

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Burke Trend  
Sir Thomas Brimelow  
Ambassador Cromer  
Mr. Richard A. Sykes, Minister  
Patrick Nairne  
Charles Powell, First Secretary  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
William Hyland, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 19, 1973  
1:15 - 5:45 p.m.

PLACE: The British Embassy  
Washington, D. C.

Drinks were served on the terrace of the British Embassy. The conversation was light and shortly luncheon was served in the Dining Room. The talk was cordial and some of the subjects were; the Soviet exit tax, the Profumo affair, the Watergate affair, the liberals in the United States, Romania and its luxurious accommodations, the Moscow Summit, a private line between the British Embassy and the White House, a Chinese travelogue and the Chinese logic of categories.

The party then proceeded to a meeting room in the new chancery.

Dr. Kissinger: I have the following items we would like to discuss: the nuclear document, that we have been talking about; SLBM upgrade; MBFR; our plans for Atlantic relations, how the President envisions the conduct of affairs in what has been called the Year of Europe; a general review; a few words about energy, we have defined the problem a little better; the Middle East, nothing new to report; and any other topic that either of us wishes to raise.

Sir Burke Trend: The President's conception of how the Atlantic relationship should develop in the year of Europe--we have given you our document. This is not formal, but rather personal.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NLN 04-30/10 per ltr. 7/4/2011

BY JWR NARA, Date 10/13/2011

[p. 1 of 35]

Dr. Kissinger: I sent a scorching note to the Chinese and their reply was a personal reply from the Ambassador. No, I understand.

We continue to proceed from the view that, when we say the "Year of Europe" we mean not that this year can settle all the problems. But rather, to frame the issues so that we can help start relations develop organically, even after this administration ends.

The necessity is produced by the changed conditions caused by the success of the Alliance, the impact of the detente, changes in technology and the unification of Europe. We have held the view that these problems should not be worked on, and each dealt with on its own merit. In the economic field, the technicians will gain the upper hand, and in defense the suspicion pervades that all our efforts mask our desire for a partial or total withdrawal. Our aim is to see whether we can work on some form of principles and objectives, with enough progress in a few selected areas so that we can look as if we are in motion. We are trying to get into the public consciousness in the same manner as our dealings with Moscow and Peking have been developed.

Through close consultation with you and talking with Brandt and Pompidou, we can get some general proposals agreed upon this summer. And when the President goes to Europe we will culminate in an agreed statement of principles that is more than a reaffirmation of traditional liturgies.

I am giving a speech on Monday to a group of American newspaper publishers in New York. I am outlining this as a goal and if this could be picked up by some leading Europeans... I will let you see a draft. When are you leaving?

Sir Thomas Brimelow: At 8 o'clock.

Amb. Cromer: No bother, it can be telegraphed.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have it for you tonight or the first thing in the morning. The speech will be an attempt to be constructive and will lay to rest suspicions that we are trying to wreck the European Community or trying to withdraw. I am afraid that if the trade negotiations take place in solely economic terms, they can be damaging. I am also not encouraged by MBFR. The tragedy is that this President is more likely to understand foreign policy and more committed to keeping American commitments. This is our approach.

We have read your paper. While we agree on much, our major objection is the tone of military fatalism. One doesn't derive dynamism or possible

things that can be achieved... that the best we can do is to limit the damage. As an historian I might agree, but in terms of statesmanship, we want a firmer more optimistic approach.

Sir Trend: In not more than five lines, what is the importance of Europe to America? Why do you care?

Dr. Kissinger: As Sonnenfeldt pointed out to me, I can't get a verb planned in less than five lines. (laughter)

The importance of Europe to the United States is first, if there should be a Eurasia, either controlled from Moscow or effectively dominated by Moscow, we would then find that all other parts of the world, especially Latin America would fall ideologically in that order. There are profound political consequences for the United States in the fields of; energy, the power balance, and the psychological cohesiveness of the United States, which would undergo unusual transformations.

I think an extreme radicalization of American society would be the outcome. Initially on the right more than on the left. This is my guess, as would be a substantial demoralization of the American left. I must say that this would not be perceived that way by most of our critics.

We could survive by a degree of regimentation that would leave dramatic transformations.

Sir Trend: The Russians are not going to attack you.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't say that. Let me pass this for a moment. This is like asking if the French had controlled Antwerp would they land on the cliffs of Dover.

Our ability to influence events in the world would gradually vanish. Never can we survive as an island in a totally hostile environment.

Sir Trend: Now you have all of South America?

Dr. Kissinger: No, not at all, South America would be viciously anti-American. And Europe would have to rely on the USSR, say as Poland.

Amb. Cromer: As evident in the recent OAS meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, you would have a total change in Japanese orientation. China would make major accommodations. In fact if China concluded, either because of our performance in Southeast Asia or because of domestic

troubles, that we have lost the capacity for decisive action, you may find a shift in their policy. They are an unusually pragmatic people.

We will not knowingly sacrifice European interests. Inadvertently it might happen, but we would not knowingly make a deal at the expense of Europe. That is inconceivable.

Sir Trend: If the other superpowers altered their relations what would you do then?

Dr. Kissinger: I think that an accommodation between China and the Soviet Union is possible. The Soviets realize that another Mao and Chou En-lai could conceivably happen again. With 800 million people, highly disciplined, to whom they have an aversion, there will be a limit. If it were to happen we would... I think the importance of the Atlantic relationship would be greater. All of this is true if Europe represents some complement to our strength. If Europe takes the view that it is irresponsible for our embarrassment, then we don't have to pay a price. These are the limitations.

Sir Trend: Is there any risk of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China?

Dr. Kissinger: Not with Mao still alive.

Sir Trend: He is pretty old. Do you think the Soviet Union attacking China is more likely?

Dr. Kissinger: Our joint strategy with China... the symbolic ties permit an American option to help China if it should be attacked. And to help China to survive to the death and disappearance of those who have originated it. The Chinese have gone to great lengths to symbolize this new era. They have treated our advance team better than other diplomatic teams that have arrived in China.

Sir Trend: Do you think that the risk is still there?

Dr. Kissinger: Of a Soviet attack? (there is a nod from Sir Trend) I don't think that it is like Joe Alsop's nuclear castration theory. They may want to intervene in the succession struggle. The Chinese believe this: it is a passionate concern of theirs, and they are not an emotional people. Nor is it in their interest to overplay something.

