of the British operated pilot training schools, 1,433 were French graduates of Army Air Force schools, and 1,363 were Chinese graduates of Army Air Force schools. The number of Latin American graduates was 361.[29]

The extent of future foreign training by the Army Air Forces is yet to be determined. At present it seems limited to finishing that Chinese training agreed to prior to V-J day and to Latin American training offered under terms of the Act of 24 June 1938. Quotas planned for this latter training total 648 for the first eight months of 1938. Of this number, 160 are to be trained as pilots, 132 as ground officers, 10 as medical officers, and 346 as enlisted technicians.[30]

Although foreign training is thus much diminished from its size during the war, it seems quite possible that this training may continue to maintain considerable importance in the postwar period. While the purpose present during the war of training air personnel of our Allies

for use in an immediate military situation will be gone, certain purposes of larger scope will remain. The purpose of building up goodwill toward the United States, so well recognized in Latin American training, may well be served by additional legislation permitting the United States to offer to train foreign air personnel of any nation when such training seems to be in the national interest.

The rendering of substantial foreign training will also have the further advantage of assisting the Army Air Forces in keeping its training plant near peak efficiency and in maintaining a larger training establishment than would be necessary for training solely American military personnel. This "extra" capacity for foreign training would be a safety factor in that it would provide means for a somewhat more rapid expansion of the Army Air Forces in case of emergency than would otherwise be possible. These two reasons for foreign training--of broad national interest and of special interest to the Army Air Forces--need to be properly evaluated. It is quite possible that after such evaluation the continuing use of personnel, equipment, and facilities of the Army Air Forces for training air personnel of both Latin American and non-Latin American nations will seem of considerable benefit both to the nation and to its military air establishment.

NOTES

1. Memo, Brig Gen J. S. Bradley, Acting ACofS, G-3 to CG, AAF, 24 Apr 1945. 350.2B Tng of Chinese Stus.

2. Ltr, Hq AAF, to CG, TRC, 3 July 1945. Tng 9 China.

3. Memo, AC/AS-5 to CofAS, 19 Sept 1945. 350.2B Tng of Chinese Stus.

4. R&R, OPD to G-2, 21 June 1945. 350.2 Tng of Chinese Stus.

5. Ltr, Brig. Gen. E. M. Powers to Air Marshal Douglas Colyer, RAF Delegation, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1945. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

6. Ltr, Air Marshal Douglas Colyer to Brig. Gen. E. M. Powers, 25 May 1945; and Ltr, Brig. Gen. E. M. Powers to Air Marshal Douglas Colyer, 29 May 1945. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

7. Daily Diary, Hq TRC, 27 Aug 1945. AFSHO files.

8. See statistical chart, "Graduates from British Flying Training Schools from Establishment...Through 11 Sept 1945..." in Appendix to History of Training of Foreign Nationals by the Army Air Forces, 1939-1945. AFSHO files.

9. Ltr, Lt Col W. F. Brazeau, Foreign Liaison Office, G-2, to Maj Gen Charles Luguet, 25 May 1945. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Officers.

10. Memo, Maj Gen Charles Luguet to Gen G. C. Marshall, CofS, 12 June 1945. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Stus.

11. Memo, Department of State to War Department, 20 July 1945. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Stus. See also later memo, Secretary of State to Secretary of War, 19 Nov 1945. Tng 9 France.

12. Memo, AC/AS-3 for Gen H. H. Arnold, 1 Nov 1945. AFSHO files.

13. Memo, President Truman, to James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, 5 Dec 1945; and also Memo, Maj Gen I. H. Edwards, ACofS, G-3 to CG, AAF, 12 Dec 1945. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

14. Ltr, Hq AAF, to CG, Continental Air Forces, 18 Jan 1946. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

15. Memo, Admiral W.D. Leahy, CofS to the President, to CG, AAF, with incls, 20 Nov 1945. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

16. Ibid.

17. Memo, Gen H. H. Arnold to Admiral W. D. Leahy, 28 Nov 1945. Foreign Sec Files, AC/AS-3.

18. Memo, AC/AS-3, for Gen H. H. Arnold, 23 Nov 1945. AFSHO files.

19. Memo, Col Desmond O'Keefe, Air Judge Advocate to Gen H. H. Arnold, 8 Nov 1945. AFSHO files.

20. See History of Training of Foreign Nationals by the Army Air Forces, 1939-1945. AFSHO files.

21. Ltr, Maj Gen Charles Luguet, Chief, French Air Mission, Washington, DC, to Lt Gen J. E. Hull, Deputy CofS, 3 Oct 1945. Tng 9 France.

22. History of TRC, 7 July 1943 to 31 Dec 1944, p. 1696.

23. Ltr, Hq 78th Flying Tng Wg, to CG, AAF, 2 Feb 1945, through channels with inds. 350.2 Tng of Chinese Stus.

24. Ltr, Hq AAF to Director, Selective Service, Washington, DC, 20 Mar 1945. Tng 9 China.

25. Ltr, Hq AAF to Director, Selective Service, Washington, DC, 12 July 1945. Tng 9 China.

26. Memo for Record, Maj Gen W. F. Kraus, CG, CFTC, Randolph Fld, Tex, 18 Apr 1945; also Ltr Hq, TRC to CG, CFTC, 22 June 1945 with inds. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Stus.

27. Memo, Maj Gen R. L. Walsh, Special Asst to CG, AAF, to Lt Gen I. C. Eaker, CofAS, 1 June 1945. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Stus.

28. Ltr, Brig Gen C. H. Caldwell, Acting AC/AS Tng, to Lt Gen B. M. Giles, CofAS, 19 Mar 1945. 350.2 Tng of Foreign Stus.

29. See statistical charts in Appendix to History of Training of Foreign Nationals by the Army Air Forces, 1939-1945. AFSHO files

30. Chart: "Proposed Quotas for Latin American Air Force Personnel in US AAF Schools, 1 Jan 1946 to 30 Aug 1946," 18 Dec 1945. Foreign Sec files, AC/AS-3.

G L O S S A R Y

AAB	Army Air Base
AAF	Army Air Forces
AAFld.	Army Air Field
AC	Air Corps
AC/AS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff
AC/S	Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg.	Acting
AF	Air Force
AFCC	Air Force Combat Command
AFFTC	Army Air Forces Flying Training Command
AFSHO	Army Air Forces Historical Office
AFTRC	Army Air Forces Training Command
AFTTC	Army Air Forces Technical Training Command
AGF	Army Ground Forces
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
ASC	Air Service Command
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASTP	Army Specialized Training Program
ATC	Air Transport Command
ATSC	Air Technical Service Command
Avn.	Aviation
BFTS	British Flying Training Schools
C/AAF	Chief of Army Air Forces
C/AC	Chief of Air Corps
CAF	Continental Air Forces
C/AS	Chief of Air Staff
CBI AFTC	China-Burma-India Air Force Training Command
CCTS	Combat Crew Training School
CFTC	Central Flying Training Command
CIS	Central Instructors School
Conf.	Conference
C/S	Chief of Staff
DAC/S	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
DC/AS	Deputy Chief of Air Staff
DC/S	Deputy Chief of Staff
EFTC	Eastern Flying Training Command
I TTC	First Troop Carrier Command
FTD	Flying Training Detachment
GCTC	Gulf Coast Training Center
GHQ AF	General Headquarters Air Force
JA	Judge Advocate
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LA	Latin American
LAB	Low Altitude Bombardment

GLOSSARY—Contd.

M&S	Materiel and Services
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MM&D	Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
OCAC	Office of Chief of the Air Corps
OC&R	Operations, Commitments, and Requirements
OPD	Operational Plans Division
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OTU	Operational Training Unit
RAF	Royal Air Force
R&R	Routing and Record Sheet
ROM	Radio Operator Mechanic
RTU	Replacement Training Unit
SAAAB	Santa Ana Army Air Base
SAACC	San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center
Sch.	School
SE	Single-Engine
Serv.	Service
SETC	Southeast Training Center
Stu.	Student
S/W	Secretary of War
TAG	The Adjutant General
T&O	Training and Operations
TE	Twin-Engine
Tng.	Training
TTC	Technical Training Command
US/W	Undersecretary of War
WCTC	West Coast Training Center
WD	War Department
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WFTC	Western Flying Training Command
Wg.	Wing

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

N O T E S

Chapter 1

1. 52 Stat. 1034.

2. Exec. Order 7964, Federal Register, 30 Aug. 1938. It appears that in practice few Latin American nations seeking training for their nationals made their requests through the Secretary of State. More often they dealt directly with the War Department through the Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2.

3. Ltr., TAG to Chiefs of Arms and Services, 4 May 1939, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of LA Students. Memo, Lt. Col. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Sec. to Brig. Gen. H. H. Welsh, AC/AS-3, 18 Sep. 1945, in ibid.

4. 55 Stat. 31.

5. Quoted in memo, Col. F. L. Llewellyn, Asst. JAG to US/W, 13 Oct. 1941, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Chinese Stus.

6. This figure includes 6,129 British pilots and approximately 260 Netherlands pilots trained in this country at schools operated under lend-Lease by the British and Netherlanders, respectively. For supplies and for certain services, such as medical care, however, they were dependent upon personnel of the AAF.

7. A summary set of statistics by country of individuals graduating from types of training given by the AAF was compiled by the Foreign Section, AC/AS-3, in January 1946 and is included as appendixes to this study.

[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Chapter II

1. Ltr., Air Commodore C. C. Pirie, Air Attaché, Brit. Embassy, Washington to Maj. Lawrence Higgins, Chief, Foreign Liaison Br., G-2 Div., 5 April 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

2. Ibid.

3. Ltr., Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, C/AC to C/S, 18 Oct. 1940, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

4. Rpt. of Conf. held in Gen. Arnold's Office with Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, Air Attaché, Brit. Embassy, Washington, 2 Jan. 1941, in ibid. See also ltr., OCAC to CG GHQ AF, 26 March 1941, in ibid.

