

Scowcroft 6/22

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

OSD Rev. 3/30/05

MR05-07 #2 of Renewal 3/11/04

By del NARA Date 6/22/05

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 3, 1975
9:20 a.m. - 10:13 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: We are flooded with phone calls. I have instructed my senior staff to make no statement at all. Schlesinger has obviously been very active.

President: He or Laitin obviously called Jackson, McClellan, Goldwater, and Thurmond. It confirms the wisdom of my decision. I am comfortable with the decision and I am going ahead.


Kissinger: I think it important that the thing not be portrayed as a fight between me and Schlesinger or a victory by me.

President: I haven't written anything out, but I planned to say from the outset I have been worried about intelligence, and so on.

Kissinger: How about Nelson? Is that happening?

President: He is coming in at 10:30 with a letter stating that he won't stand for elective office. Elliot I asked to be Finance Chairman. He asked also to replace Morton eventually. He said no today but would think about it.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: What a patriot. As you know, I have no use for him.

President: I agree, but with this Nelson thing I had to balance it out with something for the Liberals.

But back to the announcement. I will say I have been concerned about intelligence procedures and I wanted my own team in the vital national security area.

Kissinger: I think it is important to stay out of personalities so he [Schlesinger] doesn't look like a knight in shining armor.

President: I have no intention of allowing that. I will emphasize that this was all my decision. It was, as you know. I just couldn't work with Jim any longer.

Kissinger: Here is a paper on the 200-mile fisheries zone. Even if you find it persuasive, you may want to have a meeting of your principal advisors.


President: Let me read it first, though I am inclined to a meeting.

Kissinger: The fishing people don't really understand all of the ramifications. We are making progress on limiting catches -- which would go by the board if we made a unilateral move. My people think we could turn some people around with a determined effort -- like Gravel, who has the same constituency as Stevens.

On Angola, we are doing amazingly well. All the ports but Luanda are surrounded.

On the Spanish Sahara, Algerian pressure has caused the Spanish to renege. Algeria wants an Atlantic port and there are rich phosphate deposits. The Algerians have threatened us on their Middle East position. We sent messages to the Moroccans yesterday. I think we should get out of it. It is another Greek-Turkey problem where we lose either way. We could tell Hassan we would entirely oppose him; that might stop it but it would make us the fall guy. Or we could force Waldheim forward.

President: I think the UN should take on more of these problems. God damn, we shouldn't have to do it all and get a bloody nose.



Kissinger: The UN could do it like West Irian, where they fuzz the "consulting the wishes of the people", and get out of it.

President: Let's use the UN route.

Kissinger: We may have another problem in British Honduras. Callaghan gets emotionally involved in these things. He wants British Honduras independent and he has a resolution in the UN. But the British can only send 200 troops in and Guatemala can defeat that. I think we should try to get a compromise out of it. I think we can.

President: On coffee, I will go with you, but let's have a meeting tomorrow to hear all sides.

On the South Africa thing, it is a close call, but I think it is time we move just a bit.

Kissinger: As you know, on substance I am uneasy about squeezing South Africa the way we are. It isn't a big thing.

Scowcroft: We don't have to make a big deal of it. I think it is just a matter of our export license.

President: Let's go ahead on that in low key.

Kissinger: On China, I think these changes, which Bush explained to them, may be taken as a slap at Mao, because of Schlesinger. There was a cool tone and they may not be willing to announce the trip tomorrow.

President: Was my trip yesterday [to Jacksonville] worthwhile?

Kissinger: You are in great shape with Sadat. At any other time, what you are doing would be heralded as a great achievement.

President: Sadat said he planned to work very closely with the Saudis.

Kissinger: What you have done is remarkable. Also, Martinique, Vladivostok. All of these things have been dumped on because of domestic politics.



President: Our foreign policy is in great shape.

Kissinger: Plus coming out of a total debacle in Vietnam and six months later we have recovered as a world leader.

I will give a speech in Pittsburgh next week to outline and foreshadow the Economic Summit.

President: Good idea. I notice the Soviets are in worse trouble on grain.

Kissinger: I am worried about them. Their note [on SALT] is a real stonewall and they haven't even answered about a meeting with Gromyko.

President: You notice I subtly cautioned Sadat about the Soviets and Gromyko.

Kissinger: It was very well done.

Sadat would like you to come about the end of March.

President: Let's hold off a bit on that.

Kissinger: You would get a fantastic welcome and you could go places Nixon couldn't, like Algeria and Morocco.

I talked to Hyland. He will do it.

President: Have you checked the record? We have to be very careful.

Scowcroft: He has always been in analysis, never operations.

President: I want him to really pitch in. You [Brent] have been overworked badly and I want Hyland to take some of that burden and get the NSC staff in top shape. I want to rely on the NSC system and I want it to be a top flight operation, with much less burden on you, Brent. At some point, I would also like to meet with the NSC staff. I really know nothing about them. It is a very shadowy organization.

Scowcroft: They work over in the EOB. It would be a great morale booster for them to meet you.



✓ P/K 3 Nov 75

K We are flooded w/ phone calls. I have instructed my senior staff to make no statement at all. Schles has obviously been very active.

P He or his team obviously called Jackson, Mr. Bolton, Bolbin, etc. I think I'm suspicious & wondering of my decision. I am comfortable w/ the decision & I am going ahead.

