New Interviews
China’s Oil Cutbacks may be only temporary
July 3, 2012 | 2:06pm
Erica Downs
On June 28, the United States reported that China cut its imports of Iranian oil by 25 percent to avoid U.S. sanctions. What impact will the cutback have on China-Iran relations, both economically and politically?
Politically, the exemption from the Obama administration is not necessarily that damaging for China-Iran relations. While China’s relationship with the United States is Beijing’s most important bilateral relationship, the Chinese government would also like to preserve a good working relationship with Tehran. The fact that the Chinese government did not publicly promise to reduce oil imports from Iran to secure an exemption from U.S. sanctions gives Beijing some room to maneuver.
Beijing can tell Tehran that it opposes the sanctions--and that the U.S. exemption does not reflect China’s support for U.S. sanctions. It can note that the reduction is due instead to a contract dispute earlier this year between Sinopec, the largest Chinese importer of Iranian crude, and the National Iranian Oil Company. As a result of this contract dispute, China’s oil imports from Iran fell by more than one-third in the first quarter of 2012.
Economically, China’s cutbacks are having an impact on the Iranian economy, as are reductions made by other countries. Iran’s crude oil exports have fallen from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2011 to 1.5 million bpd, which implies revenue losses of $8 billion per quarter, according to the International Energy Agency.
Moreover, unilateral sanctions by the United States, the European Union, Japan and other countries in 2010 have constrained China’s national oil companies in Iran. Since these sanctions were imposed, Washington repeatedly warned Beijing that it opposed Chinese companies taking over oil and natural gas projects abandoned by European and Japanese companies. China’s companies have not taken over any of these projects.
What will China’s cutback mean for Iran’s economy? Can China find alternative oil imports on a long-term basis?
China can find alternative oil imports. Earlier this year, for example, Sinopec was not buying from Iran due to its contract dispute with National Iranian Oil company. So China it bought more oil from Russia and Vietnam. Going forward, China should be able to continue to find oil supplies to replace future reductions in its imports from Iran. Saudi Arabia has increased its output; Libya is back on-line; and oil production is growing in Iraq and the United States. The decline in U.S. imports of light crudes from Africa due to increased domestic production, in theory, frees these crudes for sale to China.
The U.S. waiver of sanctions on China is good for only 180 days. China must cut back even further on its Iran oil imports to continue to get the U.S. waiver in six months. Is Beijing likely to comply? Why or why not?
It will probably be more challenging for China to secure another exemption in six months. The reduction in China’s imports of Iranian crude during the first five months of this year were due largely if not entirely to the contract dispute between Sinopec and National Iranian Oil Company. The contract dispute, which began in late 2011, was resolved in March 2012. As a result, China’s oil imports from Iran began to rise in April, and by May, China’s oil imports from Iran were back to 2011 levels of more than 500,000 bpd.
Sinopec has said it plans to buy 16 to 20 percent less from Iran in 2012. But most of those reductions have already occurred. If China continues to buy at 2011 levels this year, then China is unlikely to satisfy the U.S. criteria of “significant reduction in Iranian crude oil purchases” for another 180-day sanctions exemption.
China is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil. China accounted for 22 percent of Iran’s oil exports in the first half of 2011, averaging 543,000 bpd. How much Iranian oil can China cut back realistically without hurting its own economic growth?
China has reduced its Iranian oil imports by 25 percent from January to May 2012 without any adverse effects to its economy. There are other sources of supply, which could replace future reductions in China’s oil purchases from Iran. Sinopec may be reluctant to change the mix of crudes in its refineries, but it would not be that difficult for Sinopec to do so.
Erica Downs is a fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center.
The following is a link to her latest paper on Iran and China.
Gulf Considers Political Union to Handle Iran and Arab Spring
May 1, 2012 | 3:34pm
Caroline Crouch
Interview with F. Gregory Gause
The six oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are now considering political federation to unify their foreign and defense policies. The move, originally proposed last December by Saudi King Abdullah, is a response to growing regional challenges over the past 18 months, including from Iran, Sunni-Shiite tensions in little Bahrain, and the Arab uprisings.
