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
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WORLD MEDICAL STUDY: No. 52

REPRODUCTION PERMITTED FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

RAF Historical Division
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May 1954



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FOREWORD

This study was written by Dr. Chauncey E. Sanders of the USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The comments and/or recommendations contained in Part II are exploratory in nature and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Air Force.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FILE ONE

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ARMY

Some time in the middle of this century have had to make their
choice of war. Some time they have been those forces--war for an
all out total annihilation of professional soldiers--as opposed to civilian
life. This has all been proved that a soldier's life is not by these
experiences, but it is to avoid in of the reconstruction the
violations in the field of war. The length of the strength
destruction was the most complete, but not capable of all.

Reconstruction After the Revolutionary War

The destruction following the Revolutionary War was a rather heavy-
handed affair; indeed, there was a sort of total annihilation in an
unprecedented way, with many of the soldiers drifting out of the
services as they had no skills to train. Thus, almost 50 the total
number of American soldiers in the course of the war was 395,359,¹
of which the Revolutionary War was as high as 90,000 troops under his com-
mand;² the war, the forces that were engaged in battle was 17,000.³
At the end of the war, there were 29,340 soldiers to be retrained;⁴
this was only a fraction of one percent of a total population of
about 30 million.⁵

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As Major Sparrow puts it, in his History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army:

After the cessation of hostilities the Continental Army was almost completely disbanded. Men were allowed to return to their homes without receiving medical examinations or treatment and were often discharged from their organizations without payment or with a small amount of the practically worthless currency.

Sparrow continues with the story of one Joseph Jared, a member of the Virginia militia, who was twice discharged during the Revolutionary War; on neither occasion was he given a written discharge or any other token of his having served under arms. Hence, when Jared applied for a pension in 1833, he had no evidence beyond his own word that he was entitled to compensation. Sparrow concludes his discussion of our first demobilization with this sentence:

"Apparently demobilization was a relatively simple and easy process in those days and the soldiers were left to get home as best they could, for Jared was some distance from home when discharged."⁶

On 3 November 1783 all that remained of the Revolutionary Army were two battalions of artillery and one regiment of infantry.⁷

Demobilization after the War of 1812

At the outset of the War of 1812 the authorized strength of the Regular Army of the United States--consisting of 25 regiments of infantry, 4 of artillery, 2 of dragoons, and 1 of riflemen, plus engineer troops and artificers--was 36,700; of this total almost 30,000 existed only on paper. The actual number under arms was 6,744. The total strength⁸ increased during the year, however, to at least 65,000. In the less

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then three years' course of the War, 527,654 American troops were involved;⁹ of this number no more than five per cent were actually on duty in the field at any given time.¹⁰ Moreover, of the total only 63,179 served for more than 12 months, and 174,200 had service of less than one month.¹¹ The largest number of troops available in any one year--that was in 1814--was 235,639.¹² Since the population of the United States in 1815 was somewhere in the neighborhood of 8,000,000,¹³ the number of troops to be demobilized at the end of the War could not have represented much more than 2 per cent of the total population.

Major Sparrow wrote:

As in the Revolutionary War there was a constant stream of men being inducted into active service and at the same time large numbers of men being discharged because they had served their terms of enlistment, extending from one to twelve months. An examination of militia records reveals that many state organizations were enrolled and discharged from service two or more times. When active hostilities had ceased, an Act of Congress approved 3 March 1815 permitted those who had enlisted for the war to be discharged from the regular establishment, while those who were serving under longer enlistment were allowed to be discharged or were transferred to active regiments. The Army was returned to a peacetime basis by disbanding all excess regiments and consolidating remaining ones with regiments of the Regular Army. The demobilization of the wartime army repeated the same mistakes made in the Revolutionary War disbandment and contributed very little that could be used in large-scale demobilization planning.¹⁴

The Act of Congress just mentioned also provided that the peace strength of the Army be fixed at 10,000 men;¹⁵ thus, although the Army was larger than in 1812 in the proportion of 10,000 to 6,744, its authorized strength was reduced to little more than one-fourth of what it had been three years earlier.

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Demobilization After the War With Mexico

Of the Mexican War, Colonel Spaulding wrote:¹⁶

As must always be the case, the temporary forces raised for the Mexican War were discharged with the least possible delay. The permanent force was depleted by premature discharges granted under a special Act of Congress and by wholesale desertions from the companies in California to join the rush for the new gold fields. During the first eight months of 1849, nearly 500 out of 1,200 men so deserted. In Texas, an epidemic of cholera almost paralyzed military movements.

Colonel Gance made this observation: "The small army became still smaller every day."¹⁷ Dead men and deserters do not have to be demobilized.

The gold-seekers of '49 were not the only deserters; in more than one battle of the War, the raw, untrained American troops had fled from combat, sometimes in company, or even almost regimental strength.¹⁸

And cholera was not the only man-killing disease rampant in the southwest;

yellow fever, smallpox, and other pestilences plagued the armies of

Generals Scott and Taylor.¹⁹ Even greater depletion of the Army was

caused by discharges. Almost 40,000 of those who volunteered were

mustered into federal service for 12 months or less;²⁰ there was not

much inclination to reenlist,²¹ and there can be little doubt that most

of the 40,000 had left the Army before the War ended. Almost 12,000

were discharged for disability or causes other than expiration of en-

listment.²² Following the War, the authorized troop strength was reduced

from 30,890 to 10,320.²³ If something like 70,000 men had died,

deserted, or been discharged before the end of the War, it would have

required a demobilization of little more than 20,000 of the over-all

total of 104,284²⁴ to reach the new troop basis. That would have meant

the demobilization of far less than 1 per cent of the population of the

country.²⁵

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Little information has been found as to the method of demobilization. Major Sparrow wrote:

The Army was composed largely of volunteers and militia under 3-month and 1-year enlistment. At one time during operations in Mexico, General Scott lost approximately 40 percent of his army because of the expiration of enlistments. It was not until the latter stages of the war that the President was authorized to enlist volunteers for the duration. An army organized in this manner and fighting under these circumstances does not furnish proper conditions for studying demobilization policies. 26

Colonel Spaulding dismissed the subject even more briefly and only a little more informatively: "The volunteer and the temporary regular regiments were discharged, . . ." 27

Demobilization After the Civil War

The first really large-scale demobilization carried out in the United States was that which followed the Civil War. As in our previous wars, throughout the period of hostilities men were being discharged, as short-term enlistments expired. But no consideration seems to have been given to the problem of postwar demobilization until after Lee surrendered. Then the Government was confronted with the task of discharging 1,034,000 Union soldiers. 28

The hastily-devised demobilization plan called for each division to be moved intact to one of nine rendezvous areas. 29

At these camps, muster-out rolls and pay-rolls were prepared, containing the following information about each man: rank and age; where, when, and by whom enrolled; when, where, and by whom mustered in; when last paid and to what time; how far he had traveled; what subsistence and forage he had furnished; what equipment and clothing he had received; and his absences, special duties, promotions, wounds, and illnesses. After this administrative work had been performed, corps and divisions were inactivated. Each lower command was mustered out of Federal service and the men forming the organization were sent to their home state and camp of organization for individual muster-out. In the final movement of individuals at regimental or lower level, transportation was provided by various means. Sometimes

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these movements were accomplished by changing from rail to boat to wagon to foot and back again before reaching the camp where the individual was to be mustered out.

To those familiar with the events of 1945-1946 mention of some of the demobilization difficulties of 1865-1867 has a familiar sound. Records were incorrect or missing. Lack of any program or facilities for recreation and entertainment at the rendezvous camps left the troops easy prey to boredom and homesickness; wholesale AWOL's and desertions resulted. Among those who remained in camp, rebellion against being kept in service after the fighting had ended was universal. Men wanted to get back to their homes, to jobs that would pay more than their meager Army pay.

One difficulty of the 1860's that did not arise in later demobilizations was the result of lack of uniformity in mustering-out pay.³⁰

In some states troops were paid to include day of individual discharge or muster-out, while in others, notably Illinois, troops were only paid to include the date that they had arrived in the state rendezvous. This was not made uniform until late in November 1865 when troops were paid to include the last day in Federal service.

Another difference between the Civil War demobilization and those that followed has to do with the physical condition of the men being discharged. "Many soldiers were suffering from wounds and service-incurred disease and, while physical condition was not neglected by standards of that day, there was no organized effort to restore the soldier to greater health."³¹

Despite difficulties, demobilization proceeded rapidly. Between 1 May and 7 August 1865, 640,806 officers and men had been discharged; by the end of the year the total was about 900,000. The one million

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mark was passed before 30 June 1866, and by 1 November of that year 1,023,021 had been mustered out. A few volunteers were kept in service, for various reasons, more than a year longer; the last volunteer organization was not disbanded until 30 December 1867.³²

Demobilization After the Spanish-American War

The Spanish-American War was too brief and too limited in scope to provide any very significant test of demobilization procedure. The number of troops involved was well under 300,000;³³ and the fact that fighting continued in the Philippines and elsewhere until 1902 made impracticable as complete a demobilization as had followed our earlier wars. Nevertheless, the discharge procedures followed between 27 August 1898 and 22 June 1899 are worth considering.

The method first adopted was this: "Records of soldiers were to be completely prepared at Federal camps before transporting the organizations to their respective state camps. After arrival within the state, organizational commanders accomplished final payment and men were mustered out without furlough."³⁴ Ten days later, however--on 30 August--a new directive was issued; this called for organizations to be moved directly to state camps and for the administrative details connected with records and other matters to be accomplished in the camps while the men subject to discharge were enjoying 30- or 60-day furloughs.³⁵

The new method of discharge had disadvantages that were soon apparent. These were summarized, in part, at least, in a report to The Adjutant General:³⁶

1. Clerical and other administrative procedures relating to demobilization of personnel should be performed while organizations are under federal control at stations in the

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field. Individual records could not be completed while men were on furlough from their state camp. It required four and one-half days longer to demobilize a regiment at its state camp than at a Federal station, even though administrative work continued while the majority of the troops were on furlough.

2. Thirty- and sixty-day furloughs granted to troops produced evils. Some of these were:

a. The uncertainty of the time of discharge made it difficult for an individual to obtain permanent employment.

b. Large numbers of men were unable to support themselves properly on their pay and commuted subsistence during extended furlough periods.

c. Sudden changes of climate produced much sickness and discomfort because men, anticipating muster-out on their return from furlough, did not want to wear additional clothing.

d. Volunteer soldiers did not accept the furlough as a reward. Men would have preferred to be discharged and then be given the additional pay of the furlough period.

The policy of extra pay instead of a furlough was eventually adopted.³⁹

Another disadvantage of the decentralization to state camps was the fact that because the state camps were so numerous, many more Regular Army officers were required than had previously been needed to supervise and assist in the administrative work; hence the expense was greatly increased.³⁸

The demobilization was completed in less than a year; it had directly affected about .0036 of the country's population.³⁹

Demobilization After World War I

Writing of World War I Professor Paxson remarked: "There were times in the history of mobilization in which the government of the United States looked like a madhouse; during demobilization there was lacking even the madhouse in which the crazy might be incarcerated. They were at large."⁴⁰

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Accounts of the planning for World War I demobilization vary, but all authorities agree that the planning was started too late; and to say that the planners--and the executors of the plan--acted as if they were crazy is not too harsh an exaggeration.

According to one version, the impetus that finally started demobilization planning was furnished by the British. On 8 October 1918, Col. E.S. Hartshorn, Chief of the Coordination Section of the General Staff, wrote a memo for his chief, Maj. Gen. Frank McIntyre, pointing out "that the enormous expense connected with the military establishment and the desirability of the speedy return to normal economic conditions, indicated that the disembarkment of our soldiers should be accomplished with the least practicable delay."⁴² Colonel Hartshorn added that he had been informed by a member of the British Military Mission that the British War Office had already made plans for discharging their forces, including colonials. The memo ended with a recommendation that the War Plans Division of the General Staff be directed to study and report on all phases of demobilization.⁴² On 14 October General McIntyre acted on this recommendation; but no results were forthcoming until 22 November, more than a week after the fighting had stopped.⁴³

Another version of the history of World War I demobilization planning has it that the inspiration was a letter written by the Chief of the Operations Division, General Staff, to the President of the Army War College, who doubled as Chief of the War Plans Division. The letter read, in part, "There are one or two questions it seems to me should be studied and worked out so that you shall be good and ready for any contingency. The first of these is the plan for demobilization

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and musters out."⁴⁴ This letter was written in October 1918; since the exact date is not given, it is impossible to tell whether the letter preceded or followed the Harshorn memorandum.

If we seek to find the reason for the Army's failure to have demobilization plans ready when they were needed, an answer can be found in a letter written by Secretary of War Baker several months after the Armistice: "The collapse of the Central Powers came more quickly than even the best informed military experts believed possible."⁴⁵ Another cause for the failure to undertake postwar planning while the war was still raging was the fear of an unfavorable public reaction in the event that the existence of such planning should become known. The letter to the President of the Army War College asking for a study and report on demobilization contains this sentence: "I do not want to advertise it too much at present as it might be thought to be peace propaganda."^{46*} These explanations may, at the time, have seemed adequate; that they are not is obvious. To defer postwar planning until a war is won, or nearly won, is to court disaster. There should be demobilization

* It is interesting to note that the same fear was expressed in connection with World War II demobilization planning; a JCS paper (431, 30 July 1943) emphasized the necessity for keeping secret the existence of the newly-created Special Planning Division "in order to avoid a public relaxation in the war effort should it become known that we were deeply involved in preparation for demobilization."

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planning before a war begins; every mobilization plan should have a concomitant demobilization plan.*

Five methods of determining separation priority were considered: (1) length of service; (2) occupation; (3) individual application, supported by offer of employment; (4) locality (i.e., separation to be conducted by local draft boards; and (5) military units.

Demobilization by Length of Service

The first method was impracticable, mainly because the United States had not been at war long enough for length of service to be an equitable criterion of eligibility for discharge. Our Army of almost three and a half million had been recruited, trained, and sent into action so rapidly that, in many instances, those who had experienced the

* The plan of October-November 1916 was not the first attempt by the War Department to prepare for demobilization. In the spring of 1918 Robert C. Clothier, a member of the United States Committee on Classification of Personnel of the Army and later President of Rutgers University, had gone to England to study demobilization plans (Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, p. 13). The Committee's report, which was not submitted until 10 October 1918, recommended that men be discharged by trade or profession, so that they could be fed back into civilian life at the rate at which the economy of the country could absorb them; the Committee also recommended that the Department of Labor should be the principle agency concerned in the resettlement of ex-soldiers in civil life. "There is no evidence to show that these suggestions were considered seriously by the War Department." (Mock and Thurber, Report on Demobilization, pp. 128-29) Since this report had no effect on demobilization as it was actually carried out, it has been ignored in the text of this study.

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most arduous and most dangerous action had had only brief service;* the men with the longest service were often those who had spent the entire war period in safe billets in the United States.

Demobilization by Occupations

The idea of releasing, first the men who were most needed in trade, industry, and agriculture was an appealing one. This method--or a combination of this method and the one to be discussed next--was the method adopted, and later abandoned, by Great Britain; it was the method advocated by employment experts and various other civilian authorities in this country. On 9 November 1918, Felix Frankfurter, then head of the War Labor Policies Board, in a letter to Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, urged "demobilization by vocational groups, geared to the demands of civilian employment--under close co-operation between the Departments of War and Labor."⁴⁸ In another letter to Mr. Wilson, dated 22 November, Mr. Frankfurter proposed that soldiers be discharged in this order:⁴⁹

1. Farmers, dairymen, tractor men, cattlemen, and all agricultural workers at once, since food is the great need of the post war world. Seasonal farm laborers should be held till March, since their demobilization now would only heighten unemployment, or steer the likeliest into city industry--where they might prove hard to dislodge when the sap begins to rise.
2. Executives and professional men, holding strategic posts in civil life.

* The experience of the author of this monograph may be taken as a case in point. Having enlisted in the Signal United Reserve Corps, he was called to active duty in November 1917. He landed in France on 10 March 1918 and, after little more than two months' training in trench warfare, was sent to the Chateau-Thierry front--where there were no trenches to speak of. He had been in action for almost two months before he was disabled, on 25 July, by mustard gas.

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- 3. Men formerly employed in mining, shipping, production of railroad equipment, where the scarcity of labor is now acute.
- 4. Men whose employers promise that jobs are waiting.
- 5. Men who can qualify for jobs certified by the United States Employment Service.
- 6. Men from regions where the Service reports labor shortages.
- 7. Federal, state, and municipal employees under civil service.
- 8. Men of independent means--this class clearly less important than the first six.

