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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft
 Ambassador John Holdridge
 William Gleysteen

DATE AND TIME: Friday, September 19, 1976

SUBJECT: U. S. -Singapore Relations

General Scowcroft said Ambassador Holdridge must find Lee Kuan Yew a fascinating man which Holdridge agreed was the case. Holdridge said he had adopted a very positive approach toward our relations with Singapore because he had been instructed to do so by the Secretary. Scowcroft endorsed the line and said Holdridge was doing a fine job of representing us.

Holdridge explained that our only real problem in Singapore was to avoid pushing for too much too fast. Lee had to worry somewhat about leftists, elections, and his non-aligned status. If, for example, we scheduled too many MAC flights through Singapore, Lee might get mad and react quite forcefully. Scowcroft suggested that we should inch our way in with a small number of sporadic flights until we got Singapore used to the idea. Holdridge said that was precisely the idea and that, fortunately, Defense now saw the light. The JCS were going to limit initial flights to two a month on a random schedule.

Holdridge said our Singapore relationship could prove very useful, though it could not substitute for a satisfactory base structure in the Philippines. If we were not able to maintain ourselves at Clark Field and Subic Bay, he feared our entire position in Southeast Asia would be basically affected. He hoped that Marcos recognized that our bases were in his interest as well as ours.

Scowcroft said he was not pessimistic about the Philippine base negotiations, at least yet. The Philippines had heard some remarks from us which

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Rev. CW 3/13/04

NARA DATE 7/29/04



probably gave them the impression that we needed a quick settlement of the negotiations for domestic political reasons, and this impression was undoubtedly playing some role in the present difficulty.

On the question of military sales, Holdridge said that the U. S. had been fairly generous but there was a tendency in the Pentagon to want a quid pro quo for everything. He himself thought we should instead seek to construct a good general relationship with Singapore which would allow us to draw on it when we needed it.

Holdridge described our naval arrangements in Singapore as coming along quite satisfactorily, which was also true of plans for handling our air presence. In this case, however, there was again a tendency by our military to be too pushy. They wanted, for example, to put in FASU (Forward Air Support Unit). This would be quite unacceptable because it would involve significant numbers of personnel and begin to look to Lee Kuan Yew like a base. Scowcroft suggested that the Australian connection should help. Holdridge agreed but noted that it had yet to be worked out. Lee would be visiting Australia in October and the Australians apparently intended to try to make some specific proposals to him at that time. Before then, presumably right now, we would have to settle with the Australians on what we have in mind. Scowcroft and Holdridge agreed we needed some periodic participation by the Australians such as Australian P-3 flights into Singapore as part of our joint interest in Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean surveillance.

Holdridge said he was surprised at the extent to which Singaporeans looked to the U. S. rather than the U. K. -- though this was a natural phenomenon reflecting objective realities. In any case, Singapore attitudes were quite favorable toward us and it was perhaps worth some effort to keep them that way. In this connection, he noted that there were "Presidential scholarships" in Singapore -- i. e., Singapore students were selected on a highly competitive basis to go abroad under scholarships provided by certain foreign countries. The British and Germans had established a program and Holdridge was trying to get CU in State interested in our participation. Scowcroft said it sounded like a good idea to him.

The conversation concluded with a brief discussion about Malaysia and Malaysian-Singapore relations. Holdridge described these as considerably better since Hussein had taken over from Razak. Hussein was more cooperative with the Singaporeans and seemed more vigorous in pursuing the terrorists. To be sure, Hussein had some real problems and might not last.

16
WJH
JTB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 21, 1976

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *✓*

FROM:

WILLIAM GLEYSTEN *WJH*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Your Conversation with
Ambassador Holdridge of Singapore

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with Ambassador John Holdridge on September 17 at 3:00 p. m.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.

APPROVE

WJH

DISAPPROVE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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BY *WJH*

DATE 7/29/04



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
9	21	9	21	14	7605251

INITIAL ACTION 0

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT _____

SCOWCROFT ~~_____~~ * SECDEF _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ MODIS _____

HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ (S) _____ CODEWORD _____

OTHER Hyster TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Removal of Scowcroft conversation w/ Amb Holdridge of Singapore

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC. CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. _____
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR PRES. _____
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR _____
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO _____ TO _____
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS _____
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO _____
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: _____
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
9/21		Scowcroft	X	Decision	(9/30)	
10/10		NSC/S	C	Scowcroft approved		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED X

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OCT 14 1976

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