5. Ltr., Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, Air Attaché, Brit. Embassy, Washington to Maj. Lawrence Higgins, Chief, Foreign Liaison Br., G-2 Div., 5 April 1941, in ibid.

6. Ltr., OCAC to CG CFTC, and others, 12 April 1941, in ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, pp. 2080-83. See also memo, Brig. Gen. Davenport Johnson, Chief, T&O Div., OCAC, to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, C/AC, 19 May 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

9. History of Avenger Field, Sweetwater, Texas, 10 Aug. 1942-1 March 1944, p. 4.

10. "Notes of a Meeting held in London on 13 April 1941 to discuss Flying Training Facilities in the United States," in AAG 353.9-2B, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

11. Memo, Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Actg. C/AC to C/S, 6 May 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

12. Memo, Brig. Gen. Davenport Johnson to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 3 June 1941, in AAG 353.9-2B, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

13. History of EFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941, p. 574.

14. History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, p. 2091; History of EFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941, pp. 562-567.

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15. Memo, Col. W. F. Kraus, Exec., T&O Div. to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 8 May 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Tng. See also memo, Col. W. F. Kraus, Exec., T&O Div., to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 10 May 1941, in ibid.; and History of the AAFFTD, Pan American Airways, Inc., 1 Aug. 1940-1 March 1944.

16. Ltr., Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Actg. DC/S to US/W, 22 April 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Tng.

17. R&R, S-3, Hq. AFFTC to Mat. Div., 14 Feb. 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

18. Ltr., Hq. AAF to Chief of Engineers, 7 May 1942, in AAG 322.3, British OTU's. See also statement accompanying Lend-Lease Requisition, 3 Aug. 1942, in ibid.

19. Ltr., Air Marshal D.C.S. Evill, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to Gen. H. H. Arnold, 8 July 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

20. Interview with Flight Lieutenant Jamieson, RAF Delegation, Washington, by G. T. White, AFSHO, 20 Feb. 1946.

21. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 3 July 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

22. History of EFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 954. See also History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, p. 2098.

23. History of the AAFFTD, Pan American Airways, Inc., 1 Aug. 1940-1 March 1944, p. 73. Records of the Foreign Section, AC/AS-3 indicate that the total number of British graduates from the Pan American school was 1,152. This figure may be solely for those graduated under the "1,000 navigator" program. See App. 14, this study.

24. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 3 July 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

25. History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 912, in AFSHO files. See also p. 94 , this study.

26. Ltr., Gp. Capt. R.H.S. Spaight, Dir. of Tng. (USA) RAF Delegation to Col. W. F. Volandt, 15 March 1944, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3.

27. Chart, "Graduates from BFTS from Establishment of Schools in 1941 through 11 Sep. 1945 . . .," in ibid. See App. 14, this study.

28. See statistical tables on British training in App. 14, this study.

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29. See "Plan for Establishment of an Inter-American Fighter Wing," AC/AS, Plans, 20 July 1943, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3; R&R, AC/AS, Plans to AC/AS, CC&R, 10 April 1944; and R&R, AC/AS, Plans to DC/AS, 15 April 1944, in AAG 350.2B, Tng. of LA Stus.

30. See statistical tables for the various Latin American countries, Apps. 1, 3, 4, 6, 8-10, 12, 15-17, 20, 22-24, 29, 30, this study.

31. Ltr., P. D. Warner, Actg. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, to Air JA, 11 Aug. 1943, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

32. Ltr., Hq. AAF to Nelson A. Rockefeller, 14 July 1941, in ibid.

33. History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939 to 7 July 1943, pp. 2111-24; History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 925.

34. Memo, Maj. E. F. Gillespie to C/AAF, 12 Jan. 1942, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

35. Interview with Lt. Col. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Sec. and Maj. A. Kidder, II, Asst. Chief, Foreign Sec., by Cpl. G. F. White, AFSHO, 18 Oct. 1945, in AFSHO files.

36. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFTRC, 24 Oct. 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. LA Stus.

37. See statistical table on Brazil in App. 4, this study.

38. R&R, Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold to Brig. Gen. L. S. Smith, Dir. of Ind. Tng., 19 Feb. 1943, in AAG 350.2, Brazil.

39. R&R, Brig. Gen. L. S. Smith to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, 20 Feb. 1943, in ibid.

40. Memo, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, AC/AS, Plans to C/AS, 6 Jan. 1944, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. of LA Stus.

41. Memo, Brig. Gen. H. S. Vandenburg, Actg. C/AS, to North American Delegation, Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission, 12 Jan. 1944, in ibid.

42. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, pp. 1601-02.

43. The plan for training a Brazilian fighter squadron for service overseas was advanced at least as early as August 1943. (Memo, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, AC/AS, Plans to CG, AAF, 25 Aug. 1943, in AAG 322-T, Units, Miscellaneous.) Other plans included one for the use of Andean natives from Bolivia and Ecuador as flexible gunners on heavy bombers, since they were inured to high altitudes. This plan, urged upon General G. C. Marshall by the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, was investigated but not adopted. (Memo. Gen. G. C. Marshall to CG AGF, (Contd)

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43. (Contd) and others, 6 May 1943, in AAG 350.2, Trng. of LA Stus.) Another plan, drawn up by AC/AS, Plans, provided for a fighter wing which would draw its personnel from all 21 American republics and would serve in combat under American leadership. Because of the political and diplomatic difficulties involved, it also failed to get beyond the planning stage. ("Plan for Establishment of an Inter-American Fighter Wing," AC/AS, Plans, 20 July 1943, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3.)

44. Ltr., Col. W. E. Taylor, CO 26th Ftr. Comd. to CG 6th AF, 20 Dec. 1943, in AAG 350.2A, Trng. of LA Stus. See also ltr., Gen. H. H. Arnold to Dr. Salgado Filho, Brazilian Air Minister, 18 Aug. 1944, in AAG 350.2B, Trng. of LA Stus.

45. Ltr., Lt. Col. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Sec., AC/AS, Trng. to the Sec. of State, 7 Aug. 1944, in AAG 350.2, Instruction of Foreign Officers at US Mil Schs.

46. Memo, Maj. Gen. G. V. Henry, Joint Mexican-U. S. Defense Commission to CG AAF, 12 Dec. 1944, in AAG 350.2C, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U. S. Mil. Schs.

47. 52 Stat. 1034.

48. See statistical tables for the various Latin American countries in Apps. to this study.

49. Chart, "Proposed Quotas for Latin American Air Force Personnel in U. S. AAF Schools, 1 Jan. 1946 to 30 Aug. 1946," 18 Dec. 1945, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3.

50. "Report of Brig. Gen. H. B. Claggett on the Air Mission to China," Intel. Rpt., Serial 26, Intel. Div., Office, Chief of Naval Opns., 28 July 1941, in MIS Lib. files, G-2 Div.

51. Cablegram 491, U. S. Mil. Attaché, China, 6 May 1941, in ibid.

52. Ltr., Gen. G. C. Marshall, C/S to Dr. Lauchlin Currie, 15 July 1941, in AAG 350.2, Trng. Chinese Stus. See also reply, Dr. Lauchlin Currie to Gen. G. C. Marshall, 6 Aug. 1941, in ibid.

53. History of the Eighth Group, Chinese Air Force, p. 1, in AFHRC files.

54. History of ACTC, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 1942, Doc. XVI-1.

55. Ltr., Dr. Lauchlin Currie to Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, 22 April 1942, in AAG 350.2, Trng. Chinese Stus. See also ltr., Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold to Dr. Lauchlin Currie, 27 April 1942, in ibid.

56. Ltr., Maj. Gen. T. H. Shen, Chinese AF to Col. L. S. Smith, Dir. of Ind. Trng., 2 July 1942, in ibid. See also R&R, C/AS to Dir. of Ind. Trng., 1 Sep. 1942, in ibid.

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57. 2d ind. (ltr., Maj. Gen. P. T. Mow, Chinese AF to Lt. Col. H. A. Kenyon, MIS, G-2 Div., 22 Nov. 1943), Hq. AAF to AC/S, G-2, 2 Dec. 1943, in AAG 350.2, China.

58. Incl. with memo, Lt. Col. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Tng. Br. to Brig. Gen. W. W. Welsh, AC/AS, Tng., 2 Nov. 1944, in AAG 350.2B, Tng. of Chinese Stus.

59. Memo, Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, AC/AS, Plans to C/AS, 25 Aug. 1944, in ibid.

60. Memo, Brig. Gen. J. S. Bradley, Actg. AC/S, G-3 Div. to CG AAF, 24 April 1945, in ibid.

61. Memo, Brig. Gen. M. A. Irvine, DAC/S, G-3 Div. to CG AAF, 1 March 1945, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of Chinese Stus.

62. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFTRC, 3 July 1945, in AAG Tng. 9, China.

63. Material on the location of various phases of Chinese training has been found primarily in the installments of the History of AFTC (CTC). See also History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943; History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944; and History of the Eighth Group, Chinese Air Force.

64. See statistical tables on Chinese training in App. 7, this study.

65. Memo, Col. F.G.L. Weijerman, Netherlands Mil. Attaché at Washington to AC/S, G-2, 17 March 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

66. Memo, Lt. Col. E. J. Rogers to Brig. Gen. D. D. Eisenhower, 16 March 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. Foreign Officers.

67. Ltr., Col. F.G.L. Weijerman, Netherlands Mil. Attaché at Washington to Col. Babbitt, Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div., 27 April 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

68. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 5 May 1942, in ibid.

