

MARCH 5, 1971

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*But SRG like notes*  
CHILE

*I want also analyzing post - Allende election*

4 March 1971

WHY DID THE U. S. GOVERNMENT NOT TAKE MORE VIGOROUS POLITICAL ACTION MEASURES TO PREVENT THE ELECTION OF THE MARKIST CANDIDATE, SALVADOR ALLENDE, AS PRESIDENT OF CHILE?

*especially assuming that we could make in local election*

1. There was no systematic analysis or consideration at the policy-making level on the question of how great a threat an Allende Government would be to U. S. interests. Hence, there was no clear consensus at the policy-making level on a consideration which was fundamental for determining how much effort and risk were worth taking to prevent an Allende victory.

The first systematic analysis of the consequences of an Allende victory for U. S. interests was undertaken in the NSSM 97 study (on options for U. S. policy in the event of an Allende victory). The NSSM was issued on July 24, 1970, about five weeks before the Chilean elections and the study was not considered by the Senior Review Group until October 19, 1970, six weeks after the popular election. Prior to that time, there were assessments contained in an NIE on Chile, cables from Embassy Santiago, and papers prepared for the 40 Committee. However, these assessments were not subjected to systematic consideration for decision at the policy-making level.

The 40 Committee was the only policy-level Committee which considered Chile until August 1970 (when the SRG met to review the NSSM 97 study, but decided to postpone it until after the election). The 40 Committee considerations, however, did not include any serious assessment of the threat to U. S. interests, but rather focussed on questions of whether, how and who to provide support to.

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By NALH NARA, Date 10/25/10

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Even at lower levels of the NSC system, there was no effective analysis of interests. The ARA/IG did not consider an annual Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for Fiscal Year 1971 (the electoral year) because no CASP was submitted by the Embassy due to the uncertainties involved in the GOC's renegotiations of copper agreements. The CASP for the previous year, which had been approved by the ARA/IG in May of 1968, included as one of its objectives "maintenance of supremacy by progressive-minded democratic parties over the FRAP in the Congressional elections of 1969 and the Presidential election of 1970", but focused essentially on developmental goals. It defined our essential interest in Chile as "to have it achieve a sustained and balanced economic growth, social progress and a strengthened democratic framework..." A CASP was prepared for FY 1972, and approved by the IG on April 28, 1970, but it was addressed to the post-election period, and did not consider pre-election issues. In fact, it was predicated on the assumption that Allende would not win. The IG decision memorandum (dated April 28, 1970) noted that "recognizing that an Allende victory is possible, though unlikely, the IG observed that the CASP did not address the kind of strategy and programs we would need to develop with an Allende administration in the CASP period. Therefore, should Allende win the election, our objectives, strategy and programs would have to be reexamined."

In the absence of consideration and agreement at a policy-making level on the degree of threat which an Allende Government would pose to U. S. interests, differing assumptions undoubtedly were held in the bureaucracy.

In a cable on March 16, 1970, Ambassador Korry expressed his view of the danger of an Allende regime, and the apparent lack of concern elsewhere: "Our preoccupation is with the... concern that Chile may emerge from its Presidential elections on a course towards emulation of a Castro regime... it is essential that attention be focused on our preeminent worry... a democratic process putting into power a Marxist regime <sup>edie</sup> designated to the elimination of U.S. interests and influence in the area. Unfortunately, my reiteration for some two years has converted this concern into an undurable banality elsewhere, thrown aside by more immediate challenges."

In a June 18, 1970, message via [REDACTED] in which he proposed an increase in the political action program, Korry again expressed his concern, stating that "unless altered, these threats could well culminate in the election of Allende, and as a consequence the inevitable imposition of a Leninist state in South America."

The memorandum prepared for the 40 Committee (dated 5 March 1970) for its March 25, 1970, meeting stated that "the Embassy in Santiago, the Department of State, and the CIA have agreed that election of the UP candidate would be detrimental to the U.S. ...." It concluded further that "based on Allende's own views, plus the public platform of the UP, we must assume that an Allende victory would mean the emergence of a Castro-type government in Chile."

