

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDSMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Amb. Hermann F. Eilts, U. S. Ambassador
 to Egypt
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
 for Political Affairs
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday, June 21, 1975
 9:20 - 10:22 a. m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

Secretary Kissinger: The Syrian may have seemed tough to you, but he seemed more willing to go along with our strategy, if we have one, than ever. This is the best meeting we have had with them; we all agree. They are anxious for you to meet with Asad. Maybe in Vienna. They prefer Austria, but it can't be Salzburg.

Mr. President, I thought Hermann should give you a frank assessment of what we now face.

Ambassador Eilts: When I saw this map cold, I thought Sadat would be very upset and negative. He has been saying for a year he had to have the passes -- and the oil fields, but especially the passes. They are different from the oil because of his military. He is committed to the Army on getting the passes.

In connection with my presentation, I will ask that I speak only to Sadat and Fahmy, but he will probably insist on Vice President Mubarak, who is the Army's eyes and ears.


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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/9/04
 BY NARA DATE 5/20/04

~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



Sadat will say this is worse than they were offered in March -- when they didn't show us a map. The only new elements are the two company positions, but still under Israeli guns. They [the Israelis] are insisting on military positions on the western slope of the passes.

There is even a difference between the two sides on how long the passes are. Egypt considers the Giddi to be nine kilometers long; Israel goes further west. The Mitla Egypt says is 21 kilometers; Israel says it's longer.

At some point, Sadat will explode -- or implode, as he does. This is where his heart problem comes in.

He will review this in light of Salzburg. He is euphoric about his meetings with you. Now, he will say, "Is this the best the U. S. can bring forth after three weeks? What kind of reliability can we put in the United States?"

The President: What should we do?

Ambassador Eilts: He has been looking to us to present a plan ever since December. We could now ask him whether he would want us to present an interim plan or to go to Geneva with a comprehensive plan, with the understanding that not much can happen for 18 months. I think we must offer to put forward some plan.

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you present a plan, you must accompany it with an aid package not exceeding last year's -- \$600-\$700 million.

The President: I was thinking of this last night. It seemed to me we should submit the aid bill with no more than last year, and whatever we think Egypt needs.

Kissinger: But it all needs to be done together. The only thing the Israelis understand is aid levels -- otherwise they will go on debating us forever. Their duplicity is unbelievable. When we were debating my meeting Gromyko on 7-8 July, Rabin knew he was to be in Germany 8-11 July and he said not a word.

Sadat must understand that we can't impose an interim settlement and six months later ask for something on Golan or a comprehensive proposal.



An Egyptian-Israeli Agreement would also explicitly be discriminating against Syria. We would, before going that way, have to consult with the Saudis to prevent Arab coalescence over this.

You don't have to decide right now. I am instead thinking that if Sadat rejects it, you should then send a letter to Rabin. We will be drafting one.

I had Dinitz put to Rabin moving the Egyptian line forward to encompass the two company forward positions and Rabin has rejected it.

Here are the talking points I would propose that Hermann use.

[The President reads the Talking Points at Tab A].

The President: If the Israeli Cabinet fell, and they had elections, what would happen?

Kissinger: It would be a mess. It would take nine months to sort out. If Rabin went into the election, he could win overwhelmingly. If he was soft, Peres might become the Prime Minister. As Prime Minister he would be more conciliatory than Rabin. But for nine months your hands would be tied.

The President: What would happen to Dayan?

Kissinger: Dayan in opposition would be a massive problem. As Prime Minister, he would settle. He is the only one who would settle on the Golan. He said in '67 that as long as Israel held the Golan, the conflict with Syria would continue and Israel had to decide whether it wanted war or peace.

Ambassador Eilts: What Sadat can never understand is why the United States, which provides Israel with everything, cannot move them.

Kissinger: Because Israel thinks they can work their way with the Congress. And we must remember this is a carbon copy of the strategy Israel pursued against Rogers in '71.

The President: As I indicated yesterday, unless Sadat accepts this, which I think he will not, we should indicate we will put forth an interim plan. We then are in a better position at home to show we went the last mile. We can show the equipment deliveries last fall, and so on. That protects our flanks and puts us in a better position to go to a comprehensive plan.



Kissinger: I would hold back just for now talking of an imposed American plan. I think maybe it's a better tactic to write formally to Rabin asking for reconsideration. If you take Israel to the mat, it's 55-to-45 they will accept it -- but then we are in real trouble with respect to Syria. We couldn't go again on the Golan in a year. Writing Rabin a letter I strongly favor. You could do it in such a way that it is almost an American plan.