The chief of the Operations Branch is cited as another who advocated the occupational approach to demobilization; he is quoted as having stated in a memorandum dated 22 November 1918 that "the paramount issue in the discharge of men was not the military efficiency of the army organizations, but the resumption of the normal, industrial life of the nation, and the placement in such industrial life of individuals who had been engaged in occupations which would end with the war or who had been in the military forces."⁵⁰ Secretary of War Baker himself seems to have been of the same school of thought. He is quoted as having said in a press conference a few days after the Armistice that it was necessary "to demobilize the men in this country and in foreign lands with reference to their occupational opportunities, in order to get them back into the normal life of the country without filling the nation with unemployed men." Mr. Baker added that the War Department was cooperating closely with the Department of Labor, through its United States Employment Service, and with the War Industries Board.⁵¹ That cooperation, however, was short-lived. Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board, considered

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what, as soon as the war was won, the Board had accomplished its mission; consequently, at his suggestion, the Board was abolished by Executive Order dated 31 December 1918. In the United States Employment Service was so hampered by the refusal of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds that it was relatively ineffective after March 1919;⁵² moreover, the extent of the War Department's cooperation, under 5 December 1918, was to keep the Department of Labor informed about demobilization activities.⁵³

Despite the view of Secretary Baker and of the Chief of the Operations Branch, General Staff, the War Department was opposed to the principle of discharging men as they were needed in civilian life, or could be gainfully employed there. War Department officials agreed that the Army did not have, and could not in any practicable way acquire, enough information about the occupational qualifications of its soldiers or about the labor conditions, the employment possibilities throughout the nation, to make such a method of demobilization feasible.⁵⁴ It has been said⁵⁵ that the plan envisaged by Messrs Frankfurter and Baker could have been successfully carried out if arrangements for putting the necessary procedure into effect had been made well before the end of the war. It seems doubtful, however, whether the ideal of discharging each soldier and putting him into a civilian job as soon as such a job became available could ever have been realized.

Indeed, Mr. Frankfurter himself may have come to feel, in the light of his postwar experience, that his plan could not have been made to work.

As chairman of A.L.R.B., in his own bureau, he soon met what other ranking officials were encountering on the heels of Armistice: mounting civilian pressure for the boys' return home, and to hell with economic consequences. His titles should have been bedeviled by criticisms from widows for their sons, wives for their husbands, politicians for their constituents. The agony of tears, and the

vision of Congress and military men sighting down the path of local resistance, looking away from planned economy. Moreover, the whole drift of W.I.P.A.--seeking to stabilize employment, wages, prices--was fought by two groups seldom allied. On the one hand, organized labor, impatient with wage ceilings, eager to achieve liberty of action, though somewhat fearful of labor surpluses resulting from fast demobilization. On the other, even more violently, businessmen bent to return to laissez faire: men who looked upon labor as a commodity, and to raise the first reduction in post-war production costs at its expense.⁵⁶

Unless a determined and successful effort had been made to control these various sources of pressure--families, politicians, labor leaders, and employers--no demobilization plan keyed to the economic situations could possibly have succeeded.*

In June 1917 Great Britain adopted a demobilization plan--over the protests of Sir Douglas Haig, who characterized it as "most objectionable and prejudicial to discipline"⁵⁷--which was based on the policy of immediate discharge of men who were most critically needed in British industry, commerce, and agriculture and of others as jobs were available for them. This plan, put into effect immediately after the Armistice,

*The comment of Professor Faxon is worth repeating (The Great Demobilization, p. 11): "There was no plan for the demobilization of the armed forces; and none would have been accepted by the men, anxious to be released, or by their people, anxious to have them back. Some of the filing cases now in Washington contain worthy proposals, urged but not adopted, for an orderly return of the troops, class by class, to be fitted into jobs as jobs were found or to be sent to work new farms, for the old idea of a workable frontier hung on long after the frontier itself was gone. No such theory governed the return. The men came back from France as ships were available for them at Brest." A statement in Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilson, Demobilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 5, is also of interest here: "Demobilization meant, first of all, the disbanding of the American Army. Whatever economic considerations might govern the reflection of war industry, no such considerations were to be permitted to retard the homeward progress of the troops. Four million American homes demanded their men at once; and whether the immediate return of the troops meant unemployment and distress or not, the Government was determined to comply with the demand."

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made resentment inevitable than rank alone, because of their importance to the British economy, had been deferred from active service until very late in the war, were the first to be discharged. Conversely, men who had been in the war since 1914, or soon after that time, found themselves hampered in seeking offers of jobs by the mere length of their service. Moreover, the plan lent itself to abuses; when a soldier applied for discharge on the strength of an offer of employment, it was not always possible to determine whether or not the offer was bona fide.

Within a month or so after the British demobilization got under way, feeling over the manner in which it was being conducted became so intense that the morale of the entire British army was disrupted. Herch, Winston Churchill, when he took over the War Office in January 1919, immediately instituted a demobilization procedure based primarily on length of service, but also giving considerable weight to wounds and age. The new system seems to have worked very well.

Demobilization by Individual Application

The third method of demobilization proposed--and promptly rejected by the War Department--made it a prerequisite for discharge that the applicant submit, along with his application for discharge, a statement to the effect that a job was available for him. Discharges would then be granted without consideration of the nature of the jobs; in other words, there would be no attempt to return soldiers to civilian life as they were most needed in the civilian economy, filling the

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critical jobs first and leaving to be discharged last those who would be qualified only for the least important jobs. The adoption of this method would have made the vast majority of United States soldiers eligible for discharge almost overnight. Moreover, in order to prevent abuses, it would have been necessary to check each claim of job availability to make sure that such a job really did exist and would be given to the applicant upon his return to civilian life. It is not surprising that the War Department gave little consideration to such a plan. As General March put it:

Had the War Department announced such a system of discharge on individual application, practically every man in the Army would at once have submitted his request for immediate discharge. As it would not have been possible to discharge immediately all who applied for such discharge, the different applications would have required careful study to determine which was the most deserving and who should be discharged first. This comparing of the relative merits of individuals for discharge would have involved an almost inconceivable amount of work and would have very greatly retarded the progress of demobilization. To try to decide the priority for discharge of individuals in any army of nearly 4,000,000 soldiers would have created infinitely more dissatisfaction among the soldiers who were not selected for early discharge than the method used of discharging the men by units.

Demobilization by Local Draft Boards

One other proposed method of demobilization should be mentioned. The selective service boards of Chicago, enthusiastically seconded by General Crowder--who, as Provost Marshal General was in charge of the administration of the national draft act--believed that the local draft boards, which had done an excellent job in recruiting nearly 4,000,000 men, would be the appropriate agency to perform the demobilization function. There was objection to this proposal on the part of a number

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of Chicago labor leaders, who felt that some local boards had displayed anti-union bias in selecting men to be inducted and that those boards might be expected to display the same bias if they were permitted to conduct the demobilization.⁶¹

A more important objection to the proposal was the fact that it would have entailed making each local board a separation center. Presumably, the boards already had the medical personnel to conduct the necessary physical examinations of men to be discharged, since they had for months been performing the task of examining draft registrants; but they would have had to have, in addition, commissioned and enlisted personnel to check and correct records, receive and store government equipment being turned in, issue uniforms, and make financial adjustments. Also each board would have had to provide housing, messing, and hospitalization facilities for the men while they were being discharged. The mere fact that there were 4,648 local boards was enough to make this method impracticable; there is no evidence that it was ever seriously considered by anyone other than the Chicagoans who were the authors of the proposal, and General Crowder.⁶² There may or may not be significance in the fact that General Crowder's recommendation that the local draft boards be utilized to demobilize the Army, which was submitted to the Chief of Staff on 11 November 1918, did not reach the Director of Operations, WDPS, until 22 November;^{*} the official announcement of the plan to be used had been made six days earlier.⁶³

*It is perhaps a mere coincidence that the War Plans Division's formal report on demobilization was submitted to the Chief of Staff on the same day (Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, p. 14).

Demobilization by Military Units

The plan adopted was essentially unit demobilization. The War Department gave five reasons for choosing this method:⁶⁴

In the first place, it was a speedy way of discharging the men. Second, it contributed to the orderly return of the troops, and third, maintained efficiency in the military forces through priority schedules. Also, fourth, in the opinion of the officials, such units represented cross sections of the nation's industrial life, and obviated the necessity of discharging men because they possessed certain trades or skills. Finally, the War Department claimed that it allowed sufficient elasticity to provide for special and individual cases.

The first three points were well taken; there can be little question that the three desiderata--speed and orderliness of return to civil life and maintenance of military efficiency in the units kept in service--can best, or at least most easily, be gained by unit demobilization. The fourth allegation--obviously an attempt to placate those who believed that economic considerations should govern the demobilization--is very dubious. Even a unit as large as a division, which, in World War I days, comprised more than twenty thousand men, is not a sufficiently large aggregation to be necessarily a cross section of anything. The proportion of bankers to brewers, of bailmakers to bankers, might be far greater--or smaller--in any given division than it is in the country as a whole; and one division might differ greatly from another in the occupations represented by its personnel. The fifth point apparently alludes to War Department Circular No. 77, 21 November 1918, which provided that an individual soldier might be discharged because of sickness or undue hardship in his family or, in exceptional cases, because he was badly needed in an important civilian job.⁶⁵

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World War I Demobilization in Operation

The War Department was not much concerned with economic considerations. Although it informed the Department of Labor in November 1918 that it would study the possibility of retraining for demobilization in communities in which there was already a labor surplus, there is no evidence that any such study was ever made. On the contrary, everywhere across the country soldiers were discharged as fast as the Army could process and discharge them. Consequently, between 1 December 1918 and February 1919, according to the War Trade Board, unemployment increased some-
 thing like 1,300 percent.⁶⁶ But the Army was unperturbed by such reports; it looked upon unemployment and other economic facts of life as things beyond its purview. From 11 November to the end of 1918 and throughout 1919 the Army had one impelling motive: to relieve the public, journalistic, and Congressional pressure by responding to the demand, "Bring the boys home!" Bring them home it did.

Demobilization began on 11 November 1918. Within an hour after the news of the signing of the Armistice reached Washington, separations from the service were taking place.⁶⁷ In more than one instance a troop train, loaded with newly sworn-in inductees headed for training camp, was stopped and sent back to its starting point; there the inductees were immediately discharged from the service.⁶⁸ Units in the United States, from development battalions to combat divisions in training, were disbanded or inactivated and their personnel discharged as fast as the necessary processing could be accomplished. As combat divisions and other organizations overseas were declared by General

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Perishing to be no longer required, they were shipped back to the United States to be discharged or inactivated if not required as components of the Regular Army.

There were, however, thousands of men overseas who had, generally because of having been hospitalized, become detached from their organizations.* Those were sent to casual camps such as the one at St. Armand (known to its inmates as "St. Irony") and held there until service records were received from Tours, the records depository. When a group of some 200 soldiers had been matched with their service records, they were organized into a casual company, put in charge of a couple of officers who were similarly detached from their organizations, and put on the first available States-bound ship. From the port of debarkation the casals were sent to a place such as Camp Devens at Ayer, Massachusetts; there they were held for a few days while groups, one for each demobilization center, were organized.† Every soldier was assigned to the group headed for the center nearest his home.

The discharge procedure--physical examination, turning in of government property, pay and travel allowance computation--generally required about four days. Upon being discharged, each soldier was given a uniform, shoes, and an overcoat or raincoat, depending upon the prevailing weather; those who returned from overseas with helmet and gas mask were allowed to keep those articles as souvenirs. The dischargee

*When a man was wounded and sent to a field hospital, his service record was retained by his unit for five days; if, at the end of that time, he had not returned, it was assumed that he had been sent on to a base hospital, and his service record was sent to the Central Records Office at Tours.

†General March (The March at War, p. 321) says there were thirty of these demobilization centers; Thurber and Cook (Report on Demobilization, p. 134) say that the number was thirty-three.

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was also given all pay and allowances due him, plus a \$60 bonus. He was encouraged to return immediately to his home town; the railroads helped by offering a reduced rate to discharged soldiers returning to their homes.

Reference has already been made⁶⁸ to the deviation from the principle of unit demobilization permitted by the provisions of War Department Circular No. 77, 1918. Another deviation occurred when three classes of workers--anthracite coal miners, railroad employees, and railway mail clerks--were ordered discharged;⁶⁹ more than 51,000 soldiers were affected by this order.⁷⁰ Another concession to economic considerations made by the War Department is represented by War Department Circular No. 34, 1919, which⁷¹

provided that commanding officers should take steps to insure that every enlisted man in their command understood thoroughly that the War Department did not desire to discharge any soldier who could not secure civilian employment, and that in place of being discharged, as he would be normally on their orders for demobilization, he might remain in the military service until such time as he could secure employment.

By February 1919 orders had been issued by the Chief of Staff making eligible for discharge all troops that had been in this country on 11 November 1918; certain categories--Regular Army troops, medical personnel, and soldiers engaged in administrative work connected with demobilization--were excepted. The last group complained so bitterly about being kept in service that, in March 1919, they were replaced by civilians.⁷²

The chief difficulty in the demobilization program was the lack of

⁶⁸See above, p. 19.

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of his own personal property in the...; such a
 letter, of course, included in it the fact that the obligation
 concerning the...; General... by the... of
 1918... 12,000...; Dec...
 was... with 13,042...; First half of
 1919... 274,479... in
 March to 404,500...; by 1 July a total of 2,735,906 had been
 secured. By the end of the year 1919 the total number of operations
 was 3,416,000. At that time the strength of the Army was less than
 275,000; on 30 June 1920 it was 203,901.¹³

...this program... it was not...
 ...; but... it follows that it was not... enough for
 the... of the United States Congress. It... of course...
 ...; the... Office Buildings... into the War...
 ...; the... of it, and the... of... to be
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 3 January 1919... to...
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¹³... 3 January 1918; but
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and could be said in his words: "I don't know just what is the matter with the War Department, but something is the matter."⁷⁴

General March's criticism of the War Department's policy of discharging surplus personnel was not a simple matter of discharging personnel. It was a matter of discharging personnel in the name of the War Department. This is what he had criticized in 1919; for in a speech in the House on 15 January 1919 the General was referred to by the House as "giving the War Department a bad name from the Chief of Staff as 'giving the War Department a bad name in reference to the policy of the War Department about discharging from the Army which I have seen,..." and asking for unanimity in support of the letter he read in the House of Representatives. General March explained his account of the episode with this sentence: "This was done, and criticism thereafter ceased."⁷⁵

As a result of this criticism, General March's letter did not know the facts or was not as candid; less than candid; for criticism did not cease. Senators and Representatives continued to assail the Army for what they considered dilatoriness in discharging surplus personnel. On 3 February 1919 Secretary Baker wrote to Senator McMillan regarding Senate Joint Resolution 196--a bit of proposed legislation that would, had it been passed, have overturned the War Department's discharge program and have added greatly to the confusion that characterized the post-Armistice period. In protesting against the resolution, Secretary Baker wrote: "To hold the Army responsible for the Army's proper functioning and to destroy its organic integrity by such legislation is to impose a duty which cannot be taken away from the Army for its performance with the other."⁷⁶ The resolution was not passed, but the criticisms of the Army evidently continued; for on 24 March 1919 the War Department found

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if necessary--or at least, desirably--to issue an Official Bulletin
 to define the demobilization program and giving the General Staff's
 reasons for choosing the unit discharge method rather than another.⁷⁷
 Throughout the demobilization period the Secretary of War, the Chief
 of Staff, and others who should have been permitted to devote their
 selves to other purposes were compelled to spend much of their time
 in what was largely a vain attempt to defend the Army and its policies.