On April 28, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal said the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman—will discuss details of a “federation” at a May 14 summit in Riyadh. The first step reportedly may be a federation between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
"Cooperation and coordination between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in its current format may not be enough to confront the existing and coming challenges, which require developing Gulf action into an acceptable federal format," the Saudi foreign minister said in a speech delivered on his behalf at a GCC youth event.
The GCC was created in 1981 in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Its original goals were greater cooperation in defense, finance, trade and scientific research. But deep divisions among the GCC sheikdoms have often undercut unity projects. In 2009, a proposal to create a common currency failed when the United Arab Emirates withdrew its support.
F. Gregory Gause is chair of the University of Vermont’s political science department and author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. The following is an interview in which he analyzed the motives, impact and obstacles to a GCC federation:
Why are the six sheikhdoms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) talking about a political union or federation? And why now?
This is clearly a reaction to the events of the Arab Spring more generally and the upheaval in Bahrain specifically. It can be seen in a general context of GCC fears about the growth of Iranian power in the wake of the Iraq War, but the real driver here is Bahrain specifically and the upheavals of 2011 generally. We should note that all six are not talking with equal enthusiasm about the idea of union or federation. This is very much a Saudi-driven idea and the Bahraini government is its most enthusiastic supporter. The other states do not seem as committed.
How feasible is a political union, given the history of differences among the Gulf countries? What are the obstacles? And what is the proposed timeframe—given that the GCC was formed in 1981 and still is not completely coordinated on defense capabilities?
It is very unlikely that the governments of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE or Oman would give up any real sovereign power, even if they agreed to a federation. The most likely "constitutional" change would be a coordinating foreign and defense policy committee, with an eye (by the Saudis) to replicating the European Union experiment of a "common foreign and defense policy" and a single representative (like Lady Ashton, but it would be a man) of that policy.
But the EU has had its own problems here, and the GCC would too. Each state has a bilateral relationship with its most important security partner, the United States, and that would not change. Qatar's leaders are unlikely to give up their regional ambitions and submerge them in a Saudi-led effort for long. Right now, all the GCC states are basically on the same page -- worried about Iran, supportive of regime change in Syria, looking for a soft landing in Yemen. But that might not last forever.
It is entirely possible that there will be some announcement about a federation or union plan at the next GCC meeting, but actual implementation would be far down the road. The organization is having lots of trouble coordinating on a common currency. It would have equal troubles implementing a real common foreign and defense policy.
What would a political union or federation look like? Is there a model elsewhere in the world? Is this potentially an equivalent of the European Union? How might a Gulf union differ from other regional alliances, such as the Arab League and OPEC?
It would differ from the Arab League in that there would be fewer members and thus it would be easier to reach unanimity and take actions. It would be different from OPEC in that it would tackle a range of issues, and not be concentrated on just one. I think that the supporters of the notion really do have the EU in mind as a model of economic and political integration, but I doubt that the political circumstances are such that any of the smaller state governments except Bahrain would be willing to submerge their sovereign powers to Saudi Arabia, which is what, in effect, such a union would be. Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE do not need Saudi money and do not need Saudi security forces.
What difference would a Gulf political federation make in either individual countries or the Gulf region? What would it change as far as regional dynamics with Iran?
I'm not sure there would be much change at all, except in Bahrain, where any hope for political reconciliation would go out the window. There is already a common GCC policy on a number of issues with Iran, including the UAE islands, and a common perception that Iran is their biggest security issue. There is already GCC cooperation on internal security issues, most notably manifested in the sending of troops to Bahrain to support the government by not just Saudi Arabia, but also (more symbolically) by Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.
There might be some better coordination on defense issues -- early warning systems, inter-operability on radars and the like, more joint military planning, more intelligence sharing. But since the confrontation with Iran is more political and less military, these would not be centrally important in the current context.
How much of the Saudi proposal was spurred by fears of Iran? And how much was spurred by Sunni-Shiite sectarian differences, particularly the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
For the Saudis, there is little difference right now between fear of Iran and Sunni-Shiite tensions. The Saudis see the Iranians behind the Iraqi government and Bahrain protests. The Saudi leadership sees Iran primarily in balance-of-power terms, not in sectarian terms. As recently as 2005-06, Riyadh was willing to engage Iran much more directly.