There is no doubt that all the agencies considered an Allende victory detrimental to U.S. interests. What that meant, however, might well

have seemed different to different viewers. Some undoubtedly believed that the threat posed by an Allende victory would be limited by the obstacles he would face in carrying out his programs-- i. e., "the necessity of bringing the security forces to heel, of obtaining congressional support... and of keeping the UP coalition together." It was also noted that he would encounter resistance from the Church, "some segments of organized labor, and particularly from the sector of the Christian Democratic movement that responds to Frei's leadership." (NIE, 30 July 1970, page 17)

A staff memo to Dr. Kissinger on June 23 stated that Korry's assessment of the seriousness of the threat might not be generally shared: "There is no question that his (Allende's) victory would present problems for us. Whether that means a serious threat to U. S. security and national interests requires a better and more systematic judgment, because how serious we deem the threat to our interests to be will determine the risks we are willing to take to ensure his defeat. I do not think we have reached sound conclusions, etc., and certainly not a consensus." (Vaky to Kissinger, June 23, 1970)

An exchange of messages between Ambassador Korry and the State Department in early July 1970 via the Roger channel suggested a difference of views. In a July 3rd message to Korry, Assistant Secretary Meyer noted the Department's reservations about the expanded program approved by the 40 Committee on June 27, citing among the reasons for State's opposition to an expanded program "the probability that, from the standpoint of our interests in Chile, all three candidates would be negative sooner or later

and the certainty that exposure would destroy any prospect of mitigating Tomic or Allende's post-election attitudes. In brief, we believed that the potential gains were outweighed by the potential costs." In his reply of July 6, Korry stated "what is extremely unsettling is the wide breach between us over objectives." Korry went on to note that "if at any time previously our central thesis ~~that~~ the election of Allende would signify the imposition in Chile of the Communist regime of either the Castro or overt variety had been challenged, we would have done our best to persuade you of the contrary, but would have ceded to your judgment and to your decision. But because we assumed general agreement on this point, and because we anticipated the President's arguments as they applied here, we decided with great reluctance that the Allende chances of victory were so strong that we bit the main bullet. Hence, we appear to differ with you that 'all three candidates would be negative sooner or later' since we feel that the negative aspects of one transcend the other two and the election of one would have repercussions far beyond Chile...."

In a reply of July 7, however, Assistant Secretary Meyer declared that there really was no difference of opinion on the consequences of an Allende victory or about the importance of an Allende defeat. "The differences were principally about the degree of risks we should take in an attempt to achieve the objective, considering the adverse consequences to our position in Chile and elsewhere should we be caught out."

As late as August 23, 1970, a CIA memo noted that it was based on the "assumptions that the U. S. Government will have reached a firm determination that the interests of the U. S. in Chile and in the Western Hemisphere as a whole are best served by Alessandri's election to succeed Frei and by a denial of the Presidency to his principal opponent, Allende." (CIA memo, 23 August 1970)

2. Attention paid to the Chilean election at the policy-making level was infrequent and late

As noted earlier, the only policy-level forum in which the Chilean problem was considered prior to the election was the 40 Committee (with one exception noted below). The record indicates that its meetings on this problem were few and relatively far between until just prior to the popular election and during the period between the popular election and the Congressional run-off, by which time possibilities for effective action were very limited. During the crucial few months prior to the election, much of the time and attention of policy-making level officials was taken up by the situation in Southeast Asia (the Cambodia operation) and the Middle East -- 40 Committee meetings on Chile were cancelled or postponed.

The first meeting of the 40 Committee on Chile during the current Administration was held on April 15, 1969. The Committee received a report on the limited covert support provided during the Chilean Congressional

election election of March 1969. At that time, "the Chairman raised the question of whether anything should be done with respect to the Presidential election in Chile in September 1970. He stated that in a recent conversation a friend of higher authority had urged that higher authority provide assistance to rightist Alessandri in the 1970 Presidential election. The members concerned that Alessandri's prospects are reasonably good, but decided no immediate steps are necessary since the Presidential candidates are not yet formally declared." (Minutes, 15 April<sup>1969</sup>/40 Committee)

The Director of CIA noted that when candidates are declared, an early decision should be taken on whether to provide covert support to any candidate, observing that "a great deal of preliminary work is necessary, and CIA has learned through experience that an election operation will not be effective unless an early enough start is made." (Minutes, 15 April)

The final election of candidates occurred in December 1969 (when Allende was selected by the Popular Unity coalition). The next meeting of the 40 Committee on this subject was held on March 25, 1970, almost a year after the April 1969 meeting, and only six months before the election.