Yet the complaints were not, essentially, against the demobilization
 plan itself but rather against the execution of the plan. There was
 no general public clamor against the principle of unit demobilization.
 But the plan had been made and adopted so belatedly that there had
 been no time to train personnel to carry it out. The administrators of
 the demobilization had to learn on the job, by trial and error. There
 were undoubtedly many cases of injustice to individuals; men who should
 have been discharged early were discharged late. And--so, at least
 it seemed in military circles--the public and the press found these
 cases much more newsworthy than the Army's explanation that it was
 doing the best it could, and not too badly, at that.⁷⁸

The demobilization of almost 3,500,000 soldiers affected directly
 about 3 1/2 percent of the population.⁷⁹ It is not to be wondered, however,
 that the Navy, which had grown from 35,777 officers and men on 1 April
 1917 to 497,030 on 11 November 1918, also carried out an extensive
 demobilization program, returning more than 400,000 men to civilian
 life.⁸⁰ Thus the total number demobilized by the United States after
 World War I was close to 4,000,000--nearly 5 percent of the population.⁸¹

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Moreover, the complexity of modern warfare is such that vast numbers of workers are required to run the aircraft and munitions plants and to supply personnel for various other war industries. Thus a much larger proportion of the people of the United States was involved, directly and indirectly, in the demobilization that followed World War I than had been affected by any of the five earlier demobilizations. Consequently, the impact of the demobilization of 1918-1919 was much greater than that of any previous demobilization; it is probably not too much to say that it was greater than the impact of all the previous demobilizations combined. Concerning it Professor Parson was permitted to write: "Another Great War, should it come upon us, might indeed be won; but the student of the Great Demobilization is justified in wondering, whether American society, or any society, could win another 'peace.'¹⁰² That Professor Parson's fear was well founded is amply demonstrated by the fact that even now, twelve years after the end of World War II, it is by no means certain that any action has been taken to avert the 'peace.'

Summary: 1788--1812

In each of our first six demobilizations the planning for the demobilization was started too late to have had any possibility of succeeding. Indeed, in the first five demobilizations there would seem to have been no pre-arranged or pre-surrender planning at all; and in the sixth, constructive planning was begun, not months or weeks, but only days before the end of hostilities. The worst features of those demobilizations could have been avoided by timely

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... reasons for the ... of mobilization ...

Footnote 5.

Footnote 6: ... for 6 April 1917 ...

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bounty was raised to ten dollars for a three-year enlistment.⁸⁹ On
 15 Sept. 1776 the Congress, acting to raise 50 battalions, provided
 20 and 100 acres of land to every noncommissioned officer and soldier
 who would serve for the duration of the war.⁹⁰ Early in 1777
 representatives of 11 of the England states recommended that their states
 should add a state bounty of thirty-three and one-third dollars to the
 Congressional bounty of twenty; that Massachusetts and New Hampshire
 should add the state bounty, bringing the total for each recruit in those
 two states to fifty-six and two-thirds dollars.⁹¹ In March 1779
 the Congress resolved

That a bounty of two hundred dollars out of the Continental
 Treasury shall be granted to each recruit who after January 23rd
 hath enlisted or shall enlist during the war, or in case the
 State shall have granted a reward or greater bounty the said two
 hundred dollars for each such recruit shall be applied to the credit
 of the State for whose quota he shall be raised.⁹²

This Congressional bounty was nothing as compared with the generosity
 of the states. On 3 May the Virginia legislature offered to every re-
 cruit seven hundred and fifty dollars, one suit of clothes per year,
 and a hundred acres of land. (From this total, the Continental bounty
 was to be deducted.)⁹³ In 1780 New Jersey offered a bounty of \$1,000;
 this was to be in addition to all Continental bounties and allowances.⁹⁴

Of course it was the depreciation of the Continental currency
 that made it necessary for the Congress and the states to bid for re-
 cruits with ever-increasing bounties, but the system defeated itself.
 Recruits, realizing they would increase in the bounty, refused to sign up
 until the increase had been authorized; thus the recruiters were always
 at least one step behind. Currency prices in the fall of 1782, the year

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with Mexico, and the Civil War merely emphasized the lesson that should have been learned since the Revolutionary War: that short-time mobilizations, in conjunction with a healthy system, provide a most effective and highly efficient method of feeding an army in the field. Fortunately, this lesson, at least, the country has come to have learned; for in both World War mobilizations, though they left much to be desired in the planning and the execution, did provide troops obligated to serve for the duration.

A third lesson to be learned from previous mobilizations--one that, as we shall see, is also to be learned in World War III--is that paper work is important. Perhaps not many members of our armed forces have had such an experience as that of Joseph J. ⁹⁵ but many of the difficulties with which our mobilizations have been plagued can be traced to faulty or inadequate personnel records. It may well be that in the heat of battle administrative officers cannot be expected to keep up with their duties; where they do find that all personnel are adequately equipped with the necessary records. But before or after every battle there is a really a hell that should be made time and opportunity for bringing records up to date. The classification, training, and assignment of individual officers and airmen, and an efficient system of keeping up personnel records will not be the task of another mobilization as it has been in the past.

Another lesson that should be learned is that soldiers should not be sent back until they have been brought--through post-war hospitalization, if necessary--to an adequate state of health. The

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agreements to maintain health, in the form of pensions for all, added so
 early in the cost of past wars, had since World War I been put on
 a much sounder basis. No one has a right, merely by virtue of having
 served in the armed forces in time of war, to receive for the rest of
 his life a monthly gratuity from the Federal Government. He does have
 a right to be returned to civilian life after his service in--if
 possible--as good physical condition as he enjoyed at the time of his
 enlistment or induction. He has a right, moreover, to free treatment
 for, and, whenever possible, the cure of any disability, no matter when
 it first became evident, that is a result of his service. The privi-
 leges granted under various "GI Bills of Rights"--free educational ad-
 vantages, housing benefits, and the like--are not matters of right;
 neither is the support of them to be regarded as bestowed by a benevolent,
 paternalistic Government. Rather, it is a sound investment, because it
 provides insurance of a better type of citizenry for the future.

The lesson to be learned that has not yet been learned; unless it
 is learned between now and the end of World War III, the next mobilization
 is doomed to failure. The lesson is that to have a good mobilization
 plan is not enough; the plan must be carried out. We have seen that the
 worst difficulties in the mobilization that followed World War I stemmed
 from the fact that plans were not carried out as announced. It will
 be found that the same difficulties, arising from the same cause,

NSA 113-59, pp. 21-22.

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characterized the demobilization that followed World War II. In both cases, the inability to carry out the demobilization plan was the inevitable result of (1) the lack of sufficiently trained brains in demobilization procedures and (2) the failure to condition the American public, the press, and the politicians in what to expect of a demobilization program. If the next demobilization is to be successful, there must be both a training program and a public relations program; the former must be both timely and adequate, and the latter must be carried out with all the skill and finesse to which we are accustomed in a nation-wide advertising campaign.

Demobilization Following World War II

Demobilization following World War II was not early enough, but it was expedited by the fact that there was really no war to demobilize from. It was expedited by the decision that the war against Germany would end before it was in the Pacific, probably a year before. This meant that there would be a rapid demobilization of the forces in the ETO and MTO, accompanied by a redeployment to the Pacific and the GIL. It was planned from the start, however, that for the AIF there would be a demobilization on 11 March 1945; in order to win the war against the Japanese as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, all the air power that could be spared would be turned against Japan.

In the reorganization of the Army, effective 10 March 1943, Col. J. Frank Pevision, who had been A-1 since 12 January 1942, was replaced by Col. Gen. J.M. [redacted]. Colonel Pevision was the Chief of a new

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Special Staff Section, The Special Projects Office, the mission of which was "to study the problem."⁸⁶ Direction was given to this planning by General Leavelle in a letter dated 2 April 1943 which he sent to Colonel Tamm asking for a committee of staff officers then available to be organized in the Special Projects Office to study the problem of demobilization:⁸⁷

- a. The detailed action to be taken the day the armistice is signed.
- b. Plans for disposition of surplus war material, material, and facilities available by following cessation of hostilities.
- c. Determination of the size, composition and disposition of post-war Air Force.

As a result of a general staff meeting headed by Gen. Nathan F. Sorenson, Chief of Staff of the Army Service Forces, to "initiate to provide any studies exploring the limits of basic policy and broad planning for the demobilization of our military organization after the cessation of hostilities."⁸⁸ General Sorenson immediately brought in from the Conditions Management Board (C.M.B.) officers to carry out the assignment. General Tamm organized a Project Planning Division in the G-3.⁸⁹ On 18 June 1943 the Division sent to the Chief of Staff the "Study of Demobilization Plan B"; this was a broad outline, based on four assumptions:

- a. The United States will emerge as the preeminent military power and will be able for at least several post-war years in a state of preparedness for action in widely dispersed areas.
- b. Operations in the Pacific theater will be limited to some degree in the Pacific.
- c. When the United States will fall an important time for deployment of troops in occupied areas for an extended period.
- d. Public opinion in the United States will demand a speedy repatriation of our forces abroad and quick demobilization of our army and air forces.

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To the extent of the information furnished, the following is a summary of the
 information furnished to the Special Florida Division in connection with the
 investigation of the activities of the subject as of 1954. In connection with
 the above information, the Special Florida Division is advised that the
 activities of the subject are of a confidential nature.

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On 10 July 1954, the Special Florida Division received information from the
 Special Florida Division, Miami, Florida, in connection with the
 activities of the subject as of 1954. The information received was
 of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the Special Florida
 Division for its information only. The subject of this information is
 a confidential source of information and is being furnished to the
 Special Florida Division for its information only. The information
 received is of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the
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 Special Florida Division for its information only.

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The information received from the Special Florida Division, Miami,
 Florida, in connection with the activities of the subject as of 1954,
 is of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the Special Florida
 Division for its information only. The information received is of a
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- a. The information received from the Special Florida Division, Miami,
 Florida, in connection with the activities of the subject as of 1954,
 is of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the Special Florida
 Division for its information only.
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 Florida, in connection with the activities of the subject as of 1954,
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- c. The information received from the Special Florida Division, Miami,
 Florida, in connection with the activities of the subject as of 1954,
 is of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the Special Florida
 Division for its information only.

The Director of the Special Florida Division, Miami, Florida, is
 advised that the information received from the Special Florida Division,
 Miami, Florida, in connection with the activities of the subject as of
 1954, is of a confidential nature and is being furnished to the Special
 Florida Division for its information only. The information received is of
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On obligation by skill, length of service, by age, and by
superiority--would be acceptable to them, that the determination
of the priority of separation would be made on the basis of
a or his idea of his age.¹⁰⁵

The first step taken by the IAF in the execution of de-obligation
plans was the activation, on 15 June 1943, of the IAF Distribution
Center at Atlantic City, New Jersey.¹⁰⁶ The functions of this organi-
zation were:¹⁰⁷

- a. To receive all Army Air Force personnel returning,
to the continental United States area overseas, except those
referred for hospitalization or on specific assignment, and
to receive such Army Air Force personnel as they are transferred
to the Distribution Center by continental commands and air forces,
and after examination and re-evaluation assign them to appropriate
stations, detail them to such commands or effect their separation
from the service.
- b. To maintain and operate post camps for which Army Air
Force personnel are required for necessary rest.

At the same time, Distribution Stations were established at Atlantic
City and Miami Beach, Florida and post camps at Lake Lanier, North
Carolina and Camp Springs, Indiana.¹⁰⁸ On 1 June 1944 the Dis-
tribution Center became the Personnel Distribution Command (PDC).¹⁰⁹
Distribution Stations were opened at San Antonio and Santa Ana in
California,¹¹⁰ at Camp Travis and Fort Ord in North Carolina,¹¹¹ and
at San Antonio, Texas;¹¹² the PDC was also given jurisdiction during
1944 and 1945 over more than a dozen continental hospitals and several
Continental Army Air Force posts.¹¹³

One thing the de-obligation elements needed to know in the summer
of 1943 was how much time they had for their planning: i.e., what was the
earliest date on which it might be necessary to get their plans in effect?

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SFO and SFO appealed to G-2 and received the reply that the earliest probable date for the termination of the war against Germany was 1 September 1944.¹¹⁴ It was anticipated that the surrender of Japan would come at least a year after that of Germany.¹¹⁵ Other assumptions, as of 8 July 1943, were:

- b. Partial demobilization would begin with victory in Europe.
- c. The force requirement for U.S. share of the emergency inventory force was left blank.
- d. The U.S. would probably furnish a share of international Police force, largely air cover.
- e. In demobilization the principle of discharge to men of longest service would be the guide.
- f. Some form of unit readjustment would be maintained by the U.S.¹¹⁶

The War Department carried out some very practical demobilization planning in 1944. On 2 March a separation center which was to serve as a pilot installation to provide experience in discharge procedures, was activated at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Within the first week of its existence, the number of basic discharge forms was reduced from 32 to 5, the number of copies required from 57 to 21, and the number of signatures from 33 to 6.¹¹⁷

Before the end of April the SFO had prepared a list of "Actions to be Taken by AIF Commanding Generals in SFO and IWO Immediately Following the Defeat of Germany." The item on this list of chief interest here is the provision that personnel with longest or nears service be transferred, so that such transfers could be effected without too seriously affecting the operational efficiency of the units

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concerned, second, and third, and for further combat their units to be sent back to the United States for domestic reserve; such personnel would, upon arrival in the US, be placed in the service.¹¹⁸

The War Department had developed a personnel plan and had it tested by the Caribbean Defense Command,¹¹⁹ and the MIF had followed with its "J" plan;¹²⁰ all US planning, compiled in War Department Regulation 1-1, dated 30 August 1944. D-1 1-1, which called for changes from the basic plan, appeared to be the basic plan for the rehabilitation of captured personnel. It provided that the War Department, as soon as a requirement of the group basic should become possible, would inform the commander in chief of each theater or major command of his responsibility to be, and which would be the case of free choice. In addition, the War Department would be invited, and then the War Department would decide to accept elements from each theater or command to be placed in each of four categories: I, the element retained for continued service in US line combat commands; II, the element transferred to the US Army to provide service in the United States, or the US Armed Forces to a theater; III, the element to be reorganized and transported to the other of the theater or command; and IV, the element deactivated. Each theater or command would then select a suitable organization to take up his quota in each category.

The War Department 1-1, which provided for all of the above, was to be revised, and to be revised up to the point, if for any reason, it was found that the War Department 1-1 was not adequate.



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The information contained in this report is classified as CONFIDENTIAL, and its disclosure to unauthorized persons is prohibited. 124

The information contained in this report is classified as CONFIDENTIAL, and its disclosure to unauthorized persons is prohibited. 124

- a. [Redacted]
- b. [Redacted]
- c. [Redacted]
- d. [Redacted]
- e. [Redacted]
- f. [Redacted]
- g. [Redacted]

The information contained in this report is classified as CONFIDENTIAL, and its disclosure to unauthorized persons is prohibited. 124

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...of the results, ...

A draft of the ... dated 25 March 1954, was submitted to the Chief of Staff, ...

... by 1 October ...

... 1-2, ... 1-3, ... 1-4, ...

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... decision to place the responsibility for all operations in the hands of the NSZ was made at a high level. It was, on first thought, a logical decision. The NSZ was organized in broad-headed details of all kinds, including physical operations; it didn't have been expected that an organization could be built up under NSZ auspices that would be capable of handling the declassification of the entire leg office with any efficiency.

Indeed, there is evidence that the NSZ believed that GRT is not necessary; see as NSZ HQ memo notes: ¹⁵⁰

... mid-June 1959 was reported that the War Department had adjusted Plan, to carefully provide for the following: (1) This procedure, was neither still in progress nor had the three requisites which had been the basis for the plan:

1. Military security - Deployment was being through towards the Pacific Theater.
2. Technical capabilities - The necessary technical personnel and equipment, i.e., with the highest cost items, were being provided and, where necessary, by all available means, was expedited.
3. Morale - The morale of the individual soldiers considered in the adjusted Plan (air and the selected for operation were being maintained in such a manner as to cause them to leave the leg with a high regard for its efficiency.

Such statements represent wishful thinking on the part of GRT HQ. In NSZ HQ memo such as the one he said that the moral and technical capabilities were not being provided by "the combination, possible all elements of command." ¹⁵¹ It is true that there is relatively little criticism of the adjusted Plan itself, and some of that was not valid. None in the upper and broader scope of the NSZ was not included as a factor in the NSZ score and not likely to have been reflected solely by a concern for

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with her captives. When she had no children and they were not
 then were of large objects--for different reasons--to the credits
 given the parent's; but the soldier who had one child and those who
 had two or three children naturally they got the credit fair
 enough. They're considered that too much credit was given for combat
 service were or flooding, or what through it was so, the discomfort
 and the April 30th had to be reduced in order to earn a credit.
 In the Army--and--later they objected to the credit for a
 month or two years would have objected to any other factor that did not
 operate to the advantage.

