

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NARA date 11/7/00 By dal

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, June 9, 1975
9:22 - 10:24 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: The Vice President made a mistake in not consulting with you before releasing his report on CIA. We probably made one in not saying Friday you would release it.

President: I will say tonight that it will be released and that the assassination data will go to Church. Rummie thinks I should do it today.

Kissinger: I don't think so. That would open your press conference totally and you can't know the answers.

Church is going to turn the investigation into a review of all of foreign policy. He has asked for all the strategic estimates since '64 and the intelligence warnings of crises.

President: Maybe we should stop it if we can. I don't know the legal aspects. Let's find a place to draw the line.

Kissinger: We should have a meeting without you to draw up a strategy, and then meet with you.

President: Good. Let's do it. [Gen. Scowcroft left briefly and then returned]

Kissinger: Nahum Goldmann's views are that Israel will never back up except under overwhelming pressure. If the Klutznick meeting goes well, you might consider meeting with them. It is quite a group. Goldmann says there is nothing we can do through the Presidents Group. They are too committed.



SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

They are very upset about the letter of the 76 Senators. They thought it was a great mistake. Even Ribicoff thought so.

President: Who started it?

Kissinger: Javits with Dinitz. It was designed to bring pressure on Congressmen like Percy, and you.

I have tried to give you a fair analysis in this package. I don't think you should get into aid. Tell them you can't talk aid until you know whether or not you are supporting a stalemate. They are projecting a conciliatory air. I think you should be very stern -- whether you were misled or not, you were deeply disappointed. Next, the leaks and proselytizing with Congress and the public here is unacceptable. Then say you must know within two weeks whether or not an interim agreement is possible. We have a window with the Soviets until CSCE and I wouldn't let it drag out.

I think we are in good shape for a comprehensive settlement. Ribicoff says the Jews couldn't stand against you if you went on TV stating an American position. He spoke very highly of you and he thought only Kennedy would have a chance against you. And Kennedy's life is such a mess that it would be a real problem.

President: Some people are prone to mistakes. He can't make good judgments under pressure. He doesn't plan it -- it just happens.

Kissinger: It's almost as if he punishes himself.

President: The odds are he will make another public mistake.

Kissinger: Back to the Israelis. Their capacity to misrepresent is so total that it's hard to know how they will hit you. I think they might say they will accommodate if Egypt will change its position. Then they will leak the Egyptian position and we will be in a hassle. We should do it the other way around. Ask them what they want; if they say non-belligerency, say forget it. If it's about duration and warning sites, say he and I should talk about it.

President: How about American manning of the warning sites?

Kissinger: I would leave that to the last, as a major concession. Don't give it during the meeting. They should then send Allon back over with the answers to the questions we need. They shouldn't spend more than a week.



He will also want to tie you down to a figure, and a commitment not to make an overall proposal. That you can't do.

President: How about a move with Syria?

Kissinger: If he is willing to go for a Syrian one, we can avoid a comprehensive proposal. If not, I would say we have to go to Geneva. Don't tell him we would put forward a comprehensive proposal, but just say we would consult with them closely, but keep open the option.

My meeting with the SFRC was an eyeopener. They were very deferential, and every few sentences there was a comment about the success of your trip.

The Israeli Cabinet has said it would stick with their March position unless Egypt made some changes in its position.

The first day I would be very tough -- say there's no sense talking economics. Rabin's nerves are not that good. He is smart and shy, but he's not all that tough.

On aid, we have a really good paper. The \$2.6 figure they gave is phony. With \$1.5 they can meet their military purchases and still have A GNP growth of 4%. I think we should keep them on a tight leash and give \$1 billion if they come across. If they don't...

President: Keep them to the level of this year.

Kissinger: Right.

On Greece and Turkey, the Turks have decided they won't do anything until July 5.

President: That is our hardest problem. We must plot a strategy after the Rabin visit to get it through the House.

Kissinger: I think we could live with release of FMS and the cut-off of grant.

President: There were two comments the other day -- Broomfield wanted a time limit.

Kissinger: Three months is hopeless; nine months maybe.



President: The other was the refugee problem.

Kissinger: We can't get movement on refugees--we only can give them aid.

President: Let's look at putting a refugee package together with the FMS package. Have you people do it.

Kissinger: The Cyprus parties will meet again in July. That will be the last one unless we bring pressure on the Turks, and we won't do that without movement on aid. We could stand some clause for review by next spring. If we could get the bill through July, you could really put the heat on Demirel.

