

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 13, 1976
11:20 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR01-101, #25 OSD 11-3/2/04, SE 11/27/04

del NARA Date 7/20/04

Decisions on Moscow Signal

There is some merit in the claim that some of the radiation is caused by us, so we are turning off our equipment. In response, we expect them to turn off their radiation. In addition, we expect action to reduce the radiation emanating from their installations in the U. S.

SALT

Kissinger: I have just glanced at Don's memo. I see the differences as being: he wants a general statement on the grey areas. I think that is a mistake. He also wants to conclude the deferred negotiation by October 1977. I think that is not possible. I would like to work it like SALT I -- a permanent agreement on ABM and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons.

I would propose deferral to October 1981. We would say no increase in Backfire production and would defer deployment of cruise missiles. I have no objection to beginning the negotiations right away.

We and they have to decide what to do about detente. Are we going to be restrained in third areas and settle this? If so, you would tell him there are no bargaining issues in this.

CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

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The President: I think we should go with a date which is about when we are ready for deployment -- but I wouldn't sell it that way.

Kissinger: Yes. I would say that eight years are too long because we don't know what will happen on cruise missiles, just as they don't. But we are willing to try four years, which represents a unilateral restraint on us.

The President: We shouldn't set a date before we would be ready to break out if need be.

Rumsfeld: I think we really need to face up to the grey area problem.

Kissinger: I agree on the substance, but I just wouldn't face up to it now. I am afraid if we discuss all grey area systems, they will bring up FBS and the British and French nuclear systems.

Rumsfeld: I agree with that, so we don't disagree. Ultimately, though, we have to deal with systems which are peripheral and central.

We would describe the protocol as dealing with systems which are difficult and which are different in character.

Kissinger: That is a constructive way to do it. But we have to realize that for the Soviet Union, putting Backfire into any negotiation will be a massive problem.

You can say, though that they can claim it's a refinement of the Vladivostok Agreement -- because SLCM's clearly aren't in that Agreement.

Our negotiating position by 1980-81 should be strong -- they can't do much to accelerate Backfire and we can break out on cruise missiles.

The President: Let's start with 1980, but let me see the deployment data.



P/K/R

13 Jan 76



Decision of Unusual Signal

+ Some merit in claim some of radiation caused by us so we turning off eqs. In response we expect them to turn off their radiation. In addition we expect action to reduce radiation emanating from their installations in a US.

Salt

R. I have just glanced at Davis memo. I see a difference as being: he wants a joint statement on grey area - I think that a mistake. He also wants to conclude agreement by Oct 77. I think that not possible. I would like to work it like Salt - OBR program & a interim agreement.

I would propose agreement to Oct 81. We would say no in the interim production.

Deferral of deployment of CVs. I have no objection to say: negot right away

Plan to decide what to do about detents
Are we going to be restricted in
3rd news & settle this? If so
you would tell him there was
bargaining room in this.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY Per mR 01-101, #25

BY Ma NARA, DATE 8/17/09



P I think we should go w/ a date which is about when we are ready for deployment - but I wouldn't pull it that way.

R Yes. I would say that's quite long because we don't know what will happen on this - just as they don't. But ^{we're willing to try} we're 4 years, which represents a real constraint on us.

P Well, shouldn't set a date where we would be ready to break out if need be.

R I think we really need to face up to a grey area problem.

R I agree on substance but I just wouldn't face up to it now. I fear if we discuss all grey area systems they will bring up F/B M+F systems.

R I agree w/ that, so we don't disagree. Ultimately tho we have to deal w/ systems which are peripheral & central.

We would describe protocol as dealing w/ systems which are different ^{in nature} and which are different in character.

K That is a constructive way to do it. But we have to realize that for a SC, putting Backfile into any system will be a massive job.

You can say tho that they can claim a requirement of U.S. - cause S.F.C. is clearly active in that.

Our negot position by 80/81 should be strong - they can't do much to accelerate Backfile & we can break out on this.



P lets start w/ \$0, but let me see deployment
data.

In treaty & AHCAs (see other aft Com com
AHCAs same than 600)

(all other aspects of inc protocol)