The March 25 meeting resulted in a decision to approve a limited "spoiler" operation against Allende, but without directly supporting either of the two candidates. "Cognizance was taken of the fact that following an electoral poll to be conducted in Chile in April, the Ambassador and the CIA Station Chief might recommend additional action, possibly even including direct

support to one candidate." (Minutes)

However, the next 40 Committee meeting on this subject was not held until June 27--over 3 1/2 months later and less than 2 1/2 months before the election. The June 27 meeting approved an expansion of the "spoiling" operation, despite reservations by State, and deferred a decision "on the buying of Congressional votes should the election go to Congress." It was agreed that CIA should proceed with detailed plans toward identifying "persuadable individuals in the Congress, though the risks in eventually embarking on this course were apparent and no action would be undertaken without further deliberations by the 40 Committee." It was decided that "the Committee will keep close watch on Chilean developments from now until September." The Committee met for a briefing next on 7 August less than one month before elections, but no decisions were taken.

There were no further meetings of the 40 Committee until after the popular election.

There was a Senior Review Group meeting on August 19, 1970, ostensibly to consider the NSSM 97 study (which the Review Group decided to defer until after the elections). The SRG in fact considered the question of preventing an Allende victory in the Congressional run-off, and called for preparation of an action plan on how we might accomplish that objective.

After the September 4 election the 40 Committee held six meetings between September 9 and October 14 to consider various measures for affecting the October 24 Congressional run-off or stimulating or supporting action by President Frei and/or the military to prevent an Allende victory.



Thus, the chronological record indicates that increasing high-level attention was paid to the problem of Chile in the period immediately prior to the election and very considerable attention was given to Chile between the popular election and the Congressional run-off, but that in the year or two prior to the elections --when there may have been more flexibility to prepare for and establish mechanisms for larger-scale political action efforts--limited attention was given to the problem at a high level. The question of policy towards Chile was not brought before the NSC until after the Congressional run-off. No issues were presented to the President for decision until the pre-Congressional run-off period.

3. An Allende victory was not considered probable.

All of the assessments agreed that the election would probably be a close three-man affair, but it was generally agreed that Alessandri was the probable winner. As the election drew nearer, there was increasing concern that Allende might finish a very close second in the popular election and manage to win the Congressional run-off.

A NIE on Chile, dated 28 January 1969, forecast a three-man race "in 1970 in which no candidate will win a clear majority, and the final choice will be made by the Chilean Congress." It concluded that the Congress would probably choose the candidate with the largest number of votes, "particularly if there is a clear margin between the two leading candidates."

The paper prepared for the 15 April 1969 40 Committee meeting concluded that "In the present political climate, the Communist-Socialist front would stand perhaps an even chance for the Presidency," as would Alessandri. In the 15 April 1969 meeting of the 40 Committee, "the members conceded that Alessandri's prospects are reasonably good but decided no immediate steps are necessary...." (Minutes, 40 Committee, 15 April 1969)

A 6 August 1969 CIA memorandum, "Presidential Politics in Chile: Waiting for Don Jorge," concluded that "Alessandri has to be considered the front runner." It summarized the infighting on the far left and raised doubts about the ability of the leftist parties to unite around a single candidate (pages 12-15).

A faith in the democratic traditions of Chile also contributed to the belief that in the final analysis Allende would not win. An assessment by Ambassador Korry in January 1970 reaffirmed his convictions "that Chile is one of the calmer and more decent places on earth, that its democracy, like our own, has an extraordinary resilience.... For my part, I see little that will endanger U.S. real interests in the country, in the area or in the hemisphere... My visceral instincts and my cognitive assessments persuade me for one that these... accomplishments of the Frei government are sufficient to keep Chile more or less on center and compatible in form and direction with our own system." (Santiago 0010)

Increasing concern about the elections trends was noted in March 1970. The paper prepared for the 25 March 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee noted that Alessandri "is the early leader in the Presidential race", with Allende second, but noted Korrry's view that "Alessandri's strength may be at its peak."