Sir Trend: To get back to Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Just to make another point, everything we have seen has the

intention...if there is one target it is China.

Sir Trend: Yes, yes, do you believe in the detente?

Dr. Kissinger: With the Soviets?

Sir Trend: With the Europeans.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we can't. We have a temptation to believe this that the Soviets, for a number of reasons in your paper, want to weaken Japanese-American ties, undermine European-American ties, to isolate China and to avoid isolation themselves. They are now pressing for a detente. What is now justified as the best tactic could turn into the real thing. We have to be open to this.

Sir Trend: A growing number of people believe that if it isn't real, it could be made real.

Dr. Kissinger: Where?

Sir Trend: In Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We have gained more in the short term. Their benefits are in long term trends. My view is that the pernicious German development is out of our control, and is not the result of American detente policy. I think it is true that there are an increasing number of people who hold the views you say. I hate to think where we would be in this country if we had besides the war in Vietnam, great problems with the USSR and China, as we are using the detente policy. And this in fact is becoming a criticism of the new left, which is actually right.

Sir Trend: Do you think that the normal strains in the Soviet Union could make the detente necessary for them?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that could happen. But if the West did not have to deal with domestic public opinion, it could get more concessions. If a 100,000 more voters had switched in 1968, the detente would be far more extreme than it really is.

Sir Trend: (to Sir Brimelow) You had a good report of what Brezhnev said in Prague.

Sir Brimelow: Brezhnev said to the Czechs that there must be a detente for 12 years, to about 1985. During this period they would make a mandate and the countries of the War saw Pact would strengthen themselves. After

which they would be able to dictate their own terms.

Dr. Kissinger: I would say two things to this. It is an hypothesis that could happen. And a projection for the 12 year period puts it out of conceivable succession for our country. If he had said three years we would have an operational document, but 12 years appears as an alibi.

Sir Trend: What morale do you draw from this for Europe? We can't relax.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to give symbolism to our relations with Europe. We are losing an established group that has an invested interest in European ties. Look at the Amsterdam meeting, they were all men from past administrations, and not will be in the next administration. There is nothing Americans feel they can be proud of in European relations. This has become an emotional necessity for many people. Take the Mansfield Amendment, the only way we can keep troops in Europe is to throw a few babies to the wolves. For all these reasons... (in an aside) I was recently talking to a group of Jewish men, and the conversation riveted around Moscow, China and Vietnam. Nobody ever talks about Europe.

We have to get into the public consciousness that we have done something of substance, not just typical subjects such soybeans, etc. There is a malaise that whenever we deal with Europe there is a picayune problem where no one knows where we are going. Nor, have we made a great overture.

Sir Trend: Do you want an overture?

Dr. Kissinger: The first thing we need is to get in our people's minds that we want to do something substantial where Europe is concerned. Perhaps we could begin to put it at least on an equivalent basis with the Brezhnev visit and the major Chinese overtures. I have no doubt that China will make major moves toward the United States. I don't know what they will do.

Sir Trend: We shall have to discuss who is to do what.

Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly what I want to discuss. We can make this meeting every three or four weeks. After Moscow I could spend a day with this group.

Sir Trend: When is your trip?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not certain, but probably around the 5th to the 8th

or 9th of May. I could be in London on the 10th, which is roughly three weeks from now. Give me a day, either the 10th or the 11th.

The reason I am making this speech on behalf of the President is because we don't have a good forum. I am not going to give many specifics. If some European leaders would say that is what we should do...then we could begin working. Then we could decide among ourselves to have working parties. The working parties should be given high level attention. This way they won't be the typical dreary affairs.

Sir Trend: What kind of working parties do you propose?

Dr. Kissinger: Economic, defense, and political coordination, not each requires an equal amount of work. Political coordination can be discussed on a less frequent basis, because of its philosophical nature. The economic side is dreary, but it needs much work. It should therefore, have high directives from the top. Every paper we get from our people has a huge list of what Europe must do for us. And this is impossible for the President to veto because of the various pressure groups.

Sir Trend: There is the monetary thing.

Amb. Cromer: I think progress is pretty disappointing. There is not enough good will at the top level.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we have to include the monetary thing.

Amb. Cromer: The technicians are just working in a dreary way.

Dr. Kissinger: There is one problem we have never worked on, energy. The problem is feasible with many ramifications. I don't know what the impact on the monetary situation will be.

Amb. Cromer: It is an impossible situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Just depositing the Arab oil money in banks is destabilizing, but if it is used strategically it is a nightmare. A few weeks ago the Indian Ambassador wanted to know what will happen if the Arabs put money into armaments. This won't happen in the next five years. But a few years earlier this would never have crossed an Indian's mind. 40% of the United States', 80% of Europe's, and 90% of Japan's energy comes from the Middle East. If all the oil consuming nations are going to wait for the debacle of one of the others, so they can jump in and increase their own reserves, then sooner or later we have a prescription for breaking whatever exists in industrial nations. We need some idea on how

to cooperate to avoid these dangers. We are prepared to do it. We need a working group. We have now started a study of this; ten questions including a question on where the Soviets are.

Sir Trend: Do you see the Soviets getting a strangle hold on the western world?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they will never attack us. When you look at military technology, you never can tell what temptations will come along.

Sir Trend: You say we ought to have a series of working parties. Is that just you and us?

Dr. Kissinger: We will talk to the Germans and the French. We will talk to Pompidou in the <sup>way</sup> Mao talked to the President ( a reference to the luncheon conversation--to talk in a web).

Sir Trend: We will talk to the Allies and we won't say that we have talked to you.

Sir Brimelow: Thorn talked about this on the 16th of March.

Dr. Kissinger: He has no comprehension of English.

Sir Brimelow: The Minister agreed we would get together in June and political directives would be talked about to the 25th. Then I imagine the various governments can begin discussing their ideas in Washington.

Dr. Kissinger: If it takes the form that the European directors in every country...

Sir Brimelow: Nine.

Dr. Kissinger: I will guarantee that progress will be slow.

Sir Trend: This is the difficulty. It is easy for us to talk to you.

Dr. Kissinger: The meeting with Thorn was less pleasant.  
everything

Almost ~~done~~ in this administration is done on two tracks. The bureaucrats on one side and the other is done in this sort of forum. The exercise of the nine with the State Department is a good legitimization for what we are doing here.

Sir Trend: Henry, you are like a revolutionary, always concerned with



legitimacy. Shall we get on?

