New Interviews

Regime Isolates Entire Rafsanjani Family

May 1, 2012 | 1:08pm

Interview with Yasmin Alem

The daughter of the former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has been sentenced to six months in prison on charges of "spreading propaganda against the ruling system." The trial of Faezeh Hashemi took place behind closed doors in December 2011. Hashemi is a former member of the Iranian parliament. In an interview, Yasmin Alem interprets the trial and conviction.

Why was Faezeh Rafsanjani charged?

Hashemi is the most politically active of former President Rafsanjani's children. She is a prominent social activist and leading Islamic feminist. A supporter of presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi in the 2009, she participated in a number of opposition rallies after the disputed poll. Ms. Rafsanjani was arrested and briefly detained by security forces on two occasions and barred from travelling abroad. But her conviction on Jan. 2, 2012 stems from an interview with Roozonline, an opposition online newspaper. The interview was conducted after she was harassed by plainclothes security agents in April 2011. She told the opposition news website that “thugs and hooligans” were running the country. She was subsequently accused and convicted of “insulting Islamic Republic officials.” She was sentenced to six months in jail and banned from membership in any political organization as well as taking part in online and media activities for the next five years. Hashemi is likely to file an appeal. While she may be able to get her jail sentence overturned, the ban on her political activities is unlikely to be lifted.

Her sentence reflects the longstanding rivalry between two of the Islamic Republic’s founding fathers: former President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The two men have jockeyed for the upper hand—and the country’s political direction—since the death of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Hashemi’s conviction is another way for the supreme leader to pressure his political rival at a time when Rafsanjani is already at the nadir of his power.

How has the regime’s pressure on former president Rafsanjani increased in recent months?

Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s political clout has diminished significantly since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005. The campaign against him increased further after the controversial 2009 election. His son Mehdi Hashemi was forced into exile after being charged with corruption and named as a major instigator of the post-election unrest. His other son, Mohsen, was pushed to resign from his post as the director of Tehran’s metro in 2011.

The Supreme Leader has gradually stripped Rafsanjani of his official positions. The former president was first barred from leading Friday Prayers in Tehran in 2009. In March 2011, he lost his position as the head of the Assembly of Experts, an elite clerical institution responsible for selecting and supervising the Supreme Leader. A few months later, Khamenei ordered the establishment of a five-member “arbitration committee” to resolve disputes among the three branches of government. The creation of this committee was widely interpreted as an attempt to further isolate Rafsanjani, who heads the Expediency Council, a body constitutionally mandated to resolve disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council—basically the same purpose.

In December 2011, Rafsanjani’s personal website was blocked and later completely shut down. Judiciary spokesman Gholamhossein Ejeii said that the website was filtered based on the Islamic Republic’s internet crimes regulations.

On Jan. 2, 2011 Iranian media reported that the passports of his family members were confiscated at the Tehran airport, further evidence of the regime’s squeeze.

Why now? Is her sentence related to the parliamentary election in March?

The regime has ratcheted up pressure on the opposition ahead of the pivotal elections. The move against Hashemi may also be designed to compel the former president to publicly endorse the forthcoming poll and side with the supreme leader’s loyalists—effectively political blackmail. So far, Rafsanjani had not taken sides.

Hashemi’s conviction may also foreshadow a move to take away her father’s last leadership post, chairmanship of the Expediency Council. The five-year term of the council’s current members is due to expire in February. The prospect of Rafsanjani’s reelection for another term is widely seen in Iran as improbable.

The move against Rafsanjani’s family may be an effort to ensure that the former president fades quietly into oblivion.

What does this mean about tensions between Khamenei and Rafsanjani?

Tensions between the supreme leader and the former president, colleagues for a half century, may have deteriorated beyond repair in recent years. Differences between the two men came to surface during the 2005 election when Rafsanjani competed again for the presidency against then Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After the disputed 2009 election, the supreme leader publicly broke with Rafsanjani and said his views were “closer” to Ahmadinejad’s.