K I think it is important that a thing not be portrayed as a fight bet me & Schles or a meeting by me.

P I haven't written anything out, but I planned to suggest from a outset I covered about intell. p.p.

K How about Wilson? Is that happening?

P He coming in at 10:30 w/ a letter he won't stand for electronic office. Elliott I asked to be finance chairman. He asked also to replace Winton verbally. He said no today but would think about it.

K What a patriot. As you know I have no use for him.

P I agree, but w/ this Wilson thing I had to balance w/ something for a future.

But back to a comment. I would say I covered about intell procedures & would say our terms in this intel world security area.

K I think it is important to stay out of presidential ~~to fight~~ so he doesn't look like a target in shiny armor.

P I have no intention of advising that - I will keep

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Per. ew. 3/11/04

BY lh

NADA DATE 6/16/04

~~Peter~~

Angola - How much money have we in?
What are our options in respect to Ess and left?

Colby

Realized that this was all my decision. It was, as you know, I just couldn't work w/ Jim any longer.

K There is a paper on 200 mile fisherie. Even if you find it persuasive, you may want to have a copy for your principal advisers.

P Let me read it, the 200 mile included to a copy.

K ^{The} fishing people don't really understand all the ramifications. We are making prog on limiting catches - which would go by a board if we made unilateral & more. My people think we could turn some people around w/ a determined effort - like Gornel who has some constancy as Stennis.

On Angola we doing amazingly well. All parts but ~~know~~ ^{know} ~~surround~~ ^{surround}.

On Sahara, Algerian pressure has caused Spanish & ~~single~~. Algeria wants an ~~exclusive~~ ^{exclusive} part, & there are such prospects ~~against~~ ^{against}. The Algerians have threatened us on ~~the~~ their MIE part. We sent Toller to knockers yesterday. I think we should get out of it. It is another G-T part where we lose either way. We could tell Hassan we would entirely offer him. We might stop it but would make us a fall guy. Or we could face a ~~adhering~~ ^{adhering} ~~pressure~~ ^{pressure}.



X Sched coffee mtg tomorrow

P I think the UN should take on some of these jobs. Good damn we should know how to do it all & get a bloody - war.

K ~~to~~ The UN could do it like West frank where they freeze "consulting - assets of the people" + get rid of it.

P Let's see, UN stuff.

K We may have another part in Br. Honduras. Euzelpan gets eventually involved in these things. He wants Br. Honduras input & has a resolution to UN. Best Brats can only send 200 troops in + Guatemala can depart that. I think we should try to compromise out of it. I think we can.

P On coffee, I will pass you but later have a mtg tomorrow to hear all sides.

On South Africa thing, it a hot call but I have tried it twice and means ~~are~~ just a bit.

K As you know, on foundation I am uneasy about squelching S.A. & very aware. It isn't a big thing.

S We don't have to make a big deal of it. I think it is just a matter of an X license.

P Let's go ahead and that later hey

K On China, I think that changes, certain kind of demand to them, may be taken as a slap at them, because of Schlos. There was a hot time & they may not be willing to

Plan work

40 ^{lines} ~~lines~~ WP pro for Portugal & think we should try to get the best & provide approx WP & talking with 50-60,000

an ~~and~~ a trip tomorrow.

P Was a trip yesterday worth while?

K You are in great shape w/ S. Lat. at my other time but you are doing ~~well~~ ^{well} but would be ~~hard~~ ^{hard} to do part a ~~short~~ ^{short} trip.

P S. Lat. would be ~~good~~ ^{good} to make ~~it~~ ^{it} w/ a Sardinia.

K What you have done is remarkable. Also

Washing, Red. All have been dropped on ~~to~~ because of domestic ~~politics~~ ^{politics}.

P Don F. is in great shape. ~~F. is~~ ^{F. is} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~you~~ ^{you}

K ~~matter~~ ^{matter}, plus economy, and if ~~it~~ ^{it} a total debacle in UK & 6 mos later ~~they~~ ^{they} are ~~have~~ ^{have} increased as world leads.

(Outline your summit in Pitt speech)

P Good idea

I notice S. Lat. in wave ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~year~~ ^{year}.

K I worried about them. Their vote is a real straw man & they haven't even answered about ~~it~~ ^{it} w/ ~~Germany~~ ^{Germany}

P You ~~wrote~~ ^{wrote} I ~~sent~~ ^{sent} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~to~~ ^{to} S. Lat. about a ~~few~~ ^{few} ~~days~~ ^{days} ago.

K It was very well done.

S. Lat. would like you about end of month.

P Let's hold off a bit on that

K You would get fantastic ~~advice~~ ^{advice} & you could go places ~~like~~ ^{like} ~~Algeria~~ ^{Algeria} & ~~Tunisia~~ ^{Tunisia}.

~~very~~ ^{very} ~~well~~ ^{well}



K I talked to Hazelwood. He will do it.

P Have you checked the record? we have to be very careful

S He has always been in emergency, work ops.

P I want him to really pitch in. You (Burt) has been overwhelmed lately & I want Hazelwood to take some of that burden & get - NSC stuff in top shape. I want to rely on the NSC system and I want it to be a top plate operation, with much less burden on you, Burt. At some point, I would like to meet with the NSC staff. I really know nothing about this. It is a very shallowly organized.

S They are over in EOB. It would be a great small meeting for them to meet you.