Dr. Kissinger: We need a minimum of attractive topics. I think realistically we should begin talking bilaterally. We then could expand to Germany and France in the next round and then go on. But to expect the formal machinery to come up with something precise is ridiculous.

Sir Brimelow: Both France and Germany should talk to Washington.

Amb. Cromer: It is a vacuum.

Sir Brimelow: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We have nothing against this. We will talk with the Germans. I don't expect enormous results from this. We have not told either we are talking to you.

Sir Brimelow: We will be talking to Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Bahr is coming a day before Brandt will be here. He will be here the 29th and Brandt is coming the 1st. Jobert is coming sometime before the Pompidou visit.

Brimelow: And Jobert?

Dr. Kissinger: Jobert was at my lower level. The President trusts him. We will also talk to their Ambassador. He is playing a dual role. His role will not be put into formal channels, neither will this conversation.

Sir Brimelow: We will have to make certain that what we say is compatible with what you say. We don't want the same sentences coming out. The question of discussion is a very delicate one.

Dr. Kissinger: There have never been any discretions.

Sonnenfeldt: Don't quote from your paper.

Sir Brimelow: Yes, that is right.

Dr. Kissinger: You can assume we will use a less frank, boiled down version. We will never refer to this conversation.

Sir Trend: What do you think Pompidou and Jobert are trying to do? How do you think they will respond?

Dr. Kissinger: Favorable, that I have already talked with Pompidou about in the general sense. He agreed that after his election this would be one of his principle objectives. After the election we have worked with France on the dual tracks that we have generally followed.

Their Ambassador went home to Paris with an oral message and Pompidou specifically affirmed that he wanted a dialogue via Jobert.

With the Germans we have been somewhat less specific. We have given the Germans a one page outline of what we have in mind. The gist of the paper is that the first need of European relations is European protection until they can do without it. This view is not inconsistent with the ideas of Bahr.

Sir Trend: Did you detect from Pompidou any willingness to come in NATO?

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't get into that.

Sir Trend: This is what will be the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I have decided that this should be a practical rather than a theological issue. Integrated staffs are more important than institutional ones, these already exist.

Sir Trend: The machinery of this whole thing makes it difficult.

Dr. Kissinger: We would have no difficulty setting up bilateral arrangements with Europe, but it is so time consuming.

Sir Brimelow: There is a difficulty you will find--that people who deal with monetary matters will be afraid of this general approach, which they feel is something that could be used by the U.S. to strengthen its own bargaining position.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true.

Sir Brimelow: It is a real problem.

Dr. Kissinger: If one looks at the economic negotiations now going on... we went through this with the Soviet Union about linkage. Europe is being built up with American support and if Europe is taking advantage of us... we are on a slope on which the only issue is how steep it will turn out to be.

Amb. Cromer: Political leaders are on the necks of their technicians to

make sure that the technicians work so that what they want they may attain.

Dr. Kissinger: This can also be used by our administration as a restraint on our own. If today Flannigan sent in something re soybeans or ten grievances how could the President refuse. We need a bigger objective. We must concentrate on a few key items. Thus, it should be used as a restraint on both sides. Today take the monetary furor, it is almost impossible for our President to intervene. If he and Heath and a few others could define a key objective... The sensible way of looking at it is that it will not last until we perceive it to be in the general interest.

Amb. Cromer: The technicians are arguing with each other on facts which are extremely dubious. They are discussing a sort of political argument on how terrible life is and they are getting into political instead of technological spheres.

Dr. Kissinger: In each of these areas they are arguing--in trade bargaining we are trying to get the best position, in defense, we are going to get out, and in political coordination we are trying we are trying to get a free hand. There is just enough truth in each of these to make them plausible. The leaders have to look at the matter in a general interest.

Sonnenfeldt: Technology can create a climate where one has no choice.

Amb. Cromer: All has to be done on a high level.

Sir Trend: I agree. I don't see it being done at any level below. On the time table, what point in the year can we get together?

Dr. Kissinger: Whenever we are ready. October. We would rather defer the President's trip to Europe. It should be geared for the President's trip to Europe. We need pride in our Atlantic relationships. This could be used to promulgate as a goal for next spring or next summer. And we don't necessarily need a presidential trip to Europe. I was astonished when he announced it.

Amb Cromer: So we were, also.

Sir Brimelow: Still it will give points of discussion for the political directors.

Sir Trend: Does that exhaust the framework?

Sir Brimelow: I would like to go back to our paper. You had asked for our concept of a general framework, and this is what it is. Because it was a

general framework, it lacked facts.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't disagree with your analysis.

Sir Brimelow: We want to know which particular questions are attracting your interest? It becomes a question of priorities.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Economic areas will be imposed on us. Defense is one; energy is another, because it is staring at us. East-West relations from the point of view whether western countries can develop some concept for the plethora of bilateral negotiations that are now going on. I think we ought to decide how we will deal with France and Germany.

Sir Brimelow: Brandt will have been here.

Dr. Kissinger: It will be the same as with Heath in January. And anyway, precision of thought is not his most outstanding attribute. He and the President don't click.

Sir Trend: Energy is now a very fashionable subject. There is an enormous amount of discussion. It is wider than Europe and Japan, and it could be the bait of the Soviets. The Middle East problem is also tied up with it. How does one get the machinery to handle this?

Dr. Kissinger: On energy, we haven't any answers. When we last talked I didn't even have good questions.

Sir Trend: And now you have?

Dr. Kissinger: They are of the kind I have outlined here. I think what we should attempt to do when we meet in May is to give you some preliminary thoughts. This clearly at some point has to include the Japanese. I don't want to bother with technical aspects, but rather with the political aspect.

Amb Cromer: To be effective in political terms there has to be an exercise in joint assistance.

Dr. Kissinger: I offered last time, if you would like to send somebody over...

Amb Cromer: Political assessments have become tremendously mundane.

Dr. Kissinger: My staff and Dibona have done some work. Why not send somebody over to see if yours agrees with mine.

Sir Brimelow: (to Sir Trend) Who should we send?

Dr. Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt can act as traffic cop. Do it with Hal and Phil Odeen.

Amb. Cromer: That would be useful and it does save time. Who would it be?

Sir Trend: I will have to find the right man. What about the military thing and MBFR?

Dr. Kissinger: We do feel agreed about MBFR.