Mr. Sisco: You can go back and recite what our presumptions were on the passes and the oil fields.

Kissinger: It puts you in a good position.

The President: The night of the dinner, Dinitz and I got off together and I asked him where their military installations were. The impression I got from him is that the area they are really concerned about is in the vicinity of the airfield, east of the passes.

Kissinger: The Israelis have gotten the whole issue of the passes totally confused. Before Egypt could make an assault, they would have to get across the Canal. By then Israel would have mobilized. They have decided politically not to do it. They have pocketed the American warning station and the non-use of force.



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A



Talking points for Eilts
6/21/75
10

I

A. The talks between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin were protractive and intensive.

- Initially scheduled for June 11-12, they were continued in Washington for one more day.
- Additionally, Secretary Kissinger saw Rabin when he was in New York on Sunday, June 15, for further clarification of the Israeli position.

B. This is the map the Israelis gave us after these protracted efforts. I have been instructed not to comment until we hear your reaction to the Israeli proposal:

- Show him the map which the Israelis say was their proposed line at the end of March, but point out that no such map was given to us during the March talks. In comparing the two maps, explain, without endorsing, the following proposed changes in the Israeli position since March 1975.

- 1) Israeli forward defense line is farther east than that indicated in March. (Note: In the Secretary's judgment, an additional 2-2 1/2 kilometers in the passes may be



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State Dept. Guidelines

State Review 0/9/04

NARA, Date 5/20/04

By [initials]

- attainable, but only on the last shuttle. Absolutely nothing should be said about this, since premature disclosure could cause Israeli Cabinet eruption.)
- 2) A continuous Egyptian land link with the oil fields and Egyptian civilian administration in a UN supervised demilitarized zone is accepted.
- Show him the Egyptian road and the area where the Egyptians can construct an extension to the road to connect their northern area with Abu Rudeis.
- The Israelis want a monitoring station at Hamam Faraun. (*Will probably settle for us*)
- 3) One Egyptian company at the western end of the Gidi and Mitla passes with weapons and fortifications organic to one company. (Note: Rabin would be willing to go to two companies each, but only on the last shuttle).
- 4) U.S. manning of the present Israeli monitoring station and a second U.S.-manned Egyptian early warning station constructed in the UN zone.



5) Limited armaments zone

-- Size of forces will be the same as at present, but number of tanks can be increased 70-76 to match number agreed to in the Syrian agreement. (Note: If it is a matter of a thousand additional troops, this can probably be gotten.)

II

A. The Israeli Government now clearly seems to be inviting a counterproposal. Should President Sadat wish to present one, we will be happy to transmit it.

B. Assuming Sadat's reaction is negative, Ambassador will indicate that we, too, are bitterly disappointed with the Israeli attitude.

-- The above is what has been obtained with American pressure.

-- The Israeli domestic political situation is such that too much pressure would probably result in the resignation of the Israeli Cabinet. The resultant state of flux would simply delay matters further.

C. Conscious of the shortcomings of the Israeli proposal, and especially as it relates to your long-stated requirement for the passes, we considered whether to present it



to you to decline to do so. We opted to present it to you without recommendation on our part. Failure to do so would make us vulnerable to an Israeli charge that we are prejudging their offer. This, in turn, would harm the constructive role we are trying to play.

D. We want you to know that we remain committed to prove to you that working with us is of benefit. As President Ford has said, we will not permit stalemate or stagnation to develop in the peacemaking process. We have two alternatives and would welcome your views on how we should proceed.

1) We could present a U.S. interim agreement. This would put the Israelis at the eastern mouth of the passes. The chances are even that the Israelis would turn it down. It would take enormous pressure to attain it. (If we say to the Israelis, aid will be kept at the levels of last year in return for an interim agreement, *preclude further similar pressure for* this would be bad.) Our public presentation of such a position would be almost impossible.

-- If that is what Sadat wants, we are willing to consider it. In that case, however, he must give us his pledge that he will exert all of his influence to keep the Arabs

*some
yunt*



for about 2 years.
quiet in ~~1976~~ and into 1977. Arab
before
pressure in ~~1976~~ will seriously under-
mine President Ford and the role we are
trying to play. ~~It would play into~~
~~Israeli hands.~~

2) The second option is to go to Geneva where we would almost certainly be willing to put up a proposal for an overall settlement. The date for reconvening could be decided between us.

-- In putting forward an overall agreement, we could say with respect to extraordinary aid for Israel that it cannot be justified until such an agreement is attained.