69. Ltr., Maj. Gen. L. H. van Oyen to Col. H. A. Johnson, G-2 Div., Hq. AFFTC, 29 May 1942, in ibid.

70. Ltr., Hq. AFFTC to Dir. of Base Serv., 11 May 1942, in ibid.

71. Ltr., Hq. AFFTC to CG AAF, 23 Jan. 1943, in AAG 350.2, Netherlands.

72. History of AFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 1002.

73. Ibid., p. 1001.

74. See statistics on NEI training in App. 18, this study. For some other statistics impossible to reconcile with these cited here, see History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, pp. 1728-29.

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75. Memo, Brig. Gen. O. A. Anderson, AC/AS, Plans to CG AAF, 4 Jan. 1943, in AAG 350.2A, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs. See also Rpt. of Maj. F. Mildman to CG AAF, 10 Jan. 1943, in ibid.

76. Cable Msg., Maj. Gen. C. A. Spaatz to CG AAF, 29 Dec. 1942, in ibid.

77. Ltr., Hq AAF to CG AFFTC, 26 Feb. 1943, in ibid.

78. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1647.

79. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG 3d AF, 12 Nov. 1943, in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs. See also ltr., Hq. AAF to CG 3d AF, 17 Dec. 1943, in AAG 350.2, France.

80. Memo, Foreign Tng. Sec., AC/AS, Tng. to C/AS, 10 July 1943, in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

81. MD Disposition Form, Foreign Tng. Sec., AC/AS, Tng. to Foreign Liaison Br., G-2 Div., 29 Dec. 1943, in AAG 350.2, France.

82. Ltr., Ho. AFTRC to CG AAF, 5 Nov. 1943, in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

83. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1647.

84. Material on the location of various phases of French training has been found primarily in the installments of the History of EFTC for 1943 and thereafter. See also History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943; and History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944.

85. See statistical table for France in App. 13, this study.

86. Lt. Col. M. F. Brazeau, Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div. to Maj. Gen. Charles Luguet, Chief, French Air Mission, 25 May 1945, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

87. Daily Diary, AC/AS-3, Hq. AAF, 1 Nov. 1945, in AFSHO files.

88. Memo, President Truman to James F. Byrnes, Sec. of State, 5 Dec. 1945, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3.

89. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG CAF, 18 Jan. 1946, in ibid.

90. R&R, Brig. Gen. C. A. Spaatz, C/AS to CG AFCC, 28 Aug. 1941, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. Foreign Officers. See also ltr., Hq. 2d AF to C/AAF, 1 Oct. 1941, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

91. Memo, Lt. Col. J. G. Taylor, Chief, Intel. Div. to Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div., 5 Aug. 1941, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. Foreign Officers.

92. Folder on Polish training, in AC/AS-3, Training Div. files.

93. WD Disposition Form, AC/AS-5 to C/S, 24 Sep. 1945, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of Foreign Stus.

94. Ltr., Gen. D. T. Simovitch to Ambassador John G. Winant, London, 12 Aug. 1941, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. Foreign Officers.

95. R&R, Brig. Gen. M. S. Fairchild, Exec., OCAC to C/AAF, 6 Oct. 1941, in AAG 350.2, Tng. Foreign Officers.

96. Memo, Col. E. L. Naiden, A-3 Div. to C/AAF, 9 Dec. 1941, in ibid.

97. Memo, Capt. G. A. Braga to Col. L. S. Smith, Dir. of Ind. Tng., 14 July 1943, in ibid.

98. Memo, Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane, Sec., JCS, for CG AAF, 19 Sep. 1942, in ibid.

99. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 1 Dec. 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. of Yugoslav Stus.

100. Ltr., Hq. AAF to Col. W. J. Donovan, OSS, 1 Dec. 1942, in ibid.

101. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, pp. 1731-33.

102. Ltr., C/AS to CG 12th AF, 8 Oct. 1943, in AAG 322, 12th AF.

103. R&R, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, AC/AS, Plans to DC/AS, 10 June 1943, in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

104. Ltr., Maj. T. Ariburun, Turkish Air Attaché at Washington to Col. Theodore Babbitt, Foreign Liaison Br., 15 Dec. 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

105. R&R, A-3 Div. to C/AS, 29 Dec. 1943, in ibid.

106. Ltr., Maj. T. Ariburun, Turkish Air Attaché at Washington to Col. T. Babbitt, Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div., 26 Jan. 1943, in ibid. See also History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 952.

107. History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1944-30 June 1944, pp. 563-69.

108. Ltr., Maj. C. Aydinalp, Turkish Mil. and Air Attaché at Washington to Col. O. T. Jamerson, Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div., 17 Jan. 1945, in AAG Tng. 9, Turkey.

109. See statistical tables on Turkish training in App. 27, this study.

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Chapter III

1. See the various sections of Chapter II, this study.

2. For a memo outlining a proposed method for handling requests for foreign training at the General Staff level (no name or date, but about 1 March 1945), see AAG 350.2, Trng. of Foreign Stus. See also "Procedure for Processing Requests for Training or Attachment of Latin American Military Personnel . . .," 21 Nov. 1945, in Foreign Liaison Sec. files, G-2.

3. Col. E. S. Broadhurst, ADC3, OPD stated to Cpl. G. T. White, AFSHO, 18 January 1945, that no program for training foreign air personnel was ever approved by OPD without prior consultation and agreement with AC/AS-5 and AC/AS-3.

4. Airgram, Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, Bogotá to Sec. of State, 20 Sept. 1943, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

5. WD Disposition Form, Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, AC/AS, Plans to G-2, 4 Nov. 1943, in ibid.

6. R&R, OPD to G-2, 21 June 1945, in AAG 350.2, Trng. of Chinese Stus.

7. Memo, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Actg. AC/S, G-2 Div. to DC/S for Air, 25 Oct. 1941, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus. See also memo, Col. E. A. Hill, Air Insp. to Brig. Gen. C. A. Spaatz, C/AS, 30 Oct. 1941, in ibid.

8. Memo of a meeting between Nelson Rockefeller, Wallace K. Harrison, and three Latin American air officers, 20 Dec. 1941, in ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Memo, 2d Lt. R. C. Crown to AC/S, A-2, 24 Jan. 1942, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

11. Ltr., Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, C/AAF to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, C/AC, 10 Feb. 1942, in ibid.

12. R&R, Lt. J. E. Roberts to AGO, AC, 6 March 1942, in ibid. See also Organization and Function Charts of AAF, 13 June 1942, in AFSHO files.

13. 201 file, A. F. Katzentine.

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14. 201 file, C. A. Braga.

15. 201 file, Alfred Hidder, II.

16. 201 file, A. H. Richards.

17. 201 file, G. E. Robinson.

18. Organization and Function Charts of AAF, 25 Jan. 1943, in AFSHO files.

19. Organization and Function Charts of AAF, 1 Oct. 1943, in ibid.

20. Organization and Function Charts of AAF, 1 June 1944, in ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. R&R, S-3, Hq. AFFTC to Asst. for Opns., OCAC, 20 Feb. 1942, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

23. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFTRC, 26 July 1944, in AAG 350.2, Great Britain.

24. History of ICTC, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 1942, pp. 510-12.

25. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 6 Dec. 1942, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of Yugoslav Stus.

26. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG 3d AF, 13 March 1944, in AAG 350.2, France. See also ltr., Hq. AAF to CG CAF, 7 July 1945, in AAG Tng. 9, China.

27. 52 Stat. 1034.

28. Memo, Col. Desmond O'Keefe, Air JA, to Gen. H. H. Arnold, 8 Nov. 1945, in AFSHO files.

29. 2d ind. (basic ltr. missing), Latin American Subsection, Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 24 June 1942, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus.

30. Interview with Lt. Col. E. L. La Tendresse, Asst. Chief, International Br., AC/AS-4, by G. T. White, AFSHO, 18 Feb. 1946. For additional material on the Defense Aid Section and its subsequent designations, see ATSC Historical Monograph, "Supplying the Air Forces of the United Nations, March 1941 through Nov. 1944," in AFSHO files.

31. 2d ind. (basic ltr. missing), Latin American Subsection, Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 24 June 1942, in AAG 350.2, LA Stus. See also ltr., Col. J. H. Moore, International Officer for the AAF to CG ATSC, 17 Sep. 1945, in International Br. files, AC/AS-4.

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32. Interview with Lt. Col. H. E. La Tendresse, Asst. Chief, International Br., AC/AS-4, by G. T. White, AFHHO, 18 Feb. 1946. For additional material on the Defense Aid Organization and its subsequent designations, see ATSC Historical Monograph, "Supplying the Air Forces of the United Nations, March 1941 through Nov. 1944," in AFHHO files.

33. Ho. Office Instruction 20-43, Hq. AAF, 1 June 1944, in International Br. files, AC/AS-4.

34. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. Powers, International Officer of AAF to CG ASC, 16 Aug. 1944, in ibid.

35. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG's all Air Forces, AFTRC, ATC, I TCC, and ATSC, 30 Oct. 1944, in ibid.

36. This figure does not include medical charges nor charges for transportation to and from the United States. See chart, "Total Charges for Training Foreign Nationals under Lend-Lease," prepared by International Br., AC/AS-4, 14 May 1946. The chart is misnamed, for in the absence of basic statistics it has been impossible to compute charges for any nation except Great Britain beyond the latter months of 1944. The chart also fails to include the NEI training.

37. This estimate has been reached by rule of thumb. It takes roughly into account the facts that the British received no operational training (the most expensive of all training); that the British rate of elimination was lower than in any other of the major foreign training programs; and that, counterbalancing these factors in part, nearly all British graduates were flying training graduates (technical training courses tended to be much cheaper).