Our grievance is that we simply do not accept the proposal that Hungary is a major consideration of the West. We agree that Hungary should be protected by a non-circumvention clause. I don't agree with the view of Luns that Hungary will be a repository for the Soviets.

There is no dispute on our side that Hungary should be covered by a non-circumvention clause. You have seen the options that we have developed. You will see that we are aiming not for a big cut, but we want a common ceiling established. I have seen that we need a general approach, and I think that a common ceiling is the best approach. The common ceiling requires a disproportionate cut by the Soviets of 1-1/2 to 1 or 2 to 1. If you include Hungary and insist on a common ceiling, you have 5 to 1. You are, therefore, driven to percentage cuts. Then you will not get into very dangerous levels of cuts. We believe the maximum cut would be around 15% and we prefer around 10%. This would affect 7 - 8,000 troops in Hungary. Nobody can tell us that these troops affect the security of Western Europe. The insistence of Hungary makes it difficult to insist on a common ceiling, and forces us to make percentage cuts, which are not in our interest.

We have made a serious attempt to deal with MBFR as a security problem. We will not use it as the European vehicle of Vietnamization. We will use it for a security debate and to quiet down our domestic situation. I do so at the minimum level we consider realistic. We realize that at the precise time when it most important, all our governments are under pressure to dismantle. We think it is imperative to address the security debate.

Amb. Cromer: We think it was you who introduced Hungary anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be.

Sir Brimelow: I have here the reply of Sir Alec (Douglas-Home). He reads... (re Hungary in MBFR)

Dr. Kissinger: We will accept this.

Sir Brimelow: This is terribly important.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that. We have never had the view that Hungary should be excluded.

Sir Brimelow: This is a matter in which our Ministers are interested. They do attach much importance to bringing Hungary into MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't have to be at the table to have the area covered by a non-circumvention clause. This would certainly be a legitimate subject of discussion.

Sir Brimelow: Would you like to keep that? (refers to reply of Sir Alec Douglas-Home-- [Tab A] )

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Sir Brimelow: I think that letter calls for a reply from Secretary Rogers, not Kissinger.

Sonnenfeldt: Your people certainly stonewalled in Brussels.

Sir Brimelow: Yes, as you say, they have stonewalled. Ted Peck wrote "as foreseen, we are in the minority of one.", and we will have to consider how to reply to Luns' appeal.

Dr. Kissinger: If you can't give way gracefully...

Sonnenfeldt: How much can we put ourselves formally on paper? We have to give some assurance that we are serious.

Dr. Kissinger: We will develop a common position before the negotiations.

Sir Trend: We are disposed to reconsider our attitudes.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec will reply to Secretary General Luns unless you want a further discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's get an answer to Sir Alec.

Sir Trend: When we reach substantial negotiations, you will insure that Hungary will be covered by the non-circumvention clause?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we accept what Sir Alec has said. What we want to do now is to debate on how to phrase the non-circumvention clause.

Amb. Cromer: You can use my good office.

Sonnenfeldt: We are half way there with the unilateral Western statements made in Vienna.

Sir Brimelow: We are not happy with the unilateral statements made in Vienna.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that the substance of the issues relating to Hungary should be part of the actual negotiating position, which I assure you will be a common one.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec has said that he would be ready to accept it, but would do so with some misgivings.

Dr. Kissinger: Someday tell me what you are trying to achieve. What is it you are giving up with misgivings?

Sir Brimelow: "The attitude which we have hitherto adopted." (laughter)

Sir Trend: Now, MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to MBFR, we will put before the NATO Council a paper boiled down, but what your people saw. There are two options for third countries in a separate status. We should use the nuclear option as a building block. We do not believe that this can be presented as the only Western option. I don't think the Soviets would accept it. Therefore, we have two options; do we want to operate in two stages by the usual U. S. cut in regard to Soviet forces. Or do we want simply a cut of U. S. to Soviet forces where percentage equilibrium leads to a common ceiling on both sides.

Sir Trend: What do you favor?

Dr. Kissinger: In the first option you have 10 and 10. I favor the second option where the number of forces cut is slightly less. Option one is a 38,000 cut. We don't like indigenous force cuts. Look at what would happen in the countries concerned, we would be trading good German divisions for

second rate Czech divisions. We would on the whole prefer the second option, but we are not going to press it.

Sir Trend: How will the Russians react?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no feeling for this. Prior to the Summit they offered a 5 % US-Soviet cut. We refused to discuss it and we have never had a serious discussion on MBFR. My impression is that they are very badly organized in this and find it difficult to find a bureaucrat to propose anything.

On the nuclear package, which is not a separable package, one can make arguments for both. We have many more than can possibly be ever used. We have 5,000 in the Central Front. They can be used as a compensation for some inequality of number.

Amb. Cromer: These are ten times more than <sup>the</sup> last time we have discussed it.

Dr. Kissinger: Ten is the number that NATO has agreed on. I have my futile task to get the President to understand this. We are not going to press that at all. What is your view?

Mr. Nairne: We like the common ceiling approach and the great emphasis on European security. Where is the starting point? How do you see this beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the starting date of negotiations?

Mr. Nairne: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were to conduct a negotiation I wouldn't say anything about nuclear <sup>war</sup> first. Then you make options, and they will scream at inequality. After a deadlock we could introduce nuclear elements.

Mr. Nairne: The percentage element would be quite lower to begin with?

Dr. Kissinger: Not just to begin with, this is the only negotiation. We would pick a draft that would result in a common ceiling.

Sonnenfeldt: What preliminary proposals do you start with?

Dr. Kissinger: I hate to give up the common ceiling, I might start at that and stick at that. If you say ten, then you have yielded a principle that is dangerous.



Amb. Cromer: A common ceiling means sixteen.

Sonnenfeldt: It happens to be the only way you can get it.

Dr. Kissinger: You have the advantage of an equal cut and an equal outcome.

Amb. Cromer: But you are really in a heading position.

Dr. Kissinger: But if you start yelling about inequality where we get rid of a little more than they in the specialized weapons...

Mr. Nairne: We want something from them.

Sonnenfeldt: Obviously.

Dr. Kissinger: Our military had one option which was 40 Pershings and 60 RF-4s for 140,000 Russians. Unfortunately, we don't have the personnel to be able to negotiate this.

Mr. Nairne: The whole way that Europe looks upon tactical nuclear weapons is part of the strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what we would do with them and their number might inhibit the President from using them at all.

Mr. Nairne: I think 15% would be a high figure.