You know you are seeing Ceaucescu on Wednesday. He is a tough little guy, who runs the most Stalinist regime in Europe.

President: That is not the impression.

Kissinger: Inside be tough; outside be tough with the Soviets. Show him as much consideration as possible.

We are having a big fight on MFN for Romania. I wouldn't raise this first. If he does, tell him it is his domestic issue and you would just as soon leave it to the end. There are two problems, just like with the Soviets: Congress wants us to say we received assurances; that they won't do. They will tell us what their practice is. Next they want an increase in the rate of emigration. That is only a problem for them in yielding to pressure. At the end you could tell him your problems. But if he gives in when the Soviets refused, he can be accused of selling out. But he wants MFN. Emigration is down to about 60 per month. It has been as high as 300 a month. It may actually be that the Jews are hearing stories of life in Israel.

On the Mideast, anything you say will get to the Arabs.

On PLO, you can tell him that sooner or later we know we must talk to the PLO.

On CSCE, he will urge for some permanent follow-on organization-- we don't want it, and neither do the Soviets.



If he wants to, he can put on an unbelievable reception for you.

President: Does he speak English?

Kissinger: No. He is a little, cocky guy. He may raise North Korea. You can say if North Korea recognizes South Korea, we are willing to talk to them, but not if there is a chance of war. You could say you want to have the same special relationship with him as Nixon had. You could say you are considering going to Romania following CSCE, or what does he think?

President: I see the Soviets have made concessions in CSCE.

Kissinger: They did on Basket I and earlier they gave us 250 kilometers, up from 180 kilometers. I have let Callaghan and Genscher know this. If it works, we could have a Summit Conference about the 23rd. I have said 2 1/2 days of formal meetings to have it longer than that without any accomplishments would be bad. We will get a press beating here anyway. You should see Brezhnev -- maybe you can wrap up SALT.

Gromyko wants to meet me. The Middle East will be humiliating for them. I plan to see him on the way there, before my shuttle. If I do, maybe you should make a speech on the Middle East before I see Gromyko.

On the Prepeon, we are getting into a disagreement with France. They want to turn it into a super conference which deals with everything. We want the two commissions (on raw materials and economic development) other than energy just to monitor; France wants them integral. We will try to beat the French in the IEA.

On oil prices, there is no issue now. We have heard nothing about a \$4 price rise. The Saudis are hinting they might want to hold the line. You know what the Shah is saying. Simon is hinting that he can bring prices down. The only leverage we have is to cut off military equipment, and that would be self-defeating.



→ Q+A on 14 pages
Q+A - And P. promise Salat 67 photos

wednesday & Schlos - lunch tonight at 6-5:30 P/K 9 June 75
Mon. 9:22 - 10:24

K He made a ~~report~~ mistake in not consulting w/you.
We ~~prob~~ make one in not saying Friday you would
release it.

P I will say tonight it will be released and that ~~assess~~
data will go to Church. Kenneth thinks I should do
it today.

K I don't think so. That would open your press w/ry
to Kelly & you can't know answers.
Church is turning the invest into a ~~subset~~ ^{summary} of FP.
He has asked for all the ~~stat~~ estimates since 64 and
the ~~entire~~ ^{entire} ~~summary~~ ^{summary} of cases.

P Maybe we should stop it if we can. I don't know
legal aspects. Lets find a place to draw a line

* K We should have a meeting w/you to draw up a
strategy, and then meet w/you.

P Good. Lets do it
(I left)

K Goldman's views are that they will never back up except
under overwhelming pressure. If the Kitznick entry goes
well, you might consider w/ry of them. It is quite
a young group. Goldman says there nothing we can do than
the ~~President's~~ Group - they are too committed. They are
very upset about a letter - that it was a great mistake.
Even Kevioff that so.

P Who started it.

K Janits w/ Orin. It was designed to bring pressure
on Cong like Perry & you. I have tried to give you
a fair analysis in this package. I don't think you
should get into aid. Tell them you can't talk and
until you know whether or not you are supporting
a statement. They are projecting an ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~emulating~~
air. I think you should be very stern - whether
you were misled or not, you were deeply
disappointed. Next, a leak to ~~people~~ ^{people}
pressing w/ Cong & people is unacceptable



Then say you must know a/ in 2 weeks whether a fast interview is possible. We have a window a/ says till CSC E and I wouldn't let it drag out. I think we are in good shape for complete settlement.

Rehrhoff says a Jones can't stand against you on TV stating a position. He spoke very highly of you & he thought Kennedy would have a chance against you. And Kennedy's life is such a mess that it would be a real job.