For the past two years, Rafsanjani has in turn basically ignored Khamenei’s orders that the regime’s elite disavow the opposition Green movement. Rafsanjani has repeatedly advocated national reconciliation, refusing to adopt the bellicose rhetoric of Khamenei’s loyalists against the so-called “seditionists” of the Green Movement.

Rafsanjani’s further isolation could facilitate Khamenei’s proposal to change Iran’s political system from presidential to parliamentary. Rafsanjani initiated changing the constitution in 1989 to create an executive president. He has recently challenged the return to the old system on grounds that it would undermine the Islamic Republic’s popular legitimacy. If Rafsanjani is marginalized, Khamenei would effectively appropriate most levers of power.

Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems.

Click here to read Yasmin Alem's latest article on Elections.

Posted by: Iran Primer

Will Iran Dare Close the Strait of Hormuz?

May 1, 2012 | 1:06pm

Interview with Michael Singh

Iranian officials grabbed global headlines in recent days by threatening to close the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s traded oil passes. Iran sought to back up its threats by holding a 10-day military exercise in the Persian Gulf and warning the recently-departed USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group not to return to the area. The United States and European Union have brushed aside Iran’s warnings, vowing to maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf and proceeding with plans to impose sanctions on Tehran’s oil trade. This heated back-and-forth has roiled global oil markets and led to heightened speculation about a US-Iran military confrontation. The following is an interview with Michael Singh of the Washington Institute on Near East Policy about the rising rhetoric.

Could Iran actually close the Strait of Hormuz?

It is unlikely that Iran could close the Strait for a meaningful period of time. Any Iranian effort to seize control of the Strait would meet swift and determined resistance from the US Navy, with the support of U.S. allies in the region and beyond. Iran’s regular navy and air force are no match for their U.S. counterparts; both would almost certainly be dispatched quickly in any outright confrontation. Recognizing this, Iran is more likely to use the asymmetric warfare capabilities of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy to disrupt shipping through the Strait and to harass U.S. forces. The Revolutionary Guards could use small boats (either individually or in “swarms”); influence mines (which do not require that a ship run into them); midget submarines; anti-ship cruise missiles; and even divers. These tactics could be a nuisance, but they are also unlikely to shutter the Strait. Yet they would probably provoke a strong U.S. response.

What would be the consequences of an Iranian attempt to close the Strait ?

Iran is unlikely to try to close the Strait for several reasons. The regime surely recognizes its military disadvantage; it is also cognizant of its own dependence on the Strait. About 70 percent of Iran’s budget revenues are generated by oil exports, all of which must transit the Strait. This fact alone would make a preemptive effort to close the Strait self-defeating.

If Iran nevertheless sought to close the Strait – say, in response to an oil embargo rather than preemptively – the consequences would extend well beyond the mere military setback of the United States then forcibly reopening the passage. Global oil prices may sharply increase, though the extent and duration of this increase would depend on the scope and intensity of the conflict and the speed with which the United States could assert dominance in the Gulf.

The United States, the presumable target of an Iranian move against the Strait, would probably suffer like the rest of the world from the effects of rising oil prices. But U.S. oil supplies would not be meaningfully imperiled. The United States imports 49 percent of the petroleum it consumes, and only 25 percent of those imports come from the Persian Gulf, far less than is available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. China, however, is heavily dependent on Gulf oil sources, particularly from Saudi Arabia. China also happens to be Iran’s largest oil customer and provides Iran with critical support in the form of weapons sales and diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Iran can ill afford to anger Beijing.

Iran would also need to consider the likelihood that United States and its allies would not stop at reopening the Strait in response to an Iranian attempt to close it; they might also target nuclear and military installations on the Iranian mainland and perhaps even seek to topple the Iranian regime. The impediments to a preemptive U.S. attack – including uncertainty about the aftermath, worries about oil markets, and the desire for diplomatic support – would be rendered largely moot by an Iranian offensive in the Gulf.

As a result of these factors, an Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz would likely have devastating strategic consequences for the Iranian regime.

What is Iran’s aim, then, in threatening to close the Strait and attack U.S. forces?