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Chapter IV

1. For Chinese examples, see ltr., Maj. Christy Mathewson to Maj. Gen. E. P. Cousins, CG AFTC, 10 Dec. 1943, in AAG 350.2, China, which includes recommendations of Maj. Gen. P. T. How, Chinese Air Force, for changes in the training curriculum for Chinese students, and ltr., Hq. Luke Fld., Ariz. to CG AFTC, 24 April 1944, in ibid. For a French example, see memo, Lt. Col. W. L. Breyton, Chief, French Air Force Student Corps in US to AC/AS, Trng., 3 April 1945, in AAG Trng. 9, France.

2. Ltr., SAAAB to CG AAF, 17 Dec. 1943, with inds., in AAG 350.2, China.

3. Memo, Capt. Philip H. DuBois to Lt. Col. J. C. Flanagan, 14 April 1944, in AAG 350.2C, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

4. Ltr., Lt. Col. J. G. Heinartz, Comdt., Sch. of Avn. Medicine, Randolph Fld., Texas to Air Surgeon, Hq. AAF, 25 Feb. 1942, in AAG 350.2, Trng. Foreign Officers.

5. Ltr., Capt. J. D. Landauer, Asst. exec., SAACC to CG GCTC, 4 June 1943, in AAG 350.2, Brazil.

6. Ltr., Hq. 78th Flying Trng. Wg., SAACC to CG AAF, with inds., 10 Feb. 1943, in AAG 350.2, Trng. of Chinese Stus.

7. History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, p. 955; ibid., 1 Jan. 1944-30 June 1944, pp. 646-47, 658. See also History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, p. 2100.

8. Ltr., OCAC to CG SWC, 15 May 1941, in AAG 353.9-A2, Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Trng.

9. Ltr., Lt. Col. H. Y. Lai, CO Chinese Avn. Stus. in U.S. to CG CFTC, 2 April 1945, in AAG Trng. 9, China.

10. See also Rpt. of Conf. between Brig. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer and Air Marshal Carrod, 16 Oct. 1941, in 353.9B, Foreign Trng. in Avn.; and memo, Lt. Col. Ben W. Barclay, Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission to AC/AS, Trng., 2 June 1944, in AAG 350.2B, Trng. of LA Stus.

11. See ltr., Hq. AFTC to CO's of AAF schs. tng. French stus., 1 Sep. 1944, in AAG Trng. 9, France.

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12. Ibid.; History of AFFTC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, p. 2175; History of SETC, 1 Jan. 1939-7 Dec. 1941; History of CFTC, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 1942, p. 515.

13. Notes on Meeting Held in AC/AS, Plans, Western Hemisphere Br., 4 April 1944, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of LA Stus.

14. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1600.

15. Ltr., Maj. Christy Mathewson, Dir. of Pilot Tng., Glendale, Ariz. to CG AAF, through CG AFTC, 29 Oct. 1943, in AAG 350.2, China.

16. Ltr., SAAAB to CG AAF, through channels, 2 March 1944, in ibid.

17. Proposed Program of Instruction for Pilot Trainees (Chinese OTU), La Junta AAFld., Colo., 22 Nov. 1943, in ibid.

18. Ltr., Office of Liaison Officer, Chinese Program, Luke Fld., Ariz. to CG AAF, 20 March 1944, in ibid.

19. Ltr., Capt. Christy Mathewson, Office of Dir. of Tng., Chinese Flying Det., Marana AAFld., Ariz., 10 Nov. 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. of Chinese Stus.

20. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1650.

21. Ibid., p. 1659.

22. History of AFTC, 1 Jan. 1944-30 June 1944, p. 648.

23. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFFTC, 6 Dec. 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. of Yugoslav Stus. See also ltr., Capt. J. J. Stiglich to Hq. AAF, 25 Dec. 1942, in ibid.

24. Ltr., Capt. J. J. Stiglich to Maj. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Tng. Sec., March 1943 [?], in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS-3.

25. History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1944-30 June 1944, p. 569.

26. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1725.

27. History of AFTC, 1 Jan. 1943-31 Dec. 1943, pp. 1016-17.

28. History of CFTC, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 1942, p. 512.

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41. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, pp. 1606-07.

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53. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AFTRC, 13 Oct. 1943, with inds. and incl., in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs.

54. Ltr., Maj. A. D. d'Amercourt, CO French Air Trng. Centers to Lt. Col. H. A. Lenyon, Foreign Liaison Br., G-2 Div., 15 Feb. 1944, in ibid. See also History of CFTC, 1 Jan. 1944-30 June 1944, Doc. XVII-2.

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60. Ltr., Col. C. S. Patterson, Actg. Air JA to Lt. Col. W. J. Wilkins, Staff JA, Hq. 2d AF, Colorado Springs, Colo., 18 Sep. 1944, in AAG 350.2B, Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Mil. Schs. See also ltr., Hq. AAF to CG CAF, 7 July 1945, in AAG Trng. 9, China.

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62. Ltr., Maj. C. Aydinalp, Turkish Mil. and Air Attaché at Washington to Col. O. T. Jemerson, Foreign Liaison Officer, G-2 Div., 18 July 1944, with ind., in ibid.

63. Interview with Maj. A. Kidder, II, Chief, Foreign Sec., by C. T. White, AFCHO, 15 Jan. 1946. See also Excerpt from Rpt. of Trip to CCTC by Lt. Kidder, 7-16 March 1943, in Foreign Sec. files, AC/AS, Trng.

64. Ltr., TAC to CG, AAF, 22 Nov. 1943, in AAG 350.2, China.

65. Memo, AC/S, G-2 Div. to AC/AS, Trng., 13 April 1944, in AAG 350.2, France. See also ltr., TAC to CG, AAF, 25 July 1944, in AAC Trng. 9, France.

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72. Ltr., Hq. 78th Flying Trng. Wg. to CG CFTC, 3 July 1944, with ind., in AAC Trng. 9, Turkey.

73. History of AFTRC, 7 July 1943-31 Dec. 1944, p. 1696.

74. Ltr., Hq. CFTC to CG AFTRC, 6 Nov. 1944, in AAC Trng. 9, China.

75. Ltr., Hq. 78th Flying Trng. Wg. to CG AAF, 2 Feb. 1945, with inds., in AAG 350.2, Trng. of Chinese Stus.

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85. Disposition Form, Maj. C. H. Robinson, Foreign Sec., AC/AS-3 to AC/S, G-3 Liv., 24 Sep. 1945, in AAG 350.2, Tng. of Foreign Stus.

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88. Memo, Lt. Col. E. J. Rogers to Brig. Gen. D. D. Eisenhower, 16 March 1942, in AAG 350.2A, Tng. Foreign Officers.

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101. RAF Form 449, 31 Jan. 1942, in files of the RAF Delegation, Brit. Embassy, Washington.

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105. RAF Form 449, 31 Dec. 1942, in files of RAF Delegation, Brit. Embassy, Washington.

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Chapter V

1. See Appendixes, this study. These figures include the 6,921 British pilots and approximately 260 Dutch pilots graduated from schools operated by the British and Dutch in this country but maintained in part with personnel of the AAF. They include only graduates, not eliminees. Were the number of students enrolled included, the total would be much larger. Perhaps it might be as much as a third again as large. The number would have been still larger except for the fact that in nearly all programs the effort was made to train eliminees from pilot training in some other air force specialty. Two exceptions to this general policy were British pilot training and Turkish pilot training.

2. Interview with Lt. Col. C. A. Brage, Chief, Foreign Sec. and Maj. L. Kidder, II, Asst. Chief, Foreign Sec., AC/AS-3, by Cpl. G. F. White, AFSHO, 18 Oct. 1945.

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These files are an excellent source for materials pertaining to the financial aspects of foreign training.

G-2

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Military Intelligence Library files.

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AAG Central Files

322	Twelfth Air Force
322-T	Units, Miscellaneous
322.3	British CIU's
350.2	Brazil
350.2	British Students
350.2	China
350.2	France
350.2	Great Britain
350.2	Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Military Schools
350.2	Latin American Students
350.2	Netherlands
350.2	Training Chinese Students

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350.2	Training Foreign Officers
350.2	Training Foreign Students
350.2	Training Latin American Students
350.2	Training of Yugoslav Students
350.2	Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Military Schools
350.2A	Training Chinese Students
350.2A	Training Foreign Officers
350.2A	Training Latin American Students
350.2A	Training of Yugoslav Students
350.2A	Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Military Schools
350.2B	Training Chinese Students
350.2B	Training Latin American Students
350.2B	Instruction of Foreign Officers at U.S. Military Schools
353.9-A2	Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Training
353.9B	Foreign Training in Aviation
353.9-2B	Canadian, RAF, Philippine Army Training
Tng 9	China
Tng 9	Foreign Trainees
Tng 9	France
Tng 9	Turkey

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History of Eastern Flying Training Command, 1 January 1939-7 December 1941; 7 December 1941-31 December 1942; 1 January 1943-31 December 1943; 1 January 1944-30 June 1944.
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These histories of the Training Command, of one of its predecessors, and of the subordinate flying training commands contain substantial sections which are devoted to the foreign training story. Although not here cited, the History of the Training Command has been brought up to V-J day in four-monthly installments, and the histories of the subordinate commands have been brought up to the same date in series of bi-monthly installments.

201 Files

G. A. Braga.
A. F. Patzentine.
Alfred Kidder, II.
A. H. Richards.
G. H. Robinson.

Interviews

Interview with Lt. Col. G. A. Braga, Chief, Foreign Section, AC/AS-3, and Maj. A. Kidder, II, Assistant Chief, Foreign Section, AC/AS-3, by Cpl. G. T. White, AFSHO, 18 October 1945.

Interview with Maj. A. Kidder, II, Chief, Foreign Section, AC/AS-3, by Sgt. G. T. White, AFSHO, 15 January 1946.

Interview with Col. L. B. Broadhurst, War Department General Staff, Operational Plans Division, by Sgt. G. T. White, AFSHO, 18 January 1946.

Interview with Lt. Col. H. E. La Pendresse, Assistant Chief, International Branch, AC/AS-4, by Dr. G. T. White, AFSHO, 18 February 1946.