But the struggle for influence with Iran is played out in the domestic politics of weak states and divided societies -- Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen (to a lesser extent), now Syria -- where the Saudis usually find Sunni allies and the Iranians find Shiite allies (some exceptions, to be sure). So the sectarian struggle and balance-of-power politics are now conflated. The Saudis believe they have the upper hand here, given the majority status of Sunnis in the Muslim world. But such an emphasis on sectarian identity pushes Arab Shiite in Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere toward Iran, if they are not allied with Iran already.
Can Iran Replicate U.S. Drones?
May 1, 2012 | 1:14pm
Ted Wynne
Interview with Michael Elleman and John Pike
Iran claims it is reproducing U.S. stealth technology less than five months after capturing an RQ-170 Sentinel drone, the most advanced unmanned surveillance aircraft. On April 22, Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh told Iranian state television, “Our experts are fully dominant over sections and programs of this plane."
Hajizadeh also offered details of the drone’s past activities “to let the Americans know how deep we could penetrate into [the technology of] this drone," Iran’s Fars news agency reported. He even claimed the decoded data proved that this particular drone had been used to help track movements inside Osama bin Laden’s secret compound in Pakistan. “Had we not accessed the plane’s softwares and hard disks, we wouldn’t have been able to achieve these facts,” said Hajizadeh, who is commander of the Revolutionary GuardsAir Force.
The RQ-170 is an unmanned aircraft with a 65-foot wingspan, stealth technology and a single jet engine. Iran captured the drone on Dec. 2, 2011, although the United States has never confirmed whether the unmanned aircraft malfunctioned or Iran penetrated its technology and brought it down. U.S. officials did confirm that the drone operated out of neighboring Afghanistan, but did not comment publicly on widespread speculation that it was used to spy on Iran’s controversial nuclear program.
Two U.S. defense experts—Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in Bahrain and John Pike of globalsecurity.org based in Washington DC—assessed different aspects of Iran’s claims.
Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies
How difficult would it be for Iran to replicate the RQ-170 drone?
It would be taking a piece of cake and replicating the recipe or being able to determine what the recipe was.
What are the most sensitive technologies?
There are several elements to a stealth drone or aircraft. One issue is the geometry or shape of the object—trying to create an object that has no reflecting surfaces. The Iranians could copy the geometry or shape of the object.
The other issue is the material that coats the stealth aircraft or drone. Those materials are very complex electromagnetic properties. When they receive electromagnetic energy from radar, they absorb the energy received instead of reflecting it. Because of that, the materials that they use to coat it are very unique. They try to reduce the signature to nothing.
The Iranians may be able to tell what the constituent ingredients or ferro-magnetic materials are. But they won’t be able to determine the process by which they were made, which is as important as the materials themselves. It has to with the way everything is aligned structurally.
What aspects concern the United States the most?
The military and the intelligence agencies would be concerned that the Iranians can start testing the materials to see how they reflect radar energies. They can do experiments on the drone and may be able to update their radars to better detect future stealth drones. It gives them a leg up to better understand what they’re up against.
The other issue of concern is that the Iranians get to see what the sensors are – the cameras, the data links, how they communicate back to a satellite, whether the sensors are regular cameras or infrared. The sensors may have a sampling capability; they could sample the air to test what the Iranians are doing.
The Iranians now might have an ability to better screen or camouflage whatever facilities they are trying to hide. That’s the intelligence loss. Now they have a better idea of what we’re looking for and how we’re looking.
John Pike of Globalsecurity.org
Iran claims to have replicated the technology from the RQ-170 Sentinel Drone. How credible is this given the short 4-month timeframe from when Iran came to possess it?
The Iranians are notorious braggarts. It is plausible that they could have replicated the general structure of the airframe [or structure]. It is much less plausible that they could have gotten much beyond that.
The drone’s primary mission is to conduct surveillance. How will its loss impact the U.S. ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program?
It will have no impact, since the program of which it was a part surely continues.
How long would it take Iran realistically to reproduce a drone?