The Iranian regime – like the North Koreans and others – understands that rattling a saber can be more beneficial than actually using it. Iran’s bellicose rhetoric and behavior are aimed at both domestic and international audiences.

Inside Iran, the regime has struggled with internal divisions, a growing (if temporarily suppressed) opposition and, perhaps most urgently, a crumbling economy. The regime may calculate that provoking tensions externally can divert domestic attention from these crises. If this is its aim, however, there is little evidence that it is succeeding. Indeed, these actions may prove counterproductive domestically, as they provide the regime’s opponents with ammunition to accuse it of increasingly reckless and damaging policies. Some observers speculate that hardline groups in Iran – for example, the Revolutionary Guards – may want an actual (albeit limited) conflict to consolidate their domestic control. But so far, the regime has preferred leveling threats and working through proxies to maintain plausible deniability.

Externally, Iran may hope that its actions will produce several responses that will prove useful. First, it is relying on the United States to demonstrate restraint to avoid conflict. Iran has engaged in brazen provocations in recent years—including mock attacks on U.S. vessels, the seizure of Western hostages, and attacks on U.S. targets—that have provoked limited Western response. This restraint – along with the uncertainty about the U.S. regional posture after withdrawal from Iraq– may prove counterproductive by feeding Iranian commanders’ sense of impunity.

Second, the Iranian regime almost certainly understands that Western countries are worried about an increase in global oil prices at a fragile time for the global economy. Tehran’s actions are meant to sharpen these fears by increasing oil prices in the near-term and holding out the prospect for sharper increases down the road. The regime’s hope, presumably, is that oil-dependent countries – both consumers and producers – will focus on defusing the current crisis rather than on Iran’s nuclear program--and may delay plans to sanction Iran’s oil exports or even urge the United States to reduce its military posture in the Gulf. But the United States and European Union have thus far refused to play along, brushing off Iran’s threats and moving forward with oil sanctions.

Michael Singh is managing director of the Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council.

Posted by: Iran Primer

Iran Election Watch #1

May 1, 2012 | 1:04pm

Interview with Yasmin Alem

What is Iran’s parliamentary election schedule until the March poll?

Election activities began in December as Iran’s Election Commission announced that the Ministry of Interior established election headquarters in all 31 provinces. The key dates are:

December 24: The candidate registration period begins.
December 30: The registration period ends.
January: The Guardian Council reviews the credentials of all candidates, a process that usually takes about a month.
Late January or early February: The final list of eligible candidates – and disqualified candidates -- should be released. In the past, the majority of candidates have been disqualified for not meeting vague criteria.
February 22: The official campaign period begins and lasts eight days.
February 29: The official campaign ends.
March 2: Election Day.

Who will organize and run Iran’s latest election—and how has control over voting procedures changed over the past three decades?

Two bodies are charged with managing and administering election-related activities in Iran:

The Guardian Council has a broad supervisory role. It vets all candidates, monitors the voting process, and certifies the election results.
The Ministry of Interior implements election operations under the council’s authority. It is responsible for the conduct of elections, including establishing and operating polling stations, administering the vote, and tabulating the results.

Iran’s electoral infrastructure has technically not changed much since the 1979 revolution, but in practice the role of the Guardian Council has increasingly marginalized the Ministry of Interior. The twelve-man Council of religious and legal experts has emerged as the main arbiter of election outcomes in two ways. First, the Council has extended its powers to interpret the constitution to include supervising all stages of the elections, including the approval and rejection of candidates.

Second, the Council has transformed its temporary supervisory offices staffed with volunteers into permanent offices in every county across the country. Today, Iran has more than 384 Guardian Council supervisory offices operating year-round with full-time staff members. Concurrently, the Council has enjoyed an astronomical budget growth from $480,000 in 2000 to $25 million in 2011. The Guardian Council, dominated by conservatives, has thus morphed into the most omnipotent and omnipresent electoral management body in Iran.

What are the political undercurrents and competing interests among the government offices that oversee elections?