Sir Trend: Have you contemplated what would happen if no agreement is made with the Russians?

Dr. Kissinger: If we have used it to put before our people as a policy that makes sense, and we can put this before the Soviets... We will fight for it. If we can put before Congress and the public a rational plan, elaborate what our defense strategy is and the reason the Soviets won't accept it, we will be o.k.

I believe the tide is going to turn, again if it weren't for Wtaergate...

Sir Trend: There isn't much sign of this in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Look at the POWs. This is not a defeatist country. Unfortunately our intellectuals are out of whack.

Sir Trend: Is there, then, a rational defense policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and this we want more than a rational MBFR policy.

Mr. Nairne: This raises a dilemma.

Dr. Kissinger: In this country we believe we can do both. I don't know if the European Allies can do both.

Mr. Niarne: We would like to, but the prospect of MBFR makes one believe that one will have a tremendous task.

Dr. Kissinger: The great danger will be if the whole detente policy makes people think they don't need defense at all.

(There is general agreement among all present.)

Dr. Kissinger: We want to say that it is our defense effort that has gotten us the detente. This will take enormous management in our country. We can't give up the detente. You would get unilateral disarmament.

Sir Trend: Is it necessary?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is. I think we should honestly look at defense capabilities of NATO. The problems are that there is a reluctance of NATO governments to look at it honestly because it is expensive and the bureaucrats in NATO don't want to look at their infallibility.

First, why are our strongest forces defending the most scenic area?

Second, what is the real logistic situation? I have that your forces have 14 days as a consumption rate, the Belgians 28 days, the Germans 36 days, and the Americans 90. We have 120 in some and 60 days in other areas, and some general says 90, by just figuring out the average. Then I find out that the consumption rates are figured differently in each country. The British retort that they can send supplies over easily. Has any body examined this? This is against what I have understood to be desirable logistic patterns.

I don't think NATO is addressing the problem--how to calculate. Some general said that it would take 57 days to arrive at the Rhine.

Sir Trend: What nationality are we talking about?

Dr. Kissinger: One ratio I was given: American-Soviet forces remain at 1 to 1 and they concentrate against your forces. Supposing they do the Schlieffen plan.

Sir Trend: Did you ask your general this?

Dr. Kissinger: He hadn't examined it.

Amb. Cromer: Haven't they ever read history?

Mr. Nairne: There have been some talks about this.

Dr. Kissinger: But not about attacks.

Mr. Nairne: Yes, there have been some about the nature of a Soviet attack. I am astonished at a figure of that kind.

Mr. Hyland: The last war figure is 5 to 6.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to attack the generals.

Sir Trend: (jokingly) You like to.

Dr. Kissinger: That's true. (laughter) What is rational defense? Until the President knows that in a way he can believe, we don't have a rational approach.

Mr. Nairne: We have been troubled for several years about how long we can last. In theory 30 days is the agreed level, and this does lead across to the reinforcement problem. In terms of days, one is talking about a very short period of days.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that if you tell the American people all we can hold out for is five days, it is very hard to say we need all these troops.

Mr. Nairne: I have attended nuclear planning meetings; there are some agreements.

Sonnenfeldt: And demonstrations?

Mr. Nairne: This is a political exercise for the Germans, but there is some work going on to make adjustments.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no confidence that we could order the tactical use of nuclear weapons in any sense. If so, there has been a gap between NATO and us.

I have the uneasy feeling that if there a major attack in Europe there would be total chaos.

Mr. Nairne: NATO is weak in crisis management. But there has been progress in the crystalization of how nuclear weapons contribute to this situation.

Amb. Cromer: How is it that Dr. Kissinger is not able to get this information?

Dr. Kissinger: I know some of what you are talking about. I don't think there is as yet a conception of battle field use. I know there is a use of ten weapons in a demonstrative way.

Sonnenfeldt: We don't know what will happen next.

Sir Trend: To expand the use of tactical weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that we haven't got.

Mr. Nairne: Follow up use is happening. Its outcome on the whole thing is producing a kind of rationale. But by no means weakens the tactical nuclear use for strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: I know what is going to happen, we have four or five clearly defined options for strategical use. The President can say we will do one of these. There is no such thing for tactical nuclear weapons.

I must tell you honestly to go to general nuclear exchanges is something so horrendous, because it puts leaders in the position of being able to exterminate 2/3s of its population and that of the enemy's. I like to think that we would play this game as brutally as anyone. Intellectually, yes. An attack on Europe should lead logically to an escalation to a point that would lead the Soviets to make the decision that I have just described. Rather, than put us in that position. We are lucky that the Soviet leaders have been brutal, limited bureaucrats. But when a Russian Kennedy comes along...

Sir Trend: Or a Hitler...

Dr. Kissinger: Then you can see where they will go when pushed against a wall.

Amb. Cromer: There is some difference between what has been done by NATO and what you say.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally believe that NATO has a capacity for an adequate local defense in Europe and in a follow up doctrine.

These ten doctrines want the most common denominator. You have only two choices: to use force, or not to use force. If you use nuclear weapons you need to go very fast. You cannot let the enemy get used to each level of attack, because they can counter it.

MR. Nairne: Nobody would disagree with you.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have the answer. I believe that some time over the next 20 years we are going to pay the price for our transgressions.

Sir Trend: How do we lay your doubts to rest?

Dr. Kissinger: My objective is the greatest possible local defense of Europe, and to develop a strategy for tactical nuclear weapons.

Sonnenfeldt: The objective is to persuade people that you have a defense policy that makes a difference.

Sir Trend: How do you do this?

Dr. Kissinger: To get us the capability where we are respected, and to tell Congress what we are doing.

Sir Trend: Does Congress believe it?

Dr. Kissinger: You come into the malaise where you are the victim; that we don't have what we say we should.

Mr. Nairne: You can't get a Defense Minister in Europe to get money when he sees that the United States is reducing.

Amb. Cromer: That is irrelevant.

Dr. Kissinger: But there would be a reduction of the Soviets.

Mr. Hyland: The requirement for Soviet mobilization for an attack would be even greater.

Mr. Nairne: Can one assume that the Soviets would demobilize?

Sir Trend: Would you demobilize?

Dr. Kissinger: We would tell you that we would not, but we would demobilize.

Sonnenfeldt: It depends if you are talking about units or people.

Dr. Kissinger: If only people it is not so bad, but if you lose units, then it is a problem.

