

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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E.O. 12958, Section 1.3  
By            NARA, Date 11/19/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: FRED MALEK *FJM*  
SUBJECT: Campaign Organization

Per our discussion yesterday, attached is a paper on Campaign Organization. These are somewhat random, general, and hastily drawn; and I do not always propose solutions. Nevertheless, I believe the observations are valid.

Attachment

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CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS

This paper responds to your request for general problems I perceive in the campaign organization. It is divided into four sections: (a) Overall Direction, (b) Priorities, (c) Political Coordinators, and (d) Programs.

OVERALL DIRECTION

To my mind, the greatest problem we are experiencing at 1701 is that we lack firm direction and consequently do not have a sense of urgency. There seems to be great complacency -- with many key people spending their time developing multitudes of programs, thinking about organization, and worst of all, plotting to improve their own positions. All the while, precious little is being done to actually put together the strongest possible organization in the States and get it mobilized in a constructive fashion. This is in marked contrast to the McGovern campaign to date which is full of young, energetic, results-oriented people who are focusing totally on organization matters, with considerable success.

The problem may well lie in our campaign leadership. Starting at the top, John Mitchell is a superb political strategist and a man of consistently sound and unflappable judgment. Moreover, he is a strong, firm, and objective decision-maker. However, he is not a charismatic, fast-moving ass-kicking, general manager who first gives firm direction and then pushes people relentlessly in that direction. Jeb Magruder, while a good program manager and organizer, is also not the hard-driving, fast-mover that is needed. In addition, the Political Coordinators are a mixed group and, as is outlined further below, do not provide the kind of leadership that is needed.

What 1701 really needs is a field management group or campaign manager under Mitchell who will for the most part forget about developing programs and concentrate their total efforts on field organization, starting with voter identification and registration. We need people who will travel the States, ask the tough questions, impact and energize the State Chairmen, kick them in their asses if needed, and make sure they are really moving on the right track. This kind of firm direction and operating leadership simply does not seem to be present.

The result is that each State Chairman is kind of doing his own thing, is resentful of direction from Washington, and is more or less building his own empire -- which may or may not be the best approach. The one thing that I am sure of, however, is that we are not organized or fast moving,

and are losing ground on registration and are incredibly weak in the field when compared with the McGovern organization.

This problem has in part been perceived, and we are now embarking on a major new registration drive which will be the top priority of the entire campaign organization. We intend to impart a real sense of urgency on this to try to shake people out of their complacency, and will attempt to mobilize our entire national and field organization for this registration drive. I think this will have a positive effect, but I wonder whether it is the only answer or whether it is enough to correct the major problems outlined above.

### OVERALL PRIORITIES

I sense that the campaign organization is failing to act according to priorities. This is a feeling on my part, and not as crisply defined as are problems in the political or program areas; but it could be an extremely important weakness.

Priorities seem to be well enough delineated in strategic terms -- the key states, constituent groups, etc. -- but the priorities do not appear to carry over into how people spend their time, or where energies are placed.

For example, everyone agrees that McGovern will be the opposition's candidate, and has shown surprising strength. However, we do not seem to be devoting sufficient resources to analyzing his strengths and weaknesses, and exploring his areas of vulnerability. One would think that this would be a top priority project -- but all that has surfaced thus far is a rather obvious one-page 'analysis' that could have been prepared from reading the newspaper.

Another example is the State Chairman situation. We go to the trouble of carefully selecting the key states -- then several of them sit without activity for months because we do not follow through and name State Chairmen.

Part of the problem is that everyone seems to be going in 50 directions rather than selecting what is really important and pushing like hell on it. This is aggravated by the previously described lack of urgency at 1701. The attitude is that we have plenty of time, so there is no reason to hurry, work long hours, or otherwise extend ourselves. Consequently, there is no follow through on priorities -- no urgency to make things happen quickly.

## POLITICAL COORDINATORS

The principal motivators of action in the field should be the five political coordinators. However, as was mentioned above, they are at best a mixed group.

Harry Flemming, in my opinion, is very weak. The slow progress in the development of the organization in the States is largely attributable to his poor performance when he was the sole head of the political division. Although his sphere of influence has been narrowed to the Southern States (plus New York), he remains a negative force on the overall campaign. Many persons still look to him as the "senior" political coordinator, and so his bad judgment affects more than just the Southern States (as if that were not enough). He seems to spend most of his time scheming and plotting on how to improve his position with Mitchell. He spends almost no time in the field.