By June 1970, Korrry reported his concern about the trend lines: "a continuing decline of Alessandri, stagnation of Tomic and gathering strength of Allende." (Korrry cable [REDACTED] 18 June 1970). **SANITIZED**  
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State replied on 20 June by noting that Korrry's assessment was based on polls in the Santiago area only and that a later country-wide poll had Alessandri ahead by 5 points over Tomic, with Allende slightly below in third place. (State to Korrry, [REDACTED] 20 June 1970). Korrry came back the following day suggesting that the poll understated Allende's strength: "In my view, Allende is over 30%, perhaps by one percentage point, perhaps by two." He ranked Tomic at roughly 30%, with Alessandri right around 35%. "Given Alessandri's steady erosion, Allende's base, and Tomic's inability so far to catch fire we have a true horse race." Korrry cited his (Korrry cable [REDACTED] 22 June 1970) electoral analysis to support his proposal for an expanded "spoiler" operation/

A staff paper for Dr. Kissinger (dated 22 June 1970) summarized State, CIA, and Embassy assessments of election prospects and noted that all agreed that support for the three candidates was about evenly divided, with Alessandri

running ahead though he lost much of the commanding lead he held earlier.

"It is entirely possible that any of the three candidates could become the next President of Chile." (Vaky to Kissinger in memo 22 June 1970)

The paper prepared for the 27 June 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee compared the recent poll to a January 1970 poll as follows:

	<u>Jan. 1970</u>	<u>May/June 1970</u>	<u>Change</u>
Alessandri	44.4	35.6	-8.8
Tomic	23.1	29.9	+6.8
Allende	18.5	28.4	+9.9
Undecided	14.1	6.3	

The paper noted that "there is a State/CIA consensus that no candidate in the 1970 Presidential election will win a majority." It suggested that "The present composition of the Congress is such that if Allende runs a close second to Alessandri in the voting, there is more than an even chance that the Congress will elect him President." By this time, however, it was less than 2 1/2 months before the election.

4. There were philosophic reservations about intervention in a democratic election.

There was a question in the minds of some as to whether under our general policy approach we should not leave the Chileans to protect their own interests. In a meeting in the State Department on January 19, 1970, between CIA and State Department representatives, to consider proposals for anti-Allende "spoiler" activities, the State Department representatives reportedly expressed several reservations: "From the beginning,

the State Department had questioned the need for the U. S. Government to be involved in the election at all." (Helms' post-mortem on the Chilean Presidential election dated 12 November 1970, page 7). Ambassador Korry's account of the meeting notes that Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins "made case in his and Meyer's name against U. S. involvement." Crimmins reportedly asked "What difference it would make if we did not become involved, seeing how sensitive involvement may be versus what we may gain." (Korrry's post-mortem, para. 1, 8 November 1970)

In April 1970, Assistant Secretary Meyer, responded to a request by the Chairman of the Board of the Anaconda Corporation for U. S. Government support for the Alessandri campaign by commenting that "He was saddened that situations materialized which bring a U. S. company to suggest that the U. S. Government consider gross intervention in the political affairs of another country. He said that it was a pity that wealthy and concerned Chileans did not make adequate contributions to enable Mr. Alessandri to have all the media coverage he needs in the campaign." (MemCon dated April 10, 1970) Ambassador Korry reacted similarly to the Anaconda proposal, raising the question of "why the USG should seek to substitute for their (Alessandri's <sup>reporters</sup> ~~suggestion~~) lack of commitment and of national interest. This situation is the very anti-thesis of what I understand to be the Nixon doctrine." (Santiago 1538 of 28 April 1970)

At the 40 Committee meeting on 27 June 1970, at which proposals for expanded "spoiler" operations were considered and approved, the State Department representative, Under Secretary Johnson, "said that Messrs. Meyer and Crimmins from ARA were negative on both Korry proposals and that he himself had philosophical reservations. In these times when we are getting away from traditional election management, he compared Chile to the Italian situation where there was plenty of money within the country if it would only mature politically." (Minutes of 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting.) The Helms post-mortem memo also notes that "the principal Department of State representative present stated that **he harbored** philosophic reservations about furthering election interventions...." (Page 11) The Chairman's reply reportedly was "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." (Minutes of 27 June 1970 40 Committee)

In his 3 July 1970 Roger channel cable to Korry, Assistant Secretary Meyer in noting the reasons why the Department had opposed expansion of the political action program at the 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting, explained "we also were influenced by the fact that we will be doing something which Chileans, who have ample resources and a great stake in the outcome, should themselves be doing." (Korry post-mortem, para. 11)

5. There was concern about the risks of exposure if we provided substantial support, particularly if the support were provided to one candidate.