Sonnenfeldt: The trouble is that half of the people believe that there is no threat, and the other half believe that it is so great that they needn't do anything about it.

Mr. Nairne: I don't think they believe the latter.

Amb. Cromer: There is some sort of problem of communications.

Mr. Hyland: In regard to the initial use and follow up do the Germans agree? Don't they have reservations?

Dr. Kissinger: The danger is that this becomes so esoteric for some, that it never goes to the leaders or to the public at large. I would rather maintain our public position than to raise in public the issues I have raised here.

Sir Trend: How can this problem be tackled if you start it at all...

Dr. Kissinger: No, we can't. It would bring about what we fear most.

Sir Trend: I want to think about it.

Mr. Nairne: What is a clearer phrase for rational defense policy?

Dr. Kissinger: All I know is that for four years I have asked our people these questions, and have tried to elicit from them a coherent statement on the use of tactical weapons. Therefore, I may not be able to give you a satisfactory answer.

Mr. Nairne: No less important is the concept of how long operations will go on.

Dr. Kissinger: I feel that if the alliance cannot... It is a sign of moral collapse that they have not even standardized consumption rates. It can't be so hard. Each has very specific consequences.

Amb. Cromer: This is the responsibility of the Military.

Dr. Kissinger: They won't. I don't know what the answer is. Each country decides on the rate differently. Shouldn't it be standardized?

Mr. Nairne: Yes, but I do know how we do it.

Dr. Kissinger: I do too. We have never studied how we would organize this and how it would affect our situation. There is an aversion to face realities.

Mr. Nairne: This is a frozen subject. One can foresee things going on for three months. We don't think this is rational.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think that among each other we should know what we face? If you say 30 days and we say 90 days for conventional war...

Amb. Cromer: But you will be dead in three days.

Dr. Kissinger: I think you may be much more right than we are. Yet, you don't want to have a debate that weakens deterrents. This cannot be publicly debated.

Sir Trend: We can think about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I have no answers. What is going to happen is that our opponents will send Lowenstein. He will strangle us in Europe; he will pick up facts like these. If we take the position that defense is there or nearly there, and if he can prove that what we say is wrong, they will beat us silly.

Sir Trend: The problem is -- is defense an anachronism?

Dr. Kissinger: I see it coming. At Harvard all the people who said get out of Vietnam are beginning to hint about a force level reduction, even Hoffman and Brezinski. It is not yet organized. But a few days<sup>ago</sup> the New York Times talked about it.

Sir Trend: Is it feasible to have any rational defense policy if France is not in it?

Dr. Kissinger: I am assuming that France will be in it. We have to get the French cooperation and know where they will be. Their interest in the defense of Europe is no less than anybody else.

Mr. Nairne: We have been working on this assumption. Would they pledge themselves in principle?

Dr. Kissinger: There have been some talks between Goodpaster and the French general.

Mr. Nairne: Yes, but we need some kind of commitment.

Dr. Kissinger: It is easier for you, but we will take this up with Pompidou.

Sonnenfeldt: In the case of France, I think it will be more in their interest to be engaged.

Mr. Nairne: I think their formal position is because they don't want to influence national sovereignty over security.

Dr. Kissinger: I really don't think we should worry about the prestige, if we can just get a practical agreement.

Mr. Nairne: They have been very cautious about how they will arrange nuclear warheads on their soil and they talk in terms of deployment.

Dr. Kissinger: They can still always disengage. I would be satisfied with hypothetical planning.

Mr. Hyland: But if they have a different document than NATO...

Dr. Kissinger: If we could get them to agree, I have no way of knowing...

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You can't exceed the possibility that once they get them you can find out how they will react.

Sir Trend: If there is an understanding...

Dr. Kissinger: If France maintains the formal position that they can disengage, while the U.S. can't, the situation is hopeless.

Mr. Nairne: They have lived with this for many years.

Sir Brimelow: They are assuming that the U.S. will maintain a military commitment from which they can benefit.

Sir Trend: We can get them to subscribe to some understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it would be highly desirable.

Mr. Sykes: I have two thoughts on the nuclear problem; there are two difficulties. The first is the psychological hurdle which everyone has to get over, which I think has been achieved within limits, but has to be taken slowly. There is an inherent reluctance. Secondly, although one can establish what one thinks may happen it is simply a matter of probabilities



only. But this is not a reason for not trying to do something.

Dr. Kissinger: It is certainly a matter of probabilities. You can't make a demonstration of what will happen. But you can think of things you want to have happen. There are examples that are contrary to military history. After you have done all this, you still have the problem that you are talking about weapons that nobody has ever used. The Soviets can't know what is going to happen either. But if they figure they will use ten and then they are home free, there is a difference there. Or you are driven to the view of having 300,000 American troops there for tactical strategy. There is a need for forces large enough.

Mr. Nairne: There is the belief of many that you would be able to sustain against a major Soviet attack.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think that NATO deployment has had a cold-blooded look.

Mr. Nairne: On the central front area there is a thinness now.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Particularly because of our maldeployment.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are our forces guarding the Alps?

Sir Brimelow: For historical reasons.

Dr. Kissinger: If I sent a memo to the Pentagon for an optimum deployment of forces in Germany, they would give me 500 reasons why they can't move.

Shall we talk to you about the nuclear issue?

Sir Trend: We are frankly not ready. Some sort of nuclear cooperation with the French will be feasible.

Dr. Kissinger: We will approach it sympathetically. We would just as soon rather do it earlier, rather than later in our discussions with the Soviets.

Sir Trend: Is that a good thing?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and the President thinks that it is a good thing. Nuclear capability might as well be effective. It is not desirable that we are the only nuclear power in the non-Communist world. But what formal decisions will be made, I don't know.

Dobrynin asked me what our intentions were in the nuclear program.

MR. Sonnenfeldt: There have been many newspaper articles, such as Beecher.

Dr. Kissinger: We have removed him and given him a government job. (laughter) You have talked to the military?

Amb. Cromer: No, with Schlessinger.

Dr. Kissinger: It wasn't a big discussion, what seemed to worry Dobrynin was MIRVs. If we left that open in theory, we could use it as a concession.

On the Soviet final document on European security, they said that they have given it to the French and the Germans. France and Germany have not discussed it with us. Have they discussed it with you?

Amb. Cromer: No, nor have the Russians given it to us.

Dr. Kissinger: But they know that we have given it to you. We have your comments on the draft general declaration.