To reproduce the airframe would only take months. To replicate the whole thing [stealth, sensors, computers, etc], they would probably still be working on it when the Hidden Imam returns from Occultation.
What new military capabilities does this drone provide to Iran?
Without a better understanding of the range and endurance of the RQ-170, it would be hard to say. But it was built to support a US persistent surveillance requirement that has no immediate Iranian counterpart. The RQ-170 develops target signature intelligence to support counter-personnel attacks, to include attacks from other UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicle]. The United States conducts such operations. Iran does not.
How does this event affect Iranian capability to impact U.S. interests?
It doesn't.
Russia and China have both expressed interest in the drone’s technology. What is the likelihood they may have assisted Iran in its technological exploitation?
One assumes that both countries wanted to get a look-see, and that Iran obliged once the price was right. I don't think this will change the larger scheme of things.
Ted Wynne works for the Center for Conflict Management at the U. S. Institute of Peace.
Election Watch #3: Election Crackdown on Media
May 1, 2012 | 1:10pm
Interview with Yasmin Alem
- This is the first election since the controversial 2009 election and reports of a clampdown on media are increasing. What is the situation for social media and internet usage in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections?
With less than three weeks to parliamentary elections, the Iranian authorities are choking internet access in Iran. Social networking sites and international news sites have either been blocked or the connection is so slow that they are difficult to access. Email providers such as Yahoo, Gmail and MSN have been cut off sporadically, as have many sites with secure coding (https) that protects users from third-parties accessing their information. All of these disruptions have increased since the beginning of February.
The restrictions and extra filtering have even provoked reactions from government officials. On February 12, Ahmad Tavakoli, a conservative member of parliament and the head of the parliament's research center publicly criticized the crackdown on the internet and said "[t]he new filtering measure and cutting of access to the services used by most people without prior notice... will raise the ire of the people."
In the past few months, there has also been talk of establishing Halal internet, a national internet that would disconnect the Iranian population from the World Wide Web and create something like an intranet. With Halal, Iranians would only be able to access internal websites.
- Has the regime imposed similar restrictions in previous elections?
The Iranian regime traditionally permits a politically vibrant atmosphere to emerge before elections by easing restrictions on social liberties. In the months leading up to elections, it usually provides more space for debate in the press to encourage voter turnout. But this year, the regime is taking a different course. The pro-reformist daily newspaper, Roozegar, was shut down by the authorities in the first week of February after it published an interview with Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of former President Mohammad Khatami.
The government has also launched a systematic crackdown on civil society actors and journalists since the beginning of 2012. At least ten journalists and bloggers have been arrested. In recent weeks, Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, revealed that the government had identified a network of journalists who worked with the BBC and had taken them into custody. In an unprecedented move, family members of journalists living abroad, including BBC Persian employees, have been harassed, questioned and detained.
- Why is the regime increasing media and civil society restrictions at this time?
The regime appears to be worried about two separate challenges. Its first concern is countering the call for an election boycott from reformist groups and political personalities who have used social networking sites and news websites to spread their message. By restricting access to these networks and websites, the authorities may be trying to prevent the message from reaching Iranians.
The second concern is security-related. The government's clampdown can be interpreted as part of the regime's new strategy to prevent unrest following the election, and a repeat of the turmoil after the 2009 presidential election. In the past, the authorities have tried not to arrest journalists and activists or clamp down on the media prior to elections because they want to at least appear to tolerate a vibrant electoral atmosphere. The arrests have usually happened after the elections. This election season, however, the regime started its campaign of intimidation and coercion early apparently because it views the poll as a potential security challenge.
Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems.
Click here to read Yasmin Alem's latest article on the upcoming Elections.
Election Watch #2: Iran Starts Slashing Candidates
May 1, 2012 | 1:09pm
Interview with Yasmin Alem
How do the numbers of registered candidates compare to previous elections?
The number of candidates who registered for the 2012 parliamentary elections is at its lowest since the 1996 elections. Only 5,395 individuals registered to run for parliament, a 33 percent drop from four years ago. Women comprise less than 10 percent of those who have registered to run. Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, the Minister of Interior has attributed this decline to amendments made to the electoral law, such as the prerequisite that a candidate hold at least a master’s degree. Other factors include the prevailing climate of political apathy, the marginalization of reformists, and prospects of harsher disqualifications.