As was true in 1918-1919, it was the execution of the mobilization
 plan, rather than the plan itself, that caused dissatisfaction.
 Perhaps the most important to the troops was the uncertainty
 uncertainty. In theory, the critical score that was to be announced
 a week before V-E Day would be available for separation of any
 personnel as necessary to reduce the Army from its V-E Day strength to the
 number thought to be required for the defeat of Japan. After V-E Day
 additional quotas of personnel sufficient to reduce the Army to the
 troop base stipulated for the European Theater of Operations
 personnel were to be made available by reducing the critical score to
 whatever figure would "collect" the required number. Thus each in-
 dividual could very properly expect to be discharged or reduced from
 service only when the critical score had equalled or fallen below
 his own score, or would be discharged thereafter, a discharge
 that would be required to trace credit, by the military conditions.

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When, conditions are favorable, the plan of contact is
to be made through the subject, to the degree of first class.
The subject is required to maintain contact with a number of
individuals, to be determined, in the near future.

The plan of contact, as outlined above, is to be executed
as follows: The subject is to contact the individuals named
in the plan of contact, and to maintain contact with each
of them, as outlined in the plan of contact. The subject is
to be instructed to contact the individuals named in the plan
of contact, and to maintain contact with each of them, as
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instructed to contact the individuals named in the plan of
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outlined in the plan of contact.

The plan of contact, as outlined above, is to be executed



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"Green Project" or "White Project" called for the use of all aircraft D-17's and D-17's, except those required for the European Operational Air Force, to fly from the UK and the US to the United States by their own pilots as well as aircraft carrier routes up to a total of 10.¹⁵³ The operation began on 20 March with the objective of 35 heavy bombers from the UK and 6 from the US. The route called for the United States via the northern route, the latter via the southern route. The passengers who remained on these White Plan aircraft were all AF's personnel, and they maintained the same level of troops under the White Plan as to the number of troops in the planes; later the plan was amended to 31 in each. By the time the project was completed, more than 5,000 aircraft had been received, carrying 73,000 persons. Of this personnel, 32 percent, arriving in the northern route, were received at Froyd Field, in Connecticut; 68 percent, coming from the UK via the southern route, landed at Hunter Field, in Georgia. Of the 5,000 aircraft, 26 suffered accidents, with 100 persons killed. The greatest loss of aircraft was 600--a record of which both the US and British aircraft manufacturers are well aware.

The Green Project

The "Green Project" was a plan to fly the Air Force's transport aircraft over Europe from the UK and the US to the US, a total of 50,000 per month. To achieve this goal, at least 100 D-17's and 100 D-17's were required. The British aircraft were to fly to 550,550 flights per day, . . . or

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The capital of 37.2 million was... of the... of...
 24 to... of... daily to...¹⁶⁰ The... for...
 ... 15,000... of... 27,500;... 20,302...
 ... in... of 20,270 in...¹⁶¹ The July... of 13,750 was
 ... by... 15... 50,223... about
 10... of... the... to...
 ...-... of... of...
 ... of...
 ... about 25, and...
 10... of...¹⁶²
 ... in the Pacific...
 ... 35,000... 10,000...
 ...¹⁶³ ... the...
 ...¹⁶⁴ ...
 ... 100,000...
 ...¹⁶⁵ ...
 10... 1945.¹⁶⁶

The Air Force Following World War II

The War Relocation Authority...
 ... in November 1945, ... 2,000;
 ... 250,000.¹⁶⁷
 ... 275,000...
 ... 55,000 to the Army Service Forces, 100,000
 to the Army Ground Forces, and 120,000 to the Army Air Forces. This
 allocation to the AAF, according to... to be distributed

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to assign 30,000 to each of two commands, 10,000 to the training establishment, and 50,000 to the tactical command.¹⁶⁹ That number of combat aircraft would have sufficed for four to 10 combat wings, perhaps only 16--20 for example. The 105 wings for which AF had no planes had only one or two 75 aircraft, but the number of such aircraft, the 16--20 Air Force wings, was a reality. The AF declined and its loss for 1945 was 209,¹⁷¹ to be in force 1950,¹⁷² an increase in the number of military aircraft of 2,411,254 in force 1944¹⁷³ to a loss of 203,614 in May 1947.¹⁷⁴

General Spaatz was, in 1947, Chief of Staff, USAF:¹⁷⁵

The conditions in the Air Force for skilled specialists developed during the war. Many of the number of officers and men were trained in the United States. There were about 100,000 in force of 1945 for which the Air Force was responsible, and in 2 1/2 years, 1945, V-J Day, the Air Force was nearly as large as on V-E Day, four years earlier.

At the end of the war a considerable number of officers had been assigned to the Air Force and no one had sufficient personnel to carry out the responsibilities assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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Later General Spaatz added:

The loss of personnel, with its significant effect on the training organization and on the availability of men to learn new aircraft techniques, had the effect of reducing the number of men of the Air Force. On V-J Day there were 210,000 of the five or six wings. The number of 1945 would have been reduced to 100,000 by the loss of 100,000.

The training of the V-J Day Air Force had a significant effect on the Air Force. The Air Force had a large number of officers and men who were trained in the United States. There were about 100,000 in force of 1945 for which the Air Force was responsible, and in 2 1/2 years, 1945, V-J Day, the Air Force was nearly as large as on V-E Day, four years earlier.

¹⁶⁹ General Spaatz (Chief of Staff, USAF, 1947-1950) in "The Air Force in the United States, 1947-1950," p. 10) "The Air Force in the United States, 1947-1950," p. 10) "The Air Force in the United States, 1947-1950," p. 10).

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of the 109... Air Force... 1917... 1970...

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Air Force... [faded text]

On 14 June 1950... [faded text]

In the event of... [faded text]


Agreement... [faded text]

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obligations--and it is well known that there will be other forces--
 these are the forces to which credit will be given when a force
 is established. It would be possible, if the conditions involved are not
 too large, to facilitate the public distribution of credit to private
 individuals, even though to return it to the general public will be
 difficult, particularly in the case of the general public in the American
 world, the general public, the general public, or causing
 the return of the credit to the general public.

Such public obligations, however, would be all-out obligations,
 or all-out obligations which are required for the general public,
 that they would be the general public, that they would be
 all-out obligations, and they would be, as is already the
 public, to be all-out obligations. This is a general obligation
 that is to be considered.



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PART TWO

DEMobilIZATION IN THE FUTURE

What has thus far been written in this study is history; that which follows is necessarily speculation. The views expressed and the conclusions reached are based upon the best sources of information available; but they do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Air Force.

The necessity for having a demobilization plan to accompany every mobilization plan has previously been emphasized;* it is also true that in planning the demobilization one must take cognizance of the mobilization. This latter statement is not so much a truism as it may at first glance seem. Obviously one could not plan a demobilization without knowing how many troops will have been mobilized; but, as will be seen, the method and the timing of the mobilization are factors that must be taken into consideration in planning for demobilization.

The Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

In World War I the United States air arm--known in 1918 as the Air Service--expanded from a total personnel strength on 6 April 1917 of some 1,200 officers and men¹⁸⁰ to approximately 195,000 on 11 November 1918;¹⁸¹ thus there was a build-up to more than 160 times the prewar strength. In World War II there was an expansion of the Air Corps/AAF from 24,724 on 30 July 1939 to 2,411,294 on 31 March 1944¹⁸²--an increase

* See above, pp. 10-11 and 27.

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of nearly one hundredfold. The first build-up was accomplished in a period of 19 months; the second required almost five years. The World War I demobilization reduced the Air Service from 195,000 to about 24,000¹⁸³ in less than eight months; during the following year--Fiscal Year 1920--total Air Service military personnel strength dropped to 9,358.¹⁸⁴ Following World War II, as we have seen,¹⁸⁵ the AAF declined from its peak strength of almost 2,500,000 in March 1944 to a low of little more than 300,000 in June 1947.

In the light of these figures, what are the prospects for the mobilization-demobilization cycle in World War III? It has been estimated that 18 months will be required for the nation's war potential to reach capacity production. If the manpower build-up is geared to the materiel build-up, personnel peak strength would not be reached until some time between D plus 18 and D plus 24. There will be no increase to 160 times or even 100 times prewar strength. It is thought that the full mobilization requirement in personnel will call for, at the most, no more than two times the number on active duty on D-day. If properly planned and carried out, the demobilization should require approximately the same length of time as the build-up. The problem, then, with this type of mobilization, would be to separate something like one million personnel in from 18 to 24 months.*

* Following World War II AAF personnel strength declined from 2,253,182 in August 1945 to 314,413 in December 1946, a drop of almost two million in 16 months (Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, 1946, p. 14).

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Planning for a Future Demobilization

Although general, and in some cases perhaps tentative, principles for demobilization planning can be established now, detailed demobilization plans will depend upon information not now available and not likely to be available until the next war is almost won. Such information includes the following items: (1) the amount and location of territory to be occupied after the war and the length of time that occupation may be expected to last; (2) the degree of hostility--if any--of the resident population toward the occupation troops; (3) the kind, amount, location, and condition of materiel to be disposed of, and the manner in which that disposition is to be made; and (4) the size, nature, and deployment of the postwar Air Force. Only when such information is at hand can Air Force planners determine what USAF troops will become surplus, and when; only then can demobilization planning be specific and detailed.

Lacking the information required for detailed planning, we must consider the possibility of proceeding under assumptions. We might assume that, following the next war, no foreign territory will be occupied and, hence, that no troops will be needed to perform police duties abroad. In that event, all overseas combat units could be returned to the United States as rapidly as the logistic situation would permit, priority in return being based on length and arduousness of service. Maintenance and salvage troops would be required only so long as there were installations to be closed down and materiel to be disposed of. However, the assumption that no occupation forces will be required after the next war now seems so unlikely that it can be rejected as unrealistic.

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If we are to assume, then, that an occupational police force of combat troops will be required, we must determine, as best we can, what types of units will be needed, how many of each type, and where they will be located; we must make the same sort of determination for the remainder of the postwar USAF. The demobilization problem becomes a matter of reducing the manpower of the wartime Air Force to the number and types of personnel required for the units of the postwar Air Force. The first thing to be considered is the method to be used in bringing about this reduction; and that brings us to a consideration of the advantages of unit demobilization as compared with individual "selection out." We have seen that the demobilization following World War I, in which the unit method was used, and that following World War II, in which the individual method was adopted, both had undesirable features that we should not want in any future demobilization. But we have also seen that in both cases it was not the method used but rather the way in which it was used that was responsible for the undesirable features.

Unit demobilization would always be the choice of the military if their preference were the only consideration. Demobilization by the disbanding or inactivation of units is easy to administer. Personnel records are ready at hand in group or wing headquarters; if any records are incomplete, the information required to complete them is, or should be, available within the organization. What is even more important is the fact that the organizations to be retained in service are kept at full strength and efficiency. In one sense, the method is fair. No matter whether the organizations marked for inactivation are chosen by lot or



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in some order of merit, the men in the organizations to be retained in service may envy their more fortunate comrades in the units to be released, may curse their own unhappy fate, but have to admit that such ill luck as has been meted out to them has been the soldier's lot from time immemorial.

To the non-military mind, however, unit demobilization is inequitable to the point of being iniquitous. It releases in one organization raw recruits with the briefest of service along with the seasoned veterans, while in another unit men who have served long and suffered much are kept under arms against their will.

Perhaps a combination of the unit and individual methods, or what might be considered a compromise between them, would prove the best solution for a future demobilization. Reduction of personnel would be accomplished by inactivating units; but the units will have been remanned in the theater so that all personnel in the units to be inactivated will be individuals who are eligible for relief from active duty. Such eligibility would be based upon length and arduousness of service. A rating system would be devised according to which service in a combat area--i.e., any area wherever located that had been subjected to heavy bombing or in which hard fighting had occurred during the individual's presence there--would be weighted most heavily, while service in the ZI (or in any part of the ZI not subject to attack) would carry least weight. The ratios might be: four points for each month of service in an area that was subject to attack while the individual served there; three points for each month of service in an area not subject to attack but characterized by objectionable living conditions, such as an arctic or desert climate; two points per month for service in an overseas area not included in either of the preceding categories; and one point a

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month for service in the ZI if not subject to attack. Putting these credits on an individual rather than an organizational basis will eliminate one of the worst inequities of the point system used in and after World War II--the fact that credits awarded to members of combat groups were denied members of service groups, even though all the individuals concerned had experienced the same hardships and had been subjected to the same jeopardy.* The cut-off figure would be that which would make eligible for relief from active duty all officers and airmen not required by the postwar Air Force; the figure would not necessarily be the same for officers as for airmen but might be higher or lower, depending upon the manning requirements for the two categories of personnel.

There should not be the frantic pressure for relief of those eligible for separation that has characterized past demobilizations, because the reduction, like the build-up, will be much less drastic. There will be those who will be desperately eager to return to civil life, and they will have families and friends; but the total number of potential writers of letters to members of Congress will be far less than in 1918-19 or 1945-46. Indeed, it should be possible to meet the full manning requirements for the postwar Air Force with careerists and other volunteers; thus no one would be kept on active duty against his will.

In choosing the units that are to comprise the postwar Air Force it would be logical to make the selection on the basis of war records; organizations with a long and noteworthy history will generally give a

* Credit for parenthood has not been included here because it is felt that being a father should not limit the duty a man owes to his country.

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better performance than would new and relatively untried ones. But the older units that would be thus chosen are likely, unless their attritional losses have been excessive, to have the largest proportion of officers and airmen who have already experienced long, hard service. Some of this personnel will be careerists; with them we need not be concerned here. The non-careerists who wish to return to civil life and whose service entitles them to release from active duty would be transferred to units scheduled for inactivation; they would be replaced by personnel--taken from units to be inactivated--who have less than the amount of service required for relief from active duty and others who, though eligible for relief, are willing to sign up for continued active service.

The skills that will be required in the postwar Air Force must be taken into consideration. Each unit to be retained in service would be checked to make sure that it possesses in its personnel all the skills called for in its manning requirements. It will be the responsibility of the Training Command to have officers and airmen trained and ready to serve as replacements in any positions where replacements may be required. Military necessity* will justify the retention on active duty of a key officer or airman for a time; but the time must not be an unreasonable one. Suitable replacements should be on hand during demobilization and afterward so that, whenever an individual becomes eligible for relief from active duty, such individual can be released promptly without in any way lessening the efficiency of the organization

* The American people must be made to realize that military necessity does not cease to exist as soon as an armistice is signed and hostilities are ended.

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to which he had belonged. The security of the United States, the preservation of the American way of life, and, it is not too much to say, our very lives may depend upon the ability of every Air Force unit to perform its mission; that ability must be maintained at all times and at all costs.

If the next war should end at some appreciable time before D plus 24, it might be assumed that all of the overseas units to be returned to the United States will belong in one or the other of two categories: (1) units to be kept in active service as components of the postwar USAF and (2) units to be placed in an active or inactive Reserve status. If hostilities should continue beyond D plus 24, it might be evident at the time of the armistice that some of the units mobilized would not be required in a future emergency. If that should be the case, there would then be a ^{third} category of units to be returned: those to be disbanded.

When it has been decided what units will comprise the postwar USAF, including the occupational air force, it will be possible to determine, in the light of each unit's mission and the overall mission of the force of which the unit is a component, what installations will provide the most appropriate bases. Some units of the occupational air force may be left in the theater in which they were serving at the cessation of hostilities if there is a post-armistice need for them there. For such units especially, but also for the USAF as a whole, an equitable rotation policy must be established immediately, to replace the more rigorous wartime rotation system. The policy might call for either unit rotation

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
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or individual rotation. It would seem offhand that unit integrity would best be preserved and fostered by unit rotation; but there may be morale-building and esprit de corps-inspiring factors in long association of a unit with a particular locality, factors that would make individual rotation preferable. The long service of the 19th Infantry in China might be a case in point. Once a rotational policy is adopted, nothing but the direct emergency should be allowed to interfere with its being carried out according to schedule. Allowance should be made, in determining the length of an overseas tour, not only for the living conditions encountered during the tour, but also for the nature of the service performed. It is imperative that any rotation plan must be such as will not impair the efficiency of the unit.