Over the past three decades, relations between the Guardian Council and the Ministry of Interior have fluctuated—sometimes quite seriously. Occasionally, the two bodies have had common interests, but other times they have been controlled by competing factions. Since its inception, the Council has tied to conservative factions. The Interior Ministry, however, has changed hands as part of the executive branch of government.

During the 2004 Majles elections, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council and the reformist-controlled Ministry of Interior were at daggers drawn. But the 2008 Majles elections were organized at a time that both institutions were under conservative control. The upcoming 2012 Majles elections are unique. Although conservative factions control both the ministry and the Council, their rivalries have turned the process into political fratricide.

Far from being a homogenous group, conservative factions have generally melded into broad coalitions during electoral events to maximize their share of the votes. At the onset of the 2009 presidential election, competing conservative factions united against the reformists. But after the regime suppressed the Green Movement, brewing tensions over President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s long-term political agenda re-emerged. A public rift between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad erupted in the spring of 2011 and deepened conflict among conservatives. The president’s staunchest conservative supporters quickly turned into his vocal critics. The president’s associates were charged with corruption and embezzlement and publicly dubbed “political deviants.”

Revelations about Iran’s largest banking embezzlement, scandals over corruption in the automotive industry and the alleged plundering of social security pensions fueled the conservatives’ war against Ahmadinejad. Members of Parliament have repeatedly threatened to summon the president to parliament for questioning and some have even proposed to impeach him.

In late 2011, Ahmadinejad fought back by threatening opponents with revelations about their own misconduct. He has reportedly also used state resources under his control to win over interest groups. The president and his controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, have reportedly paid between $15,000 to $40,000 to all Friday prayer leaders, who play an important role in mobilizing the faithful.

The open power struggle among disparate conservative factions is likely to make the elections more interesting or contentious than originally expected.

What are the various electoral bodies doing to prepare for the March 2012 poll? Will there be different procedures this year?

Politically, the two main institutions in charge of elections are implementing strategies intended to tilt the balance of power in their own favor.

The conduct of elections provides the sole avenue for President Ahmadinejad and his supporters to influence the election outcome. So, for the first time, the Interior Ministry is conducting training seminars for local authorities in Iran’s provincial capitals. The training is designed to enhance the technical knowledge of election officials, but it also appears to be politically motivated.

Ahmadinejad’s rivals have not been idle. The judiciary has also set up special judicial branches in Iran’s provincial capitals to ensure the implementation of election rules and the swift prosecution of electoral violators. The judiciary is, notably, headed by Sadeq Larijani, a former Guardian Council member and brother of the parliamentary speaker. State Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, a bitter foe of Ahmadinejad, heads this initiative. The Guardian Council has warned the “deviant current” against trying to manipulate the election. The new judicial procedure is widely seen as a means of providing the Guardian Council and forces close to the supreme leader with additional levers of pressure against the president and his supporters.

Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems.

Posted by: Iran Primer

Challenging the Balance of Power: Ahmadinejad vs. Parliament

October 5, 2011 | 12:31am

Interview with Hosein Ghazian

Hosein Ghazian is an Iranian sociologist and former pollster who is currently a visiting scholar at Syracuse University.

This is the eleventh in a series on parliamentary elections due in March 2012:

How has parliament’s political role—and authority--been affected by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency?

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has challenged the parliament in two of its primary roles: legislating and supervision [of the executive branch]. Ahmadinejad has refused to implement laws approved by the parliament and ignored the latter’s supervisory role.

Ahmadinejad has defended his actions by arguing that certain parliament-approved laws contradict the constitution. Technically, the approval of laws passed by parliament is the Guardian Council’s duty.

Ahmadinejad offers a legal explanation for his interpretation. He argues that Iran’s political system had been converted from a parliamentary to a presidential system after the constitutional revisions in 1989 [shortly after revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s death]. He claims that Khomeini’s description of parliament’s role at “the helm of politics” applies to the period before the constitutional change—and his death. Most legal scholars disagree with Ahmadinejad’s interpretation.