The abortive army uprising of October 1969 had been accompanied by charges of CIA involvement. In a mid-January meeting between State and CIA representatives to consider expanded "spoiler" operations, State expressed its concern that the U. S. had been accused of involvement in the Chilean military uprising and that there was particular sensitivity in Chile now about the CIA (Helms post-mortem, page 7).

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 Ambassador Korrry's negative comment on the proposal by Anacenda that the U. S. Government provide support to the Alessandri campaign noted that "any significant sum arriving from the U. S. would be as discreet as a moon launch. Not only does the GOC have the advantage of its 1964 experience and knowledge, but I have had too many painful experiences... with supporters of Alessandri who believe that discretion signifies only telling their five closest friends. To cite an example, it was Foreign Minister Valdes who informed me in February that Nacional Senator Pedro Ibanez had been to U. S. agencies in Washington seeking funds for Alessandri and had been turned down." Korrry also stated that pro-Alessandri Chilean and U. S. Government intervention "could not be hidden." (Santiago 1538 of 28 April 1970).

In June 1970 Korrry accompanied his proposal for expanded "spoiler" operations by stating that he was satisfied there was "an absolute minimum risk of exposure." (18 June 1970 Korrry cable [REDACTED] The State

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Department reacted to Korry's proposal by raising questions about the risk factor and recalling Korry's earlier comment that any significant sum would be as discreet as a moon launch: "While we recognize that you were talking about a program for support of Alessandri, we would like your comment on relevance that comment has to effect expanded program." (State Cable to Korry, [REDACTED] June 20, 1970.)

Korry replied by noting that his proposal did not really involve significant sums by his measure and noted that any additional funding would be handled only through the same "cut-out" that had been used for previous operations. He did say "I am aware that we have no iron-clad assurances of enduring secrecy," but continued to endorse his proposal. (Cable from Korry to Department [REDACTED] 22 June 1970)

In the paper prepared for the 40 Committee meeting on 27 June 1970, it was stated that "although the political climate remains sensitive to the U.S. and the CIA, there is justifiable expectation that these activities can be conducted without the U.S. hand showing."

In a Roger channel cable from Assistant Secretary Meyer to Ambassador Korry on July 3, 1970, Meyer noted that the Department had recommended against the proposals for expanded political action and explained that "We give more weight to exposure potential and less weight to the practical attractiveness of being able to 'say we had done something'..." (Helms post-mortem page 12; also Korry post-mortem, para. 11).



Ambassador Korry's proposal for a Phase II operation to identify and provide support to Chilean Congressmen to influence their votes in a Congressional run-off aroused particular security concerns. It was agreed at the June 27, 1970 40 Committee meeting that CIA should proceed with detailed plans toward identifying persuadable individuals in the Congress, but that "the risks in eventually embarking on this course were apparent and no action would be undertaken without further deliberations by the 40 Committee." (Minutes, 40 Committee, 27 June 1970)

In a discussion of the Phase II operation at the 7 August 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee, Mr. Broe of CIA stated that "the only reliable way to identify the 'persuadables' would be to 'confide fully in Frei and/or Duran and get their assessments... but it would be disastrous to show our hand' at this stage." (Minutes, 40 Committee, 7 August 1970).

In a Roger channel message to Korry on August 12, 1970, Meyer noted that it remained to be seen whether the risks and uncertainties of Phase II would be worthwhile. "He noted how delicate and questionable Phase II would be and quoted Bill Broe as stating it would be a 'security nightmare'". (Korry post-mortem, para. 14).

6. Two other factors reduced the options for a more vigorous effort to prevent the election of Allende:

- (1) reluctance to go beyond anti-Allende "spoiler" operations to support one of the two opposition candidates;
- (2) the lack of focus until just prior to the election on options for a Congressional run-off.

Reluctance to go beyond "spoiler" operations

In what turned out to be a close race -- Allende's margin was only 40,000 votes out of almost three million -- the U.S. did not undertake any direct political action programs to support Alessandri, who was from the beginning the candidate most likely to beat Allende, nor did we undertake any political action programs to support the third candidate, Tomic, in an effort to draw away votes from Allende, either to edge Allende into third place and out of the Congressional run-off or to give Alessandri a greater margin in a possible Alessandri-Allende run-off.