In sharp contrast, the number of incumbents seeking re-election is at a record high for the 2012 poll. Of the parliament’s 290 sitting MPs, 260 are seeking re-election. With incumbency rates averaging 35 percent in the last 30 years, it will be interesting to see how many deputies will be re-elected and how many will lose ground to freshmen challengers.
The elephant in the room, however, is the absence of leading reformists. In an attempt to portray the upcoming elections as pluralistic, the Ministry of Interior announced that 14 percent of registered candidates are associated with the reformist camp. Yet, two of the most prominent reformist parties have announced that they will not register for the vote. Like the reformist members of the current Majles, the candidates carrying the reformist banner are widely expected to be aligned with third- or fourth-tier reformist groups.
The Islamic Republic has a long record of family members entering politics. Who are the high profile or unusual candidates?
Four are particularly interesting. One is Parvin Ahmadinejad, the sister of the president. Tahereh Nazari Mehr, the wife of dismissed foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki, is also running.
Mohammad Reza Tabesh, the Secretary General of the Parliament’s minority faction, has also registered as a candidate. His registration came as a surprise since his uncle, former president Mohammad Khatami, had previously opined that participation in the upcoming poll was meaningless under the current circumstances.
Another high profile candidate is Mojtaba Zolnour, the former deputy representative of the Supreme Leader in the Revolutionary Guards. The majority of the high profile candidates this year belong to conservative ranks.
Who was excluded and what implications does this have?
In the first round of vetting by the Ministry of Interior, only 17 percent of candidates were disqualified. The second and final round of vetting, by the Guardian Council, is currently underway. The Council has the power to reverse the results of the first round and to reject the credentials of approved candidates.
Among those disqualified were 32 sitting MPs. Accusations that the provincial-level executive committees -- in charge of the first round of screening – acted in a partisan fashion surfaced when the credentials of President Ahmadinejad’s strongest critics in parliament were rejected. They included Ali Mottahari, Hamidreza Katouzian and Godratollah Alikhani. The first round of vetting provided Ahmadinejad’s allies the opportunity to settle old scores.
Hamidreza Katouzian, a two-term conservative MP, was instrumental in impeaching President Ahmadinejad’s close friend and minister of Interior Ali Kordan in 2008. Ali Mottahari, the son of Ayatollah Mottahari, one of the ideologues of the Islamic Republic, spearheaded the initiative to question the president, albeit unsuccessfully.
Speaker of parliament Ali Larijani has questioned the legality of some disqualifications and condemned the actions of the Ministry of Interior. Charges of unfair vetting have also emerged in small towns. In the president’s hometown of Garmsar, the five most serious rivals of Parvin Ahmadinejad were reportedly disqualified in the first round of screenings. Many speculate that the move is designed to ensure a victory for the president’s sister and prevent the risk of an electoral defeat.
What is likely to happen in the second round of vetting?
The Guardian Council has the final say on vetting the candidates, so the list is likely to change again in the coming weeks. On January 22, provincial-level supervisory committees -- under the authority of the Guardian Council – already reinstated 10 out of 32 disqualified MPs. Among the approved candidates were Ahmadinejad’s staunchest critics such as Mr. Mottahari and Katouzian. In contrast, at least two clerics closely associated with the president’s controversial chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, had their credentials rejected in the second stage of vetting.
The Guardian Council is set to release the final list of vetted candidates on February 21, only ten days before Election Day. If the first stage of the electoral process is any indication, current intra-conservative rifts are likely to deepen in the final weeks before the elections.
Yasmin Alem, an independent Iran analyst, is the author of Duality by Design: The Iranian Electoral System published by the International Foundation of ElectoralSystems.
Click here to read Yasmin Alem's latest article on the upcoming Elections.
Recent Interviews
-
02/10/2013 - 11:35
-
02/07/2013 - 12:08
-
02/05/2013 - 11:07
-
02/01/2013 - 15:52
-
01/31/2013 - 09:24