Throughout the Islamic Republic’s 32-year history, parliament’s role has never been as restrained politically and symbolically as it has been under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Ahmadinejad has not adhered to the Islamic Republic’s political traditions and has even ignored its legal boundaries and procedures. Neither former president Mohammad Khatami nor former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani challenged the Majles as much as Ahmadinejad. The legislative branch also had greater authority than the executive when Mir Hossein Mousavi was prime minister and Ali Khamenei was president in the 1980s.

How does parliament’s current role compare to that during the reformist period of President Mohammad Khatami?

The presidential and parliamentary elections are not held at the same time. So each president has to deal with two different parliamentary sessions during each term (and three sessions in their two terms).

Ahmadinejad’s two terms (2005-09, 2009- present) have so far overlapped with the seventh and eighth parliaments (2004-2008 and 2008- present). Both have been fairly similar in their formation, membership, political nature, and actions. [He will face a third session after the 2012 parliamentary elections.]

President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) also faced three different parliamentary sessions during his two terms in office. But these sessions were quite different from each other:

The fifth parliament (1997-2000): Right-leaning deputies had the majority and began challenging the reformists, although this parliament was operating in a socio-political context in which reformists were ascending. So the fortunes of the conservative faction and followers of the supreme leader began to diminish.

The sixth parliament (1997-2000): Reformists were dominant. This parliament is considered Iran’s most progressive parliament to date and tended to support the Khatami administration. Although this parliament and Khatami were able to support each other politically, they were not able to coordinate or push through political reform in the face of resistance from the regime’s unelected institutions [such as the Guardian Council that vets legislation].

The seventh parliament (2004-2008): The supreme leader had important influence on political candidates through] electoral engineering. Prominent reformists were vetted heavily by the Guardian Council plus voter turnout, particularly in large cities, was very low. This parliament was subservient to the supreme leader politically--even at the expense of losing some independence. Parliament supported Ahmadinejad laragely because of the supreme leader’s strong support for the president. Dissident parliamentarians were a minority; their voices were overshadowed by hardliners who controlled the majority of seats.

This balance of power continued until 2010 [mid-way through the eighth parliament). But in 2011, some MPs have changed their positions toward Ahmadinejad, as the supreme leader’s relationship with the president has changed.

Khamenei ended his strong support for the president after Ahmadinejad tried to demonstrate his political independence. Khamenei’s ardent supporters have now begun to challenge the president.

Parliament’s heightened opposition to Ahmadinejad also stems from a political tradition. Members of parliament tend to disagree with the administration more toward the end of parliament’s four-year term. These deputies question the administration on economic and social failures in order to increase their own popularity among people unhappy about their lives.

What issues have caused tensions between the current administration and parliament?

Tensions between the parliament and president are rooted in Ahmadinejad’s attempts to reduce the parliament’s law-making and supervisory powers. But political disagreements have recently increased.

Ahmadinejad has undermined the parliament’s supervisory role in several ways which has led to heightened conflict:

concealing or not releasing various economic data, such as information on foreign currency reserves and the amount of deposits in the National Development Fund;
refusing to answer questions by the Audit Court, affiliated with the Parliament, on the implementation of annual budget plans; and
refraining from submitting annual reports on the progress of Majles-approved five-year development plan. Even official data showed that Iran was well behind achieving its economic goals.

So parliament has been unable to supervise the administration when it does not have data. The administration’s lack of transparency has angered prominent parliament deputies such as Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and Ahmad Tavakoli, head of the Majles Research Center.

The subsidy reform plan, for instance, aims to eliminate subsidies on energy, foodstuffs and medicine, instead giving cash payments to families. Based on the administration’s original suggestion, the plan would have allowed the administration to appropriate $40 billion annually, to spend on the plan’s implementation and investment. Parliament initially halved the amount to $20 billion and placed restrictions on its spending. But the administration ultimately appropriated the full $40 billion that Majles had not approved by changing the implementation of the plan.

A constant dispute between the executive and legislative branches has centered on the annual budget. [Each budget has to be finalized by the Iranian New Year in March, so the executive branch is supposed to submit its plan to Majles for approval by the previous December or January. But] the administration has continuously delayed submission of the budget, ultimately forcing parliament to accept the budget, without much revision, due to time constraints.