I have never given them an answer and never discussed it further and now that they know you know, do you think all four of might get together? This is our analysis of the document. [Tab B]

Sir Brimelow: Their text and your notes, and we should talk?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but let me check with the Soviets first. We should let them know because this is a private communication.

Sir. Brimelow: Only Mr. Rush knows.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The staffs don't know. The main delicacy is vis-a-vis NATO in Brussels.

Dr. Kissinger: The main problem is should we discuss this as a family? Shall we discuss what you call "hulla ballu" ?

Sir Brimelow: You sent us a copy of your last text. If it would interest you I could give you copies of drafting points.

Dr. Kissinger: This is what has happened since. They have accepted the

preambular changes that we have made. You will get a text of this. They have accepted Article 7. They object to Article 5, and I have serious doubts, also.

Let me talk about Articles 1 and 2. Article 1, what Dobrynin claims apart from the article, is that this thing has become a central theme, and he has never used the argument that this is major domestic policy before. He has never said this before. He most argued about Article 1, particularly the phrases... (he reads... increase to nuclear weapons will not be justified...) , and the second paragraph doesn't refer to nuclear weapons at all. Your objection "attach importance to", he agreed to strengthen that. He wanted a reference to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war. We were reluctant. He then wanted to say outbreak of nuclear war among themselves. I objected. He then said between themselves and between other countries.

Let me show you where it now stands. The preambular paragraph says, you don't have to give me your final work now, they have agreed to the your preambular thing.

Sir Trend: Do they still attach importance to this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Sir Trend: It has increased in importance and it is geared to the summit. Is there a date?

Dr. Kissinger: June 18. This has become almost the only thing they are pressing. They have dropped the Middle East.

We believe that we must avoid the implication that we already agreed to the exclusion of nuclear weapons in separate parts. Now this article is essentially from the declaration of principles, almost verbatim. And it includes a specific, "if exclusion between themselves, it must also be excluded between third countries."

Article 2--we want to make clear that the situation has never arisen. The preambular conditions; Article 1 is objective, and the second paragraph restates the principles. Article 2 we have changed "presupposed to proceed from the premise." Here we have a difference with the Soviets. We have attempted to make Article 1 dependent on Article 2, in other words to do both.

Article 3 and 4 is what we have had. Article 6 is what we have had also. Article 7 is familiar. Article 5 they would like to eliminate. My view is that this may have a heavy impact, for the unsubtle reader, of a condominium. How will this be read in Peking?

Sir Brimelow: Going back to the history of this, did they not put this obligation in a treaty form and ask that we put it in a treaty form? I expected them to object to Article 5 because they don't want to commit themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: My concern, do we really want them to commit themselves?

Sir Trend: Why not?

Dr. Kissinger: Because of the concomitance fear.

Sir Brimelow: Yes, you have to carry them along without engaging yourself in anything specific.

Dr. Kissinger: I have left Article 5, and have not answered their objections because I wanted to hear from you of what importance is this.

Sir Brimelow: It is not of central importance.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to put forth my worry. I doubt if we can get Article 5.

Sir Brimelow: I am sceptical of their willingness to work for a real detente. You want to keep them in place without coming to a definite conclusion. This will test their genuineness of intentions. We don't expect them to accept it.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Would it be worth getting?

Sir Trend: I think nuclear powers should study this question.

Dr. Kissinger: When I think of my Chinese clients... We can make a case for Article 1 out of principle. Article 2 can be used as a proof that they have broken something with us. This is good for a legal basis for the Chinese. Article 3, nothing, Article 4 is out of the principles. Article 5 I could have it used for the purpose you described. I understood what you wanted to achieve, and I knew what you wanted. I am not fully convinced that we want Article 5.

Sir Brimelow: It is not something in which we really believed. It was put forward as something which you couldn't come to a conclusion.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This has the smell of permanent US-Soviet machinery.

Sir Trend: As does Article 4.

Dr. Kissinger: The question I am raising is that from Peking are they going to say, "What are these bastards (Moscow and Washington) really up to? "

Sir Trend: The Chinese are included in Article 1. (He reads Article 1) Article 1 protects the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know if they want to be protected. I have stopped discussion on this, you have already told me you are not interested.

Sir Brimelow: Could we go back a bit to the statement of basic principles? (He reads.) In the long term, as far as China is concerned, it is written in the document already.

Dr. Kissinger: To establish a joint group to study and consult. What else would a condominium do?

Sir Brimelow: To meet joint exercises in control.

Dr. Kissinger: I have two concerns with Article 5. Do we mask it by calling it a study group, and do we exclude China from it?

Sir Brimelow: That is why we suggested Article 6, which leaves you free to inform us and third parties. I don't consider Article 5 essential or probable. As long as you have the right to inform third parties with what you are doing.

Dr. Kissinger: Who gains the most from the right to raise problems? If you are getting along it is useful, if you are not getting along political warfare results. Then they raise a new set of issues that we don't want to adjust to. It took us four years. We delayed the European Security Conference and we have delayed many things. Suppose they can force us to talk about something, simply as a result of the exercise of Article 5.

Sir Brimelow: I have a comment on Article 5. We don't think a study group is mandatory.

Sir Trend: You could omit "establishment of a joint group".

Mr. Hyland: What does that accomplish?

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask, and I realize that you will give us your detailed comments, how do we surface it? What do we say about speaking to you?

Sir Trend: Nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: We could say we discussed it with you when you were over here. Can we agree on that?

Mr. Sykes: And Bahr?

Dr. Kissinger: He comes over regularly to talk to me, so he cannot be that concerned. With the French we won't discuss it until we have a date for Jobert.

Sir Brimelow: We will feed it into NATO before it becomes public knowledge.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, of course, don't you think so?

Sir Brimelow: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: First, I have to feed it into the State Department.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Instructions to Peck.

Sir Trend: Why do the Russians attach so much importance to this?

Dr. Kissinger: We have to find some mode of discussion in the NATO Council before the President and Brezhnev have met. The Secretary of State will be at the NATO meeting. Wouldn't that be the right time to do it?

Sir Brimelow: That will be just before Brezhnev arrives?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, wouldn't that be the most efficient?

Sir Brimelow: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Now to tell you what is happening in the Middle East. I have given you a summary of the talks with Ismail. They have a summary of our talks to the Saudis, who have given it to our interests in Cairo, but by the time it reached them it is no longer recognizable.

