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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia  
Milos Minic, Vice President of Federal Executive  
Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Amb. Lawrence H. Silberman, U. S. Ambassador  
to Yugoslavia

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, August 3, 1975  
7:35 - 9:00 p. m.

PLACE: Federal Executive Council Building  
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Tito: I would like to say again how happy I am to exchange views with the President and his associates and to welcome you here. I am only sorry it is for such a short time. I hope there will be some opportunity for you to visit Yugoslavia unofficially.

President Ford: I am most grateful for your personal welcome and for the welcome of the Yugoslav people. My return to Belgrade brought back many memories of twelve years ago when I had a chance to meet many people in your government and establish a relationship. May I congratulate you on your speech and presiding at Helsinki.

Tito: And may I say the same to you as well.

President Ford: I wish we could stay longer. Mrs. Ford and I would like to return again and enjoy the beauties of Yugoslavia.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

RV 104 NARA DATE 5/24/04

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~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Tito: I would like to hear how you would like to proceed. We don't have much time tonight. I think our bilateral relations are good. We discussed international relations in Helsinki. Maybe we could talk about the future.

The President: I agree, Mr. President, that our bilateral relations are excellent. Maybe we could expand on what we touched on earlier -- Greece and Turkey and the Middle East. Those are areas where the threat of conflict is great and the dangers that it could bring are very serious. Maybe we could discuss these things.

Tito: The Middle East is the most troublesome point. I feel that there is some deterioration and that the situation could get more and more complicated. Since it is the most serious, I would suggest discussing it tomorrow.

Perhaps we should discuss security in Europe and what we should do to promote it. I think that after Helsinki the moral factor will become important. I have heard that there has been, for example, some new progress between Greece and Turkey in Vienna. I hear there was also progress at SALT.

The President: Yes. We made some progress. Not as much as we hoped, but I think sufficient to lay the ground work for an agreement this year. The issues are very technical. While I had hoped for more progress, we did make some and I am reasonably optimistic.

Tito: These talks were just in passing then.

The President: Yes, but we are hoping they will lead to something in finality. We are also concerned about MBFR. Do you have any advice for us in this crucial area? We are deadlocked.

Tito: I know very little about them other than the fact that they are deadlocked. Perhaps Minic can give us something more.

Minic: I know little more about it. But Palme has made a proposal that the two sides should reduce on each side.

We think reduction would be good also.

Tito: I think there is a connection between the reduction of arms and Helsinki. Otherwise we haven't done much.

The President: I assure you that we will do our best. We have a formula and we will attempt a breakthrough. We think the spirit of Helsinki should push the negotiations forward.

Tito: Reduction of arms certainly falls within the Helsinki concept. It is important not to let things stagnate.

Minic: Some progress should be made. Otherwise the spirit that we now have would be dissipated.

The President: There was some implication that CSCE would be followed by MBFR. Not an agreement to do so, only an implication.

Kissinger: So far each side has proposed disarming the other. But we will put forth a serious proposal this fall and should make some progress.

The President: We have turned it off for this year but the Congress, if there is no progress, will renew its efforts to make unilateral force cuts. I will resist, but it could happen.

Tito: I couldn't believe the Congress would do such a thing.

The President: My Administration never will. But there are members who would do so. Thus far they are a minority.

Tito: In 1977, after your elections, there will be a summing up of the Helsinki follow-on.

The President: I am looking forward to attending it as President.

Tito: All the international conferences held in Belgrade have been successful. For example, the first non-aligned conference.

Kissinger: It is now bigger than the two blocs! It's the biggest bloc now.

Tito: It is not a bloc. [Laughter]. There have been some rocky days in the non-aligned group, but we will get by. It is not good to be exclusive groups. We will discuss it tomorrow. I would like you to understand our position.

The President: I know you can imagine how much time I, and I assume Brezhnev, have spent working to implement the Vladivostok accord. We think that dividing the world into blocs is not the best way to deal with the

problems. In the kind of world we live in today, there can't be the kind of confrontation and military activity which took place during your time and mine. I will dedicate myself to eliminating those sources of conflict that could lead to military confrontation. Our orientation will be that way.

As I was saying earlier, I recall Dulles saying how important it was to establish a good relationship with Yugoslavia. Over the years that relationship has grown and expanded and been highly beneficial to both sides and to the world. The American people as a result have developed a great affection for the Yugoslav people. The American people -- if I can say it in the right way -- sometimes don't understand criticism of our actions. The feeling for Yugoslavia is very strong, and under those circumstances criticism is easily misunderstood. So I would hope we could each moderate our statements.