The Ahmadinejad administration has also tried to buy parliamentary votes by giving financial support to a district or, reportedly, cash to specific MPs. These reports have further heightened tensions and encouraged opposing parties to further reveal information against each other.

Tension between the current administration and parliament is now unprecedented. The intensity of disputes is all the more interesting because conservatives—including the supreme leader—hope to unify disparate conservative factions in one bloc in preparation for the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections.

The 2012 parliamentary elections are considered a platform for the 2013 presidential elections, so Ahmadinejad’s opponents are benefitting from heightened opposition to the president and his chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.

Attacks against Ahmadinejad are tacitly supported by the supreme leader. With the reformists now marginalized, Khamenei views Ahmadinejad’s political task as over. Khamenei also needs someone to blame for Iran’s economic and social woes over the past six or seven years—and Ahmadinejad seems to be one of the main candidates for this purpose.

What role will the Guardian Council play in the 2012 election? Do you expect it to vary from the past?

The Guardian Council is responsible for preventing outsiders from gaining a role in the regime through elections. Like other institutions, it has obeyed the supreme leader in the role of vetting candidates, and it is unlikely to deviate in the upcoming election. The council is likely to continue cleansing the political system of opposition.

The Islamic Republic embarked in a different direction after the 2009 election; the emphasis today is less on being a “republic” and more on being “Islamic.” Regime critics now call Iran an Islamic government—in which elections are of lesser value--rather than an Islamic Republic.

The regime is in the process of redefining boundaries between regime insiders and outsiders. Some political currents are being excluded. They include:

reformists
major groups, such as the Islamic Participation Front and the Combatant Clerics Association
prominent politicians, such as like Hashemi Rafsanjani
and some of Ahmadinejad’s supporters.

For now, only those currents, forces, and individuals considered to be insiders are likely to be allowed to participate in the 2012 elections. Candidates have been rigidly vetted in the past, but this time the circle of insiders is smaller than ever.

Online news media are welcome to republish original blog postings from this website in full, with a citation and link back to The Iran Primer website (www.iranprimer.com) as the original source. Any edits must be authorized by the author. Permission to reprint excerpts from The Iran Primer book should be directed to permissions@usip.org

Posted by: Iran Primer

Women Struggle in Parliament

September 21, 2011 | 8:46am

Interview with Fatemeh Haghighatjoo

By Semira N. Nikou

Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo is a former member of Iran’s parliament (2000-2004). She is currently a visiting professor at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.

This is the seventh in a series on parliamentary elections due in March 2012:

What role have women played in Iran's parliament since the 1979 revolution?

Women in parliament can be divided into two groups: those who have a feminist conscientiousness or awareness, and those who do not.

Once we, the reformists, won the election in 2000, we began having meetings and seminars with women’s rights activists. Our promise during the sixth parliament (between 2000 and 2004) was to change discriminatory laws against women.

There were women and men who defended women’s rights. On one bill related to women’s issues, one of our male colleagues told us, “It is important that as a member of the clergy, I defend this bill, rather than you women having to defend it.” So the sixth parliament had a very different atmosphere than subsequent parliaments.

Zahra Rahnavard—then president of Al Zahra University and wife of opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi—sponsored one of our seminars. It explored which women’s issues should be prioritized in parliament. All of the female MPs formed a caucus to address these issues. Even though some of the 13 women had values, they had all been elected on a reformist platform.

But women have played different roles since in the seventh (2004 to 2008) and eighth parliaments (since 2008). In both parliaments, women have been very patriarchal. Unfortunately, they have not challenged any gender inequalities that are justified in the name of Islam. For instance, they defend polygamy because they consider it an Islamic value. They also defend segregation and the gender division of labor.

In another example, Eshragh Shaegh—a representative from Tabriz in the seventh parliament—said that if ten prostitutes were executed, there would not be any more prostitution in the country since it would be considered too dangerous or criminal.

Why did conservative women dominate the recent parliaments?