Interview with Flight Lieutenant Jamieson, RAF Delegation, Washington, D.C., by G. T. White, AFSHO, 20 February 1946.

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APPENDIXES

The statistics here presented were compiled for this study primarily by Maj. Alfred Kidder, II, Chief, Foreign Section, AC/AS-3 in January 1946. Statistics for Chinese training were compiled by Maj. Anne H. Richards of the Foreign Section, AC/AS-3. They represent the best statement of the number of foreign individuals graduating from training courses in the United States which can be obtained. They are suspect as to exact accuracy, however, because of the fact that statistical data current with training were not always properly forwarded to and recorded by higher headquarters. The recapitulation attached to the Chinese statistics, moreover, cannot be reconciled with the more detailed statistics given therewith for each of the courses.

For a somewhat different set of statistics, also compiled by the Foreign Section, AC/AS-3, see Chart, "Foreign Flying Training Graduates, AAF Training Command, May 1941-September 1945." This chart does not include graduates of nonflying training courses received in the Training Command nor graduates of flying training courses received in the four continental Air Forces. It does include the pilot graduates of the British- and Netherlands-operated schools.

Still another set of statistics is to be found in a chart in the History of AAF Training Command and Its Predecessor Commands, 1 January 1939-2 September 1945. The chart includes all graduates of Training Command schools, both flying and technical, between 1 January 1942 and 31 October 1945, but does not include graduates of training in the British- and Netherlands-operated schools. It is apparently based not on the number of individuals who graduated from training in one or more air specialties, but on the number who graduated from each type of training. Those who had graduated from both radio schools and from flexible gunnery training would be listed twice. The chart was prepared by the Statistical Control Section, Headquarters, AAF Training Command.

Appendix 1

ARGENTINA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Single-Engine	11
Twin-Engine	1
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	10
TOTAL	22

Technical Training

Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Armament	1
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Meteorology	1
TOTAL	2
GRAND TOTAL	24

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Appendix 2

AUSTRALIA

Flying Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
B-24 Transition	8
Long Range (Loran) Navigation	12
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Pilot Instructor (Central Instructors School)	2
Loran Navigation	1
1 Jan 45-2 Sep 45:	
Instrument Instructor	2
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Bombardier Instructor	7
Low Altitude Bombardment (LAB) and Radar Intelligence	4
TOTAL	36

Technical Training

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	2
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	13
Armament	2
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Armament	1
Radio	1
TOTAL	19
GRAND TOTAL	55

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Appendix 3

BOLIVIA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Single-Engine	2
Twin-Engine	3
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Single-Engine	3
Twin-Engine	6
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	16
Twin-Engine	14
2 Sep 45-31 Dec 45:	
Twin-Engine	1
TOTAL	45

Technical Training

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
TOTAL	1
GRAND TOTAL	46

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Appendix 4

BRAZIL

Pilot Training[a]

	No. Grad.
Prior to 30 Jun 42:	
Twin-Engine	7
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	19
Pilot Instructor	15[b]
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Single-Engine	2
Twin-Engine	27
Pilot Instructor	6[c]
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Single-Engine	8
Twin-Engine	6
Pilot Instructor	13[d]
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	48
Twin-Engine	72
Pilot Instructor	1[e]
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Single-Engine	10
Twin-Engine	6
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	14
Twin-Engine	24
Glider	1
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:	
Single-Engine	29
Twin-Engine	43
4-Engine (B-24) Transition	8[b]
TOTAL	316

a. Exclusive of 1st Fighter Squadron and replacements therefor.
b. Twin-Engine graduates same period.
c. 4 Twin-Engine graduates and 2 Single-Engine graduates same period.
d. 3 Twin-Engine graduates previous period, 6 Twin-Engine and 4 Single-Engine graduates same period.
e. Single-Engine graduates same period.

Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

Résumé of Pilot Training[a]

	Total No. Grad.
Total individuals	273[b]
Single-Engine	111
Twin-Engine	204
4-Engine	8
Pilot Instructor	35
Glider	1

130 Pilot Program

Entered	27
Graduated:	
Single-Engine	10
Twin-Engine	13
Instructor	19

1st 300 Pilot Program

Entered	291
Eliminated	155
Killed	2
Graduated:	
Single-Engine	57
Twin-Engine	77

a. Exclusive of 1st Fighter Squadron and replacements therefor.
b. This total differs from that of "316" as given on the preceding page. Perhaps some of the individuals included in the 316 total other than those specified took more than one form of training and are counted twice--Editor.

Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

Bombardier Training[a]

	No. Grad.
30 Jun 43-31 Dec 43	3
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	7
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	7
TOTAL	17

Navigation Training[a]

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	4
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	0
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	2
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	12
TOTAL	18

Flexible Gunnery Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	4[b]

a. All students were eliminated from 1st 300 Pilot Program.
b. Used in "B-25 Cadre," q.v.

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Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

Technical Training[a]

	No. Grad.
30 Jun 42-31 Dec 42:	
Armament	1
Radio	2
Link Trainer	1
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	4
Photography	3
Link Trainer	2
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	9
Armament	10
Photography	14
Link Trainer	1
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	19
Armament	12
Radio	12
Photography	2
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Aircraft Maintenance	6
Radio	3
Administration (Supply Course)	1
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:	
Aircraft Maintenance	37
Radio	10
TOTAL	149

a. Exclusive of 1st Fighter Squadron.

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Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

First Fighter Squadron[a]

Strength:

Officers	
Pilot	40
Nonpilot (including medical and nurses)	24
E/M	
Trained at P-47 Factory School and Unit Training	25
Unit Training	261
TOTAL	350

Replacement Pilots:[b]

Combat Training (P-47 CCTS[c])	
30 Jun 44-1 Jan 45	7[d]
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	12[e]
30 Jun 45-28 Sep 45	35[f]
TOTAL	54

a. Unit was trained in Panama prior to transition to P-47 and final unit training at Suffolk Army Air Field, N.Y., in July and August 1944.
b. No ground echelon replacements were trained in the United States.
c. Combat Crew Training School.
d. Single-Engine graduates same period.
e. 2 Single-Engine graduates (2d half of 1944) and 10 rated Brazilian Air Force officers, who received fighter transition and P-47 CCTS only in the United States.
f. 1 Twin-Engine and Instructor Pilot graduate (1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43 period) and 34 rated Brazilian Air Force officers, who received fighter transition and P-47 CCTS only in the United States.

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Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

B-25 Cadre[a]

Pilots--all Twin-Engine graduates, 1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	6
Bombardiers--all U.S. AAF bombardier school graduates	3
Gunners--all gunnery graduates, 1st half 1945	4
Communications Officer--graduate Communications Officer Course	1
Armament Officer--graduate Armament Officer Course	1
Engineering Officer--graduate Aircraft Officer Maintenance Course	1
Airplane & Engine Mechanics--graduates B-25 Factory School	4
Radio Mechanics--graduates Radio Mechanic Course	2
Supply Officers:	3
Graduate of Supply Course, ATSC, Warner-Robins	1
On-the-Job, Greenville Army Air Base, S.C.	2
Supply Clerk--On-the-Job, Greenville Army Air Base, S.C.	1
TOTAL	26[b]

a. These men, after refresher or individual training, trained at Greenville Army Air Base, S.C., 28 Feb-28 May 45.

b. Of the 26 total, 3 did not receive prior training in AAF schools. All others are included as graduates in appropriate flying and technical categories.

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Appendix 4--Contd.

BRAZIL--Continued

Résumé: Individuals Trained in One or More Courses or On-the-Job

Pilot	273[a]
Bombardier	17
Navigator	18
Flexible Gunnery	4
Technical	149
1st Fighter Squadron	350
1st Fighter Squadron Replacements	44
B-25 Cadre Members	3
TOTAL	858

a. See Résumé of Pilot Training for breakdown.

Appendix 5

CANADA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
B-17 Transition (3 days)	4
B-24 Transition	8
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:	
Helicopter	1
TOTAL	13

Flexible Gunnery Officer Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	5
GRAND TOTAL	18

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Appendix 5--Contd.

CANADA--Continued

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Armament	13
1 Jul 43-30 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	6
Armament	22
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	31
Armament	2
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	12
Armament	3
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Armament	3
TOTAL	92

Appendix 6

CHILE[a]

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 30 Jun 42:	
Twin-Engine	10
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	3
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Twin-Engine	2
Pilot Instructor, Twin-Engine	1
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Single-Engine	10
TOTAL	26

Combat Crew Training

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
A-24 (1-man crew)	9
GRAND TOTAL	35

a. This is more accurate than the report on Latin Americans to AC/AS-2 dated 30 Nov 1945.

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Appendix 6--Contd.

CHILE--Continued

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	4
Link Trainer	1
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	6
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
Armament	1
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Administration (Supply)	1
TOTAL	15

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Appendix 7

CHINA

Pilot Training[a]

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Single-Engine	79
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Single-Engine	85
Twin-Engine	80
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	18
Twin-Engine	23
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Single-Engine	39
Twin-Engine	59
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	26
Twin-Engine	84
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:	
Single-Engine	61
Twin-Engine	217
TOTAL	771

a. Under the regular pilot program 1,511 entered and 771 had graduated by 31 December 1945.

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

4-Engine Transition Training[a]

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	69
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	24

Reconnaissance Tactical Training

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	3

F-5 Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	25[b]
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	6[b]

C-47 Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	20

Instrument Pilot Instructor School

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	3[b]
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	3[b]
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	2[b]

Central Instructor School (CIS)

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	11[b]

Fixed Gunnery Instructor Training

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	8[b]

Liaison Pilot Training

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	1

Observer Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	8
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	28

a. The men who took this training were not included in the regular pilot program; they took preflight, advanced twin-engine, and 4-engine transition only.

b. Graduates of regular pilot training program.