Units being returned to the United States for continued duty in the postwar Air Force would, upon arrival at their port of debarkation, be sent immediately to a processing station. The processing would include a physical examination, designed chiefly to reveal cases of contagious disease and conditions that would disqualify individuals for further active duty; a record check; a clothing and equipment check; and a financial accounting, with payment of all funds due each individual. These procedures should be accomplished in 48 hours or less; and the troops should have been informed--either before or immediately after debarking--just what they are to expect as to the nature and the duration of the processing they are about to undergo. At the processing center the food, the sleeping accommodations, the telephone and telegraph arrangements, the recreational facilities--there will be little time for recreation; but


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a good day room, at least, should be provided--and the treatment by permanent party personnel should be such as to make each individual feel as one returnee felt, in January 1945, after going through the Initial Processing Station at Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut: "Bradley Field was wonderful. . . . I couldn't believe it was the Army--it was so efficient!"¹⁸⁶

By the time the units of the postwar Air Force begin to return from overseas, the installations that are to serve as their bases of operations will have been selected and made ready. Hence, as soon as a unit's processing has been completed, a small cadre would be sent, with the organization's records and whatever equipment has been retained (most of the equipment would have been turned in before the organization left the theater), to the Air Force base that had been selected as the permanent station of the unit. Other personnel of the unit would, immediately after being processed, be sent to their homes, or to such other places as they may elect, on leave or furlough. Or the World War II device of granting 30 days' TDY for "RR&R" might be adopted. During this time the members of the cadre would be requisitioning supplies and equipment and making such other provisions as will be required for the normal functioning of the unit. At the end of the 30 days, after the other personnel had reassembled, the members of the cadre would have their opportunity to visit families and friends. When its members have all finally been brought together again, the unit should--if the processing station and the homefolk have properly performed their roles--be ready to undertake its postwar mission efficiently and with high morale.



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Units not selected as components of the postwar Air Force would be returned as expeditiously as possible and according to a priority based on the length--and perhaps the nature--of each organization's overseas service. All personnel of these units will be eligible for relief from active duty as soon as their processing has been completed. Troops in the ZI in units scheduled for inactivation--except those required to man the demobilization centers--would also be eligible for relief from active duty; many, perhaps most, of these could be processed and released while the overseas units were making their Stateside journey. The processing of these troops--both ZI and returnees--would be much the same as that given to members of units to be retained on active duty, except that the physical examination should be more thorough. It is this examination that determines whether the individual will re-enter civilian life in the best possible physical condition; if the examination reveals that an individual's health would be improved by a few days, or weeks, or even months of hospitalization, he should be given the opportunity to benefit by such treatment. Indeed, in most cases it may be best that no option be offered; the individual should be kept on active duty until the indicated treatment and the consequent physical improvement have been effected.

An equally important reason for making this physical examination comprehensive and thorough is the fact that the record of this examination will be definitive; it will be the basis for a decision in the event an application for disability compensation should be made. Thus the record must show illnesses contracted and wounds or other injuries incurred



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during the individual's period of active service, so that it will be possible to decide equitably whether a disability that develops later is or is not service-connected.

The processing of individuals to be relieved from active duty would also differ from that of officers and airmen being kept in service in that it would include one or more orientation periods, in which special emphasis would be placed on making clear to each individual what his rights and privileges as a veteran are, and what responsibilities and opportunities will be his as a Reservist. There should also be a graphic and forceful presentation of material on the subject of "What We Fought For," by way of complementing the material on "What We Are Fighting For" that would presumably have been presented while the war was in progress." The purpose of such presentation would be, of course, to review the accomplishments of the armed forces in the war, by way of giving the Air Force veterans recognition for their part in those accomplishments, and to inculcate in the future Reservists the views and principles necessary to the winning of the peace. These orientation programs could be used to fill the voids that will occur in any processing schedule, however well planned and executed.

The Place of the Reserve in Demobilization

Public Law 51, 19 June 1951, requires all individuals inducted into the armed forces of the United States to serve, on active duty and/or in

* Some, at least, of this material might appropriately and profitably be presented to the officers and airmen being kept in active service.

† This orientation material should be prepared, on a USAF-wide scale, well in advance of the cessation of hostilities and kept up-to-date by revisions as required.

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a reserve component, a total of eight years.¹⁸⁷ According to the provisions of Public Law 476, 9 July 1952,

Except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress, any member of the reserve components who is not serving on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States shall, upon his request, be transferred to the Standby Reserve for the remainder of his term of service.

Such transfers were authorized only, however, if the applicant's service put him in one of the four following categories: 1) those who had served on active duty in the armed forces of the United States for not less than five years; 2) those who, having served on active duty for a total of less than five years, have satisfactorily participated in an accredited training program in the Ready Reserve for a period which, when added to his active duty time, totals not less than five years; 3) those who served on active duty for not less than 12 months between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 and, in addition, served on active duty for not less than 12 months subsequent to 25 June 1950; and 4) those who have served as members of a reserve component subsequent to 2 September 1945 for no less than eight years.¹⁸⁸

Generally speaking, then, for the majority of USAF airmen, there would be an obligation to remain in the Reserve for the difference between eight years and the combined total of their active duty and previous reserve time.

Prior to 1951 appointments of reserve officers were for terms of five years each; it was the responsibility of the individual to renew



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his commission at the end of each five-year period.* Public Law 51, 19 June 1951, provided¹⁸⁹ that a reserve officer must serve a minimum of eight years, reserve and active duty time combined. Public Law 476, 9 July 1952, makes all appointments of Reserve officers effective for an indefinite period;¹⁹⁰ instead of making it necessary for the individual to renew his commission after every five-year term, it is now necessary for him to take positive action if he wishes to terminate his commission.⁴

It would appear, then, that unless the next war should be a very long one (which seems highly improbable), a great many of the veterans of that war will, at the end of hostilities, be under obligation to spend some time in the Reserve. Each individual who is so obligated would, on the completion of his processing, be relieved from active duty and transferred on Reserve status to the Air Reserve Center nearest his home, or otherwise assigned at the discretion of Continental Air Command, or whatever organization may then have jurisdiction over Reserve forces. The Air Force--and the other armed forces as well--would be greatly benefited if the veterans who had already completed, by the end of the war, their

* An exception was made following the Korean outbreak; commissions that would have expired in 1950 or soon thereafter were continued in effect until April 1953 by Congressional and Presidential authority (Lt. Kenneth A. Walker, draft of USAF Hist. Study No. 85, "The USAF Reserve Program, October 1945 to January 1953," p. 142).

⁴ Upon being relieved from active duty every officer whose service during the war was satisfactory should be permitted to retain his commission in the Reserve. Whether or not terminal promotions shall be granted--as was the policy, in some cases at least, following World War II--is a question that can be left for a future decision. In any event, a promotion policy must be worked out that will be fair both to Reserve officers and to officers of the Regular establishment. To have a Reserve officer recalled to active duty under such circumstances as will give him precedence over an officer who has remained all the while on active duty may create a serious morale problem; conversely, a Reserve officer involuntarily recalled may be required to make great financial and other sacrifices, for which he deserves compensations. Both sides of the question must be taken into consideration in working out a truly equitable promotion policy.

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obligatory active and/or Reserve duty and who, consequently, would be eligible for discharge from the service, could be kept on the Reserve rolls, even in an inactive status in the "Selectively Callable Reserve"--formerly the Standby Reserve--for at least a year. New legislation would be required, of course, to bring about the change; but it should be possible to achieve the enactment of such legislation if the facts are correctly and forcefully presented. If such a bill were to be introduced in time of war, when the Congress is amenable inclined toward the armed forces, there should be no difficulty about its passage.

The chief advantage, of course, in having all the veterans of the war enrolled in the Reserve would be that it would give the USAF an accurate knowledge of the names and addresses of possessors of the multifarious and highly technical skills that would be required by the USAF in the event of an emergency. What is almost as important, the Air Force would have the opportunity to encourage the veterans, as Reservists, to pursue training and thus raise the level of their skills. Such procedure would greatly ease the burden of the Training Command in a future emergency and would at the same time provide the Air Force with the added numbers of highly trained specialists needed. Thus an airman who had served in the war in AFSC 71070--Printing and Duplicating Helper--and would, in all probability, have had to begin any future service in the same capacity might, through Reserve training, qualify for AFSC 71130--Senior Duplicating Device Operator--or 71110--Duplicating Supervisor--or even 71000--Printing Superintendent.



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Current Plans for Reserve Legislation

Current Department of Defense and USAF planning envisages no startling or radical legislation involving the Reserve force. It does, however, contemplate holding the citizenry of the United States to more definite obligations for service than have previously been or are now required. There is no thought of increasing the number of years of military obligation beyond the eight years called for by present law; but efforts will be made to make the Reserve a genuinely "ready" Reserve. The legislation required can be classified under four headings: (1) procurement, (2) organization and administration, (3) enforcement, and (4) incentive.

In the field of procurement, changes in the Universal Military Training and Service Act are needed to extend authority for induction and to convey authority to induct individuals for service in the Reserve forces, including the Air National Guard. An initial period of active duty for training should be provided for; it should be specified, however, that this active duty will not qualify an individual for veterans' benefits. Section 4 (d) (3), providing for voluntary release from active duty for service in a Reserve force, should be replaced. Provision should be made to permit involuntary assignment to the Air National Guard of individuals having an unfulfilled military obligation. It should also be provided that individuals who have been inducted for the Reserve forces shall not be subject to induction for service with the active forces. Finally, the eight-year obligation prescribed in Section 4 (d) (5) should be extended to persons inducted, enlisted, or appointed before they have reached the maximum age for induction if they have not

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previously incurred such obligation by reason of service in an armed force of the United States.

To make possible the organization and administration of the type of Reserve structure desired for the USAF, Sections 204 through 214 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 must be revised to provide for:

- (1) establishment of the "Service Callable Reserve" and the "Selectively Callable Reserve," with liability to call to active duty specified for each;
- (2) establishment, within the "Service Callable Reserve" of the "First Line Reserve" and the "Auxiliary Reserve";
- (3) authority to discharge from membership in a Reserve component any individuals in excess of mobilization requirements in any category of skill or qualification;
- (4) maximum limits on the amount of participation required of members of the "Service Callable Reserve" and grant of authority to Service Secretaries to prescribe minimum standards for satisfactory participation;
- (5) elimination of numerical limits of the strength of any Reserve category; and
- (6) authority to transfer involuntarily to the Air National Guard for completion of their periods of obligated service any personnel of the Air Force, whether initially inducted or enlisted. It will also be necessary to revise Sections 222 (a) and 226 so as to permit direct, involuntary assignment to the Air National Guard of individuals with a military obligation for the fulfillment of that obligation. Section 233 should be revised so that it will: (1) provide for the mobilization of the "Service Callable Reserve" when authorized by the President or Congress, in numbers determined by the President to be necessary to meet the needs of national security; (2) prescribe the authority for call to



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[REDACTED]

active duty of the "Selectively Callable Reserve"; (3) authorize the involuntary call to active duty for training of the "Service Callable Reserve"; (4) authorize the involuntary call to active duty of any Reservist for trial for specified offenses against the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and (5) authorize involuntary call to active duty for training of any member of a Reserve force whenever he is required by other provisions of the law to participate in such training. Section 253 should be amended to provide that personnel detailed to duty in connection with the training and administration of Reserve forces shall be in addition to existing authorized strengths of active duty personnel.

To provide a system of enforcement for the Reserve program Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be revised to make subject to the Code all Reservists, other than those who are members of the Air National Guard, who are required to perform inactive duty training, whether written orders to such duty are voluntarily accepted or not. Article 15 of the Code should be amended to authorize the regularly assigned commanding officer of a Reserve component to impose specified and appropriate non-judicial punishment for minor offenses of omission or commission in connection with inactive duty training. The appropriate punitive articles of the Code should be amended to include failure or refusal to participate in inactive duty training to which a Reservist is lawfully ordered and which he is required by law to perform. Article 8 of the Code should be amended to include authority for civil officers to apprehend and deliver Reservists who fail to comply with lawful orders to active duty.

[REDACTED]

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To provide incentive for enlistments into the Active Forces, amendments to the Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952 should limit benefits such as education and training, guarantee of loans, farm loan benefits, and preference in housing purchasing to individuals who have served continuously for four or more years in the Active Forces. Another incentive would be furnished by the proviso that such individuals will be required to serve in the "First Line Reserve" only until their combined active and Reserve service equals six years; they would presumably thereafter be assigned to the "Auxiliary Reserve" of the "Selectively Callable Reserve" for the remainder of their eight-year obligation. Individuals whose service with the Active Forces amounts to less than four years would be required to fulfill their military obligation in the "First Line Reserve."

The object of this legislation is to insure that we shall have in the event of a future emergency a fully ready Reserve force of about one-third the size of the Active force. The "Service Callable Reserve" will be subjected to a continuing screening process to make sure that its members are always ready and available for active duty when needed. Whenever a member becomes ineligible for immediate call to active duty--as, for example, when he is elected to public office, or accepts a key position in an aircraft or munitions plant, or becomes physically or otherwise disabled--he will be transferred to the "Selectively Callable Reserve" or separated from the armed forces. Vacancies in the "Service Callable Reserve" will be filled by: (1) appointment or enlistment of volunteers released from active military service; (2) appointment or enlistment of volunteers not subject to induction; (3) transfer of personnel from other

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branches of the armed services; (4) transfer and assignment of obligated Reservists released from active duty; (5) reassignment of obligated Reservists or volunteers from the "Selectively Callable Reserve"; and (6) voluntary enlistment of non-prior service personnel only to the extent necessary to meet mobilization requirements. The "Service Callable Reserve" would be so organized and trained that, in the event of a limited emergency, there could be immediate mobilization of such units and individuals as would be required to meet USAF objectives. The Air National Guard, which is an integral part of the "Service Callable Reserve," would be subjected to frequent and thorough inspections, to make sure that its members, both individuals and units, would be always ready for immediate call to active service.

A New Concept of the Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

The new Department of Defense plan for a truly ready Reserve in all the armed forces makes possible, if the plan can be carried out, a concept of World War III that involves a mobilization-demobilization cycle completely different from any this country has previously experienced. There would be no holding action, accompanied by the build-up necessary to permit launching of the assault or decisive phase. Instead, thanks to the "Service Callable Reserve," peak strength would be reached by D plus one hour--theoretically, that is; actually, D plus one month might be a more realistic estimate. Such prompt mobilization would permit "massive retaliation"--an all out effort to knock the enemy out of the war at the outset. It is anticipated that the decisive phase would

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be over and the war won--to all intents and purposes--by D plus two months. The exploitation phase, which would be characterized by sporadic fighting and mopping up operations, might last until D plus 18 months; the surveillance--military government--phase might extend to D plus 48 months, or even longer. It might appear, then, that demobilization would not begin much before D plus 18 and would not be completed until D plus 48 or later.

The new concept of World War III, however, just as it necessitates a mobilization different from any we have known before, so it also involves a different type of demobilization. It is anticipated that losses in aircraft and aircrews will be very heavy during the decisive phase--that is, through D plus two months. It will be impossible to replace the aircraft losses, since the aircraft industry, by D plus two months, will hardly have begun its climb toward peak production--a height not to be reached before D plus 18 months. Hence, if there is on D-day a proper balance between aircrew and ground personnel, there will begin to appear, almost immediately after D-day, overages to requirements in ground personnel. As aircraft are lost and cannot be replaced, the men whose job it was to maintain and service those aircraft will become surplus. Since a shortage of aircrews will develop later--perhaps about D plus 6 months--as replacement aircraft become available, it may be wise to anticipate that shortage by giving aircrew training to the required number of ground personnel as soon as overages occur in such personnel. This number would be determined by the planned output from other aircrew training and the number of aircraft expected to be available. Most of the surplus ground

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personnel, however, would either be trained in specialties that will be required during the demobilization process--clerk typist, truck driver, cook, supply clerk, personal counselor, and so on--or be transferred to the Reserve.* Well in advance of D-day the aptitudes and potentialities of every Reservist should have been determined and recorded. That information should always be at hand so that, whenever it may be desirable to train an individual in a specialty other than the AFSC he has, the decision as to the type of training to be given can be quickly and intelligently made. If any of the individuals being trained for demobilization specialties should complete training before full-scale demobilization begins, he--or she--would be transferred to the Reserve until needed and then recalled to active duty.

With the type of mobilization-demobilization cycle here envisaged, the demobilization should be relatively easy. A considerable number of troops will already have been transferred from active to inactive status before the demobilization proper shall have begun. Even though some attritional losses may have been replaced, the total number to be separated at the end of the war will be but a small fraction of the numbers involved in the 1918-19 and 1945-46 demobilizations. Units returning from overseas to become part of the postwar Air Force will have been remanned in the theater so that they will arrive at the processing station fully manned with personnel eligible for continued

* This would, presumably, be the "Selectively Callable Reserve," since the "Service Callable Reserve" will have been integrated with the Active Forces. There might be advantages, however, in retaining the "Service Callable" classification for individuals who are definitely expected to be recalled to active duty.