There is an unwritten rule that some women have to be candidates for parliamentary elections. Since the 1979 revolution, most political parties have included at least two women in their lists for Tehran and other large cities.

But the Guardian Council, which acts as a vetting body, banned reformists from participating in 2004 and 2008. More than 2,500 reformist candidates were disqualified. Only those seen as loyal to the regime were allowed to run. So conservative women won.

What type of women--political affiliation, religious background, social class--generally run as candidates?

Non-Islamic women cannot run for parliamentary elections, which is the case for both men and women. Only those who are loyal to the regime and the supreme leader (velayat-e faqih) can participate. So from the ideological perspective, we can say that only religious women can run.

In terms of social background, we often see women from the middle class. For example, many teachers have run as candidates.

Some female candidates have also been relative to authorities, such as:

Gohar Dastgheib (daughter of Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib)
Ategheh Rajai (wife of former President MohammadAli Rajai)
Faezeh Hashemi (daughter of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani)
Azam Taleghani (daughter of Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani)
Jamileh Kadivar (wife of former minister Ata’ollah Mohajerani and sister of Mohsen Kadivar)
Fatemeh Karoubi (wife of former speaker of Majles and opposition leader Mehdi Karoubi).

In politics, family ties are is important, and not just for women. For example, Mohammad Reza Khatami got the most votes in the sixth Majles because of his relation to the (then President) Mohammad Khatami. The two are brothers.

For example, Soheyla Jelodarzadeh (member of the fifth, sixth, and seventh parliaments) had no family connections. She represented the Islamic Labor Party (Hezb-e Eslamieh Kar) in parliament. I represented the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jebheye Mosharekate Iran-e Eslami) as well as the student movement. I was active as a student, which led to my inclusion on the political list. In most cases you have to be supported by one of the political wings.

But Iran has also had independent women who do are not affiliated with a political party and do not have a family relation.

Which women tend to get more votes?

It depends on the period. Different types of women have been voted into office, based on the atmosphere of society at the time.

For example, Faezeh Hashemi came in near the top of the list of candidates from Tehran in the fifth parliament (1996-2000) not just because she was the daughter of former President Rafsanjani, but because her campaign promises and personal actions—such as riding a bicycle—were attractive, particularly to young women.

But even though she did well in the fifth parliament election, she lost in the next election]. She played the family card; she ran as the daughter of Rafsanjani--a move that was not popular at the time.

Why has the number of female parliamentarians decreased since 2004?

The role conservative women played in the seventh parliament (2004 to 2008) caused women to question whether female parliamentarians would in fact work in their favor. The patriarchal positions of conservative parliamentarians probably affected the voting pattern. As a result, Iran did not have female candidates who could represent women’s needs and issues in the seventh and eighth parliaments.

What positions do female parliamentarians generally hold on issues affecting women—such as on divorce or controversial family laws?

Changes favoring women have often been drafted by female parliamentarians. As a general pattern, women in all parliaments have tried to liberalize the law—even if by a little bit-- in favor of women. Personal status laws, such as divorce laws, have been the main issues that female MPs have tried to revise. But each time they have only made minor changes. We still have not been able to bring equality in divorce.

The controversial family protection bill (that would allow men to marry additional women without the consent of their first wife, among other issues) introduced to the seventh parliament actually came from the government--the judiciary and the president's office.

The women’s movement in Iran has played an important role in influencing parliamentary positions on women’s issues, especially on the family protection bill. But female parliamentarians are not necessarily sympathetic toward the women’s movement. The women in the seventh parliament (2004 to 2008) and eighth parliament (since 2008) are very traditional; many support polygamy.

The women’s movement has been able to organize and speak with unity—from the secularists to the Islamists as well as from the left to the right—against issues such as polygamy, which would be allowed under the family protection bill. Why do you think the family protection bill of has been sitting in parliament for the past seven years? It has not passed because of the independent women’s movement’s opposition.

This women’s activism in society and the bottom-up pressure on the parliament and the clergy have been a success story for the independent women’s movement. They reflect how even the conservative parliament can be pushed toward policies favoring women.