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Combat Crew Training

	No. Grad.
Bombardier:[a]	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	10
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	35
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	79
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	111
TOTAL	235
Navigator:[a]	
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	60
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	23
TOTAL	83
Radio Operator Mechanic:	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	13
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	24
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	58
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	81
TOTAL	176
Airplane and Engine Mechanic:	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	14
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	19
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	86
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	76[b]
TOTAL	195
Factory (A&E Mechanic, B-24):[c]	
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	12
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	9
TOTAL	21
Factory (A&E Mechanic, B-25):[c]	
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	46
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	2
TOTAL	48

[Footnotes on next page.]

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Combat Crew Training--Continued

	No. Grad.
Armorer:	
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	34
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	60
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	94
TOTAL	188
Gunnery:[d]	
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	46
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	130
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	141
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	102
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	378
TOTAL	797
GRAND TOTAL	1,743

a. 36 graduates of both bombardier and navigation training were designated as bombardier-navigators.
b. 25 of this number originally scheduled as aircrew never received gunnery training.
c. Took airplane and engine mechanic training first.
d. All except 126 career gunners received other aircrew training as bombardiers, navigators, bombardier-navigators, airplane and engine mechanics, radio operator mechanics, armorers, or observers.

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Ground Crew Training

	No. Grad.
Mechanic (A&E):	
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	59[a]
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	79[a]
TOTAL	138
Armament:	
1 Jan 42-30 Jun 42	19
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	24
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	13
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	13
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	46
TOTAL	115
Communications:	
1 Jan 42-30 Jun 42	20
Photography:	
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	18
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	6
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	3
TOTAL	27
Link Trainer:	
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	4
Maintenance Engineer:	
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	6
GRAND TOTAL	310

a. These mechanics went on to other training; 12 had completed all their training by the end of 1945.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Pilot Training--Breakdown by Group
(As of December 1945)

Group	Date Training Completed SE	Date Training Completed TE	No. Entered	No. Grad. SE	No. Grad. TE	Total Grads.
1st	Dec 42	-	50	39	0	39
2d	Dec 42	-	50	40	0	40
3d	Dec 43	Dec 43	147	52	39	91
4th	Dec 43	Dec 43	52	15	18	33
5th	Dec 43	Dec 43	82	18	23	41
6th	Jun 44	Jun 44	64	18	23	41
7th	Dec 44	Dec 44	63	23	35	58
8th	Dec 44	Dec 44	88	16	24	40
9th	Feb 45	Mar 45	76	26	27	53
10th	Jul 45	Jul 45	84	19	28	47
11th	Aug 45	May 45	78	11	21	32
12th	Oct 45	Jun 45	83	20	36	56
13th	Dec 45	Sep 45	94	11	22	33
14th	-	Nov 45	104	-	29	29
15th	-	-	108	-	-	-
16th	-	-	78	-	-	-
17th	-	-	148	-	-	-
TOTAL			1,449			633

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Heavy Bombardment (Pilot) Training

30 Crews	No. Grad.	Date
4-Engine Transition	69	Jul-Dec 44
B-24 Replacements		
1st Group (4-Engine Transition)	24	Nov 45
2d Group (Advanced Twin-Engine):		
32 Crews	56	Aug 45
3 Squadrons	82	Nov 45

140 Pursuit Program (P-51)

Reconnaissance:[a]		
Tactical	3	Jan-Jun 44
Photographic	6	Oct 45
	11	Jan 45
	14	Jun 45
Transport		
C-47[a]	20	Jun 45

Miscellaneous Training

Instrument Pilot Instructor School	2	Jul 44
	3	Jan 44
	3	Nov 43
Twin-Engine Instructors	2	Jul 43
Single-Engine Instructors	9	Aug 43
Fixed Gunnery Instructors	6	Sep 43
	2	Oct 43
Liaison Pilot	1	May 44
Observer Course (Gunnery)	8	Oct 43
Observer	20	Jul 43
Gunnery	20	Sep 43
Observer	8	Jun 43
Gunnery	8	Aug 43

a. Took regular pilot training first.

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TRAINING OF BOMBARDIERS

Heavy Bombardment Program

	No. Entered	No. Grad.	Date
30-Crew Program			
Bombardier Training:			
1st Group	10	10	Jun 44
2d Group	10	9	Jul 44
3d Group	10	10	Aug 44
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		10	Jan 44
2d Group		10	Feb 44
3d Group		10	Apr 44
B-24 Replacements			
Bombardier Training	19	13	1 Aug 45
		6	29 Aug 45
Gunnery Training		13	Oct 45
		6	Oct 45
Pilot Eliminees		2	Sep 45

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TRAINING OF BOMBARDIERS--Contd.

Heavy Bombardment Program--Contd.

	No. Grad.	Date
960 Program		
Bombardier Training:		
1st Group	(19	Feb 45
	(1	May 45
	(1	Jun 45
2d Group	16	May 45
3d Group	(19	Jun 45
	(1	Aug 45
4th Group	(23	Sep 45
	(24	Nov 45
Gunnery Training:		
1st Group	18	Apr 45
2d Group	14	Jun 45
3d Group	(19	Aug 45
	(1	Oct 45
4th Group	(23	Nov 45
	(24	a

a. Unfinished by December 1945.

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TRAINING OF NAVIGATORS

Heavy Bombardment Program

	No. Entered	No. Grad.	Date
Chinese Navigators			
Navigation Training:			
1st Group		9	1 Jul 44
2d Group	11	9	31 Jul 44
3d Group		12	Sep 44
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		10	Jan 44
2d Group		10	Feb 44
3d Group		11	Apr 44
Heavy Bombardment Replacement Crews			
Navigation Training:			
1st Group	16	11	Sep 45
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group	11	11	Nov 45
Pilot Eliminees			
Navigation Training		4	Sep 44
Gunnery Training		4	Dec 44

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

AIRCREW TRAINING

Training of Bombardier-Navigators[a]

	No. Grad.	Date
30 BN Program		
Bombardier Training	(14 (10 (1	Jul-Nov 44 Jan 45 Sep 45
Navigation Training	26	Jul-Nov 44
Gunnery Training	29	Jan-Jun 44
960 Program[b]		
Bombardier Training:		
1st Group	6	Feb 45
2d Group	8	May 45
3d Group	7	Jun 45
4th Group	7	Sep 45
5th Group	(24 (6	Dec 45 Jan 46
Navigation Training:		
1st Group	4	Aug 45
2d Group	8	Dec 45
3d Group	-	-
4th Group	-	-
Gunnery Training:		
1st Group	4	Nov 45

a. Each of these trainees normally was given training in gunnery, navigation, and bombardiering.

b. Gunnery training given to 1st Group only. Full training as BN gunners completed by 1st and 2d Groups only.

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Aircraft Maintenance Training

	No. Entered	No. Grad.	Date
960 Program			
Airplane & Engine Mechanic Training:			
1st Group		23	Jan 45
2d Group		24	Feb 45
3d Group		24	Mar 45
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		20	Apr 45
2d Group		21	Jun 45
3d Group		(18	Aug 45
		(5	Sep 45
B-25 Factory Training:			
2d Group		24	Apr 45
3d Group		(22	May & Jun 45
		(2	Jul 45
Pilot Eliminees			
Airplane & Engine Mechanic		15	Jan 45
B-24 Factory		9	Mar 45
Gunnery		8	May 45
2d Medium Bombardment Group[a]			
Primary Airplane & Engine Mechanic		(18	3 Sep 45
		(4	3 Sep 45
		(56	16 Sep 45
Crew Members			
B-25		10	Nov 45
Gunnery		10	Dec 45
Primary[b]		17	Sep 45

a. These were ground crew personnel.
b. Received no further training.

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

Aircraft Maintenance Training--Contd.

	No. Entered	No. Grad.	Date
B-24 Program			
Airplane & Engine Mechanic Training:			
1st Group	14	14	Apr 44
2d Group	12	8	Jul 44
3d Group		11	Aug 44
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group	12	8	May 44
2d Group	12	11	Feb 44
3d Group		12	Apr 44
B-24 Factory Training	13	8	Jul 44
B-24 Replacements			
Airplane & Engine Mechanic Training:			
1st Group	12	12	Jul 45
2d Group	12	12	Nov 45
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		12	Sep 45
2d Group[c]			
100-Technician Program			
Airplane & Engine Mechanic Training		(12	Jan 45
		(47	Jun 45
		(1	Sep 45
		(5	Oct 45
		(3	Aug 45
		[redacted]	Sep 45

c. No gunnery training.

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TECHNICAL TRAINING

Communications Training

	No. Entered	No. Grad.	Date
Heavy Bombardment Program			
Radio Operator Mechanic Training:			
1st Group	13	13	Apr 44
2d Group		12	Jul 44
3d Group		12	Jul 44
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		13	Jun 44
2d Group		13	Feb 44
3d Group		12	Apr 44
B-24 Replacement Program			
Radio Operator Mechanic Training:			
1st Group	12	12	Aug 45
2d Group		12	Dec 45
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group	12	12	Oct 45
2d Group[a]			
960 Program			
Radio Operator Mechanic Training:			
1st Group	24	24	Mar 45
2d Group		(16	Jan-Jun 45
		(6	Aug 45
3d Group		(18	Jun 45
		(6	Aug 45
4th Group		(21	Oct 45
		(2	Dec 45
5th Group	22	22	Dec 45
Gunnery Training:			
1st Group		21	May 45
2d Group		22	Jul-Dec 45
3d Group		(18	Aug 45
		(6	Oct 45
4th Group		21	Dec 45
5th Group[a]			
Non-Aircrew			
Miscellaneous:			
Radio Operator Mechanic		20	Jan-Jun 42

a. Not completed.

Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TECHNICAL TRAINING--Contd.