Bob Mardian, who has the Western States, has proved a big disappointment. Our twice-weekly meetings with Mitchell and the political coordinators have become virtually non-productive, with Mardian and Flemming taking up the entire time with irrelevant verbal battles. Mardian seems intent on having the last word on every point, no matter how inane. Frankly, I do not see how Mitchell stands it. At least Mitchell has stopped Mardian from telling us "how we did it in Arizona in 1964 . . . ." Mardian does not seem to be a clear thinker or good manager. If you are concerned about Nofziger in California, I am doubly concerned about Mardian supervising Nofziger.

Don Mosiman has not really said or done enough for me to draw any firm conclusions about his performance at the campaign. However, he has been cooperative and industrious in his approach, and he appears adequate at this point. He has a really heavy load, being entrusted with key states like Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

Al Kaupinen (New England) and Clayton Yeutter (Farm States) seem adequate enough for their present assignments, but I do not think they should be given any additional responsibilities.

To sum up, then, it is a pretty grim picture -- two out of the five political coordinators with over half the States are inadequate, in my opinion. As a result, the campaign has been woefully slow in naming State Chairmen --

key States such as Texas are still without Chairmen. In addition, there is no orderly flow of information to and from the States. Communications in the field are so fouled up that the Citizens Group Directors cannot even find out the background of the delegates to the Convention.

I really think that the best solution to this problem is the tough one -- fire Flemming and Mardian, and replace them with outstanding political managers if they can be found. Obviously, this has to be done as quickly as possible, but even at this late date it would be preferable to the alternative of letting them stay on and screw things up even more. I do not have any instant ideas of who could replace Flemming and Mardian, but my bet is that this could be solved inside of two weeks.

One more thought about the political division should be mentioned -- Mitchell seems to be relying increasingly on Fred La Rue for advice on how to handle the political coordinators. I think Fred is very astute politically, and is a good advisor to Mitchell. However, I think it would be a mistake to assume that the problems in the political division could be solved by moving La Rue in over the existing political coordinators. Fred is a good advisor, but I do not think anyone could manage that crew.

### PROGRAMS

In my recent progress report on campaign activities, I concentrated on the problems in the Citizens area, and outlined what I planned to do about them. I also stated that I thought that Jeb was doing a good job, and I do. However, I have concerns about three of his areas: national voter contact programs, surrogates, and public relations. I discussed the understaffing of 1701 PR in the progress report, and it is being taken care of. The other two areas of concern are discussed briefly below.

1. National Voter Contact Programs. The national voter contact programs include direct mail, telephone operations, and door-to-door voter canvassing, all of which are based on computerized voter lists. If the computer tapes containing the various lists necessary for these programs are not accurate and are not received on time, none of these critical programs can be executed properly. In the test run in the California Primary, the computer tapes were neither completely accurate nor on time with resulting delays in the start up of the telephone banks, and delivery of the direct mail (up to three weeks late). While these deficiencies could be coped with in California, we could not expect to overcome similar problems in eleven key states simultaneously in October.

As a result of the poor showing of the national voter contact programs in the California primary, Bob Marik and Bob Morgan have undertaken an extensive review of their efforts. In the last week, they have changed the entire concept of the computer system from a single, centralized computer in Illinois to a decentralized system with a number of regional computer centers. They have also substantially redesigned the paper flow system in an attempt to make their information usable by the door-to-door canvassers, as well as by the telephone and direct mail programs. Finally, they have selected several new vendors to supply the lists to the computer centers.

These actions represent a fundamental change in the entire approach to the national voter contact programs. I agree with these changes, however, if the redesigned program does not work, we will not get another chance. In view of past performance, I continue to be concerned about this critical area. By the end of next week, Marik and Morgan should have a final revised program. I intend to analyze it carefully, and make further recommendations at that time.

2. Surrogates. As you know, the surrogate program has been unsatisfactory in several respects. The principal problem is that Bart Porter is weak, overly defensive, and in my opinion abrasive to work with. Moreover, he does not seem to be creative or a good planner, as shown by the fact that he has not yet pulled together a long-range plan, including identification of key media areas, which surrogates should be in these areas, with what frequency, etc. Some of the Citizens Group Directors have done this for their own surrogates, so there is no excuse for Porter not doing it for the major surrogates. John Whitaker is moving in on this situation now, and I am hopeful that he will be able to straighten it out.

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I realize that this paper has been long on problems and short on specific solutions. However, if we can agree on the problems, I would think we will be able to find solutions.