

*Scowcroft file*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT FORD  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, December 18, 1975

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: At NATO I presented detente as a combination of conciliation and firmness.

Giscard invited me to a private dinner. He is concerned about Angola. They will recruit mercenaries, provide gunships, and put mirages into Zaire.

At the very moment when the Soviets begin to blink, the Congress is going to cut our legs off.

Zaire and Zambia were very upset at Moynihan -- who is a laughing stock and a disaster in Europe.

I am purging the African bureau, after the NY Times article [There was further discussion of State and Defense leaks].

The President: How about a veto if they pass the bill? I could say it was hasty action, and make the point they are toying with the national interest.

Kissinger: We are living in a nihilistic nightmare. It proves that Vietnam is not an aberration but our normal attitude. When our critics can complain about the volume of SS-19s and cave in Angola, when they can try to change the Soviet internal structure...

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B(1), (3)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON July to det.

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Bureau 3/14/04  
 BY [Signature], NARA DATE 1/14/04

The Soviets have become a superpower. Before World War I, the emergence of Germany as a major power brought about a war. We have to manage the emergence of the Soviets to a superpower status without a war. We are being deprived of both the carrot and the stick. We will lose Angola and then they will want us to cut off grain to the Soviet Union. We are losing all flexibility and we will soon be in a position of nuclear war or nothing.

President: I couldn't agree more.

Kissinger: No one will ever believe us again if we can't do this. How can they believe we will back them?

[Discussion of Woodward article in the Post about the circumstances of the Nixon pardon.]

Kissinger: I would recommend to take on the Congress on the national interest. We have little to lose. It was inevitable there would be a Soviet overture -- now they are laughing at us. We would have had Angola settled by January if these bastards had not been in town.

President: The more I think of it, the more I think I should veto.

Scowcroft: A veto threat is keeping the bill from being passed.

President: But if we veto and get it sustained, we can at least show that one-third of the government is with us.

Kissinger: We have several problems: even if you veto, we are out of funds.

[Discussion of tactics on veto, delay, and getting \$28 million.]

Kissinger: If this works, I would send Schauffle to Africa, go to the UN Security Council in January with a program. We have to be careful about withdrawal of foreign forces.

[The President calls Mahon on Angola reprogramming action.]

President: He was wafflie at first, but I got him back on the track. We will get the Subcommittee down here. I think we can make it.

Kissinger: It is not just Angola. I think when you make a decision it is the responsibility of each agency head to pull his department in line. They will do the same thing in SALT.



On SALT, I think we cannot count Backfire, we must have a position on cruise missiles, and I must have negotiating flexibility in Moscow. The Pentagon position is to leave out Backfire, and cruise missiles. They lose both ways that way; it counts Backfire as within SALT and lets the cruise missiles run free. They might as a last ditch effort.

President: I talked to Don and the JCS.

Kissinger: Brent said you were terrific.

President: I talked to Don. He promised to work with the JCS and he says they are committed to coming up with some new sillos.

Kissinger: They must stop treating me as the soft guy. If they take it seriously....

President: Give them a chance.

Kissinger: I think we can get an agreement and sell it.

One other point. Levi is hell bent to bring suits against companies that are doing business with the Saudis. You have to understand the Saudis don't care -- they will shift all their orders to Europe. [Described the boycott Presidential statement.] The Israeli strategy is to defeat you and so embroil us with the Arabs that whoever comes in will be paralyzed.

Scowcroft: There is a big package you approved which was designed to hew to the legal line.

President: Get that paper out and let's look at it.

Kissinger: In substance we are in good shape. Your relations with Giscard are fantastic. With Europe it is great; Angola is no problem with them. We are having a break-through on Cyprus. The NATO meeting was terrific -- they showed a degree of unity which is unprecedented.

President: Are they changing on Spain?

Kissinger; Yes. And Giscard is one of your strongest supporters.

We have a sick press now and it isn't helped by the White House group. They ought to be positive.



P/K 18 Dec 75

K They judgment is - at NATO I presented details of coalition & finances. General invited me to a private dinner. They will discuss arrangements, provide guarantees, & put things into force. At

at every moment when I do begin to blink, & they are going to cut our legs off.

Zaire & Zambia were very upset at Angolan - who is a hanging stock & a disaster in Europe.

I am purging a African bureau from a bad Arab article (described state & def leaks)

P How about a veto if they pass a bill? I could say it was hasty action - make a point they are trying w/c mutual interest.

R We are living in a nebulous environment. It poses that UK is not an observation but an normal ~~is~~ attitude. When an article can explain state w/c of SSYI + even in Angola, when they can <sup>get change</sup> ~~change~~ a ~~same~~ without structure, but <sup>can't</sup> ~~can't~~. We have to manage a ~~analysis~~ <sup>analysis</sup> of 502 to super power status w/c war. We are being deprived both of a carrot & a stick. We will lose Angola ~~then~~ <sup>then</sup> they will want us to ~~close~~ <sup>cut off</sup> gain to - 50. We are losing all flex & we will soon be in a position of no war or nothing.

P I could but agree more

R We ~~are~~ one will over believe us again if we can't do this. How can they believe we will back them.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *state review 3/11/04*

BY wh NARA DATE 6/4/04

Lee Galt's outline to Pres.

How Senate approach reprogramming?

(Discussion of W. Schramm article about Nixon pardon).

K I would recommend to take on a Congo or a North interest. Use him little to lose. It was inevitable there would be a Sov overture - now they are laughing at us. We would have had Angola settled by Jan if those bastards had not been in town.

P The same I think for a case I think I should veto.

S (Vote on buying a bill from being passed)

P But if we veto & get it reauthorized we can at least show that 1/3 of the Coast is w/ us.

K We have ~~2~~ several pots: Even if you veto, we are out of funds.

(Discussion of tactics on veto, delay, getting it mil.)

If this works, I would send Schramm to Africa, go to UNSC in Jan w/ a prog - hard to hear about (Reals Unation on Angola) <sup>w/ demand of foreign forces.</sup> reprogramming action)

P He was waffler at 1st but I got him back on track. We would get a substantive dinner here I think we can make it.

K It isn't just Angola. I think when you make a decision it is a rep of each agency head to pull his dept in line. We'll do some thing in Salt.

On Salt, I think we ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> not count Backfire, we must have a position on CM's & I must have negot flex in Moscow.

The Pentagon position is to limit out Backfire & CM's. They use both any other way - confront

Bankers as well in Salt & lets EN's run free.  
They might do a last ditch effort.

P I talked to Don, and c JCS

R Brent & will you ever trip.

P I talked to Don. He promised to work w/ c JCS & he says they wanted to evening up w/ some concessions.

R They must stop ~~to~~ treating me as a soft guy. If they take it seriously...

P Give them a chance.

R I think we can get an agreement & sell it. One other point. Levee is hell bent to bring suits against companies doing business w/ Saudis. You have understood c Saudi's don't care - they will shift all their orders to Europe. (Decisional & boycott Pres. statement).

The F strategy is to defeat you and so neutral as w/ c Arabs that whenever crisis in will be paralyzed.

S ~~As~~ There is a big package you approved which was changed to how to a minimum line

XX P Get that paper out & lets look at it

R In substance we are in good shape. your notions of Grand are fantastic, w/E we are it is great, maybe no prob. we having break-down on Cyprus. NATO unity was terrific - a degree of unity which is unprecedented

P Are they changing on Spain

R Yes. And Grand is one of your strongest supporters.

We have a sick press now & it isn't helped by a lot of groups that they ought to be put out.