


MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant
to the President

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, November 19, 1975
9:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: Our relations with Japan are now in a class by themselves -- unbelievably good.

The President: Here is a Japanese magazine of the Emperor's visit. [He showed it to Secretary Kissinger.]

Kissinger: In the records, the major achievement will be the tightening of the bonds of the West.

David Brinkley said you are in good shape. The shakeup didn't hurt you at all. Reston agrees. You will come out fine in New York.

I'm having Murphy tell Asad he has to hold out til '77. If he wants a negotiation on the Golan, we will do so. If he wants to work with the PLO, we can't do it before 1977, but we can send a private person to talk to them. If they want a negotiation in conjunction with Jordan, though, we would support it. I haven't told Israel that, though I think they will be upset.

I don't like the boycott statement. Can't we lower the profile? The Jews are going all-out to get us embroiled with the Arabs. We also have a problem on the arms. Our studies show they don't need any additional equipment.

Scowcroft: This will make it difficult in handling the issue.

The President: Can't we let the Congress know what the situation is?

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Scowcroft: It will certainly leak.

Kissinger: But I have to testify in support of it, and you recommended it.

The President: Yes.

Kissinger: On the China trip: We are planning only one substantive meeting per day. There isn't that much to say.

The President: I want to be well prepared.

Kissinger: Brent, tell Solomon that the meeting with Mao should not be on the first day. Tell him to suggest it subtly with the Chinese.

President: Could you get the records of my meeting with Chou En-lai in 1972, with Hale Boggs?

Scowcroft: We'll get it.

Kissinger: We will have by tomorrow a book of all with Mao conversations and selected other ones.

Tell Solomon to try not to have Mao meeting on the 1st day. I would not banter with him. He is very subtle and says nothing without a purpose.

The President: Should I, since they are pro-Schlesinger, talk about Rumsfeld's testimony?

Kissinger: No, I don't think we should be defensive about it. I would say there is no Kissinger policy, no Schlesinger policy -- only a Ford policy.

The President: I agree.

Kissinger: I would be very tough on that. You are totally in charge.

The President: You are right.

Kissinger: We need an NSC meeting on the DPQ issue. On nuclear weapons in Europe. Schlesinger wanted to take them out. This should be in the NSC system.

Only heavy bombers can have cruise missiles over 600 kilometers in range. We could agree to counting as MIRV any bomber with ALCMs over 600 kilometers. Also SLCM's. Then we reduce the aggregates to 2300 -- that's equal to 100 Backfire. Then get a letter saying they will only deploy 1200 MIRVs. They plan to build 400 Backfire, so this would get them 300 free but they couldn't put longrange cruise missiles on it.

The President: Going from 2400 to 2300 is good from a perception point of view.

Kissinger: We could probably get them to buy it if we let the Backfire go.

You are meeting Wilson today on the 200-mile limit. Gravel has done a really good paper on it. I know you have a tough political problem.

The President: It's a tough political problem either way. I will listen today. I would rather have no bill down here. Where is it?

Scowcroft: The SFRC reportedly negatively 7 - 6. It is going to Senate Armed Services, which will probably report negatively.

Kissinger: Church's assassination report will be approved tomorrow. It will be a disaster.

The President: Can't we get our friends to set it straight?

Scowcroft: Only Hyland has seen it thus far.

Kissinger: The trend is against us in Angola. I think we should appeal for a cease-fire to the OA U and the Soviet Union. Colby is blackmailing us.

Solomon * Not 1st day, see page 2 with
* Get information of Pers. w/ Chom + at all (Boys).

P/K 19 Nov 75

9:15 am

2

K Our relations w/ Japan are now in a class by themselves - undoubtedly good.

(Pres. showed a Jap magazine of Empire inst. Jap records a major achievement will be a tightening of a bond of a west.

Beinabe said you are in good shape. The shakery hasn't hurt you at all. Boston agrees. You will come out fine in NY. I having trouble to tell Assad he has to hold out till 77. If he wants a negot on Colson, we will do so. If he wants to work w/c PLO, we can't do it before 1977, but we can send a private person to talk to them. If they want a negot. in negotiation w/ Jerusalem, then we would support it. I haven't told I that, tho they will be upset.

I don't like a boy with statement. Can't we have a profile? The Jews are getting all out to get us embroiled ~~in~~ w/c Arabs. We also

(Assad) have a pull on a arms. Our studies show they don't need any additional equip.

S This will make it dif. handling the event

P Can't we let the Cong. know what's sit. is?

S It will naturally leak

But I have a testify in support of it, and you know. It P, yes.

K On PRC, we planning only 1 sub entry (flag)

There isn't that much to say

* P I want to be well prepared (secretary)

K We will have by tomorrow a ~~list~~ book of all a Mass concentration of selected others ones.

Tell Solomon to try not to have two entry one 1st day. I would not bother w/ him. He

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NARA date 11/9/00 By KSH

→ NSC mem on DPA
you are having?

is very subtle + says nothing w/o a purpose.

P Should I, since doing pre-Schles, talk about
Rosenfeld's testimony.

R No, I don't think we should be defensive
about it. I would say there is no K policy, no
Schles policy - only a Ford policy.

P I agree.

K I would be very tough on that - totally in
charge.

P You are right

we need on NSC mem on CDPQ issue. (Described it
K DPA to Pres, who had not remembered a pub.

NSC structure

SOWT

Only many banks can handle M's over 600 km.
We could agree to counting a MIRV as
four of R/CMS over 600 km. Also
SLCM's. Then reduce aggregates to
2300 - that equal to 1000 Baskfire. Then
get a letter saying they will only deploy
1200 MIRV. They plan to build 400 Baskfire,
so this would get them two's free, but they
couldn't put LR CMS on it.

P Going from 2400 to 2300 is equal from
perception point of view.

R We could probably get them to buy it if
we let - Baskfire go.

You are meeting Wilson on 200 mile
Grand has done really good paper on it. I
know you have a tough job ahead of you.



- P It's a tough prob. put either way. Small
history today. I would rather have no bill
than have. What is it?
- S SERC reported negatively 2-4. It is going to
SASC, which will put report negatively.
- R The assessment report will be approved
tomorrow. It will be a disaster.
- P Can't we get our friends to set it straight.
- S Only Hyland has seen it thus far.
- R The Tribunal is against us in Angola. I
think we should appeal for case - file
to OPU & SC. Colby is blackening me