Armament Training

	No. Grad.	Date
Miscellaneous		
Armament Officers	(10	Jul-Dec 43
	(13	Jul-Dec 44
Bombsight Maintenance	(8	Apr 44
	(5	May 44
Enlisted Bomb Armament	14	Jul-Dec 43
Armorer	(19	Jan-Jun 42
	(1	Jan-Jun 45
Aircrew		
B-24 Program (30 Crews):		
Armament	34	Jul-Nov 44
Gunnery	34	Jul-Nov 44
B-24 Replacement Program:		
1st Group:		
Armament	12	Jul-Dec 45
Gunnery	10	Jul-Dec 45
2d Group:		
Armament	12	Jul-Dec 45
Gunnery	14	Jul-Dec 45
960 Program:		
4th Group:		
Armament	22	Jul-Dec 45
Gunnery	22	Jul-Dec 45
32 Medium Bombardment Replacement Crews:		
Armament	60	Jan-Jun 45
Gunnery	60	Jul-Dec 45
2d Medium Bombardment Group:		
Armament	(47	Aug 45
		Oct 45
Gunnery		Oct 45
	(2	Dec 45
Armament (Ground Crew)	45	Jun 45

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Appendix 7--Contd.

CHINA--Continued

TECHNICAL TRAINING--Contd.

Gunnery Training[a]

	No. Grad.	Date
B-24 Career Gunners (30 Crews)	103	Jul-Dec 44
First 12 Replacements	23	Sep 45

Photography Training

Photo Lab Commanders	(3	Jun 43
	(2	Apr 43
	(3	Apr 43
	(10	Mar 43
	(6	Nov 43
	(3	Oct 44

Link Trainer Training

Link Trainer	4	Oct 43

Maintenance Engineering Training

Maintenance Engineering	6	Apr 43

Combat Crew Training

B-24[b]	30	May 45
B-25[b]	22	Jan 45

a. Other gunnery training appears under each crew position.
b. Personnel went through individual training courses prior to receiving combat crew training.

Appendix 8

COLOMBIA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-Engine	8

Navigator Training

1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42	1
GRAND TOTAL	9

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COSTA RICA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	1
TOTAL	1

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 10

CUBA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-Engine	6
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	6
Instructor Pilot	2[a]
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Twin-Engine	7
Instructor Pilot	1[a]
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Twin-Engine	1
B-25 Transition	7[b]
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	13
Instructor Pilot	12[c]
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Twin-Engine	12[d]
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS	33

D-8 Bombsight Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
D-8 Bombsight (use by pilot)	10[e]

Navigator Training

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Navigator	1[f]

a. Also Twin-Engine graduate, same period.
b. Same personnel graduated from Twin-Engine 1 Jan 43-30 June 43 period.
c. From personnel graduated from Single-Engine, same period.
d. From personnel graduated from Single-Engine 1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44 period.
e. Four Twin-Engine graduates of 1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42 period and six Twin-Engine graduates of 1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43 period.
f. Also Twin-Engine and Instructor graduate 1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43 period and B-25 Transition graduate 1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43 period.

Appendix 10--Contd.

CURA--Continued

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Photography	1
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Link Trainer	2
TOTAL	3

Appendix 11

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance (Civil Contract School)	1
TOTAL	1

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Appendix 12

ECUADOR

Pilot Training[a]

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	3
Instructor Pilot	3[b]
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Twin-Engine	4
Single-Engine	6
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS	13

Technical Training

Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Link Trainer	1
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	2
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS	3

a. Latin American Report of 30 Nov 45 is incorrect in the twin-engine category; probably includes pilots in training.
b. Twin-engine graduates same period.

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Appendix 13

FRANCE

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 44–30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	236
Twin-Engine	158
1 Jul 44–31 Dec 44:	
Single-Engine	141
Twin-Engine	119
1 Jan 45–30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	163
Twin-Engine	133
1 Jul 45–31 Dec 45:	
Single-Engine	218
Twin-Engine	183
TOTAL	1,351

Appendix 13--Contd.

FRANCE--Continued

Bombardier Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	32
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	47
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	85
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	89
TOTAL	253

Navigator Training[a]

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	7
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	19
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	17
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	31
TOTAL	74

Flexible Gunnery Training[b]

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	40
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43	170
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	39
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	192
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	223
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45	291
TOTAL	955

a. Not used in B-26 crews.

b. Either had graduated from or later entered armorer, radio operator mechanic, or airplane and engine mechanic course.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 13--Contd.

FRANCE--Continued

Combat Crew Training[a]

		No. Grad.
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:		
P-47 (1-man crew)		25
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:		
P-47 (1-man crew)		121
B-26 (6-man crew)	50 crews	300
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:		
P-47 (1-man crew)		95
B-26 (6-man crew)	44 crews	277[b]
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:		
P-47 (1-man crew)		156
B-26 (6-man crew)	71 crews	431[b]
TOTALS	165 crews	1,405

a. All personnel had graduated from appropriate flying or technical courses prior to entry into combat training.

b. Discrepancy between number of graduates and number of 6-man crews is due to shortages or overages, which resulted in partial crews or spare-crew members.

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Appendix 13--Contd.

FRANCE--Continued

Technical Training[a]

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Armament	47
Radio	30
Photography	10
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	224
Armament	135
Radio	98
Photography	22
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	223
Armament	71
Radio	89
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Aircraft Maintenance	84
Armament	83
Radio	100
1 Jul 45-31 Dec 45:	
Aircraft Maintenance	69
Armament	85
Radio	105
TOTAL	1,475

a. Includes both aircrew and ground personnel. Aircrew trainees (armorer, radio operator mechanic, and airplane and engine mechanic) also took gunnery.

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Appendix 14 [redacted]

GREAT BRITAIN

Pilot Training

AAF Schools

	No. Grad.
1941-Feb 1943:	
Single-Engine (6-mo. periods not on record)	3,099
Twin-Engine	1,271
1942-Mar 1945:	
Pilot Instructor	34
30 Jun 45:	
Instrument Instructor	2
1 Jan-30 Jun 45:	
C-54 Transition	8
TOTAL	4,414

British Flying Training Schools (Civil Contract):

Total final graduates	6,921

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Appendix 14--Contd. [redacted]

GREAT BRITAIN--Continued

Navigation Training

	No. Grad.
1941-1942:	
Pan American Airways, Inc., Coral Gables, Fla. (Civil Contract)	1,152

Transport Crews

30 Jun 44-1 Jan 45:	
Airline Procedure (Twin-Engine Transport)	1 (4-man crew)
Airline Procedure (4-Engine Transport)	1 (5-man crew)

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Appendix 14--Contd. [redacted]

GREAT BRITAIN--Continued

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
Radio	12
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	15
Armament	8
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance	13
Armament	4
Radio	1
Photography	1
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Armament	3
1 Jul 45-2 Sep 45:	
Aircraft Maintenance	7
TOTAL	65

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Appendix 14--Contd.

GREAT BRITAIN--Continued

GRADUATES FROM BRITISH FLYING TRAINING SCHOOLS, 1941-11 SEPTEMBER 1945

Class	Graduates From Elementary		Graduates From Advanced		Date of Graduation From Advanced
	British	U.S.	British	U.S.	1941
1	180		155		Oct
2	235		194		Dec
					1942
3	247		223		Jan
4	274		236		Mar
5	280		242		May
6	292		260		Jun
7	285		229		Aug
8	253		209		Sep
9	268		213		Nov
					1943
10	303		240		Jan
11	266		228		Feb
12	227		193		Apr
13	386	81[a]	331	78	May
14	306	81	273	70	Jul
15	348	81	295	80	Oct
16	353	78	302	75	Dec
					1944
17	359	85	318	73	Feb
18	368	95	319	89	Apr
19	385	92[a]	347	93	Jun
20	348		310		Aug
21	321		293		Nov
					1945
22	382		327		Jan
23	344		285		Apr
24	352		288		Jun
25	328		292[b]		Aug
26	352		319[b]		Aug
27	371[c]		0		
TOTAL	8,403	593	6,921	558	

a. No U.S. students before 13th nor after 14th classes.
b. Completed one-half Advanced.
c. Did not enter Advanced.

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Appendix 14--Contd. [redacted]

GREAT BRITAIN--Continued

Résumé

	No. Grad.
Pilot--AAF Schools	4,414
Pilot--British Flying Training Schools	6,921
Navigator	1,152
Technical	65
TOTAL	12,552
Transport Crews 2 (total, 9 men)	9
GRAND TOTAL	12,561

[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 15

HAITI

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	3
Twin-Engine	2
TOTAL	5

Technical Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Parachute Rigger	2
GRAND TOTAL	7

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Appendix 16

HONDURAS

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-engine	3

Technical Training

1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
GRAND TOTAL	4

Appendix 17

MEXICO

Pilot Training

(Exclusive of 201st Fighter Squadron and Replacements Therefor)

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42	5
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	9
Pilot Instructor	1[a]
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Twin-Engine	4
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
C-60 Transition	1[b]
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	4
AT-7 Transition	4[c]
C-60 Transition	3[d]
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS	23

a. Twin-engine graduate same period.
b. Twin-engine graduate 1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42.
c. Single-engine graduates same period.
d. 2 were twin-engine graduates 1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42 period.

Appendix 17--Contd.

MEXICO--Continued

Technical Training[a]

(Exclusive of 201st Fighter Squadron and Replacements Therefor)

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Link Trainer	6
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
Aircraft Maintenance	25
TOTAL	31

a. Headquarters, AAF Training Command reports:

20 Radio Operators) trained in 1942
19 Armorers)

4 Armament Officers) trained in 1943
4 Armorers)

Headquarters, AAF, however, has no record of this training.

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 17--Contd.