-- It is unlikely, however, that any such agreement can be achieved until 1977 or later.

Here again, however, it is essential that President Sadat assure us that he will exert all of his influence to keep the Arabs quiet in ~~1976~~.

The intention or else we will be accused of having undermined the ceasefire.



✓ P/K/E etc / Sisco

21 June 20

9:20-10:22 a.m.

K The Syrian army show turned tough to you, but he seemed more willing to go along w/ our strategy if we have another war. This is a best bet we have had w/ them, w/ all eyes. They are anxious for you to meet w/ Assad. Maybe in Vienna. They prefer Austria, but it can't be Salzburg. I think Hermon should give you a frank assessment.

F When I saw this map called I that Sadat would be very upset & negative. He has been saying for a year he had to have a peace - and a fulfilled, but lose passes. They are dig from a hill because of a mt. He is entitled to a Army on a pass.

In connection w/ my presentation, I will say that I speak only to Sadat & Fathi but he will not insist on ^{or} Ambarrow, which is Army eyes & ears.

Sadat will say this is worse than they were offered in Munich - when they didn't show us a map. The only new elements are a

~~map~~ 2 carrying positions, but still small I guess. They are insisting on creating positions on a Western slope of a pass.

There is even a dig bet a 2 on how long a pass is. E considers Ciddi & how, F goes further west. Whether E says is 21 km, I longer.

At some point, Sadat would explain - or

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/06, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *State Review 3/9/04*

BY , NARA, DATE 5/22/04



implode, as he does. This is where his heart
problem comes in

He will survive this in light of Salzburg. He
is emphatic about his vote w/ you. Now, he
will say, is this a best a bet we can bring forth
after 3 weeks. What kind of reliability concerns
put in a US

P What should we do.

E He has been looking to us to present a plan since
Dec. We could now ask him whether he
would want us to present an interim plan or to
go to Geneva w/ a complete plan, w/ understanding
that not much can happen for 18 mos. I think
we must offer ^{to put forward} some plan.

K I think if you present a plan you must
accompany it w/ and not exceeding last year
(6-700 mil)

P I was thinking of this last night. It seemed
to me we should submit a bid bill w/ no
more than last year, & ~~and~~ whatever we think
E needs.

K But it all needs to be done together. The only
thing I understand is air levels - otherwise they
will go on debating us forever. Their duplicity
is remarkable. When we were debating my
only George on 2-8 July, Robin Power he
was to be in Geneva 8-11 July & he said
not a word.

So let us understand that we can't insist



can maintain attachment & say was later out
for something on Golan & a concrete proposal.
A E-I agreement would almost explicitly be
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forward to Enayass & 2 company forward further,
& Rabin has rejected it.

However the T.P. I would propose that the same use
(Pleads)

P If I submit full, ~~and~~ & they had election, what
would happen

K It would be a mess, would take 9 mos to ~~start~~^{start out}
If Rabin went into election, he would win
overwhelmingly. If he was soft, Less might become
PM. As PM he would be more conservative than
Rabin. But for 9 mos your hands would be tied.

P What would happen to Dayan

K Dayan in opposition would be a massive prob.
As PM, he would settle. He is the only one who
could settle on Golan - he can't, as long
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& I had to decide whether he would work a peace.

E What Sadat can never understand is why

c US, which prevents I w/ everything, cannot move them

K Because I think they can work their way w/ a long. And we must remember this is a broken copy of a ~~book~~ strategy I presented against Rogers ~~and~~!

P As I indicated yesterday, unless Sadat accepts this, which I think he will not, we should initiate what will put forth an invasion plan. We then in a further position at hand to show we want to last mile. We can show a long distance last fall, etc. That protects our flanks & puts us in better position to go forward.

K I would ~~not~~ hold back just ~~for~~ ^{but} for now talking myself US plan. I think maybe a better tactic to write formally to Rabin asking for reconsideration. If you take it to a unit, 55-45 they will accept it, but then we are in the hands w/ respect to Syria. We could go again on a unit in a year.

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Since you can go back & write our promises on ~~the~~ passes & oil fields.

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P The night of a dinner, Denny & I got off together & I asked him where their mail installations were. They really don't ~~have~~ the impression I get from him is that I am very concerned

about is in vicinity of airport, east of a pass.
K. That line pattern a whole ~~area~~ ^{area} of a pass
totally exposed. Before E could make an assault, it
would have to get across a canal. By then I would
have mobilized. They have checked previously not to do it.
They have pocketed a US warning station, with a
of force.