WHY DID THE UNITED STATES NOT UNDERTAKE DIRECT POLITICAL ACTION IN SUPPORT OF ALESSANDRI?

Some of the reasons cited above, on why we did not make more vigorous effort to stop Allende, apply directly to the question of why we did not support Alessandri:

- Alessandri's prospects seemed pretty good; he was considered in all assessments right up to election day to be the leading candidate;
- concern about the risks of exposure, particularly if we provided direct support to Alessandri's campaign (Santiago 1538, 28 April 1970).

Other factors were:

1. Belief that Alessandri had no organization which could effectively utilize support.

A memo from Richard Helms to Dr. Kissinger dated 16 June 1970 reported that Don Kendall had advocated that the U. S. Government give a lot of financial support to Alessandri's campaign. Helms noted that the election "has been dicey and difficult to figure" and that "we in the Agency are worried about pouring money into Alessandri's campaign because his political organization appears to be so diffuse that we are afraid it will have little impact." Helms concluded by noting that the Agency was following the matter closely, "but it is only fair to say that we are in a quandry as to what action is wise."

Similarly, the paper prepared for the 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting commented on the erosion of Alessandri's strength: "This loss in

popularity is due primarily to Alessandri's unique campaign, which is characterized by an immature organization staffed by incompetents whose inexperience results in wasted resources, ineffective propaganda and squabbling over a post-election program. The mobilization of supporters and formulation and dissemination of a positive message to the Chilean voter has been largely ignored. The only semblance of an organization available to Alessandri, the National Party, has been shunted aside by his supporters...."

2. Belief that Alessandri supporters were more interested in destroying the PDC than in beating Allende.

In opposing the Anaconda proposal to help Alessandri, Ambassador Korry declared that "I cannot see any theoretical advantage in helping one (candidate) to fight the other with indirect benefits to Allende." The paper prepared for the 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting also noted that Alessandri's supporters "believe that Alessandri can win on his name alone and that it is more important to defend his previous administration and attack President Eduardo Frei than to prevent a victory by Salvador Allende...."

*PDC  
preference  
Korry*

3. Concern that support for Alessandri's campaign might alienate us from the PDC, or reduce our influence with Allende or Tomic if they won.

Ambassador Korry, in strongly opposing the Anaconda proposal for direct support to Alessandri noted that Anaconda had asked for his intervention with the GOC to save the copper arrangements, and added "it is reasonable to ask how we can maintain any restraining influence with

a government and a party ... that of the Christian Democrats...to save that arrangement if the U. S. were to be involved in an effort to defeat the Presidential candidate of that party." (Santiago 1538, 28 April 1970)

In another part of that cable, he commented "I remain persuaded that as long as the USG can honestly attest to its electoral neutrality with respect to Alessandri and Tomic, it will be substantiated and accepted by Tomic and his closest advisors despite their unhappiness with our non-commitment to them." He concluded by noting that "if the U. S. were to commit itself to an anti-PDC electoral position,

the short and long-term consequences with respect to what is still the largest single political party in Chile and the government could have very serious consequences here."

Korry continued to oppose direct support for any candidate, but by June was willing to accept some pro-Alessandri fall-out which might result from an expansion from his proposed expansion of "spoiler" operations, because "I am persuaded that there are so many extraneous factors beyond our capacity to influence or manipulate (Alessandri's physical condition, to mention one glaring factor) that the final beneficiary is beyond accurate prediction. Allende, and he alone is our target." (Korry to State in Cable [REDACTED] 18 June 1970).

However, State was still concerned that Alessandri might benefit from the program and asked Korry "to what degree does proposed greatly

augmented program increase risks of use of our effort in behalf of Alessandri rather than against Allende with obvious disadvantages... we would assume you would agree that, as in modest program, we would suspend expanded program if it were to be used for Alessandri." (State cable to Korry [REDACTED] 20 June 1970)

According to Helms, State Department representatives in discussions with CIA exhibited deep reservations about the expanded program in part because "later it would be difficult to prove to the Christian Democrats that this was not USG support of Alessandri should the Christian Democrats win the Presidential election." (Helms post-mortem, page 10)

Assistant Secretary Meyer, in commenting on why the Department opposed Korry's proposal for expanded operations in June 1970, gave as one reason "the certainty that exposure would destroy any prospect of mitigating Tomic or Allende post-election attitudes." (Helms' post-mortem, page 12).