MEXICO--Continued

201st Fighter Squadron (P-47)[a]

Strength

Officers:

Pilot	31[b]
Nonpilot	23[c]
TOTAL	54

Enlisted Men:

P-47 Factory School and Unit Training	63
Radio Maintenance and Unit Training	17
Unit Training	155
TOTAL	235
GRAND TOTAL	289

a. Trained during period July 1944-March 1945. Trained as unit at Pocatello Army Air Field, Idaho, and Majors Field, Texas, after specialized training of certain key personnel.
b. Received P-40 transition prior to unit training.
c. Received squadron intelligence course, Orlando, Fla.

[redacted]

Appendix 17--Contd.

MEXICO--Continued

Replacements--201st Fighter Squadron[a]

Pilot (All Single-Engine)

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45	28
1 Jul 45-2 Sep 45	26
3 Sep 45-31 Dec 45	29
TOTAL	83

Combat Training (P-47)

1 Jul 45-2 Sep 45:	
P-47 Crew (1-man crew)	9[b]
GRAND TOTAL	83

a. No entries made after V-J Day.
b. From personnel graduated from Single-Engine 1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45 period. 53 of the Twin-Engine graduates were in various types of P-47 training in January 1946.

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

[redacted]

Appendix 17--Contd.

MEXICO--Continued

201st Fighter Squadron--Ground Echelon Replacements

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:

Aircraft Maintenance	5 E/M
Administrative	1 E/M

1 Jul 45-1 Sep 45:

Aircraft Maintenance	1 Off.
Armament	1 Off.
Radio	2 E/M

2 Sep 45-31 Dec 45:

Aircraft Maintenance	6 (1 Off. (5 E/M
Armament	6 (1 Off. (5 E/M
Radio	2 E/M
Administrative	2 Off.
TOTAL	26

Appendix 18

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

A total of 575 trainees came to the United States in 1942 for training to form B-25 and P-40 crews. Breakdowns by six-month periods are not available. In addition to the original number (575) certain added personnel (number unknown) were trained at the Royal Netherlands Military Flying School, Jackson Army Air Base, Miss. This school was active from May 1942 to February 1944. The Netherlanders scheduled their own training at Jackson and often at other Training Command schools to which detachments were sent.

Attached hereto is a breakdown of courses showing NEI training completed at AAF and Navy schools other than Jackson Army Air Base and Fort Sherman, Kans. As of 15 February 1944, the following numbers of NEI personnel had been graduated and sent to the Southwest Pacific. The number of B-25 and P-40 crews is unknown. It is believed that the total number of NEI personnel to enter training in the United States numbered somewhat over 600.

Pilots	259
Bombardier-Navigators	79
Career Gunners	79
Radio Operator Mechanic Gunners	12
Radio Operator Mechanics	54
Observers	8
Armorers	10
Radio Mechanics	2
Airplane and Engine Mechanics	23
Intelligence Officers	1
Liaison Officers	1
Clerks	3
Technical Officer	1
TOTAL	532

[redacted]

NEI TRAINING OTHER THAN AT JACKSON ARMY AIR BASE, JACKSON, MISS. AND FORT SHERMAN, KANS., AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1943[a]

Course	Location	Students Enrolled	Students Completed
Primary	Augustine Fld., Miss.	28	15
Basic	Greenville AAFld., Miss.	15	11
Single-Engine (Adv.)	Craig Fld., Ala.	10	10
Twin-Engine (Adv.)	Columbus AAFld., Miss.	1	0
Bombardier	Midland AAFld., Texas	104	97
Navigator	Corpus Christi, Texas	35	34
Navigator	Hondo AAFld., Texas	30	30
Air Gunner	Tyndall Fld., Fla.	304	292
Air Gunner (Refresher)	Corpus Christi, Texas	10	10
Flying Seaplanes (Adv.)	Corpus Christi, Texas	20	20
Observer	Brooks Fld., Texas	29	26
Intelligence	Harrisburg, Pa.	7	7
Intelligence Photo	New Haven, Conn.	2	2
Armament	Buckley Fld., Colo.	6	6
Communications	New Haven AAFld., Conn.	8	7
Wireless Operator Mechanic	Scott Fld., Ill.	15	15
Wireless Operator Mechanic	Sioux Falls, S.Dak.	73	62
Meteorological	Univ. of Chicago, Ill.	4	4
Turret Maintenance	Tyndall Fld., Fla.	6	6
Equipment Maintenance	Bendix School, South Bend, Ind.	2	2
Equipment Maintenance	Sperry School, Brooklyn, N.Y.	8	8
Equipment Maintenance	Jack & Heinz, Cleveland, Ohio	2	2
Equipment Maintenance	Curtiss-Wright Corp., Buffalo, N.Y.	2	2
Equipment Maintenance	Allison Service School, Indianapolis, Ind.	3	3

a. Graduates of Primary Training at Fort Sherman continued training at Jackson Army Air Base [redacted]

Appendix 19

NEW ZEALAND

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Instrument Instructor	1
TOTAL	1

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Appendix 20

NICARAGUA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-Engine	2

Technical Training

Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Armament	1
GRAND TOTAL	3

Appendix 21

NORWAY

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Glider Pilot	1

Technical Training

1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Aircraft Maintenance (Civil Contract Schools)	1
GRAND TOTAL	2

Appendix 22

PANAMA

Technical Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
TOTAL	1

Appendix 23

PARAGUAY

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
2 Sep 45-31 Dec 45:	
Twin-Engine	2
TOTAL	2

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Appendix 24

PERU

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 30 Jun 42:	
Single-Engine	3
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	5
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Single-Engine	5
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	3
Twin-Engine	3[a]
4-Engine Transition	1
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	1
TOTAL	18

Combat Crew Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Fighter (P-51) (1-man crew)	2
2 Sep 45-31 Dec 45:	
Fighter (P-51) (1-man crew)	2

Bombardier Training

1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44	1

a. Single-engine graduates 1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43 period.

Appendix 24--Contd.

PEHU--Continued

Technical Training

	No.	Grad.
Prior to 1 Jan 42:		
Radio	2	
1 Jan 42-30 Jun 42:		
Aircraft Maintenance	1	
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:		
Aircraft Maintenance	1	
Armament	1	
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:		
Aircraft Maintenance	5	
Armament	1	
Radio	2	
Photography	1	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:		
Aircraft Maintenance	3	
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:		
Aircraft Maintenance	5	
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:		
Aircraft Maintenance	6	
Aviation Engineer	1	
TOTAL	29	

Appendix 25

POLAND

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
P-40 Transition	1
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
C-47 Transition (Troop Carrier)	2
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
C-47 Transition and Glider Flying Transition (Troop Carrier)	5
TOTAL	8

Technical Training

1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Aviation Engineer	2
Administration (Statistical Control)	2
TOTAL	4
GRAND TOTAL	12

Appendix 26

RUSSIA

Combat Crew Training

Sep 41:

B-25 Crews . . . . . 26 Offs. and E/M

Technical Training

Mar 45:

Bombsight . . . . . 2 Offs.

Appendix 27

TURKEY

"11 Officer" Program

	No. Grad.
Pilot Training	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
Single-Engine	7
Twin-Engine	4
TOTAL	11
Combat Crew Training	
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
P-40 (1-man crew)	5
30 Jun 44-1 Jan 45:	
Tactical Reconnaissance (1-man crew)	1
B-24 Transition & Tactical Operation (Pilot only)	2
B-25 Transition & Tactical Operation (Pilot only)	2
TOTAL	10

Résumé of "11 Officer" Program

Entered	11
Graduated:	
Advanced	11
Tactical Training	10

Appendix 27--Contd.

TURKEY--Continued

"100 Cadet" Program

	No. Grad.
Pilot Training	
1 Jan 45-30 Jun 45:	
Single-Engine	10
Twin-Engine	7
30 Jun 45-2 Sep 45:	
Twin-Engine	9
2 Sep 45-30 Nov 45:	
Single-Engine	11
Twin-Engine	1
TOTAL	38
Combat Crew Training[a]	
2 Sep 45-30 Nov 45:	
P-47 (1-man crew)	18
Tactical Reconnaissance (F-6) (1-man crew)	2
Photo Reconnaissance (F-5) (1-man crew)	2
B-25 Transition and Tactical Operation (Pilot only)	14

Résumé of "100 Cadet" Program

Entered	92
Eliminated	54
Graduated Advanced	38
Graduated Tactical Training	36

a. 30 November 1945 was the date training was cut off by presidential Lend-Lease policy. Some of the crews did not receive full training.

Appendix 28

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jan 44-30 Jun 44:	
4-Engine Transition	1
TOTAL	1

Appendix 29 [redacted]

URUGUAY[a]

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-Engine	3
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Twin-Engine	1
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
Twin-Engine	1
TOTAL	5

Fixed Gunnery Instructor (GIS)

1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	1

Navigator Training

1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	1

Flexible Gunnery Training

1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44	1[b]

Technical Training

1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
Aircraft Maintenance	1
1 Jul 44-31 Dec 44:	
Link Trainer	2
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS	10

a. The figures in this table are more accurate than those in the Latin American Report, 1940-30 November 1945.

b. Graduated Fixed Gunnery Instructor same [redacted]

Appendix 30 [redacted]

VENEZUELA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
Prior to 1 Jul 42:	
Twin-Engine	9
TOTAL	9

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Appendix 31

YUGOSLAVIA

Pilot Training

	No. Grad.
1 Jul 42-31 Dec 42:	
B-24 Transition	7
1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	
B-24 Transition	4

Navigation Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	5

Bombardier Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43:	5

Flexible Gunnery Training

1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43	42

Technical Training

Radio	5
TOTAL	68

Combat Crew Training

1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43:	
B-24 Crews (four 10-man crews)	40[a]

a. 4 crews (40 men with 2 spares) were formed from personnel listed above. All personnel except pilots took Flexible Gunnery in addition to their other training.

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