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active duty. The few personnel who prove to be disqualified--physically or otherwise--for active duty will be transferred to the Reserve or discharged, and their places will be taken by ZI personnel eligible for further active service. Units returning to be inactivated, i.e., transferred to the Reserve, will be manned with personnel eligible for relief from active duty but obligated for varying periods of service in the Reserve. As they fulfill their obligated military service, they will be replaced by new obligors released from active service and by volunteers. Thus the Reserve will be kept at full strength and ready--if need be--for D-day of World War IV.

A Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle for a Longer War

There is a possibility, of course, that World War II will not be fought in the way that has here been suggested. The enemy might move against us so suddenly and so successfully that we should have little or nothing left to demobilize; that is a possibility that only a defeatist psychology would entertain. Another possibility is that the initial phase of the war would result in a temporary stalemate or that both sides--each prompted by self-interest--would refrain from using, or use only sparingly, fission and/or thermo-nuclear weapons. In either event the mobilization-demobilization cycle would take on something of the pattern of that of World War II. The Active force plus the "Service Callable Reserve" would not suffice to win the war; the "Selectively Callable Reserve" and Selective Service would have to be called upon to provide the build-up to a much larger force than is now contemplated,


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though doubtless not as large as that required for World War II. Extending perhaps beyond D plus 24 months, the build-up would be much more protracted than that now planned; the demobilization would be delayed and protracted. Overages in certain types of personnel might still occur from time to time, but it seems likely that places could be found, because of the enlarged troop basis, for all such personnel that are qualified and eligible for continued active duty; considerable retraining--much of it on-the-job training--would of course be required.

Even though the demobilization following a war of the type here under consideration would involve the separation of a much larger number of troops than would be needed for the blitzkrieg type of war, there is no necessity for its being conducted in such chaotic confusion as characterized the demobilization of 1945-46. Pre-armistice training of processing personnel, adoption of the unit method of demobilization, and substitution of a single processing for the two or more of post-World War II days would in themselves do much to insure an efficient and orderly return to civilian life for the veterans of World War III. However, the importance of good public relations must not be forgotten. The USAF must be prepared to handle its demobilization publicity with all the skill that is displayed by the manufacturers of automobiles, beer, cigarettes, and soap.

The Importance of Statistical Reporting in the
Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

It is absolutely imperative that there be no such cutback in training--and consequent dearth of trained specialists--as occurred during and after

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World War II. It may seem foolish to continue to train men--and women-- after peak personnel strength has been reached and every job for which there is a valid requirement has been filled. The foolishness, however, is only apparent, not real. As General Hopwood put it, when training and intake stop, "the force becomes stagnant and will ultimately collapse."¹⁹¹ Only by regular, continuing influxes of fresh troops can the vitality and esprit de corps of a force be maintained. There should be ready on D-day-- or very soon after--a rotation system designed to operate uniformly throughout the USAF to permit the return to the United States of all personnel who meet specified criteria of eligibility. The system would be administered by some successor to PDC--perhaps a Personnel Command--and monitored by DCS/P. From the theater or theaters of operations periodic-- perhaps monthly--reports would be required to indicate what individuals would become eligible for rotation and when, what skills would be required to fill the jobs vacated by the returnees, and whether each of the returning personnel wished to remain in the service or be released from active duty. Prospective eligibility should be reported far enough ahead of time to permit the Training Command to have a replacement ready by the time the individual whom he is to replace will be eligible to be replaced. Upon return to the United States those who wish to be relieved from active duty would be transferred to the reserve. Careerists, and others wishing to continue on active duty, would be assigned to positions in the ZI. Some might be used as instructors in the Training Command or in OTU's or RTU's; however, one thing that was learned in World War II is that combat

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experience does not necessarily qualify an individual to be an instructor. Only such individuals as have teaching ability and--what is just or almost as important--a desire to teach* should be assigned as instructors; those who lack either ability or interest in teaching should never be shunted into or allowed to accept instructorships.

A continuing process of replacing overseas veterans by freshly-trained ZI personnel will do more than inspire combat-weary organizations with new life and spirit; it will forestall such clamorous outcries as were raised during World War II against the AAF because certain personnel--the number given varied and was generally exaggerated--had never served outside the Zone of Interior. Everyone--even limited-service personnel, if there are jobs available for which they are qualified--should be sent overseas just as soon as there is found in the theater an individual, eligible for return to the States, whose place he or she can properly fill. Except, perhaps, for the Chief of Staff, there is no one in the USAF whose job is so important that no one else can fill it, no one so uniquely qualified for service in the ZI that he cannot be spared to take his turn overseas.

Reports from the field must include reports from the ZI as well as from the combat theater or theaters, so that those responsible for administering the rotation program will always know what ZI personnel are due--or overdue--for foreign service, what skills are available for

* In World War II one thing that made many individuals reluctant to serve as instructors was the belief--too often well-founded--that instructors were discriminated against in promotion and assignment.

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shipment overseas, and in what numbers and where those skills are to be found. Only by means of accurate reporting will it be possible for requirements to be matched with availabilities, thus permitting those eligible for rotation to be returned on schedule. If the criteria for return are equitable--taking cognizance of the fact that six months' service in one theater or one part of a theater may be as severe in its effect on the body, mind, or nerves, or all three, as a year's service elsewhere and that one kind of activity may have two or three times the morale-destroying nature that another kind has--and the program is impartially and consistently administered, rotation during and after World War III will evoke no more than routine GI complaints.

The Continental Air Command in World War III

Perhaps the necessity for discussing the place of an organization such as the Continental Air Command in World War III will have been precluded by the creation of the Continental Air Defense Command. Inasmuch, however, as reports thus far published have not made clear the relationship of ConAC to the new command, it may be worth while to investigate the matter. Indeed, even though the future of ConAC may already have been determined, there is still at least an academic interest in studying the problem.

The primary missions of ConAC, as of this date, are: (1) to administer the Air Force Reserve program; (2) to supervise the training, the mobilization, and the inspection of the Air National Guard; (3) to complete the Aviation Engineer program; and (4) to formulate plans for,



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and coordinate the efforts of, all Air Force activities in domestic emergencies arising within the continental United States.¹⁹²

The secondary missions of ConAC, according to the Command Historian, are: (5) the training of Prisoner of War interrogators; (6) the procurement of Air Force nurses; (7) the provision of escorts for deceased Air Force personnel; (8) the administration of the train rider program; (9) the support of the United Nations Military Staff Committee; (10) the monitoring of the Civil Air Patrol; (11) the support of Air Force recruiting activities; (12) the responsibility for Air Force proficiency testing services; (13) the participation of the Air Force in the Selective Service System; (14) the operation of the Military Affiliated Radio System; (15) the providing of air transportation for GI Army areas; (16) the providing of Air Force representation on Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards; (17) the administration of disciplinary jurisdiction over Air Force personnel at other than Air Force installations; (18) the coordination of all Air Force activities in connection with antisubmarine warfare; (19) the responsibility for personnel processing; (20) the administration of a censorship training program; (21) the administration of the Air Explorer program.¹⁹³

In addition to the above, ConAC is also charged, according to the terms of AFR 23-1, with "Premobilization training of units and combat crews in accordance with plans, directives, and schedules issued by Headquarters USAF,"¹⁹⁴ "Acceptance of custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas theaters, pending final disposition,"¹⁹⁵ "Establishment

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and operation of overseas replacement depots as directed,"¹⁹⁶ "Constituting a single Air Force contact to provide information and liaison with Army commanders, naval district commandants, Sea Frontier commanders, and heads of civilian agencies,"¹⁹⁷ "Preparation for overseas movement of such units as may be directed,"¹⁹⁸ and "Conduct of special air missions activity, as directed."¹⁹⁹

Of all these missions, the first two definitely represent ConAC's raison d'[^]etre; and both of them will have been accomplished within a matter of hours--at most a few days--after D-day: the first as soon as all of the Service Callable Reserve who are available and qualified for service have been called to active duty, and the second when all of the Air National Guard units have been integrated with Regular Air Force units and assigned to commands. Most of the other functions mentioned seem to have been allotted to ConAC simply because it was felt that they are ZI activities that can best be carried out by a continent-wide command and are not appropriate for any of the other such commands--AIG, AIGC, AFGC, ARALC, ATRC, SAC, and TAG--or for MAIS.

The Aviation Engineer program is scheduled for completion early in 1956; unless D-day comes before that time, ConAC's third mission will have been accomplished before World War III begins. Should D-day arrive before the integration of the SCARMAF's into the USAF has been completed, the transfer would undoubtedly be expedited and might well be concluded by the time Missions 1 and 2 had been accomplished.

The fourth mission--the coordinating of Air Force activities in domestic emergencies in the United States--could, in time of war, best

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be handled by the new Continental Air Defense Command or by a civilian defense organization which would have over-all responsibility for air raid precautions, disaster relief, and other emergency activities, and would coordinate the actions of all the armed forces through liaison with local commanders.

Most--if not all--of ConAC's secondary missions could, in time of war, be canceled or could be better or more appropriately performed by another agency. An analysis of these missions should reveal whether it would be feasible and proper to inactivate ConAC as soon as its first three missions-- recall of Reservists, federalization of the Air National Guard, and integration of the SCAWAF's into the USAF--shall have been accomplished. In order to make such inactivation possible, it will be necessary to stipulate the existence in World War III of certain commands analogous to the four ZI Air Forces of World War II and the creation of a Personnel Command.

The idea of establishing an Air Personnel Command is by no means new. In a letter to General Arnold, drafted by Lt. Col. Harold W. Nichols, Chief, Plans and Liaison Division, Personnel Distribution Command, for the signature of General Harmon, CG of PDC, and dated 25 October 1945, a plan for a Personnel Command is set forth. It was intended that the proposed command should be the successor to the Personnel Distribution Command; instead, the plan was disapproved and the PDC was abolished. According to the plan, the new command would have been responsible for (1) research into all phases of personnel management and administration;

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(2) recruiting; (3) reception of recruits; (4) basic training; (5) aptitude testing, personnel evaluation, and classification; (6) assignment to training and duty; (7) supervision and operation of overseas replacement depots; (8) supervision and operation of a redistribution system; (9) supervision and operation of officer and airman pools; (10) supervision and operation of convalescent hospitals; (11) supervision and operation of rest camps; (12) periodic determination of manning allotment needs and recommendation of tables of organization or exact manning tables for ZI activities; (13) development of uniform personnel management standards, techniques, and procedures; (14) maintenance of an office of record for personnel data from active and Reserve components; and (15) separations.²⁰⁰

In June 1948 there is a reference to a staff study and "several somewhat incomplete studies" all of which reached essentially the same conclusions: "that a Personnel Command is mandatory in war, desirable in peace, therefore should be established now on a permanent basis."²⁰¹ The reference prefaces a recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration that a Personnel Command be established with pretty much the same functions as were included in the FDC plan. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this proposal of June 1948 is that it was coordinated by 12 offices of Headquarters USAF. Only one of the 12-- Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel--opposed the idea of a Personnel Command.²⁰²

Less than a year later the idea of an Air Personnel Command came up again. In March 1949 Headquarters USAF directed an inquiry to ComAC as to the desirability of establishing such a command. In response,

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Col. (later Major General) Jacob M. Smart--at that time ConAC's Deputy for Operations--argued:²⁰³

(1) The organization, war mission, and residual function . . . of Continental Air Command provide a good basis for Personnel Command work. Continental Air Command can be expanded for the remainder much more conveniently than a new command can be established.

(2) In a protracted war it is entirely possible that the personnel functions will reach such proportions that a separate command will be required to carry them out. Such a command will in many features resemble the existing Continental Air Command. Duplication of headquarters and of geographic functions will naturally result if a Personnel Command is created. This action should, therefore, be delayed as long as is possible. We feel that the functions of a Personnel Command should, at least in the initial stages of a war possibly for the first year or longer, be made the responsibility of the Continental Air Command.

It should be observed that these arguments against the creation of a Personnel Command would all be negated by the inactivation of the Continental Air Command. In 1949, to be sure, ConAC was responsible for ADC and TAC; after the Reservists had been called up and the Air National Guard had been completely federalized, ConAC still had two very important functions to perform. The situation has been quite different since the end of 1950, when TAC and ADC were made independent commands.²⁰⁴

There would seem to be significance--and support for the idea of a Personnel Command--in the fact that on 29 July 1950, before ADC and TAC had gained their independence, General Whitehead, CG of ConAC, wrote to Headquarters USAF strongly urging the creation of an Air Personnel Command. The Mission of such a command would be to



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Provide the administrative facilities and services necessary for the effective war-time management of military personnel as individuals, together with the planning functions essential thereto. This mission will be limited to the Zone of Interior except as follows:

- (1) The organization and training of such overseas replacement centers (units) as may be required.
- (2) Administrative control of personnel movements, as individuals, to and from areas of command as may be required.

The following responsibilities were to be assigned to the command:²⁰⁵

- (1) Recruit, or otherwise procure, classify and separate personnel as directed.
- (2) Receive inductees from Selective Service System.
- (3) Establish and operate the following activities as directed:
 - (a) Personnel Assembly Stations.
 - (b) Personnel Processing Centers and Replacement Pools.
 - (c) Overseas Replacement Centers (Groups) within the Zone of Interior (provide the units and train personnel required for pipeline services requested by commanders of areas or commands.
 - (d) Rest camps and convalescent centers within the Zone of Interior.
 - (e) Definitive treatment type hospital installations required by the Air Force in the Zone of Interior.
- (4) Assign personnel to commands, and direct personnel reassignments between commands.
- (5) Discharge, within the Continental United States, the field responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, with respect to the Air Force Reserve Forces (including AFROG).
- (6) Apprehension of Air Force absentees, and insuring their prompt delivery to the nearest Air Force prisoner station or other Air Force installation capable of receiving them for future disposition. This will include cross-service with the Army, the Navy and the Coast Guard, in apprehending prisoners.

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- (7) Accept custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas areas, pending final disposition.
- (8) Evacuate to the nearest Army receiving point any prisoners of war captured in the United States by the Air Force.
- (8) Maintain appropriate personnel records and personnel accounting (to include records for Air Force Reservists) for the United States Air Force.
- (10) Maintain liaison with General Hospitals of the Air Force and other Services as required.
- (11) Maintain liaison with water and aerial Ports of Embarkation.
- (12) Conduct personnel research and development to include classification, "test" preparation and evaluation as delegated or directed by Headquarters, United States Air Force.
- (13) Participate in disaster relief, and other domestic emergencies, in support of the major Air Force Command designated to coordinate such activities.
- (14) Participate in planning for the process of personnel demobilization and initial post-war manning and procurement requirements.
- (14) Perform such other responsibilities or tasks as may, from time to time, be directed by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

The similarity of General Whitehead's plan to the 1945 plan of FDC is no more striking than the one major difference; either General Whitehead did not feel that basic training was a proper function for a Personnel Command, or he was unwilling to provoke a controversy with the Air Training Command.

A still more recent recommendation in favor of a Personnel Command was made in October 1952. The report of the Mobilization Analysis Center, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University—known as the "Harvard Report"—strongly urges the creation of a Personnel Logistics Command. The logistics aspect is stressed because the report

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is primarily concerned with logistics. The report makes clear, however, that the concept of personnel logistics is a very broad one. The functions of the proposed command are stated, in part, as follows: ²⁰⁶

- 1. To act as the worldwide command instrument which will discharge the Hq AF [sic] responsibility to all commands of maintaining strength at full authorized levels.
- 2. To minimize personnel ineffectiveness
- 3. Under policies, allocations and directives issuing from DCS/F to be responsible for control, accountability, and general administration of all casual transient personnel moving between ZI and overseas commands
-
- 5. To administer all operational aspects of Air Force manning and assignment activities.
- 6. To provide the quality and quantity of trained personnel which have been authorized to all Air Force organizations at the time and place they are required
-
- 10. To control and administer all Air Force replacement organizations and installations including ZI Personnel Processing Centers, overseas personnel reception and processing units, and separation centers.
- 11. To anticipate and forecast in coordination with major commands the number and category of future personnel losses and provide for their timely replacement.

Elsewhere, the "Harvard Report" contains this statement: ²⁰⁷

It is believed that eventually when the new concept of personnel logistics is generally accepted and is in effect, the mission of the Personnel Logistics Command could be consolidated with that of the Training Command, thereby creating an organization for personnel roughly parallel to the Air Materiel Command for materiel. It is felt, however, that from a practical viewpoint it would be wiser initially to set up a new and separate command which could devote its full energies to implementing the new concept. The magnitude and essentiality of the missions justifies such action and it is so recommended.

