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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

[88/2/14]

LA

21 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Conveying the Word to Hanoi

1. At the President's request, we have taken several steps to give the North Vietnamese leadership clear reason to believe that if Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia attack Phnom Penh, United States forces will hit them from the rear by mounting sharp attacks on Vietnamese Communist sanctuaries.

2. To get this word across, we have arranged for one basic story to be pipelined into several channels that should get it back quickly, and credibly, to Hanoi. The basic theme planted with all our sources used runs as follows, though there have been suitable variations in each specific instance:

The US and the GVN have long felt that Vietnam internal security problems can never be really solved so long as the Communists have sanctuaries in nearby Cambodia. Hence, the US and the GVN have long itched to attack these sanctuaries and the Communist troops resting or refitting in them. Recent events in Cambodia have considerably whetted American and South Vietnamese appetites, but the US (particularly) has felt the Vietnamese Communist muscle flexing in neutral Cambodia was giving Hanoi such a propaganda black eye worldwide -- particularly within the US itself -- that the United States Government was reluctant to see the waters muddied by allied military involvement in the Cambodian-VC/NVA fight. However, if the VC/NVA forces make further military moves against Phnom Penh, the US is set to take prompt advantage of world opinion focus on Cambodia's plight in the face of North Vietnamese invasion and clear up the sanctuary problem by attacking VC/NVA forces from the rear.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.8

NLN 07-59/3 per sec 3.3(b)(1)(b) 3.3(c) [50 USC 402(a)]

By AM

NARA, Date 11/04/2010

11/7/30/2010

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
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PER SEC 3.3(b)(1)(b)
3.5(c) [50 USC 402(a)]



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4. In line with the above considerations, the following moves are now in train:



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SANITIZED PER SEC 3.3(b)(1)(6); 3.5(e) [50 USC 403(g)]

EXEMPT

per sec 3.3(b)(1)(6), 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)], E.O. 13526
per ltr. 7/30/2010

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6. In both tone and content, the President's 20 April speech will make this message more credible to Hanoi. From a strictly operational perspective, the best possible support for this story's (and our sources') credibility would be the movement of selected US troops to the immediate vicinity of the Cambodian Frontier of South Vietnam.

Rich

Richard Helms
Director