4. Belief that Alessandri would not be much better for U. S. interests in the long term.

The paper prepared for the 25 March 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee noted that "No U. S. Government support is planned for Tomic or Alessandri." In citing reasons, the paper stated "Alessandri's advanced age (he is now 73 years old) and the undistinguished record of his 1958-64 Administration are factors which argue against support of his candidacy."

The 30 July 1970 NIE on Chile noted that although an Allende Administration would provide the most intransigent problems for the U.S., "there is scant solace for the future of U.S. - Chilean relations no matter who succeeds Frei... there would be problems for U.S. Chilean relations under either Alessandri or Tomic...." (page 17).

As noted earlier, the State Department in reporting to Korry its opposition to the expanded program in June 1970 stated "the probability that, from the standpoint of our interests in Chile, all three candidates would be negative sooner or later."

In discussing Alessandri's debilities, Korry stated "He has no program; he has no organization; he has no understanding of modern problems, not even what the threat of the Marxists represents; he is consumed by a desire to vindicate his actions in his previous Administration and to avenge the barbs and the triumphs of the Christian Democrats...." (Santiago 2361)

5. Concern that support for one candidate would mean a longer-term commitment.

In stating his opposition to direct support for Alessandri's campaign, Ambassador Korry stated that he could not see any advantage particularly "when such U. S. Government intervention would lead to the further indirect 'commitment' to balance out the new government whenever it got into trouble. This longer-term implication of 'commitment' is of very great interest to both the Alessandri and Tomic camps in both psychological and material terms." (Santiago 1538; of 28 April 1970)

WHY DIDN'T WE UNDERTAKE POLITICAL ACTION IN SUPPORT OF TOMIC?

Direct support for Tomic does not appear to have been seriously considered by the 40 Committee. Some of the reasons cited above apply here:

- Risks of exposure. Many of the PDC were aware of the U. S. Government involvement for Frei in the 1964 elections; in response to a question from Dr. Kissinger in the 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting, who wondered "why more active support of Tomic would not cause the most damage to Allende." Mr. Broe replied that "ground rules in Chile had prevented our dealing with Tomic's Christian Democrat Party mechanism, and infusion of support at this late date would have to be direct to Tomic, an approach entailing obvious risks." (Minutes, 40 Committee, 27 June)
- A Tomic victory would not be much better for U. S. interests in the long-run because his program did not differ greatly from Allende's in many respects.
- Concern that support for one candidate would involve a long-term commitment to that candidate (Santiago 1538).

Another factor was that Tomic had sufficient money and organization for his campaign. In the paper prepared for the 27 June 1970 40 Committee meeting, it was stated that "Radomiro Tomic is the only Presidential candidate with both ample funds and effective party organization." (page 3). It was also noted that Tomic's problem was his campaign platform, which was difficult to distinguish from Allende's.



The question of support for Tomic was raised by the NSC staff in two memos to Dr. Kissinger. On 25 March 1970 Viron Vaky commented "Why would not a complementary tactic be to strengthen Tomic's appeal? He has to contend with Allende for the same sector of votes. By dividing the left vote between them, there is a good chance of increasing Alessandri's percentage." (Vaky to Kissinger, 25 March 1970). The memo went on to note further that the paper prepared for the 40 Committee meeting 'posits merely 'spoiling' Allende's chances, but refuses to formulate a plan to support an alternative."

On June 26, 1970 Vaky again raised the question of support for Tomic: "All of this suggests rather tentatively that we should think of an anti-Allende course that would have its positive side. Perhaps we should aid Tomic to at least come in second. With Alessandri slipping anyway, this would have the advantage of strengthening Tomic to pick up the deficit from Alessandri rather than Allende, or better still a second place over Allende would be satisfactory to us. Thus, if we combine a political action plan of anti-Allende activities with pro-Tomic funding, we might increase the effectiveness of our effort." (Vaky to Kissinger, 26 June 1970).