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Examination of the secondary missions of ConAC fails to reveal a single one that could not logically and properly be assigned to a Personnel Command, a ZI training Air Force, or some other agency that now exists or will be in existence on or soon after D-day. Taking these missions up in the order in which they were mentioned above,* we find:

(5) The training of POW interrogators would be the responsibility of the Intelligence School, ATRC, with policy direction furnished by the Directorate of Intelligence, DCS/P.

(6) The procurement of Air Force nurses might be handled by the Personnel Command or by DCS/P. Better still, perhaps, it could be the responsibility of a special section in the office of the Surgeon General, USAF; the Army seems to have such a set-up in its Army Nurse Corps Liaison Section in the Officer Procurement Branch, Personnel Division, Office of the Surgeon General.

(7) The provision of escorts for deceased Air Force personnel could be handled by the Personnel Command or by the appropriate ZI Air Force.

(8) Train riders and terminal patrols could be furnished by the Air Police of the ZI Air Forces or by the Personnel Command.

(9) Of this mission (Support of the United Nations Military Staff Committee) the ConAC historian wrote:²⁰⁸

This task demanded very little of the Continental Air Command, and its inclusion in this history is chiefly for record purposes.

At the end of 1953, six airmen were assigned (against an authorized strength of 24) to duties at the United Nations. Accountability was maintained by ConAC's 2500th Air Base Group at Mitchel Air Force Base. Replacements were furnished as required.

* See above, pp. 84-96.

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One C-47 aircraft was maintained for use by the United Nations Military Staff Committee and flight records were maintained for three assigned officers.

It would seem likely that six airmen and three officers could be assigned to the United Nations Military Staff Committee from Mitchel Air Force Base without magnifying that detail into a Command mission; or the personnel, together with the necessary aircraft, could undoubtedly be supplied by MAIS. It is possible that this activity might not be required after D-day.

(10) The monitoring of the Civil Air Patrol would be an appropriate function for the Continental Air Defense Command.

(11) If we may judge by the experience of World War II, it is unlikely that there will be much Air Force recruiting to be supported after D-day. Voluntary enlistments may or may not be permitted, but the organized procurement effort will certainly be made within the framework of the Selective Service System. If other procurement activities should prove to be necessary--direct commissioning of civilians, for example--they would be handled by the Personnel Command.

(12) Several agencies have a vital interest in Air Force proficiency testing services. A Personnel Command would certainly be involved, as would AICG and the Directorate of Training, DCS/F. Consideration might be given to separating the development of tests from the administering of them; but division of responsibility for a mission is very likely to result in faulty execution of the mission. The Personnel Command should undoubtedly be given the responsibility for proficiency testing, with coordination of policy by AICG and Directorate of Training, DCS/F.

(13) Any Air Force participation in the selective service system would be carried out by the Personnel Command.

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(14) The operation of the Military Affiliated Radio System--if that activity would still be required in time of war--could best be handled by MMS through AACS.

(15) Provision of air transportation for ZI Army Areas should likewise be the responsibility of MMS.

(16) Air Force representation on Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards would be provided by the Personnel Command.

(17) The Personnel Command would also be responsible for the administration of disciplinary jurisdiction over Air Force personnel at other than Air Force installations.

(18) The coordination of Air Force activities in connection with antisubmarine warfare would be a responsibility of the Continental Air Defense Command.

(19) The responsibility for personnel processing would obviously fall on the Personnel Command.

(20) After D-day there would be no necessity for the Air Force to conduct a censorship training program. Upon the outbreak of war, there would undoubtedly be organized, as in World War II, an Office of Censorship--under that or another name--which would thenceforth assume responsibility for all censorship activities, including the training of censors.

(21) The administration of the Air Explorer program--if there should be time and place for such an activity during the emergency--would be a proper function of the Personnel Command.

Of the additional missions mentioned in AFR 23-1 and 23-1A, the first--responsibility for pre mobilization training of units and combat

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crews--would automatically be concluded on D-day; pre-mobilization training cannot very well be conducted after mobilization begins. The second, "Acceptance of custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas theaters, pending final disposition," would be a function suitable for either the Personnel Command or for the geographically appropriate XI Air Force. The third, "Establishment and operation of overseas replacement depots," would be a responsibility of the Personnel Command. The fourth, "Constituting a single Air Force contact to provide information and liaison with Army commanders, naval district commandants, Sea Frontier commanders, and heads of civilian agencies," would properly be assigned to the Continental Air Defense Command. The fifth, "Preparation for overseas movement of such units as may be directed," could be carried out either by the Personnel Command or by the XI Air Forces. The sixth and last, "Conduct of special air missions activity," would seem to be a proper function of MAC.

It seems clear, then, that once ConAC has performed its wartime task of putting on active duty the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard (and, it may be, has also completed the transfer of the Aviation Engineers from the Army to the USAF), there will be little left for ConAC to do that cannot be done as well or better by another agency. It would be possible, of course, to keep ConAC alive by assigning to it personnel functions that are not now being performed but will have to be performed during the emergency and personnel functions now being performed that will achieve greater magnitude and require heightened effort after D-day. But it would seem better to liquidate what has always been a somewhat

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anomalous organization and substitute for it a logically based Personnel Command with a clear-cut purpose--responsibility for all Air Force personnel matters in the Zone of Interior, excepting, of course, such functions as properly pertain to Headquarters USAF.

There seems to be a rather general agreement--even on the part of those who are opposed to the creation of a Personnel Command at this time--that a Personnel Command will be necessary if World War III should be thrust upon us. It is difficult to understand why anyone who is willing to admit that a Personnel Command would be desirable or necessary in time of war, should insist on delaying until after the war starts, the establishment of such a command. The advantages of a Personnel Command can be as valuable and important in peace as in war. If a Personnel-- or Personnel Logistics--Command were to be established in the near future, it would be a going, operating organization when the need for its services would be most urgent. It would have encountered and survived the trials and tribulations that beset any new creation; the kinks will have been straightened out, the rough edges will have been smoothed off, the bottlenecks eliminated.

There might be grounds for opposing the idea of a new command if it were to mean adding another to the 18 commands that now comprise the USAF, if it were to require increases in personnel and funds. But no increases need be involved. The simplest way to proceed would be to inactivate the Continental Air Command and set up the Personnel Command in its place. To the new command would be assigned all the missions pertaining to personnel that are now assigned to Con C; this would

include most, if not all, of ComC's more important missions. The remaining missions would be assigned to agencies such as Continental Air Defense Command and Military Air Transport Service.

to argue that nothing is to be gained by a change of name from ComC to Air Personnel Command is to miss the point completely. As it is now, ComC is an organization lacking in functional unity, charged with a heterogeneous confusion of missions. To turn it into the Air Personnel Command would give it definiteness and fixity of purpose. The new command could, at the proper time, coalesce with the Air Training Command to provide an organization that would be for personnel what Air Materiel Command is for materiel--an eminently logical development.

The Relationship of Materiel Demobilization
to Personnel Demobilization

One demobilization area, which is not in itself germane to the present study, remains to be discussed here: the disposition of surplus war materiel. That subject is pertinent here because the amount of materiel to be disposed of, and the manner in which that disposition is to be made, will determine the number of maintenance and salvage troops that must be kept on active duty after the armistice, and also the length of time their services will be required.

Following World War I some 2,500 airplanes were returned to the United States, but more than 2,300 were burned--after salvageable items had been removed.

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The average life expectancy of these ships was probably less than three months. There was no sale for them abroad--France already owned many more airplanes than she could possibly use up, and the attempts of the Air Service to sell used planes to individuals ended in complete failure. To knock down these machines, box them, subject them once more to the deteriorating effects of the salt humidity of a transatlantic voyage, and to reassemble them in the United States, would still further impair their condition and still further abbreviate their average life. There was also to be considered the expense of maintaining soldiers in France to protect this materiel for several months, the expense of preparing it for shipment, and finally,--the chief cost--the expense of transporting it to the United States. The question was whether it was good business to spend all this money for the sake of returning to the United States materials which would at best have a useful life of only a few weeks, and which, because of the surpluses of new or little used airplanes already on hand, might never be used at all. The War Department did not hesitate in its answer. It ordered the sale or destruction of all A. E. F. airplanes of this class; and, since sales proved to be impossible, the order meant their destruction.²⁰⁹

To be sure, the aircraft of 1918 were very different from the E-17's, E-24's, C-47's, and P-51's of World War II. Crowell and Wilson described what the Air Service destroyed in France in this sentence: "The remaining debris, consisting of little more than the highly inflammable wooden construction members and dope-covered wing fabric, was piled in great heaps and burned."²¹⁰

As soon as a determination can be made as to the kinds, amounts, location, and condition of surplus materiel to be disposed of--and it might be possible to make such a determination, tentatively at least, even before the signing of an armistice--it will be possible to decide what disposition is to be made of the materiel in question. Such a decision, like many other decisions concerning the postwar Air Force, will doubtless have to be made after coordination with and in conjunction with the Army and the Navy according to policies established by the Congress and the State Department. Obviously, the decision must be made at the highest level.

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We have seen what happened to surplus aircraft in France after World War I. In 1945 more than 5,400 B-29 planes were returned to the United States in the White Project alone.²¹¹ And many more, of course, were brought back from the various theaters of the Japanese war and from the AIC's far-flung network. Nevertheless, many aircraft were disposed of overseas; and tanks and other military equipment that cost untold millions of dollars to procure and transport to the theaters of operations were given away or abandoned. It may be good economy to give away or destroy materiel that has no value except for military purposes. It may be that--as was said at the time--the cost of returning the tanks and other equipment to the United States would have been greater than the amount for which they could have been sold upon arrival. The explanation carries conviction because there is a certain amount of truth in it. But it is difficult not to believe that in many instances the decision to leave surplus stocks overseas was prompted by fear that the prices of scrap metals and other commodities would be ruinously--ruinously, that is, for those caught in the squeeze--depressed if government surpluses were to be dumped on the domestic market.

Rumor has it--and the rumor seems to be well-founded, even though no documentary evidence has been found in the course of this study to substantiate it--that ships were returned to the United States in ballast following World War II. If such was the case, and if the cost of transportation was the only reason for not bringing back certain surplus war material, then it would seem that there was mismanagement somewhere. Obviously, tanks, cannon, and other military equipment could have been

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used for ballast instead of the water or whatever other form of ballast was actually used. That procedure would have reduced the transportation cost to the expense of getting the material to a ship, loading and unloading it, and hauling it away to storage. Even this, at union wages for railwaymen and longshoremen, would have been a considerable item; but with soldier labor, the costs would have been negligible.

It should be pointed out here, also, that, had surplus war material been brought back and kept for only five years after 1945, it could then have been sold at prices very advantageous to the Government. It is true that the cost of storage would have to be considered; but, with proper management, that would by no means have equaled the increase in the value of scrap.

The only reason for bringing a logistics problem into this personnel study is that the kind, amount, condition, and location of air material to be returned to the United States after the next war will determine the number of troops that will be required to remain in active service after the armistice to prepare for shipment, ship, prepare for storage, and store such material. When it has been decided what units will be needed for this purpose, those units would be manned with individuals eligible for continued active duty. Other maintenance and service units, manned with personnel eligible for relief from active duty, would be shipped back to the United States to be processed and, for the most part at least, transferred to the Reserve.

Advantages of the Proposed Demobilization Plan

The advantages of the demobilization plan here proposed are several, and they are important. First of all, the plan would make use of the unit

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method of demobilization, modified* to eliminate the worst inequities⁺ inherent in the method. The modification consists in establishing a system of eligibility for relief from active duty based upon the length and nature of an individual's service⁺⁺ and implementing it by transferring those eligible for relief from active duty into units scheduled to be inactivated, and mandating the units to be kept in service with personnel eligible for continued active duty. This procedure sounds more formidable than it should be in practice. The number of troops required for the postwar Air Force, including the occupational air force, might be--if World War III should be fought according to the latest plans--about three-fourths of the personnel under arms at the time of the armistice; or it might be, in something like the World War II mobilization-demobilization pattern should obtain, only half or less than half of the wartime troop basis. This post-armistice force must, however, include all the specialists needed, from pilots and navigators to truck drivers and cooks. Most of the positions can be filled by personnel from the units about to be inactivated; in those cases where no transfer is to be

* The Hon. H. Leo White, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management), in an interview at the Pentagon on 12 February 1954, raised the question whether the unit method could not be used without modification. Such procedure would certainly save a great deal of time, trouble, and money; the question is, Could it be made palatable to the GI's, and their families, friends, and Congressmen? The possibility undoubtedly deserves more study.

⁺ The view of Maj. Gen. Louis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, may well be taken into consideration here. General Hershey, in an interview held in his office on 5 February 1954, said that he was not overly concerned with inequities. He believes that when one tries to avoid one inequity, another is likely to be created. Moreover, life is full of inequities--why should the life of a GI be exempt from them?

⁺⁺ The length of service criterion, with extra credit for combat service, was advocated by Mrs. Anna N. Rosenberg, in an interview held in her office in New York on 8 February 1954.

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had to fill an overseas position, the incumbent will have to remain on the job until a suitable replacement can be brought over from the ZI; it will, as has already been indicated, be the responsibility of the Training Command--or the Personnel Command, if such a command shall have been established--to have such a replacement trained and ready.

The greatest advantages of the plan here proposed are (1) the elimination of one or more processings and (2) the immediacy of the GI's relief from active duty and return home.

The substitution of a single processing for the two or more allotted to most veterans of World War II would go far toward alleviating, if it did not eliminate, the shortage of typists that was omnipresent during the World War II demobilization.* Having only one physical examination would relieve the shortage of doctors that was one of the most critical personnel shortages throughout World War II and will, almost certainly, be equally critical in any future war.

As for the other advantage, it has already been shown⁴ that following World Wars I and II such annoyance and confusion--to use the mildest terms applicable--were caused by delay in separating those who were, and, in some cases, had long been eligible for separation. After World War II individuals in Central Assembly Stations and other installations had the experience of seeing, on all sides, others with ADI scores lower

* The number of typists required could be further diminished by using "dog tags" as stamps to obviate repetitive typing of name, serial number, next of kin, address, blood type, etc., not only during the separation processing but on various other occasions throughout the individual's service. The only machine necessary would be a device with a lever, a platen, and an inked ribbon, such as department stores use with their "Charge-a-Plate" systems. The use of a stamp would also eliminate the errors that are inevitable in frequent retypings.

⁴ See above, pp. 20-26, 42-45.

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than theirs being released, while they were being kept on for some indeterminate time, nobody seemed to know how long. It was the uncertainty that was most galling. If they had known why they were being held, and for how long they would be held, the waiting would have been much more easily endured.* In a future demobilization, the separation scheduling should be so carefully planned in advance that every unit, in the ZI and overseas, can be informed very soon after the armistice what its place in the demobilization program is. ZI organizations should be told when their personnel may expect to begin being processed for separation, and overseas personnel should be informed when they may expect to leave for the States, how long their processing will take, and when they may expect to be relieved from active duty. It will remain, then, only to carry out the schedule with the absolute minimum of deviation--a formidable but by no means insuperable task.

If the policies here outlined can be carried out, demobilization after the next war will bring the veterans of that war--those who do not elect

* A personal reminiscence may serve to enforce this point; it is, of course, only one experience out of millions, but it is typical of what happened to many veterans of World War I and an even larger number of veterans of World War II. In November 1918 I was transferred from a camp hospital--hospital in name only--to what had been a replacement center but had become a casual clearance center--St. Aignan. From St. Aignan I was sent, along with other members of Regular Army outfits and Marines and members of New York and New England national guard regiments, to a satellite installation, Flatfoot Farm--the nickname attributable to the fact that it had formerly been an orthopedic camp. At Flatfoot Farm, having been one of the early arrivals, I was quartered in a barracks building; but those who followed--and they were many, most of them convalescent from flu or pneumonia or both--slept in pup tents pitched in mud. At Flatfoot Farm we knew that we were waiting for our service records to be located and sent on from the Central Records Office at Tours. It was commonly understood that the records at Tours were in a state of complete chaos, and that our wait, consequently, might be an interminable one. There was certainly someone in command, or someone in the permanent party at Flatfoot Farm, who could have told us: "You will be here at least two days (or four days or ten days), probably five days (or seven days), but certainly not more than three weeks (or six weeks)"--it would not have mattered too much what the figures were. Had we only known what was in store for us, it might not

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to remain in the service--what they will most want: prompt release as soon as they become eligible for relief from active duty. Such prompt release will also please the families and friends of the veterans and, consequently, their Senators and their Congressmen. The USAF will have the opportunity to make friends, instead of enemies, through the next demobilization.