They say I said that our only interest was in the uniformed personnel that cross the Suez Canal--the doormen at the Cairo hotels. This is untrue. I made a joke about this a while ago with Dobrynin. He doesn't always use the information in the most constructive way.

Since then they have never proposed another meeting. They believe two

things, which are both wrong. The first is that Israel has already agreed to a total withdrawal. And second, that the White House will take responsibility for everything. I have told them that the contrary is true. Now we are waiting to see whether they are willing to meet without this. We will keep you informed.

If so, I will meet during my European trip. All my clients are assembling in Europe at the same time. Le Duc Tho might just show up. (laughter) (Dr. Kissinger then tells some funny stories about Le Duc Tho when they were in the Hanoi Archeological Museum. Le Duc Tho showed Dr. Kissinger every archeological site in the context of an ex-jail term for him.)

Sir Trend: The Prime Minister mentioned to the President about selling planes to China.

Dr. Kissinger: We are trying to review this.

Sir Trend: So are we. The Prime Minister will write to the President.

Dr. Kissinger: In regard to the fighter planes, we are highly sympathetic.

Sir Trend: (to Dr. Kissinger) May I talk to you in private?

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

RE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

Dr. Kissinger: We continue to proceed from the view that, when we say the "Year of Europe", we mean not that this year can settle all the problems. But rather, to enable us to frame the issues so that we can help start relations develop organically, even after this administration ends.

The necessity is produced by the changed conditions caused by our success-- the impact of the detente, changes in technology, and the unification of Europe. We have held the view that these problems should not be worked on, and each dealt with on its own merit. In the economic field, the technicians will gain the upper hand. In defense the suspicion pervades that all our (MBFR) efforts masks our desire for a total withdrawal. Our aim is to see whether we can work out some form of principles and objectives, with enough progress in a few selected areas so that we can look as if we are in motion. We are trying to get into the public consciousness, in the same manner as our dealings with Moscow and Peking have been developed.

Through close consultation with you and talking with Brandt and Pompidou, we can get some general proposals agreed upon. And when the President goes to Europe we will have something that is more than a reaffirmation of traditional liturgies.

My speech will be an attempt to be constructive and will state that we are not trying to wreck the European concept, and that we are not trying to withdraw from Europe. I am afraid that if the trade negotiations take place in solely economic terms, they can be damaging. I am also not encouraged by MBFR. We want a firm, optimistic approach.

The importance of Europe to the United States is first, if there should be a Eurasia either controlled from Moscow or effectively dominated by Moscow, we would then find that all other parts of the world, especially Latin America, would fall ideologically in that order. There are profound political consequences for the United States in the fields of energy, the balance of power, and the psychological cohesiveness of the US, which would undergo unusual transformations.

I think an extreme radicalization of American society would be the outcome. Initially on the right more than on the left. This is my guess, as would be a (next Page)



substantial demoralization of the American left. I must say that this would not be perceived that way by most of our critics. We could survive by a degree of regimentation that would leave dramatic transformations.

Our ability to influence events in the world would gradually vanish. Never can we survive as an island in a totally hostile environment.

South America would be viciously anti-American. You would have a total change in Japanese orientation. China would make major accommodations. In fact, if China concluded, if either because of our performance in Southeast Asia or because of domestic troubles, that we have lost the capacity for decisive action, you may find a shift in their policy. They are an unusually pragmatic people. We will not knowingly sacrifice European interests. Inadvertently it might happen, but we would not knowingly make a deal at the expense of Europe. That is inconceivable.

I think that an accommodation between China and the Soviet Union is possible. The Soviets realize that another Mao and Chou En-lai could conceivably happen again. With 800million people, highly disciplined, to whom they have an aversion, there will be a limit. If it were to happen...I think the importance of the Atlantic relationship would be greater. All of this is true if Europe represents some complement to our strength. If Europe takes the view that it is irresponsible for our embarrassment, then we don't have to pay a price.

Our joint strategy with China;...the symbolic ties permit an American option to help China if it should be attacked. And to help China to survive to the death and disappearance of those who have originated it.

(re Soviet attack) I don't think that it is like Joe Alsop's nuclear castration. They may want to intervene in the succession struggle. The Chinese believe this; it is a passionate concern of theirs, and they are not an emotional people. Nor is it in their interest to overplay something.

The Soviets want to weaken Japanese-American ties, undermine European-American ties, to isolate China and to avoid isolation themselves. They are now pressing for a detente. What is now justified as the best tactic could turn into the real thing. We have to be open to this.

We have gained more in the short term. My view is that the pernicious German development is out of our control, and is not the result of American detente policy. If the West did not have a domestic public opinion, it could get more concessions from the Soviets.

We have to give a symbolism to our relations with Europe. We are losing an established group that has an invested interest in European ties. Look at the Amsterdam meeting, they were all men from past administrations, and will not be in the next administration. There is nothing Americans feel they can be proud of in European relations. This has become an emotional necessity for many people. Take the Masnfield Amendment, the only way we can keep troops in Europe is to throw a few babies to the wolves.

We have to get into the public consciousness that we have done something of substance, not just typical subjects such as soybeans, etc. There is a malaise that whenever we deal with Europe there is a picayune problem where noone knows where we are going. Nor have we made a great overture.

The first thing we need is to get in our peoples' minds that we want to do something substantial where Europe is concerned. Perhaps we could begin to put it at least on an equivalent basis with the Brezhnev visit and the major Chinese overtures. I have no doubt that China will make major moves toward the United States. I don't know what they will do.

They (the Soviets) will never attack us. When you look at military technology, you never can tell what temptations will come along.

The first need of European relations is European protection until they can do without it. Europe is being built up with American support, and if Europe is taking advantage of us... We are on a slope on which the only issue is how steep it will turn out to be.

If we would like a bigger objective (re grievances and soybeans economic restraints), we must concentrate on a few key items. If the President, Heath and a few others could define a key objective... we have to perceive this to be in the best general interest.

## RE ENERGY

40% of the United States, 80% of Europe's and 90% of Japan's energy comes from the Middle East. If all the oil consuming nations are going to wait for the debacle of one of the others, so they can jump in and increase their own reserves, then sooner or later we have a prescription for breaking whatever exists in industrial nations. We need some idea on how to cooperate to avoid these dangers. We are prepared to do it.

We haven't any answers on energy. When we talked last time, I didn't even know what the questions were.