The question was raised again in the 19 August 1970 meeting of the Senior Review Group; the Chairman noted the possibility that the Congress might not follow tradition and the second runner--expected to be Allende--would then become President. "He asked if there were anything that could be done to prevent this, either by increasing Alessandri's margin or by supporting Tomic for second spot." Assistant Secretary Meyer stated "We know of nothing that can be done between now and the election." CIA Director Helms agreed. (Minutes, SRG Meeting, Aug. 19, 1970).

WHY DID THE U. S. NOT FOCUS EARLIER ON OPTIONS TO PREPARE FOR A CONGRESSIONAL-RUNOFF IN WHICH ALLENDE WOULD BE ONE OF THE CANDIDATES?

U. S. political action programs in the March 1969 Congressional elections (programs were initiated in 1968) were authorized for the purpose of electing moderate Congressmen who would oppose a Marxist candidate in the event the 1970 Presidential elections were decided in a Congressional run-off. Virtually every assessment of the electoral prospects indicated that it was probable that the Presidential election would be decided by a Congressional run-off, and that a Marxist candidate would stand a good chance of being one of the contenders. It was generally agreed that if Allende ran a close second to Alessandri in the voting, there would be at least an even chance that he could be elected by the Congress. Yet, it is striking to note that after the 1969 Congressional elections, U. S. political action programs were directed solely toward affecting the popular election, and consideration of options to prepare for the contingency of a contingency of a Congressional run-off involving Allende was not undertaken until just prior to the popular election.

Korry's proposal for a Phase II operation--to identify and provide support to Chilean Congressmen who might be influenced to vote against Allende--was presented to the 40 Committee at its 27 June 1970 meeting, but the 40 Committee decided to defer any decision. It did instruct CIA to "proceed with detailed plans toward identifying 'persuadable' individuals in Congress. (Minutes of 40 Committee meeting, 27 June 1970).

However, State and CIA had serious reservations about the risks of exposure involved in attempting to identify "persuadable" congressmen (cited above), and planning apparently was limited to internal consideration.

At the 7 August 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee, the CIA representative noted that only reliable way to identify "persuadables" would be to go to President Frei and other Chilean contacts to get their assessments, "but it would be disastrous to show our hand at this stage. The Committee would have to consider granting this authority if and when the election went to Congress." (Minutes of 7 August 1970, 40 Committee). Under Secretary Johnson of State strongly opposed any contact with Chileans on this matter because it "tips our hand to the Chileans before we have really decided if we would do it anyway" and it would not make much difference if we waited until after the September election (Vaky to Kissinger memo, August 20, 1970).

Ambassador Korry and the Station Chief also cooled on the idea of approaching Frei or other Chilean contacts on Phase II until after the election. It was considered that there would be sufficient time then to take readings. (Vaky to Kissinger memo August 28, 1970). However, it became quickly apparent right after the popular election that the prospects for influencing Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende were slim and that Korry's Phase II proposal would not work. (Minutes of 9 Sept. 1970 40 Committee Meeting).

The U. S. Government had two broad possibilities for preparing for a Congressional run-off involving Allende: (1) seek to influence Chilean Congressmen not to vote for Allende if he gained a slim majority or a close second; and

(2) seek to influence President Frei and/or the military to take preemptive action if it appeared likely that Allende would win a Congressional run-off.

The first possibility was not considered until 27 June 1970, and no action was taken on it except internal planning (and it appears that little of that was done until just before the election; at the 19 August 1970 SRG meeting, the Chairman asked "If we should decide to move after that time (September 4), do we know what orders we would issue and to whom?" Mr. Helms replied "we did not." It was agreed at the SRG meeting that a plan to keep Allende from winning in the Congress would be prepared.) (Minutes, 19 August 1970, SRG Meeting)

The second possibility was not considered until after the popular election. By then, intensive consideration was given in the 40 Committee to various signals we could give and measures we could take to exacerbate conditions which would induce Frei or the military to act to prevent Allende from taking office. Several steps were taken, but essentially <sup>success was dependent upon</sup> the will and resolve of Frei and the military -- both of whom proved unwilling to move.

Whether earlier planning would have made a difference or not is uncertain. However, by the time the issue was considered, it was clear that our options were limited and we were dependent on Frei and the military and that our assets with both were limited. According to Helms, the CIA Station "had been forbidden by the last two Ambassadors to be in touch with Frei; consequently, they had no assets and no channel to Frei." Ambassador Korry was thus the only contact with Frei. (Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting, 22 September 1970).