June 20, 1970

~~SECRET~~ - Sensitive

TO: Ambassador Korry - Immediate

FROM: John Hugh Crimmins

SUBJECT: Increased USG Activity in Chilean Election

1. We need your comments on following points by no later than 9:00 AM Monday morning June 22 since your important proposal to be examined at high level on Tuesday June 23.

2. It would appear that May poll used as an element of judgment in your analysis reflected results in greater Santiago area only and that you had not yet had benefit of country-wide results. We note that in the Santiago poll Allende is second with 32.1 percent following Alessandri with 35.1 percent, but that in the later national results Allende is in third place with 28.4 percent and Tomic is in second with 29.6 percent. In the latter poll Alessandri still leads with 35.6 percent. Assuming you now have results of both polls, do you believe any modification in your proposal is warranted?

3. We are not clear about the composition and role of the Chilean Cooperative Society. Who are the U.S. elements in the CCS? What is the Chilean front? What did CCS do in 1964

election? What activity, if any, would CCS carry out as an institution in the expanded program funded by us? Are you completely satisfied that CCS activity is not known to Council for Latin America (whose activity, as you have noted, is fraught with risk)?

4. We are not clear about the intended future role of President Frei. We assume that what you have in mind is in no way related to proposed post-election program but is, rather, encouragement from us to play an active part in influencing votes in the Congress away from Allende.

5. We would appreciate clarification of current activities ated to Radical Party. In para 10 of your message you say that--- "Another effort to subsidize orthodox Radical Party---has been launched". Are we correct in interpreting this to mean that it is [redacted] group and not rpt not we that has launched also another effort? It would be helpful to our considefation to have some clearer idea of the prior effort implied by the reference to "another" effort.

6. We would appreciate further assessment of the risk factor. Agency has briefed us on the operational details as you suggested in para 15. We have noted the heightened and expanded relationship with [redacted] group. As you know, approval of the earlier, much smaller program was conditioned on its not becoming a pro-Alessandri operation. Given increased dependence on [redacted] to what degree does proposed greatly augmented program

increase risk of use of our effort in behalf of Alessandri rather than against Allende, with obvious disadvantages. If risk is indeed increased, how do you foresee handling the problem? We assume you would agree that, as in modest program, we would suspend expanded program if it were to be used for Alessandri.

7. Still on risk factor, in your telegram 2230 of April 28 commenting on the Anaconda-Parkinson pitch to Assistant Secretary Meyer for USG financial contribution to the Alessandri campaign, you noted "any significant sum arriving from the U.S. would be as discreet as a moon launch." While we recognize that you were talking about a program of support for Alessandri, we would like your comment on relevance that comment to effects of expanded program.