Tito: I quite agree. A criticism can be expressed with friendly words or in a not friendly way.

Minic: Yugoslavia is entrusted with the preparation for the 1977 Conference so we will need consultation with all the parties.

The President: We will cooperate completely.

Minic: In past times we have had close cooperation between the foreign ministers and the ambassadors of our two countries.

Kissinger: I agree. We hope to continue to consult -- and we will consult before the Special Session next month because we want to make a constructive effort.

Tito: We also want to be constructive. We have had many contacts with the heads of government in Helsinki and with others with whom we have disagreements, and we agree we won't let the press lead our relations. But if there are differences, we will meet and talk them out.

The President: I have a very close and personal relationship with Secretary Kissinger. There are no differences between us. And the Ambassador is my appointment. He has my full confidence, so we have a good situation.

Tito: That is the best way -- only a few sources for passing information.

The President: At the top, information should come to me through the Secretary. But Ambassador Silberman does have my complete confidence.

Kissinger: We attach great importance to the understanding between Yugoslavia and the United States, given the standing of Yugoslavia in the non-aligned world, and we will do our best to say in close contact.

Tito: Let's close until tomorrow.

P/Tito. 8/13 1993  
T I like to say again how happy  
to exchange views w/ this access &  
to welcome you here. Only sorry  
it is such a short time. Hope  
some effort to visit offgo  
unofficially

P Most grateful for your personal  
welcome & welcome of 4-10 people.  
Return to Beograd brought back  
many memories of 12 yrs ago when  
I had done & met many people  
in your govt & establish relationships  
May I suggest you or people &  
meeting at Helsinki.

T And you  
P I wish we could stay longer. Mrs  
& I would like to visit again  
& enjoy beauties of Yugoslavia.

T I would like to hear how you would  
like to proceed, we don't have  
much time tonight. I think  
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As discussed - until relations in  
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BY: [initials]

NARA DATE 5/24/04

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Minic I know little more. But  
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side.  
We think reduction would be  
possible.

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reduction of arms & Helsinki. Otherwise  
we haven't done much.

P I assume you <sup>will</sup> do our best.  
We have a formula and we will  
attempt a breakthrough. We think  
a spirit of Helsinki should push  
a report forward.

T Reduction of arms certainly falls  
within a Helsinki concept.  
Important not to let things  
slip away.

Minic Some prog should be made. Otherwise  
a spirit we now have would be  
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P My admin never will. But there are members who would do so - thus for a minority.

T In 1977, after your election, there will be a swimming cap of the H. Simki follow-on.

P I looking forward to attending as Pres.

T All a world conf. held in Bograd has been successful. For example, the 12th was alleged conf.

K It is even bigger than a 2 bloc - the biggest bloc now.

T It is not a bloc (laughter)  
There have been some rocky days in a non-aligned group

but we will get by. It was good to be an executive group, we will discuss tomorrow - I would like you to understand our position.

P I know you can imagine how we to trust I & I assumed Biz how spent working to implement Vlad. We think dividing world into blocs is not best way to deal w/ prob. In kind of world we live in today, there exist a kind of expansionist & rival, a treaty which takes place during your time & mine. I will dedicate myself to discovering these sources of conflict which would lead to rival. Cooperation: our orientation will be that way. As I was saying earlier, I recall Decker saying how important it was to establish a good relationship w/ Yugo. Over a years that relationship has grown & parallel & even highly beneficial to both &



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The feeling for Yugo is very strong &  
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T I quite agree. A criticism can be  
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Minie Yugo is interested w/ prep. for  
1977 Conf so we will need  
consultation w/ all the parties.

P We will try everything.

Minie In past times we have had  
close conf but a foreign minister  
& a Amb of our 2 countries.

K I agree, but I hope to continue  
to consult - & will hope a spec-  
session will work because

we want to make a constructive effort.  
T We also want to be constructive.  
We have had very contacts w/ hands  
of Govt in Helsinki & w/ others w/  
whom we have agreements &  
we agree we want better press and  
our relations but if there are diff, we  
will meet & talk them out.

P I have a very close & personal relation-  
ship w/ K. There are no diff. but  
no. And a Amb is my opponent. He  
has my full conf, some time  
a good situation.

T That is a best way. Only a few  
focus in preparing info.

P At the top, info should come to  
one then Secy. But Salomon  
does have very complete conf.

R We attach great importance to  
understanding each Yugo & US given  
standing of Yugo in the world  
and we will do our best to  
stay in close contact.

That's also what we