P Some people are prone to mistake. He can't make good judgments under pressure. He doesn't plan it - it just happens.

K Almost as if he punishes himself.

P Odds are he will make another public mistake.

K Back to the I. They are their loyalty to misrepresent is so total it hard to know how they will hit you. I think they might say they will accommodate if E will change. Then they will walk E position & we will be in a hassle. We should do it a other way around. Ask them what they want - if you - belly, say forget it. If duration & coming sites, say let I talk about it.

P How about about OS remaining of sites?

K I would love that to last as a major concession - not during a mtg. They should then send Allen back over w/ a number of questions we need. I shouldn't spend more than a week. He will also want to tie you down to a figure, & a contract not to make an overall prog. That you can't do.

P How about Syria

K If he willing to go for a Syrian one, we can avoid a comp. proposal. If not I would say we have to go to Geneva - don't tell him we would put forward a comp. proposal, but just say



we could consult w/ them early, but keep open options.

My visit w/ SFRC was an eye opener. They were very disappointed & every few sentences was a comment about the success of your trip.

I Cabinet has said would stick w/ March position unless \leq small changes. 1st day would be very tough. say no sense talking now. Robin seems not that good. He is frustrated & shy, but not all that tough.

On air, we have a really good page paper. The 2.6 figure is strong. W/ 1.5 they can meet with purchases & have GDP growth of 4%. I think we should keep them on a tight leash & give 1 bid if they come across. If they don't.

P Key theme to level of this year

K Right

O on G-T, & T have decided they won't do anything till July 5.

P That our hardest prob. We must plot a strategy after Robin to get it thru House.

K I think we could line up release of FMS & cut off grant.

P There were 2 comments - other day - Brownfield would try limit

K I was it hopeless. I was maybe

P The other was upon ~~the~~ put

K We can't get movement on refugees - only can give them aid.

P Let's look at putting a refugee package together w/ a FMS package. Have your people do it.

K The Cyprus parties will meet again in July. That will be a last unless we bring pressure on C.T, & we can't do that w/o movement on aid. We could stand some minor clause by next spring. If we could get a bid then in July you could



really put a heat on Dorell.

You know you saw Edvardson on Wed. He's tough little guy who runs a most substantial regime in E. U.S.

P That's not a migration

K Dorell is tough; outside he's tough w/ Soviets. Show him as much consideration as possible.

We are having a big fight on M.F.N. for Romania. I wouldn't raise this 1st. If he does, tell him it's his domestic issue & you could just as soon leave it to them. There are 2 parts just like w/ Sov: Cong wants us to say we need assurances that they won't do. They will tell us what their practice is. They won't give in on migration. That's only a part for them in yielding to pressure. At the end you could tell him your facts. But if he gives in when Sovs refused, he can be accused of selling out. But he wants M.F.N.

Emigration is down to about 60/mo. It has been as high as 300/mo. It may actually be that & Sovs are having stories of life in E.

On M.F.N., anything you say will get to the Arabs.

On P.K.O., you can tell him that sooner or later we have to talk to P.K.O.

On C.S.C.E., he will urge for permanent system - we don't want it & neither do Sovs.

If he wants to he can put in an unbelievable reception for you.

P Dorell speaks English

K No. He is a little, cocky guy. He's very nice. Know, you can say if N.K. says S.K., we willing to talk to them, but not if a chance of war. You could say you want to have some type relationship w/ him as N has. You could say you think considering going to Romania following C.S.C.E. & what Dorell think.

P I see Sovs have made C.S.C.E. concessions.

R They did on Budget I and earlier they gave us 250 km, say from 180 km. I have let Callaghan & Groucher know this, if it works, we would have camp about 23:00 I have said 2 1/2 days of food with - larger than that w/o accomplishments would be bad - ~~it~~ it will get mess eating here anyway. You should see Guy - maybe company S&H

George wants to meet me. MIE will be transmitting for them - I plan to see him on way there, before my shuttle. If so, maybe you should make a speech on MIE before I see George

On paper, we getting into a disagreement w/ Fa. They want to turn it into a super camp which deals w/ everything we want & revised materials + equipment) other than energy just to monitor; Fa wants them integrated. We will try to break Fa in IFA.

On oil prices, there no issue now. We have heard nothing about price rise. Saudis thinking they may just want to hold the line. You know what a Saudi saying. Simon is thinking he can bring prices down. Only leverage we have is oil equip - and that would be self defeating.