Even more important, however, than the establishment of friendly relations between the USAF and the people of the United States is the necessity of having, during demobilization and afterward, an air force in being, able and ready to maintain the security of the United States against any and all aggressors. The mistake made by this country after

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have made the gasoline-flavored drinking water and coffee more palatable, or the menus--which, for several successive days, three times a day, consisted of bread, dehydrated carrots (the same ones served and re-served at meal after meal because almost no one could eat them), coffee, and nothing else--more delectable; but the knowledge would have made our stay at Flatfoot Farm less exasperating.

After about a week at Flatfoot Farm--not an unreasonable time, certainly, but one that I would have endured with more equanimity had I known in advance that it would be no longer--I was sent, along with the other members of the newly-organized Casual Company no. 431 (or some such number), to Erest. It is no doubt true that no one, from the camp commander down, knew, when we arrived in Erest, at just what time our particular casual company would be loaded onto a ship bound for the States. But certainly, at some time well in advance of the date of sailing, that information was available at camp headquarters and could have been passed on to the members of that casual company. As it was, we were confined to the camp at Erest for four or five weeks, knowing that our next move would be to board a boat for home but having no idea whether that event would occur in weeks or months. During the time we were at Erest we celebrated--if one could call it that--Christmas. Some of us had, as the pièce de résistance at Christmas dinner, the ubiquitous "slum;" the rest had cold corned beef, straight out of the can. One night at Erest--a ceremony for which, under the circumstances, we could see very little reason--we were informed that we were to get up at three o'clock the next morning, and immediately after breakfast, start the five-mile hike, with full packs, for the docks. After arriving at the dock where we were to await our ship, we stood in a bitter cold wind--with

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every past war--emasculatation of its armed forces in response to the hysterical clamor, "Bring the boys home!"--must not be repeated after World War III; but only by careful and intelligent attention to the educating of the public, the press, and the Congress can a repetition be avoided. The fact must be brought home to everyone that, at the signing of an armistice, military necessity does not cease to exist; it is reduced in scope, to be sure, but not in importance. It is still a vital factor in national security. Fewer aircrews to fly aircraft and fewer ground crews to maintain and service aircraft are required in times of peace than are needed in wartime; but those that are required are required just as urgently. The public must be brought to recognize the military necessity of having adequate armed forces at all times. If the public demands security, the Congress will appropriate the funds necessary to provide security.

Such recognition, however, is only half the picture. The U.S.A. is equally under an obligation to the public, first, to make sure that

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a sandwich and coffee for our noon meal--until late afternoon; finally the ancient White Star liner Canada made its way into the harbor, we were lightered aboard, and soon we were homeward bound.

After spending a night on the ship in Boston Harbor, we were taken, by rail, to Camp Devens, near Ayer, Massachusetts. There, and later at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois, the same experience, in effect, was repeated. In both places I was well treated--except for being confined to the camp, presumably because of the completely erroneous belief that I would go AWOL if given the opportunity; the food was reasonably good and the housing comfortable; the processing was as expeditious as could be expected; and the length of my stay was not unreasonable. But the uncertainty was nerve-racking. I was so close, I knew, to being a civilian again that every day I remained in the Army seemed an eternity; and I could not find out, either at Camp Devens or Camp Grant, how many of those eternities I had yet to endure. This information blackout was not peculiar to the demobilization process; it was characteristic of my whole experience

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no individual is kept in service on the ground of military necessity and then used in some job for which no valid requirement exists or one that could as well be done by some one else; and second, that trained replacements be made available so that no one need be kept in service very long after he has become eligible for relief from active duty. The first of these obligations can be met by making sure that unit commanders understand the metes and bounds of military necessity and by seeing to it, through frequent and careful inspections, that such commanders are acting according to that understanding. To meet the second obligation requires that there be no such setback in the activities of the Training Command as occurred in 1944. Training must continue uninterruptedly; but, as soon as the end of hostilities shall be in sight, the mission of the Training Command will change from training for combat to training for demobilization. Aircrews and ground crews will still be required for the postwar Air Force, even though in reduced numbers; but the emphasis in training will shift to the production of finance and records experts, supply clerks, and other specialists required in demobilization processing.

Summary

By way of recapitulation, then: Demobilization after the next war will be by units; but the units selected to be kept in service as components of the postwar USAF will be manned with careerists, others who

* Cont'd

in the Army. It is obvious that there are times when troop movements must, for security reasons, be cloaked in secrecy; where no such considerations are present, troops are entitled to know, when they are ordered to move, where they are going, and why, and how long they are likely to stay. Had such a policy of enlightenment been in effect in 1917-1919, I should have re-entered civilian life with a kinder feeling toward the Army than I actually did have.

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elect to remain on active duty, and individuals not eligible for relief from active duty. Members of these units who are, at the end of hostilities, eligible for relief from active duty and elect to be relieved will be transferred to units to be inactivated; they will be replaced by volunteers and individuals not eligible for relief from active duty. The criterion for relief from active duty shall be based on length and arduousness of service; the cutoff figure shall be such as to make eligible for continued active duty the number of personnel required for the postwar USAF, including the occupation air force. As this personnel will not necessarily include sufficient numbers of all the skills required, provision must be made for keeping in active service, on the ground of military necessity, some key specialists; but these must be replaced as quickly as possible by graduates of the Training Command.

The members of the units being inactivated would, for the most part, be under obligation to serve some time in the Reserve, active or inactive. If it should appear during the next war that, at the conclusion of hostilities, any considerable proportion of the veterans would be eligible for outright discharge from the armed forces, it will be advisable to procure legislation making at least one year's service in the "Selectively Callable Reserve" mandatory for all veterans.

Units and installations in the ZI will be phased out as they become surplus to requirements, until only those organizations that are to be components of the postwar Air Force and the installations required for those components will remain active. Overseas units will be returned



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to the States as rapidly as available transportation will permit, with priority being given to the organizations having the longest and most arduous service.

For all veterans, those to be kept in service as members of the postwar Air Force and those eligible for relief from active duty, there will be but one processing. Following this processing, each member of the units that will comprise the postwar Air Force will be given a month's leave or furlough--or IDY--and will then report to his unit in its new station. The others will at the end of their separation processing be relieved from active duty and transferred--in active or inactive status, depending upon the provisions of the then current law--each one to the Air Reserve Center nearest his home.

It might be possible to work out a more detailed--though still necessarily tentative--SOP for the next demobilization, by making use of current mobilization plans for various periods from D plus 1 through and beyond D plus 24, and offering alternative solutions according to various dates for the cessation of hostilities. There is, however, one all-important factor that cannot, at this time, be forecast with any degree of certainty: the size, composition, and deployment of the post-war Air Force, including the occupation air force. Hence there would seem to be little point in attempting, at this time, anything more than the statement of general principles that is contained in this study.



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NOTES

1. Prof. John G. Ford, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1947), p. 59.
2. Notes (1890) that in 1776 "the aggregate number of our troops was 11,000."
3. Prof. John G. Ford, History of the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1952), p. 3.
4. Notes, Military Policy of the U.S., p. 59.
5. Prof. John G. Ford (1950) has a total of 3,629,111 (World Almanac, 1952, p. 313).
6. General, Personal Position, p. 3.
7. Notes, Military Policy of the U.S., p. 65.
8. Notes, p. 105.
9. Notes, p. 137.
10. Thomas M. Brown, The United States Army: A History of Military Policy of the United States (New York: Scribner's, 1911), p. 250.
11. Notes, Military Policy of the U.S., p. 137.
12. Notes, p. 150.
13. The number of 1816 was 7,439,221; that of 1840 was 9,633,453 (World Almanac, 1953, p. 303).
14. General, Personal Position, p. 1.
15. General, Personal Position, The United States Army in the World Wars (New York: Doubleday, 1937), p. 107.
16. General, U.S. Army in the World Wars, p. 227.
17. General, Personal Position, The United States Army in the World Wars (New York: Doubleday, 1937), p. 250.



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- 18. Ibid., pp. 216 and 215; Upton (Military Policy of the U.S., pp. 217-18) cites the number of deserters as 6,725.
- 19. Case, Military of U.S. Army, pp. 219-20, 221; Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, pp. 211-7, 211. Upton (Military Policy of the U.S., pp. 217-18) cites the number of U.S. who died of disease as 12,226. The total of those who were killed in battle or died of wounds is 1,512.
- 20. Upton, Military Policy of the U.S., p.216.
- 21. Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, p. 211.
- 22. Upton, Military Policy of the U.S., pp. 217-18.
- 23. Ibid., p. 225.
- 24. Ibid., p. 216.
- 25. The World Almanac, 1953 (p. 330) cites the population of the United States in 1890 as 23,191,376; this population would have been 23,191,376 in 1953.
- 26. Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, pp. 4-5.
- 27. Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, p. 214.
- 28. Spencer, Military of U.S. Army in War and Peace, p. 5.
- 29. Ibid., p. 6.
- 30. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
- 31. Ibid., p. 6.
- 32. Ibid., p. 252.
- 33. Spencer (U.S. Army in War and Peace, p. 6) cites the strength of the Army as of 31 August 1898 as 230,500; The World Almanac, 1953 (p. 241) puts the figure at 274,717.
- 34. Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, p. 9.
- 35. Ibid.
- 36. U.S. Army in War and Peace, Report on the U.S. Army in War and Peace, 1990, 1992, and 1991, pp. 19-19, as cited in Spencer, U.S. Army in War and Peace, pp. 9-11.

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- 37. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 9.
- 38. Id.
- 39. Spencer, Ernest P. (Ed.), The History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1908-1975 (p. 330)
in The History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1908-1975, pp. 328-330.
- 40. The Lewis and Clark Expedition, The Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-1806
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 7.
- 41. James L. Neel, "The Lewis and Clark Expedition,"
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1964), p. 117.
- 42. Id., p. 120.
- 43. Id.
- 44. Mr., Chief of the Bureau, Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
October 1970, no. sub. C of 3 FBI, ID No. 311-1, in National Archives.
- 45. Mr., Chief of the Bureau, Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
October 1970 (no. sub. C of 3 FBI), ID No. 311-1, in National Archives.
- 46. Mr., Chief of the Bureau, Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
October 1970, no. sub. C of 3 FBI, ID No. 311-1, in National Archives.
- 47. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 11.
- 48. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 300.
- 49. Id.
- 50. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 110.
- 51. Id., p. 126.
- 52. Id., p. 131.
- 53. Id., p. 129.
- 54. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 14.
- 55. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 11, in The History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
p. 111.
- 56. Spencer, Ernest P. Reorganization, p. 11, pp. 301-7.

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- 100. [Redacted] ...
- 101. [Redacted] ...
- 102. [Redacted] ...
- 103. [Redacted] ...
- 104. [Redacted] ...
- 105. [Redacted] ...
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- 112. [Redacted] ...
- 113. [Redacted] ...
- 114. [Redacted] ...
- 115. [Redacted] ...
- 116. [Redacted] ...
- 117. [Redacted] ...
- 118. [Redacted] ...

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- 119. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 10 July 1944, p. 16, in USAFMD Archives, 170.31.
- 120. SFO, "Demobilization Planning Report for Year 1944," in AIG 370.01.
- 121. In July 1943 this figure was set at 3,070,000; see memo for Maj. Gen. W.P. Terobins, Director, Project Planning Division, from Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Henry, AG/S, CPD, sub: Planning, 9 July 1943, in OPD 370.9, Group 2, LAF, 148.
- 122. Ltr., H. J. Gen. J.A. Ullo, AAS, to C's, all Forces and Commands, 6 December 1943, in AIG 210.85; the date was later changed to 30 in January 1944--see Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 4 January 1944, p. 6, in USAFMD Archives, 170.31.
- 123. ACO Letter AG 210.85, 29 August and 24 November 1941, and AD Circular 341, 19 August 1944, and AD Circular 485, 29 December 1944.
- 124. Memo for Director, SFO, WSS from Col. S.T. Davison, 8 December 1944, in AIG 003.
- 125. Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, p. 77.
- 126. Memo for AG/As, Personnel from Col. F.H. Stalder, Chief, Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AAFPE, 9 December 1944, in USAFMD Archives, 121.33.
- 127. Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, p. 80.
- 128. Ibid.
- 129. Air Historical Studies No. 77, "Redeployment and Demobilization," pp. 22-23.
- 130. Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, p. 85.
- 131. Ibid., pp. 93-97.
- 132. "History of the Fourth Air Force, 2 September 1945 to 20 March 1946," p. 15, in USAFMD Archives, 450.01-19.
- 133. "History of the 1st Training Command, 1 January 1939 to V-J Day," I, 35-36, in USAFMD Archives, 220-1.
- 134. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces," (June 1946), I, 92, 143-24, and 127, in USAFMD Archives, 415.14.
- 135. "History of Seymour Johnson Field, 1 July to 30 September 1945," I, 7-9, in USAFMD Archives, 208.5-9.
- 136. "History of the Fourth Air Force, 2 September 1945 to 20 March 1946," p. 15, in USAFMD Archives, 450.01-19.

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137. Personnel Distribution Command, "Demobilization and Redeployment," p. 60, in USAFHD Archives, 254.2-1.
138. Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, "Organization and Missions: Headquarters SAC" (June 1946), p. 72, in USAFHD Archives, 415.01.
139. Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, 10 October 1945, in AAG 210.8.
140. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, Daily Diary, 10 October 1946, in USAFHD Archives, 121.33.
141. Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, 10 October 1945, in AAG 210.8.
142. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, Daily Diary, 17 October 1945, in USAFHD Archives, 121.33.
143. Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, 10 October 1945, in AAG 210.8.
144. Ibid.
145. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, 1 November 1945, in USAFHD Archives, 121.33.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., 30 November 1945.
148. Ibid., 19 December 1945.
149. Office Chief of Personnel, AC/AS-1, Daily Activity Report, 5 and 20 February 1946, in USAFHD Archives, 121.2.
150. Military Personnel Division, USAF, "The Separation of Military Personnel, 1 September 1939 to 1 September 1945," I, 148-49.
151. "History of the Second Air Force, 1945," I, 54-55, in USAFHD Archives, 432.01.
152. See above, p. 63.
153. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces," (June 1946), I, 43, in USAFHD Archives, 415.01A.
154. Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, pp. 213-15.
155. "History of the Fourth Air Force, 2 September 1945 to 20 March 1946," p. 15, in USAFHD Archives, 450.01-19.

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156. "History of the Second Air Force, 1945," pp. 88-95, in USAFHD Archives, 432.01; "History of the Fourth Air Force, 2 September 1945 to 20 March 1946," pp. 7-11, in USAFHD Archives, 450.01-19; and Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 8 October 1945, p. 15, in USAFHD Archives, 170.31.
157. "History of the Fourth Air Force, 2 September 1945 to 20 March 1946," p. 10, in USAFHD Archives, 450.01-19.
158. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 4 June 1945, p. 11, in USAFHD Archives, 170.31. The program was later extended to include aircraft other than four-engine bombers. Altogether, there were involved 1,629 B-17's, 2,121 B-24's, 345 B-25's, 444 B-26's, 200 C-46's, 604 C-47's, 58 C-53's, 67 A-20's, 9 O-10's, and 3 F-9B's ("Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters C.A.F.," I, 63, in USAFHD Archives 450.01 A).
159. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters C.A.F.," I, 61-64, in USAFHD Archives 450.01 A.
160. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 30 April 1945, p. 16, in USAFHD Archives 170.31.
161. Memo for General Baker from Lt. Gen. H. L. George, CG AIG, 4 July 1945, in AIG 380, Vol. 6.
162. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 6 August 1945, p. 13, in USAFHD Archives, 170.31.
163. Memo for C/S from Maj. Gen. C. C. Chauncey, DC/AS, 23 August 1945, in AIG 380, Vol. 8.
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166. Historical Unit, Caribbean Division, AIG, "The Green Project, 1945," p. 138, in USAFHD Archives, 311.1 C.
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178. Ibid.
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181. AAF Statistical Digest, 1946, p. 13, USAFAD Archives, 134.11-6.
182. AAF Statistical Digest, World War II, p. 16.
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188. 66 Stat. 463.
189. 65 Stat. 79.
190. 66 Stat. 466.

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195. Ibid., Par. 4 b (12) (a).
196. Ibid., Par. 4 b (12) (e).
197. Ibid., Par. 4 b (18).
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199. Ibid., Par. 4 b (23).
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207. Ibid., p. 107.
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210. Ibid., p. 213.

211. See above, p. 42.